PARTICIPATION OF MIGRANTS IN EUROPEAN CITIES

Patterns of civic and political engagement

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Introduction

The civic and political participation of individuals of migrant origin in European countries is of crucial importance for democracies. The active engagement by migrants and their offspring increases governmental legitimacy, the acceptance of democratic forms of government, and the sense of collective responsibility and civic duty (Desposato and Norrander, 2008; Morales and Giugni, 2011). In contrast, the exclusion from activities such as engaging in charity organisations, being involved in neighbourhood associations, voting, contacting political authorities and representatives, and taking part in demonstrations hampers the equal protection and representation of the interests and demands of migrants and their children (Heath et al., 2013). Given that most migrants settle in urban areas, many challenges concerning migrant integration, including civic and political integration, are faced and dealt with by local authorities. This chapter provides an overview of the patterns of civic and political participation of individuals of migrant origin settled in various large multi-ethnic urban settings in Europe, whereby civic engagement identifies involvement in voluntary organisations and political engagement refers to voting as well as engagement in extra-electoral political activities.

We use data from two major surveys specifically aimed at collecting information on the civic and political participation by migrants and their offspring in the following cities: Budapest in Hungary, Milan and Naples in Italy, Lisbon, Faro and Setubal in Portugal, Barcelona and Madrid in Spain, Antwerp, Brussels and Liège in Belgium, Lyon and Paris in France, Berlin and Stuttgart in Germany, Geneva and Zurich in Switzerland, London in the United Kingdom, and Stockholm in Sweden. We provide a comparative overview of: (1) engagement in voluntary organisations; (2) participation in elections; and (3) participation in extra-electoral activities. For each of these forms of participation we present comparative analysis across European cities, while also comparing migrant groups within cities, and across groups with multiple migrant generations. As to the latter, when possible, we compare levels of participation for first generation migrants, second generations and natives.

Concerning the main results, our data shows that – both for civic and political engagement – it is more meaningful to look at cross-city variation than at differences across groups within cities, as the variation among the former is greater than among the latter. We find considerable variation across cities within the same countries with regard to organisational engagement, as
well as considerable differences in migrant-native gaps. Voting patterns confirm the relevance of variation across cities and also show some variation across groups within cities. When examining political engagement in extra-electoral activities, differences across cities prevail again. These results are consistent across different sources of data. Our results highlight the importance of the local context in which migrants settle, that is, of the political and institutional rules, laws and policies affecting migrants which, confirming prior literature, significantly shape migrants’ opportunities to participate in the civic and political spheres.

### Individual and contextual factors shaping civic and political engagement

The literature has identified a number of factors that are likely to affect, to different degrees depending on the specific form of participation analysed, both civic and political engagement (Morales and Pilati, 2011; de Rooij, 2012; Voicu and Şerban, 2012; Heath et al., 2013; Voicu and Comşa, 2014; Pilati 2016). We, first, highlight the most common and significant individual and contextual factors that are likely to shape the patterns to be examined in this chapter. Among individual-level characteristics, socio-demographic and socio-economic variables are known to shape individuals’ decisions to join organisations and participate politically both among the majority, and among minorities and migrants. Indeed, specific research on migrant and minority groups has acknowledged that age, gender, marriage or living with a partner, education and occupation are significant in explaining civic and political engagement (Aleksynska, 2011; de Rooij 2012; Voicu and Şerban, 2012).

Furthermore, studies show the additional effect of specific immigration-related characteristics, like the migrant generation or the fluency in the language of the host country (Uhlaner et al., 1989; DeSipio, 1996; Tam Cho, 1999; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Morales and Pilati, 2011). Among the latter, assimilation of migrants and their descendants in the country of settlement, measured with the years lived in the country or by holding the citizenship of the country of settlement, is likely to have a positive and significant effect on civic and political engagement (Bloemraad, 2006; Aleksynska, 2011; Voicu and Şerban, 2012; de Rooij, 2012). Whether it is individuals themselves or their parent(s) who have migrated is also significant as, for instance, second generations tend to join associations or have participation profiles similar to those of the majority population (Voicu and Şerban, 2012; Heath et al., 2013). Political engagement also depends on the ability to speak the dominant language in the country of settlement, as lacking linguistic proficiency restricts access to information about the host country politics (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Morales and Pilati, 2011; Heath et al., 2013). Finally, there is mixed evidence on whether Muslim migrants in Europe are less likely to engage in political action (Eggert and Giugni, 2011; Morales and Giugni, 2011).

