Pragmatics, Conversational Implicature, and Conversation

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Sanders, Fitch, and Pomerantz (2001) indicated that "the great majority of work in LSI emphasizes the social basis of what persons interacting say and do" and "focuses on the jointly produced, communal, and/or interactional bases of communication practices, not their individual, psychological basis." They note that, among other matters, such research reveals "how interactants use particulars of conduct and interaction in the moment to achieve socially meaningful actions" (p. 387). LeBaron, Mandelbaum, and Glenn (2003) argue that "LSI research focuses on language in use" (p. 11), that language use is central to communication, and that "the doing of communication is the means by which social life is constituted, moment to moment and turn by turn" (p. 26). Two decades earlier, Levinson (1983) argued that research in language pragmatics from its beginnings has focused on "the study of aspects of language that required reference to the users of the language" (p. 3). Levinson devoted a chapter to examining both the more specific Anglo-American and the broader Continental views of the scope of such research, eventually coming to characterize language pragmatics as the study of how, in view of their background assumptions about ordinary language usage, participants interpret (and produce) sequences of utterances so as to create "highly detailed inferences about the nature of the assumptions participants are making, and the purposes for which utterances are being used" (p. 53; cf. Schiffrin, 1987, p. 383).

The common focus on participants' use of language suggests strongly that research in language pragmatics should inform research in LSI, and so it has. The full potential of this contribution has yet to be realized, however, given that much research in pragmatics thus far has focused on the individual, psychological bases of language use, ignoring the moment-to-moment interaction among users in which social life is constituted. This chapter considers past and current contributions to the study of Language and Social
Interaction that derive from one of the central theories in language pragmatics: Grice's (1967, 1989) theory of conversational implicature. Cooren's chapter in this section addresses contributions stemming from another key pragmatic theory: Searle's (1969) conceptualization of speech acts. More broadly, this chapter examines not only what LSI researchers have already learned and what they can gain from research in language pragmatics stemming from Grice's contributions, but also what LSI research can contribute to work in language pragmatics given the insights it has provided on language use in ordinary conversation.

Levinson's 1983 book, Pragmatics, is not only the first major text in that field, but also the first to include the study of conversational interaction among the traditional concerns of researchers in language pragmatics. Levinson provides an excellent overview of the methods and basic findings of conversation analysis that the essays by Drew, Heritage, and Pomerantz and Mandelbaum (this volume) examine more carefully and build on. As Schiffin (1987) indicates, however, Levinson’s overview is important beyond its value as a integrative summary: It is also basic to his concern with shifting research in language pragmatics toward grounding in empirical observation and away from justification using rational, philosophical argument. Levinson (1983) argues that the various pragmatic concepts he discusses "tie in closely with conversation as the central or most basic kind of language usage” and that “the proper way to study conversational organization is through empirical techniques” (p. 285). Accordingly, having provided a trenchant critique of Searle's (1969) speech act theory on multiple logical and empirical grounds, including its problematic explanation of indirect speech acts, Levinson uses his overview of conversation analysis (hereafter CA) research as the basis for reinterpreting indirect speech acts as prerequisites achieved by conversants in interaction. Levinson (1983) concludes his overview of CA by arguing that it

... has made important contributions to the understanding of utterance meaning, by showing how a large proportion of the situated significance of utterances can be traced to their surrounding sequential environments. Just as the problems of indirect speech acts can be re-analysed in CA terms, so many of the other central concepts in pragmatic theory may be amenable to CA ... treatments. Grice's maxims are, of course, prime targets in this regard ... (p. 364)

Levinson does not spell out how Grice's maxims might be reanalyzed in CA terms, but at the turn of the new century, the stage is set for a full-scale rethinking of Grice's contributions, particularly his theory of conversational implicature. This chapter sketches the basic concepts of conversational implicature, provides perspectives on past and current developments of Grice’s work and their importance to research in LSI, and outlines current research in pragmatics that draws both on Grice’s contributions and on research in CA and that is directly relevant to future work in LSI.

**BASIC CONCEPTS IN CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICature**

As a philosopher of language, H. Paul Grice (1989) included himself among the "ordinary language philosophers” with whom he worked at Oxford before settling in Berkeley. Grice focused much of his concern on specifying how an individual speaker could be said
to have meant something in ordinary language use, and it is Grice who introduced considerations of conversation into work in the philosophy of language. In 1967 in his second William James Lecture, "Logic and Conversation" (1975a, 1975b, 1989), Grice argued that basic to all "talk exchanges" was a global imperative for speakers to "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (1989, p. 26). He labeled this the "Cooperative Principle" (hereafter CP). Though he has frequently been misconstrued, Grice did not use "cooperative" to mean "working agreeably," but rather to mean "operating together" in creating a talk exchange, including in having an argument. Grice (1989, p. 371) argued in retrospect that the CP was "an acceptable candidate" for the "supreme Conversational Principle" governing the adequacy of people's contributions to conversations, though he clearly delimited his concern to "the rationality or irrationality of conversational conduct . . . rather than any more general characterization of conversational adequacy" (p. 369).

Grice (1989) instantiated his global principle by developing four maxims for conversation, all but one having more specific submaxims: Quantity: make your contributions as informative as required and not more so; Quality: do not make contributions that you believe are false or for which you lack evidence; Relevance: make your contributions relevant (Grice voiced concerns about this maxim); and Manner: make your contributions brief and orderly, not obscure or ambiguous. Grice acknowledged other possible maxims, but framed the CP and these four maxims as if the purpose of conversation were "a maximally effective exchange of information," a purpose he acknowledged was too narrow, though it suited his philosophical aim of seeing talk (and nonverbal) exchanges as a "variety of purposive, indeed rational behavior." More specifically, he argued that the central basis for "the assumption which we seem to make . . . that talkers will in general . . . proceed in the manner that these principles prescribe" (p. 28) was not the empirical fact that talkers can be observed to adhere to the CP, but that adhering to them was a rational practice. Grice thought of adherence to the CP and maxims as "the standard type of conversational practice," justified "not merely as something that all or most do in fact follow but as something that it is reasonable to follow, that we should not abandon" (p. 29).

