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HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION

Edited by
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Racism in the 21st Century

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Many of the world’s problems are human made, including racism. Suffice it to say that racism is a long-standing problem—despite the tremendous scholarly investigation for at least the last 60 years. With so much attention, why then have researchers been unable to cure this problem? Simply put, racism is multiply determined. Some causes of racism predict an unwillingness to desire a cure or change. Other models of racism predict a lack of awareness of that racism—thereby avoiding change. Still other models and associated data suggest that racist beliefs are simply well engrained, making it difficult to change those beliefs even if one wants to. Because of these disparate reasons, once one attempts to produce some understanding of a complex behavior like racism, one is also left with the realization that we as a science are far from any real answer.

This chapter explores racism as it is occurring today. In the first section, racism is defined and the focus of this chapter is detailed. The second section presents current manifestations of racism. The third section describes the various models describing racism. Finally, potential solutions are described. When possible, each section highlights areas where research appears to lag behind the theories. The focus of this book precludes extensive discussion of many of the associated theories. For instance, this volume includes chapters on stereotype threat and the common ingroup identity model. Both of those chapters are covered by their original authors (Aronson and Gaertner, respectively). It seems prudent to avoid extensive review of those topics given their treatment by those authors in this volume.

DEFINING RACISM

Jones (1997) defined racism as a special form of prejudice. According to Jones, prejudice is the “positive or negative attitude, judgment, or feeling about a person that is generalized from attitudes or beliefs held about the group to which the person belong” (p. 10). Racism, however, adds to prejudice the following constructs.

First, the basis of group characteristics is assumed to rest on biology—race is a biological construct. Second, racism has, as a necessary premise, the superiority of one’s own race. Third, racism rationalizes institutional and culture practices that formalize the hierarchical domination of one racial group over another. (p. 11, italics in original)

Jones’s definition brings together the concepts of perceived biological differences and apparent forms of competition and system justification, as well as feelings of self-superiority. Thus, the definition is broad enough that it encompasses most of the modern theories regarding racism.

RACISM AND ETHNICITY

The inclusion of a biological construct in the definition of racism provides room for expansion. Most geneticists and anthropologists agree that race is not a true biological construct (Smedley & Smedley, 2005). At the same time, social psychologists have long distinguished reality from the perceptions of reality. Race is a clear social and political construct, predictive of behavior and therefore...
worthy of scientific study. In a telephone survey of 600 respondents (Jayaratne et al., 2006), 27% of people reported that genetic influences accounted for some or most race differences across traits. Thus, “[r]ace, as people live and understand it, inhabits a dimension of reality that transcends biology and cannot be reduced to genes, chromosomes, or even phenotypes” (Smedley, 2006, p. 180). Because race as a biological construct is poorly defined, one is left with a much more ambiguous construct than first considered. What are layperson descriptions of race? If race does not exist as a biological construct, is it distinct from ethnicity?

This distinction between racism and ethnic discrimination, however, takes on added meaning in our new millennium. Using a layperson understanding of racism, many forms of racism are actually ethnic prejudice (Jayaratne et al., 2006). That only leads to a potentially diversionary discussion. Is it productive to distinguish racism as a biological construct from ethnicity as a cultural construct during discussions of racism (Helms & Telleyrand, 1997)? Within the context of racism and one chapter, those types of distinctions are probably less than helpful. Many of the pressing issues in the United States, for example, revolve around immigration from Mexico and Latin America and attitudes toward Arabs. In the historical categorization scheme of race, Latinos are probably most often classified as “Caucasian,” and should therefore be considered part of the ingroup as far as most Whites are concerned. There has been little empirical research regarding the connections between racism and attitudes toward immigrants. Nevertheless, there is enough evidence to suggest that occasionally, ethnic prejudice is driving the debate regarding immigration. Accordingly, it is difficult to accurately discern what is driving that political debate. In addition, it is open to empirical test to see if people currently distinguish race from ethnicity. Thus, given the ways in which people think about race and ethnicity and the emerging issues in the United States, the two are treated similarly here. The issues are merged despite the realization that layperson distinctions between race and ethnicity might distinguish the types or quality of the associated stereotypes and prejudice.

**IS RACISM STILL A PROBLEM?**

It seems obvious that racism is alive and well—but also eroding (Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000). Any summary judgments like that, however, must be supported by data. Presented next are some basic indicators of race-based disparities, prejudices, and atrocities. The focus is on the current conditions in the United States, but some world data are also presented. One recognized problem with documenting the existence of racism, however, is the simple fact that many people lie about their attitudes. In fact, the recent explosion of implicit measures of racism (see Fazio & Olsen, 2003, for one review) was predicated partially on the realization that social desirability concerns cloud many self-report measures of racism. The other problem with documenting racism is that racism often goes unnoticed. Racism can influence all facets of life, yet it is hard to specifically identify as it is occurring (Bonilla-Silva, 2001). For instance, one can document the underrepresentation of minorities among elected and appointed officials (Bonilla-Silva, 2001, p. 101), but also find it virtually impossible to identify any specific instance of racism. For all these reasons, the first section focuses on basic indexes of racial disparities. Later sections identify the subtle ways in which prejudice is expressed.

**DOES RACE PREDICT QUALITY OF LIFE?**

One way to determine if racism still exists is to document any differences in quality of life across groups. Income is the easiest to document. The Census Bureau’s most recent data (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Lee, 2006) show that in 2005, the median income for White non-Hispanics was $50,784, whereas the median income for Blacks was $30,858, and $35,967 for Hispanics. Thus, Blacks and Hispanics earn 61% and 71% of what Whites do, respectively. In contrast, the median income for Asians was $61,094, suggesting that more than just racism predicts income. Overall, these numbers differed little from 2004 and are only marginally better than in 1995. Thus, can race or ethnicity be
a valid predictor of how much one earns? Yes. Is this a measure of racism or discrimination? It is certainly one measure, but income encompasses more than just racism in the workplace. Educational attainment is one predictor of income.

Regarding educational attainment, the U.S. Census Bureau (2005) reported that 91.5% of Whites between the ages of 20 and 24 have obtained a high school diploma. In contrast, only 82.5% of Blacks and 66.8% of Hispanics those same ages earned a high school diploma. Thus, maybe income is only a logical consequence of differential educational attainment. This begs the next question: Can we identify differences in the quality of the schools that Latinos, Blacks, and Whites attend, and can that predict differential educational paths? For example, can the makeup of the schools predict how much funding per student that school receives? Questions like this only highlight a never-ending cycle of issues. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that yes, race predicts quality of life in America, at least as quality of life is defined in the traditional American ways, which are income and education.

