Chapter 22 is copyrighted by author Gregory M. Herek.
Measures of Prejudice

Michael A. Olson
University of Tennessee

Are you prejudiced? It is a simple question, but its many potential answers highlight the complexities underlying how prejudice is conceptualized and assessed. What do we mean by prejudice? Does being opposed to affirmative action mean I am prejudiced? Can I be prejudiced and be unaware of it? These are some of the many ambiguities inherent in conceptualizing, and hence, measuring prejudice, that must be addressed before posing some form of the “Are you prejudiced?” question.

Prejudice can take a variety of forms, and this basic feature of the phenomenon is reflected in the myriad measures of prejudice in use. The goal of this chapter is to review some of these measures. An exhaustive review would be impossible (detailed reviews of specific measurement types are available; e.g., indirect measures: Fazio & Olson, 2003; direct measures: Biernat & Crandall, 1999). However, I hope to have decided on the appropriate “major” measures, and I hope to have included illustrative studies. My intent is to summarize critical findings, debates, and problems associated with a variety of measures so that researchers can pursue the measure that is best suited to their research goals. In lieu of providing detailed psychometric information (which can be found in each scale’s original location as noted), I highlight each scale’s conceptual underpinnings, history, and applications.

OPENING OBSERVATIONS

Three observations are apparent on venturing into the annals in search of measures of prejudice. First, there are a lot. Second, reflecting the “great American dilemma,” the majority of these measures assess Whites’ prejudice toward Blacks in the United States. Third, a glimpse at the items of older compared to more contemporary measures highlights the constantly changing face of prejudice. For example, the “E-scale” measure of ethnocentricism from 1950 (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) included the following item: “There is something inherently primitive and uncivilized in the Negro, as shown in his music and his extreme aggressiveness,” whereas Henry and Sears’s (2002) Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (SR2K) inquires more subtly, “Some say that Black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they haven’t pushed fast enough. What do you think?” Indeed, prejudice, particularly Whites’ prejudice against Blacks, veiled itself throughout the 20th century, creating challenges for those interested its measurement.

It is the diverse theoretical approaches to prejudice that provide its diverse conceptualizations, and as this volume illustrates, there is no shortage of theories on the subject. With some exceptions, measures of prejudice are derived from these theories. Hence, it is important to connect prejudice measurement to prejudice theory. Many of these theories contrast two forms of prejudice that lie on the ends of a given dimension, such as “old-fashioned” versus “modern” prejudice (McConahay, 1986), or more controlled (“explicit”) versus more automatic (“implicit”) prejudice (Dasgupta, chap. 13, this volume). A transcending theme across many theories is that prejudice can take multiple forms not only between people, but within them. For example, a given individual can be characterized as having certain levels of both implicit and explicit prejudice. This theme manifests in contemporary prejudice research as the tendency for researchers to employ multiple measures of prejudice in a given study and assess the relationship of each with some sort of discriminatory behavior. With multiple measures in use, an understanding of what distinguishes them is critical to interpreting research findings.
SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION

Before delving into the measures, it is important to define what we mean by measures of prejudice. I have taken a broad scope, and count as a measure of prejudice any individual difference instrument designed to relate to discriminatory responding based on group membership. This means that in addition to measures designed to tap negative feelings and beliefs about a given group, measures that gauge one’s motivation to inhibit the expression of prejudice are also included, as are measures that assess one’s tendency to exhibit prejudice toward a variety of groups.

I could have organized this chapter in a number of ways, but one overarching distinction currently transcends other differences among measures of prejudice, and that is whether a given measure is explicit or implicit. However, these two terms have accumulated some unfortunate baggage in recent years, so I have opted to use the less loaded terms direct and indirect to refer to measures that either require participants to verbally report their prejudices, or that assess prejudice without requiring a verbal expression of one’s prejudices, respectively (De Houwer, 2006; De Houwer & Moors, 2007). The importance of the direct–indirect distinction will become apparent as we progress.

DIRECT MEASURES

Direct measures are typically of the paper-and-pencil variety that require participants to verbally report their attitudes toward various groups (e.g., by indicating their liking or disliking for a given group on a Likert-type scale; e.g., McConahay’s [1986] Modern Racism Scale). They share some common underlying assumptions, specifically, that people are aware of their responses on the measure and are at least somewhat willing to express them. These measures range from single items to lengthy, multifactor inventories. All can be administered and scored relatively easily and quickly. This convenience, particularly compared to indirect measures, contributes to their popularity despite some shortcomings.

Direct measures have a lineage that can be traced to a few specific influences (e.g., Bogardus, 1959; Woodmansee & Cook, 1967). One particularly ambitious early measure, the Multifactor Racial Attitudes Inventory (MRAI; Woodmansee & Cook, 1967), contained more than 100 items and 10 subscales, including Black Inferiority (e.g., “I think it is right that the black race should occupy a somewhat lower position socially than the white race”), Ease in Interracial Contacts (e.g., “If the blacks were of the same social class level as I am, I’d just as soon move into a black neighborhood as a white one” [reverse scored]), and Acceptance in Close Personal Relationships (e.g., “I would not take a black person to eat with me in a restaurant where I was well known”). The MRAI influenced the development of many later measures discussed here.

Owing to their datedness or limited use, some potential contenders are excluded from this review (see Biernat & Crandall, 1999). The measures reviewed next can be considered relatively current.

RACIAL ATTITUDES SCALE (RAS; SIDANIUS, PRATTO, MARTIN, & STALLWORTH, 1991)

This scale purports to assess what the authors call “classical racism,” a more blatant and old-fashioned form of prejudice that is irrelevant to modern antiracist social norms. The items prompt respondents to indicate their positive or negative feelings toward a variety of race-related statements and issues, like “There are too many black students at the University,” “Interracial dating should be avoided,” “Affirmative action,” “Racial equality,” and “Foreigners.”

