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SCANDAL AND NEWS VALUES

Brian McNair

Introduction

Scandal is as old, one might reasonably speculate, as human communication itself. Oral cultures nurtured scandals as surely as did early scribal cultures. It seems likely – if hard to prove, for obvious reasons – that gossip and rumour have been part of human interaction and social relations from prehistoric times. But as media technology and systems have evolved into the globalised public sphere of news and journalism we now inhabit, so have the reach and impact of scandal. Scandal is now a prominent feature of global news culture, with some scandals dominating news agendas all around the world for significant periods of time. In this chapter I consider the factors which shape the news value of scandal in both democratic and authoritarian societies.

News values

Journalism, of which news is a major subgenre, can only ever be a sampling of reality, a selection of the events and processes taking place at any given time in a given society or culture. Journalists and their editors must always make choices about which aspects of reality they will report on and publish as ‘news’, simply because they have neither the resources nor the physical space to report everything. In the days of print, newspapers had a few pages to fill, and no more (much of it taken up by advertising). In the era of the globalised public sphere, and superfast broadband, there is more space, but even that is not enough to allow everything to be reported. For one thing, and at least until AI technology permits otherwise, news is a product of human beings who need rest and salaries. Even for news aggregation platforms such as Google there is a physical, human limit to how much news can be produced by a given outlet at any given time.

In addition, given that most news media, for most of history, have been commercial organisations driven by the profit motive, it is crucial for them to publish news which attracts consumers – readers, viewers and listeners, BuzzFeed clickers, Facebook sharers and Twitter retweeters. Even non-profit outlets such as the BBC must follow this logic, since their short term funding and long term survival depends in large part on the visible demonstration of public loyalty to their journalism.

So, what gives reality value as news? Galtung and Ruge’s 1965 essay on ‘Structuring and Selecting News’ (reviewed and critiqued in Harcup and O’Neill, 2001) was and remains a
useful starting point in answering that question. Although their work related only to print and broadcast media of the analogue era, and did not foresee the always-on, globalised 24-hour news culture of today, they successfully identified some key elements of what shapes news value. The consumers of news seek out conflict, drama, negativity, deviation from social norms such as crime (the more heinous, the more newsworthy). Good news, as the cliché has it, is no news (or rarely is – we see occasional efforts by well meaning news folk to suggest that maybe, sometimes, news could be more uplifting and positive). The furore which led to the closure of the News Of The World (NOTW) red top tabloid in 2011, because of allegedly invasive reporting techniques including the phone hacking of a young murdered girl, Milly Dowler, often downplayed the fact that NOTW was a hugely popular newspaper at its peak, trading on crime, scandal and deviance in general. Stories such as that of the Milly Dowler murder were precisely the reason why millions of people bought the title over many decades, and why Murdoch’s News Corp was prepared to break laws and basic journalistic ethics to enable their reportage. (Murdoch and his family have survived the phone hacking scandal without damage, indeed they have prospered, largely, and with some justification, on the basis that, really, all they were doing with the NOTW and their other tabloids was giving the people what they wanted.)

News values remain more or less constant even as media technology advances and changes the communication environment. From the days of early print media when witch burnings and gruesome executions occupied the front pages, to today’s exposés of serial killers, sex abusers and perverted clerics, ‘problematic reality’ has news value and sells journalism. In this context, scandal is a perennially newsworthy story, as and when the problematic realities of certain individuals and organisations become scandalous. The rest of this chapter explores how scandal emerges, and how its news value is determined in specific cases.

A brief history of scandal

A short article of this kind does not allow for detailed analysis of particular scandals, but a few highly newsworthy examples which have become emblematic of the phenomenon would include the case of former UK Liberal Party leader Jeremy Thorpe, a closet gay man once tipped for great things who in the early 1970s commissioned an assassin to kill his lover Norman Scott. A highly praised 2018 BBC drama series tells the story of the Thorpe scandal, which illustrates how scandal is newsworthy to the extent that it involves elite figures, be they politicians, movie stars, supermodels or senior clerics. News values prioritise stories about elites and celebrities, and when these elites behave badly – for example, the case of Harvey Weinstein and other male celebrities implicated in the #MeToo movement – this is almost always news. If news is to a large extent the reportage of problematic reality, scandal is of obvious appeal to editors, journalists and their audiences.