RACISM IN THE WORKPLACE

One obvious predictor of differential income across racial groups is workplace discrimination. Identifying workplace discrimination, however, is particularly difficult. One central goal within social psychology has been to document the implicit biases people have and the subtle ways in which people discriminate. Those efforts are particularly needed in workplace environments where individuals have two reasons to hide their racism. First, as with most situations, it is socially unacceptable to express one’s racist attitudes. Just as important, there are legal consequences for using race inappropriately in the workforce. Those increased motives make identifying workplace discrimination more difficult than usual.

Many treatments of workplace discrimination start out with the classic research by Word, Zanna, and Cooper (1974). Across two studies, Word et al. demonstrated that Black applicants are treated differently than White applicants (less eye contact, less interview time, etc.). Just as important, those differences translate into poorer interview performances later by Black and White interviewees. In effect, self-fulfilling prophecies produced poorer performance by Blacks in the interview situation. Because of the difficult nature of the study, true replications are hard to identify. Nevertheless, conceptually, the more critical components are readily replicated. Across at least three studies, data show that targets of racism are often good judges of the degree to which another person is racist or sexist (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; McConnell & Leibold, 2001). For example, McConnell and Leibold (2001) demonstrated a positive relationship between explicit measures of prejudice and experimenters’ evaluations of biased interactions with participants ($r = .33, p < .05$). Participants who reported favoring Whites over Blacks on an implicit measure of racism were rated as interacting more positively with a White experimenter than with a Black experimenter by the experimenters themselves. Thus, the experimenters who interacted with the prejudiced participants were able to identify prejudiced reactions from the participants. The multiple studies showing this effect demonstrate that this is a consistent phenomenon.

If people can identify racist attitudes in others, it must impact their overall job performance. Unfortunately, there is little research on this effect in the workplace. The existent research is often self-report evidence of discrimination, using samples with particularly low return rates. It seems that regarding the workforce, one is left to assume that the college students used in most of the published research are many of the same individuals who later become employees and managers.

Structural factors can also impact overall performance beyond any personal levels of racism or prejudice. For example, Niemann-Flores and Dovidio (1998) showed that in academic settings, minorities, and especially solo minorities, felt particularly stigmatized and less satisfied than their White counterparts. Being a solo minority produces a feeling of tokenism that can highlight group membership, which can then impair on-the-job performance. One test of that most specific hypothesis was offered by Roberson, Deitch, Brief, and Block (2003). Roberson et al. surveyed 166 African
American managers. As predicted, solo managers felt greater stereotype threat than did other managers. Here, stereotype threat was measured rather than manipulated. A sample item included “Some people feel I have less ability because of my race” (p. 181). The results were disturbing in that greater stereotype threat also predicted discounting workplace feedback. Managers who felt greater stereotype threat tended to dismiss feedback and doubted its accuracy and worried more about the motivations for the feedback.

**Cultural Indicators of Quality of Life**

In the modern world of “modern racism” (McConahay, 1986), the political issues have changed. Busing, school desegregation, and related topics are still relevant. In addition, new issues have taken hold and have sometimes taken the spotlight. Bilingual education, voting rights acts, and immigration are often the visible issues. These issues correlate with the changing demographics in the United States. Latinos are now the largest ethnic minority in the country. As groups become large enough to be perceived as a threat (Ruddell & Urbina, 2004), be it cultural or economic (Zárate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004), they become more salient targets of prejudice.

For instance, in the past few years, 30 states have adopted English as their official language (U.S. English Incorporated, 2008). Several more states have gone a step further, implementing specific English-on-the-job laws. A number of legal cases suggest that individuals feel excluded, ostracized, or offended when others in their work environment communicate with one another in a language other than English (*Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.*, 1994; *Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.*, 1987). The common theme running through these cases is that individuals were speaking Spanish, which offended others. In some cases, the persons speaking Spanish were having private conversations over lunch, yet others were bothered. Given the changing demographics and increased Latino presence in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007), it is expected that there will be a growing backlash against Latino immigrants.

The reaction toward the growing Latino population is consistent with other data supporting a national threat hypothesis. Ruddell and Urbina (2004) investigated incarceration rates across 140 nations. They investigated the relation between population heterogeneity and imprisonment rates across the countries. As nations become more diverse, they imprison a larger proportion of their population and are more likely to utilize the death penalty. Ruddell and Urbina utilized a measure of heterogeneity that also included ethnicity and religion, which further supports the argument that racism should be broadly defined. The underlying idea is that people often purport to enjoy diversity and new cultures, but only until they perceive that group to be a threat. Once a group becomes large enough, the group is viewed as a threat and others react in prejudiced fashions.

Disentangling well-meaning motives from racist motives in political decision making can be difficult. For instance, social psychologists seem to associate conservatism with racism, especially regarding attitudes toward affirmative action, and that probably unfairly characterizes a number of well-meaning individuals and their motives (cf. Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2005; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002). Nevertheless, racism and conservatism are often confused. For instance, in 2004, Arizona passed Proposition 200, a state referendum designed to force proof of citizenship to register to vote. One can interpret that vote in any number of ways, many of which are nonracist. One thing is clear, however. The group that supported that referendum was partially directed by avowed racial separatists (the Protect Arizona Now initiative), clouding the issue tremendously. Thus, although some of the new issues surrounding immigration and politics are no doubt driven by well-meaning ideological differences, as with prior political issues, they might also reflect how racism is expressed in the modern world.
Health and Stress

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services details the many ways in which racial disparities are reflected in our health standards (National Center for Health Statistics, 2004). The effects of racism and the associated stress are evident early on (Giscombe & Lobel, 2005) and continue through the life span. The effects are seen in the mortality rates, incarceration rates, physical and mental health, health treatment options, and in seemingly every meaningful marker of health. It is virtually impossible to disentangle socioeconomic status from race in understanding health outcomes. One must also argue that those socioeconomic factors are indicators of racism in addition to predicting negative health outcomes. Nevertheless, the literature is clear that “the consistency of the finding that discrimination is associated with higher rates of disease is quite robust” (Williams, Neighbors, & Jackson, 2003, p. 202).

