Aesthetic Judgment and Reasoning

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING: WHAT AESTHETIC THINKING IS USUALLY ABOUT

Lay people and experts of all ages often find themselves making many types of decisions about what a picture shows, how it shows it, and how well it shows it. The decisions are made on many types of pictures, photographs, road signs, artworks on a wall, quick sketches, text illustrations, and more. An account has to encompass diverse types of pictures in relation to how viewers and depictors cope with difficult pictorial decisions. When people diverge about such matters as whether a picture is a “true likeness,” or the conditions under which a picture “will turn out well,” there is a chance of discerning their aesthetic assumptions. When the divergence is because the people concerned are of different ages, there is a chance of discerning how the demands of the pictorial domain shape development. Children grow into becoming art critics (Freeman, 1993; Golomb, 2003).

Let us take one example where viewers’ opinions did not altogether tally with an artist’s assumption about his work. Bernd Salfner’s late-1990s hospital murals seemed to him, as producer, to associate with color, distraction, cheering up. Some of the viewers interviewed did indeed assert that. But more viewers asserted that they associated the pictures with silence and calming down. Is that a straightforward conflict of registrations? Not necessarily. It is quite possible that “the answer reflects the hope of patients to calm down by watching distracting paintings” (Salfner & Voigtmann, 1999, p. 89). The immediate point is that the artist here appealed to what he thought the viewers brought to the situation, their hopes for what a picture could do for them in that context. The artist was wondering whether viewers had indeed perceived the mural as he did, as a lively distracting piece, and then filtered their perception through their initial hopes. In summary, this brief illustration draws to our attention the sorts of issue that arise when trying to characterize aesthetic judgment. The two biggest issues are what a picture can do for a viewer (e.g., provide distraction) and what a viewer can do with a picture (e.g., extract calm). We shall look at the issues shortly, but before doing so, we have
to note that those two issues are crosscut by two angles, which specify what is involved in mastery of the pictorial domain.

One angle, propounded by Freeman (1995), concentrated on the breadth of the domain to be learned, encompassing how pictures can relate to scenes, how artists can determine whether a picture turns out beautiful or not, how viewers look at pictures, and so forth. Basically, children grow an increasingly broad framework theory of art. They take this framework to different contexts, evaluating the artworks they find in places such as hospitals (Freeman, 1999). The other angle, propounded by Parsons (1987), concentrated on the increasingly reflective nature of interpretative activity. Basically, children tend to concentrate on subject matter first, then come to include ideas on the artist’s expressive powers, and last may become aware of their own interpretative activities as viewers. The two angles need each other (Freeman & Parsons, 2001).

Consider one example of pictorial judgment made by people poised between childhood and adulthood. Turner (1983) took a group of 14-year-olds to the Tate Gallery. They were unanimous in disliking Derain’s Pool of London (1906). In its time daring and savage (Fauvist), nowadays the picture does not look shocking in its liberal use of nonnaturalistic colors. The adolescents judged that Derain had not paid attention to accuracy in choice of colors. In their eyes, the picture did not respect visual facts about the scene, and they blamed the artist. Any pattern of reasoning can be characterized by what it can achieve and what it misses. What the reasoning achieved was to encompass the entities “scene” and “artist” in relation to “picture.” That is surely a creditable bit of breadth. What was saliently missing was any awareness of where Derain fit in with other artists of the time. Understanding how picture production always occurs in cultural context is a deep matter. It is a shallow judgment that the artist had been undiscerning or careless in coloring.

Now let us move from a case of viewers’ negative verdict to a case of positive praise. In June 2002, the great retrospective of 156 works spanning the entire career of Lucien Freud opened at the Tate Modern. A critic who reported on the preview ended with a single sentence that made three points. Those points encapsulate what many a painter would want to achieve: “I can’t praise this beautifully installed show more highly than to say that after I’d seen it once, I came back for a second look, and in every gallery—every picture, even—found new things to delight the eye and engage the mind” (Dorment, 2002, p. 9). Without falling into the trap of concluding that each and every picture should please a critic in those ways, it can surely be agreed that a picture is indeed a great success if it repays repeated viewing, delights the eye, and engages the mind. In a study of a range of pictures, Belver (1989) found extremely high correlations between ratings of attractiveness and ratings of interestingness.

A functional approach to aesthetics asks how pictures do those things for a viewer. It is certainly fruitful to inquire into what determines whether particular pictures will repay repeated viewing, why those pictures should delight the eye and engage the mind for a variety of viewers. Of course, not all viewers engage with pictures from the same stance; viewers’ tastes may differ, often as a function of age and experience, and their minds may be engaged in different ways. But although fully accepting that it is interesting to inquire into how pictures do things for a variety of viewers, the fact is that there is another way to approach the same set of pictorial functions.

If the aforementioned approach rightfully puts pictures at the center of any analysis, a second approach dethrones the picture from a central position in favor of the mind. The reason for that move is that the expression “how pictures do things” is metaphorical. A picture does not literally do something, because a picture is not an agent. An artist is the agent behind the production of the picture, and a functional approach thus asks what another agent, a viewer, does with a picture so as to register something of what an artist has done. Any functional account has to put the mind rather than the pictures at the center of an analysis, because “The
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Pictorial properties of pictures can have no causal effects upon the world except via agents who register those properties” (Schier, 1986, p. 81). Analysis of viewers’ interpretative decisions is appropriate to the “central fact about pictures,” that they are “an intentional manifestation of mind” (Wollheim, 1993, p. 134). Interpretation will be taken to be understanding or specifying the meaning of something (see Hopkins, 1992). Viewers make assumptions about how the appearances of things relate (a) to the appearances of pictures of those things and (b) to the ways in which picture producers generate the artifacts.

The psychology of aesthetics has developed from being a fairly sedate matter of assessing preferences for picture properties to attempting to grapple with the convolutions of critical judgment that people may make. The development applies to both (a) empirical aesthetics as met in art education and in experimental psychology and to (b) philosophical aesthetics as it has influenced art education. The entry on aesthetics on page 12 of *The Oxford Companion to Art* (1970) succinctly sums up how an influential tradition of writers came to the position that the study of aesthetics should center on the study of taste and on the perception of beauty in nature and in art. Briefly, the change that has occurred in the past 50 years has been away from focusing on viewers as being driven by taste and tastes. The handbook entry ends up by noting that aesthetics extends as far as encompassing beauty that is not directly perceptible, beauty that pertains to moral and intellectual formulations and representations. It is commonplace now to focus on viewers as spontaneously using a great deal of intellect to formulate what they reckon is interesting and engaging about art. An economical way to clarify how much matters have changed in the generation since the 1970 Oxford companion is to consult a subsequent Oxford book: Kelly’s (1998) *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics*.