It is important to note that the RAS assesses reactions to issues relating to a variety of racial minorities, not just Blacks. This is because the authors created the scale in the context of their theory of social dominance, which attempts to explain the general tendency to maintain current social hierarchies regardless of who happens to occupy high- and low-status positions (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). It is also noteworthy that several of the items relate to political policies (e.g., affirmative action) that could be opposed based not on racial prejudice but on political conservatism.
Measures of Prejudice

(indeed, the scale is correlated with political conservativism; Sidanius et al., 1991). This debate—whether a measure of prejudice is confounded with conservativism—appears with respect to other direct measures as well.

Little is known about the RAS’s relationships to other measures, but sensible known-groups effects have been reported. For example, Whites and Asians show more prejudice on the scale than do Hispanics and Blacks, and it is correlated with measures of nationalism (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997). Consistent with the author’s theorizing that people oriented toward more powerful positions in society are more likely to denigrate lower status groups, business students show greater prejudice on the scale than do students of other majors.

**Attitudes Toward Blacks (ATB), Attitudes Toward Whites (ATW; Brigham, 1993)**

These two scales were designed as concise measures of attitudes toward Blacks and Whites, respectively, with primarily college student populations. The ATW has seen little use outside of the original publication, so we focus on the ATB. Many of the scale’s items can be traced back to the MRAI (among others); hence, it features a diverse array of items tapping several aspects of prejudice, such as interracial contact (“I would rather not have blacks live in the same apartment building I live in”), misogyny (“Interracial marriage should be discouraged to avoid the ‘who-am-I’ confusion which the children feel”), and policy issues (“I worry that in the next few years I may be denied my application for a job or a promotion because of preferential treatment given to minority group members”).

Although the ATB can be tied to a number of theoretical sources, it was not derived to test a particular theory of racial prejudice. Thus, the scale does not appear to have a “slant” toward specific components of prejudice, which makes it well suited for general use. In initial tests, the ATB correlated with respondents’ ratings of the value of equality ($r = .33$) and self-reported contact with Blacks. Given the similarity in scale items, it is not surprising that it correlates strongly with other direct measures of racial prejudice (e.g., a short form of the MRAI, $r = .86$; the Modern Racism Scale (MRS), $r = .70$; Brigham, 1993).

The ATB sees some use in current research. Hodson, Dovidio, and Gaertner (2002) found that prejudice as assessed by the ATB related to greater discrimination against Black applicants to college, not when the applicants’ credentials were clearly strong or weak, but only when they were mixed (both positive and negative), relative to a White applicant. This suggests that the ATB may tap relatively modern forms of prejudice that manifest more subtly than old-fashioned varieties. However, Plant, Devine, and Brazy (2003) reported a strong correlation ($r = .69$) of the ATB with a measure of one’s internal motivation to respond without prejudice, suggesting that people who wish not to appear prejudiced will do so on the ATB, whether they genuinely harbor racial prejudice or not. So although the ATB appears to be a good “all-purpose” direct measure of racial prejudice against Blacks, it may be influenced by motivational concerns, a drawback that probably besets all direct measures. Moreover, the ATB has seen less use than several other direct measures, and so relatively less is known about its validity.

**Pro-Black/Anti-Black Attitudes Questionnaire (PAAQ; Katz & Hass, 1988)**

Ambivalence is the theme of the theory underlying this pair of measures. Katz and Hass (1988) argued that Whites’ attitudes toward Blacks can be best characterized as both positive (e.g., they admire Blacks and feel sympathetic toward their continued disadvantages) and negative (e.g., they feel Blacks violate traditional American values). Pro-Black items include, “Too many blacks still lose out on jobs and promotions because of their skin color,” and “Many whites show a real lack of understanding of the problems that blacks face.” Anti-Black items include, “The root cause of most of the social and economic ills of blacks is the weakness and instability of the black family,” and “On the whole, black people don’t stress education and training.”
Katz and Hass’s theory of racial ambivalence led to the development of these scales as well as two others that they argue tap the underlying values that drive Whites’ positive and negative views of Blacks: Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism (HE, which includes the values of equality and social justice) and the Protestant Ethic (PE, which includes the values of individualism and hard work), respectively. Correlational analyses performed by the authors verified that pro-black responses are relatively more correlated with HE \((r = .46)\), whereas responses on anti-Black items are more correlated with PE \((r = .40)\). An ambivalence score can be computed based on the cross-product of the standardized scores from each scale, which the authors use to test their hypothesis that ambivalent racial attitudes create “response amplification”; that is, more extreme responses to Blacks. In one study, for example, greater ambivalence was associated with more positive evaluations of a liked Black individual, but more negative evaluations of a disliked Black (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Baley, & Eisenstadt, 1991).

These scales correlate in expected ways to other direct measures of prejudice like the MRS (e.g., .64 [reverse scored] and .58 for the Pro- and Anti-Black scales, respectively; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001a, 2001b), and item comparisons indicate substantial overlap in content with the MRS and ABS. In addition to social desirability, the potential for artificially inflated orthogonality of the two scales is a concern. Items selected for each scale were deliberately uncorrelated with items from the other, and only two items from each scale are reverse scored, creating the potential for acquiescence bias. Thus, even though the scales’ authors report nonsignificant correlations between the two, it is possible that they overestimate the incidence of ambivalence among respondents.

**SUBTLE AND BLATANT PREJUDICE SCALES (PETTIGREW & MEERTENS, 1995)**

In recognizing the many faces of prejudice, the Subtle and Blatant Prejudice Scales were developed to illuminate the different consequences of these two aptly named varieties. They speak to the way contemporary prejudice has become more subtle and still acknowledge that the old-fashioned variety is still around. The scales were developed in the context of the more diverse array of majority–minority tensions that characterize Western Europe, and so can be easily applied to a variety of racial and ethnic groups (the original scales tapped British prejudice against West Indians). Pettigrew (1998) described blatant prejudice as “hot, close, and direct,” and subtle prejudice as “cool, distant, and indirect” (p. 83), and characterized subtle prejudice as more socially acceptable. The blatant scale includes both “threat/rejection” items (e.g., “West Indians come from less able races and this explains why they are not as well off as most British people”) and “intimacy” items (e.g., “I would not mind if a suitably qualified West Indian person was appointed as my boss”; reverse scored). The Subtle scale includes items tapping “traditional values” (e.g., “West Indians living here should not push themselves where they are not wanted”), “cultural differences” (e.g., “How different or similar do you think West Indians living here are to other British people like yourself in their religious beliefs and practices”), and “positive emotions” (e.g., “How often have you felt admiration for West Indians living here?”).