In the USA, president Bill Clinton illustrated the nature of scandal in the digital age when in 1998 the Drudge Report, a hitherto unknown online-only publication, exposed his relationship with intern Monica Lewinsky. Prestigious print media outlets knew about the story, but declined to publish it, deferring to analogue era standards of deference towards elite authority which had also protected the presidency of John F. Kennedy. Drudge had no such inhibitions, and the relatively uncensorable nature of the internet allowed him to turn it into a global news story of unprecedented value, which came close to destroying the Clinton presidency.

Clinton escaped impeachment, while suffering many globally reported insults to his dignity, but the story defined his presidency and returned to haunt Hilary Clinton when she was contesting Donald Trump for the presidency in 2016. How, it was suggested by Trump supporters, could the former First Lady occupy the moral high ground around Trump’s ‘pussy grabbing’
More recently in the United States, rising New York Democrat star Anthony Weiner, whose wife Huma Abedin was a key aide to Hilary Clinton up to and including the duration of her 2016 campaign for president, was revealed to have been sexting explicit images of his genitalia to another woman on Twitter. Further revelations emerged in subsequent weeks and months, effectively derailing his career and leading to his resignation from Congress. In 2016, however, at the peak of the contentious US presidential campaign in which Hilary Clinton was under relentless attack from Trump and the alt-right, Weiner was found to have been sexting an underage girl. This story was deeply embarrassing to the Clinton campaign, given that it so closely involved Abedin. In 2017 Weiner was imprisoned for transferring obscene material to a minor.

Scandal: a definition

Scandal can be defined as that moment, or series of moments – since one item of potentially scandalous information can easily lead to subsequent ones in a cycle of deepening controversy – when private gossip and rumour about transgression become part of public knowledge and media discourse.

People routinely talk about other people’s real or perceived faults, of course, be they family members, friends, work colleagues or neighbours, but only when these conversations become part of the news media and public sphere do they become the subject of public debate and opprobrium – that is, scandalous. As a recent example, we can cite the case of Meghan Markle and her father. The latter sought to cast aspersions on his daughter’s conduct around the time of her marriage to Prince Harry. Many families fall out around the arrangements for a wedding, but the statements of Markle’s father became a running global news story, lasting many months. Who in the Markle family had been invited to the wedding, and who excluded? Who was going to escort the bride down the aisle? Who said what, to whom, and why, and when, and to which media outlets, throughout the actual wedding and beyond?

This example shows that it is those who by virtue of their social position have the potential to be of news value can become the subject of mediated scandal. I may be the subject of gossip in my neighbourhood about, let’s say for argument’s sake, loud music played at night, or suspicions of domestic abuse behind closed doors, but I am not going to be the subject of scandalous news coverage in the media if no-one beyond the narrow circle of my neighbourhood is concerned by my possible transgression. My behavior is not newsworthy. Unless an actual crime is committed, which then becomes the subject of routine crime reportage in local or national media – and the more heinous the crime the more extensive the coverage will be, of course – there will probably be no media element to the allegedly transgressive behaviour. And even if a crime is committed and reported in the news, this is not necessarily a scandal. Only if it involves an already newsworthy figure – such as a celebrity like Mel Gibson, when he made anti-Semitic remarks to police – does a transgressive act tend to become scandalous.

The scandals around #MeToo concerned behaviours which have been routine in sexual and gender relations forever – arguments about consent, or appropriateness of sexual advance, or abuse of power in the workplace – but they only became scandalous in the global news media when those behaviours were linked to newsworthy figures such as Harvey Weinstein and Kevin Spacey.