In addition to individual-level characteristics, there is a bulk of literature which has shown that the context where individuals of migrant origin settle is of crucial importance. Contextual factors, that is, institutional rules, policies and laws, are referred to in the literature as the general political opportunity structure (POS) and the migrant-specific political opportunity structure. The general dimension is likely to affect both migrants and native residents alike, while the migrant-specific political opportunity structure affects migrants only (Bloemraad, 2006; Koopmans et al., 2005; González-Ferrer and Morales, 2013). Among general POS characteristics, overall natives’ rates of participation are likely to affect migrants’ civic engagement (Pilati et al., 2016). Among migrant-specific POS, the characteristics of the citizenship regimes, that is, the rules concerning citizenship acquisition, affect both electoral participation (González-Ferrer and Morales, 2013) and migrants’ claims-making (Koopmans et al., 2005; Cinalli and Giugni, 2011). The general and specific POS can refer to national-level arrangements or local-level ones.
Among local POS factors affecting the integration of migrants and their descendants, a study in Switzerland showed that policies offering relatively easy access to cantonal employment are associated with significantly higher levels of migrants’ engagement in organisations (Manatschal and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014).

Following this literature, the participatory patterns that we will be examining in the empirical analysis of this chapter are all likely to be affected by the aforementioned individual and contextual factors. In order to be parsimonious, given that we focus on broad patterns of participation and do not tackle specific sub-dimensions, we provide a primarily descriptive overview of the patterns of civic and political engagement by migrants across a number of local settings in Europe.

**Data sources**

We employ data from two surveys, the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS) conducted in 2011–2012 in 15 European cities (see www.immigrantsurvey.org) and the LOCALMULTIDEM survey (see Morales et al., 2014). ICS provides information on the whole migrant population in the following cities: Budapest in Hungary, Milan and Naples in Italy, Lisbon, Faro and Setubal in Portugal, Barcelona and Madrid in Spain, Antwerp, Brussels and Liège in Belgium, Lyon and Paris in France, and Berlin and Stuttgart in Germany. Therefore, with this dataset we are able to compare migrants’ rates of civic and political participation across European cities.

Our second data source is a collection of surveys undertaken with individual respondents in nine European cities (Barcelona, Budapest, Geneva, London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan, Stockholm, Zurich) in 2007–2010 in the context of the LOCALMULTIDEM project (see Morales et al., 2014). LOCALMULTIDEM provides information on specific migrant-origin groups within each of these European cities (see Figures 7.2 or 7.5 for the selected groups). This survey was conducted in each of the nine cities studied on a stratified sample of individuals of migrant origin of the respective aforementioned groups in each city – which included both first-generation migrants as well as second (and sometimes also third) generations – and a sample of the majority population in each city as the control groups. Therefore, with this second dataset, we can provide comparative information across groups within cities, by examining the rates of engagement by migrants of specific origin groups across cities, and we can provide comparative analysis of the participation of first-generation migrants compared to those of second generations and the majority population. As to the latter, for those cities for which we have limited data on second generations – namely Barcelona, Budapest, Madrid and Milan – we only compare levels of civic and political engagement between all migrants and the majority population. By contrast, for those cities of long-standing migration with a substantial presence (at least 5 per cent of the overall sample of individuals of migrant origin) of second generations – namely, Geneva, London, Lyon, Stockholm and Zurich – we distinguish between the majority population (natives, put briefly), first-generation migrants and second generations.

**Patterns of participation across cities and across groups**

The empirical analysis that follows depicts patterns of civic and political engagement across European cities and across groups within cities. For both civic and political engagement, our analysis first provides a general overview of the participatory patterns of migrants across European cities through ICS data. Second, this data is integrated with an analysis on migrants’ patterns of participation using LOCALMULTIDEM data and focusing on participatory patterns for some specific migrant groups within the European cities studied. Third, using LOCALMULTIDEM data, we
provide an in-depth examination of the participatory patterns of migrants from some specific groups in comparison with those of their offspring and of natives. For some cities we are able to provide full comparative analysis while for others we can only provide selected information.

