


This article was downloaded by: 10.3.97.143

On: 23 Sep 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



Routledge Handbook of Islam in the West

Roberto Tottoli

Muslims in Western Europe in the late twentieth century

Publication details

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315794273.ch5>

Ghaliya Djelloul, Brigitte Maréchal

Published online on: 20 Aug 2014

How to cite :- Ghaliya Djelloul, Brigitte Maréchal. 20 Aug 2014, *Muslims in Western Europe in the late twentieth century from*: Routledge Handbook of Islam in the West Routledge

Accessed on: 23 Sep 2023

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315794273.ch5>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Muslims in Western Europe in the late twentieth century

Emergence and transformations in “Muslim” revindications and collective mobilization efforts

Ghaliya Djelloul and Brigitte Maréchal

Introduction

In the wake of the pioneering work of Felice Dassetto and Jorgen Nielsen published in the early 1980s, the number of research projects dealing with European Islam is ever on the increase. Although this subject has received little generally focused treatment, certain logics of action do emerge in the literature available, addressing the subject of the collective mobilization efforts of Muslims (whether they are religious or religiously inspired). Indeed, the dynamics of the implantation and consolidation of the presence of Muslims in Europe are primarily approached from three perspectives: either in terms of the specific features of the national context of each of the various European countries¹ or based on the activities of one or the other Islamic current – Sufi, missionary, political, etc. – among others transnational, testifying to ideological sensitivities and specific models of action, or based on mobilization efforts within a relatively well-defined sphere of activity, such as political representation, interreligious dialogue or *halal* business.²

All sphere of activities taken together, here we present a panorama of the major lines of influence of European Muslims’ militant involvements, even if our anchoring in the Belgian context might quite likely appear determinative in our considerations. To start with, we shall provide some background, particularly the distribution and specific features of Muslim populations in Western Europe in connection with a periodization of the processes of emergence and anchoring of these individuals and/or communities. We shall then present their types of mobilization and revindications. Finally, we shall develop axes of interpretation with a view to understanding the possible particularities of these militant engagements in Europe, before concluding with the transformations all that represents and implies, not only for Muslim communities, but also, in a broader scope, for European societies.

The emergences and trajectories of “Muslim” communities

The presence of “Muslims” in Europe results from three distinct settlement processes. The earliest (seventh to eighth century) dates back to the arrival of Muslim armies in southern Europe (Spain and Sicily), from where they were subsequently driven back. The second took place in Eastern Europe, in the Balkans region and Central Europe. It was bound up in the Ottoman Empire’s military expansion from the fifteenth century on and ended in the early twentieth century with that empire’s gradual disintegration. The last process of implantation began in the 1960s; it manifests the specific characteristics this new dynamic involves.

At the geographical level, this implantation is broader than in the past not only from a quantitative point of view but also because it has gradually extended throughout European space (from southern Italy to the north of the Scandinavian countries, from Scotland to Berlin). Moreover, unlike a good part of the earlier encounters, this one is peaceful and largely composed of working-class members issuing from the four corners of the Islamic world. Their distribution throughout European territory re-establishes older, imperial or colonial connections: those who come from the Maghreb countries are predominantly implanted along the countries of the European Atlantic coastline, from Spain to the Netherlands, as well as in Italy and to a lesser extent in Germany. Those coming from the Indian peninsula and Pakistan initially established themselves in the United Kingdom. Today, these populations circulate and are present in other European countries too. Those coming from sub-Saharan Africa (especially West Africa) are established in France, Spain, and Italy. Others, arriving from Turkey, settled in Germany, Austria, as well as in France (particularly in Alsace), Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Finland. Subsequently, others have been arriving more recently from Kosovo, Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere (Dassetto 1996; Nielsen et al. 2009).

An unequal and growing implantation in European countries

Quantifying the “Muslim” presence raises many questions of definition (Dassetto 1996; Jeldtoft 2009; Spielhaus 2011). Among others: on what bases can one measure religious affiliation in the absence of reliable censuses on the subject? How is one to account for the diversity of identities and affiliations which, linked to the multiple positions that are possible with regard to Islam (spiritual, normative, cultural, civilizational, and political postures, *inter alia*), themselves lead to commitments with very variable intensities? And beyond the efforts to take them into account through typologies, are these categories mutually exclusive or do they frequently overlap? The difficulties involved in making subjective affiliations intelligible lead us to place the term “Muslim” in quotation marks and insist that it is above all a matter of people directly or indirectly originating from mainly Muslim countries, while remaining aware that it is important to consider the presence of converts to Islam, who are often actively involved in religious matters. Moreover, on the basis of the rare data existing, we can say that in Western European countries roughly 30 percent of people of Muslim origin actively express their religious identity in an explicit and visible manner – participation in Friday prayers, wearing headscarves, etc. – whereas only 10 percent of them engage in some form of collective militant mobilization efforts, whether they do so regularly or only occasionally.

To provide ourselves with points of reference, however imperfect they might be, we provide the figures here of the number of people of “attributed” Muslim origin (Table 5.1), i.e. affiliated to Islam on the basis of ethno-national criteria, according to their origin in one of the five following cultural geographical areas (the Maghreb and other Arab countries, Turkey, the

Table 5.1 Number of people of “attributed” Muslim origin

Country	Muslim population in 2000/1 (Maréchal 2002)	% of total population	Muslim pop. in 2009/10 (Nielsen et al. 2011)	% of total population
Austria	300,000	4	500,000	6
Belgium	370,000	3.7	450,000	4
Denmark	150,000	2.8	216,880	4
Finland	20,000	0.39	50,000–60,000	1
France	4,000,000	6.6	5,300,000	7
Germany	3,400,000	3.2	3,800,000–4,300,000	4.6–5.25
Greece	370,000	3–3.5	350,000 (in 2008)	3.1
Ireland	19,147 (in 2002)	0.5	49,204	1
Italy	700,000	1.2	1,420,000	2.4
Netherlands	695,600	4.6	857,000	5
Norway	56,468	1.3	150,000	3
Portugal	30,000–38,000	0.3	38,000–40,000	0.4
Spain	300,000–400,000	0.75–0.1	1,320,000	2.85
Sweden	250,000–300,000	2.8–3.3	350,000–400,000	3.8–4.4
Switzerland	310,000	4	400,000	5.2
United Kingdom	1,400,000	2.5	2,870,000	4.6

Indian peninsula, Africa, and the Balkans), adding the number of converts. For a correct grasp of the growth in figures between 1999 and 2009, we should note particularly that the estimates become appreciably more precise when self-identification surveys are introduced, as in the Netherlands in 2006.

These populations have grown rather quickly in most countries. On average, they accounted for 3.5 percent of the total European population in 2001, and then 5.5 percent in 2010, but strong disparities exist between countries: the spread ranges between 7 percent in France and 0.4 percent in Portugal. Additionally, the implantations are mainly urban, given that Muslims sometimes make up a non-negligible part of that population, which is, moreover, often concentrated in certain zones (such as the old central districts or the interstices and peripheries of cities): thus populations are over 15 percent Muslim in certain cities like Birmingham, Marseilles, Brussels, Berlin, and Utrecht. As for demographic projections, they show the possibility of higher rates in the future even if it is not certain that this tendency will continue given the fact of a progressive rapprochement in behavior as regards birth rates (Westoff and Frejka 2007).

