A multidimensional model of understanding Islamophobia

A comparative practical analysis of the US, Canada, UK and France

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Introduction

Islamophobia has a long history. Since Islam appeared in a world full of pervasive idolatry and ignorance, from the very beginning, the atmosphere of fear of Islam and the Prophet of Islam, Mohammadophobia was formed and promoted by opponents of the Prophet. This type of Islamophobia should be seen as an internal Islamophobia, formed on the Al-Arabi Island, centred around the Umayyad Caliphate, along with extreme Islamophobia with the central role played by Byzantium.

Islamophobia creates a sort of intergroup (Hopkins and Shook 2017), interreligious group anxiety between Muslims and non-Muslims, and this is the area which can cause social isolation, a sense of being outside the group, or more radically can take the form of social conflict and unpredictable social animosity, culminating in hate crime against each other, or even mass destruction arising out of a previous xenophobia like Japanophobia, which culminated in the genocides of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. According to Cheng (2015), Islamophobia or Muslimophobia is not discrimination against a particular nation or ethnic group, or even specific individuals or society, it is pressure against Islam and Muslims. Islamophobia is an extension of xenophobia, otherisation, social discrimination and racialisation (Ameli 2017). Islamophobia is neither simply the violations experienced by Muslims nor is it simply (and or in addition) policy or structure that results in the negative representation of Islam, Muslims and Islamic governance. It is not a new phenomenon, nor is it one that only affects Muslims. Xenophobia in different forms, whether policies, representation and ideology in relation to many nations, has taken place throughout history through at the hands of many groups and nation states. The emergence of the instant communication industry, global media, social and network media has reinforced the power of xenophobic content (Törnberg and Törnberg 2016).

There are a variety of views on Islamophobia. Some of these theories have essentially questioned the existence of Islamophobia. In another view, Islamophobia is considered as a phenomenon and its economic, cultural and political dimensions have been discussed. Regardless of the
two-fold approach to the existence or absence of Islamophobia, there are different approaches to Islamophobia. From a cultural and social point of view, Islamophobia has been studied in terms of social discrimination, xenophobia, the destruction of the rights of minorities, and the mutation of Muslims in non-Muslim countries into a diasporic society.

The economic impact of Islamophobia and, for example, the impact of Islamophobia on the military industrial complex has been less widely considered. Xenophobia in general and Islamophobia in particular, is one of the common tactics used to create an environment of fear in relations between countries and, consequently, warm up trade in military weapons and the business of war to prepare against illusory threats. In fact, Islamophobia has an economic infrastructure that even overlooks even the strategic arenas of regional relations. For what reason should billions of dollars be spent on weapons of mass destruction? The answer is to create an environment of fear, sense of danger and threat to national security, which justifies the allocation of resources for military purposes. Business and economy are therefore the cause of Islamophobia, a variation on the xenophobia which throughout history has been formed in relation to different subjects and nations such as Japan and Russia between the First and the Second World War, and after the Second World War.

The relationship between Islamophobia and the media, as well as new media such as representation of Islam and Muslims in social media, has attracted a great deal of research. Misrepresentation of Muslim women through Islamophobic labelling is another frame of understanding which some of the research has examined. In other words, Islamophobia, on the basis of academic and field priorities, is of political concern. Some of these approaches have focused on cultural aspects and have concentrated on xenophobia, segregation, social discrimination, and the marginalisation of the Muslim community or how Islamophobia as social policy or social strategy can affect the lives, the responses of Muslims and their reaction to them.

