Part III

METAPHYSICS
AND ONTOLOGY
15
ANALYTIC METAPHYSICS
Race and Racial Identity

Jorge J. E. Gracia
and Susan L. Smith

Introduction
Although the philosophy of race has been the center of attention for many philosophers, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, the metaphysics of race has lagged behind. Also lagging has been the attention paid by analytic philosophers to race in general and the metaphysics of race in particular. Most analytic philosophers have tended to address what they consider to be more pressing practical problems having to do with the ethics and politics of race. This contrasts with the greater emphasis that Continental philosophers, for example, have given race, although they, even more than analytic philosophers, have neglected the metaphysics of race. The purpose of this article is to bring attention to some samples of the work from philosophers who work roughly within the analytic tradition in the metaphysics of race, including Robin O. Andreasen, Kwame Anthony Appiah, J. Angelo Corlett, J.L.A. García, Joshua Glasgow, Jorge J. E. Gracia, and Naomi Zack. Many others deserve attention, such as Ian Hacking, Michael Hardimon, Sally Haslanger, and Michael Root, but space limitations make it impossible to do proper justice to their views.

The article is divided into ten sections, dealing with the following topics: analytic metaphysics, race and racial identity, Appiah's reduction of race to racial identity, Zack's radical elimination of race, Corlett's reduction of race to ethnicity, García's opposition to racial and ethnic identities, Glasgow's reconstructionist account of race, Gracia's Constructionism in race and ethnicity, Andreasen's Cladism, and a conclusion.

Analytic Metaphysics
Analytic philosophy was born at the beginning of the twentieth century as a reaction against what were perceived to be the speculative excesses, unclear exposition, and muddled thinking of nineteenth century idealism and its disregard for empirical science and the rigor of logic. Among its most influential early proponents were G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the members of the Vienna Circle, such as
Rudolph Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Kurt Gödel, and Moritz Schlick. No set of characteristics is common to all members of the initial group of analytic philosophers and those who subsequently joined it. Indeed, perhaps the best way to describe analysis is in the words of Max Black, who states that “the label of ‘analysis’ . . . serves well enough to identify philosophers who share a common intellectual heritage and are committed to the clarification of basic philosophical concepts” (Black 1963: v).

Still, some general tendencies found in analysis can be added to the aim mentioned by Black, such as a method characterized by breaking wholes into parts, a concern with language, an interest in logic and its use in philosophical discourse, a positive attitude toward science, and the conviction that non-empirical claims of a non-syntactical sort, such as those frequently made by metaphysicians, are suspect and should be subjected to careful scrutiny (see Carnap 1959). This and other tendencies make analysis appear as a turn toward the development of a more scientific and rigorous way of doing philosophy. The anti-metaphysical bias of analysts was particularly evident among its founding members and persisted for a good part of the twentieth century. More recently, however, analysts have reversed this course, embracing metaphysics with considerable enthusiasm.

Metaphysics is often described as the part of philosophy that studies being, reality, or fundamental principles. But how is this claim to be cashed out in order to include the wide range of views and approaches found among metaphysicians? One way of doing it is by conceiving the discipline as the study of most general categories and the relation of less general categories to the most general ones (Gracia 2014). If understood thus, one task of metaphysics is to establish a list of most general categories, as Aristotle did, for example, with substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, and so on. Another task of the discipline is to determine how less general categories, such as “color,” are related to the most general categories such as, for Aristotle, “quality.”

Understood in this way, it should be clear that metaphysics not only is different from other disciplines, but also plays a prominent role in philosophy for two reasons. The first, because none of the other disciplines is concerned with the establishment of a list of most general categories. The second, because no other discipline tries to determine how less general categories are related to the most general ones. Scientists are also concerned with the establishment of categories, and their interrelations, but they are not concerned with coming up with a list of most general categories. A physicist, for example, will develop a list of categories that will include “matter” and “atom,” but will not be concerned with how these categories fit into the most general categories, such as “substance” or “quality,” using an Aristotelian scheme as an example.

But how does analytic metaphysics differ from non-analytic metaphysics? If we keep in mind the methodological principles that seem to be favored by analysts, we can see that the search for the list of most general categories and the way in which less general categories fit into them, is not essentially different for analysts and non-analysts. Rather, the difference consists in the way analysts go about doing metaphysics, for the emphasis on analysis, conceptual clarity, language, science, logical rigor, and empirical evidence does significantly alter the approach followed.