A continual succession of migratory waves and the anchoring process: from Islam in exile to established Islam

Assuming that mass dynamics are especially dependent on the variable attractiveness of contexts, the last wave of implantation of “Muslim” populations into Western Europe evolved over the course of four phases (Dassetto 1996). The first among them was the fruit of a more or less voluntarist policy favoring the immigration of mainly male workers with the aim of supporting the European economic boom, particularly after the signing of labor agreements between states. This began in the 1960s in most of the countries of the center and north of Western Europe (the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden) and in the southern States (Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece) from the 1980s on.

There were some exceptions to this for specific historical reasons: France, for example, witnessed the installation of “Muslims” from the 1920s on because of its colonies and protectorate in North Africa. Ireland has welcomed a large number of “Muslim” students since the 1950s, but only experienced a more massive surge and diversification in the profiles of this “Muslim” immigration during the economic boom of the 1990s. Lastly, Finland saw a first community of “Muslims,” Tatars and Kazakhs, settling from 1830 on, at the time of its annexation by the Russian Empire. Their descendants have been officially organized as a community since 1923 and were only joined by other “Muslims” in the 1990s thanks to policies admitting refugees.

Despite the border closings decreed by the traditional countries of immigration (Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France) after the first oil crisis in 1973, a sizeable influx of “Muslim” immigration went on unabated, becoming more diversified: it especially increased in connection with family reunifications. Barely arrived, all of these populations rapidly found themselves confronted with the worsening economic crisis, unemployment, and an atmosphere of hostility.

During the 1980s a third phase witnessed the installation of new waves of immigrants in southern Europe, and in northern Europe particularly by means of marriage. Among these immigrants were now to be found students and political refugees, young, educated, and from urban environments, whereas the first waves of migration had been primarily made up of illiterate people from rural environments.

Since the late 1980s we have also seen a relative resumption of clandestine immigration and asylum requests from persons coming from the Balkans, Central Asia, and Africa. Additionally, many activists and Islamist movement leaders, above all issuing from the Machrek and the Maghreb, took refuge in European capitals, as in the case of London, reputed for the pragmatic British reception, in conjunction with their foreign policy interests. Thanks to the growing number of naturalizations, an increased number of these people circulate within European spaces – without mentioning the emergence of a new category of Muslims who are starting to count from a numerical point of view: that of native Europeans converted to Islam and who frequent, among others, the second or even the third generations of people originating from Muslim countries.

Religion’s complex and changing role: between piety, militancy, and hedonism

The arrival of four great waves of “Muslim” populations has fostered various inclinations involving the propensities and modalities of mobilization efforts, religious among others. Their variety quite likely depends on multiple economic, juridical, and socio-cultural factors, as well as on the length of the European stay (which affects integration and even the degree of facility in the host society), the religious offers available, and the types of leadership, as well as the respective weight of each generation and gendered social group (the most recent immigration remains male in the majority, composed of single men, but the influence of the presence of women, in connection with family reunifications, is increasingly making itself felt). These elements affect not only social, political, and cultural practices in general, but also the formulation of expectations with regard to religion, in terms of European contexts as well as contexts involving national origin, or even the dynamics of world Islam.

Indeed, until the mid-1970s, the offer and demand of Islam remained relatively weak and other frames of reference took precedence: tribal and/or regional affiliation, nationality of origin – and this much more so when it is supported by a strong nationalism – as well as culture, understood as an ensemble of habits and ways of acting (Dassetto 1996, 2000). But the migratory project evolved in connection with children who grew up alongside an Islamic

revival – promoted by certain currents – notably missionary, such as the Jama'at at-Tabligh, and political, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the *Jama'at-i-Islami* – in Muslim countries; the latter was exported and found itself progressively valorized from the mid-1980s on, before being extended by other dynamics, such as the Salafists in the 1990s. These religious mobilization efforts seek to produce a strong identity, thought to be able to consolidate the Muslim community and favor socially integrating young generations in particular (Césari 1998). In addition to issues of a specifically religious nature (related to the valorization of rites, beliefs, affiliations, etc.), it nonetheless leads to identity constructions of an “ethnic”³ type, which arouse and then consolidate political issues (representation before local and national authorities and ethnic voting), economic issues (*halal* consumption), and cultural issues (among others, the valorization by some of Islamic law juxtaposing positive law, by questions introduced concerning conceptions of secularity, private–public spaces, etc., notably based on promoting the wearing of headscarves).

The decades of the 1990s and 2000s thus became the theater of more contrastive dynamics, so much more so in that Sufi movements also sought to assert themselves further. And the arrival, by marriage, of (future) Muslim leaders who import concerns and visions anchored in the countries of origin (of Muslim majority) and the return of youths of the second generation of immigrants after having followed studies in Islamic sciences in Muslim countries (in the absence of valid education being provided in Europe) allowed “peripheral” networks to be interconnected (Allievi and Nielsen 2003). European Islam is thus reworked by the dynamics of world Islam, which is no longer (just) imported but indeed henceforth conveyed by actors of European descent. In parallel, on the Muslim world scale, the European experience represents a first, since, in a stable way, Muslims are experiencing the universality of the *umma* beginning with the confrontation of very varied ways of being Muslim in a pluralistic context where Islam is no longer transplanted (Dassetto and Bastenier 1984) but henceforth implanted.

The phases retraced here describe a process in countries in the center or northern part of Western Europe which have experienced the same temporality of mass immigration. In countries where the surge came later, we find “selected” or illegal immigrant workers providing low-cost labor, as well as students, refugees, and people who arrived via family reunifications (Nielsen et al. 2009). Their presence in Europe being more recent, one finds fewer generational cohorts there. However, since the 1990s that presence has been marked by an international context at once more strained with the Muslim world and more globalized, i.e. animated by a permanent flow of information and people (Allievi and Nielsen 2003); the Muslim populations there have been more rapidly made visible and more directly engaged on the collective scene (Nielsen et al. 2009; Allievi 2009).

Juridical recognition, institutionalizing the Islamic reality, and the role of context

One basic contextual element involves the concrete recognition the Islamic religion enjoys in a state. Depending on the pre-existent national juridical structures, the processes for the official recognition of Islam usually date back to the 1970s and 1980s and are more or less linked to the Muslims eventually appointing one or more representative authorities, which has seemed hard to achieve for people who do not have a legitimate model of religious structure at their disposal. Yet this process has just as readily taken place in countries where recognition is guaranteed by a universalist system (France, Sweden, and the Netherlands) as in those which have established a system of conditional recognition (like Belgium, Spain, and Austria). The countries where the institutionalization of Islam has not yet advanced find themselves in this situation either because they have not yet completed a recognition procedure (Switzerland, Germany, Italy, and

Luxembourg) or because one church is recognized as particularly dominant there (Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Denmark), which does not, however, mean that those states have done nothing as regards recognition: because of their sizeable Muslim populations, Germany and the United Kingdom have, for example, set up processes for consultations with high-ranking state authorities (Nielsen et al. 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012).