The editorial preface of Kelly (1998) stakes out a claim that aesthetics is made up of “critical reflection on art, culture, and nature” (p. ix). Why should that characterization be so broad? A broad characterization is necessary to encompass the fact that art objects make up only one of the classes of things, which afford aesthetic experiences and thoughts, and art objects certainly relate to nature and to culture. So we can do well by taking up Kelly’s gloss that aesthetics comprises the “analysis of the beliefs, concepts, and theories implicit in the creation, experience, interpretation, or critique of art” (xi). That gloss directs us to consider whether we can unearth the cognitive activity underlying the organization of a stunning variety of processes of aesthetic thought and judgment in people of all ages. Although indeed an interest in aesthetics may inexorably lead into critical reflection on art, culture, and nature, critical reflection does not have to be an austere affair, indifferent to the sensual aspects of art. Indeed, an aesthetics devoid of sensibility about feeling and expression would be a tedious, humorless affair.

A consequence of the new concentration on critical reflection, and on its constituent concepts, beliefs, theories, is to bypass the classical problem of what makes an artwork beautiful. As Kelly (1998) correctly remarks of contemporary aestheticians: “It would be unusual for them to include beauty as one of their major research topics; they talk more often about the problem of meaning or representation in connection with works of art” (p. xi). But an account of research on aesthetics that drew up its agenda so that it could not deal with developing ideas on beauty would be oddly detached from something that makers and viewers of artworks know is important to them. Again, a handy formulation is in Kelly; “Modern philosophers argued that “beauty is not a property of objects…experienced or judged as beautiful; rather it is a relational property between subjects and objects” (p. xi). Surely that is correct. We do not want to treat beauty as though it were an objective and universal property of the art object, like an object’s size or texture may be. A relational stance on beauty is needed to encompass how people think about beauty, beautification, and decoration. It is most interesting that research reviewed later in this chapter shows how young children do indeed think of beauty as though it were a transparently objective property of an object; and the children then slowly develop a
relational stance. Equally important, though, we must not get trapped into regarding beauty as though it were all in the eye of the beholder and entirely a matter of individual taste.

EVERYDAY AESTHETIC THINKING ABOUT PICTURES

People do not view pictures with a blank mind. How do people acquire commonsense assumptions about pictorial functions? It has been said that a picture can communicatively be worth a thousand words. The platitude is difficult to theorize, because the pictorial domain is vast. Could a single communicative metric cover road signs, rock art, and Rembrandts? How many words a picture is worth depends on what you want your words to say. If you want to say “Sam is ambivalent about appearing at the conference,” you are better off with just those eight words. But if you want someone to check whether Sam has put in an appearance at a meeting you might do better to hand over a picture. Pictures can be characterized as “visual prostheses—they extend the informational system by gathering, storing, and transmitting visual information about their subjects in ways that depend upon and also augment our ability to identify things by their appearance” (Lopes, 1997, p. 144). An eclipse of the sun can be depicted so that one can view something that would blind one in reality: The picture here is a device for taking the sting out of nature. A family portrait is an aide-memoire to long-vanished events. And so forth. In none of the prosthetic instances can there ever be a truly precise match between scene and picture, a true reinstatement of a previous visual experience. Viewers acquire sophisticated beliefs about the complex relations between the appearance of things and the appearance of pictures. Global assumptions about the peculiarity of depiction animate viewers’ armchair reflections. Thus, “The changing relationship with the visible world is what genuinely characterizes the ‘history’ of painting” and evaluation of viewers’ interpretations should be organized around the question of why people “relate in a number of different ways to the visible world and its reproduction” (Vajda, 1986, p. 137).

When do children’s concepts become organized to represent what is communicatively important about pictures? A study of Greek children by Maridaki-Kassotaki and Freeman (2000) proved revealing. The Greek term *kadro* literally means “frame,” but also means “that which has been framed as a display piece” to embellish the home. On two trials, 1 week apart, 120 informants explained what a *kadro* is. In the explanations of 4- and 8-year-old children, these important artifacts were held to be furnishings, useful for hanging on walls. Adults and adolescents showed conceptual flexibility and referred to the use of display to commemorate artists’ achievements. Further, these participants saw the displays as display of householders’ judgment. You can tell someone’s artistic tastes and judgments from the pictures they put on exhibition. A communicative theory of art and a critical stance are certainly in operation after middle childhood.

One can expect children gradually to develop assumptions about what pictures are good for. Pictures excel in the display of appearances that can be “emotionally engaging, eye-catching, and memorable” (Willats, 1997, p. 25). Those three aspects of pictorial vividness are usually discussed under the broad headings of *expressivity, attractiveness*, and *recognizability*. Any account of what people think about pictures has to find a way of formulating the three in a common framework.

Let us briefly survey the diversity of commonsense assumptions that a theory has to encompass. Any driver who thinks that the Canadian road authorities place pictures of moose at some roadsides as an aesthetic gesture might not survive collision with the reality. It is necessary but not sufficient to recognize the contents of the picture. Viewers have to learn to categorize such moose pictures in context for their symbolic significance. The general category under which such pictures fall is that of *advertisement* of a state of affairs that can be truth tested. Either
mooose are liable to be around or they are not; if they are around, either they are liable to stand in the road or they are not. However, there are other ways of categorizing roadside pictures. Some pictures might be placed to enable the authority to express something, as when a picture of a maple leaf in part of a province is used to assert an agency’s pride in ownership. It would be an error to assume that the maple leaf advertises the danger of leaves drifting across the road, making it slippery. That is, the communication conveys something about the relation of the agent to the scene. Yet other roadside pictures might well be placed for embellishment, in an arts-support program, and advertise nothing. On the other hand, a politically aware viewer might reasonably take the artworks to advertise an expression of the financial and political support that makes such things possible. Viewers might reasonably debate whether current moose pictures are beautiful enough to (a) encourage a conservationist attitude toward the creatures, or (b) caricature the animals to look stupid and demonize them as road hazards. Even simple depictions can offer rich interpretative possibilities for viewers to exercise their reasoning on.