Though Grice (1989) framed the CP and maxims as a set of directives to speakers, they comprise a set of standard assumptions or baseline expectations that both speakers and hearers presume will be employed as speakers go about formulating contributions to talk exchanges. In other words, the CP and maxims are the normal or default assumptions involved in producing and interpreting utterances: The speaker is presumed to be adhering to the CP, and more specifically, to be producing an utterance whose interpretation will be found to be adequately informative, true, relevant, and perspicuous. For Grice, utterances produced and interpreted as consistent with the CP and maxims represented the most reasonable, rational, and effective use of language. Very importantly, however, he also saw these standards as the baseline that hearers use both in recognizing and interpreting utterances that are not consistent with the maxims. Grice's principal interest in proposing the CP and maxims was to better understand those situations in which the speaker is presumed to be adhering to the CP, but at the same time: (a) violates one or more maxims outright, (b) explicitly opts out of them, (c) fulfills one maxim only to clash with another, or very commonly, (d) blatantly flouts or exploits a maxim to lead a hearer to construct an inference (p. 30). Conversational implicature is Grice's technical term for
the latter—an inference about speaker meaning that is both triggered by the speaker’s obvious failure to fulfill one or more of the maxims and constructed by the hearer in order to preserve the assumption that the speaker is nonetheless adhering to the more global CP.

As Green (1990) frames it, Grice’s maxims are “default instantiations of the CP” (p. 411) “which only come to our attention when we encounter speech which is hard to reconcile with the assumption that they are being observed” (p. 414). However:

Even when speech behavior appears inconsistent with the maxims, the hearer assumes that the speaker is observing the Cooperative Principle—to do otherwise would be to assume that the speaker is irrational and unpredictable. ... Assuming that the speaker is then abiding by the Cooperative Principle, the hearer will adopt a strategy of interpreting the speaker’s behavior as conforming to the maxims, and will consider what propositions must be assumed to make the speaker’s behavior patently in conformity with the Cooperative Principle and the maxims. (1989, p. 90)

Green points to the heart of Grice’s contribution to the study of implicated meaning. The global CP, together with its instantiations in the maxims, are at once a standard for interpreting utterances that conform with them and a baseline not only for recognizing utterances that deviate from standard practice, but also for interpreting such deviations. In formulating this single, concise set of principles, Grice provided a general explanation for how conversants implicate meanings in talk that are distinct from meanings that can be assessed in terms of the propositional content or truth conditions of what was said. This explanation is the principal basis for the wide-ranging interest in Grice’s work on conversational implicature, as evidenced in Lindblom’s (2001) cross-disciplinary survey of uses of the CP, in basic texts (e.g., Green, 1989; Levinson, 1983; Mey, 1993; Thomas, 1995; Vershueren, 1999), and in further development or application of Grice’s concepts in almost every issue of Pragmatics and of the Journal of Pragmatics (e.g., Mey, 2002).

This brief overview of conversational implicature must suffice for the purposes of this chapter, but there are three added issues to consider if one intends research on conversational implicature. First, Grice provided both a more precise characterization of conversational implicature and a set of distinctions among several of types of implicature that need to be taken into account (1989, chaps. 2 and 3). His distinction between particularized and generalized conversational implicature will be considered in the second section, though as Levinson (2000) notes, “none of these distinctions is straightforward” (p. 130). Fortunately, both Levinson (1983, 2000) and Horn (1988) are excellent guides to these and other key distinctions, as well to research that has developed Grice’s concepts. Critiques of Grice’s approach as in Davis (1998) and Lindblom (2001) have focused on its problems in accounting for the full range of meanings involved in implicature.

Second, Grice’s (1989) work on conversational implicature presumes his work in the late 1950s on the nature of meaning (chap. 14). Grice proposed that the phenomenon of a speaker meaning something in making an utterance could be productively construed as a matter of the speaker intending his or her utterance to cause the hearer to think or do that something, by means of getting the hearer to recognize that the speaker was intending to cause that thought or action. The strengths and weaknesses of Grice’s
view of meaning must also be taken into account in research employing his concept of implicature: Avramides (1989) defends Grice’s view of meaning, but refines it with respect to philosophy of mind; Grandy and Warner (1986) review the development of Grice’s approach to meaning and gather together several sympathetic commentaries along with Grice’s response; Schiffer (1987) argues that all intention-based semantic accounts of meaning such as Grice’s are philosophically problematic; and Wright (1975) provides an excellent overview and clarification of Grice’s program in the context of inquiry in the philosophy of language.

Third, knowing the history of Grice’s publications is helpful in understanding his contributions. Grice’s key articles on implicature reached print only in the mid- to late-1970s, though Deirdre Wilson’s typescript of Grice’s manuscript for the 1967 William James Lectures had circulated widely before then. Grice indicated in the 1970s that the Lectures were to be published in book form, but completed his work on *Studies in the Way of Words* (1989) only about a year before his death in 1988. *Studies* is a fairly complete selection from his work, with a “Retrospective Epilogue” that he hoped would “not be passed over, since in my view it contains new material, carefully but not exhaustively worked out, which is both of more than fleeting interest and closely related to the original papers” (p. vi). Readers are cautioned that though he presented the first seven chapters of *Studies* as the seven William James Lectures, only chapters 1 through 3 follow the typescript of Lectures 1 through 3 and the two published implicature Lectures (1975a, 1975b, 1978). Chapters 5 and 6 are largely the same as Grice’s 1969 and 1968 articles, respectively, but along with chapter 4 involve substantial revision and reorganization of the typescript of Lectures 4 through 6. Chapter 7, “Some Models for Implicature,” bears no relationship to Lecture 7 and contains new material on his approach to meaning that he had not fully worked out (see Arundale, 1991).

As a philosopher, Grice was not concerned with the particulars of conversational interaction. For him, “conversation” was simply a label for a situation in which two individuals intentionally focus on one another in exchanging utterances—a situation he believed had bearing on the philosophical issues underlying meaning and inference in ordinary language use. Yet when Grice’s contributions are considered with regard to subsequent research in CA, there emerge three quite remarkable convergences in fundamental principles. First, and perhaps most important, Grice (1967, 1989) presented the maxims as the normal or default assumptions hearers make in interpreting utterances and as the baseline they employ both for recognizing and for interpreting utterances that deviate from these standards. Research in CA rests on a central assumption drawn from Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodology that norms or maxims of conduct provide “both for the intelligibility and accountability of ‘continuing and developing the scene as normal’ and for the visibility of other, alternative courses of action” (Heritage, 1984, p. 108). Though researchers working with Grice’s principles have paid little attention to the principles basic to CA research, and vice versa, as the latter two sections of the chapter indicate, this convergence on a fundamental principle of language use is “of more than fleeting interest” (Grice, 1989, p. vi) to researchers in LSI and in language pragmatics.

Second, basic to Grice’s (1989, p. 31) contributions on meaning and on implicature is a more general concept of reflexivity: The speaker not only expects the hearer to recover the speaker’s meaning intention, or to work out his or her implicature, but also
expects the hearer to attribute that intention or that implicature to the speaker. In his "Retrospective Epilogue," Grice (p. 357) extended this concept by suggesting that such reflexive attribution is central to the existence of a language and to its meaningful use in a community—a suggestion with close links to the principle of "reflexive accountability of action" that also derives from ethnomethodology (Heritage, 1984, p. 109) and that is fundamental in CA.