Generally speaking, we agree with jurist S. Ferrari that Islam and Muslims find their place in European states on the basis of respect both for the principles of religious liberty (since exercising civil and political rights is independent of religious beliefs) and for the autonomy of religious organizations (non-interference in their doctrines and internal organization). After fifty years' presence in Europe, cooperation between states and Muslim communities is being achieved; Islam is gradually being placed in a position of equality in relation to other religions even if certain juridical and social difficulties remain: among other cases, when certain European values are questioned, as in the examples of male–female equality, human dignity, and democratic citizenship, etc. (Ferrari 2007).

Yet, like every other community, the social construction of Muslim communities clearly extends beyond juridical structures. It results from a dialectical relationship between the group's available resources and its social environment. However, aside from reactions *vis-à-vis* a limited number of events with global repercussions, like the Danish caricatures of the Prophet (Klausen 2009), most Muslim mobilization efforts involve national and/or local political issues which thus depend on the structures of political, juridical, and cultural opportunities. In this context, Césari and McLoughlin (2005) propose observing interactions between Muslim groups and segments of Western societies in order to ascertain transformations in political specificities (secularism, nationalism, multiculturalism ...) resulting from the establishment of new relationships between religion(s) and cultures.

Along these same lines, Amiraux and Jonker (2006) remind us that public visibility is related to the opportunities offered by a context and a specific institutional landscape wherein processes constructing the imaginaries and reciprocal representations intervene too. Hence they consider the “politics of visibility” to be a co-construction, i.e. a performance on a public stage where everyone has the opportunity of considering “alterity,” and physically meeting one another. If religion finds its place on the public scene in terms of these reciprocal social stagings, it is interesting to observe that attempts at transplantation of revindications or forms of mobilization between different national contexts have proven more or less successful, as witnessed by the experiment carried out in Belgium by Sharia4Belgium, based on mobilization efforts similar to those of the Sharia4UK group (Dassetto 2012).

Concretely, the main issues addressed relate to the recognition of religious institutions (among others, in relation to state authorities), the possibility (or not) of organizing religion courses in public schools, the exercise of chaplaincy in prisons, hospitals and the armed forces, in mentioning the (in)direct financing of religious activities and/or institutions, such as faculties in state universities, and, finally, recognition of the civil effects of religious marriage. We also find supplementary requests in certain countries (where the installation is older), such as recognition of Islamic holidays and the availability of dishes which respect food interdictions in state institutions, or requests for the possibility of legally organizing ritual slaughters, perhaps more or less co-organized by public authorities, etc. It might also involve agreeing to women wearing headscarves on their identity card, having a channel with privileged access to national media – following the example of other recognized religions – or, in rare cases, the possibility of officially recognizing religious decisions adopted in conflict regulation, particularly with regard to family law, via the mediation taking place on an intra-community level (Foblets 2003).

Yet, aside from this long enumeration, an exhaustive comparative study of *reasons for commitment* within Muslim populations in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, and Switzerland (Koopmans et al. 2005: 146–79) underlines the discrepancy between the extensive space given over to community revindications in the literature on multicultural citizenship and reality. Moreover, analysis of the influence of the political and institutional context on the emergence of such revindications shows here that the countries which maintain the migrants politically and culturally at the furthest distance from the host society are those wherein one finds the fewest, or no, community revindications. That leads us to believe that a minimum of reception is needed for the immigrant populations and their descendants to feel politically strong and autonomous enough to formulate requests for “special treatment.”

Moreover, comparison of three national approaches to Islam shows each one’s limits (Koopmans et al. 2005: 146–79). In the Netherlands, the fact of easily granting collective rights leads to a process of communitarian withdrawal following increasing demands which have merely reinforced an “amongst ourselves,” which becomes disaffiliated from the rest of the population, without counting the fact that this “communitarian” policy stimulates strong intra-community competition. In the United Kingdom, where religious revindications are the most substantial and controversial, encouragement of political participation as a religious “community” leads to a proliferation of unresolved conflicts. And finally, in France pressures to assimilate tend to distance the migrant groups from identification with the political process, constraining them to make an increasingly polarized choice between a strictly privatized or politicized Islam.

We can thus conclude from this that the multicultural or pillar models (the UK, the Netherlands) support mobilization efforts of an “offensive” type, because the context they put in place presupposes socially active and organized communities. On the other hand, since the assimilationist or differentialist models (France, Austria) take a dim view of particular group revindications, mobilization efforts based on religious factors are carried out in a “defensive” mode.

The symbolic construction of Islam in the imaginaries and in European social spaces: some reactions to Islam envisaged as a figure of social disdain

The historical process of making Islam visible in Western Europe remains unfinished (Martiniello et al. 2007). After a period of silent and forgotten presence during the first decade of implantation, characterized by a weak Islamic demand on the immigrant populations’ behalf, coupled with the autochthonous populations’ lack of interest in the newcomers, Muslim populations gradually became aware of the less and less transitory, and then definitive, character of their installation. That stabilization went hand in hand with the desire to set up infrastructure, particularly places of religious socialization for the younger generation. Experienced as familiar and reassuring places in unknown territories, mosque building, as well as associative engagement, met the needs of adult Muslims in creating places of exchange and solidarity in crisis contexts, among others, following the 1974 oil crisis. However, this domestic demand on the part of immigrant populations went hand in hand with an “Islamic revival” in the abovementioned Muslim countries, eventually sustaining many political-religious logics.

From the 1980s onward, the increasingly visible presence of Islam drew upon the decline of certain urban spaces: mosques were established in abandoned stores or warehouses, 1950s vintage workshops, cafés and cinemas having closed their doors, etc. Around them, the “ethno-Islamic” districts formed, made up of stores (among which were Islamic *halal* butcher shops), bookstores, cafés, etc. imbued with an ever stronger presence of the corporeal signs of “Muslimness” (Dassetto 1999). That presence causes a growing uneasiness in public opinion, all the more likely to lead to the development of an anti-immigrant racism when those populations

gradually come to be associated, or are even confused, with the dramatic and incessant events of the Middle East. After the Iranian Revolution, new fears subsequently developed concerning the presence of Islam in European territory, beginning with the Rushdie affair and the events concerning “Islamic headscarves” in Creil, France, in 1989. The absence of leaders and spokespeople able to formulate an audible discourse on the issues involved and provide European societies with reassuring answers resulted in Muslims withdrawing into their own, lively communitarian life. At the same time, the mosques, but perhaps to an even greater degree the associative fabric, thenceforth became the incrementally more structured anchoring point of a movement fostering the local re-Islamization of populations; particularly with young males and females finding a strong identity instrument in Islam, to appropriate for themselves, and/or as a foundation on the moral level.