For the moment, the important point is that those three functions, of truth-testable representation, expressivity, and embellishment, dominate learners’ thinking in semistructured interviews about pictures (Parsons, 1987). Assumptions about the three topics are not reserved for situations of deep reflection. Anyone who attests that a passport photograph is a “true likeness” of the sitter is deploying a commonsense theory of pictures. Anyone who picks up anything of Picasso’s political stance from Guernica has some notion of an artist expressing something through an act of production. The folksy catchphrase that something “is as pretty as a picture” can coexist with the catchphrase that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder”; both have to be accounted for in identifying constraints on learners’ assumptions. Such topics have a venerable philosophical ancestry. In Book 10 of Plato’s Republic, the general principle was put forward that there are three areas of expertise that have to be considered with all artworks: expertise in representation, in manufacture, and in usage. Pictures are open to truth testing, can conserve something of the producer’s expressivity, and can be appreciated as vividly attractive. Some pictures do indeed delight the eye and engage the mind.

EXPRESSIVITY

As noted in the opening section, one great theme of art theory is a shift of emphasis away from asking what qualities are “in” a picture to asking what interpretative inferences a picture invites. An artist’s choice of contents can express something about that artist, and viewers might learn to make inferences about artists. That is, part of learners’ commonsense theory of depiction would concern inferences about production. Artists have beliefs, desires, and feelings, and they attempt to realize some of those to communicate them to viewers. Ziller (1990) asked students to display local photographs that best described what the United States meant to them. U.S. students largely went in for “patriotism,” “development,” and “freedom,” and the foreign students largely went in for “sports,” “food,” and “security.” That seems to be a clear case where it is safe to interpret from the contents of the pictures to the mentalities of the artists, and where knowing something about the artists helps in viewing the pictures. But not all cases are so clear. In particular, expressivity can somehow be manifest not just in choice of contents but in both style and the “mood” of a picture.

Can viewers agree on moods expressed in pictures, irrespective of facts about the artists? Callaghan (1997) asked 15 artists to assess 64 museum pictures (none of which contained a human figure) for conveying happiness, sadness, calm, or excitement. Sixteen of the pictures for which there was over 72% agreement (they included Picasso’s The Pigeons, Van Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes, Monet’s Palazzo Dario, Matisse’s The Nightmare of the White Elephant) were then shown to untrained adults and to adult artists for them to categorize for mood. Both groups
came up with a mean of 75% agreement with the assessors. A second group of untrained adults was also asked to justify their categorizations. About half the justifications focused on the quality of marks (color, line) and about a third focused on the contents as depicted. There were only 2% explicit references to either the artist (“The person who painted that must have been really blue.”) or the viewer (“It makes me happy to see those trees.”). Probing interviews may be needed to expose viewers’ assumptions about agents (Parsons, 1987).

There is a traditional problem in explaining expressivity. One aspect of the problem lies in identifying signals of expressivity. In one study in which children were given a free choice of colors to use in portraying different emotions, light blue was commonly used to denote happiness (Caloni & Morra, 1990). There is no theory in the literature that could have predicted that particular color as expressive in that way. Gombrich (1972, pp. 28–30) discussed evidence that, in *Francoise Gilot, Femme Fleur*, Picasso painted her face a light blue in an effort to signal “an equivalent to the impression of slimness.” Even worse, even if there were clear agreement on how to interpret a signal, such as a sad face, there is nothing that entails that the artist actually feels sad. In that sense, an actor can portray emotions without expressing them. It may be the case that research on expressivity will be a swift route to exposing learners’ *reasoning* using commonsense beliefs about what pictures may communicate; but the gateway to the research route has not yet been found.

**BEAUTY**

The polemical opening paragraph of Neisser (1967) is worth rereading:

> It has been said that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. As a hypothesis about localization of function, the statement is not quite right—the brain and not the eye is surely the most important organ involved. Nevertheless it points clearly enough towards the central problem of cognition. Whether beautiful or ugly or just conveniently at hand, the world of experience is produced by the man (sic) who experiences it. (p. 3)

The person may well be the producer of experience, but the production is subject to constraints. McManus, Kumar, and Stoker (1989) synthesized 25 austere Mondrian abstracts on a computer screen and displayed each abstract accompanied by variants that had been altered by small random amounts. Inexpert viewers reliably preferred the genuine articles. Other research has substantiated and extended the findings. Solso (1994, pp. 264–269) speculated on the neural basis for the impact of Mondrians. But no-one has yet defined precisely what Mondrian was up to in the course of producing such attraction. Perhaps it is proving easier to pin down the orderliness underlying the efforts of Jackson Pollock. The canvasses appear chaotic, but the dripped paint conforms to the patterns unearthed by chaos theory in the hands of physicists and mathematicians. The statistics of chaotic systems seem to map onto Pollock canvasses which thereby “in other words, display the fingerprints of nature” (Taylor, Micolich, & Jonas, 1999, p. 25). There is not one law for nature and another law for art; the same eye that responds to natural patterns responds to artworks.

It is possible to study recognition of particular abstracts and to compare preference with preference for novel abstracts. Freeman and Parker (1973) serially projected 84 abstract shapes (from Vanderplas & Garvin, 1959), in runs of 14, followed by immediate serial presentation of each run randomly mixed with 14 shapes that had not been viewed. Participants were asked say whether they recognized each shape, and to give a preference rating for how attractive it was. Recognition accuracy was about 67%, with a preference for correctly recognized shapes over shapes correctly categorized as novel. The useful finding was that the same preference
disparity appeared for shapes that were mis-recognized as familiar (false alarms) compared with preexposed shapes that were not recognized (misses). The variable that controlled attractiveness was thus not the history of viewing a particular abstract but whether the viewer categorized the abstract as triggering a recognition.