Third, in framing the CP as an injunction to speakers to design their contributions to fit the ongoing talk, and in specifying the processes that hearers go through in working out implicatures, Grice (1989, p. 31) implied that a speaker must look ahead or project the hearer’s process of constructing the intended implicature on the basis of the resources the speaker presumes the hearer has available. In other words, though Grice stated the CP and maxims as if they pertained solely to the speaker, he evidently saw the speaker’s actions in formulating an utterance in a manner broadly consistent with the CA concept of "recipient design," that is, that speakers plan their utterances by projecting how recipients will interpret them (Heritage, 1984, p. 156). Along with these three convergences on basic principles, however, there is also an important divergence between Grice’s view of talk exchanges and that underlying research in CA. This divergence becomes evident in considering research that has built on Grice’s contributions.

**PERSPECTIVES ON PAST AND CURRENT RESEARCH ON CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE**

Both philosophers of language and linguists interested in pragmatics moved quickly to explore Gricean implicature, with anthropological linguists, psycholinguists, sociolinguists, applied linguists, social psychologists, and communication researchers not far behind. An overview of research on implicature in any one of these disciplines would occupy a chapter. Accordingly, the approach here will be to provide perspectives on three broad lines of inquiry that represent direct developments of Grice’s concepts and that LSI scholars will encounter in studying the research literature on conversational implicature.

**Politeness Theory.** Grice (1989) suggested that there were other maxims beyond his four, including “Be polite.” Lakoff (1973) develops his hint by proposing three new speaker injunctions—Don’t impose, Give options, and Be friendly—which she argues speakers also follow, sometimes in direct conflict with following the maxims. Leech (1983) proposes that operating parallel to the CP and maxims is a separate Politeness Principle with its own attendant maxims, deviations from which also give rise to inferences, though in this case regarding the speaker’s politeness. Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 4–5) and Fraser (1990) note shortcomings in both Lakoff’s and Leech’s approaches, though Kasper’s (1990, 1996) and Lavandera’s (1988) overviews of politeness research make evident that both have found limited use. Much more influential, however, has been Brown and Levinson’s (1978, 1987) direct application of Grice's framework in conceptualizing politeness as a reason adduced by a hearer to explain a speaker’s use of a conversational implicature.

As anthropological linguists, Brown had done fieldwork with Tzeltal speakers in highland Mexico and Levinson with Tamil speakers in southern India. They had found in
examining their data, together with their respective knowledges of patterns of use in American and British English, what they describe as an "extraordinary parallelism in the linguistic minutiae of the utterances with which persons choose to express themselves in quite unrelated languages and cultures" (Brown & Levinson, 1987, p. 55). Their central concern in their 1978 chapter is to explain why they had observed such extensive parallels where they might be least expected (Brown, personal communication, August 1998). Their interest in patterns of polite language use stems in part from Lakoff's earlier work, but the explanation they develop for the observed parallels draws both on Goffman's (1955) work on face and on Grice's concept of implicature.

Central to Brown and Levinson's (1987, p. 61) approach to politeness are their assumptions that fully socialized persons have both rationality, or the capacity to reason from ends or goals to strategies that will achieve them, and face, or the public self-image that social actors claim for themselves in interaction. Following Goffman (1955), Brown and Levinson (hereafter B&L) also assume not only that persons are mutually concerned with and attentive to both their own and others' face, but also that face has both a negative and a positive aspect. Negative face involves social actors' concerns with avoidance in interaction, or more specifically with having one's actions unimpeded by others. Positive face involves persons' concerns with approach in interaction, or with having appreciation or approval from others. B&L argue that as social actors engage in everyday interaction, many of the actions they take with respect to others constitute what are termed "face-threatening actions" in the sense that performing the action imposes on the other's (or one's own) face. A threat to negative face involves restricting freedom of action, as in requesting a favor of another or in committing oneself to an action, whereas a threat to positive face involves diminishing a level of approval, as in critiquing another's performance or in acknowledging one's own shortcoming. The degree of threat to face depends jointly on the normative level of imposition of the given action within the culture and on both the relative power and the social distance between the speaker and the hearer. Thus a request treated trivially in one culture may be viewed as a major imposition in another, and a request made to a close friend may be of little import, whereas the same request to one's supervisor may be highly face threatening.

B&L (1987, p. 244) argue that rationality and face, as defined previously, are human universals, as is mutual awareness of both. Consequently, if social actors are to maintain the concern others have for their own face, it is incumbent on them to attend to the other's face. With regard to language use, this implies that interactants should construct utterances that involve face-threatening actions in such a way as to restore or redress whatever loss of face will result from performing the action. In B&L's politeness theory, persons accomplish such redress by constructing utterances that involve Gricean conversational implicatures. More specifically, B&L indicate that the central presumption they draw from Grice's work is "that there is a working assumption by conversationalists of the rational and efficient nature of talk" (p. 4), as defined by the CP and maxims. Employing politeness strategies in constructing utterances stands out for B&L "as a major source of deviation from such rational efficiency" (p. 95), and because there should be "no deviation from rational efficiency without a reason" (p. 5), the recipient of an utterance that incorporates a politeness strategy "finds in considerations of politeness reasons for the speaker's apparent irrationality or inefficiency" (p. 4). In other words, one of the key
reasons that recipients adduce to explain a speaker’s deviation or inefficiency, and for the resulting need to work out a conversational implicature, is that the speaker is attending to the recipient’s (or the speaker’s) face. In attending to face by employing such a strategy, speakers accomplish face redress or politeness, defined as attending to or restoring face in order to offset or balance the face loss involved in performing a face-threatening action. In B&L’s framework, a speaker who constructs an utterance that adheres to the CP and maxims is not being polite, which is distinct from being impolite, although B&L do not address impoliteness.

In short, for B&L (1987, pp. 5–6) “it is the mutual awareness of ‘face’ sensitivity, and the kinds of means-ends reasoning that this induces, that together with the CP allows the inference of implicatures of politeness.” Drawing on their field data, B&L provide an extensive catalog of politeness strategies, organized by type of face redress, that appear in parallel form across three quite distinct cultures and languages. These data ground their claim that the use of such strategies to engender “implicatures of politeness” is a universal of language use and a key part of “the very stuff that social relationships are made of” (p. 55). B&L’s explanation for this universality rests on their assumptions regarding face and rationality in language use, one key aspect of that rationality being Grice’s concept of rational, efficient usage as defined by the maxims. Within B&L’s theory, then, politeness is a universal in language use in part because politeness is always (and only) accomplished by means of conversational implicature (pp. 5, 22, 55, 95, 271; Brown, 1995, 2001). This point bears emphasizing because the research literature includes works misinterpreting B&L as having conceptualized politeness as a meaning that is inherent in discourse forms such as the strategies they identify, that is signaled by the presence of terms identified as politeness markers, or that is accomplished by incorporating in an utterance specific linguistic items or formulae said to function as mitigators. Conceptualizing politeness in any of these ways would link it to a specific language and cultural group, but more important, is simply inconsistent with the Gricean foundation of B&L’s theory.