Reference to #MeToo underlines a second key defining element of scandal – that it is always founded on allegations of moral transgression. Such transgression can be related to the breaching of sexual codes – as in #MeToo, where a series of men (and some women, such as actress Asia
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Argento and New York University professor Avital Ronnell) were accused of exploiting others for sexual motivation; corruption by governing elites who are exposed as abusing public monies for their private benefit (as in the scandal which followed the Panama Papers; religious clerics who violate their stated oaths, as in the global scandal of child sexual abuse within the Catholic Church. On the latter, the Pennsylvania Grand Jury report of July 2018 which exposed the abuse over decades of literally thousands of children by hundreds of clerics, and the associated cover up by senior Church figures, was a recent case of a phenomenon in which priests and more senior clerics have been exposed as abusers of the vulnerable who were placed in their care. Notable examples include those of the late Cardinal Keith O'Brien in Scotland – a vocal critic of homosexuality in his day, who turned out to have been abusing young trainee clerics for years before achieving seniority in Scotland and then the global Church hierarchy; Cardinal Phillip Wilson in Australia, who was in August 2018 convicted of covering up paedophilic abuses by clerics under his regime – and thousands of others, all over the world, prompting Pope Francis to issue an unprecedented letter of apology for ‘atrocities’ to his dwindling flock in August 2018. The transgression here was both a violation of what have become common social norms in Western societies – paedophilia is today recognised as unacceptable criminal activity – and, more importantly, moral hypocrisy, given the claims made by Catholicism for its divinely mandated spiritual superiority (and its imposition of celibacy on the priesthood). In many prominent cases of scandal, it is the perception of hypocrisy that generates news value and ultimately proves fatal to the allegedly scandalous.

By way of example, in 2015 Australian politics was experiencing one of its most newsworthy scandals of the last few decades – that of Barnaby Joyce, prominent Coalition MP and Deputy Prime Minister at the time when the scandal broke. Joyce exemplifies many of the features of a good scandal, and the reasons for media potency. First, he was a prominent opponent of same sex marriage rights in Australia, declaring himself to be a man of ‘family values’ at a time when Australian same sex couples were lobbying for marriage equality (a referendum overwhelmingly endorsed it in 2017). And indeed, he had then a family to whom he had always expressed loyalty – four children to his first wife, Natalie. His career in politics had been rooted in his family values brand, bolstered by his claim to rural Aussie authenticity.

He was also the government figure – Minister of Agriculture at that time – who threatened actors Johnny Depp and Amber Heard with arrest after they smuggled in their toy dogs to a film set on Australia’s Gold Coast in 2015, a stance which drew him global media attention and transformed him into a celebrity beyond his own country. Joyce threatened to have the dogs killed unless they were immediately removed from Australia. As he explained, ‘If we start letting movie stars – even though they’ve been the sexiest man alive twice – to come into our nation [and break laws], then why don’t we just break the laws for everybody? It’s time that Pistol and Boo [Depp’s dogs] buggered off back to the United States’. Depp was himself to be the subject of scandal a few months later, accused of domestic violence against Heard; but Joyce clearly relished in the fame his stance had attracted, and his image as a conservative Aussie battler who took no nonsense even from the likes of the movie star Depp contributed substantially to his rise to the position of deputy prime minister of Australia. Alas, as the Depp/Pistol/Boo saga was unfolding, it later transpired, Joyce was having an affair with one of his publicly funded staffers, a woman called Vikki Campion, who then went on to bear his (fifth) child. Joyce also revealed in his 2018 memoir that he had been pursuing women ‘for years’ in Canberra, Australia’s political hub, where he plied his trade as a career politician. His claim to believe in ‘family values’ were dubious, we thus learnt, when set against his actual behaviour.

The Joyce case underlines the fact that, in addition to involving a member of some elite group, for a story to become a scandal it should be one of transgression against self-proclaimed
or societally mandated values. Scandal is, in news terms, a narrative about the violation of rules, and when those who break the rules have been vocal advocates of them – as when a conservative ‘family values’ politician is found to have more than one family – the conflict between public stance and private behaviour is particularly newsworthy.

The formula for the news value of a scandal can perhaps be summarised thus:

\[ \text{newsworthiness} = \text{elite status} + \text{moral transgression} + \text{hypocrisy} \]

When the Barnaby Joyce scandal broke in Australia, it was above all the contradiction between his public statements against homosexuality and for ‘family values’ on the one hand, and on the other his private behaviour in breaking up his own family, which generated news value and fuelled the media fire. Without that appearance of moral hypocrisy, or his admitted deceit and lies to his own wife and children when caught out, no-one would have cared who Barnaby Joyce was having sex with in his office after hours.