The task of an analytic metaphysics of race and racial identity, then, involves the identification of more general categories in which race and racial identity fit (e.g., being, reality, social construct, set, property, clade, nation, and so on) and how they differ from
other categories with which they might be confused (e.g., family, species, nationality, class, and so on). This is in fact the task pursued by the authors discussed in the rest of this article. Keep in mind, however, that the discussion of race and racial identity is not the province of analytic metaphysicians alone. Nor is it the case that those analytic philosophers who discuss race and racial identity have restricted their discussion to the views of analytic philosophers.

Race and Racial Identity

The discussion of race in the United States goes back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the work of pioneers such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Alain L. Locke, and Alexander Crummell among others, who first tried to understand race. The roots of analytic philosophy were being developed at the time in Europe, but analytic philosophers were not interested in race, let alone a metaphysics of race and racial identity. Their focus, generally in line with that of logical positivism, was science, logic, and related disciplines, so that the investigation of race for them was confined to that of specialized sciences such as biology. This disinterest continued well into the second half of the twentieth century. Although there were some early discussions of race by analytic philosophers, they tended to concern ethical and social issues rather than metaphysics. The turn toward a more metaphysical approach arose from the discoveries in genetics in the seventies that indicated, contrary to widely accepted views, that the biological grounds for race were either very limited or non-existent.

The argument against race was based on several facts: (1) genetic differences between races are minuscule if compared with what members of different races have in common (Lewontin 1972; Nei and Roychoudhury 1982); (2) no single gene can be used to classify populations into races (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994: 19); (3) no strict correlation exists between the directly observable traits of a person, known as phenotypes, and genetic specifications inherited from parents, known as genotypes (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994: 6–7); (4) particular phenotypes result from different gene combinations and do not adhere to stable racial boundaries (King 1981: 50–51; Zack 2002: 43); and (5) there are no strict boundaries between what are regarded as racial groups, rather these groups grade from one to another (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994: 17–19).

These discoveries gave rise to the controversy concerning the reality of race: If (1)–(5) are true, can race be still considered real or is it a mere social construction? Three basic responses were given to this question at the outset. Eliminativism argues that race should be eliminated from discourse, because all racial discourse is biological and race has no biological bases. Reductionism rejects the notion of race, but substitutes it with such other notions as racial identity or ethnicity. And Constructionism preserves the notion of race, but understands it not as a biological fact, but as a social construction. Many varieties of these three basic positions have been proposed, but we shall concentrate on a handful of examples.

Not everyone was convinced of the unreality of race. Some have continued to hold that race has some biological basis. For example, several versions of Cladism, which looks to ancestral lineage for an understanding of racial groupings, have been proposed. This in turn has generated a strong reaction among those who oppose any biological basis for race for fear that it might reify race and, in turn, promote racism. Supporters of Cladism respond to this by pointing out that their conception of race
does not imply racism and must be evaluated on its merits alone rather than by its social repercussions.

To the question of the reality of race must be added that of the relation of race to social identity. Does it make sense to speak of racial identity, and how is that different from speaking about race? The term “identity” comes from the Latin idem which means “the same.” A thing is identical to itself, and two or more things are identical with respect to some property they have, such as humans with respect to having the capacity to laugh or certain hair color. Moreover, being identical to something else in some sense implies that the things in question are different from other things. That humans are identical with respect to the capacity to laugh makes them different to those beings that do not have such capacity, such as lions and rocks.

From this comes the talk about persons and social groups as having identities. Identity in this sense involves having something that is particular to a person (i.e., personal identity) or group of persons (i.e., social identity) and is different from other persons or groups of persons. Because particular races are composed of people that are supposed to share some features with other members of their racial groups and not with members of other racial groups, it has become common to talk about racial identities. Thus we speak of black and white identities. But does it make sense to talk in this way? Philosophers disagree on this point.

Appiah’s Reduction of Race to Racial Identity

A pioneer and still major figure in the discussion of race is Kwame Anthony Appiah. His position can be classified as a form of Reductionism. It is articulated in his influential essay, “Race, Culture, and Identity: Misunderstood Connections,” published in Color Conscious, a book that has made history in race studies. Appiah not only rejects any biological conception of race claimed to be based on factual evidence or conceptual analysis, but also a cultural understanding of it. Rather than race, he proposes that we should use the concept of racial identity. As he puts it: “First, . . . American social distinctions cannot be understood in terms of the concept of race. . . . Second, replacing the notion of race with the notion of culture is not helpful . . . And third, . . . we should use instead the notion of racial identity” (Appiah 1996: 32).