B&L (1987) provide a rich and compelling explanation for a diverse set of observations regarding the linguistic minutiae of everyday interaction. That their work is widely regarded as “the most influential publication on politeness as revealed in language usage” (Watts, Ide, & Ehlich, 1992, p. 2) is evidenced both by the number of critiques the theory has garnered and by the wide range of productive applications of it. As with other widely employed theoretical frameworks, B&L’s approach has been the object both of criticism, in some instances based on misconstruals of the original theory, as well as of proposals for revision, though in most cases these suggestions remain to be fully developed or to be applied in research. B&L examine a number of these critiques and provide a reappraisal of the theory in their introduction to the 1987 reissue of their original 1978 chapter. Examples of more recent critiques suggest the range of issues and arguments. Mao (1994) argues that B&L’s concept of face is too restrictive to explain Chinese face. Ji (2000) disagrees, but acknowledges both Matsumoto’s (1988) related concerns regarding Japanese face and Ide’s (1989) view that politeness theory does not address the careful assessment of social situations she finds essential in understanding Japanese politeness. O’Driscoll (1996) argues that B&L’s definitions of positive and negative face are culture specific, proposing instead an abstract underlying dualism of association and dissociation. Drawing on ethnographic data, Fitch and Sanders (1994) question the type of cross-cultural
theorizing that B&L attempt, whereas Janney and Arndt (1993) raise similar doubts in examining the history of research on language universals. Based on a review of empirical research on politeness, Holtgraves (2002) questions B&L’s hierarchy of politeness strategies, their framing of the impact of social variables, and their concept of face. Craig, Tracy, and Spisak’s (1986) attempt to test politeness theory leads them to conclude that it does not “easily lend itself to experimental or quantitative interpretation” (p. 447) and to propose tenets for constructing a new theory of facework. Finally, Kopytko (1995) focuses on B&L’s theory as a key example in his critique of rationalistic approaches in language pragmatics, whereas Eelen (2001) provides a critical analysis of theoretical perspectives and ideological commitments in nine theories of politeness.

The critiques and reappraisals of B&L’s theory are nevertheless far fewer than the productive applications of their explanation across the social sciences in examining data on politeness in language use (e.g., Aronsson & Rundström, 1989; Chen, 1990–1991), in explaining aspects of the management of social relationships through talk (e.g., Chen, 2001; Cupach & Metts, 1994), and in developing new theories of language use in social interaction (e.g., Arundale, 1999; Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998). An adequate overview of such applications and developments would be a lengthy chapter in itself, whereas a suggestive summary would be both sketchy and potentially misleading. It must suffice to note several more global indicators of the broad use and influence of B&L’s theory. DuFon, Kasper, Takahashi, and Yoshinaga’s (1994) bibliography on linguistic politeness has over 900 entries, a sizeable portion of which reference or examine B&L’s work. Both citation searches in the social sciences and concept searches in language, psychological, and communication research databases indicate considerable breadth of application, as well as continuing use of the theory. Special issues of both Pragmatics (Kienpointner, 1999) and the Journal of Pragmatics (Mey, 2003) focus on politeness and on face, and almost every issue of both journals includes work that cites B&L. Very importantly, recent international conferences and current books (e.g., Bayraktaroglu & Sifianou, 2001; Eelen, 2001; Mills, 2003; Watts, 2003) point to renewed interest in politeness and to critical rethinking of B&L’s theory, as well as to future theoretical developments and research building upon their contribution.

Were one to examine a sample of studies drawn from these many applications, it would be apparent that B&L’s theory has been used to address a range of research issues distinct from their original question about why they had observed parallels in polite usage across different languages. In her recent overview of B&L’s contribution, Brown (2001) identifies research foci as diverse as gender differences in talk, the social psychology of face management, the analysis of formal ritual, and the sequential development of politeness. One criterion for a good theory is productive application beyond the question originally addressed, but there are also limits to the explanatory potential of any theory. Brown considers the original goals, together with the critiques that have arisen in these diverse applications of the theory, and finds that beyond its unique contribution to research on language use “the B&L model of politeness as originally formulated clearly needs elaboration and revision” (p. 11623). In particular, she notes that politeness theory needs to be developed to encompass the continuum of politeness from enhancement, through maintaining face, to rudeness; to include social/interactional as well as individual/psychological factors; to clarify the dependency of politeness judgments on social
context; by examining the sequential achievement of politeness in naturally occurring data; and by testing the theory using ethnographic approaches. LSI researchers have been and continue to be directly involved in applying as well as in critiquing B&L's theory. Clearly they have much to contribute in the future as well, given that all of Brown's areas for development fall within the scope of research on Language and Social Interaction.

Surprisingly, the most important contribution that LSI researchers can make to the development of theories of politeness and of facework is not mentioned in Brown's (2001) overview, although it is the direct consequence of two penetrating, but frequently overlooked critiques B&L make of their own theory. In their original chapter, they note that in one respect their "own analysis must be found wanting, dominated as it is by the act-by-act analysis of contemporary philosophy and linguistics" (1978, p. 89; 1987, p. 84). That is, with one exception, most of their analyses proceed "as if interaction were built out of unit acts," which are "strung together with no more than occasional reference to prior acts (as in answers or agreements) or to succeeding acts (as in questions or requests)" (1978, p. 237; 1987, p. 232), such analyses in terms of unit acts having been "ably criticized" (1978, p. 237; 1987, p. 232) in the early work of conversation analysts. The unit acts to which B&L refer are single sentences or utterances, and the act-by-act analyses they find problematic are those that examine single utterances in isolation from any other utterances that may appear with them in interaction. Examination of isolated, single sentences (normally ones invented for the purpose) is endemic in argumentation in the philosophy of language, as in Searle's speech act theory and Grice's theories of meaning and conversational implicature. Most of the utterances B&L consider are drawn from field records of natural interaction (1987, p. 11), but their critique acknowledges that in analyzing these data they normally examined utterances apart from whatever utterances preceded or followed them in interaction.