Two major events, the fall of the Soviet bloc in 1991 and the September 11, 2001 attacks in turn further marked ways of perceiving Muslims in European societies, who were in effect gradually going to incarnate the face of the Other, or rather, a step further, the face of a “disturbing strangeness.”⁴ On the one hand, the first ratified a radical expansion of liberalism as a dominant political and philosophical principle in Europe, affecting how the elites considered social cohesion. Consequently, the centrality of individual freedom and civil rights in “traditional” liberal thought ran up against the equally increasing demand for a recognition of rights specific to ethnic or religious communities, especially when certain rules were perceived as contradicting the basic principles of liberalism (Nonneman et al. 1996), such as the right of people to self-determination in their own lives, whereas these very people testify to a form of submission to constraints which are at least apparently imposed by some particular group. If states retain control over the political orientations they intend to privilege, the demand for certain (collective) rights for minorities nonetheless challenges the limitations of human rights (Kymlicka 1995); all the more so in that the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) regularly adopts new orientations in the area of respect for religious liberty, following the appeals introduced, especially since the early 1990s, by certain Muslims, among others, calling for observation of their fundamental rights, considered to have been violated by national states.⁵

The second factor further affecting European societies’ relationships with Islam and Muslims throughout the last decade relates to the events of September 11, 2001. The perception of Islam as a diffuse and internal threat reached its paroxysm at that moment and the media reacted in supporting the collective memory. Thereupon George W. Bush declared “The War on Terror,” completely transforming American and British political agendas around a double strategy aimed at prevention and launching a struggle against Islamic extremism, yet while maintaining privileged relationships with Muslim organizations who were already initially engaged, in Great Britain in any case, in a veritable “faith relation industry” aimed at encouraging social cohesion (McLoughlin 2005). But opinions became polarized and, subsequently, radicalized.

On the one hand, Samuel Huntington’s thesis (1996) describing a “clash of civilizations” had far reaching influence on public opinion and affected public policies, followed by a long list of “affairs,” from the Van Gogh assassination (in 2004) to international tensions created by the propagation of the Danish caricatures of the Prophet (in 2005), from the attacks in Madrid and London in March 2004 and July 2005 to various amalgams related to forced marriages and the emergence of *shari’a* courts, etc. If what was above all fostered in European societies was a certain mistrust, strains were sometimes exacerbated to the point of engendering Islamophobic feelings and/or attitudes towards Islam and Muslims, who were seen as representing the antithesis of Europe and its values. On the other hand, many personalities came forward to address these imaginaries, fed by a culturalist approach to the reality of Islam, considered an exceptionalism, thus explaining its refusal to be assimilated, unlike previous (intra-European)

migrations. These figures testified to the internal pluralism of Muslim communities in their identities, their affiliations, and their practices: they pointed out the complexity of identity constructions and the development of sentiments of loyalty to the host country (Seddon et al. 2003), and called for the construction of a veritable spirit of “living together.” Within Muslim communities, too, where religion is more or less serenely increasingly thought of as passing into the order of private affairs, certain voices have arisen denouncing past laxity in dealing with radical Islamist currents at the intra-community level.

The specificities of Muslim mobilization efforts and revindications in Europe

Having outlined the multiple social contexts of European Islam in the twentieth century, let us turn to the ongoing mobilization efforts and revindications being made in the name of religion so as to provide a progress report on their evolution. Indeed, along with the national social, political, cultural, and economic contexts, they undergo transformation once the temporary implantation of the Muslims is converted into a permanent installation and communities more or less withdrawn into themselves come to include young people involved at the intra-community level and/or on the extra-community public scene: besides the fact of trying to have their needs met, the latter seek to express their singularities therein or to symbolically defend Islam or the Muslims, or even to bear witness to a certain exemplarity on the level of values in European societies. But then who are the actors in these Islamic mobilization efforts and what dynamics guide their engagements among the multitude of forms existing? To grasp the long and complex history of the construction of European Islam, we propose the following typology, distinguishing intra-communitarian organizational dynamics from political activities and symbolic mobilization efforts.⁶ This presents the advantage of showing the basic tendencies, although it hardly brings national specificities to light.

Mobilization efforts to meet intra-community needs above all

From a historical point of view, local community investment has been European Muslims' privileged reason for mobilization and remains so today. This involves multiple venues and manners of engagement, which implies, besides the ability to collect private or even public funds, organizing themselves to open and animate places of worship with the possibility of setting up courses in Arabic and/or initiation into, or even advanced study of, religion. Under the auspices of these places of worship – which generally remain very strongly divided along the ethnic-national lines of the countries of origin and Islamic organizations professing adherence to various tendencies⁷ – and then, gradually, independently of them, commitment to religious transmission increased from the late 1970s on, once the need for socializing children in Islam appeared.

Thus, besides the courses proposed in mosques, a few dozen Muslim primary schools were also rather rapidly created from the 1980s on in countries like Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands, while the phenomenon has remained quite marginal in other European countries, among other reasons because the teaching of Islamic religion courses has in places been gradually inserted into pre-existing school networks, as in the cases of Spain, Austria, Finland, certain German *Länder* (federal states), and Belgium, where no fewer than 700 professors are financed by the state (Maréchal et al. 2003; Nielsen et al. 2011).

With regard to higher education levels, they only began to be a subject of concern in the 1990s, with, for example, the Muslim College in London, or the European Institute of Social

Sciences in France, or the Islamic University of Rotterdam in the Netherlands all proposing degree programs for becoming an imam and/or teaching the Islamic religion. Existing institutes of higher education are usually the result of private initiatives and, with exceptions, their official, or even unofficial, recognition by the state structures of European countries remains rather weak. To meet increased educational needs, new programs have nonetheless begun to be set up in universities financed by certain states, as in Germany, where the universities of Erlangen-Nuremberg and Osnabrück have just begun organizing programs for professors of the Islamic religion (Nielsen et al. 2012).

Besides the organization of worship and teaching, which thus represents *the* primordial and ongoing investment for Muslim communities, if only to continue to improve the practical conditions for the exercise of worship or consolidate offers of instruction in Islam, local-level involvement concerns other important needs too. We especially have in mind developing networks for the supply of *halal* meat, via more or less informal channels or based on the creation of Islamic butcheries.⁸ But this also involves the establishment of associations organizing pilgrimages to Mecca or setting up networks of solidarity for repatriating the bodies of the deceased to their countries of origin, prior to the subsequent consideration of creating specific burial areas through the recognition of Muslim plots in cemeteries.⁹

In these domains, the task of many, we notice a relative predominance of first generation men, especially with regard to the management of mosques; the young hardly compete with them there, except that young people's intervention is sometimes required, for instance when a better knowledge of the external context is required, among other things for the collection of public funds (Allievi 2009). In the meantime, since the mid-1990s these youths' investment has thus concentrated on founding new associations with varied socio-cultural goals, which do not enter into competition with the places of worship but rather aim to supplement and/or diversify the offers of service proposed by the elders (Dassetto 1996): organizing talks, setting up or following school or extracurricular activities, investment in humanitarian activities or cultural events centered on awareness of Islam, etc. These domains of activity are quite often mobilized just as much by young women as men, even if mixed associations remain proportionally rare, and subsequently we see that many places of worship try to take over some of these efforts, placing them under the auspices of the mosque, if only by making their buildings available. In the last decade, it is nonetheless interesting to notice the extent to which more and more women are committing themselves to teaching, among other areas, whether it be in public or private schools, as well as in the associative sector (Ben Mohamed 2006).