Appiah’s criticism of the notion of race is developed in terms of two theories of meaning, the ideational and the referential, since credible claims about race must be based on a clear meaning for the term “race.” The ideational account, strictly speaking, requires a coherent set of beliefs associated with the use of the term (Appiah 1996: 35, 36). The referential account requires something in the world that provides an effective causal explanation of the use of that term.

Appiah argues, however, that the history of the concept of race in the United States reveals no identifiable objective phenomenon to which people respond when they talk about race that can effectively function causally (Appiah, 1996: 40, 72). Nor is there a uniform set of coherent beliefs about race (Appiah 1996: 72). This indicates that we do not have either a proper referent of the word “race” or a proper idea of race. In short, Appiah points out,

you can’t get much out of a race concept, ideationally speaking, from any of these [American] traditions; you can get various possible candidates from the
referential notion of meaning, but none of them will be much good for explaining social or psychological life, and none of them corresponds to the social groups we call “races” in America.

(Appiah 1996: 74)

Instead of race or the concept of race, Appiah proposes, we should adopt the concept of racial identity. This, in his view, adheres much better to what we do when we speak about races, racial phenomena, and racial groups. He defines racial identity as:

a label R, associated with [1] ascriptions by most people (where ascription involves descriptive criteria for applying the label); and [2] identifications by those who fall under it (where identification implies a shaping role for the label in the intentional acts of the possessor, so that they sometimes act as an R), where there is a history of associating possessors of the label with an inherited racial essence (even if some who use the label no longer believe in racial essences).

(Appiah 1996: 81–82)

The conditions of racial identity, then, are ascription by others, self-identification by the labeled, and a set of descriptions, used for both ascriptions and as norms for action, that has a historical association to a label involving a racial essence. It does not matter for racial identity that race has any reality, or even that we have a consistent concept of race. What matters is that people label some other people and themselves in certain ways and that the labels include a notion of inherited racial essence. A racial essence consists of a set of conditions regarded as necessary and sufficient for a particular race, whether in fact such conditions exist or not. The key, for Appiah, is the labeling, which he regards as crucial. The label comes first, and it is only afterwards that other features, such as cultural traits, are associated with it and used for action (Appiah 1996: 89). In his own words: “Collective identities . . . provide what we might call scripts: narratives that people can use in shaping their life plans and in telling their life stories” (Appiah 1996: 97).

Appiah’s view involves both the elimination of race as a reality and of a cogent concept of race. In place of these he proposes certain procedures of labeling, varying descriptions, and attempts by those described to tailor action to those descriptions. Unlike radical eliminativists, he finds a substitute for race and its concept in the concept of racial identity. This, he argues, reflects accurately the way humans function with respect to racial phenomena.

Zack’s Radical Eliminativism

A supporter of a radical form of Eliminativism is Naomi Zack. Although she is not an analytic philosopher in the historical sense mentioned earlier, she shares with analytic philosophers an interest in science. Echoing the conclusions of biologists, she holds that race is not a biological reality, that is, a fact that exists independently of human thought, and this makes race a social construction and not a characteristic of anything in the world (Zack 2002: 106ff.). From this she concludes that the concept of race is in fact meaningless and groundless, a remnant of archaic science (Zack 2001). “Black”
“Race” means a biological taxonomy or set of physical categories that can be used consistently and informatively to describe, explain, and make predictions about groups of human beings and individual members of these groups” (Zack 2002: 1).

According to Zack, “there have been four bases for ideas of physical race in common sense: geographical origins of ancestors; phenotypes or physical appearance of individuals; hereditary traits of individuals; [and] genealogy” (Zack 2002: 26). But all four fail the scientific test. And, since science does not support the reality or concept of race, we must do away with it completely. Further, we commit the fallacy of ontological obligation when we continue to use the term “race” as if we are referring to something real.

In spite of the support in science that eliminativists have found, their position has been attacked by reductionists and constructivists whether working in the analytic tradition or not. One early, and prominent, example outside the analytic tradition is that of Lucius T. Outlaw Jr., who works in the American Pragmatic tradition. He has argued that, even if not a biological reality, race is real and has affected and still affects society in significant ways, a reason why it cannot be eliminated from our discourse or consideration (Outlaw 1996). This sentiment is echoed by most of the authors discussed here.