How might racism affect health? One avenue is through the added stress associated with dealing with racist behavior. Brondolo, Rieppi, Kelly, and Gerin (2003) reviewed the existing literature testing the explicit links among racism, blood pressure, and hypertension. They reported that while the evidence testing the link between racism and measures of blood pressure and hypertension is mixed, the lab evidence is clear. They concluded from their review that “acute exposure to racism is associated with increases in cardiovascular activation. In addition, past exposure to racism may influence current” reactions to stressors as well (p. 61). Future research will need to identify the specific mechanisms beyond cardiovascular response that are negatively influenced by racism.

Implicit Prejudice

Possibly the most extensive evidence of prejudice has been developed by social cognitive researchers investigating implicit prejudice (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Implicit attitudes are those attitudes that are either below conscious awareness or well practiced and therefore automatic. Implicit measures of attitudes are those measures that do not directly ask for the desired response. Rather, the measures are either indirect or subtle and prejudice is inferred. There are multiple motives for understanding implicit attitudes and implicit measures. One motive is purely theoretical. What is the structure of attitudes? Are they unidimensional (meaning that implicit attitudes should always correlate with explicit attitudes) or are they multifaceted? Are people even aware of their racist attitudes? What type of attitude best predicts discrimination? The second reason is equally important. Social desirability concerns obviously influence overt responses to prejudice measures. Thus, although it is fair to say that prejudice is eroding, it is also fair to say that some apparent reduction in prejudice is because participants consciously mask their true attitudes. It is no longer socially acceptable to express one’s racist attitudes, and therein lies one motivation for developing implicit measures of prejudice.

The ways in which racism are measured have gone through a clear theoretical progression. Some of the first subtle measures included the Modern Racism measures (McConahay, 1986; McConahay & Hough, 1976). The measures were based on the recognition that many persons publicly reject or otherwise disavow themselves of traditionally racist beliefs. According to this type of model, racism is expressed symbolically (Sears, 1988) or indirectly through the endorsement of political and social attitudes that preserve racial inequalities.

More recently, however, the field has seen an explosion of even more subtle implicit measures of prejudice. One can identify any number of implicit measures, the most famous of which has been the Implicit Associations Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998). The IAT measures the automatic or underlying associations between group labels (or faces, names, and other symbols of a group) with positive or negative evaluations. For example, Experiment 3 of Greenwald et al. (1998) asked participants to pair Black and White faces with positive and negative words. Participants are asked to respond to two sets of tasks. Often, they are asked to distinguish positive and negative words on one task, and Black and White faces on a supposedly unrelated but interlaced task. Thus, participants
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are required to respond with one hand to White and good, and the other hand to Black and bad (or vice versa). Bias is interpreted as the differential speed to respond with the same hand (associate) to the two race terms with positive or negative terms. In Greenwald et al., participants were clearly faster at associating White with positive than Black with positive. Moreover, their implicit responses were unrelated to their responses on explicit measures of prejudice. The IAT is impressive because it seems one can get the effect even if one warns the participants of what it measures. Moreover, responses show adequate reliability and validity (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001).

The IAT builds on previous literature using semantic priming methodologies to identify automatically activated attitudes (e.g., Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Zárate & Smith, 1990). It also reflects a developing theoretical perspective that suggests one can utilize well-practiced processes to identify tendencies participants might otherwise avoid expressing. Thus, participants often seem aware that prejudice is being measured. They are unaware of the fact that small response speed differences (e.g., 40 msec) can demonstrate racial bias with predictive utility. For instance, McConnell and Leibold (2001) demonstrated that more bias on an IAT predicted more negative interactions with a Black experimenter and more negative responses on an explicit measure of prejudice. The IAT identifies bias beyond any cultural-level associations between the color white and good versus the color black and bad (Smith-McAllen, Johnson, Dovidio, & Pearson, 2006). The effect occurs even if one controls for differential familiarity with Whites versus Blacks (Dasgupta et al., 2000). The explosive interest in the IAT as a methodological tool has earned some critical responses (cf. Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, & Christie, 2006; Olson & Fazio, 2004), but overall, the IAT has proven to be a valuable tool in understanding or identifying racism. Individuals consistently express more prejudice via the IAT than they do with more explicit measures of prejudice.

Implicit measures like the IAT are helpful in that they help identify many of the subtle ways that people stereotype others but are unable or unwilling to express. From a layperson's perspective, however, the measures are sometimes arcane. How can a few milliseconds actually predict later behavior? Towles-Schwen and Fazio (2006) demonstrated the predictive effects of implicit measures of racism. The participants of interest were students randomly paired in the dorms with either same-race or other-race living mates. The implicit measure of racism was given at the start of the semester. The main measure was if the participants were still living together at the end of the year. Participants were presented with photographs of Black, White, Asian, and Latino targets. The photos were used as primes within an evaluative judgment task. Following each face, participants were asked to respond to various positive and negative traits. Participants were asked to identify if each word was positive or negative, irrespective of the prime face. The relative degree to which the various faces facilitated responses to positive versus negative words served as the implicit measure. As expected, the best predictor of relationship status after the year was the implicit measure. Participants who demonstrated the greatest ingroup bias were the participants least likely to still be living with their other-race roommates.

The interest in the IAT coincides with a larger theoretical movement to identify multiple subtle or implicit ways in which racism is expressed. Many of these other measures are also more implicit in the sense that participants appear completely unaware of how racism is being measured or even that racism is being measured at all. One notable example is the stereotypic explanatory bias (SEB; Sekaquaptewa, Espinoza, Thompson, Vargas, & von Hippel (2003). The SEB occurs when individuals explain away or justify behavior when the behavior is inconsistent with their stereotype. Thus, if one assumes that all Latinos are lazy, for instance, one is more likely to explain why a particular Latino is not lazy than explain why a different Latino is lazy. The beauty of the methodology is that people appear unaware of how or when they produce the effect. This makes the measure particularly implicit. Sekaquaptewa et al. (2003) demonstrated that the tendency to explain Black-inconsistent events predicts more negative interactions with a Black partner. It is interesting to note that the SEB did not correlate with an IAT measure. This dissociation suggests that not all implicit measures are tapping into the same process. This type of dissociation is being investigated to fully disentangle the various processes.
Etnic Cleansing