**Civic engagement**

Despite there being no consensus about how to conceptualise and measure civic engagement (see Alexander *et al.*, 2012, p. 48), consistent with many other empirical studies, we understand civic engagement as individual involvement in various types of voluntary organisations (in the migration studies literature see, among others, van Londen *et al.*, 2007; Voicu and Şerban, 2012). Examining civic engagement provides us with substantial information on the way migrants are included in the societies where they settle and where their children are born and/or raised. In particular, it tells us about the ways migrants participate in the community by engaging in organisations that pursue a multiplicity of objectives and that may be active in a range of activities. These voluntary organisations can be very varied, from charity or religious organisations, to trade unions and advocacy organisations. Furthermore, there is a long scholarly tradition arguing that civic engagement fosters political engagement (see Morales and Pilati, 2011, for a summary).

Empirical evidence on civic engagement in Europe has so far shown that migrants have substantially lower rates of involvement in voluntary organisations compared to the majority population, and European societies therefore generate severe civic and political inequalities (Jacobs *et al.*, 2004; Aleksynska, 2011; Strömblad *et al.*, 2011; Strömblad and Adman, 2011; Voicu and Şerban, 2012). Using ICS data, Figure 7.1 examines civic engagement by looking at involvement by migrants in voluntary organisations across European cities.

**Figure 7.1** Engagement in organisations by migrants across European cities.


*Note*

The findings suggest that patterns of civic engagement are not dramatically different across cities. There is a slightly higher average of organisational membership in ‘old’ cities of migration, such as the Belgian or French ones (29 per cent), as compared to the ‘new’ cities of reception of migrant flows, such as Budapest and the Spanish cities (26 per cent), but the difference is substantially very small. What is more striking in the ICS findings is the considerable variation we find across cities within the same countries, therefore lending credibility to the hypothesis that civic engagement is affected by local policies of integration and that different national level policies and laws are less consequential for this form of participation.

If we turn to the LOCALMULTIDEM data on migrants from specific groups, we can ascertain simultaneously cross-city and cross-group variations within cities in the levels of organisational engagement by migrants (Figure 7.2).

The results presented in Figure 7.2 confirm previous patterns whereby most migrant groups within each city show similar percentages of engagement in organisations, but also that rates of engagement in voluntary associations by migrants are fairly similar across most cities, ranging between approximately 30 and 45 per cent. Stockholm is an outlier to this pattern, as it clearly stands out as the city where migrants have the highest levels of organisational engagement. Additionally, some groups are extremely marginalised in terms of organisational engagement, as we find very low rates of engagement among Muslim and Chinese migrants in Budapest, Indians in London and Maghrebi groups in Madrid and in Milan.

Figure 7.3 finally investigates the relative levels of organisational engagement by migrants by comparing them with those of natives and second generations.
Through Figure 7.3, we can examine the variation among categories with a different migrant status. For all cities, if we compare the percentage of engagement in organisations between migrants and natives, the data suggest that individuals of migrant origin in Europe have lower access to organisations compared to the majority population across most cities. However, there are also substantial differences across cities. In particular, the low levels of civic engagement by migrants in London and Budapest are common to natives as well. By contrast, the gaps between migrants and natives in Milan, Geneva and Zurich are wide. Not unexpectedly, gaps in civic engagement are found in cities that share exclusionary conditions for migrant integration, that is, closed political opportunity structures (Cinalli and Giugni, 2011). This finding lends credibility to the hypothesis that suggests that patterns of migrants’ civic engagement significantly depend on national and local contextual conditions given that in contexts which tend to be associated with open opportunities for migrants, like Stockholm, Lyon or London, the differences in the levels of civic engagement between natives and migrants are lower.

When we turn to compare organisational engagement patterns between migrants and their offspring, the patterns for second generations do not provide clear evidence for a systematic or obvious role of specific political opportunity factors. We do not find a clear-cut pattern of higher levels of civic engagement by second generations than by migrants across the cities for which we can make these comparisons. Again, second generations in Stockholm have the highest levels of participation compared to most second generations in other cities. However, second generations in Stockholm also engage somewhat less in voluntary organisations than first
generation migrants. These results are in line with other studies confirming the relevance of the segmented assimilation hypothesis and of studying second generations separately (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Pilati, 2017).