Corlett’s Reduction of Race to Ethnicity

In Race, Racism, and Reparations, Corlett articulates a version of Reductionism that responds to strong versions of Eliminativism and differs from Appiah’s view of racial identity. His position rejects race but develops a genetic view of ethnicity that takes the place of race, and in some ways looks very much like it.

Corlett presents his view as a solution to the practical problems posed by public policy. He begins by distinguishing between two analyses, one in terms of “public policy” and another “metaphysical,” which in his opinion do not have to coincide (Corlett 2003: 51). His main concern is with the first, but he also offers a concrete proposal for the second. Sally Haslanger also advocates something quite similar to a “public policy” account of race. Though she largely eschews a metaphysical approach to race, she does see the utility of acknowledging race as a social category in order to eliminate racial injustices (Haslanger 2005).

According to Corlett, the primary purpose of a public-policy analysis of ethnicity is “to accurately classify people into categories of ethnicity for purposes of justice under the law” (Corlett 2003: 46). The focus of his book is reparations for members of ethnic and racial groups that have suffered discrimination and other social ills as a result of their ethnicity or race. Now, these sorts of reparations require an accurate identification of people along ethnic and racial lines, although the need to come up with accurate classificatory criteria for ethnic and racial groups is not just a requirement of reparations; it is also required for the implementation of other social policies, such as affirmative action. After Corlett presents his position in the context of the Latino ethnic group, he claims that it “serves more than any other philosophical conception of who and what we are as Latinos to assist governments in enacting and administering positive
public policies aimed at Latinos” (Corlett 2003: 60). His conclusions have a broader application and are not meant to apply only to Latinos. They are intended for all ethnic groups, although Corlett uses Latinos because he considers them to be a clear and effective illustration. Moreover, since ethnicity takes the place of race, his conclusions should also be applicable to what others refer to as races.

In Corlett’s own words, his view is that, “for public policy considerations, genealogy ought to be construed as both a necessary and sufficient condition of award or benefit” (2003: 51 et passim). If reparations are to be justified for Latinos, a genetic tie is both necessary and sufficient to implement them, and the government in charge of the implementation needs to pay attention to it. Still, Corlett agrees, there is more to belonging to an ethnic group than genealogy. To be a Latino is more than just having Latino ancestry. Here is where the metaphysical analysis comes in, giving rise to a graded conception in which to be Latino is a matter of degree and involves a number of factors. As Corlett puts it:

Aside from public policy consideration, however, factors that would go toward making one more or less a Latino may include the degree to which one knows and respects a Latino language or dialect thereof; possesses and respects a traditional Latino name; engages in and respects Latino culture or parts thereof; accepts and respects himself or herself as a Latino; is accepted and respected as a Latino by other Latinos; and is construed as a Latino by outgroup members. . . . each of these conditions admits of degrees. . . . [but] neither (sic) . . . is either necessary or sufficient to make one a Latino.”

(2003: 51)

In sum, the metaphysical view of an ethnic group consists of a list of conditions (Corlett does not tell us whether the list is exhaustive), each of which is subject to degree, resulting on one being more or less a member of the group. Consistently with this, the public policy view also is subject to degree, although in contrast with the metaphysical view, it is presented as a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementation of public policy.

**García’s Opposition to Racial and Ethnic Identities**

García has been a constant critic of talk of identity, whether racial or ethnic. Indeed, he has objected to the most salient philosophical views on such identities, including those of Appiah, Zack, Corlett, Gracia, and Alcoff. He criticizes the inconsistency of the eliminativist views of Appiah and Zack with their preservation of the notions of racial and ethnic identities (García 2007: 46–49); Gracia’s attempt to reconcile antiessentialist views of race and ethnicity with his commitment to a historical familial view of ethnic identity (2007: 53–54; 2014); Corlett’s comparative and scalar conception of group identity (2007: 54–62); and Alcoff’s masquerading normative and ideological politics as epistemology and ontology (2000: 68).