Meertens and Pettigrew (1997) reported a range of correlations from .48 to .70 between the two scales, and noted that the blatant scale trends toward a lower (i.e., less prejudiced) mean. More prejudiced scores on both scales relate to greater conservatism, less education, greater national pride, and less of a “European” identity; blatant prejudice shows a stronger relationship to perceived relative group deprivation, whereas subtle prejudice relates more (negatively) to having friends from the outgroup (see Pettigrew, 1998, for a review). Interestingly, although political conservatives tended to show more blatant prejudice, liberals and conservatives scored similarly on the subtle index. Scores on both measures have been used to identify people as “bigots” (high on both), “subtiles” (low blatant, high subtle), and “egalitarians” (low on both), with few people being high subtle but low blatant (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Compared to the MRS, these scales were better able to distinguish high- and low-prejudiced Dutch respondents in terms of the cultural stereotypes they
hated toward Moroccan and Surinamese people (Gordijn, Koomen, & Stapel, 2001), even though they were moderately correlated (as high as $r = .48$) and share similar items.

The Subtle and Blatant Prejudice Scales have the unique advantage of having been administered to a wide array of populations with similar results (Pettigrew & Meertens, 2001). However, although they have seen wide use in Europe, they have received little use in the United States. It might be the case that certain forms of prejudice are more “socially acceptable” to express in Europe than in the United States (particularly with respect to Blacks), and future research will tell whether, for example, White Americans are as willing as their European counterparts to express their prejudices.

**The Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981)**

As the civil rights movement slowly wove its way through U.S. culture, publicly expressed prejudice against Blacks became increasingly less acceptable. According to the MRS’s authors, old-fashioned racism had evolved into modern or “symbolic” prejudice, involving a belief that Blacks are unfairly demanding and violate “cherished values.” The modern racist, in this view, does not actually believe he or she is racist. Aware that racism had “gone underground,” researchers interested in prejudice desperately needed a nonreactive means of tapping more subtle prejudice, and the MRS seemed to deliver. The scale’s popularity grew quickly, and despite repeated expressions that its age of over a quarter-century might render it “modern” no longer (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), it is still by far the most used direct measure of racial prejudice in social science. Its original form contains seven items focusing on beliefs about race-related public policies (e.g., “Discrimination against blacks is no longer a problem in the United States,” “Blacks have more influence upon school desegregation plans than they ought to have,” and “Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights”).

Much information is available about the MRS’s relationships with other variables (including those just mentioned). The MRS tends to be moderately correlated with measures of old-fashioned racism ($r_s = .30–.70$; e.g., McConahay, 1982, 1986), patriotism, belief in the PE (negatively; Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996), and issues like opposition to busing in desegregation (McConahay, 1982).

The MRS has been used in many research contexts, and here I highlight only a few. Scores on the MRS have been associated with voting for a Black versus a White political candidate (McConahay & Hough, 1976). Devine (1989) demonstrated that although both high- and low-prejudiced individuals, as measured by the MRS, share knowledge of the cultural stereotypes of Blacks and automatic activation of the Black stereotype, only high-prejudiced individuals report more negative impressions of Blacks. Scores on the MRS have also been associated with impressions of Black targets (e.g., Biernat & Manis, 1994), personal standards about how one should react to Blacks (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991), guilty verdicts and sentence judgments of Blacks (Wittenbrink & Henly, 1996), a tendency to categorize social targets by race (Blascovich, Wyer, Swart, & Kibler, 1997), more negative facial movements when exposed to Black targets (Vanman, Paul, Ito, & Miller, 1997), and subtle aggression against Blacks (Beal, O’Neal, Ong, & Ruscher, 2000).

Although there is no doubt a great deal of experimental evidence supporting the validity of the MRS, it has also been heavily criticized. First, critics have argued that the MRS confounds prejudice and conservativism, and repeated findings of correlations with measures of political ideology confirm it would be difficult for a political conservative to respond in a “pro-Black” direction on the MRS (Fazio et al., 1995; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). At the same time, it has also been argued that MRS implies a clearer distinction between old-fashioned and modern racism than might actually exist (Weigel & Hayes, 1985; see Sears & Henry, 2005, for a review of these criticisms). Indeed, the MRS may increasingly resemble old-fashioned racism with age, and correlations between measures of the two were as high as .67 even in 1985 (Weigel & Howes). Its datedness may contribute to reports of its insensitivity (e.g., Gordijn et al., 2001, described earlier). Finally, despite early evidence to the contrary, the MRS has been shown to be reactive; that is, affected by social desirability...
handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination

and motivational concerns. McConahay and colleagues (1981) demonstrated that Whites do not attempt to appear less prejudiced on the MRS in the presence of a Black experimenter. However, by 1995 this was no longer the case: Fazio and colleagues demonstrated, indeed, that Whites adjust their responses in a less prejudiced direction with a Black experimenter present compared to a more anonymous mass-testing setting. Moreover, individuals motivated to control prejudiced reactions report less prejudice on the MRS (Fazio et al., 1995). Despite these serious concerns, the MRS remains in popular use, and has spawned a measure of sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995), as well as adaptations for British populations (Lepore & Brown, 1997).

**More Recent Measures of Modern and Symbolic Racism**

Others have attempted to “modernize” the construct of symbolic racism by developing similar scales that address the growing datedness of the MRS. For example, the Racial Resentment Scale (RRS; Kinder & Sanders, 1996), includes some original MRS items, but focuses on feelings of anger and indignation on the part of Whites because of their perception that Blacks are not doing enough to improve their status. In National Election Survey studies, the RRS has shown reliable relationships to policy preferences (e.g., opposition to affirmative action), voting behavior, and feelings toward a variety of disadvantaged groups (e.g., gays, Palestinians; Kinder & Sanders, 1996).