At the core of B&L's first critique is the evidence from early research in CA (e.g., Sacks, 1992; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974) that participants in interaction both design and interpret any given utterance in direct relationship to the utterances that have preceded and that will follow it in sequence. Subsequent research in CA referenced by Drew, by Heritage, and by Pomerantz and Mandelbaum (this volume) has both corroborated and elaborated this fundamental finding. The consequence is that any analysis based on the presumption that the primary unit of analysis is the single, isolated utterance simply cannot address those characteristics of the design and interpretation of utterances that derive from their place in the sequence of talk-in-interaction. As B&L (1978, p. 89; 1987, p. 84) indicate, their own analyses, and by extension their own theory, are to be "found wanting" for failing to take into account aspects of the construction of meaning and action in which participants in talk are demonstrably engaged.

In introducing the 1987 reissue of the original chapter, B&L reiterate these concerns with analyses based on unit acts and add a second critique of their work:

Social interaction is remarkable for its emergent properties which transcend the characteristics of the individuals that jointly produce it; this emergent character is not something for which our current theoretical models are well equipped. Workers in artificial intelligence have already detected a paradigm clash between 'cognitivism' and 'interactionism', and noted the failure of the former paradigm to account for interactional
organization. . . [Suchman, 1987]; our own account suffers from the same dose of 'cognitivism'. Work on interaction as a system thus remains a fundamental research priority, and the area from which improved conceptualizations of politeness are most likely to emerge. (p. 48)

In other words, the "current theoretical models" on which politeness theory is based, that is, Searle's and Grice's work, conceptualize talk as an activity performed by individuals, and more specifically as the rational, cognitive activity of speakers who are intending to generate meanings and action, or of hearers who are interpreting the talk speakers have produced. B&L point to research in artificial intelligence that indicates such cognitively or individually oriented accounts cannot account for the emergent aspects or the interactional organization of social interaction. Researchers in clinical psychology, communication, child language development, and CA, for example, have also reached the conclusion that individual or monologic accounts are inadequate to explain emergent phenomena that are apparent when interaction is conceptualized as a conjoint or dyadic activity (Arundale & Good, 2002).

The key issue in B&L's second critique is that an explanation of language use that is framed in terms of one individual's cognitive processing during producing or interpreting utterances can explain a talk exchange only as a matter of the output from and input to a pair of separate, one-person systems. Such monologic accounts treat talk between two people entirely as a summative phenomenon. If one chooses to treat talk-in-interaction as a dyadic activity, however, one examines talk exchanges as the conjoint product of a single two-person system, recognizing that such systems exhibit nonsummative or emergent properties. "Work on interaction as a system," to use B&L's (1987, p. 48) phrase, has identified the ordinary construction of turn sequences, the repair of problematic events in talk, and the telling of stories in conversation as but three examples of phenomena that are emergent in interaction or are interactionally organized. As B&L (1978, p. 89; 1987, p. 84) acknowledge, their account of politeness phenomena rests on a monologic explanation of language use, the implication being that, here again, their theory is to be "found wanting" in its ability to explain the interactional construction of politeness.

Both of B&L's critiques, the focus on unit acts and the use of a monologic account, point to the inability to explain the interactional organization of talk. The critiques are incisive because they question the assumptions regarding language use on which politeness theory is constructed: assumptions that derive not from their application of Grice's theory of conversational implicature, but from the monologic view of talk exchanges that Grice and Searle employed. Given the importance of both philosophers' work in the subsequent study of language use, it comes as no surprise that much research in language pragmatics shares the analytic focus on unit acts and the emphasis on monologic accounts, and likewise fails to address or explain interactional organization. Examining the interactional organization of ordinary talk is a central concern of many researchers in LSI, and in CA in particular, which suggests the fundamental nature of their contributions to the development of theories of politeness and of facework in particular, and to theory and research in language pragmatics in general. Importantly, research in LSI is also empirically grounded, making it fully consistent with Levinson's (1983) concern with shifting the
basis for research in language pragmatics away from philosophical argumentation and toward empirical observation.

The final section of this chapter considers current theories in language pragmatics that draw directly on findings from research in LSI regarding the interactional organization of conversation. Because these theories address both the unit act and monologic account critiques, they provide groundwork not only for a reanalysis of Grice's maxims, as Levinson suggested, but also for new conceptualizations of Gricean conversational implicature and of B&L's politeness theory. Before outlining these new theories, however, it is important to overview two other contemporary theories that derive from Grice's work on conversational implicature: Sperber & Wilson's (1986, 1995) relevance theory and Levinson's (2000) theory of generalized conversational implicature. Researchers who examine the current literature in language pragmatics will encounter discussions of both. Considering each theory in light of B&L's critiques should prove helpful in understanding its contribution to the study of language use and its utility for inquiry in LSI.

**Relevance Theory.** Since the early 1980s, Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) have argued that Grice's four maxims, and with them all of the pragmatic aspects of interpreting utterances, can be explained using a generalization of the maxim of relevance. Their clear précis of their theory in *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* (1987) indicates the Gricean foundation of their approach:

Communication can be achieved by two different means: by encoding and decoding messages or by providing evidence for an intended inference about the communicator's informative intention. Verbal communication, we argue, exploits both types of process. The linguistic meaning of an utterance, recovered by specialized decoding processes, serves as the input to unspecialized central inferential processes by which the speaker's intentions are recognized.

Fundamental to our account of inferential communication is the fact that to communicate is to claim someone's attention, and hence to imply that the information is relevant. We call this idea, that communicated information comes with a guarantee of relevance, the *principle of relevance*. We show that every utterance has at most a single interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance, which is thus enough on its own to account for the interaction of linguistic meaning with contextual factors in disambiguation, reference assignment, the recovery of implicatures, the interpretation of metaphor and irony, the recovery of illocutionary force, and other linguistically underdetermined aspects of utterance interpretation. (p. 697)

For Sperber and Wilson (1987), "Communication is a process involving two information processing devices. One device modifies the physical environment of the other. As a result, the second device constructs representations similar to the representations already stored in the first device" (p. 697). Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) identify the encoding and decoding of messages as the most prevalent explanation of communication and provide an especially clear argument that this code model is descriptively inadequate as an account for all aspects of utterance comprehension in context, "context" in their usage being "a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer's assumptions about the
world” (1987, p. 698). They reject the code model as the sole explanation of communication because “Comprehension involves more than the decoding of a linguistic signal,” work in pragmatics and philosophy of language showing that “there is a gap between the semantic representations of sentences and the thoughts actually communicated by utterances. This gap is filled not by more coding, but by inference” (1987, p. 697). Sperber and Wilson focus on explaining the inferential processes in utterance comprehension that operate as a supplement to subservient encoding/decoding processes (1986, pp. 27, 176).