The degree of political scandal generated by an act of moral or other transgression, the case of Joyce confirms, is in large part a function of the gap between public statements and private behaviour which the media are willing or able to expose. JFK got away with serial womanising and sex orgies in the White House, attended often by journalists, because his reputation was well known to insiders and the media chose not to report what was known by journalists to be typical behaviour. Donald Trump was elected despite the many claims of extramarital affairs, tax dodging, draft evasion, racism and the rest, because, well, he never seriously denied any of it. Allegedly, he was a known womaniser from the start, a man who openly mocked disabled people at his public rallies, denounced Mexican migrants as rapists, and thus could not be called out as a hypocrite after 8 November 2016. Those who voted for him knew what they were getting.

In the cases of both Bill Clinton and Donald Trump, two US presidents whose campaigns and terms in office were surrounded by accusations of sexual misconduct, their widely known sexual interest in women other than their own wives were frequently newsworthy but prevented scandal from becoming terminal. In August 2018, for example, as his former lawyer Michael Cohen was being convicted for campaign finance violations around payments to Stormy Daniels and Playboy model Karen MacDougall, Trump freely admitted that he had made the payments from his own personal funds (which would not be an illegal campaign finance transaction). His supporters, many of them interviewed on US media outlets at the end of August 2018, many of them devout Christians, defended this behaviour as merely part of Trump’s political persona – one they admired. ‘He’s only human,’ said one Trump voter interviewed on CNN about the Cohen convictions and hush money payments. The story was newsworthy, for sure, but survivable for a man with Trump’s record and reputation.

Similarly, when the then Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi was exposed in the global media for organizing Bunga Bunga parties at his villa, involving underaged girls and foreign leaders among others, his supporters cared little. He was already known as a serial philanderer, and the fact that some of the women paid to attend the parties were below the legal age of consent in Italy was no great news in that country, and certainly not scandalous enough to remove him from office. Berlusconi’s transgressions, like Trump’s two decades later, were simply discounted by his followers as part of his roguish profile.

The functions of scandal

Scandal has an important role to play in human culture. It helps to sell journalism in information markets which are driven by commodity relations and where there is the freedom to report on
the bad behaviour of elites. Scandal thus has value in news terms, but for this value to be realised media organisations must have the freedom to report on elite transgression. Absent the capacity of media organisations to report on, say, Kate Moss snorting cocaine, as reported by the UK’s Daily Mirror on 15 September 2005 – ‘Supermodel Kate Moss snorts line after line’ – there would be no scandal, especially when it concerns political elites. The transgressive behaviour would remain private.

In authoritarian societies where there is no or limited freedom of press, elite scandal is rare. In such societies there is no ‘news value’ in anything but what the ruling party, clan or family decrees to be permissible at any given time. As I note below, ruling elites in China have recently allowed media limited scope to cover scandals such as that involving Bo Xilai and his wife around the murder of a British businessman, but only for the purposes of internal power struggles. Coverage of the Panama Papers exposé of Chinese party financial affairs – a much more significant story in terms of how China is governed – was and remains fiercely suppressed.

In free media markets on the other hand, sex sells, to use that overworked cliché. But not only sex – drugs, financial corruption, cheating in sport (see the 2018 example of Australian cricketers caught on camera tampering with the ball, or English cricketers allegedly involved in match-fixing activities) – all can be the subject of scandal because they are attractive to media consumers and help sell papers and cable TV subscriptions (or drive clicks to online sites). The online TMZ publishes virtually nothing except scandal, most of it celebrity-based, such as the August 2018 story of #MeToo activist Asia Argento’s alleged sexual abuse of a 17-year-old teenager, Jimmy Bennett, illustrated by intimate photographs and texts. Argento’s case is another example of how perceived hypocrisy drives the news value of a scandal – she had been a leading proponent of the #MeToo movement, so when it emerged that she herself had been implicated in potential sexual misconduct involving a vulnerable underage male, she became headline news.

Amanda Foreman’s (1998) book on Georgina, Duchess of Devonshire tells how scandal functioned as a driver of print media in early modern Europe. Georgina was a Princess Diana-like figure, who broke taboos and defied the social conventions of her time. She was wealthy and privileged, but also punished for her transgressions. Her treatment by the eighteenth-century media was commercially motivated, and also establishes the notion that scandal – celebrity scandal, at least (Georgina was not a politician) – is a form of what Mikhail Bakhtin (1984), in his reading of Rabelais, called carnivalesque, a form of cultural ritual in which the downtrodden masses get to gawp at and perhaps even criticise the excesses of their social superiors. If we can see Kate Moss snorting cocaine on the front cover of the Daily Mirror, then maybe her multimillionaire status is not such a bonus? Then again, she wakes up the next day and is still a millionairess, courted by everyone from Richard Branson to Philip Green, while the proles are working for minimum wage at Tesco, reading their tabloids in their ten-minute tea breaks. Who got the best deal?