Some of these studies are concerned with the social impact of Islamophobia through media representation of Islam and Muslims. Ahmed Al-Rawi (2014), in his paper on ‘the representation of September 11th and American Islamophobia in non-Western Cinema’, investigated the way some non-Western films on 9/11 attack have affected the lives of Muslims living in the West and their homelands. In this study, the notion of a unified umma and that Muslim countries are homogeneous has been rejected. His conclusion is that despite the differences in cultures and people’s backgrounds, they are not at war as they share similar values and aspirations for peace, but foreign policies affect these relationships in today’s world and believers of religions should not be blamed or hated for the actions of a few unrepresentative members (ibid., p. 163). Drawing an equivalence between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism is another important facet of the literature and conceptualisation of Islamophobia (Bunzl 2005; Gingrich 2005; Klug 2014). The clear and obvious common feature of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism is that in both cases, religion is the centrepiece of social discrimination and the creation of fears and threats. In anti-Semitism, Jews, both as a religion and as an ethnic group, are linked to discrimination and violence. In Islamophobia, both Islam and Muslims are threatened and discriminated against, so if anti-Semitism is a crime, Islamophobia should also be considered a crime.

The former Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams (Merali 2018) refers to the pertinence of this analogy. Interviewees in the Counter-Narratives to Islamophobia project (ibid.) see the analogy as highlighting the commonality of (potential) experience, and also terms of recognition by the state with regard to recognition and policy-making. Rajina (2017, cited in Merali 2018) highlights the existence and relative security of some Jewish schools in Stamford Hill, London where the experience and institutions of the Jewish community provide for her examples of good practice. In maintaining an eastern European, Yiddish-speaking identity some eight generations or more after arrival in the UK, there is ample scope for Muslims to emulate and government
and local authorities to adopt in their approach to Muslims. Rajina points to the fact that there are many schools in that community which are known to be failing schools but which have been largely left alone by the authorities because of the community’s ‘putting their foot down’. As an example to Muslim communities this is illustrative of how a confident and determined community can face off hostility from the authorities to maintain their access to the institutions without external harassment. Kundnani (in Merali 2018) highlights that the Muslim community’s failure to draw a red line with the government over the Trojan Horse affair was a miscalculation that has resulted in increased harassment. As a recommendation to civil society, establishing boundaries over issues affecting the community is part of a long-term strategy that has in the case of some parts of the Jewish community in the UK been shown to have positive effects.

This example bucks the narrative of minority conditionality imposed by Cameron (2007) as resting upon a critical conversation between the state and racialised minorities. Cameron claimed that the demands for Muslims to reform had a precedent in the conversations fifty years ago between state and non-Jewish communities on one side and the Jewish community on the other over the possible conflicts between their identity and Britishness. It is implied in his speech that an assimilationist track taken by the Jewish community has led to their full acceptance in British society and that this is the route Muslims in the UK must take. This speech forms the basis of much policy and rests upon and reproduces various Islamophobic narratives of Muslims as an internal threat, disloyal and incompatible with the nation. It also revives similar anti-Semitic tropes by re-envisioning the history of Jewish communities in the UK, as recent, conditional and entirely socialised to the state, and is worthy of examination in regard to the rise of anti-Semitism in the UK in other research.

Myriam François (quoted in Merali 2018) highlights also:

the Jewish community; they have then had certain commissions put in place to assess the state of anti-Semitism in the UK and then policies can be devised off the back of those. We know that in the UK that has not been devised by the UK government in the same way for Muslims despite repeated claims to do that.

Williams (in Merali 2018) sees trends and traits of Islamophobia that mirror the anti-Semitism in Europe of earlier years and asks why lessons have not been learned from this.

In this chapter, the typology of Islamophobia as well as the Multidimensional Model of Understanding Islamophobia (MMUI) will be explained and a secondary analysis of data related to Islamophobic behaviour against Muslims in USA, Canada, UK and France will be discussed before elaborating on Islamophobia through the MMUI model in relation to DHMIR.