The SR2K is also situated within the modern and symbolic racism tradition (Henry & Sears, 2002). The scale’s authors argue that their version of modern racism entails “a blend of racial antipathy and traditional conservative values,” and “is more than simply the sum of those parts” (p. 269). They report factor analyses in support of this view, and highlight their measure’s ability to predict policy preferences and generalize across demographic groups. The scale overlaps considerably with the MRS and RRS, but avoids problems of earlier measures by balancing the items in terms of direction and avoiding mention of government involvement. Items include, “How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think blacks are responsible for creating?” and “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.”

Although relatively new, the SR2K appears to hold promise as a more contemporary means of assessing modern and symbolic prejudice. For example, the authors demonstrate that the SR2K better predicts attitudes toward various race-based government policies (e.g., federal assistance) than do several other measures of racial attitudes and political views (Sears & Henry, 2005).

**Other Measures**

Direct measures do more than merely assess prejudice through questionnaires, and readers should be aware of the variety of tools available. Thus, this section includes what might be called more “distal” measures of variables known to relate to prejudice, as well as measures of motivation to control it. It ends with a discussion of the various ways researchers create ad hoc measures of prejudice-related variables for specific research purposes.

**Distal Measures**

Although a full catalog of every psychological variable with known links to prejudice is beyond the scope of this chapter, there are a few that have been shown to relate in fundamental ways to prejudicial attitudes toward a variety of groups (and that have well-validated measures associated with them). Two additional measures, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981) and social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) are mentioned here.

The concept of RWA has a history extending back to at least Adorno et al. (1950), who advocated that a certain “type of man” is prone to develop prejudices towards Blacks, Jews, and many other groups perceived to be “deviant.” Although this particular personality approach to prejudice was ignored by most social psychologists for many years, Altemeyer (1981, 1996) successfully exhumed
Measures of Prejudice

Measures of Motivation

Owing to the emphasis social cognitive models of prejudice place on relatively universal and less controllable aspects of prejudice (e.g., Devine, 1989), measures of one’s motivation to curb those automatic prejudices have been developed. Two such measures frequently appear in the literature. Dunton and Fazio’s (1997) Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale (MCPR) includes items like, “It is important to me that others not think that I am prejudiced.” It consists of two factors, concern for acting prejudice, which focuses on one’s desire to not appear prejudiced to oneself or others, and restraint to avoid dispute, which relates more to wishing not to offend anyone or cause a dispute with or about Blacks. Plant and Devine’s (1998) Internal (IMS) and External (EMS) Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale is also widely used. Its two subscales, IMS and EMS, tap one’s motivation to not be prejudiced for personal, self-derived reasons or because of external antiprejudice social norms, respectively.

These scales have seen relations with a variety of prejudice-related antecedents and outcomes (e.g., Plant & Devine, 2003). For example, both scales have shown links to different emotional consequences after a seemingly prejudiced response (e.g., Fazio & Hilden, 2001; Plant & Devine, 1998). Motivated individuals, according to scores on the MCPR, make efforts not to categorize others by race (e.g., Fazio & Dunton, 1997). High IMS in conjunction with low EMS scores have been linked to not only greater compunction upon exhibiting a prejudiced response, but also to the development of skills that, through practice, contribute to a reduction in racial prejudice over time (Devine, Plant, & Buswell, 2000). We saw earlier, perhaps not surprisingly, that internally motivated individuals tend to report less prejudice on direct measures, but interestingly, externally motivated individuals sometimes report more prejudice on direct measures, perhaps out of reactance (e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998). As we shall see later, coupling measures of automatic prejudice with measures that tap more controlled processes provides a more complete view of the determinants of discrimination.

Still More Measures

Although this review focuses on Whites’ prejudice toward Blacks, there are a number of measures of prejudice toward other groups available. These include Blacks’ attitudes toward Whites (e.g., Johnson
& Lecci, 2003), as well as prejudices toward a variety of other groups, including gays and lesbians (Larsen, Reed, & Hoffman, 1980) and Asians (Son Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002), among others.

It is also important to acknowledge the important role that “unofficial” measures of prejudice play in the literature. These measures are often constructed for the aims of a specific study as dependent measures, but they are more flexible and, notably, more prolific than the “official” measures. Perhaps most common are semantic differentials, where a given group (or group member) is rated on a scale anchored by two opposing endpoints (e.g., unintelligent vs. intelligent), and trait ratings, where respondents indicate the extent to which they believe a given trait characterizes a group (e.g., Peffley, Hurwitz, & Sniderman, 1997). Simple Likert-type ratings of liking of groups are also used (e.g., Ford & Stangor, 1992). A variety of means of assessing the perceived homogeneity or variability of groups are available (e.g., Park & Judd, 1990), but these measures are rarely tied to other prejudice research (but see Lambert et al., 2005). Measures of “social distance” have a long history, and are used to assess the extent to which respondents would be comfortable sharing increasingly closer quarters with outgroup members (e.g., from living in the same town to sharing an office; Bogardus, 1959; e.g., von Hippel, Silver, & Lynch, 2000). Finally, a modest, single-item measure called the “feeling thermometer” deserves some recognition (e.g., Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993). It invites respondents to indicate how “warmly” they feel toward a given group on a thermometer-like scale (typically ranging from 0 [cold] to 100 [warm]). This measure correlates with a remarkable number of other measures and is easily adapted to most any research purpose.

**DIRECT MEASURES: SUMMARY**

Clearly there is no shortage of direct measures of prejudice. This rich array of measurement tools provides flexibility for the researcher, but unfortunately, the extensive overlap between measures can feel both arbitrary and overwhelming when it comes to selecting a measure for one’s own research. Moreover, the proliferation of measures creates the potential for “competition” between measures for validation and use, as well as redundant research findings. On the other hand, findings based on the use of a variety of direct measures continue to help devise, validate, and refine theories of prejudice. Compared to indirect measures that typically require respondents to be in front of a computer equipped with specialized software, practical considerations must be acknowledged: Direct measures require fewer resources to administer.

