Power in EU-Russia relations
More than meets the eye

Tom Casier

Few concepts get more attention in the study of EU-Russia relations than power. Yet power is a complex given. It is in constant flux, never static. Moreover, it operates along many different dimensions, on different fronts. A substantial part of the analysis of power is locked into a one-sided theoretical approach: power relations get analysed in terms of a single factor (energy, economics, military). Moreover, there is a tendency to attribute certain types of power to one actor: energy to Russia, trading power to the EU. The reality of power in EU-Russia relations is much more complex, and this chapter seeks to unravel its complexity. It does so by taking an integrative approach to power, exploring how power operates along different dimensions and considering changes over time. It also examines the subjective notion of power: the perception both of the counterpart’s power and their willingness to use it. An important part of the power struggle between Brussels and Moscow is fought on that subjective front. Understanding the complexity of power is essential to grasping the essence of EU-Russia relations. This chapter first explores how power features in literature on EU-Russia relations. Second, it presents a pluralist, integrative approach to power and assesses power relations along the different dimensions of this model. Third, the subjective dimension is introduced, looking at perceptions of power and status. The chapter closes with an analysis of strategic choices by both actors against the background of their power position.

Power in EU-Russia research

There is a surprising discrepancy between the central role attributed to power and the limited systematic treatment it has received in research on the EU and Russia. The topic of power has mainly been studied in individual sectors, such as trade or energy (for example, Forsberg and Seppo 2009; Paillard 2010; Siddi 2018; Talseth 2017). In the case of energy, power has arguably become the main lens, leading to ‘the reduction of EU-Russian energy relations to the diktats of power politics’ (Judge et al. 2016: 754). Furthermore, there are studies that provide a systematic analysis of Russia’s power in general, rather than in relation to the EU (Kuhrt and Feklyunina 2017; Monaghan 2017). Mutual power relations in EU-Russia relations have seldom been analysed in a systematic way. Some exceptions include Forsberg (2013) and Casier (2018). Also, Haukkala (2008, 2010) deals with power in interactions between Russia and the EU but mainly focuses on the concept of hegemony.
Despite this lack of systematic study, power is often implicit in the theoretical assumptions of the author (for an overview, see Forsberg 2019). Arguably, structural realist approaches tend to dominate, giving a central place to interests and the maximisation of power through material capabilities (see Smith and Yuchshenko this volume). Liberalist studies focus on how asymmetrical interdependence creates control over outcomes (e.g. Proedrou 2007). In constructivist approaches, power resides in clashes over identities (e.g. DeBardeleben 2012; Dias 2013; Kratochvil this volume; Sakwa 2012), while critical and post-structuralist approaches focus on power in othering and liminality (e.g. Klinke 2012; Morozov and Rumelili 2012; see also Pavlova this volume).

A large part of the literature studies power in a one-directional way, focusing on the power of a single actor rather than on a relationship. Cross and Karolewski (2017), Forsberg (2013) and Forsberg and Seppo (2009) study the (limits of) power of the EU over Russia. Others study the power and strategies of Russia vis-à-vis the EU (for example, Wigell and Vihma 2016). Busygina (2017) associates two different concepts of power – the power of authority and the power of coercion – with EU and Russian foreign policies, respectively, resonating with a widely distributed dichotomy in research. As with the attribution of coercive power to Russia and normative power to the EU, it should be noted that associating different types of power with individual actors also raises issues of theoretical consistency.

An additional complication is that power can be studied on two levels: that of EU-Russia relations and that of the bilateral relations between individual member states and Russia. Leonard and Popescu (2007), for example, have engaged in a power audit of EU-Russia relations, dividing EU member states into five categories, according to their attitudes vis-à-vis Russia. Power also features implicitly in the different national perspectives of EU member states in David et al. (2013). To unravel the complexity of power, the next section dissects the different dimensions of power and assesses power relations between Brussels and Moscow along these lines.