**Typology of Islamophobia**

One typology of Islamophobia is in terms of periodisation of Islamophobia. Islamophobia can be divided into three periods of history:

1) **Traditional Islamophobia** related to the period of the beginning of Islam up to the emerging industrial world and the gradual formation of modernity. In this long period, the ‘civil’ or perhaps ideological and physical wars that began at the time of the Prophet between the old idolaters against the Prophet, his companions and the early Muslims, continued. However now, those opposed to Islamic thought and Muslim practice often took on the guise of Muslims and battled those forging ahead with multiple praxis of Islam in different theatres. One can call this type of Islamophobic war ‘Islam against Islam’ or
A multidimensional model

‘religion against religion’. In the same period of time, external Islamophobia can be defined as confrontation between Christianity and Islam, which led to prolonged wars. Tagging and coding of Islam began by linking Islam with ignorance, barbarism, irrationality. At the same time, many false discourses were formed that Islam was a fake religion invented by Mohammed. For many centuries, instead of using the word Islam, opponents of Islam used the term Muhammadan.

2) Modern industrial Islamophobia: Modern Islamophobia is related to the emergence of the print industry and formation of modern philosophy. Modernism created a serious change in the philosophy of life. With the formation of the institutions of modernity, and the development of modernisation and liberalisation, conscious and unconscious changes entered into all aspects of life. This intellectual, institutional and process change in culture, politics and economics led to the great ideological changes, including secularisation, in all processes of life. This means that the relationship between religion and life has gradually diminished, and has been even accompanied by contradictions in the areas of religion and life, religion and work, religion and science, and even religion and leisure time. This path is another form of panic against all the great religions, especially Islam, which created a rival religion for the religion of Europe and the United States. On the other hand, the emergence of the printing and spinning industry was the beginning of mass production. Obviously, the industrialisation of printing provided the mass production of the message. Although the Enlightenment and the formation of modernity were marked by the emergence of the printing industry, the synchronisation of these two major social changes provided the capacity for the spread of Islamophobia both in terms of intellectual infrastructure and mass production technology. The emergence of mass media such as cinema, radio and television, and the press before them, provided more scope for representing phobia and hatred towards Islam and Muslims.

3) Modular instant Islamophobia: Modular instant Islamophobia refers to the instant communication environment which can make a modular connection between all users and the layers of the web’s content and social media. According to Barbara Schewick (2010), a modular environment, while providing independence for nodes of communication, creates the possibility for interconnection between modules as well as independent nodes of interaction. This means the possibility of instant connections between devices connected to people, information, things and processes (‘Internet of Everything’, or IoE) (Schatten, Ševa and Tomičić 2016) and the instant movement of messages locally, regionally and globally. Islamophobia can spread everywhere to one and all individuals and groups.

Multilateral Model of Understanding Islamophobia

The first point we should highlight is that these days Islamophobia or the Islamophobic environment has become global. There is evidence, which shows the experience of hate and Islamophobic representation or presentation in the USA (Ameli, Mohseni Ahooei and Merali 2013), Canada (Hanniman 2008; Ameli and Merali 2014), Sweden (Hirvonen 2013), United Kingdom (Ameli and Merali 2015), France (Ameli, Merali and Shahghasemi 2012).

Understanding Islamophobia requires a morphological look at all constituent elements and one also needs to understand phenomena at the macro level that express the totality of its nature. Islamophobia pursues economic, political and cultural goals, and can be understood and analysed in a multilateral, interconnected algorithm. At the same time, it can be said that cultural goals are the basis of economic and political goals. The multifaceted dimensions of Islamophobia lead to the formation of conditions and outcomes that are modelled in the hated society model of Islam.
One consequence of hating society domination over the hated society is that the hated community might end up being mutated or isolated. On the other hand, the process of strengthening hatred from the path of re-creation, xenophobia, otherisation, segregation and isolation also has important consequences. In such a model, hateful elements and internal and external Islamophobia project the way forward for cultural ethnocide and genocide (Ameli 2017).

In practice, understanding Islamophobia requires a wide, multidisciplinary approach. Islamophobia consists of political, cultural and economic dimensions and without integration of all these dimensions one cannot understand the phenomenon of Islamophobia, whether it is a reality or a figment of the imagination, whether it exists to what extent, and whether it is visible or invisible.