Direct measures do suffer, however, from some shortcomings. Foremost is the fact that by definition, they require verbal reports of one’s attitude, and, by implication, assume both a willingness and an ability on the part of respondents to accurately report their attitudes. Many individuals are reluctant to report their prejudices, thus, direct measures cannot distinguish between respondents who appear to be low in prejudice based on motivational concerns from those who genuinely are low in prejudice. This has been demonstrated with the MRS in particular, but researchers who wish to distance themselves from the controversies surrounding the MRS should be aware that other direct measures likely suffer from similar problems. Also, attempts at creating more subtle measures can lead to questions that are circuitous or problematically ambiguous (e.g., that confound racial attitudes and political beliefs).

**INDIRECT MEASURES**

If you are prejudiced but are reluctant to admit it on a questionnaire, indirect measures may circumvent these barriers to direct attitude reporting and more accurately reveal your underlying racial sentiments. Indirect measures have derived from theories, not of prejudice, but of social cognition more generally. Such theories (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) emphasize the role of spontaneous and uncontrollable cognitive processes, and indirect measures were developed as a means of tapping these processes. Thus, they not only provide a potential solution to the social desirability problems
that affect direct measures, but indirect measures like priming and the Implicit Association Test (IAT) provide an index of the automaticity of one’s attitudes through examinations of reaction times to stimuli.

A note about terminology is in order before we continue. The term implicit (as opposed to explicit) is nearly universally applied to the measures discussed in this section, so the terminology chosen here is a departure from orthodoxy. De Houwer (2006) gave good reason for the switch. First, the term implicit has been used in a number of inconsistent ways, with its most prevalent connotation also being its least tenable. Specifically, researchers have tended to use this word to describe attitudes tapped by indirect measures about which the perceiver is unaware (e.g., Richeson & Shelton, 2003; Rudman & Kiliński, 2000). Not only is there no evidence to support this claim, there is actually evidence against it (e.g., Olson, Fazio, & Hermann, 2007). “Implicit” has also been the label applied to claims that respondents are unaware that their attitudes are being assessed with a given indirect measure and that they cannot control their responses on the measure, and there is reason to question the accuracy of these uses of the term as well (e.g., Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001). Moreover, some indirect measures might be implicit in one sense but not another. Hence, De Houwer (2006) advocates use of the term indirect because what is common to all such measures is that “participants are not asked to self-assess the extent to which they hold a certain attitude or cognition” (p. 20).

Indirect measures are a more recent addition to the prejudice measurement arsenal (see Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983, for an early effort), but they have seen prolific use in the past decade, and much is now known about their validity and reliability. However, two measures in particular, the IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and variations on priming procedures (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995), have seen the lion’s share of use, and thus receive the most focus in this review (see Fazio & Olson, 2003, for an extensive review).

**Priming Measures**

If one has a negative automatically activated attitude toward Blacks, perceiving a Black individual immediately and inescapably triggers negativity. Having such negativity activated should make it easier to respond to other negatively evaluated objects, and analogously, it should make responding to positive objects more difficult. This is the logic underlying priming measures. Such measures entail the presentation of a prime, which is the attitude object (e.g., a picture of a Black individual) for a brief duration (typically between 150 and 300 milliseconds) on a computer screen. The prime is immediately followed by a “target” that requires some kind of a response. Often the target is a positive or a negative adjective (e.g., awesome, terrible), and the respondent is required to identify its connotation by pressing one of two keys labeled “bad” and “good.” Participants undergo many such trials, and in the case of a priming measure designed to assess Whites’ attitudes toward Blacks, primes would include several Black and White primes as well as other race fillers, each presented multiple times followed by both positive and negative targets. The latency to respond to each target is recorded, and average response latencies across a 2 (prime: Black vs. White) × 2 (target: positive vs. negative) matrix are compared to arrive at an overall estimate of one’s attitude toward Blacks relative to Whites. To the extent that one harbors automatic negativity toward Blacks, relatively quicker responses should be observed to negative targets following Black primes and positive targets following Whites primes. Indeed, the Prime × Target interaction is often computed on a per-participant basis to arrive at an estimate of automatically activated attitudes toward Blacks relative to Whites.

A variety of studies testify to the predictive validity of priming measures. For example, Fazio et al. (1995) found estimates of respondents’ automatic racial prejudice based on a priming measure to predict a Black experimenter’s impressions of the friendliness of respondents—those with more negative estimates were seen as less friendly. This measure also predicted attributions of responsibility for the 1992 riots in Los Angeles following the Rodney King verdict. In interracial interaction settings, individuals characterized by more negative priming estimates of racial prejudice tend to
exhibit more negative nonverbal behavior (e.g., less eye contact, more speech errors, etc.; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997), more negative judgments of friendliness toward a Black interaction partner according to naive observers (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002), and less physical contact with a Black partner (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Respondents with more extreme racial attitude estimates tend to categorize social targets by race (Fazio & Dunton, 1997) and show different emotional responses to apparently prejudicial responses (e.g., Fazio & Hilden, 2001). Consistent with contemporary theories of social cognition, note that many of these studies focus on less monitored and less controllable prejudice-related behaviors. However, the automatic processes tapped by priming measures can influence more deliberate behaviors as well (Olson & Fazio, 2004b). For example, Towles-Schwen and Fazio (2006) found that a priming measure predicted the success of randomly assigned Black and White college freshmen dormmate relationships over the course of the students’ first semester in college.

Several variations of priming measures of prejudice exist. Modifications have been applied to the nature of the primes and targets, as well as the type of judgment made. For example, Dovidio et al. (1997) utilized schematic Black and White faces as primes, Fazio and colleagues’ research has employed actual photographs of Blacks and Whites, and Wittenbrink and colleagues have simply used the words “Black” and “White” as primes (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997, 2001a). In terms of target judgment variations, the latter researchers have also shown that lexical decision tasks (i.e., word vs. nonword) are more sensitive to stereotype content, whereas connotation tasks (i.e., good vs. bad) are more sensitive to attitude activation. Payne, Cheng, Govorun, and Stewart (2005) employed Chinese symbols as targets and required participants to “guess” their meaning. The reasoning underlying their affect misattribution procedure (AMP) is that affect activated by the prime is misattributed to the symbol, thus influencing participants’ impressions of it.