**Political engagement**

**Voting**

We now turn to political engagement strictly speaking, therefore focusing on those activities which are aimed at influencing the distribution of valued resources in society, that aspire to trigger broader social or political change or which specifically address political institutions. We first examine the most conventional form of political action, voting. We consider the percentage of all migrants (Figure 7.4), and the percentage of migrants from specific groups (Figure 7.5) who have voted either in the last national or in the last local elections across the cities studied. In both analyses we only include eligible voters, i.e. respondents with the right to vote. However, this means that in places where only a small share of migrants have voting rights – such as the Swiss cities and the cities of new migration such as Budapest, Milan and the Spanish ones – the proportion of the overall contingent of migrants who have actually voted is much lower for many groups (cf. Figure 7.9). Indeed, in most of the cities studied – Milan, Barcelona and Madrid at the time of the survey, Zurich and Lyon – non-nationals from non-EU countries are not granted voting rights even in local elections. Of the cities studied, only in London do we

![Figure 7.4 Percentage of migrants who voted in the last national or local elections across European cities.](image)


**Note**

find that non-EU nationals (citizens of Commonwealth countries) have voting rights both at the local and at the national level. With the exception of Lyon, for many of the origin groups we study, such restrictions on local voting rights are also accompanied by a high share of foreigners among the population of migrant origin due to strict legislations on citizenship acquisition.\(^9\) Therefore, all these elements affect the actual possibility of voting.

Figure 7.4 considers the percentage of migrants who voted either in the last national or in the last local elections, considering eligible migrants only. Levels of participation for most cities range between 40 and 60 per cent of migrants eligible to vote. There are exceptions to this pattern, as Faro shows much lower rates with only around 20 per cent of eligible migrants having voted. In turn, Berlin shows the highest percentage, as almost 70 per cent of eligible migrants voted. Voting rates are on average higher in cities of long-standing migration (51 per cent) than in more recent destinations (41 per cent). Overall, as is the case for organisational engagement, we find considerable intra-country differences in voting patterns, with the only exception of the two Spanish cities, where turnout rates for migrants are very similar in both cities.\(^10\)

Figure 7.5 confirms intra-country differences, but also shows remarkable group differences within cities. Particularly, ethnic Hungarians in Budapest, Andean Latin American migrants in Barcelona and Madrid, and Egyptians in Milan show significantly higher levels of voting rates than other groups considered in these cities. All the latter groups show very high turnout rates – around 70 per cent – for eligible migrant voters. As was the case for civic engagement,
Stockholm is the city where migrants from the specific groups studied participate the most, whereas both the Chinese in Budapest and the Filipinos and Ecuadorians in Milan show the lowest turnout rates.

Figure 7.6 considers a comparison of the turnout rates for migrants with those of natives and of second generations. Again, Stockholm shows the highest turnout rates for both migrants and second generations. Lyon and London tend to show the most similar turnout patterns for natives, migrants and second generations; whereas in Geneva we see large gaps among all these groups.

**Political engagement in extra-electoral activities**

We now focus on extra-electoral activities using data from the LOCALMULTIDEM survey. For these forms of political engagement, we do not have information on the whole migrant population across cities through the ICS (or other) surveys. Therefore, the analysis focuses on specific migrant groups by comparing the participation patterns of migrants to those of second and third generations and of natives. The questionnaire of the LOCALMULTIDEM survey included a wide range of forms of extra-electoral political activities: (1) contacted a politician; (2) contacted a government or local government official; (3) worked in a political party; (4) worked in a political action group; (5) wore or displayed a badge, sticker or poster; (6) signed

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Figure 7.6  Percentage of migrants of specific groups, of natives, and of second generations who voted in the last national or local elections across European cities (only eligible voters).


Note
a petition; (7) took part in a public demonstration; (8) boycotted certain products; (9) deliberately bought certain products for political reasons; (10) donated money to a political organisation or group; (11) took part in a strike; (12) contacted the media; (13) contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons. If they participated in any of these forms, they were asked to specify the people concerned by the activity. The response categories were: (i) ‘only yourself, your family or a few other people’, (ii) ‘people in this city or region’, (iii) ‘people in whole host country’, (iv) ‘people in homeland country’ and (v) ‘people in the whole world’. With all this information, we created a new synthetic variable of participation in extra-electoral activities relating to issues affecting the country of residence, such that individuals were assigned a value of 1 if they had participated in the previous 12 months in any of the 13 forms of action for issues relating to the categories of people identified in i–iii and v.  