Assessing power in EU-Russia relations in its various forms

Power is a game played on different boards at the same time. To understand power both in its complexity and as the essence of EU-Russia relations, one needs to understand how power operates along many dimensions. Therefore, this chapter introduces theoretical insights on power from International Relations, drawing on the taxonomy of power developed by Barnett and Duvall (2005). This is a matrix of four types of power, based on two dimensions: power as interaction versus power as social constitution and power as direct versus power as diffuse control (see Table 7.1). Power itself is defined as ‘the production in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 42). Compulsory power refers to direct control over the actions and circumstances of another actor. Institutional power is indirect control over the conditions in which actors operate. Institutions and the rules they are composed of imply unevenly distributed rewards.

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<thead>
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<th>Table 7.1 The taxonomy of power</th>
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<td><strong>Relational specificity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Power works through</td>
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<td>Interactions of specific actors</td>
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<td>Social relations of constitution</td>
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Source: Barnett and Duvall (2005: 48)
and capacities but do not seek to control a specific actor directly. The two other types of power are forms of constitutive power and will be treated jointly in this chapter. Through structural power, actors produce identities and structures of subordination that determine their social capacities. Finally, productive power refers to how constantly changing and contingent social processes produce and shape meaning in subjective ways.

To understand power in EU-Russia relations, we need to examine power along these different dimensions. The purpose of the chapter is not to apply the taxonomy of Barnett and Duvall in detail (for that, see Casier 2018). Rather, their model is used to look at the key dimensions of power in EU-Russia relations: in particular – economic and energy dependence, institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood and the capacity to determine identities. These aspects of power reflect different dimensions of the taxonomy of power and have been at the heart of the EU-Russia agenda, either at the top of the formal agenda (energy, economics, the common neighbourhood) or formed an implicit source of rivalry (in the case of identities).

Comparing and balancing capabilities

Table 7.2 compares GDP in absolute figures for Russia and the EU, as well as Germany – the EU’s primary economy. In 2017, the EU’s economy was 10 times larger than the Russian economy, while in 1992, it was more than 90 times larger. Today, the German economy is more than twice the size of the Russian economy. The latter is roughly equal to that of the Benelux countries. When compared to 1992, however, the gap has grown smaller; the Russian economy then represented only a good 4 per cent of the German economy.

But the power generated by economic capabilities cannot only be measured in terms of the overall size of the economy. The structure and nature of the economy also matter. Russia’s economy and trade largely depend on primary sources (Bradshaw and Connolly 2016). This makes the country vulnerable to fluctuating oil and gas prices. On top of this, Russia’s economy suffers from a weak investment climate and limited innovation capacity (World Bank 2018). Moreover, Western sanctions have contributed to the ‘creeping securitisation’ of the country’s economic policy (Connolly 2016: 750). The EU, for its part, recovered slowly from the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and there are continuing concerns about sovereign debt in some member states and the coordination of monetary policies within the Eurozone. Brexit is likely to have a substantial impact on the economic standing of the EU.

What is a structural weakness for the Russian economy – its excessive dependence on primary production of oil and gas – is often regarded as a strength in Russia’s relations with the EU. The latter is predominantly an energy consumer. The asymmetrical interdependence in energy relations may create potential leverage for Russia. This is particularly the case for natural gas, which is mainly traded through pipelines and subject to long-term contracts, in contrast to oil traded on a global market. Energy trade has been largely unaffected by EU sanctions and Russia’s counter sanctions. The import of Russian natural gas into the EU reached a new peak.

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<tr>
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<th>1992</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU-28</td>
<td>8587</td>
<td>17325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2128</td>
<td>3701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1578</td>
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Source: IMF 2018
in 2016, with 39.9 per cent of imported gas being of Russian origin (for crude oil, this was 31.6 per cent) (DG Energy 2018: 26). Yet this figure needs to be nuanced in two ways. First, the EU imports around 70 per cent of its natural gas, implying around 30 per cent is domestic production (DG Energy 2018: 22). Moreover, gas represents 23.4 per cent of the total consumption. This means that the actual share of Russian gas in total EU energy consumption is much lower: over time, it has been rather stable around 6.5 per cent (Casier 2011). It means that the real issue of dependence on Russian natural gas is that of individual member states more than the EU as a whole. Moreover, Russia is also dependent on demand for gas in Europe broadly: in 2017, 87.88 per cent of Russia’s natural gas exports by pipeline went to Europe (including Turkey) and 73.81 per cent to the EU-28 (BP 2018). Both the EU and Russia have invested in the diversification of their energy imports and exports to reduce their dependency.