Within the context of a major diversification of actors, let us finally note the progressive visibility and recognition of minority Islamic tendencies: in a report concerning the conflicts surrounding the construction of mosques in Europe, for example, the extent to which authorities can play a deciding role or influence intra-Islamic competition by means of granting (or refusing) building permits for places of worship has been shown (Allievi 2009).

Contrastive mobilization efforts at the political level

Early on, any possible political mobilization efforts by Muslims who arrived in Europe, when they came to light, were primarily directed towards their countries of origin. Some of them reaffirmed their "nationalitarian" anchoring (Frégosi 2009) in their society of origin, or even loyalty to its regime. On the other hand, for a minority, certain currents of which are known as "Islamist," the issue revolves around contesting the regimes in power in the name of Islam, which is that much more easily accomplished by having acquired student or political refugee status in Europe, enabling them to invest in creating social change in Muslim countries, also

noting that, when measured by the passing decades, their deployment in European space sometimes represents a factor of internal transformation of their own ideas and ways of acting (Maréchal 2008).

These two opposing dynamics have each seen an upsurge in the past decade. On the one hand, since the mid-2000s, states like Morocco and Turkey have shown the extent to which they are willing to invest or reinvest in the Muslim populations in Europe, in propagating their own conceptions of Islam under the cover of managing to struggle against the radical offshoots which have led to attacks in Europe as well as on their own soil, while they remain quantitatively few in number, and research processes of de-radicalization (Coolsaet 2011). In addition, the onset of the Arab spring has engendered strong mobilization efforts within European Islamist ranks – and not just to support the political changes already in progress (Brandon and Pantucci 2012). However, many have already benefited from the Arab spring to return to their countries of origin. Yet maintaining contact with European Muslim populations remains important, since while preserving the nationality of their country of origin, they benefit from European political rights. While these dynamics may lead to some passing fads or even commitments, including among the young, the latter nevertheless prefer to invest their efforts locally, in developing an “associative fabric independent of chancelleries and national federations” (Frégosi 2009), or sometimes even investing in humanitarian causes, paid or voluntary, which require both local and transnational mobilization efforts (Kraffess 2005).¹⁰

These young Muslims generally tend to withdraw from forms of strong organizational affiliation and instead prefer to participate in one-shot mobilization efforts. For that matter, the influence of the means of communication (internet, social networks), coupled with these youths’ preference for timely forms of engagement over the organizational, probably goes a long way towards explaining the influence Salafist discourses exert on these youths’ religious terrains, concentrating as they do on questions of personal or family morals and normative precepts in the light of the prophet’s exemplarity (Dassetto 2011).

As regards Muslim investment in European national, political, and institutional scenes in their own right, as voters and then as candidates, it began in a second phase, with the migrant individuals obtaining the nationality of the countries concerned, depending on whether that possibility is favored, or not, by the specific rules of each country. Some countries, following the example of the Scandinavian countries, among others, have also authorized the possibility of participating in local elections, the only condition being the ability to prove a relatively long stay in the country concerned (Allievi, in Maréchal et al. 2003; Nielsen et al. 2012). All levels taken together, let us note from the outset that Muslims’ political mobilization efforts are usually concretized within and to the advantage of traditional political parties, given that, if the religious dimension of elected Muslim officials has usually hardly produced spectacular effects in this domain, that dimension may sometimes appear to be more clearly affirmed than in the early 2000s. Yet this religious dimension seldom results in the founding of Muslim parties, strictly speaking. Admittedly, certain initiatives have particularly stood out, among others the Noor party in 1999, which became the Islam Party in Belgium in 2012, Suomen Islamilainen Puolue (the Finnish Islamic Party) in 2007 (Nielsen et al. 2011), the Islam4UK party, finally banned in Great Britain in 2010 (Nielsen et al. 2012); but these initiatives have only obtained 1 percent at best of the total vote in the various districts concerned, which hardly confers any more than a token weight on them, inversely proportional to the media din they have generated.

All these developments should not hide the fact that the political mobilizing of Muslims was not all that self-evident at the start because, for certain minority milieux more or less influenced by political Islam, it was only in the early 1990s that clear declarations began circulating which dissociated the acquisition of a new nationality of a European country from a form of disloyalty

towards the Islamic *umma*, one which saw Europe beyond the simple classical geopolitical dichotomy between a “land of Islam” and a “land of war,” describing it, among other things, as a “land of ease”; This gradual transformation of the paradigm, fostering promotion of the possible compatibility of citizenship and “Muslimness,” remains contested from a religious viewpoint within certain minority milieux among Muslims who are devoted to Salafism, who remain in the background or even distrust these institutional policies.¹¹ Hence, in these areas, sharing a common reference to Islam can function as a lever in mobilizing one or more networks and stimulating the constitution of an ethnic and/or religious vote (Zibouh 2010; Nielsen 2013), but it can just as readily favor an *identity* policy (a defensive reaction to being stigmatized) as a (proactive) politics of Muslim citizenship, like that developed by certain young urban elites, concerned for the common good (Pędziwiatr 2010). This ongoing development of civic consciousness implies actively supporting projects of European states as well as stressing the duties shared by all citizens, independently of their origins and religious references. In this context, struggles against economic and social discrimination come in a variety of forms of engagement, denunciation, protest, and resistance, etc., but they also affirm an attachment to the common values of equality and democratic progress, and so on.

In countries where the implantation is the oldest, we witness the development of forms of religious engagement in other extra-community spaces, notably on the social and juridical level, supporting appeals for such things as recognition of cultural-religious specificities like wearing headscarves in schools or workplaces, the regulation of sanitary arrangements on occasions of festivals of sacrifice, the possibility of recognizing places for prayer in businesses. Their revindication of “normalization” of the Islamic religion relates to several areas: that of state institutions (schools, administrations, sanitary regulations, national medias ...), private law, labor law, etc. It bears witness to a desire for *incorporation*, for integration into the workings of institutions, as seen in the investment made in order to present the Muslim religion to states, whether this has been in England, France, Belgium, or Sweden, and some time ago in the Netherlands. Indeed, the advantages the welfare state can offer are not negligible, whether it be in the area of taxation, obtaining building permits for places of worship or subsidized land, or the recognition and even education and employment of chaplains.

Although we find mobilization efforts for community representation on several decision-making levels (local, national, and European, coupled with the development of certain lobbies, among which are the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe), their forms and their range of interest are largely dependent on the political and institutional structure of each state (Nonneman et al. 1996: 17), which often determines the shape of dialogue with Muslim representatives, and even the development of a representative body (composition and functioning). Hence, this power of recognition that the state has exerts a major influence on the internal, associative dynamic of the communities. The state thus plays the regulatory role in a highly competitive field between various Islamic movements and organizations, sometimes favoring the fragmentation of initiatives or, on the contrary, their centralization under umbrella associations (Allievi 2009; Nielsen et al. 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012).