Figure 7.7 shows migrants’ extra-electoral engagement across European cities. The figure is very clear in showing that there are considerable differences across cities. Milan, Budapest (for the Chinese and Muslim migrants), London and Zurich show some of the lowest rates of participation of migrants across all European cities. As was the case for civic engagement, this percentage is extremely low compared to migrants living in Lyon or Stockholm, where more than around 60 per cent of migrants engaged in at least one form of extra-electoral political activity.

Compared to differences across cities, fewer differences exist among migrant groups within cities, with the exception of some groups like the Moroccans in Madrid or the Chinese and

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**Figure 7.7** Engagement by migrants in at least one extra-electoral political activity across European cities.


*Note*

Muslim migrants in Budapest, who face considerable exclusion compared to other groups. Therefore, although institutional constraints – e.g. those related to restrictive citizenship rules – do not directly prevent migrants from participating in these extra-electoral activities, participation gaps are still extremely wide, suggesting that national and local conditions of integration are consequential for any type of political activity considered.

The final figure (Figure 7.8) compares the differences in the levels of engagement in at least one of the aforementioned extra-electoral political activities between natives, migrants and second generations. In most cities, natives are much more active in extra-electoral forms of political participation than first generation migrants. However, there are some exceptions as, in Barcelona and London, natives and all migrant groups show similar rates of engagement in extra-electoral political activities, and in Budapest ethnic Hungarian migrants are more active than the native Hungarian population.

The figure also shows that migrants’ levels of extra-electoral participation in Milan and Zurich are extremely and homogeneously low compared to natives’ rates, with natives being up to six times more likely to participate in these forms of action than migrants. In most cities, natives’ participatory rates are also higher than those of second generations. However, gaps vary across cities too. There is hardly any gap in London and Lyon, while in Zurich gaps are remarkable, and they depend on the ancestry of the second generations in Geneva and Stockholm.

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**Figure 7.8** Engagement by natives, migrants and second generations in at least one extra-electoral political activity across European cities.


Note
Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to provide a descriptive overview of the patterns of civic and political engagement of migrants and their offspring across European cities. For a number of cities, the data allowed us to provide information on the whole migrant population as well as on specific migrant groups. For other cities, we had information on either the whole population or on specific migrant groups only. We nonetheless provided the broadest picture possible with the available survey data.

The analysis described in the chapter allows us to synthetically draw a number of conclusions. The main one is that there is considerable variation across European cities in the extent to which migrants and their offspring engage in civic and political life, as well as in the extent to which there is a participatory gap between individuals of migrant origin and the majority population. Although we also find differences across groups within cities, whenever we are able to compare cross-city variation with cross-group variation within cities, the former is systematically greater. This means that the context of settlement is a much more determining factor than the national origin or ancestry of migrants when it comes to shaping patterns of civic and political engagement. These findings are consistent across the three broad forms of engagement we examined: participation in voluntary organisations, electoral turnout and extra-electoral political participation.

These findings lend some support to those studies arguing that the specific local policies and regulations adopted by local authorities to integrate migrants and minorities are crucial to affect the ways migrants, and to a certain extent their descendants too, eventually participate in voluntary organisations and in the political sphere of the cities where they settle. In particular, where cities grant more opportunities for migrants and their descendants to get settled and well integrated, they are more likely to participate in the civic and political local life to a greater degree. Of all the European cities analysed here, Stockholm is the city that stands out as the one offering more chances for migrants to become integrated in the local civic and political spheres. However, similar patterns are shown in the French cities and in Brussels, with regard to the items considered in this chapter. In contrast, in cities such as Budapest, Milan and Zurich some migrant groups are considerably excluded from the civic and political life of their wider local and national communities.

Future research should expand the study of the direct links between local policies of migrant integration and how they nurture (or otherwise) a vibrant civic and political life for migrants and their offspring. This will be possible with a continuation of ambitious comparative efforts to study migrants’ civic and political engagement across a wide range of local contexts.