Probably the most compelling reason to merge together ethnic discrimination and racism is ethnic cleansing. Reports of ethnic cleansing continue, despite the horrible memory of the Nazi Holocaust. In Kosovo, Kosovar Albanians have been the victims of ethnic cleansing at the hands of Serbian forces. The very nature of the atrocities precludes accurate reports regarding the numbers of victims. The U.S. State Department reports that between 6,000 and 11,000 Albanians were killed. The atrocities do not stop there. Over 1.5 million Albanians were forcibly expelled from their homes, in multiple cities women were systematically raped, and thousands of homes were destroyed (U.S. State Department, 1999). Human Rights Watch (2006) described similar ethnic cleansing in West Dafur between two ethnically similar groups. The current fighting in Iraq between Sunni and Shiite Muslims is another example of ethnic cleansing. Thus, some of the worst forms of racial prejudice have been between ethnically similar groups. The one similarity among all of these conflicts is the correlation between small ethnic differences and religious differences. Thus, one argument is that researchers studying racism might attend more to religious prejudice as well. I do not know of any data supporting this, but it appears that people are more willing to express their religious prejudices than their racial prejudices. More important, it seems as if they are more willing to act on those beliefs. Thus, an analysis of the truly horrendous group conflicts suggests that too little attention has been paid to religious conflicts.

What Drives Racism?

Given the complex nature of racism and the multifaceted way it is expressed, it should not be surprising that there are any number of theories that predict racism. Each model or predictor has its own predictive utility. As with many predictors of any human behavior, however, most model building appears to have progressed with little attention to alternative models. Thus, although one can find tremendous evidence in support of any one model, one is left searching for answers regarding when each model is most predictive (Greenwald, Pratkanis, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1986). Nevertheless, the types of theories one can bring to bear on racism are impressive.

Regarding the types of theories being tested, they fit well with Jones’s definition of racism. In particular, most models appear based on essentialism, self-concepts, economic competition, and system-justifying motives. The models are diverse in origin and are rarely mutually exclusive. It also seems that some types of models can support or otherwise produce other effects, but at this stage, it is difficult to accurately determine what model drives what. Outlined next are a sampling of the diverse approaches toward understanding racism.

Essentialism

Jones’s definition of racism includes a biological component that we suspect might drive many racist attitudes. Racist attitudes are presumed to derive from basic genetic differences between groups. Within an essentialist framework, differences between groups “are taken to represent human types, specifying that an individual is fundamentally a certain sort of person. Racism attempts to fix social groups in terms of essential, quasi-natural properties” (Verkuyten, 2003, p. 371). Thus, people perceive an essence or coherent structure underlying the different groups. Similarly, but within a different theoretical framework, Yzerbyt, Rocher, and Schadron (1997) contended that certain large social categories, like race, are perceived of as natural kinds that produce more group entitativity. Because these differences are fundamental properties of the person and the group to which they belong, they are also conceived of as natural and unavoidable. Because they are natural and unavoidable, more stable dispositional inferences are drawn regarding the behaviors of the person (Sekaquaptewa et al., 2003). Consistent with theorizing by Jayaratne et al. (2006), lay theories of essentialism are best
characterized as “organized belief structures” (p. 79) that reflect a conceptualized framework for understanding group differences.

On an intuitive basis, a clear understanding of an essentialist approach seems paramount in understanding how people think about race. Nevertheless, there is surprisingly little empirical research on the topic. Jayaratne et al. (2006) showed that the more White participants endorsed a genetic model to explain race differences, the more bothered they would be if their son or daughter dated an African American. This effect held for more traditional measures (modern racism) of racism as well.

Haslam and colleagues (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002) developed a research program investigating essentialism and stereotyping. The basic idea rests on work by Levy, Stroessner, and Dweck on implicit person theories. Levy et al. (1998) found that some individuals they labeled entity theorists make more stereotypic judgments of others than those they labeled incremental theorists. Entity theorists believe that people change little over time and are the way they are because of human nature. Consistent with that general framework, Bastian and Haslam (2006) showed that the more one adheres to an essentialist framework, the more one endorses group differences. This endorsement was predicted after controlling for other forms of racism. Thus, essentialist beliefs appear to contribute unique variance to the predictability of stereotyping and prejudice. This general idea seems central to many definitions of racism and is an exciting new direction in racism research.

**Social Identity Theory**

Much of the modern social psychological theorizing has derived from social identity theory (SIT) as proposed by Tajfel and Turner (1986). SIT states that individuals attempt to achieve a positive social identity, and that this is accomplished partly through positive comparisons between the ingroup and relevant outgroups. The model includes both motivational and cognitive components. On the motivational side, people are theorized to desire a positive self-esteem. They do this by derogating relevant outgroups to make the ingroup appear more positive.

The cognitive component entails the process through which perceptions are driven by group memberships. Thus, the mere identification of differential group memberships is sufficient to produce ingroup favoritism. SIT predicts then, that the ability to differentiate groups is enough to produce prejudice. As such, person categorization has become one of the primary issues in social cognition. If true, this portends a never-ending racism in this country. Previous immigrant groups, for instance, assimilated relatively quickly, as least as compared to Blacks and Latinos. In the early 1900s, the immigrant groups were often from different European countries. Those groups provide fewer perceptual differences between the groups than do Europeans and most Latinos, African Americans, and Asians. The ability to differentiate the groups, then, should lead to a continued racism toward ethnic minorities. This general approach has dominated modern social psychology. Outlined next are some ramifications of the general approach.

**Social Categorization**

Two of the most influential models in person perception, Brewer’s (1988) dual-process model of impression formation and Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum model, are parallel and serial process models, respectively. The ways in which person and group representations interact can have important consequences for stereotype change processes, yet this issue is somewhat understudied.

Fiske and Neuberg (1990) stated that
Within the model, the first premise is that category-based processes “have priority over attribute-based processes” (p. 2). Depending on the target fit with any preexisting categories, perceiver motivation, and other social factors, the perceiver either stops at the categorical level, or proceeds to make attribute-based (which we interpret as person-based) inferences.

Brewer (1988) stated that “the primary distinction drawn in the model is that between processing states that are category-based and processing that is person-based (personalized). The two types of processing result in different representations of the same social information” (p. 5). This model is also more clearly a dual-process model (see Livingston & Brewer, 2002). In fact, at some levels, person identification is the primary process involved (Brewer, 1988, p. 5).