Comparing the military capabilities of Russia and the EU is less relevant. The latter has a weakly developed security and defence policy, and most of its members are part of NATO, the collective defence organisation that matters most when it comes to hard security issues. With Brexit, the EU lost one of its two nuclear powers: the United Kingdom has an estimated 215 nuclear weapons and France 300. Russia has around 7000, roughly on a par with the United States (Kile and Kristensen 2017). When it comes to military expenditure (data for 2017), Russia – representing 3.8 per cent of world military expenditure – is only slightly ahead of the EU’s biggest spender, France – with 3.3 per cent. The United Kingdom and Germany follow with 2.7 and 2.5 per cent, respectively (Tian et al. 2018: 2). Self-evidently, the more useful comparison is between NATO and Russia: the North Atlantic alliance represents 52 per cent of global military spending, almost 14 times more than Russia (ibid.).

Capabilities are always context specific. As Keohane and Nye (1989) have pointed out, power relations differ from one sector to another: military, economic, energy and so on. Among these issues, there is no predetermined hierarchy: military *rapports de force* only become dominant in extreme, conflictual circumstances but may have little relevance in a cooperative setting. Moreover, as Baldwin (2016) has argued, to reach a specific objective, only specific capabilities fit for that target are of relevance rather than the aggregated capabilities. As a consequence, generalisations about power on the basis of capabilities alone have to be made carefully. Making smart use of selected capabilities potentially generates more power than the broad, indeterminate use of power means. This idea will be revisited in the last section of this chapter, where Russia’s action on a wide range of fronts is considered.

**Institutional rivalry**

Institutional power, as defined by Barnett and Duvall, is about the indirect power that is generated through institutional arrangements and rules. Both change the conditions in which other actors operate: they may redistribute cost and benefits differently not just for those involved in these arrangements but also for those excluded from it. For example, a free trade treaty may create economic opportunities and benefits for the parties involved. But it equally affects third countries: if tariffs among their trade partners are abolished, the export and import flows of third countries are likely to be affected as well.

For our case, this means that power relations between Russia and the EU are not simply conditioned by their direct relations but also determined by their capacity to set up and change institutional structures in their common neighbourhood. Issues of institutional power became particularly important after the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 and Russia’s decision not to participate. They matter in two crucial ways. First, because of the EU’s policy towards its eastern neighbours, aimed at legal approximation and normative
convergence – as well as Russia’s increasing contestation of this policy. Second, because of rival integration projects set up by Brussels and Moscow targeting the same countries in their common neighbourhood: the Eastern Partnership with its Association Agreements and the Eurasian Economic Union.

The EU launched the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009, as a dimension of its ENP. It sought to establish Association Agreements, which were concluded with three of the six EaP states in 2014: Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The main component of the Association Agreements is the creation of a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA), but they also provide for the alignment of the foreign policy of the countries concerned with that of the EU (see, for example, European Union 2014). The agreements build on a long tradition of normative convergence (accepting key norms concerning democracy, rule of law, free market) and legal approximation (adapting domestic legislation to fit with the EU’s legislation, in particular in areas relevant to the Single European Market). This policy had been applied for the enlargements of the EU and was repeated to some extent in the ENP/EaP but without offering partner states the prospect of membership. In doing so, the EU built on its undisputed position of ‘normative hegemony’ (Haukkala 2010), which made it appear as the natural norm setter. The Union used the instrument of conditionality in which the fulfillment of certain conditions (reforms reflecting EU norms and legislation) was rewarded with certain benefits (such as free trade or financial support). De facto this implied a form of partial integration, whereby the EU’s legal and economic sphere in certain areas extended beyond its eastern borders. It clashed with Russian integration initiatives, precisely because it implied a different distribution of costs and benefits – the essence of institutional power. Russia launched the Eurasian Customs Union in 2010, together with Belarus and Kazakhstan. It was reformed into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015, when Armenia and Kyrgyzstan also joined the organisation. Membership implies the acceptance of common external tariffs in trade and envisages the harmonisation of legislation.