Sperber and Wilson’s (1986, 1995) explanation of what they term “inferential communication” is broadly consistent with Grice in that it presumes his account of meaning as the hearer’s attribution to the speaker of an intention to cause the hearer to think or do something. However, their explanation of the processes of inference in comprehension represents a clear break from Grice in that they reinterpret or collapse the CP and maxims into the single, explicitly cognitive principle of relevance. Grice saw implicature as a reasoned response to a speaker’s departure from normative standards for exchanging talk. Sperber and Wilson frame inference as an individual’s ongoing cognitive process of identifying among his or her assumptions about the world those assumptions that, together with the initial contextual assumptions at the point new information appears, modify that context so as to permit the comprehension of that information. The process of identifying assumptions rests on the principle of relevance: Those assumptions that the hearer identifies with the greatest effect and the least effort are the assumptions the speaker intended the hearer to employ in interpreting the new information. Given this radical revision of Grice’s approach, researchers will find relevance theory commonly referred to in the literature as a post-Gricean theory.

Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) work has led to a reasonably wide interest in relevance theory, principally among linguists and psychologists interested in pragmatics, as indicated in the “postface” and bibliography in their second edition (1995). Carston, Sun Song, and Uchida’s (1998) and Jaszczolt and Turner’s (1996) more recent volumes are representative of both books and articles that apply relevance theory. These explorations in cognitive pragmatics include Escandell-Vidal’s (1996) use of relevance theory in arguing that the politeness phenomena B&L address can be explained more effectively in terms of social cognition (see also Jary, 1998, and a critique by Chen, 2001, p. 95). Grice (1989, pp. 371–372) expressed concern about Sperber and Wilson’s reduction of the maxims in his “Retrospective Epilogue,” but did not develop his reservations. Levinson (1989, 2000), however, makes clear in his critique that Sperber and Wilson’s reduction fails to address the many different aspects of meaning investigated in language pragmatics, whereas Mey and Talbot (1988) argue that relevance theory “is irredeemably asocial and therefore relevant to neither communication nor cognition” (p. 743). These critiques notwithstanding, Sperber and Wilson’s recasting of Grice’s explanation of conversational implicature, and the research following from it, will continue to be of interest to LSI scholars seeking individual or cognitive explanations of language use. However, given Sperber and Wilson’s move to provide a monologic account of language use and their argumentation based on isolated unit acts, relevance theory cannot account for the interactional organization of conversation, making it of relatively little use to researchers in LSI who examine the interactional organization of talk.
Generalized Conversational Implicature Theory. Since the mid-1980s, Levinson (2000) has studied the properties of the generalized conversational implicatures that Grice had characterized as distinct from particularized conversational implicatures, but had not examined. Levinson notes specifically that whereas Sperber and Wilson "intended to replace the whole Gricean apparatus" (p. 55) in explaining particularized conversational implicatures, his theory of generalized conversational implicatures "is simply not a general theory of human pragmatic competence" (p. 22). It focuses instead on explaining a relatively small though important and pervasive

level of systematic pragmatic inference based not on direct computations about speaker-intentions but rather on general expectations about how language is normally used. These expectations give rise to presumptions, default inferences, about both content and force; and it is at this level (if at all) that we can sensibly talk about speech acts, presuppositions, conventional implicatures, felicity conditions, conversational presequences, preference organization, and ... generalized conversational implicatures. (pp. 22–23)

In other words, generalized conversational implicatures are one among several important types of inference that hearers construct in comprehending a speaker's utterance. These types of inference are elaborative because they involve meaning construction beyond or in addition to meanings that can be accounted for strictly on semantic grounds, they are systematic in that speakers can and do routinely depend on the hearer's ability to construct them, and they represent a form of pragmatic inference or presumptive meaning that Levinson (2000) argues on multiple grounds is an essential component of utterance interpretation, but has been almost entirely overlooked. More specifically, virtually all research on pragmatic inference following Grice's contribution has focused on particularized conversational implicatures, that is, on the elaborative meanings that hearers construct using unique or specialized inferencing tied directly to the particular speaker's intent and to the particular utterance context. As one type of systematic, presumptive inference, generalized conversational implicatures are distinct in that they are elaborative meanings people construct using routine or default inferencing that is not linked to the speaker's intentions and that proceeds or carries through unless the context is markedly atypical or the speaker acts to block the inference.

Levinson's (2000) example helps clarify the distinction between particularized and generalized conversational implicatures (e.g., between PCIs and GCIs):

Context 1
A: "What time is it?"
B: "Some of the guests are already leaving."
PCI: 'It must be late.'
GCI: 'Not all of the guests are already leaving.'

Context 2
A: "Where's John?"
B: "Some of the guests are already leaving."
PCI: 'Perhaps John has already left.'
GCI: 'Not all of the guests are already leaving.' (pp. 16–17)
The PCIs that arise in these different utterance environments are distinct because they involve both different presumptions about the speaker's intent and different verbal contexts. That is, if A asks "What time is it?" and B responds "Some of the guests must be leaving," A encounters a maxim violation, but consistent with the CP assumes that B intends his or her utterance regarding guests leaving to be related to matters of time, and hence A constructs the implicature "It must be late." However, if A asks "Where's John?" and gets the same response from B, A assumes B intends the response to be related to John's presence or absence, and hence constructs the implicature "Perhaps John has already left." On the other hand, the GCI that arises in these different utterance environments is the same, because it is independent of speaker intent and context. That is, given that B has done nothing to block the inference, on hearing "Some of the guests are already leaving," A is entitled to use routine or default reasoning to construct the implicature "Not all of the guests are already leaving."

If the inference involved in this particular example were the only type of GCI, one might argue that because the term "some" implies "not all," the inference does not qualify as a Gricean conversational implicature. Levinson (2000) demonstrates, however, that logical inferences such as these are one among a diverse set of phenomena encountered in interpreting utterances (e.g., entailments, repetitions, and more) that can be explained more parsimoniously in terms of three recipient heuristics for interpreting that derive directly from Grice's maxims of quantity and manner. Speakers and hearers share these heuristics, which operate in concert to both engender and constrain elaborative inferences, or in other terms, default or presumed interpretations, apart from detailed contextual knowledge. Because the three heuristics are the recipient corollaries of two of Grice's maxims, GCIs are Gricean implicatures; however, because Levinson reformulates these maxims, rather than replacing them as do Sperber and Wilson, researchers will find his theory distinguished in the literature as a neo-Gricean theory.