García’s position is not entirely negative. Instead of the concept of identity and its use in various contexts, he suggests “that we should strive toward what might be called ethno-racial skepticism and a deflationary conception of race and ethnicity” (2007: 69). He aims for simplicity and clarity, pointing out that the very notions of race and
ethnicity are complex and difficult, posing problems for determining their extension and content. Indeed, according to García, we are very unclear about the extension and content of ethnic and racial affiliations. The understanding of this complexity and difficulty in these notions is made worse, rather than easier, by the introduction of the notion of identity, which is itself complex and difficult. Instead of introducing this notion in discussions of race and ethnicity, we might do much better in our investigation, for example, “to replace as much as possible such putative, ascribed affiliations with more restrained talk of ethnic (and, more problematically, racial) background, especially ancestry” (2007: 73).

One of the benefits of staying away from identity talk in the context of racial and ethnic groups, he argues, is that it dispenses with a number of confusions. One example is the misguided understanding of anyone’s self-image as having to do with the group rather than with what it should be, namely, the self (2007: 76). Another is the view that race or ethnicity “can give ‘meaning’ to its participants’ (members’) lives,” which is entirely too vague to be of any use (2007: 77). Rather than putting emphasis on racial or ethnic affiliations, García proposes that we adopt “a new interpersonalist personalism” that emphasizes our status as human beings, as rational animals, or even as creatures of God.

Glasgow’s Reconstructionist Account of Race

Although Glasgow’s account of race could be considered to be constructionist in that it conceives of race as a social kind, he instead labels it “reconstructionist” and distinguishes it from other constructionist approaches by utilizing, at least in part, experimental philosophy. Focusing on ordinary use, he argues that race terms should be understood to refer only to “wholly social categories,” because retaining these terms “may even operate as a source of meaning in life and of perspectives from which we come to know the world and ourselves” (Glasgow 2009a, 139). Glasgow’s reconstruction comes into play when he acknowledges that the contemporary use of the term “race” is mistakenly, but inextricably linked to biology. Still, he argues, we should continue to use the term and allow it to refer to the racial groupings we currently accept, although these groupings, after proper reconstruction, should be regarded as social kinds, not biological realities.

The first step in articulating the meaning of “race,” which Glasgow considers to be a conceptual question, is to ask what people mean when they use it. The answer is to be found in empirical studies that reveal our common sense understanding of race. Once we find out the characteristics of race embedded within the concept of it, we can then, as a subsequent step, investigate the reality of those characteristics. If they do not exist, then the concept refers to a non-existent entity and must be reconstructed.

The conclusion that Glasgow draws from his research into the common sense notion of race is that “race-thinking seems to involve both biological and social elements” (2009b: 78). While he does allow that there are some correlations between race and certain physical characteristics, he holds that these correlations do not justify a biological component to race. The fact that there is a disproportionate occurrence of a medical condition, even a genetic one, in a particular racial group just means “that it is common among people whom we have categorized as a race, rather than one that is demarcated in nature” (109). Such differences can be the result of environmental pressures based on social categorization constructed by society. As an example he cites
the disproportionate occurrence of hypertension in black males resulting from social pressures where we have a social cause that results in a biological effect.

In conclusion, then, if our common sense understanding of race includes biological elements and no such elements are warranted because they do not exist, then we are using “race” mistakenly to refer to a non-existent entity. Glasgow may be considered an anti-realist in the sense that he believes there is no biological basis for race. In spite of this conclusion, however, he favors the preservation of racial discourse to the extent that, properly understood, it can be beneficial for addressing some social issues. We should neither completely eliminate nor “wholeheartedly conserve it, but we should replace racial discourse with a nearby discourse” that uses racial terms only to refer to social categories (2). As he puts it:

the word “race” in ordinary discourse purports to refer to something biological. Since no such biological thing exists, we have reason to get rid of that discourse. However, if we simultaneously replace it with the language of race, then we will implement a discourse that refers to a wholly social object, which turns out to be real

Thus reconstructed, racial discourse is useful in that, for example, it allows us to preserve racial identity and race-conscious policies. Racial identity is important for people to maintain proper conceptions of themselves and race-conscious policies, such as affirmative action, can promote equal opportunity (133). In short, we should continue to speak of race, but we should understand it as not having a biological import.

Gracia’s Constructionism in Race and Ethnicity

Gracia rejects radical Eliminativism, such as that of Zack, and the Reductionism of Appiah and Corlett. In agreement with Outlaw, he keeps the notion of race, but rejects its identification with racial identity or ethnicity. His position preserves a distinction between race and ethnicity and allows for the notion of racial and ethnic identities. He calls his view of race the Genetic Common-Bundle View and his view of ethnicity the Historical-Familial View (Gracia 2005: 82 and 24; 2000: 27–33). Both incorporate a familial dimension.