The common theme running through these highly influential models is the idea that the initial categorization should predict the types of inferences made about the person. To that end, the data strongly support that basic hypothesis. Dovidio et al. (1986) were the first to demonstrate this basic construct. Participants were presented with a series of race categories (Black, White) as primes. Following each prime, a test word was presented—some of which were stereotypic traits. Participants responded faster to the stereotypic terms when they matched the category label. Included in the terms were positive and negative traits as well. As predicted, participants also demonstrated an evaluative bias. Black primes produced faster responses to negative terms, and White primes produced faster responses to positive terms.

Zárate and Smith (1990) demonstrated a similar effect, but with pictures. In the main study of interest, they demonstrated that the faster White participants categorized targets by race, the more likely they were to ascribe race-stereotypic terms to others. Finally, Stroessner (1996) showed that African Americans are categorized faster as Black than White Americans are categorized as White. If speed of categorization predicts the degree of stereotyping, and Blacks are categorized fastest by race, it suggests that Blacks are much more likely to be stereotyped by race than are Whites.

Our own work on this topic suggests also that race- and person-based perception are antagonistic processes (Sanders, McClure & Zárate, 2004; Zárate, Sanders, & Garza, 2000). We have used visual field paradigms whereby faces are presented to either the left or right visual field. The information is then processed first by the contralateral hemisphere. Zárate et al. (2000) produced a series of related findings. One of the primary findings is that person and group information are processed differently. Ingroup and outgroup faces act as primes for positive and negative descriptors (respectively) only when presented to the left hemisphere. People demonstrate memory for the specific faces only in the right hemisphere. Current work is investigating the hypothesis that perceiving a person via group-based features inhibits the ability to perceive them as individuals. Later work has further delineated the neurocognitive underpinnings of social perception, all of which is reviewed elsewhere in this volume.

**INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE VARIABLES**

The social cognitive research cited earlier attempts to delineate the normal processes associated with stereotyping and prejudice. The underlying idea is that stereotyping and prejudice are normal by-products of our need to comprehend and interact with the social environment. In contrast to that approach are multiple types of individual difference factors that highlight seemingly motivational approaches to stereotyping and prejudice. Prejudice is no longer considered a normal by-product, but is something that is desired as a way to justify the status quo or to otherwise explain the current situation. Thus, stereotyping and prejudice are considered normal only in that most people hold some degree of motivation to justify the status quo. Prejudice is not, however, a necessarily expected
outcome. The two models that have dominated the recent research domain are social dominance orientation and system justification approaches. Each is briefly outlined here.

One of the more influential theories has been social dominance orientation. Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, and Levin (2004) conceptualized social dominance theory as a structural and psychological framework that identifies the ways in which societies develop group-based oppression strategies. Within this framework, racism is just one of the ways that people discriminate other groups to enhance their own group standing. Wealth is allocated to the powerful and actively kept from the less powerful groups. Within the theory is social dominance orientation, which is an active attempt to promote racism by the dominant group to enhance their overall standing. The individual difference factor derives from one’s desire to enhance the group-based hierarchy. The degree to which people accept and promote the group-based hierarchy reflects their overall prejudice levels and reflects their overall orientation.

Similarly, the system justification approach (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005) posits that people develop an ideology or understanding of the world that supports the current status quo. According to the theory, people are motivated to justify the current situation or cultural system. One interesting aspect of the theory is that the motivation comes from disadvantaged groups as much as from individuals from advantaged groups. One way this occurs is to develop victim-enhancing stereotypes. Thus, disadvantaged ethnic groups often buy into statements such as “We may not be rich, but we are warm and happy” (Jost et al., 2005).

**Summary**

How do the various theories work together to produce the types of racism one sees at all levels of society? The nature of the models predicts few integrative programs of research. Thus, one can find studies whereby only those high in social dominance orientation, for example, produce particular implicit stereotyping effects consistent with the categorization view, but beyond that, the models appear to work in relative isolation. If one believes that racism is indeed multiply determined, however, this relative isolation makes perfect sense. I suspect that researchers will start to integrate the various models, particularly as we learn more about layperson theories of essentialism.

**Solutions**

When I am lecturing on racism, students sometimes ask me when I believe racism will stop. In my more pessimistic moments, I respond with “When Martians attack.” My response reflects some well-known theories about racism (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). In this section, methods of combating racism are discussed. When possible, I focus on studies that have used race-based experimental groups. As already discussed, racism is possibly distinct from other forms of prejudice for a number of reasons. In particular, the essentialism discussed previously may provide more stable or otherwise distinct forms of prejudice that go beyond school affiliation or minimal group situations. Minimal group situations or school or political affiliation manipulations, however, provide still other problems. The most salient feature distinguishing the minimal group situation from race is the degree to which participants identify with the minimal group versus their own ethnic group. Degree of identification with the group is an important variable in intergroup interactions (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). Another important distinction between minimal groups or school affiliations versus ethnic groups is the degree to which the group memberships are permeable (Ellemers, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish, & Hodge, 1996). Race, unlike minimal groups or even sports affiliations, is nonpermeable. One can choose to highlight racial identity, or even ignore it, but one cannot change the group, nor presume others will ignore the grouping. Because of the nonpermeable and salient nature of ethnic relationships, generalizations from minimal groups may prove misleading.
Regarding the targets of discrimination, what options do people have in reactions to racism? The options can be divided along personal reactions and group reactions. Regarding personal reactions, one can confirm the stereotype or confront the stereotype. One can also ignore the stereotype, which is probably rather common but also a relatively unstudied option (Crosby, 1984).

Group-level actions take on a different approach. With group-level actions, particular individuals or even actions are not necessary. Rather, the group acts as a collective to form a group identity or to combat institutional forms of racism. Specific people or racist actions are not always central. Regarding group actions, one can legally protest or form a group identity. One can also choose to highlight an assimilation view of intergroup relations, or a multicultural view of intergroup reactions (Berry, 1984). Those approaches are discussed last.