Copies of Levinson's work on generalized conversational implicature began circulating in the late 1980s. Together with parts of the overall argument that appeared in journals, it immediately attracted the interest of linguists concerned with semantics and pragmatics. As a consequence, both applications and critiques of the work appeared prior to Levinson's (2000) book length presentation. Huang (1994), for example, applies GCI theory to resolve long-standing problems in the pragmatics of anaphoric terms such as pronouns. Carston (1995) argues, however, that the phenomena Levinson examines can be explained more adequately using relevance theory's approach to particularized conversational implicature. Levinson (2000, pp. 54–59) disagrees, arguing that in those cases where relevance theory makes specific predictions about the phenomena he examines, it makes the wrong predictions. Despite the differences between GCI theory and relevance theory, Levinson's work, like Sperber and Wilson's, is both framed within the Gricean monologic view of language use and based in linguistic and philosophical argumentation focused on unit acts. Accordingly, although Levinson's (2000) theory is of direct interest to LSI scholars concerned with conversational implicature as a component of utterance interpretation, his acknowledgement that "interactional factors" are "almost totally ignored in the present work" (p. 379) suggests limits on the theory's value for LSI researchers concerned with the organization of talk-in-interaction.
But it would be premature to dismiss Levinson’s GCI theory completely, on the basis of the divergence between the monologic view of talk he adopts from Grice and the interactional account provided by CA. Levinson’s (2000) work departs from a third of a century’s work on particularized conversational implicature to examine an issue almost entirely ignored: how Grice’s maxims serve as normal or default standards in interpreting utterances. Grice clearly saw the CP and maxims functioning both to make talk that was consistent with them intelligible and accountable, as well as to make visible any talk that departed from them (cf. Heritage, 1984, p. 108). As in the first section of the chapter, Grice and CA converge on this fundamental principle of language use, which implies that Levinson’s move in opening a new line of inquiry on heuristics for normal or default interpreting has the potential to inform research in LSI. As he argues, inquiry into presumptive meaning in utterance interpreting may provide insights into key conversational phenomena such as presequences, preference organization, and conversational action. In the near term, then, scholars examining the literature on conversational implicature will encounter GCI theory applied primarily to matters in linguistic semantics and pragmatics. In the longer term, however, both further research employing Levinson’s theory and new inquiry in pragmatics focused on principles or norms for default interpreting will both inform, and be informed by, empirical research in CA in particular and in LSI more generally.

PRAGMATICS INFORMED BY CONVERSATION ANALYSIS

Convergence on the fundamental importance of norms or principles for default interpreting is one of three convergences identified earlier between Grice’s work on conversational implicature and work in CA. One implication of these convergences might appear to be that CA researchers should begin making use of the theorizing about conversational implicature that has grown from Grice’s contribution. Such a suggestion is problematic, however, given that the CA position on the centrality of empirical evidence and on avoiding abstract theoretical constructs and idealizations has been carefully articulated and is conceptually and methodologically sound (see Pomerantz & Mandelbaum (this volume), and Heritage, 1984, pp. 231–244). The converse implication is the one to which Levinson (1983, p. 364) points in noting that Grice’s maxims are a prime target for reexamination in CA terms. That is, implicit in the wealth of CA findings on “the procedures and expectations in terms of which speakers produce their own behaviour and interpret the behaviour of others” (Heritage, 1984, p. 241) is a sophisticated, complex, and as yet unarticulated theory of human communication that is a highly productive alternative to the encoding/decoding model grounding both relevancy theory and GCI theory, and indeed most research in pragmatics. Unlike the focus in CA, articulating theory is central to inquiry in pragmatics, hence following Levinson (1983), it is researchers in pragmatics who need to begin making use of the empirically grounded findings about conversation that are CA’s contribution and that are summarized in Drew (this volume).

That implication is fully consistent not only with B&L’s (1987, p. 48) observation that “work on interaction as a system thus remains a fundamental research priority, and the area from which improved conceptualizations of politeness are most likely to emerge,” but also with Bilmes’ (1993) and Schiffrin’s (1987) arguments that an empirical base will
lead to better understandings of a range of issues in pragmatics, including conversational implicature. Key directions to be followed in developing theory in pragmatics that is informed by research in CA are already apparent in the work of Arundale (1999), Clark (1996), and Sanders (1987). All three authors address the divergence between the Gricean monologic view of talk exchanges and the interactional account developed in CA. Specifically, each recognizes that theorizing regarding language use must be grounded in the careful examination of talk in its full sequential context, rather than in the study of isolated utterances. Each also treats cognitive processing in comprehending and producing utterances as inseparable from interactional considerations, and hence accounts for language use as a dyadic rather than as a monologic activity. Nevertheless, all three develop different approaches to explaining the interactional organization of conversation.

Sanders (1987) develops a formal theory of strategic verbal and nonverbal communication framed within what he terms the “sequential inferential paradigm” for studying human interaction (1995). He explains individuals’ strategic competence in making contributions to interaction by identifying broad principles of situated interpretation that are involved as participants “fashion communicative acts anticipatorily and proactively to increase the probability of achieving a desired resolution of the current interaction or of avoiding an undesired one” (1995, p. 103), as well as to foster “desired (re)interpretation of antecedents” (1987, p. 211) to the act currently being fashioned. For Sanders, then, the cognitive fashioning/interpreting of utterances is bound to the sequence of interaction, that sequence being the basis for inferences about the trajectory of the interaction and about other participants’ interpreting and psychological states (1995, p. 103). Fundamental to the theory are two postulates that, taken together, instantiate the CA concept that meaning and action are interactionally achieved. The first postulate reflects the CP’s presumption that utterances are related to their antecedents and are interpreted so as to make them related. The second postulate recognizes an emergent phenomenon in conversation that simply cannot be conceptualized using an encoding/decoding model: Subsequent utterances “can warrant retrospective changes in the specific interpretation of some antecedents” (1987, p. 9).

The specific interpretations for which Sanders’ theory provides an account are not fixed but are adjustable as interactions progress and can involve either an utterance’s propositional content, illocutionary force, or conversational implicature, depending on which makes the utterance most relevant in the moment. The relevance of an utterance is central in all interpreting, but unlike Grice and Sperber and Wilson, Sanders (1987) conceptualizes relevance as interactionally achieved. Research in CA is one central empirical basis for the theory and a key source of insights on the properties of interaction, both in the original presentation and in its continued development (1997a, 1997b). Sanders’ theory of the strategic nature of conversational interaction is a clear contribution to language pragmatics in that it integrates work on conversational implicature with key understandings of talk-in-interaction provided by CA. The theory is likewise a contribution to LSI scholarship within the sequential inferential paradigm (Sanders, 1995) in that it provides an explanation for the interactional achievement of specific interpretations of both verbal and nonverbal “utterances.”