There is a class of pictures where there is something to recognize, but the artists make it difficult for untrained viewers to accomplish the recognition. One such style is cubism. Cubist pictures make it impossible to decide whether the particular human figures depicted are beautiful as people. Hekkert (1995) showed nonexpert adults 40 cubist human figure pictures of varying degrees of abstraction. Some of the pictures were rather easy to decipher as being human-figure portrayals; other pictures more obscured the portrayal. For fast-recognizable portrayals like Picasso’s *Clovis Sagot*, ratings of how beautiful the pictures were was a positive function of human-figure recognizability and was unrelated to ratings of pictorial complexity. For slow-recognizable portrayals like Braque’s *Man Smoking a Pipe*, there was an inverted-U function of beauty against the complexity of lines in the picture itself. In light of the aim of cubism to force viewers’ attention onto the picture plane itself, it is interesting that slow recognizability did lead untrained viewers to concentrate on the complexity of the markings on the picture plane. Hekkert found a criterion shift in vocationally expert viewers: (a) With fast recognizability, ratings of beauty were a small negative function of recognizability; and (b) for slow-recognizable pictures, the inverted U of beauty against complexity vanished in favor of a null relation. Reanalysis showed that, for the experts, rated beauty was a positive function of how typical a picture was judged to be as an exemplar of cubism.

In summary, with different types of pictures, determinants of beauty can be attributed to different variables. Recognizability is often important, so let us now consider the pictorial functions of recognition.

**RECOGNIZABILITY**

Kose (1985) questioned 7- and 11-year-olds about photographs. Replies focused on the scenes recorded and on the medium, with virtually no mention of photographers’ intents. Later, with maturity, some viewers come to distrust photography, because agents manipulate cameras to obtain various effects (see Beloff, 1985). Indeed, Lynch and Edgerton (1988) found that digital-image processors introduce much “crafting of resemblances,” to make the products acceptable and comprehensible to potential viewers. Yet some viewers come to regard photography as a touchstone of communicative truth, treating the photograph–referent relation as transparent. Presumably a search for some “true likeness” is why, as Gombrich (1960) pointed out, mature viewers reject most snapshots as uncharacteristic of their referents.

A commonsense opinion about the display of appearance in photographs was crucial in a Court of Appeal landmark decision (London, October 10, 1997) reviewing a conviction for possession of indecent video photographs. The defence submitted that the prosecution had not called an expert to attest the age of children in the photographs. A substantive issue was seen to be involved; the appeal would not otherwise have been considered at Court. Lord Justice Judge and colleagues rejected the appeal on the grounds that photographs were referentially self-evident: “A brief look at the material would show whether it did or might depict a person under 16,” and, in that respect, the “jury was just as able as an expert” in assessing the evidence (*R. v. Land*, 1997, p. 446). The assumption was that viewers are equal as pictorial interpreters for the task, and it was explicitly recorded that the presumption of equality applied to the defendant (*O’Hanlon*, 1997). It is irrelevant whether or not the photographs had been faked; that is, the causal history of production is irrelevant. The offence was held to concern representations that trigger instant recognition in all viewers.
The judge’s ruling was in line with Schier’s (1986) philosophical characterization of pictorial competence as a disposition to recognize a picture of a referent by using the skill involved in being able to recognize the referent itself (see also Hopkins, 1998; Lopes, 1997, p. 178). The judge’s ruling seems reasonable for his purpose. Would it be reasonable to extend the ruling to cases of line drawings stylized as caricatures? Research on caricatures has become very interesting nowadays. Caricatures themselves clearly preserve the imprint of agency: Some artists have gone to great lengths to interpose themselves between reality and image. The issue here is that line caricatures are not entirely *naturalistic* (surfaces of the referent may only be implied by white spaces between the lines, and proportions can be so distorted that a real referent would be unviable). But the crucial fact about instant recognition is that some caricatures can serve as “superportraits” triggering faster and more accurate recognitions than undistorted images (see Rhodes, 1996). Pictorial *realism* can be specified as “the quality of a picture that allows us quickly and easily to recognize what it is a picture of” (Sartwell, 1994, p. 354). Realism lies “not in quantity of information but in how easily it issues” (Goodman, 1976, p. 36). It is theoretically most interesting that caricatures, which are clearly fictional transformations of referent appearances, can be categorized by philosophers as more realistic than photographs that one signs for as “true likenesses” on identity documents.

Recognizability is not a function of how confusible a picture is with its referent. Nobody confuses a caricature with a real face, yet a caricature can indeed be as recognizable as an undistorted image (Perkins & Hagen, 1980). Something is known of the basis in the visual brain for how caricatures work. Think of a line drawing as having tonal contrasts in it that would be appropriate either to valleys cut into the surface or to ridges standing proud of the surface. Pearson, Hanna, and Martinez (1990) demonstrated that black-on-white line drawings mapped onto luminance valleys from gray-scale images. Recognition accuracy of black-on-white caricatures was thereby superior to that of white-on-black caricature; one would predict superiority in speed of recognition too, not just in accuracy of recognition (contrary to a suggestion by Biederman & Kalocsai, 1997, on comparing drawings with photographs).

Given a picture that triggers a recognition of its contents, under what conditions will a viewer be willing to “affirm a likeness”? Rhodes and McLean (1990) reported that untrained viewers recognized caricatured birds as accurately as undistorted images. Bird experts even found caricatures more recognizable than undistorted images. The important point is that the expert bird watchers had not been specially trained with caricatures. Therefore, it must have been the bird watchers’ expertise in discriminating between real birds and between bird pictures that gave positive transfer to caricatures. Only some people are expert bird watchers, but all people can be regarded as expert face watchers; and a caricature advantage can indeed appear with face recognition. Caricatures may serve as better likenesses than undistorted images (see Rhodes, 1996, pp. 98–102, for conditions under which a caricature advantage holds). The advantage is a function of the degree to which a particular caricature exaggerates distinctive aspects of the particular referent face it is caricaturing. It is also possible to generate anticaricatures that deemphasize referent distinctiveness (Brennan, 1985). Rhodes, Brennan, and Carey (1987) reported that viewers’ speed in recognizing caricatures of their colleagues was twice the speed of undistorted images, which was, in turn, twice the speed of anticaricatures (see Benson & Perrett, 1994; Stevenage, 1995, for cognate data).