1) It is political since Islamophobia producers seek: a reduction in (perceived or real) Muslim power around the world; fragmentation of the Muslim community and intra-Muslim unity; and/or the engineering of different types of Muslims e.g. moderate(d) Muslims, traditional Muslims, modern and postmodern Muslims. Islamophobia works also as a source and reference for making distance between so-called Islamic values and ‘modern’ values in the minds of Muslims and non-Muslims. It is also a behavioural factor that has meaning before the law (in some countries) in the form of aggravation or intent, and in a more general sociological and psychological sense as a motivator for hate crime, discrimination and malign representation; an enabler of an environment of hate, a precursor and part of hate ideology and hate education against Muslims around the world. Islamophobia can be seen as an instrument for the justification of greater wars and minor wars against Muslims around the world as happened against the Japanese before the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

2) Islamophobia is a cultural phenomenon in its effect on the culture of Muslim society and the intercultural relationship between non-Muslims and Muslims, on Muslim identity and its role in the unconscious change among Muslims, especially its effect on Muslim self-confidence and a weakening in the sense of pride and affiliation with Islam.

3) Further there are economic and business aspects of Islamophobia that serve as a facilitating factor. The more phobic and insecure the world, the better this is for the marketing of the technology of war.

Islamophobia pursues at least four goals, which primarily include the destruction of the image of Muslims and, in a deeper dimension, the destruction of the image of Islam. In the next step, it seeks to separate the Muslim community from non-Muslims. The separation policy seeks to control Muslims’ influence on non-Muslims and somehow constrain the development of Islam. The third goal of Islamophobia is to legitimise war and to strengthen the development of the military industrial complex and the economy of war. The fourth result of Islamophobia is the creation of great fear by associating Islam with violence, assassination, murder and crime, and ultimately creating a fear among the non-Muslim communities of Islam and Muslims.

These four outcomes are external consequences of Islamophobia, but the internal outcomes of Islamophobia are first the collapse of Muslims from the inside and the elimination of religious beliefs in the Muslim community and the transfer of a fictitious image of Islam and Muslims into Islamic societies. To a greater extent, the combination of external and internal Islamophobia will strengthen the groundwork of moving part of the Muslim community towards Western modernism and liberalism or liberal Islam. A large part of the Muslim community will respond to the stresses of Islamophobia with patience and forbearance in the cause of God. On the other hand, in a small section, there will be extremist behaviours and extremist responses both in the non-Muslim racially-based area and in the extremist Islamic area (Garner and Selod 2015).
There are many factors, which can be considered accelerators of Islamophobic perception. Among the most important are palpable crises such as 9/11 or the calamitous actions of ISIS. Such a repulsive representation can easily lead to the perception that one is equal to all and all are equal to one or ISIS is equal to all Muslims and all Muslims are like ISIS.

**Domination Hate Model of Intercultural Relations**

The Domination Hate Model of Intercultural Relations (DHMIR) was first developed in 2010 and since then it has been applied in several contexts in cooperation with IHRC’s research in the USA (Ameli, Mohseni Ahooei and Merali 2013), UK (Ameli and Merali 2015), Canada (Ameli and Merali 2014) and France (Ameli, Merali and Shahghasemi 2012). Ameli (2010) tries to include the many important factors in today’s complicated environment of hate. Much of what gets labelled ‘hate crime’ is more casual confrontation in which racist (or other hate language) is deployed. When a hate crime occurs, organised hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, skinheads or neo-Nazis are often blamed. However, in general, organised hate groups do not commit the majority of hate crimes. As noted in numerous studies, although hate crime offenders generally commit their crimes in groups, they are not usually affiliated with an organised hate group. DHMIR endeavours to reveal how an innocent citizen can turn into a hate crime offender. Indeed, this model does not try to exonerate hate crime offenders. Rather, it only draws attention to a complicated process in which the hate crime offenders become passive implementers.