Clark’s (1996) work is a careful, fully elaborated integration of research in pragmatics (including the CP and Grice’s theory of meaning), of a broad range of findings from
research in CA, and of his own extensive research on collaboration and common ground in language use (e.g., 1992, 1997), into a comprehensive theory of the production and comprehension of language and associated nonverbal behavior in conversation. The theory is a major extension of the standard psycholinguistic model of the monologic processing of isolated sentences (Clark & Clark, 1977) because it treats the cognitive operations involved in constructing and interpreting utterances as integral with the pragmatic phenomena of using language in situated conversational sequences. Clark (1996) explains the use of language and of the nonverbal behavior integrated with it as a form of what he calls "joint action," defined as a sequence of individual actions by at least two persons in which each person's action is mutually and intentionally coordinated with the action of the other.

For Clark (1997), joint action in conversation can be examined at four levels ranging from A's producing sounds or gestures for B and B's attending to these, to A's presenting an utterance to B and B's identifying it, through A's meaning something for B and B's understanding what A means, to A's proposal of a joint project to B and B's consideration of uptake (p. 582), the latter two levels representing "communication" (1996, p. 153). Clark draws extensively on evidence from psycholinguistics and from CA to develop a set of general principles of joint action operating across these levels. He argues that out of the copresent verbal/nonverbal behavior described by these broad principles arise all of the locally managed conversational phenomena characterized in CA research (1996, chap. 11): the coordination of turns at talk, the introduction and development of topics, and the construction of sequences of conversational action. What is identified in CA as the interactional achievement of meaning and action becomes for Clark a process of "validation and correction of construals" of one's own and of the other's prior utterance components in the process of arriving at "joint construals" of utterances (1996, pp. 215–216). Clark provides LSI scholars with a major theory that responds to B&L's critique of models of language use framed in terms of monologic cognitive processing of isolated utterances. As LSI researchers begin to utilize Clark's theory, however, there is likely to be debate about whether or not the theory's conceptualization of emergence provides an adequate account of the nonsummative properties of conversation identified in research in CA.

Arundale (1999) develops a theoretical model of the co-constituting of meaning and action in conversation, both as an alternative to the encoding/decoding models of communication predominant in research in pragmatics and as the basis for developing "face constituting theory" in direct response to B&L's (1987, p. 48) call for "an improved conceptualization of politeness." Co-constituting theory is constructed within the sequential inferential paradigm, but differs from Sanders' more formal, abstract approach in that Arundale employs CA findings, together with research in psycholinguistics and pragmatics, not only to ground the three core theoretical principles, but also to model "the procedures and expectations in terms of which speakers produce their own behaviour and interpret the behaviour of others" (Heritage, 1984, p. 241). The sequential interpreting principle explains participants' incremental interpreting of the current utterance in view of expectations invoked in prior utterance interpreting, as well as the participant's integrating of current with prior interpreting and retroactively confirming or reshaping that prior interpreting. One corollary principle frames the routine or default interpreting of
utterances, while a second frames the specialized or unique interpreting that includes conversational implicature. The recipient design principle explains participants' incremental designing of utterances on the bases not only of expectations invoked in prior interpreting and of interpretations the participant hopes to engender, but also of the participant's projecting of the recipient's sequential interpreting of the utterance being produced.

Both the sequential interpreting and recipient design principles make evident that utterances are co-constituted, in that each participant's cognitive processes in interpreting and designing are responsive to prior, current, or potential contributions the other participant makes to the stream of interaction. But both principles are also monologic in that interpreting and designing are matters of individual cognition. The adjacent placement principle draws the principles together into a dyadic account of the interactional organization of conversation. Sacks (1992, p. 554) provided the original formulation of this "fundamental ordering principle for conversation" (Heritage, 1984, p. 241) in the 1970s, noting that adjacenty placed utterances will be interpreted as related, unless the speaker actively blocks such interpretation. Accordingly, it is in acting to place their utterances adjacent to the specific utterances of others that participants create interdependence between their contributions, both persons affording and constraining the other's interpreting and designing. The utterances and the sequence of talk that result are emergent in that they are generated under both participant's full influence, but under neither participant's full control. Arundale (1999) provides researchers in LSI and in pragmatics with an account of conversational phenomena as interactionally achieved, or in B&L's (1987) terms, with an understanding of why "social interaction is remarkable for its emergent properties which transcend the characteristics of the individuals that jointly produce it" (p. 48).

These very brief sketches of Sanders', Clark's, and Arundale's theories suggest the usefulness to LSI research of current work in language pragmatics that employs empirically grounded findings from CA. As do many researchers in pragmatics, each of these theorists draws on Grice's contributions regarding meaning, the CP and maxims, and conversational implicature, although each does so in different ways. The consequence is that although each author addresses the three convergences between Grice and CA on basic principles, that is, the normative basis of interpretation, reflexivity in using language, and design for recipients, each does so in distinct ways and with differing levels of explicitness. None of the three takes as his specific goal or prime target the reanalysis of Grice's maxims that Levinson (1983) suggested was possible, but all three demonstrate that "many of the other central concepts in pragmatic theory may be amenable to CA . . . treatments" (p. 364). It is out of such interactionally informed research in language pragmatics, along with re-examinations of conversational implicature as in Sperber and Wilson's and Levinson's theories, that a full-scale rethinking of Grice's contributions is likely to emerge. In short, future research in language pragmatics promises not only to be more valuable to LSI scholars, but also to be more dependent on LSI research than it has been to date.

Reprise. Though it was Grice who introduced the concept of conversation to work in philosophy and thus to language pragmatics, it would appear that along with other ordinary language philosophers he did not recognize that the most fundamental thing
that ordinary people *do with words* in talk exchanges is that they engage one another in interaction. As a result, though it was Grice who proposed the CP as a candidate for the "supreme Conversational Principle," neither he, nor many researchers in pragmatics who have followed him, was in a position to consider the CP in relation to two central characteristics of interaction. First, the CP's admonition to "make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs" (Grice, 1989, p. 26) presumes the interactional achievement of turn taking (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). Second, the admonition that one's contribution be such as is required "by the accepted purpose and direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" overlooks the principle of adjacent placement (Sacks, 1992, p. 554): Regardless of the accepted purpose and direction of a conversation, any contribution placed adjacent to a prior turn at talk will be interpreted as related to that prior turn. That Grice and those who initially developed his insights did not recognize the centrality of either turn taking or adjacent placement is not a critique of their contributions, but a reflection of the limited state of knowledge regarding talk exchanges a third of a century ago. To his credit, Grice (1967, 1989) sensed the importance in ordinary language use of other key principles of social action that Garfinkel (1967) was developing concurrently and that would emerge as basic in research in CA: the normative basis, the reflexivity, and the recipient design of conversational action. Most important, however, Grice provided both the insights and the framework for the very research that has made apparent the need to re-examine research in language pragmatics from the vantage point of research in LSI on the interactional organization of conversation.

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