Caricatures can also facilitate learning names for faces (Stevenage, 1995), so caricatures support the consolidation of associative memory traces. It has proved possible to model some of the caricature effects in computational research. Tanaka and Simon (1996) found higher activation for caricatures than undistorted input by back-propagation in a neural net modeling (see also Calder, Young, Benson, & Perrett, 1996, on modelling a caricature advantage in priming).
Given that caricatures are pictorially powerful in their effects on perception and memory, the next question is whether recognizability results carry through to viewers’ beliefs about caricatures. We know how viewers react to caricatures in various ways that show that viewers’ visual systems are registering a likeness, but are viewers likely consciously to affirm a caricature to be a likeness? Rhodes and Tremewan (1996) studied face caricatures varying in distortion and found that 30% to 50% distortions facilitated recognition, yet 10% caricatures were judged to be best likenesses (Rhodes, 1996, p. 102). However, Benson and Perrett (1994) allowed viewers also to act as artists by giving them a slider that controlled caricature distortion on the screen; and some 40% distortion was produced in a best likeness task. The stimuli were then checked for recognizability, and a satisfactory fit was obtained in the data. It seems that when participants are put in the artist’s role, they tend to adopt a realist stance on ensuring that visual information “issues easily” from the drawing; and when participants are put in the viewers’ role, they use more naturalistic criteria for judging likeness. Consonant with that, viewers generally rated photographs as truer likenesses than professional caricatures of famous faces in most of the conditions used by Tversky and Baratz (1985). Finally, note that photographs can be put into a caricature program and thus produce photographic caricatures. Such pictures trigger a strong naturalistic preference for undistorted images as best likeness (Benson & Perrett, 1991; Ellis, 1992). It is essential to see whether there would be a tilt toward realism when participants themselves produce photographic caricatures. It is essential to find out whether the previous empirical effects extend to recognition and judgment of aspects, such as mood.

PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION

Communication systems all involve one small set of relations between a communicator and a receiver. Constraints on those relations allow agents to agree on what information is transmitted from one mind to another. Thus, with language, “When noises have meaning they do not only have distinctive relations with human beings who use them or respond to them but also distinctive connections with some . . . states of affairs . . . in the world” (Heal, 1978, p. 367). That is, communication of something is from an agent to an agent via an utterance. Those four entities are the irreducible minimum needed for defining linguistic communication. Cognate terms for pictorial communication are artist, viewer, picture, and referent. They may become empirically very close-knit, as when an artist makes a self-portrait and is the first viewer of the finished product. But no matter how close-knit the relations become, those four entities are analytically distinct. A theory of pictures, whether in the mind of the scientist or in the mind of the lay viewing public, must encompass relations between the four entities. That is the main thrust of a broad analysis of pictorial reasoning (Freeman, 1995). The problem for children is that pictorial reasoning has to be spread broadly over all four entities. That is why pictorial reasoning is a lifelong endeavor (Freeman, 2000). For each of the topics of expressivity, beauty, and recognizability, it is straightforward to lay out how people can vary in their thinking. Here is an example for beauty.

1. Beauty might be assumed to be an objective property of a picture, much like the complexity of its lines is an objective property (as studied by Hekkert, 1995, for cubism).
2. Another assumption would be that beauty is a function of whatever referent is recognizable. Parsons (1987) suggested that learners in such a phase would deny that one could get a beautiful picture of an old and rusting automobile. Young children assume that if a referent were ugly, then a picture of it would necessarily be ugly in the same way as the referent itself. That rigid concept of resemblance neglects the agency of the artist.
3. A third assumption would be that the artist was the responsible agent, beautifying a picture regardless of the referent, analogous to the power of a decorator to do up a decrepit house. Hekkert’s (1995) series of experiments revealed a component of inexpert viewers’ preference as being a requirement that artists’ agency be apparent in their mastery in production.

4. Finally, beauty might be assumed to be a function of the viewer, “beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” That conception operates as though the viewer held all the power of agency in the situation and direction of fit were from picture to mind in the viewer, irrespective of what the picture might display and how powerful the artist’s expressivity might be.

Is it likely that people develop very firm assumptions about pictorial beauty? It is certainly common to regard being beautiful as a prime attribute of pictorial success. Kindler and Darras (1998) interviewed 7- to 14-year-olds in British Columbia, Quebec, and France, in the absence of pictures. The question of interest here is “what is a good drawing?” The most common attribute across the cultures was that the drawing be “beautiful.” Thereafter, there was interesting cultural diversity, with consideration of expressive quality being second for Quebec participants, but low for others. What we can take from that study is that in order to be the most common attribute emerging over and above a degree of cultural diversity, a conception of beauty must be rooted in some very firm assumption or other. In a probe for assumptions about pictorial beauty, Freeman and Sanger (1995) interviewed Anguillan children who had no art training beyond the chance to paint at Sunday school. Most 11-year-olds maintained that an ugly thing would make a worse picture than a pretty thing. The children’s reasoning was mainly “if something is ugly, you would have to draw an ugly picture, and an ugly picture is a bad picture.” That is, (a) beauty or ugliness exists in the referent, (b) it becomes transferred onto a picture surface, and (c) the terms “pretty” and “ugly” map onto “good” and “bad,” so (d) if something is ugly then it must be bad. The children were in accord with the formulation of classical naturalism, where “The work of art is conceived as the mirror for natural beauty” And “. . . naturalism . . . may be inconsistent with some of the senses of ‘realism’” (Osborne, 1970, p. 767). Most 14-year-olds maintained that it did not follow that if something were ugly a picture of it would be bad and largely explained that the outcome depends on the artist’s skills and enthusiasm. Those children were spontaneously shifting from focusing on the picture–referent relation to invoking the artist–picture relation that the interviewer had not explicitly mentioned. That is a shift toward regarding pictures as communications of the artist’s competence (see Gross, 1973). The prediction is that the shift would be even further delayed in a systematic replication with questioning about photographs. Freeman and Sanger (1993) noted that the shift occurred in English city children some 3 years younger. The suggestion is that the same conceptual shift occurs in urban English children and Caribbean island rural children, just on a different timescale. Evidence for that suggestion came from asking children questions that explicitly mentioned other relations in the intentional net. Younger children largely applied the same resemblance argument for expressivity as for beauty, whereby an artist feeling happy or sad produces a happy or sad picture. Maybe the children were using some notion of emotional projection; but another finding does not entirely support that idea, whereby the younger children largely held that a viewer’s mood could not affect viewing. For them what the picture is, is what you see. As hypothesized, the viewer was the last entity to be integrated into thinking, with a conception of viewer autonomy emerging in the older children. It is worth noting that even 3-year-olds understand that viewers differ in their liking for drawings (Hart & Goldin-Meadow, 1984); they understand that the viewer–picture relation can vary. But that is a long way from understanding viewers as representational agents whose culturally relative pictorial judgment will vary depending on what they bring to the viewing situation (see Parsons, 1987).
Studies of the Earliest Signs of Pictorial Reasoning