**Stereotype Confirmation**

This volume contains a chapter on stereotype threat processes (Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995) that precludes extensive coverage in this chapter. Nevertheless, the importance of the effect warrants some discussion of the associated research. One way in which stereotypes are inadvertently confirmed is via stereotype threat, which occurs when a known stereotype influences stereotype-relevant task performance. A typical measure is to provide various Graduate Record Exam type questions to African Americans. The typical manipulation is to suggest to the students that the test measures intellectual performance or is unrelated to intellectual ability. When told it measures intellectual performance, students often perform worse. One common stereotype is that African Americans lack the same intellectual ability as Whites. Because of that, the performance inadvertently supports the very stereotype most people find offensive. The stereotype then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The effect is particularly interesting given the fact that at least for gender stereotypes (Schmader, 2002), the more one identifies with the group, the more likely one is to confirm the stereotype. This becomes paradoxical in nature in that the more one opposes the stereotype, the more likely one is to support it.

Stereotypes are confirmed in a number of different ways, although as with other areas reviewed in this chapter, not all areas of research appear to attempt to disentangle when one process might predict behavior better than other processes. Wheeler and Petty (2001), however, disentangle ideomotor processes from stereotype threat processes regarding stereotype confirmation effects. Basically, simply activating stereotypes can then produce subsequent behavior in ways consistent with that general stereotype.

Iodemotor processes are reflected as behavioral priming effects. They are proposed to follow automatically once primed and without conscious awareness. They result from a simple semantic association between a stereotype and the associated behaviors. Because stereotypes are often associated with related behaviors, activation of the stereotype activates that behavior, making it more likely to be performed.

**Confrontational Approaches**

Either purposefully or nonconsciously supporting the stereotypes seems like a poor option given the fact that many if not most stereotypes are negative in character (Rothbart & Park, 1986). The clearest option, then, is to protest racism. That form of protest can also take multiple forms. Neither option studied, however, appears ideal.

In a particularly important study by Kaiser and Miller (2001), participants rated an African American male as more “hypersensitive, emotional, argumentative, irritating, trouble making, and complaining” when he attributed his failure on a test to discrimination rather than to the quality of his answers or to the difficulty of the test. This was found regardless of how much discrimination the participants were told the person actually faced. Most important, the study showed that the negative evaluation was not due to simply not taking blame for the failure. When the attribution
was made to the difficulty of the test, also an external factor, the target was not rated negatively as when he attributed his failure to discrimination. Thus, the negative evaluations derived purely from identifying a racist situation.

In a later study, Kaiser and Miller (2003) further tested their hypothesis by allowing the participants to see the discrimination firsthand. In this study participants were told that they were going to be aiding in the evaluation of an employment interviewing process. They were handed the interviewer’s notes where the interviewer expressed high, moderate, or low discriminatory comments, and were told that the interviewee attributed his failure to get the job to either discrimination, interview skills, or competition for the job. As in the first study, participants were rated as more hypersensitive, emotional, complaining, and so on, when they attributed their job rejection to discrimination, regardless of the degree of racism that the interviewer expressed in his or her comments. This study examined a more realistic setting in which discrimination may occur and allowed participants to directly witness the discrimination in the interviewers’ notes. Despite the evidence, participants still evaluated the victim negatively when he attributed his job rejection to discrimination. Later work by Kaiser and colleagues (Kaiser, Dyrenforth, & Hagiwara, 2006) shows that individuals high in system-justifying belief ideologies are particularly punitive toward the victims of racism.

Thus, the consequences for complaining are real. The victims are derogated and seen negatively—even by observers who are privy to the racist information. It would be one thing for people to react negatively at being labeled a racist, but another for a casual observer to also react negatively toward the victim of racism. This is striking given the supposed social rules against expressing prejudice. One argument is that although openly expressing prejudice is against the social norms, there is a stronger social norm against identifying a racist act. This is particularly interesting in light of the already cited studies showing that perceivers can in fact accurately identify racist individuals.

A more confrontational form of protest against racism is to directly confront racist comments (Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006). What are the effects of directly labeling behaviors as racist immediately after those behaviors occur in a conversation? The potential effects are tremendous. Aversive racism research demonstrates that people desire to be egalitarian (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). Aversive racism research also suggests that people are occasionally forced to reconcile their own racist attitudes with their desire to be egalitarian, and that this generally produces discomfort. In addition, given the strong social norms against racism, challenging individuals might also produce a sense of social challenge as opposed to just interpersonal challenge (assuming the victim is not then derogated by others in the conversation). The final avenue of change is that confrontations may make individuals more wary of future conversations (which, unfortunately, may simply increase racism), meaning there will be even less long-term change. Thus, for many reasons, openly challenging racist comments might very well prove to have long-term benefits.

Across three studies, Czopp et al. (2006) led participants to say sentences that could be easily construed as racist. Confederates then challenged those comments. The less threatening challenges produced more negative self-directed affect among the participants, which then reduced subsequent stereotyping. This effect was similar across Black and White confederates (confronters), suggesting that this effect can be readily used by minorities as well. Finally, confrontations also produced more negative evaluations of the confronter. Czopp et al. also reported contradictory evidence that White confronters can be more persuasive than Black confronters, and future research will need to empirically disentangle those divergent findings.

The problem with this methodology is reflected in how racist attitudes are usually expressed. The implicit social cognition measures are based on the realization that people rarely openly express their racist attitudes. Rather, racism is often expressed in very subtle forms. If one is to believe the studies by Dovidio et al. (2002), Fazio et al. (1995), and McConnell and Liebold (2001), people can accurately identify racist individuals, even when people are consciously masking their true attitudes. Intuition suggests that challenges toward subtle racism will produce far more reactance. Thus, this methodology is contingent on the idea that Whites will confront racist Whites to defend ethnic minorities. How often that will occur in the real world is open to empirical investigation.
Nevertheless, this is a promising line of research with a number of questions to be asked: What are the conditions for this to be effective? When are minorities effective and what are the repercussions? What are the conditions that would drive Whites to defend minorities? One particularly important question is this: What are the ramifications when minorities make claims of racism to subtle expressions of racism? A colleague of mine uses a great example. He is African American. He asks, “How do I respond if someone tells me ‘You are very articulate’?” In this instance, the racism would be subtle. The person would be expressing surprise at meeting an articulate Black man. It is, however, a socially acceptable sentence and it is not explicitly racist. What would be the consequences of responding to that comment with a claim of racism?