In Germany, the Ministry of the Interior set up the Deutsche Islam Konferenz, in 2006, an equal representation assembly composed of fifteen representatives of the state and fifteen others from Muslim communities. The ministry chose them from among the country’s principal Muslim organizations and from various sectors of civil society, which did not fail to elicit sharp polemics, among both Muslims and their non-Muslim compatriots (Nielsen et al. 2012). In the Netherlands and in Belgium, state control is not as direct but the indirect influence remains important. If Muslim communities have benefited from the historical pillar system for assuming a certain degree of self-organization, the breach has also been capitalized on by foreign states

(Morocco, Turkey), where the majority of the migrants of this confession come from, in maintaining their influence. If in Belgium the Executive of Muslims of Belgium functions, despite sharp tensions due to external interference (Nielsen et al. 2012), in the Netherlands this situation has ruined attempts at federating the representative organizations. To this day they are split between these two communities of national origin, although they take an equal part in consultations organized by the Dutch state. Other associations have denounced the influence of foreign countries and the monopoly of organizations whose members are severely lacking in generational and gendered variety (Nielsen et al. 2012).

Muslim communities' difficulties in organizing amongst themselves are also felt on the level of the official media channels, which consequently often remain inaccessible to them; on the other hand, their investment in the world of media appears to be ever on the increase and diversified, beginning with the mobilization of young Muslims in what were initially marginal media channels (the plethora of blogs, internet sites, etc.): this seeks to give a voice to those *without a voice* and/or to broadcast material with content sensitive to the concerns of Muslims living in a pluralistic context (following the example of *oumma.com*, *Radical Middle Way*, *Generation M*, etc.).

Growing mobilization efforts on the cultural and symbolic levels

All of these mobilization efforts contribute to the construction of an – at times essentialized – “European Muslim identity,” which in a great many cases has predominated over other factors of belonging and identity.

This identity is certainly the clearest result of the Muslim Brothers' influence in Europe, building networks, promoting the global character of Islam (Maréchal 2008), and encouraging specifically Islamic *and* European cultural events like the Le Bourget fair, in France, which commemorated its thirtieth year in 2013, as well as pro-headscarf discourses from the late 1980s on, and creating the European Council for Fatwa and Research in 1997, issuing laws for specific minorities. Beyond their attempt to develop an Islamic thought suited to its context, the intellectual means nonetheless remain very limited by the classical framework of Muslim thought, making it hard for really reformist ideas to take hold.

Meanwhile, new ways of being Muslim are making their presence felt and in fact represent the last field of engagement: integration by means of cultural and economic production. Constructing this “self,” which resides in a relationship of symbolic recognition, requires a mobilization involving various forms of artistic expression, such as mosque architecture (Roose 2009), fashion, and music – including rap (El Asri 2014). It is characterized by a diversity of values and modes of expression in asserting a cultural identity, all conforming to the surrounding society's codes, aware that information technologies have undoubtedly speeded up the ethnicization process here via semi-communitarian channels which boost networking with the rest of the (Muslim) world as well as (generational, sexual, etc.) mixing.

It is also marked by the appearance of a niche market enjoying exceptional potential: the “*halal*” market, i.e. “conforming to Islamic law.” Initially restricted to meat, this label has been extended to many goods and services (food, drink, clothing, tourism ...) (Bergeaud-Blackler 2005). From here on in it also involves the consumption of Islamic symbols, an ethnic marketing strategy, creating the accessories materializing and presenting an Islamic lifestyle (Haenni 2005; Boubekeur 2005; Pink 2009). In finance, for example, this goal of conformity implies the impossibility of Muslims using most of the financing and investment products available on the market because most of them are based on the payment or collection of interest rates. But this market arouses envy and the United Kingdom is far and away the first European money market for the development of Islamic finance (Sor 2012).

“Muslimness” also resides in the expression of symbolic struggles for the recognition of marginal identities, for example Muslim homosexuals or feminists, among others, via investment in internet networks (Ali 2012; Djelloul 2013). They form part of European societies, all the while incarnating a militant posture which is opposed to the system: whether that system be patriarchal, economic, or one stigmatizing the religious affiliation of these (mostly marginalized) populations. Considering the role of the gender dimension in the construction of reciprocal imaginaries, the extent of women’s engagement is the greatest of these symbolic revindications (Guénif Souilamas and Macé 2004). For some, the latter symbolizes a “civilizational” frontier, a marker of the incompatibility of Islam with “Western” values; for others, a rampart of protection of Muslim specificity and social gender identities, nonetheless threatened on all sides by social evolution. We need only recall the innumerable affairs of headscarves, niqabs, and burqas, to realize the symbolically very strong impact of this in most European countries; more so in that the media attention paid to it in fact amplifies the ethnicizing effect of the construction of an alterity. For their part, the (young) girls struggling to wear headscarves in places where it is objected to describe this choice as personal, concerned with such things as their freedom of expression, of conscience, to have freedom of decision over their own bodies. Thus, for them, this clothing choice symbolizes emancipation from social pressures and a feminist appropriation of their own bodies (Boubekeur 2004).

Lastly, mobilization efforts linked to events of global scale, interpreted as touching on the integrity of Islam (the Rushdie affair, prohibition of the veil in France in 2004, the caricatures affair, the Ratisbonne speech, prohibition of total covering in Belgium in 2011, and so on), refer to more or less exacerbated religious sensitivities or to politicized actors. For the groups on the attack, most often by legal means, against media hostility towards Islam (like “Vigilance Musulmane” in Belgium) or against various basic discriminations (e.g. at work, at school, racist) defense of the integrity of Islam plays a “social face” role in Goffman’s sense (Goffman 1967). The creation of these groups is thus often caused by specific events and their efforts converge towards the recognition of Islam as a fully fledged religion in European space. These mobilization efforts have perhaps become greater in number today, as, under the weight of the moral panic surrounding Islam since September 11, 2001, the defensive reactions of “Islam” have increased. They especially relate to youth (the educated but not exclusively, involved or not in networks, etc.) because it is essential to them to put an end to aberrations and change mentalities, statuses, and even ways of being in European societies with a view towards a stronger co-inclusion (De Changy et al. 2007).

It seems to us that this bears witness to a surpassing of strictly material concerns, favoring instead immaterial considerations together with a certain acculturation *vis-à-vis* dominant currents and a certain ease with the host society’s paradigms (surfing on consumerism while investing in the economic domain, whereas that materialism appears far removed from spirituality; surfing on the wave called Islamophobia to denounce the society’s incoherencies, etc.). The subjacent issue at stake is always recognition (Honneth 2002; Caillé 2007), with the first recipients of these actions being henceforth the *Others*, i.e. the societies called *host*, although these mobilization efforts also play a role in developing the community’s consciousness of its status and weight. At the same time, other mobilization efforts, like interreligious dialogue, now seem unattractive to young people. That is probably due to the emphasis placed on strengthening identity constructions.