So, while the EU and Russia did not per se aim to control each other directly through the EaP and EAEU, both initiatives clashed with each other, because of the indirect redistribution of costs and benefits they implied. The legal incompatibility of subscribing to the DCFTA and joining the EAEU (or its predecessors) implied that the countries of the common neighbourhood had to make a choice. They were tempted with different benefits by Moscow and Brussels but also threatened with sanctions or the loss of benefits. This institutional rivalry over the neighbourhood loomed for years and collided regularly (for example, over the approximation of Ukraine’s energy legislation to that of the EU) but eventually escalated over Ukraine when it was facing the choice in autumn 2013 between signing the Association Agreement with the EU or potentially joining the Eurasian integration initiative.

The power to determine identities and hierarchies

When it comes to constitutive forms of power in EU–Russia relations, two issues stand out. One is the capacity to recognise a country’s identity as ‘European’. This power determines inclusion or exclusion of a European community of states. The second issue is the recognition of status. Both generate more or less stable hierarchies among states that ultimately determine their social capacities.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia aimed to reprofile itself as a post-communist, liberal-democratic country. It sought recognition of this new identity by Western states, which would allow it to be included in the international community. The EU, driven by the new,
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ambitious Maastricht Treaty and its attractiveness for its eastern neighbours, was in a unique position to grant the identity of Europeanness to post-communist countries. Moreover, it had powerful means at its disposal to reward behaviour compatible with self-defined Europeanness by confirming an actor’s European identity with membership or closer relations. The language used by the EU in the 1990s to qualify Russia’s identity was one of inclusiveness. Russia belonged to the European family, was part of European civilisation and shared core values. By the late 1990s, Moscow’s frustration grew over the feeling that – despite rhetoric – Russia was not truly recognised by the West as one of them. This feeling was boosted by the enlargement of NATO and the Kosovo intervention of 1999. As tensions grew, recognition of its Europeanness was increasingly withheld from Russia. Moreover, in terms of its domestic choices, Russia slowly drifted away from the European model. This became particularly clear in 2005, when the Kremlin launched the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ (Okara 2007). Brussels increasingly coined relations with Moscow in pragmatic terms: the need for close relations was no longer justified on the basis of Russia’s identity as part of the ‘European family’ but because the size, proximity and economic role of Russia made a close partnership inevitable and of paramount importance. This contrasted sharply with the case of Ukraine, where the label of Europeanness got reinforced in the process of preparing the Association Agreement (see European Union 2009). As a result, a rivalry developed over the capacity to claim Europeanness. Moscow increasingly presented itself as the defender of ‘genuine’ European values and thus a ‘better’ member of the European family. As Morozov (2018; see also Morozov this volume) and others have pointed out, influential elites in Russia understood these European values in a most conservative way. Moreover, this process was characterised by a substantial degree of ambivalence, with Russia simultaneously seeking to redefine itself as a Eurasian power (Richardson 2015; Sakwa 2015)

A similar story about (non-)recognition of identities can be told about status. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has been a status seeker (Freire 2011), seeking recognition as a ‘normal great power’ (Kozyrev 1992: 10). Initially it tried to obtain this recognition through a strategy of ‘social mobility’ (Larson and Shevchenko 2014), climbing up the ladder of the (Western) community of states. Through its strategic partnership with the EU, it hoped to gain recognition as the equal of the Union. At a later stage, Putin (2011) promoted the idea of a Eurasian Union, albeit in an ambivalent way, in parallel with continued claims to genuine Europeanness. This shift could be explained as a reaction against Russia’s non-recognition as a European power but also as an attempt to create a more symmetrical balance with the EU (DeBardeleben 2018). Frustrated over a lack of status recognition, Russia eventually changed its strategy to one of social creativity (trying to obtain status in distinctively different ways, other than by being a good pupil in the Western class) and social competition (challenging the West’s dominant position) (Larson and Shevchenko 2014). In sum, the power struggle over Europeanness and status was not a trivial one but sat at the very heart of EU-Russia relations. For a long time, it was an asymmetrical one, whereby the EU – in the aftermath of the implosion of communism – was in a unique position of uncontested leadership.