On the downside, priming measures have been criticized for their poor reliability (e.g., Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001). As Wittenbrink and colleagues’ research suggests, variations to primes, targets, or judgment task can tap different aspects of prejudice, and only a limited amount of research has investigated these issues. However, compared to other indirect measures, priming measures have a longer history of validation and their underlying mechanisms are better understood (Fazio & Olson, 2003).

**IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998)**

Like priming measures, the IAT relies on response latencies to stimuli to gauge associations in memory. Unlike priming, it does so through forcing participants to classify four categories of stimuli using only two response keys (e.g., positive vs. negative stimuli and Black vs. White targets). On a given trial, one of the four types of stimuli appears, and respondents are instructed to categorize it as rapidly as possible. Two categories always share a response key assignment, and this assignment varies by “compatible” versus “incompatible” block. In the compatible block, respondents press one key to classify positive and White items, and the other key to classify negative and Black items. The key assignment is reversed in the incompatible block (i.e., positive and Black share a response key, and negative and White are assigned to the other). According to the measures’ developers, to the extent that Black and negative share an association in memory, participants will be quicker to assign them to the same response key (and hence response times should, on average, be shorter during the compatible block relative to the incompatible block). Some form of a difference score is computed between average response latencies to the two block types, resulting in an index of automatic prejudicial associations to Black-negative and White-positive (for an overview, see Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007).

Despite its widespread use, little was known about the mechanism underlying performance on the IAT until recently. De Houwer (2001) argued that stimulus features that are tangential to the categorization task can be used to solve the mapping problem posed by the IAT (see De Houwer, 2003, for a structural review of indirect measures). For example, although a Black stimulus is to be
classified by race according to the task instructions, the negative valence associated with Blacks can be used to aid categorization in the compatible block. One need only note that an item is a member of the category “Black” to classify it as such. To test this relevant feature account, De Houwer conducted a British-foreigner IAT, but the exemplars used to represent each category were both positive and negative (e.g., foreigners included both Einstein and Hitler). He found that the exemplars did not matter: Participants (who were British) appeared to prefer British to foreigners regardless of whether individual Brits were liked or disliked. In other words, it is the responses to the categories, not the individual exemplars, that typically influence IAT performance.

Early IAT research focused on validation using a known groups approach (e.g., Jews vs. Christians tend to show a bias in favor of their own groups; Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999; see also Greenwald et al., 1998). More recently, evidence has accumulated to suggest that the IAT relates reliably to behavior—particularly, and similarly to priming measures, to less controllable behavior. McConnell and Liebold (2001), for example, demonstrated correspondence between a racial prejudice IAT and naive judges’ impressions of a White participant’s behavior, as well as various nonverbal indicators such as speech errors and smiling, during an interracial interaction.

In addition to the prediction of discriminatory behavior, a variety of findings illustrate the IAT’s ability to predict biases in perceptions of emotional expressions (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003), and cognitive impairment following interracial interactions (Richeson & Shelton, 2003). Richeson and her colleagues, in work on the contextual determinants of prejudice using the IAT as a dependent measure, have shown increased prejudice when Whites take a colorblind versus a multicultural perspective and when they are assigned a subordinate role to a Black (Richeson & Ambady, 2003; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). In prejudice reduction research, the IAT has proven sensitive to various forms of contact (Henry & Hardin, 2006) and diversity education (Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001). It has been adapted to many different populations, including children, who appear to develop prejudices at surprisingly young ages (Baron & Banaji, 2006), and has seen other unique prejudice-related applications, such as a measure of White identity (Knowles & Peng, 2005).

Clearly, since its presentation in 1998, an explosion of IAT-based research has resulted in an overwhelming literature, one that this review has only touched on. Although much research attests to its validity, other findings have stirred considerable controversy about just what the IAT measures. Compared to priming and other indirect measures, correspondence between the IAT and direct measures of prejudice has been observed with more regularity (e.g., McConnell & Liebold, 2001; Rudman et al., 1999). Some evidence suggests that respondents are at least somewhat aware of what the IAT measures (e.g., Monteith et al., 2001), and that more deliberate, motivated processes are related to IAT scores (Vanman, Saltz, Nathan, & Warren, 2004). Recent research also suggests that IAT performance can be faked (De Houwer, Beckers, & Moors, 2007). Other research has documented failures of the IAT to predict relevant behavior (e.g., Karpinski & Hilton, 2001), even behavior that other indirect measures do predict (e.g., Vanman et al., 2004). Others have questioned what any given IAT “score” actually indicates about a person’s attitudes (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006).

Perhaps even more troubling is evidence that the IAT might be contaminated by “extrapersonal” information—associations that are available in memory but that do not contribute to one’s attitudes (Han, Olson, & Fazio, 2006; Olson & Fazio, 2004a; see also Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Extrapersonal associations can stem from knowledge of others’ attitudes, cultural norms, or other sources. Han et al. (2006), for example, demonstrated that IAT-assessed attitude estimates were influenced by attitude-irrelevant sources respondents themselves deemed extraneous and incorrect, whereas a priming measure was not so contaminated. A modified (or “personalized”) IAT involving subtle changes to the category labels (e.g., “Pleasant” was replaced with “I like”) was sufficient to reduce the impact of extrapersonal associations in Han et al.’s research (see also Olson & Fazio, 2004a).

A variety of other modified IATs have also been developed. For example, Nosek and Banaji (2001) introduced the Go/No-go Association Task (GNAT) as a means of indirectly assessing attitudes without the need for two contrasting categories of attitude objects. Much research has also
investigated specific psychometric parameters of the IAT such as the number of trials, exemplars, and various timing parameters (e.g., Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).

**Other Indirect Measures**

Owing to the popularity of the IAT (and, to some extent, priming), other indirect measures have probably not received the attention or use they merit. For example, word fragment completion measures are well understood and well validated (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1997; Son Hing et al., 2002), but rarely receive much attention in discussions of indirect measures. These measures are reviewed briefly here in the hope that researchers will not overlook them in choosing an indirect measure for their own research.