Gracia begins by making a distinction between “a race” considered as a group of people, “race” considered as a property of members of a group, and “racial identity” which is the possession of the racial property. These correspond with, but are different from, “an ethnos” (or ethnic group), “ethnicity” (a property of members of the ethnic group), and “ethnic identity.” A race as a group of people consists of a sub-group of individual human beings who satisfy the following two conditions:

(1) each member of the group is linked by descent to another member of the group who is in turn also linked by descent to at least some third member of the group; and (2) each member of the group has one or more physical features that are (i) genetically transmittable, (ii) generally associated with the group, and (iii) perceptually perspicuous.

(2005: 85)
Race as a property consists in the set of characteristics that satisfy these conditions. And racial identity is the higher order relational property of having such a property.

Gracia argues that neither one of the two conditions required by a race, taken by itself, is sufficient for racial membership, unless one were to adopt the infamous One-Drop Rule, which is inconsistent and hence unacceptable (see Malcomson 2000). The One-Drop Rule is inconsistent as a racial marker because it can function effectively only if applied discriminately to some races and not others. This means that being related by descent to a member of some race, who is in turn related by descent to at least some third member of that race, is not sufficient for someone to be a member of the race, since the person in question may not share in any of the features generally associated with members of it (Gracia 2005: 85–86). This, Gracia claims, is the reason why we say that people can change races whereas in fact, and strictly speaking, there is no such racial change. The presumed change amounts to the recognition that the persons in question do not satisfy the conditions sufficient for belonging to a particular race while they meet the conditions of belonging to another race. The change is one of labeling, that is, of what we call the persons, rather than of being, that is, of what the persons are.

In the same way, according to Gracia, having physical features associated with a particular race does not automatically make a person a member of the race or serve effectively to identify the person as such (2005: 86). Some Indians, Italians, and blacks have many phenotypes in common, but the first two are not considered to be members of the black race because they do not satisfy the descent condition.

Although Gracia uses the notion of family to understand both race and ethnicity, he distinguishes ethnicity from race in that it is conceived in terms of history and does not require the two stated racial conditions. This means that ethnicity is a more flexible notion and contingent on historical events, even if such historical events may include descent and certain phenotypes as required in race. It is for this reason that race and ethnicity are often confused with each other as happens with Hispanics/Latinos (Gracia 2000).

Gracia’s position with respect to race and ethnicity may be considered constructionist insofar as, apart from descent and the inherited and physical character of the phenotypes that make up the distinguishing racial property of a racial group, the choice of the particular features is the result of social construction and thus may vary from society to society. Ethnicity is also a construct but, unlike race, it is not constrained by descent or inheritable physical phenotypes, although these may in fact be part of the distinguishing ethnic property of particular ethnic groups. Still, both races and ethne are familial groups when this metaphor is used broadly.

**Andreasen’s Cladism**

Most, if not all, accounts of race as a biological entity have come under heavy criticism. Some have been accused of being motivated by a racist agenda, whereas others have been criticized because of their theoretical flaws. Among recent authors who reject such charges is Andreasen. She proposes that races be understood using a cladistic method. She defines races as “sets of lineages that share a common origin” (Andreasen 2000: S655). Cladism as used in biology refers to the grouping of organisms by ancestry. This
contrasts with evolutionary taxonomy, in which the groupings are based on ancestry and adaptation, or a phenetic approach in which the groupings are based on perceived similarities (see also Kitcher’s similar approach in 1999).

One of the strengths of Cladism, for Andreasen, is its inherent objectivity insofar as the construction of an ancestral lineage is not subject to cultural biases or social preferences as may be the case in the phenetic approach. Additionally, Cladism does not rely on “kind-specific essences” as some previous biological approaches did. In her view, such essentialist approaches were not compatible with evolutionary theory, whereas phylogenetic approaches, such as Cladism, “are historical, since they define taxa in terms of evolutionary history . . . [and] aim to represent the evolutionary branching process” (Andreasen 2000: S656).