In this model, Ameli claims that the interest groups design a campaign of xenophobia. Hate is disseminated in the society by means of media and hate representation. For certain, the media in any culture is in the hands of those who are in power. After producing a public panic, a hate environment comes into existence gradually. In the hate environment, every act against those who supposedly pose a threat to society becomes plausible. It is here that hate crime offenders are motivated and when the media report these attacks, the hate crime offenders find themselves represented alone as the perpetrator without any context. All of these processes are governed and directed by hate policy.

This particular approach to hate crimes denies the simple linear relationship between perpetrators and victims of hatred and shows better the complexity of interactions between the hated and hating society. In addition, this model recognises the hate crimes holistically and therefore does not regard hate crimes as a product of a particular social or media event. Societies are different in terms of social structure. In some societies, intercultural tolerance is more ethical or customary than other societies. This situation has a direct impact on the nature and severity of the emergence and ideology of hatred. Hate ideology is the result of inhumane inter-cultural approaches that historically uses identity components such as race, religion, and gender to justify hate. Communities with a hatred-based social structure, with sophisticated techniques and strategies, reproduce their common values based on social differentiation in ways that are consistent with changing detrimental global attitudes of hatred and discrimination.

These types of ideologies, for example, by linking a particular religion with an inhuman situation like terrorism, provide legitimacy for the necessity of hatred. In societies with a hatred-based social structure the media does not work the same way in representing two similar crimes. For example they do not refer to the offender’s religion in representing a Christian criminal offender, but they emphasise the religion of a Muslim offender and may even link news reports to other cases of Muslim perpetrated crimes. This kind of representation, rather than action directed by specific individuals or social groups, is a product of the hating society that tries to produce the reasons for the legitimacy of the hate ideology. The relationship
between hate practice and hate ideology is reciprocal. The ideology of hatred requires facts that support its legitimacy for survival. The hateful acts put these facts at the disposal of hate ideology. On the other hand, hate ideology supports the legitimacy and requirement of hate policy and hate media representation. All of these create the necessary context for the development of hate practices in society, and more importantly, it transforms these hatreds into unproblematic behaviours. In other words, this continuous cycle considers hatred as a natural occurrence. The behaviour of other out-group(s) (the hating society/ies) to out-group(s) targeted by a hate environment (the hated society) is modelled by the operation of this environment, thus acts of hatred are more often committed by individuals who feel provoked into doing so at the sight of someone from an out-group rather than by organised groups e.g. far-right groups. They act out – essentially operationalise – the social construction of difference that hate representation and ideological hatred encourage (Ameli and Merali 2014). As Figure 4.1 shows, the DHMIR also relates the hated society to the hating society to show how these two societies share many common interests, not least humanitarian ones. Conflict, or as DHMIR shows, accelerated conflict, will create a sphere of action in which no one is a winner.

**Background and methodology**

The analyses presented in this chapter compare the data provided by five surveys on hate crimes and anti-Muslim experiences experienced by Muslims conducted by the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) in four western European and American countries: *Getting the Message: The Recurrence of Hate Crimes in the UK* (Ameli, Mohseni Ahooei and Shaghasemi 2011), *France and the Hated Society: Muslim Experiences* (Ameli, Merali and Shahghasemi 2012), *Once Upon a Hatred: Anti-Muslim Experiences in the USA* (Ameli, Mohseni Ahooei and Merali 2013), *Only
The data collection in all this research is conducted based on ‘data triangulation’ (Denzin 2006). Instead of relying on a particular type of data, data triangulation makes it possible to concentrate on three different data sources, while avoiding reductionism in understanding the causes of a phenomenon, as well as the relationship of the phenomenon under consideration with its historical and social background. In fact, one of the fundamental difficulties in analysing such issues is the adoption of an abstract approach and the analysis of the phenomenon, regardless of its context.