A subtle and perhaps unnoticed bias toward more abstract language tends to appear in descriptions of outgroup behavior that are consistent with negative expectancies about the group (Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989). Capitalizing on this phenomenon, von Hippel and colleagues (e.g., von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997) have prompted respondents to provide descriptions of behaviors performed by Blacks and others, and compare the use of abstract versus more concrete language to arrive at an estimate of prejudice they refer to as the stereotype explanatory bias (SEB). In recent work, an SEB measure related to a Black confederate’s impressions of White participants: White participants who made external attributions for Black stereotype-incongruent behavior were viewed more negatively (Sekaquaptewa, Espinoza, Thompson, Vargas, & von Hippel, 2003).

Although social psychologists have been somewhat slow to incorporate them, physiological measures of prejudice are also becoming increasingly popular. Eye-blink startle responses to Black versus White faces have been used to predict various motivational orientations regarding race (Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2003). Other subtle facial reactions via electromyography (EMG) have been employed as indexes of affective reactions to Blacks versus Whites by Vanman and colleagues (Vanman, Paul, Ito, & Miller, 1997), and such measures predict race-related judgments (Vanman et al., 2004). Electroencephalography (EEG) approaches have also been used to illuminate the lack of intentionality often involved in race-biased responses (Amodio et al., 2004). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques have implicated the amygdala as being critically involved in affective responses to faces of differing races (Phelps et al., 2000; Wheeler & Fiske, 2005), and individual differences in amygdala activation relate to behavioral indicators of prejudice (Cunningham et al., 2004).

**Relationships Between Indirect Measures**

Several researchers report similar patterns of findings with priming and IAT measures in separate experiments (e.g., DeSteno et al., 2004), suggesting that similar processes are tapped by these measures. However, the simplistic assumption that indirect measures should correlate with one another because they all purport to assess more automatic forms of prejudice turns out to be incorrect. Although occasional correspondence between indirect measures has been observed (e.g., Rudman & Kiliasnki, 2000; Wittenbrink et al., 1997), correlations near zero have been reported (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Moreover, although roughly half of White respondents appear prejudiced toward Blacks on priming measures, around three quarters do on the IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2003). Even more perplexing is the finding that Black respondents show a bias in favor of their own race on priming measures (Fazio et al., 1995), but often show a bias against Blacks on the IAT (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002).

The question, then, becomes one of how indirect measures diverge. Owing to the difficulty of incorporating multiple indirect measures in a single study, only a handful have systematically addressed the relationships between them. Cunningham et al. (2001) implicated their relatively poor reliabilities as the cause of their divergence, and across multiple data collection sessions and multiple IAT and priming measures, reported latent variable analyses that improve their correspondence substantially.
However, measurement error may be only part of the answer. Capitalizing on De Houwer’s (2003) analysis suggesting that exemplars have little influence on typical IAT performance, Olson and Fazio (2003) demonstrated that the IAT assesses associations to the category (e.g., “Blacks”), whereas priming measures involving individual Black stimuli (typically images of faces) as primes tap automatic responses to individual members of the category. In a priming condition where respondents were led to perceive the exemplars as category members, the priming measure and the IAT showed greater convergence. Interestingly, a greater proportion of respondents appeared prejudiced when led to categorize the stimuli in terms of race on both priming and IAT measures. These findings suggest not only a potential for discordance between peoples’ individual-level and group-level evaluations, but also that evaluative reactions to the category “Blacks” might be more negative than evaluative reactions to individual Blacks. These findings also suggest that a priming measure using the label “Blacks” as primes, as in Wittenbrink et al.’s (1997, 2001a) research, would correlate with the IAT better than a priming measure involving individual faces as primes, as most of Fazio and colleagues’ research has employed.

Thus, in the same way that direct measures show imperfect convergence owing to different emphases within different measures, so too do indirect measures assess different aspects of prejudice. Some measures may emphasize stereotype content versus a more “pure” evaluative component (e.g., Wittenbrink et al., 2001a), or, as we have seen earlier, reactions to individuals versus categories. Physiological measures involving amygdala activation may best tap emotional reactions to groups, as might EMG measures. These assertions remain somewhat speculative, however, and future research (as arduous as it will be) will have to clarify the conceptual overlap among indirect measures.

**Malleability of Indirect Measures**

Recent research suggests that responses on indirect measures can be malleable and context dependent (Wittenbrink et al., 2001b; for a review, see Blair, 2002). For example, exposure to positive Black and negative White exemplars (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001) and the presence of a Black experimenter (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001) have all been shown to decrease prejudice on indirect measures. This research has been interpreted as evidence that stable, enduring attitudes are unlikely to exist, and that, instead, attitudes are constructed as needed based on person variables and situational factors (e.g., Schwarz & Bohner, 2001). That this view has gained momentum in recent years is somewhat surprising given the wealth of research demonstrating both the tenacity and context-transcending nature of prejudice.

What is probably more likely is that many contextual manipulations affect not the attitude itself, but participants’ construal of the attitude object. The manipulations involved in the malleability studies like those cited earlier often prompt participants to recategorize individuals about whom they harbor prejudices as members of liked groups or cause them to call up evaluations of liked subgroups, but underlying prejudicial associations probably remain intact in these cases. In other words, contexts are likely to produce “a change in the object of judgment” instead of a change “in the judgment of the object” (Asch, 1940). Researchers should consider the nature of the attitude object they have in mind in using indirect measures of prejudice, and recognize that contexts can have powerful effects on how those objects are construed and categorized.