**Collective Approaches to Prejudice Reduction**

The types of changes discussed next are psychological in nature, meaning the individual is driving the process. Nevertheless, these approaches also suggest a level of group identity and often reflect how groups of individuals react to the larger sociological context. Both approaches derive from the contact hypothesis, the simple idea that “contact between members of different groups will improve relations between them” (Hewstone, 1996, p. 327). Theoretically, stereotyping and prejudice are due to ignorance about the stereotyped group and its members, and contact reduces that ignorance (Stephan & Stephan, 1984). With enough contact with outgroup members, individuals learn to modify their previously held stereotypes and develop new and nonstereotypic attitudes.

Since Allport (1954), the idea has received extensive attention (Pettigrew, 1998; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Tropp, 1997). The subsequent research, however, has provided a number of limiting conditions necessary for contact to provide the most attitude change (Cook, 1978; Rothbart & John, 1985; Stephan, 1985). Contact assumes that over time, individuals learn to ignore group memberships and treat each other purely as individuals. Another possibility, however, is that contact might produce an appreciation of group differences that would then reduce prejudice. Outlined next are two distinct approaches that reflect that distinction.

**Common Ingroup Identity**

When students ask about the end of racism, and I reply with “When Martians attack,” I am responding with a common ingroup identity philosophy (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998). The general idea is that one way to eliminate prejudice is to eliminate group boundaries. To do that, the most common process is to identify a common enemy or superordinate goal. One rarely expresses group-based prejudice against other ingroup members. The evidence supporting the common ingroup identity model is clear. Nier et al. (2001), for instance, recruited participants as they were entering a football game. There were two manipulations of interest. First, White fans were approached by either a White or Black experimenter. Second, the experimenter was wearing a cap from the same school as the football fan (identified via clothing worn by the fan) or from the opposing team. Participants were more compliant with the Black experimenter when the experimenter was from the same school as the fan. Thus, individuals were more positive toward individuals when they were from the same group. Even in the highly charged world of sports, a common identity overwhelms race. In the occasional brawl during games, never have the brawls been between the races. Invariably, brawls entail two teams going against each, not two races of players. That characterizes the common ingroup identity approach.

As a collective approach, it is consistent with an assimilation or melting pot model of intergroup relations. Thus, maybe everyone should simply label themselves as “American” rather than use any hyphenated labels and assimilate toward the norm (Berry, 1984; Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002). Berry identified a number of different ways in which groups merge. Within his framework are four distinct styles of intergroup relations—assimilation, integration, segregation-separation, and deculturation or marginalization. Assimilation, which appears intuitively appealing for many
Americans, entails a strategy whereby smaller minority groups relinquish their cultural identity and adopt the cultural ways of the dominant group. Within this assimilation type framework, one can assimilate in two ways. One can envision a “melting pot” whereby each group adds a distinct taste to the overall group culture and at any one time, the prevailing culture is a sort of weighted average of the constituent cultures. In practice, however, the norm is for new ethnic groups to simply relinquish their own identity and adopt the mainstream identity. Thus, the culture is essentially unchanged over time—even with the addition of new ethnic groups.

Consistent with that are societal pressures to make groups adapt to the dominant culture. For example, English-only laws are a relatively new phenomenon within the United States. Currently, there are 26 states with English-only laws, and all of them have been adopted since 1975, making them a new phenomenon. Language use is only one example, but a symbolically important example. Take, for example, the uproar in the summer of 2006 over a Spanish-language version of the U.S. national anthem. “The Star-Spangled Banner” was translated into Spanish and recorded and it received tremendous calls of protest. This was only one small but clear example of the constant pressures for groups to adapt particular cultural styles. Berry makes one point clear: Assimilation strategies are based on the assertion that there is a negative evaluation of the minority group. Thus, the attempts to sublimate the ethnic culture are from a conscious attempt to eradicate that cultural influence.

Under other conditions, however, it may be impossible to ignore group memberships. To the extent that persons develop self-esteem from that group identification, attempts to ignore or denigrate group identity can theoretically produce even greater prejudice. In summary and in principle, a common ingroup identity sounds appealing, but as stated by Crocker, Major, and Steele (1998),

Despite the attractiveness of a society in which race, gender, disability, sexual orientation, or other social identities are irrelevant, it is rare (and perhaps impossible) for non-stigmatized individuals who are steeped in the cultural meaning of these identities to be truly "blind" to their significance in interactions with stigmatized individuals. (p. 539).

Accordingly, “it has become increasingly clear that attempts to emphasize integration and similarity can sometimes backfire by threatening group distinctiveness” (Spears et al., 1997, p. 545). Thus, alternative approaches exist that are designed to reduce racism.

**Multiculturalism: Maybe Group Differences Are Meant to Be Enjoyed**

SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) postulates that one process driving prejudicial attitudes is the desire to identify positive differences between the ingroup and a relevant outgroup. Thus, “pressures to evaluate one’s own group positively through ingroup/outgroup comparisons lead social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from each other” (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p. 16; italics added). Theoretically, ingroup distinctiveness reduces prejudice because it reduces the perceived competition between the two groups. Thus, highly similar outgroups are often perceived as a threat to the ingroup. To the extent that two groups are distinct (or are perceived as distinct), competition between the groups is reduced, and therefore, so is the prejudice.

As a collective approach to intergroup relations, this becomes a cultural pluralism model of prejudice reduction. If individuals actively identify between-group differences, one reduces the perceived competition between the groups, which acts to reduce the perceived threat posed by the outgroup. Accordingly, it may be more beneficial to the collective self-esteem to actively identify how the ingroup differs from relevant outgroups and to actively make conscious the ingroup identification. This model is in contrast to the common ingroup identity approach outlined earlier in that it represents a “salad bowl” approach rather than a melting pot approach to intergroup relations. Within U.S. culture, for example, assimilation models entail the notion that if persons of different ethnic groups stop using hyphenated labels (e.g., Mexican American), and refer to themselves only as American, all Americans will get along more peacefully. Thus, common or layperson theories of
intergroup relations suggest that attention to group differences will increase prejudice, whereas this cultural pluralism model contends that attention to group differences can (under certain conditions) reduce prejudice.

In a series of studies we tested the effects of a cultural pluralism model on attitudes toward the outgroup (Carpenter, Zárate, & Garza, 2007; Zárate et al., 2004; Zárate & Garza, 2002). Across three sets of studies, participants were asked to make either similarity or difference comparisons between their ingroup and a relevant outgroup. Within each study, some participants made “similarity” comparisons, where they were asked to evaluate, on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all similar) to 7 (extremely similar) how similar their ingroup was to a salient outgroup. With a between-subject design, others were asked to evaluate how different their ingroup was to a relevant outgroup. These participants were asked to rate, on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all different) to 7 (extremely different), how different their ingroup was to the outgroup. Using this basic paradigm, multiple studies showed that Latino participants who made difference ratings expressed significantly less prejudice than participants who made similarity ratings.