This section demonstrated the complexity of power in EU-Russia relations by looking at key aspects of its compulsory, institutional and constitutive dimensions. In doing so, it added nuance to the dominant tendency in literature to reduce power relations to a single factor. For a profound understanding of power, one additional step is required and that is to look at the subjective dimension of power: how power is perceived and attributed by Brussels and Moscow. This element of subjectivity is present in the different dimensions of power in Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy but deserves separate analytical treatment.
Power, perception and status

Delving into the performative function of power, Guzzini argued that attributing power to an issue implies justifications of action or inaction. In other words, attributing power has the effect of ‘politicising issues’: ‘attributions of power are themselves part of politics’ (Guzzini 2005: 509). The politicising effect of power attributions was clearly visible in the clash between the EU’s Eastern Partnership and Russia’s project of a Eurasian Customs Union (later EAEU). As described previously, both projects were targeting the same countries ‘in between’, albeit not necessarily with the intention to weaken their counterpart. Yet, in a context of increasing competition, the regional cooperation plans of Moscow and Brussels were mutually read as part of a bigger geopolitical plan and understood as a zero-sum power game. Because of the incompatibility of both initiatives, these became seen as rivals to each other and at the heart of the power game. As a result, Ukraine’s choice was perceived by Brussels and Moscow as tilting the *rapports de force* between them.

Furthermore, the power ascribed to an actor is a function of perception (Jervis 1976). Effective power cannot be measured purely by objective standards. As a result, the relation between the power a country has on paper (along any of the dimensions outlined in the previous section) and the power it is seen as having by others is not one on one. This also holds for material capabilities, which are always subjectively perceived to generate a degree of power in a certain context. The same holds for status. Russia has been actively seeking recognition as a great power, but whether it is granted that status ultimately depends on the subjective recognition of other significant players and thus on perception. Freire (2011) has argued that Russia has been an ‘overachiever’ when it comes to its status: it has enjoyed a higher status than objective power indicators would allow for. It will be argued in the next section that Russia deliberately follows an approach whereby it seeks to enhance the external perception of its power. If this perception is created successfully, this will also de facto enhance the country’s power. In other words, if most actors believe that Russia is a powerful player and act accordingly, this will make the country de facto more powerful.

As for the EU, its normative leadership in the 1990s and beyond also has a strong subjective dimension. For many years after the collapse of communism, the EU’s norms were seen by many post-communist countries as the norms to follow. This perception gave them a semblance of universality. This power is largely attributed power but again a very real form of power, creating long-term competitive advantages and structural forms of influence. The EU actively tried to enhance this through policies of conditionality: countries that successfully reformed on the basis of the EU template were rewarded with membership in the case of accession or were promised privileged relations and market access in the case of the ENP.

Revised Russian and EU strategies after the Ukraine crisis

The confrontation over Ukraine in 2014 signified both the culmination of tensions in the EU-Russia power struggle (Haukkala 2015) and a radical change in the nature of that struggle. As described previously, the most crucial power struggle until the Ukraine crisis was over institutional and structural forms of power: it was about rival institutional arrangements for the common neighbourhood and about the (non-)recognition of identities.

With the Ukraine crisis and the change of regime in Kyiv in 2014, the emphasis of the power struggle clearly shifted towards issues of compulsory power. The latter was certainly not absent before the crisis (as could be seen from the gas spats in 2006 and 2009, for example), but they were less determining overall. The shift in emphasis to compulsory power could be understood as the result of Moscow’s reading that the Euromaidan protests and regime change in Ukraine...
implied a fundamental loss in the power struggle with the EU. As Youngs argues, the developments signified an ‘existential crisis’ for Russia (2017: 214). This pushed Moscow to a change in strategy in which compulsory elements of power moved to centre stage. In a surprise move, Russia annexed Crimea and played an important role in the war in Eastern Ukraine. As no annexation policy was pursued for the Donbas area, the latter was less an attempt at obtaining active direct control than aimed at preventing the West from obtaining ‘useful’ control over Ukraine. In other words, Moscow perceived the regime change in Kyiv as a geopolitical loss of key importance. In a zero-sum reading of the situation, it sought to limit the benefits that Ukraine would yield for the EU and the West by destabilising the country and obtaining a veto position on certain issues. This can be seen as a ‘negative’ form of compulsory power (in the sense of aimed at the prevention of effective control by the West), seeking to turn Ukraine into a liability for its partners by waging a war on its territory and by preventing Kyiv from having full control over its territory. The events of early 2014 set a logic into motion which substantially pushed compulsory power to the forefront. Rivalry over institutional and structural power did not disappear, but the new measures taken on both sides were aimed predominantly at direct control. They included (counter-)sanctions and military build-up.