The first source of the research data collection includes a historical review of the subject as well as the review of all the research conducted in the area. The second and the third sources are quantitative and qualitative surveys that are conducted in a seamless and parallel way. These surveys cover a wide range of demographics including gender, areas of countries with a high Muslim population (as well as areas with a significantly low Muslim population and in between) gender, a variety of ages, ethnic backgrounds, marital statuses, work statuses, employment sector, levels of education, categories of income groups, countries of birth and citizenship, self-deemed levels of religious practice and of course visibility of ‘Muslimness’.

The qualitative survey questions sought to elicit the respondents’ views as well as lived experiences (Jansen 2010) on societal/governmental perception of Muslims, feelings on whether religiously motivated acts of hate are dealt with adequately, causes of racist/Islamophobic culture, if institutions such as the media contribute to such cultures, the role, and effects on the behaviour of Muslims, etc. In contrast, the quantitative surveys categorised experiences into five sections:

- interpersonal Islamophobia;
- ideological Islamophobia;
- Islamophobic policy;
- discrimination and double discrimination; and
- intercultural sensitivity.

The surveys were carried out between 2009 and 2014. The difference in the data collected in each country has made it difficult to match the results. This led to the comparison of just three axes of interpersonal Islamophobia, ideological Islamophobia and Islamophobic policy in the present comparative analysis. Also in the case of ‘verbal abuse’, there was no data for the USA indicated in the corresponding graph.

In all surveys, three sampling methods of snowball (Goodman 1961; Salganik and Heckathorn 2004; Browne 2005), clustering (Kerry and Bland 1998), and simple random (Yates et al. 2008; Meng 2013) have been used in combination. The fieldwork consisted of a collection of qualitative and quantitative surveys, made up of hard copies and the surveys that were conducted online. The snowball method is a way of reaching Muslim populations in each country and building confidence in the research process so that individuals can express their real experiences easily. On the other hand, since research on all individuals of Islamic populations is not possible, the cluster sampling method has been used. In this way, we have reached groups of Islamic populations in each country. In the third step and in each cluster, a simple random sampling method was used to reach the homogeneous collection sample of the Muslim community in each country. In this way, by comparing the characteristics of the sample population with the research community, research generalisation can be made possible.

Besides the sampling methods employed, the number of samples per survey is matched according to the population of the survey’s community. This is done by using Cochran’s sample
size formula (Cochran 1953). Using results from the United Kingdom Census of 2011, for example, giving the UK Muslim population as 2,786,635 (4.4% of the total population), the last survey, *Environment of Hate: The New Normal for Muslims in the UK* (Ameli and Merali 2015), according to Cochran’s sample size formula, suggests 384 cases as the minimum number of samples needed for generalising the results to such a community. However, the number of samples for this survey is 1,800 cases. Such a rule is applied to all other surveys. The basis for analysis in the collection of hate crimes surveys was the use of the median, mean, and mode. In other words, the main part of the analyses was descriptive and based on three simple statistical tests. Convenience of analysis, the simplicity of understanding the statistics and maximum clarity are the main reasons for using descriptive analyses (Trochim 2006; Babbie 2009).

In addition, whenever there is a significant relationship between demographic variables and studying variables, the correlation tests have also been used to determine the impact of demographic variables on the experience of hate crimes. Since all the measures were at the nominal or sequential level, all correlation tests are performed based on the chi-square or its related tests (Ryabko, Stognienko and Shokin 2004). In many cases, the impact of specific variables such as gender, age and the level of education was evident in the experience of hate crimes, which are reflected in the analyses. In addition, the ability of this test in ‘normalising’ (Nikulin 1973) is used for cases where the data ratio in the sample was different from the actual proportion in the community being surveyed.

We also found in the research process that Muslims are not willing to narrate their very acute experiences for reasons such as privacy (Babbie 2009). Victims, for example, generally have little desire to describe their sexual harassment in order to avoid audience judgments. Also, although, because of their Islamic dress codes, women are more likely to be victims of hate crimes than men, they are less likely to disclose details of events that threatened them physically or mentally. The fear of judgment, stigma, misunderstanding, punishment, or aggression prevents victims from exposing their experiences. So, although, our effort was to glean the maximum amount of data, the ethical and professional barriers of research prevented us from doing so. In other words, we have only been able to see the part of the iceberg that is above the surface of the water and we do not have any idea about the hidden part of these experiences and their degree of deterioration.