General debate over intention in production can be traced back to Luquet (1927). He argued that preschool children are accustomed to start off with an intention to draw some particular referent, and if the emerging drawing seems to resemble something else, they may switch to a new interpretation (see Freeman, 1972, for a critique). Even children as old as 4 years of age may only recently have emerged from the phase where they pretend to act as artists by stipulating what their scribbles show, suspending the truth condition of recognizability of referents. A child’s scribble of mother falls short of depicting her because it “simply does not represent her as having any visual properties—properties she may be seen to have” (Lopes, 1997, p. 98). For a century, researchers have been offered the stark alternatives that early scribbles (a) reveal as-yet unmodelable connections between representational intent and product (see Smith, 1979; also Stephan, 1990, pp. 94–99), or (b) “show the utter lack of any apparent connection between a mental picture in consciousness and the movements made by the hands and fingers in attempting to draw it” (Lukens, 1986, pp. 79–80). The latter has been decisively disconfirmed, and the former has been made more precise.

A longstanding empirical problem has been that many 2–year-olds stay silent when asked what their scribbles show. It transpires that it is possible to elicit a high level of replies if the experimenter points to segments of the scribble. Adi-Japha, Levin, and Solomon (1997) identified a regularity specifying (a) what segment will elicit a representational reply and (b) under what conditions. Let us take those two in turn. Inflected lines were stronger stimuli than smooth curves. The authors showed that the distinction could be formulated in terms of a psychophysical function governing the speed of the pen. Inflections involve slowing the pen. The suggestion is that making an inflection involves an effort of production that primes focal attention to the mark. The conditions under which the inflection advantage held were illuminating. The advantage was disrupted by even moderate delay, suggesting that a memory of the act of production was important. That rules out the possibility that the advantage was solely a product of associative visual memory in which, for some reason, a greater number of inflected forms than smooth forms were stored. Congruent with that, the advantage vanished when the segments were in another child’s scribble or in the experimenter’s copy of the child’s own scribble. Long before children’s own productions can trigger content recognition in a viewer, a basis is laid for some conception of an active relation of production. There is no evidence that any of the 2-year-olds’ interpretations were other than post hoc as opposed to preplanned representational intention. Some evidence for a connection between representation and fulfilled prior intention can be found by asking children to draw a segment of an otherwise finished picture. Freeman (1980, pp. 5–6) gave a 2-year-old scribbler incomplete drawings to scribble over on condition that he stated what he was going to draw before he started. The resulting scribbles were uninterpretable; but for each segment, the pen hit at the start precisely where it should to complete the drawing (for sample data on multicue control see Freeman, 1980, pp. 198–201). For viewers only of the finished product, the representational intent visible during the process of scribble production had been hidden in noise.

Systematic evidence for a connection between representation and fulfilled intention comes from 3-year-olds. Gelman and Ebeling (1997) used pictures that appeared poorly done but could be seen as representational (e.g., a bear). Children were told that the markings either (a) had arisen by accident (e.g., someone knocking over a paint pot) or (b) had been intentionally produced by someone. The children were then asked to describe each picture. The intentional group had had the artist–picture relation primed; they named the contents much more than did the unintentional group. One possibility is that the intentional group noticed the contents of the pictures more than the unintentional group did. It is feasible to do a systematic replication varying pictorial realism to counterpose intention against a successfulness of a product as it
looks to a viewer. It is important to discover whether the intention effect (a) applies across the board to different levels of realism or (b) leads to a lower criterion for a recognizable picture, to encompass less realistic pictures. A more powerful study was reported by Bloom and Markson (1998). In one circumstance, preschool children were asked to draw a balloon on a string. The drawing was put away. On a separate occasion the children were asked to draw a lollipop. A balloon on a string can be visually parsed as a volume on an extended thin object and thence pictorially mapped onto a circle on a line. But so can a lollipop. If a preschool child produces virtually identical drawings of balloon and lollipop, how can anyone decide which picture is which? Bloom and Markson (1998) reported that the children who had produced the circle-line drawings used recall of own prior intention to label their own drawings; and sometimes protested if the experimenter deliberately transposed labels. Let us put the finding in formal terms: When the shape on the page did not serve its usual role in deciding what shape in the outside world was the referent, preschool children relied on a memory of the causal history of production to label what each drawing referentially communicated. The authors’ general conclusion was that “Children might call a picture that looks like a bird ‘a bird’ not merely because it looks like a bird, but because its appearance makes it likely that it was created with the intent to represent a bird. In general, appearance—and shape in particular—is seen as an excellent cue to intention” (Bloom & Markson, 1998, p. 203).

It would be unsafe to credit the preschool children with a deep grasp of representational principles, but their pictorial decision accorded with an insistence in the literature that knowledge of causal history may legitimate an interpretation. Thus, a picture of you represents you and not your identical twin (see Schier, 1986; also Perner, 1991). It could even be true that your twin has never been drawn or photographed by anyone. The representing relation is here analogous to a written marriage contract; someone who marries you does not thereby marry your twin, not even if your parents had absentmindedly given both of you the same name which is thus written on the marriage contract. A picture of a lollipop is not a picture of a balloon even if the two can be depicted identically. An analogy can also be taken from intentional communication terms: The word “bank” denoting a riverside does not denote a financial institution even though the pronunciation is identical. The resemblance is not a relevant resemblance. From a variety of theoretical perspectives, analyses of representation and of communicative relevance crucially intersect (see Freeman, 2000; Harrison, 1997; Hobson, 1993; Schier, 1986; Searle, 1982; Sinha, 1988; Wollheim, 1987). A working definition of representational depiction should include the notion of “someone’s attempt to communicate preserve, or express” something (DeLoache, Pierrotsakos, & Troseth, 1997, p. 3). Pictures not only allow a viewer “to see things but also allow one person to communicate with another. This means they are almost invariably subordinate to intention” (Kennedy, Gabias, & Pierantonii, 1990, p. 43). In Bloom and Markson’s (1998) experiment, the causal history included the artist’s representational intent. Bloom and Markson argued that viewers categorize pictures as functional artifacts that realize intentions. Viewers assume that if a drawing is seen to have a similar shape to something else such as a clothespin, it would be extremely unlikely that the two appearances would have been made to match by accident.