Strategies were moulded in the slipstream of this new logic. Russia opted for a ‘full spectrum approach’, that is, ‘drawing on all national means to achieve its ends’ (Monaghan 2017: 3). This refers to a wide array of measures, ranging from influencing social media (see David this volume), over election meddling and financing radical parties, attempts to diversify energy exports, to the showcasing of new nuclear weapons. These are often – erroneously – referred to as the Gerasimov doctrine or a new type of Russian invented hybrid warfare. Monaghan casts doubt on the coherence and strategic character of this approach; he speaks of ‘a misdiagnosis of a Russian “master plan” and the notion of “seamless coordination” of activities against the Euro-Atlantic community’ (Monaghan 2017: 5).

Action on different and non-military fronts is certainly neither a new invention nor exclusive to Russia. It is important to remember that Gerasimov’s call for the use of diverse means – including non-military and asymmetrical means – was exactly a reply to what the General saw as a secretive, subtle and indirect American strategy to force regime change (Bartles 2016). Russia showcasing its power on different fronts is not per se a sign of a well-coordinated, effective strategy displaying Russia’s strength. More likely it is driven by the gap between Russia’s ambition to be recognised as a great power and its relatively weak capacity to achieve that position. This has pushed Russia towards a policy of actively challenging Western hegemony with relatively limited means, trying to punch above its weight. It is an attempt to increase the perception of its power by displaying it on many different fronts, an attempt to generate maximal effects with minimal means.

In the EU’s case, too, we have seen adaptations of its policy as a result of the Ukraine crisis. The latter contributed to a reformulation of its strategy in terms of resilience. The EU Global Strategy reflects a stronger emphasis on ‘principled pragmatism’ (Juncos 2017). In the context of increased contestation of the EU’s normative hegemony, the organisation does not discard its norms altogether but takes a more pragmatic, interest-based approach. Youngs (2017) also notes elements of continuity and change in the EU’s policy vis-à-vis its eastern neighbours. It reflects stronger geopolitical thinking; yet he argues that Brussels did not opt for either offensive or defensive geopolitics but evolved to asymmetrical ‘liberal-redux geopolitics’ (Youngs 2017: 30). It is a more selective and calibrated use of liberal-cooperative practices, combining defensive with assertive tactics, continued commitment to the EaP with a factoring in of Russian concerns, bounded containment of Russia with neutrality-light or continued reliance on democratic values used more instrumentally (Youngs 2017).
The EU’s Guiding Principles for Relations with Russia equally reflect reinforced pragmatism while sticking to a principled position (Mogherini 2016). They put forward strengthening EU resilience and relations with Eastern partners, as well as selective engagement with Russia. The latter provided for a stretchable element in the EU’s policy towards Russia.

Conclusion

To understand power relations between the EU and Russia, we need to explore the very different dimensions of power. A simple comparison of capabilities that create economic or energy dependence misses an essential part of the power story. It overlooks the competition between Russia and the EU over institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood and over the capacity to attribute identities of Europeanness and great power-nesses. Before the Ukraine crisis, this competition was much more central to EU-Russia power relations. With the Ukraine crisis, the emphasis shifted drastically to forms of compulsory power, aimed at both gaining and preventing control. Moscow’s reading of the crisis as a vital threat prompted it to a new approach, seeking to weaken Western effective control and to create a maximal perception of its power despite relatively limited means. Its actions on highly different fronts can be read as a deliberate attempt to punch above its weight. Additionally, the Euro-Atlantic community opted for a more compulsory approach. While hard security was left largely to NATO, the EU put itself in a more explicit geopolitical position but without abandoning its liberal normative policy altogether.

Little indicates that the escalation in which EU-Russia relations have become entangled can be turned back any time soon. Understanding how power evolves along these different dimensions is essential for comprehending the foreign policy positions of both actors and ultimately also for reflecting on possible solutions. In research, there is a need to move beyond the study of power as material capabilities and to explore the wide variety of power practices in EU-Russia relations, as well as how they are perceived.

Note

1 This review does not include the broader literature on power in interactions between Russia and the West, such as structural realist accounts.

References

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