**Relationships Between Direct and Indirect Measures**

Several reviews have recently examined the interrelations of these two measurement types (e.g., Blair, 2001; Brauer, Wasel, & Niedenthal, 2000; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach 2001). Generally, correlations between direct and indirect measures of prejudice range from nonexistent (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2002; Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998) to weak (e.g., Lepore & Brown, 1997; McConnell & Liebold, 2001; Wittenbrink et al., 1997). In a recent meta-analysis, Hoffman, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, and Schmitt (2005) reported increased IAT–direct measure correspondence to
the extent that direct reports were made more spontaneously (and, hence, tapped more automatic processes) and when the two measurements corresponded conceptually. To these Nosek (2005) added the element of social sensitivity, among others. In domains like prejudice, where social forces often make the natural expression of one’s attitudes contentious, direct and indirect measures are less likely to converge. Indeed, in less controversial domains, clear correspondence has been observed repeatedly (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986; Greenwald et al., 1998; Nosek et al., 2002; Olson & Fazio, 2001).

Thus, the question is a matter of when, not whether, direct and indirect measures are correlated. As we discuss next, it is the job of good theory to explain the interrelations among measures and the role each measurement type plays in predicting behavior.

THE BIGGER PICTURE

Social behavior is driven by both controlled and automatic processes, and the development and subsequent popularization of indirect measures was fed by a desire to examine the influence of the latter on social behavior in conjunction with the more controlled processes tapped by direct measures (even though no measure is “process pure”). Hence, researchers often employ both when trying to predict prejudicial behavior, and the overarching finding is that less controllable behaviors are better predicted by indirect measures, and more controllable behaviors are better predicted by direct measures. For example, in Dovidio et al.’s (1997) research, nonverbal behavior toward a Black person was predicted by a priming measure, but explicit ratings of liking were predicted by a direct measure of prejudice (see also Fazio et al., 1995).

Several theories on attitude–behavior relations, automatic social behavior, and impression formation are relevant to this work, and some research has attempted to integrate itself with these broader theories. For example, Wilson and colleagues’ (2000) model of “dual attitudes” argues that individuals can have two attitudes toward the same object, one “implicit” (or automatic) and the other explicit, and that these two attitudes can coexist and independently influence behavior. One might, for example, have a negative automatic reaction to Blacks even though one holds positive views of Blacks explicitly. A related theory, Fazio’s MODE model (Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants of the attitude–behavior relation; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999), does not assume that attitudes of the more automatic variety coexist with more “explicit” attitudes. Instead, automatically activated attitudes are those that are spontaneously activated on perception of the attitude object. These attitudes, assessed with indirect measures, will influence behavior in the absence of motivational concerns. If one is motivated and has opportunity to do otherwise, however, motivated processes will influence behavior. Motivation is typically assessed with Dunton and Fazio’s (1997) MCPR, reviewed earlier. Thus, in the MODE model, direct measures map not onto “implicit attitudes,” but motivation. For example, Whites’ impressions of Blacks tend to be driven by their automatically activated attitudes in the absence of motivation, but Whites who are motivated to avoid appearing prejudiced will correct for the attitudes in reporting their impressions of Blacks (Olson & Fazio, 2004b). According to the MODE model, automatic responses can have “downstream” consequences in more controllable aspects of behavior as well (e.g., Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2006), and other research also suggests that indirect measures can influence controllable behavior (Vanman et al., 2004). Thus, we should not expect a simple mapping of direct measures onto controllable behavior and indirect measures onto less controllable behavior.

Perhaps the discrepancy between these theories boils down to a definitional issue: Does one want to refer to a report on a direct measure an “attitude” in addition to the attitude revealed by an indirect measure? Wilson and colleagues would answer affirmatively, but Fazio and colleagues maintain that the opportunity for respondents to adjust how they present themselves on direct measures renders separating motivational influences from attitudes impossible. In other words, direct measures might reveal more about one’s motives than one’s attitudes.
Theories of attitudes have informed research on the measurement of prejudice, and these measures, in turn, have informed theories of prejudice. For example, Son Hing et al. (2002) used indirect and direct measures to identify “aversive racists” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004); that is, individuals who identify themselves as nonprejudiced (on a direct measure), but who still harbor hidden biases against Blacks (as revealed by an indirect measure). They found that aversive racists (as compared to other combinations of directly and indirectly measured prejudice) felt guilt and discomfort when writing about past prejudicial behavior. In a test of Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum model of impression formation, Gawronski, Ehrenberg, Banse, Zukova, and Klauer (2003) demonstrated that more stereotypical impressions of women are formed only when respondents harbored strong gender stereotypes as assessed by an IAT. Impressions based on individual characteristics of the target, on the other hand, were formed in the relative absence of such stereotypes.

CONCLUSIONS

Clearly, prejudice has many forms and can stem from many sources. This means that no single measure can capture this multifaceted construct. I have attempted to illuminate the rich and diverse range of measures available. One conclusion that should be apparent is that the choice is not arbitrary. Direct measures tend to lend themselves toward more deliberate, controlled forms of prejudice along with some of its political undertones. Indirect measures, on the other hand, tap more automatic processes. Another apparent conclusion, ironically, might be that the choice of measures can feel somewhat arbitrary. Of the direct measures, should one select the MRS or ATB? If one aims for an indirect assessment, should it be the IAT or priming? The considerable overlap among measures notwithstanding, important differences do remain. For example, priming measures might suffer from reliability concerns, but the IAT appears to be contaminated by factors unrelated to prejudice.

Indirect measures have seen a tremendous surge in use, but much of their underlying mechanisms and the nature of the constructs they tap are in need of clarification. Some have even questioned whether these measures have lived up to their promise of accounting for variance in behavior for which direct measures cannot (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). Furthermore, research on more blatant forms of prejudice may risk being neglected in the face of the popularity of indirect measures. Hate crimes and genocide are rampant in this world, and one need not lift the rug to uncover the fact that old-fashioned forms of prejudice are everywhere. For example, a recent poll by Gallup (2006) indicated that nearly 40% of Americans are readily willing to admit publicly to “at least some prejudice” against Muslims, and nearly one third believe that Arabs should carry special identification cards.

To sum it all up, prejudice comes in many forms, and the “lens” one chooses to examine it affects what one finds. When selecting a measure, researchers should use relevant theory to inform their decision, with an eye toward the research history of each measure and the practical limitations of conducting the research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Lowell Gaertner, P. J. Henry, and Ashby Plant for valuable feedback on an earlier version of this chapter.

REFERENCES


Measures of Prejudice