These efforts seem paradoxical in that what they are revindicating is just as much the fully fledged recognition of a collective specificity as a status as “Muslims” led to anchor themselves in the European landscape. And what’s more, isn’t the expression of these specific needs more readily sayable once it is recognized from the outset (Césari and McLoughin 2005)?

Might we not speak of a process of “indigenization of Islam” whereby a factor of ethnicizing, identity construction in the collective development of social structures is crystallizing around this motive for engagement (Sunier 2009)? We might then postulate that the more collective specificity is recognized from the outset, the more it generates demands for differentiation, alongside the development of loyalty at the heart of efforts made for recognition.

Axes of interpretation

Studying the Muslim discourses most disseminated within Muslim communities, among others inspired by literalistic, political, and missionary currents, shows the extent to which individual and collective engagement remains a fundamental concept: propagating the message, the *da'wa*, remains a promoted value, even if it is sometimes done more discreetly and is increasingly likely to take various forms, among others based on exemplary behavior, as promoted by the Fethullah Gülen movement, which has known a significant development. Yet, not only do the forms of engagement vary in terms of the manners of identification and affiliation with Islam (given that a large majority of Muslims are reserved about their religious practices), this palette becomes even more colorful given the pluralization of individual experiences in connection with globalization, the increase in possibilities for contact with intra-Muslim sensitivities other than those transmitted by parents, as well as other philosophical and religious cultures and traditions, etc. Between the Salafists (whose religious vision determines not only the principles of their individual ethics but their performative aspects as well, to the detriment of other approaches to understanding reality, which are set aside) and many Sufi groups, potentially more open to the wealth of the Other and concerned about living-together, as a factor of mobilization, Islam can just as readily be a motive for distantiation/detachment from the political scene or, on the contrary, can motivate engagement. Moreover, the terrain for religiously based mobilization efforts is changing at the intersection of two processes: the discovery of an ever-increasing internal plurality ever more openly expressed in its difference; and new extensions in Muslim visibility where the forms of expression leave the strictly religious and cultural sphere, instead investing efforts in various social spheres (artistic, economic, cultural, and political). How are we to understand this evolution and diversification in forms of religious mobilization in a European space scrutinizing contemporary theories describing a growing distance and bursting of engagement (Ion 1997)? What is bringing about a paradigmatic change in Muslim mobilization efforts?

The constitution of a European intra-Islamic field and its integration into global (Muslim) space

The first hypothesis we reach is that of the (ongoing) constitution of an intra-Islamic field, in Pierre Bourdieu's sense (Bourdieu 1971). We offer as evidence the increase in types of Muslim mobilization efforts mentioned above, expansion in the spheres invested in, accompanied by an increasing competition between Muslim movements, while at the same time some (not that many) revindications of specificities may also appear as a safety valve in managing to *find oneself* – over and above a major acculturation process. The increasing room that expressing religiosity takes up in the public domain is transformed by the media and social networks into a space for collective elaboration of the social codes of an Islamic lifestyle, based on a process of social distinction (Bourdieu 1979). Economic issues structure this space in part, as shown by the power struggles for *halal* certification – generating substantial financial dividends – the passion for Islamic marketing, Islamic fashion, etc. Thus this hypothesis does not signal withdrawal but

indeed a redefinition and extension of the community beginning with the religious domain. The mobilization efforts we have observed in the past two decades mark a certain emancipation from worries related to their countries of origin and entry into the national and international political and cultural scenes, seeking visibility and a recognition of their citizenship as “Muslims.”

Three major lines of tensions

De- vs. recomunitarization

Some of the social dynamics affecting Muslim populations are the same as those encountered by other European populations. The exhaustion of the mobilizing ideologies, beginning with the importance attached to individualism and hedonism (versus a philosophy of effort and sacrifice, etc.), has led to a secularization of individual religious practices and influenced the forms the mobilization efforts and engagements through which European Muslims make their specificity exist. More concretely, these collective dynamics bear witness to a certain political apathy (little investment in democracy or human rights) except for contesting perceived injustices or incoherencies in European systems. We thus find, on the one hand, a way out of a strictly communitarian frame of reference, to the benefit of an increased attention to the social regulations of the surrounding society and its ways of thinking, and, on the other hand, an over-focusing on the religious domain, inspired by speeches conveyed – often unconsciously – by the predominant movements, such as the Salafist branch or the Muslim Brothers, resulting in a propensity to react in the face of a kind of social disdain, or even to valorize Islam at all costs. This paradox leads us to the hypothesis of a “recommunitarization,” founded on the symbolic struggle for recognition of the identities, rights, and dignity of “Muslims” and the affirmation of an aspiration to a moral dimension in the society in promoting the values of Islam. This recommunitarization produces revindications reflecting a will to integrate and make their specific contribution to the national and European community visible.

Making belief private vs. visible

Another contradictory dynamic at work in the European intra-Islamic field is the process of belief privatization (Fadil 2008), contemporaneous with its further affirmation in extra-community public spaces. In effect, evolutions in Muslim forms of religiosity in non-Muslim societies are influenced by the fact that Islam no longer enjoys external support there (such as law inspired by Islamic principles or social pressure), as is the case in societies of origin. So we may consider that the religiosity practiced involves an individualization of practices and choices, a characteristic of European societies (Roy 2002). However, paradoxically, the history of these mobilization efforts surrounding the religious object has, on the contrary, shown us a process of the forms of religiosity becoming increasingly visible, notably its extension through multiple forms involving daily practices, and conferring on them a much greater symbolic significance than “classical” Islamist engagement would have (Mandaville 2011).

Domestication vs. transnationalization

The Europeanization of Muslim identity, or its “domestication” (Sunier 2009), goes hand in hand with an intensification of the religious frame of reference among these populations. Indeed, the re-elaboration of the social codes and symbolic systems of Islam in the various

European contexts results in a *visibility* as well as a *readability* of the symbolic border founding the community (Poutignat and Streiff-Fénart 1995).

These evolutions are also connected to the Muslim world, and interpenetrate one another in “mutual feedbacks” (Allievi and Nielsen 2003). The historical Islamist movements are transformed and translate their goals into “European” terms (Reetz 2009; Schulze 2009), integrating European Muslims into the scene of global intra-Islamic competition (such as with the emergence of *global leaders* like Yusuf al-Qaradawi) (Caeiro 2009; Skovgaard-Petersen and Gräf 2009). These elements lead us to supplement our hypothesis of the constitution of an intra-Islamic European field with that of a transformation of Islamic loyalties: no longer just national to the country of origin, but also Islamic (towards the *umma*), in being the basis of a hybrid loyalty, on the level of European and global Islam (e.g. debates on Muslim British soldiers being allowed to fight in Afghanistan) (Birt 2006).