It is feasible to ask how viewers’ interpretation of what they see in a picture weighs evidence from a producer’s state of mind against the appearance of the finished product. Thus, in a set of studies on adult drawing where “Both skilled and unskilled artists overestimated the accuracy of rendering regardless of who created the rendering...the artists may have recognized what the critics may have missed: the intent behind the marks...an understanding of the intent behind a mark may translate into a higher estimation of the accuracy of the rendering” (Cohen & Bennett, 1997, p. 620).

An account of viewers’ assumptions must incorporate an idea of a picture as an artifact, made by one agent (artist) and available for use by another agent (viewer) who, in the Bloom–Markson (1998) and Cohen–Bennett (1997) studies, had commissioned the artist to depict
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named things. Note how Bloom and Markson’s formulation reflects the shift in aesthetic argument that was noted in the opening section of the present chapter: A mental analysis, rather than a picture being central, takes center stage. What is central is not the shape on the page exerting its effects on a viewer but the communicative intentions of the picture producer. Bloom (2000) argued that the intentional analysis is not peculiar to the pictorial domain. Sensitivity to communicators’ intentions is central to children’s learning in general. Of course, children might misread intentions, and the communicator might well be animated by intentions below the level of conscious awareness. But that is a different matter: Any learning-approach makes mistakes.

There are data showing that some preschool children confuse the properties of a referent with the properties of a picture. In general, it seems that discrimination between picture properties and referent properties is established by some 19 months of age (DeLoache, Pierroutsakos, Uttal, Rosengren, & Gottlieb, 1998) but takes time to become effective under test conditions. Preschool children may predict that a picture of an ice-cream will feel cold and be edible. Maybe some of the children have yet to learn that the medium does not transparently allow the transfer of those particular properties from the referent. However, such errors often vanish with counter-suggestion or an invitation to eat the picture (Beilin & Pearlman, 1991). More persistent failure, even in 4-year-olds, to separate picture from referent comes from studies in which a photograph is taken, then the referent is changed, and the child is asked what the photograph depicts. Updating the picture occurs, as though the depiction were tied to reality instead of being a representation of its aspect at the time of depiction (Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Peterson & Siegal, 1998; Slaughter, 1998; Zaitchik, 1990). However, a crucial constraint on the error was noted by Robinson, Nye, and Thomas (1994), in systematic replication involving the experimenter making line drawings. The design included a converse test in which the line drawing was changed and the child was asked to predict whether the referent would change. Updating errors were clearly asymmetrical, running from referent to picture rather than the reverse. That is, the child may regard a picture as tied to reality, but is less likely to regard reality as tied to a picture. That is at least in the right direction: A picture might become uninterpretable when its referent gets destroyed, but reality does not vanish if a picture gets destroyed. It is a plausible guess that the average 3-year-old would not be terror stricken if a drawing of her were torn up (Freeman, 1991).

Robinson, Riggs, and Samuel (1996) ran a deceptive box task in which 3- and 4-year-olds were asked what they thought was in a smartie tube, and to draw the contents, then were shown that the contents were marbles and were asked to recall what they had first thought and drawn as (mis)representations of the contents. Recall of the caption of the drawing was 70% accurate, compared with 45% accurate recall of the prior belief. In another study in which the child watched someone else doing the test, recall was 85% for drawing and 63% for belief. Let us first consider children’s successes. It was easier for children to categorize a drawing as a representation that can mismatch reality than to categorize a prior belief as a misrepresentation. Children who have only a rudimentary theory of mind as indexed by the standard deceptive box test are likely to have precociously acquired a concept of depiction, and the two can readily be empirically dissociated (Slaughter, 1998).

Finally, what is the role of the viewer in young children’s assumptions? Taylor (1988) showed children, between 3 and 8 years of age, pictures of animals (e.g., a giraffe), drawing attention to the aspect that was depicted (e.g., sitting). Viewers were then allowed restricted views of the picture, ranging from a tiny edge to a small part that would only just reveal what species was depicted. Half the children up to 5 years of age reported on at least one trial that even a tiny edge was sufficient for the viewer to recognize the species. Above the age of 3 years, there was less tendency also to claim that the viewer would recognize the aspect under which the referent was depicted. Pillow (1994) showed children a segment of a picture, say a triangle,
and asked them what they thought it was before revealing the rest of the picture in which the triangle turned out to be the roof of a house. The procedure was repeated. On the third presentation the triangle turned out to be a shark fin. The whole procedure was repeated with a fresh viewer while the child watched. The child was asked to predict how the viewer would interpret the triangle on the third trial before seeing the whole card. The correct answer “roof” and not “shark” was only at some 50% level even in 6-year-olds. Chandler and Lalonde (1994) confirmed that one cannot rely on children under some 7 years of age to take into account in their pictorial inferences other viewers’ epistemic states. The overall indication is that the viewer is the last entity to be incorporated into pictorial reasoning. It may even be the case that a slogan like “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” is actually a rather advanced formulation. The formulation appears to be a trite comment on people’s tastes differing, and so it might be in the minds of many. But it is also conceivable that the formulation reflects a discovery of the agency of the viewer. If that be so, it is rather a creditable discovery that can be built on, instead of being used to foreclose discussion in line with the well-worn notion that there is nothing to argue about where differences in taste arise.

EDUCATIONAL CHALLENGES

Innovations in art put a strain on the everyday aesthetic reasoning of the viewing public. That is, artists invent a new method of production, and viewers deploy commonsense assumptions to test claims about the products. Any account of aesthetic judgment has to explain the nature of challenging encounters with artworks that might lead viewers to reflect on their pictorial assumptions (Parsons, 1987) or to reject the artwork. Many viewers exhibit resistance when entering a collection of assemblages of junk (see Matravers, 1994) or canvasses in varying shades of gray. Viewers may well reject an innovation, expressing concern and dismay at any gallery paying good money for whatever artwork it is that is taken to be an affront. And yet it would be a big mistake to let one’s attention be captured by the fact of expressed rejection. That distracts one’s attention from an analysis of what pictorial reasoning underlies the rejection. Often enough, expressed rejection seems to be generated by an attempt to articulate that the artist has failed to communicate. In this section we examine that possibility and ask what the educational implications are.