Different methods of constructing ancestral lineages have been proposed, but Andreasen relies on the research of Luigi Cavalli-Sforza, Masatoshi Nei and Arun Roychoudhury, and Allan Wilson and Rebecca Cann for her construction. Accordingly, gene frequencies are used to construct groupings, of which Andreasen proposes nine (New Guinean & Australian, Pacific Islander, SE Asian, NE Asian, Arctic NE Asian, Amerindian, European, Non-European Caucasoid and African). She acknowledges that these groupings rely on some controversial data, but this does not preclude the possibility of their representational accuracy.

Andreasen’s version of Cladism is unique among biological accounts of race in that it neither looks at racial groups as subspecies, nor does it propose that such groups have any significance in terms of complex social characteristics. Indeed, for Andreasen a cladist approach is compatible with social Constructionism and the claim “that most CS [common sense] beliefs about the biological reality of race are empirically unjustified” (Andreasen 2000: S662). There is nothing biologically meaningful with respect to common sense notions of race, but this does not mean there is no biologically meaningful way of creating racial groupings. Cladist racial groupings, rather than relying on subjective criteria, such as skin tone similarity or hair type, provide an objective and biological basis for racial groups. Cladist groups can change or become extinct and new races can emerge. Andreasen also claims that races are disappearing because geographic reproductive isolation is not occurring to the extent it did before technological advances allowed humans to travel the globe.

Conclusion

Although recent analytic philosophers have explored many aspects of race, in metaphysics they have often focused on the questions of the reality of race, the distinction between race and other social categories such as ethnicity, and the viability and nature of racial identities. All the authors discussed here have something to say about the first two topics and most of them also about the third. Their discussions can be characterized as metaphysical both because they have raised questions dealing with the reality of race and they have provided categorizations of race in terms of more general categories that distinguish it from other phenomena.

Appiah disputes the reality of race and the cogency of the corresponding concept providing a linguistic analysis based on the notion of racial identity. Zack rejects any uses of the language or concept of race because they imply a biological reality that does
not exist. Corlett rejects the reality and concept of race, but unlike Appiah argues in favor of substituting race by ethnicity. Gracia proposes distinctions between “a race,” “race,” and “racial identity” on the one hand and “an ethnos,” “ethnicity,” and “ethnic identity” on the other. A race is a group of people and thus real, but race is a property of members of a group that is the result of social construction, although some of its components are real first-order properties. García’s effort focuses on arguing against the concept of racial and ethnic identity. Identity for him should be restricted to personal identity, although this does not entail that people may not be appropriately classified as belonging to a race or an ethnic group. Glasgow offers a view of race that, similar to eliminativist positions, acknowledges a disconnect between common sense ideas of race and the reality of race. His approach differs from eliminativist approaches in that he argues for retaining the term “race” while reconstructing its meaning so that it exclusively refers to a social construction. Andreasen argues for a biological understanding of race that relies on a phylogenetic account of racial groupings in terms of clades that is potentially compatible with constructionist theories.

Although not all the authors discussed address the same problems and, when they do, they seldom agree with each other, some common elements distinguish them from other philosophers of race belonging to non-analytic traditions. In terms of topics, they focus on race, ethnicity, identity, and their interrelations, introducing distinctions between them that are often ignored in non-analytic accounts. Unlike philosophers who tend to shun metaphysical analyses, they often explicitly take these up and argue for their fundamental role in any account of race. Likewise, they tend to include Constructionist elements even when their overall positions rely on non-constructionist bases. In line with the scientific origins of analysis, analytic philosophers generally pay particular attention to scientific discoveries, integrating them into their views as much as possible. For the most part, they seek to make original contributions to race theory backed up by carefully crafted arguments in accordance with the method of analysis. And although analysts often discuss political, social, and moral issues, their accounts do not include as many witnessing narratives, contrasting with other traditions that often give such narratives a predominant place in their discussions. Particularly infrequent in analytic accounts are autobiographical narratives, insofar as analysts prefer to deal with conceptual matters rather than personal ones. Finally, in accordance with the method of analysis, members of this tradition approach race and racial questions through the analysis of language.

These differences with other philosophical traditions give analytic discussions of race a character quite different from those of other philosophical traditions. Indeed, the originality and value of analytical treatments of race owe much to these differences; it is precisely because of them that analysts have been able to pinpoint subtle, but significant and different nuances in the conceptions of race, ethnicity, and identity that had been ignored by other philosophers. And it is thanks to those differences that analytic accounts constitute real alternatives to other accounts, and challenge the assumptions that guide them.

References