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Notes

1. All these activities are undertaken at the city level. However, the scope of these activities may be broader. For instance, voting may regard national-level elections as well and, likewise, participation in demonstrations may concern issues of national concern.
2. The groups were selected because of their significance within the migrant population of each city, and so as to include in each city at least one group of long-standing immigration, one of more recent arrival, as well as one from a country of Muslim religious dominance.
3. Second generations include both second and third generations.
4. Due to the low number of cases, results for second-generation Kosovars in Geneva and Zurich need to be interpreted with some caution.
5. Our variable is a dichotomous indicator taking the value 1 for respondents who are involved in voluntary associations and 0 for those who are not. It measures membership or participation in associations. With the LOCALMULTIDEM data, we considered involvement in 18 types of associations: (1) sport club or club for outdoor activities; (2) organisation for cultural activities, tradition-preserving or any hobby activities (e.g. musical, dancing, etc.); (3) political party; (4) trade union; (5) business, employers, professional or farmers’ organisation; (6) organisation for humanitarian aid, charity or social welfare; (7) organisation for environmental protection or animal rights; (8) human rights or peace organisation; (9) religious or church organisation; (10) immigrants’ organisation (e.g. organisation for the support or

Figure 7.9 Percentage of migrants from specific groups who voted in the last national or local elections (including individuals with no voting rights).


Note
promotion of immigrants’ interests, broadly defined); (11) [ethnic group] organisation (an organisation that primarily seeks the advancement of the ethnic/national-origin group); (12) anti-racism organisation; (13) educational organisation; (14) youth organisation; (15) organisation for the retired/elderly; (16) women’s organisation; (17) residents’, housing or neighbourhood organisation; (18) other organisation. The variable takes the value 1 if respondents said they were members (currently, or currently and in the past) of at least one type of organisation or had participated in any activity organised by at least one such type of association in the last 12 months, and 0 if otherwise. The ICS data is less detailed in the types of organisations that were asked about and only included generic categories: political parties, trade unions, ethnic or immigrant associations, and any other form of organisation. Engagement in organisations may also inform us about the way migrants socialize with co-ethnics and natives, whether migrants organize along ethnic bases, or along cross-cutting ethnic ties. However, for the sake of economy, we do not delve into this issue (cf. Pilati and Morales, 2016).

6 The degree to which individual migrants engage in voluntary associations is not enough to gain a complete picture of the civic integration of migrant communities in European cities. Indeed, structural patterns established by migrant organisations may also result in isolated clusters of segmented migrant communities. However, for reasons of economy and space, in the chapter we do not delve into this issue (cf. Vermeulen, 2006; Morales and Ramiro, 2011; Pilati, 2012; Eggert and Pilati, 2014).

7 The figure includes cities where percentages for migrants are compared only with those of natives and other cities where percentages for migrants are compared with those of both natives and second generations. The former cities are those where migrant waves are quite recent and the size of second-generation populations is small. For the latter, some groups have also a small second-generation population, for instance, Kosovars in Zurich. Therefore, for these cases, results need to be interpreted with some caution.

8 In particular, LOCALMUTIDEM data show that more than 80 per cent of migrants in Barcelona, Budapest and Geneva are not eligible to vote in national elections and more than 80 per cent of migrants in Barcelona are not eligible to vote in local elections either; more than 90 per cent of migrants in Madrid, Milan and Zurich are not eligible to vote in national or local elections; more than 60 per cent of individuals of second generations are not eligible to vote in national elections in Geneva and more than 70 per cent in Zurich. In Zurich, more than 70 per cent of individuals of the second generation are not eligible to vote in local elections either.

9 For the Spanish case, the rules for citizenship acquisition vary depending on the nationality group, as migrants of Latin American origin have a privileged access to Spanish citizenship.

10 The figures for the two Italian cities (Milan and Naples) need to be interpreted with great care as, for both cases, they are based on data regarding less than 50 respondents who were eligible to vote.

11 The categories used refer to activities migrants have engaged in the country of residence and which are oriented to people in the country of residence. By contrast, the response category of issues that concern ‘people in homeland country’ includes activities oriented to the country of origin/ancestry and its peoples. It is therefore considered an indicator of transnational political activity and excluded from our variable, which focuses on participation relating to the country of residence.

12 In this figure, migrants who were not eligible to vote have been recoded as if they had not voted.

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