**Interpersonal Islamophobia**

Comparing the experiences in seven categories in the range of verbal abuse and physical assault shows, in general, the intensity of the sense of belonging to an Islamophobic society. Comparing the results of the surveys in four countries indicates Muslims in the United Kingdom are more likely to encounter Islamophobic expression, behaviour, and actions in their everyday life. In contrast, Muslims in France report relatively fewer Islamophobic experiences. However, the quality of such harassments is not the same. Under physical assaults, for example, a few people reported a continuous confrontation, but such experiences are so repulsive that even the low stated percentages are significant enough to consider.

**Ideological Islamophobia**

Another kind of Islamophobia relates to religious beliefs of Muslims. Religious challenges in the workplace, school or college, and hearing Islamophobic comments are some illustrations of this kind of hatred. This hatred mostly depends on Islamophobic attitudes. The intensity of Muslim experiences in this area is also remarkable and consistent among the studied countries.
Figure 4.2 Intensity of categories related to interpersonal Islamophobia. (In the cases of physical assaults and verbal abuse, there were no data respectively for the UK and the USA.)

Figure 4.3 Intensity of ideological Islamophobia experienced by Muslims.
Islamophobic policy

The third type of Islamophobia is that of policymakers and media. This sort of Islamophobia is more significant than the others, especially because of its extent and overall influence in legitimising Islamophobia in societies. This systematic Islamophobia can also be observed as the origin of interpersonal Islamophobia which Muslims experience in their everyday life.

The regular experience of Islamophobic policy in the United Kingdom, the USA, and Canada, sequentially, is 43.3 per cent, 42.5 per cent, and 37.2 per cent. French Muslims experience relatively less intensity (24.4 per cent) of Islamophobic policies.

![Figure 4.4](image-url) Intensity of Islamophobic policy experienced by Muslims.

![Figure 4.5](image-url) Comparison of three sorts of Islamophobic experiences by intensity.
Comparing the three sorts of Islamophobia experienced by Muslims shows that two types of ideological Islamophobia and Islamophobic policy are respectively highest by percentage. In other words, Muslims perceive these two types of Islamophobia more than the interpersonal one. This can be a reason for the greater effect of these two sorts of Islamophobia on their lives.

Furthermore, the severity of the experience of the three main themes of Islamophobia among countries shows some variation. In general, the experience of all themes of Islamophobia in France has been lower than in other countries, and conversely, the greatest experience across all types is in the UK. Also, while the experience of ideological Islamophobia among Muslims in the UK and France shows the greatest intensity of experiences (47.8 and 32 per cent, respectively), the USA and Canada have the highest scores when it comes to Islamophobic policy (42.5 and 37.2 per cent respectively).

It is said that females are more exposed to discrimination and the experience of Islamophobia because they are often more visible as Muslim in terms of their clothing. Also, one can assume that the patriarchal approach of the countries under study leads to a kind of dual discrimination against females in that they suffer both gender and religious discrimination. However, the

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**Figure 4.6** Intensity of Islamophobia experienced by Muslims.

**Figure 4.7** Intensity of Islamophobia experienced by gender.
results do not confirm these assumptions. Apart from France where females (61.3 per cent) are significantly more exposed than males (38.7 per cent) to Islamophobic experiences, in other countries, there is little difference in the extent of the experience of Islamophobia between the two genders.

In terms of the relationship between socio-economic class and the intensity of the experience of Islamophobia, there is no significant difference between countries. Major experiences of Islamophobia are experienced by middle-class Muslims in all studied countries. However, in the US and Canada, higher class also significantly exacerbates the experience of Islamophobia.