In the earlier section on pictorial communication, it was noted that the irreducible minimum is to consider the four terms: artist, viewer, picture, and referent. Given four terms, it follows that people might give weight to one term more than to other terms in any particular situation of a pictorial puzzle. We went through the possibility of children progressing from thinking that the beauty of a picture came directly from the referent, or scene, depicted, so that a picture acted rather like a mirror held up to nature. Another possibility was of a development to grasping the role of an artist who uses the power of agency as a beautifier, much as a decorator beautifies a blank room that is just waiting for something to be done. And two other possibilities were considered. The assumption we use in this section is that mature people become accustomed to thinking about artworks in terms of the four entities in the communication network. It follows that if a particular artwork appears to obscure the role of any one of the four entities, people will react by trying to repair the damage; so the viewers will thereby attempt to reinstate their ideas of communication.

Consider for the moment the “case of the vanishing artist.” The lesson will be that it is absolutely fine to foster innovation and experimentation in art education, as long as it be accompanied by an awareness of exactly how the innovation challenges the viewing public. The fostering of such awareness in art students is in itself educational; it helps them become aware of how a diversity of other people may react to their work.
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First, there has been a history of artists attempting to focus viewers’ attention onto the picture by removing recognizable referents in favor of abstract patterns. Sometimes that can have unifying effects on viewers, as in responding to Mondrian abstracts, as was noted earlier. Sometimes it can misfire, as in the heyday of Abstract Expressionism where the artist might even walk over the canvas. Learners give weight to a commonsense notion that a pictorial artwork ought to be seen to be well crafted (Hekkert, 1995). Ironically, an attempt by expressionist artists physically to unite with the artwork had rendered both artist and artistry invisible, so viewers had nowhere for their concept of interpretation to grip—“anyone could do that.” Art critics justified the abstracts as historically necessary, arguing from traditions of picture-to-picture fit (see Wolfe, 1975, for polemical opposition). Viewers who reasonably rely on being able to think in terms of an intact communication model, which includes an artist’s relation to a picture, often resist critics’ deployment of art history. Gross (1973) argued that viewers are right to expect evidence on why the artist chose as she did, and what the organization is that would allow the viewer to admire the art by admiration of artistry.

Second, consider a case where the artist seems to vanish in favor of some other agency. It is, in principle, possible for an ant to leave a pattern on the sand that looks like Winston Churchill (see Putnam, 1981). The pattern is not an artifact but a natural kind which has migrated to take the artist’s position. The artist’s vanishing can be repaired by anyone willing to claim the role of artist. Someone could take a cast of the sand pattern and put it on display. Production is shared between that artist and the ant as unwitting accomplice. Such is the logic behind the display of objets trouvés in galleries. The products rely for their effect on the ambiguity between attributing responsibility to the natural producer, to the vision of the viewer who discerned initial possibilities, and to her subsequent action as an artist. It is no accident that Damien Hirst’s animal corpses framed in tanks challenge the hard-won reasoning of a vast section of the viewing public. So did Carl Andre’s unframed bricks Equivalent VIII (see Eaton, 1988, for discussion). Recently, a movement has arisen to reinstate artists proactively—“with biological art, the artist doesn’t finish his own creation. He begins the work and lets the silkworm finish it off by laying silk over the original design” (Magan, 1997, p. 3). It is safe to predict that a movement will arise to let the animal start the production and the artist intervene before or at the end. It seems equally safe to predict that the artists will have to give viewers explicit briefing about what is going on.

Third, consider cases where the artists exert their authority by removing anything that viewers would consider to be a picture. At the opening of the 2001 Turner Prize exhibition at Tate Britain, the curator announced that the prize-winning artwork was particularly significant in being a critical moment in the trend of the dematerialization of art since the 1960s. The artwork by Martin Creed was an empty room with lights spasmodically flickering. The work “has had people spluttering and complaining that anyone could have done it” (Searle, 2001, p. 3). The role of the artist had been cut out of viewers’ model of thinking, and they wanted something to fill the place. To fill the place with “anyone” is not remotely satisfying. It is no remedy to tell viewers that even if they could have done it, it so happens that they had not done it. That does not answer the viewers’ point. The point is to know what made the installation worth doing. And that is not easy to discern. It is even harder with the March 2002 exhibition at the Birmingham Custard Factory. Ana Benloch and Stuart Tait left the exhibition room bare. So if viewers wanted to imagine artworks, they could, but that was all the art experience that was on offer. So here, both artist agency and artwork had decisively been removed from being on offer. It is hard to think of what information to offer viewers in such a case to make up for their minds not necessarily being engaged. It would not help to tell them that a visit to the exhibition would be a bit like a visit to a restaurant that told you that you were free to imagine any food you like, and that was all you were going to get. It is hard in such a case to distinguish between artistic wit and artistic dereliction of duty. And if that
was the purpose of the exhibition, it needs meticulous spelling out and assimilably offering to visitors. It might be supposed that nothing can come of nothing. But that is not entirely true. Important presentation of empty space can be done. At the opening in 1999 of Daniel Libeskind's Jewish museum in Berlin, all exhibits were kept out, by public demand. The public wanted to see and feel the empty space. The attraction grew; and by the end of the year, some half a million people had come. Libeskind had made it possible for people to come to terms with vital emotions through moving through an important space. Nothing more was necessary. But then it usually is not if you get things right. And that, ultimately, was why the Tate Britain and the Birmingham Custard Factory exhibitions were failures to engage and educate the viewing public: Nothing assured them that everything or anything had been done to get things right.

With artworks nowadays, things can be gotten right. Communication can be achieved. The concerns of the viewing public can be addressed. But to address people’s minds, it is necessary to understand the assumptions they bring to the viewing situation (Parsons, 1987). It is not necessary to use information about people’s assumptions to pander to their biases. But it is such a waste of an educational possibility not to be respectful of people’s intuitive tendency to think in terms of communication.

In summary, communication is not confined to exchanging utterances or gestures; instead there is a variety of cultural devices whereby we try to bridge the gap between minds and between physical and mental realities. For example, photographs can make the look of things portable, communicating to a viewer how the agent felt about a scene, or what he or she remembers about it, maybe even inviting the viewer to compare her memory of the scene with that of the agent. Pictures are important prostheses, enabling protagonists to stage-manage a meeting of minds. Innovations in art may challenge viewers’ habitual way of seeking meaning in art. Some innovations can readily be classified so as to make salient exactly what challenge is involved. Education may well involve explaining the challenge, respectfully. With respect, that is, toward the hard-won assumptions people develop and the pattern of reasoning they undertake when they judge artworks.

REFERENCES


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