Carpenter et al. (2007) also tested African American participants using the same basic manipulation. That manipulation did not, however, influence African American responses—although that is not surprising. That research was based on the assumption that subtle word manipulations can influence perceptions of differences between relatively similar groups. That manipulation may have been too subtle to influence perceptions of differences between Whites and African Americans, where there are greater perceptual differences between the groups. The effect, however, is conceptually replicated in other ways. In particular, Sellers and colleagues (Sellers, Copeland-Linder, Martin, & Lewis, 2006; Sellers & Shelton, 2003) have been investigating the relations between racial identity and psychological distress. Their studies encompass adult and adolescent African Americans. Their studies show convincingly that having a strong sense of racial identity acts as a buffer against the perceived discrimination felt by the participants. Thus, having a strong racial identity reduces the stress of racism.

The benefits of group diversity go beyond improved self-concepts for minorities. Group diversity also positively impacts multiple forms of group interaction. Polzer, Milton, and Swann (2002) reviewed the extensive literature on group decision making and diversity. Theoretically, a diverse decision-making team will provide more diverse ideas and perspectives, which should improve the problem-solving abilities of the group. Polzer et al. (2002) reviewed that literature to show general support for that broad hypothesis. Diversity does not, however, always facilitate group decision making. Polzer et al. posited that one moderating factor is the degree to which group members have high interpersonal congruence. Interpersonal congruence is the degree to which interacting individuals have some mutual agreement about their respective roles and skills. That agreement, or strong social identity, should then facilitate discussion and problem solving. Their research utilized masters of business administration (MBA) students assigned to work in study teams. Team assignments were developed to maximize within-group racial diversity. Consistent with their hypotheses, the diverse groups with high levels of interpersonal congruence consistently outperformed other groups. Thus, the degree to which groups recognized and respected the strengths and roles of other group members predicted their overall productivity.

Even in racially charged situations, diversity appears to be beneficial. Sommers (2006) used a jury deliberation paradigm to investigate the effects of diversity on discussion strategies. The defendant was Black, providing a potentially racially charged situation. Participants, White and Black, discussed more material and spoke more in diverse groups than in racially homogeneous groups.

Finally, the effects of diversity appear to extend beyond the immediate group decision-making situation. Simonton (1997) investigated the effects of foreign influence on national creative achievement. Simonton investigated the effects of outside immigration, eminent immigration, and travel on later national achievement. The analyses were limited to Japan because of the way Japan has closely moderated immigration to Japan over the centuries. Simonton reported a strong effect whereby the influx of immigrants and ideas stimulates creativity and achievement two generations later. One can
only conjecture about why it takes two generations for diversity to have that positive effect. Perhaps some degree of negotiation and respect regarding the various roles was necessary?

**How Does Multiculturalism Act in Real Life?**

It is important to stress that a cultural pluralism approach need not be mutually exclusive from a melting pot approach (Pettigrew, 1976). Pettigrew (1976) suggested that attacks on ethnic pride might derive from “our failure to see how cultural diversity and richness can contribute to, rather than detract from, a stable, unified American society” (p. 15). Pettigrew further argued that ethnic pride and cultural pluralism are merely stages of the same ethnic assimilation processes that all immigrant groups have gone through throughout American history.

Collective action of this nature can be seen everywhere. At times, it is more confrontational, whereas at other times, the behaviors are clearly positive. How they are viewed, however, depends on the perspective of the individual. In November 2006, U.S. Representative Tom Tancredo, from Colorado, criticized Miami by saying “It has become a Third World country. You just pick it up and take it and move it someplace. You would never know you’re in the United States of America” (CBS News, 2006). Later visits to Miami were cancelled, partially in response to reports of threats on his life. What instigated Tancredo’s original comments? Tancredo originally complained that the non-English-speaking enclaves are proof that more control over immigration is needed. He then called for more control over immigration.

The Tancredo affair is not an isolated event. Representative Virgil Goode, Jr. (from Virginia) stated on Fox News that Representative-Elect Keith Ellison (from Minnesota) should use a Bible when taking the oath for office rather than the Koran Rep. Ellison had chosen to use. Goode then proceeded to say that the fact an elected Muslim was using the Koran poses a danger to traditional American values. Goode also stated that his using the Koran is evidence that the United States needs to control immigration or more Muslims will be elected to Congress. The interesting part is that Representative Ellison was born in the United States. Although both events offended particular groups, neither event earned widespread condemnation. Thus, calls for assimilation to a particular norm received condemnation, but they must have also received some level of support.

The remarks by Goode and Tancredo reflect a strong and possibly “aggressive” view of assimilation. It is one thing for groups to naturally assimilate, which may be the case under most circumstances. It is quite another to try to force groups to abandon important and beneficial self-concepts. To the best of my knowledge, the common ingroup identity manipulations have never “forced” participants to assimilate. Rather, the common ingroup identity manipulations provide an orthogonal (school affiliation) or superordinate categorization, which changes the group structure in a more subtle way. Thus, forcing people to change might actually produce reactance and more conflict rather than less conflict.

**Conclusions**

Is racism changing? Clearly it is (Dasgupta, 2004; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). How it is changing is the more interesting question. The expressed racism is becoming more subtle, and therefore harder to detect. Because of that, it leads to a different set of problems than before. This chapter did not cover attributional ambiguity and other daily stressors associated with racism. However, once racism is detected, the responses are less than optimal. One can ignore it, but then it will never change. One can complain, but that only provokes reactance. One can challenge racism. The idea is potentially groundbreaking, but one wonders how often people are willing to do so and if that will produce the desired consequences. From a minority perspective, it seems beneficial to simply accept the differences and to enjoy the diversity. Our work on that, however, has utilized primarily Latino participants, just as the somewhat contradictory common ingroup identity work has utilized primarily White participants. One wonders if the differing results are due to the different manipulations.
and perspectives, or if the participant pools dictate those differences. More research is needed regarding when and how racial identity (minority and White) produces antagonism versus when it produces improved intergroup relations.

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