This is a significant part of what scandal is for, in the view of many sociologists of culture: to deflect serious political challenge to capitalist power relations, while giving the illusion of accountability. Medieval villages in Europe hosted festivals in which the wealthy and powerful were mocked by the peasants – the world turned upside down – only for the established order of things to be restored when the feasting was over and the hangovers recovered from. Licensed mockery of the elite remains a key function of media scandal, and is a large part of its value as news to the non-powerful.

The carnivalesque function of scandal need not contradict the performance of a more politically significant democratic function – that of enhancing elite accountability, particularly that of political elites (Thompson, 2000). A notable example of the democratic functionality of scandal...
would be the work of Woodward and Bernstein in exposing the crimes of the Nixon White House, known thereafter as the Watergate scandal. Nixon’s administration, like Trump’s five decades later, was engaged in multiple nefarious activities designed to acquire and retain political power. In Nixon’s case, these included a break-in at the opposition Democrats’ Watergate hotel campaign offices, followed by a cover-up of the crime which it took Woodward and Bernstein years of investigation and a supportive newspaper proprietor to expose fully. The Trump campaign’s alleged collusion with the Russian state, WikiLeaks and other organisations to hack into Democratic email accounts has a similar profile of possible crime and cover-up, albeit in a very different digital context (Nixon’s people broke into offices; Trump’s backers, including the Russian state, allegedly hacked into electronic archives).

The difference between Nixon and Trump, one might suggest, is that the former professed to be ‘clean’ until his resignation and the bitter end of his presidency – ‘I am not a crook,’ he famously declared. Trump, on the other hand, openly called for the Russian state to hack into his campaign opponent’s emails during the 2016 campaign. He was elected with the full knowledge of his supporters that this was his intention and desire, so the potential for damaging scandal in the aftermath was sharply reduced. Everybody knew what kind of person Donald Trump was – the kind who would claim at a campaign rally that he could shoot another person dead on Fifth Avenue and still be elected – and a substantial portion of the American people did indeed elect him. There was no hypocrisy on Trump’s part, rather an overt mockery of those who regarded his transgressions as unacceptable, or a claim that his critics were all engaged in ‘fake news’ (Ball, 2017; D’Ancona, 2017; McNair, 2018).

**Political scandal in authoritarian societies**

As noted above, the existence of mediated scandal implies a media free enough to report elite transgression and to resist attempts at suppression, whether by physical or legal means. Thus, until now, scandal has been a feature of democratic societies and absent from authoritarian regimes. Of course, in countries such as North Korea and Saudi Arabia rumours and gossip about elite transgression will circulate by various means, but they do not tend to become ‘news’ in the public sphere (there are no public spheres in such societies, by definition) or the topic of public debate amongst citizens with democratic rights. Mediated scandal implies a free (or relatively free) information market in which stories of elite transgression will have news value.

Recently, however, some authoritarian states have begun to deploy scandal as a weapon in internal power struggles. In 2014 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which until this moment in its history had traditionally suppressed all potentially scandalous news relating to its own elite group in government, began to unleash negative stories about figures deemed troublesome to the new regime of Xi Jinping. A key example of this approach was the story of Bo Xilai and his wife, Gu. Bo was a powerful regional leader and potential rival to Xi. In 2014, a British investor and associate of Bo Xilai’s wife was murdered in Shanghai by poisoning. Bo Xilai and his wife were implicated in the crime and, to the surprise of many observers of the CCP’s typically totalitarian approach to information, the state-controlled media reported the story with an unprecedented degree of openness. As a result, both were prosecuted and given lengthy jail sentences, thus removing a potential threat to Xi Jinping’s exercise of power in China. The case of Bo Xilai and his wife was an example of state-sponsored scandal, limited to the extent that it damaged not the ruling elite as a whole, but elements within it who had fallen out of favour.
On the other hand, when in 2016 the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) exposed corruption in the CCP’s ruling elite – such as huge sums of money stashed in tax havens overseas by the ‘Red Nobility’ – that was not reported in the Chinese media. CCP leader Xi Jinping’s brother-in-law was exposed by the Panama Papers as:

a shareholder in two BVI companies, Wealth Ming International and Best Effect Enterprise [in which he] appeared on the shareholder registers of both companies in September 2009. They both existed for roughly 18 months before being closed in April 2011 and October 2010 respectively. The previous leak of offshore documents revealed Deng owned a 50% stake in the BVI-incorporated Excellence Effort Property Development. Ownership of the remainder of the company has been traced back to two Chinese property tycoons. Deng is married to Xi’s older sister, and together they built a fortune through investments in property and natural resources. In 2012, they were reported to hold stakes in companies with total assets of €325m, and an indirect 18% share in a minerals company worth €2 bn.²

More detail of the scandal included ‘a leaked trove of 11.5m files’ showing that:

relatives of at least eight current or former members of China’s top ruling body, the politburo standing committee, possess offshore companies arranged through the law firm Mossack Fonseca. Those named in the leaked database from the firm include Deng Jiagui, the brother-in-law of the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, and Li Xiaolin, the daughter of former premier Li Peng, a Communist party hardliner who became known as the ‘Butcher of Beijing’ for his role in ordering the 1989 military crackdown on Tiananmen protesters.

This story, in contrast to that of Bo Xilai and his wife, was not and has not subsequently been the subject of mainstream media coverage in China. Where the scandal around Bo Xilai and his wife was functional in shoring up Xi Jinping’s control of the country, the Panama Papers material was clearly too close to home, exposing as it did the financial excesses of a Party elite proclaiming its moral right to rule indefinitely and without constraint in the name of ‘socialism’. As The Guardian reported, all mention of the Panama Papers stories were banned from being reported in the Chinese state controlled media. The Chinese government also banned ICIJ coverage of Putin’s links to overseas funds:

A second directive demanded that an article published on Monday focusing on revelations about the hidden riches of Russian president Vladimir Putin’s inner circle be removed from the homepage of one website.¹⁰

For scandal to emerge, and elite transgression to have news value, in short, there must be journalistic freedom to report the bad behaviour in question.

**Conclusion**

The Chinese regime’s traditional suppression of media coverage of elite transgression – as opposed to its cultivation of the Bo Xilai scandal, which was highly convenient to Xi Jinping in his efforts to secure power in advance of a key CCP congress – demonstrates the potential
democratic function of scandalous information about governing elites. Of course, scandal in this context is strictly limited to what the regime regards as expedient, but control of the digital information environment can be precarious, and attempts to exercise it can backfire. Social media and digital networks provide new channels for the dissemination of scandalous behaviour in the context of authoritarian regimes, and countries such as China are increasingly ‘leaky’ in this regard (McNair, 2016). Journalists can be kidnapped, disappeared, beaten up, poisoned (as in the case of Alexander Litvinenko in the UK), but the world hears about it through the digitally connected channels of the globalised public sphere, and remembers, feeding information back into the authoritarian state.

When dictators and their family members and associates are caught out with their hands in the people’s pockets, as is happening in China to an unprecedented extent; as has happened in Russia under Putin and his oligarchs since the fall of the USSR; as happened in Malaysia until very recently under former premier Najib Tun Razak, media exposure is a key mechanism for progressive change.

In the democratic world, meanwhile, the Trump administration and its flouting of all hitherto accepted US presidential standards of probity and public decency has pushed the boundaries of what can be considered scandalous beyond anything Bill Clinton, JFK or even Richard Nixon could have foreseen. Trump openly declares that only stupid people pay taxes, mocks disability, abuses women and ethnic minorities, and according to the Steele dossier may well be on tape paying prostitutes in Moscow. He has been accused by a former aide of using the ‘N-word’ on the set of The Apprentice (as of this writing, these were uncorroborated allegations).

None of this appears to impact on his electoral base. Which is not to say that scandal is no longer possible with regards to a president (or any other elite figure in the era of Trump), nor newsworthy – merely that those who do not conspicuously claim moral superiority in politics are less likely to be damaged by scandal when caught behaving badly.

Notes
4. See https://bloximages.chicago2.vip.townnews.com/tribdem.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/8/64/86477024-9ff7-82d3-1795ac52e56/5b733183e8c7d.pdf.pdf.
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