And finally, although in all countries the highest proportion of Islamophobia experienced is among Muslim youth, comparing the severity of the experience of Islamophobia among the four countries in terms of age rating indicates some differences. While Canada has the lowest rate of Islamophobia for teenage Muslims (5.6 per cent), this figure is more than doubled in the UK (11.4 per cent). By contrast, in the USA and Canada (6.8 and 5.8 per cent respectively), the highest rates of Islamophobia have been experienced by elderly Muslims. Comparative analysis reveals the existence of acute issues of Islamophobia in all studied countries, but it also appears

![Figure 4.8: Intensity of Islamophobia experienced by social and economic class.](image)

![Figure 4.9: Intensity of Islamophobia experienced by age.](image)
from the analysis of data that the pattern of Islamophobia is different in each of these four countries. The patterns of Islamophobia in the UK and the USA are most similar. More than other countries, the Islamophobic experiences in these two countries impact more on the youth and the middle class. Also, in both countries, Islamophobic policy is the type of Islamophobia that is most experienced. The pattern of Islamophobia in France, however, is relatively limited and decentralised (in terms of demographic variables). The Muslims of this country suffer most of all from the negative experiences in the field of religious rituals. Finally, in Canada, the pattern of Islamophobia is more consistent with other social discrimination patterns such as gender, age, and socio-economic class discriminations.

**Conclusion: Islamophobia/Islamoromia and macro change policy of the world**

From what has been said in this chapter, conceptual dimensions and different approaches to Islamophobia were introduced, and a kind of typology of Islamophobia was introduced that was unique in its own right. In addition, a model has been developed based on dimensions of Islamophobia. The fact is that Islamophobia cannot be attributed to an agent. On the other hand, Islamophobia cannot only be attributed to specific circumstances, such as 9/11 (USA), 7/7 (UK), or the emergence of ISIS. Major events attributed to Muslims or Islam cannot explain the nature of Islamophobia. Rather, it must take into account the complex dimensions of Islamophobia. On the other hand, field evidence suggests that Islamophobia is on the rise. Field studies conducted in the United States, Canada, France and the United Kingdom, which were compared in this study, confirm the development and diversity of Islamophobia and sense of being hated by society and the political system.

The Multidimensional Model of Understanding Islamophobia (MMUI) in relation to the Domination Hate Model of Intercultural Relations (DHMIR) showed how, on the one hand, cultural and political and economic structures and objectives such as macro-dominant factors affect Islamophobia. On the other hand, it showed how the interconnection between the related factors pictured in the model of DHMIR can affect intercultural and interreligious communication and even impact negatively on communication between individuals. But the key is to understand that Islamophobia exists at the macro level as a major policy aimed at changing the relationship between the world of Islam and the West. Islamophobia is understandable if divided into soft Islamophobia and hard Islamophobia, with the aim of weakening Islamic countries and developing the dominance of the Western world. Examples of soft Islamophobia include images of poverty in the Muslim world, the lack of democracy and gender equality all around the Muslim regions, and the lack of human rights in Muslim countries. Examples of hard-hitting Islamophobia include the terrible violence that has been carried out by ISIS over the years, the brutal behaviour of Muslims, the spirit of warring, and codification of the Islamic world with bombs and warfare.

It is assumed that in order to change the status of the Islamic world and relationship between Islam and the West, Islamophobia as a pushing policy, together with Islamoromia (Ameli 2012) as a pulling policy, seeks to change the status of Islamic countries in the international community and integrate them into the western political system and western way of life. Islamoromia means looking at the nature of Islam from the perspective of Western doctrines. Based on this assumption, Islamophobia is not just a matter of hatred against Muslims in a particular region of the world, but a macro policy for changing power relations and effecting major changes in the Islamic world. This type of Islamophobia/Islamoromia policy seeks to integrate Islamic nations into the Western world not as members but as subordinate political and cultural dependants of the West. This policy is a new form of colonialism against the Muslim world.
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