Conclusion

Europe forms part of the Muslim world today and European Muslims have become fully fledged actors in their societies and in transforming the Muslim world (cf. the British monthly review *Q-News* or, further, the role of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, whose views may serve as a reference for other zones in the world where Islam is the minority religion, etc.). Here we have retraced the implantation process, the Muslim populations’ coming to awareness of their installation, subsequent extra-community revindication, and the construction of a European Muslim collective identity project. All of these investments have created the dynamics of an intra-European Muslim field marking its specificity/drawing its borders with both the Muslim world and non-Muslim European societies.

In attempting to reflect on the specificities of Muslims as related to the ongoing national struggles/debates, we may refer to a relatively recent emergence – aside from struggles against stigmatization and, above all, intra-community concerns. We might underline the pioneer role of a figure like Tariq Ramadan, inviting Muslims to become involved in both the development of their own community and the national society. But in the last few years, energetic new forces with more or less antagonistic aims have shown their desire to change a society where contradictory positions, in particular on freedom of expression, are likely to be a major stumbling block in the way of mobilization efforts to come. In fact, while some Muslims want to limit freedom of expression, particularly when they judge that comments attack the sacred, they are just as vehement in not wanting be limited in their identity expressions (cf. headscarves, etc). In the final analysis, these mobilization efforts necessitate an evolution in European thought as well as Muslim thought, while recalling that societal identities and projects are always collective constructions whose evolution is the job of everybody.

Notes

- 1 Besides the monographs which only deal with one country, see comparative works, such as Gerholm and Lithman (1988), Nonneman et al. (1996), Shadid and van Koningsveld (1991, 1995, 1996), Vertovec and Peach (1997), Hunter (2002), Rath et al. (2001).
- 2 See, among others, Maréchal et al. (2003), who, based on information expressly collected about each of the various countries of the enlarged Europe, have constructed a structured synthesis involving the fields of actions Muslims are engaged in. Since 2009, the *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, edited by Nielsen et al., has offered an overview, this time by country, of ongoing transformations, in paying particular attention to topics like the Muslims’ relationships to states, the construction of mosques and the development of teaching programs or of varied publications on Islam, the opening of Muslim plots

- in cemeteries, Muslim chaplaincy, among other places in prisons, the availability of *halal* food, the organization of religious festivities, investment in interreligious relations and in public debates. These domains are the object of larger or smaller mobilization efforts depending on the contexts, which evolve with time.
- 3 For an exhaustive panorama of the existing literature on ethnicity, see Poutignat and Streiff-Fénart, who propose the following definition of it: “variable and never ending processes through which the actors identify themselves and are identified by others on the basis of an Us/Them dichotomization established on the basis of supposed cultural traits derived from a common origin and placed in relief in social interactions” (Poutignat and Streiff-Fénart 1999: 144).
 - 4 An expression taken from an essay of the same name by Sigmund Freud, appearing in 1919, evoking the idea of something not belonging to the house and which yet remains there.
 - 5 See notably the list of ECHR decisions concerning Islam established by Prof. Louis-Léon Christians, www.uclouvain.be/260898.html (accessed March 21, 2013), which cites two further reference articles on this subject (Garay 2005; Danchin 2011).
 - 6 Two helpful articles on the forms of Muslim collective mobilization efforts have already been written by Frégosi (2009, 2012), distinguishing religious, socio-political, and identity mobilization efforts. Quite marked by the French context and anchored in a political science gaze that accentuates aspects of political organization, these very stimulating texts go so far as to include radical secular mobilizations. For our part, we only deal with mobilization efforts established in the name of Islam here, including cultural ones which include but also go beyond mobilization efforts of an identity sort.
 - 7 For a panorama of intra-Islamic currents, see Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2010). Based on the reality in Brussels, see Dassetto (2011).
 - 8 According to a study carried out by the Institut français du Proche-Orient (IFPO), 59 percent of Muslims buy *halal* meat, while a study by the French Ministry of Agriculture reports that economists calculate the tons of meat necessary for the four million Muslims in France at 250,000–300,000 tons (Bergeaud-Blackler 2005).
 - 9 Whereas most cemeteries in the United Kingdom reserve plots for Muslims, in France there are three Muslim cemeteries and 70 plots placed at the disposal of Muslims in Paris or in cities like Montpellier and Marseille (Nielsen et al. 2010).
 - 10 Aside from occasional actions resulting from obligation, in order to accomplish the *zakat* (the annual alms intended for the poorest) required of all Muslims, forms of structured activity carried out in unison with NGOs like Islamic Relief and Muslim Hands have also existed since the 1980s. Among the causes they are committed to we find a desire to respond to the social and humanitarian needs of civil populations in majority Muslim countries at war (Palestine, Iraq, Syria, etc.), but not exclusively, taking, for example, recent mobilization efforts to help the persecuted Muslim Rohingyas populations in Burma.
 - 11 For a contemporary, engaged theological argument on these questions, see, for example, Ramoussi (2012).

Bibliography

- Ahmad, W.I.U. and Sardar, Z. (2012) *Muslims in Britain: Making Social and Political Space*, New York: Routledge.
- Ali, Z. (2012) *Féminismes islamiques*, Paris: La Fabrique.
- Allievi, S. (2009) *Conflicts over Mosques in Europe: Policy Issues and Trends*, NEF Initiative on Religion and Democracy in Europe, London: Alliance Publishing Trust.
- Allievi, S. and Nielsen, J.S. (eds.) (2003) *Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe*, Leiden: Brill.
- Amghar, S., Boubeker, A., and Emerson, M. (eds.) (2007) *European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society*, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Amiraux, V. and Jonker, G. (eds.) (2006) *Politics of Visibility: Young Muslims in European Public Spaces*, Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.
- Ben Mohamed, N. (2006) *Femmes d'origine étrangère dans l'espace public: dirigeantes d'associations et élites politiques à Bruxelles*, Louvain-la-Neuve: Académie-Bruylant.
- Bergeaud-Blackler, F. (2005) “De la Viande halal à l’halal food. Comment le halal s’est développé en France?,” *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* 21(3): 125–47.

- Birt, Y. (2006) "Between Nation and Umma: Muslim Loyalty in a Globalizing World," *Islam* 21 40: 6–11.
- Boubekeur, A. (2004) *Le Voile de la mariée, voile et projet matrimonial en France*, Paris: l'Harmattan.
- (2005) "L'Islam est-il soluble dans le Mecca Cola? Marché de la culture islamique et nouveaux supports de religiosité en Occident," *Maghreb-Machrek* 183: 45–66.
- Bourdieu, P. (1971) "Genèse et structure du champ religieux," *Revue française de sociologie* 12: 295–334.
- (1979) *La Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement*, Paris: Les Editions de Minuit.
- Brandon, J. and Pantucci, R. (2012) "UK Islamists and the Arab Uprisings," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 13, www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/uk-islamists-and-the-arab-uprisings (accessed February 1, 2013).
- Caeiro, A. (2009) "Public Religion, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and the Integration of Muslims in Europe: Minority Fiqh in the Arab World and in the West," in Mandaville, P. (ed.) *Transnational Islam: Identities, Networks and Movements*, Washington: Pew Forum, unpublished paper.
- Caillé, A. (ed.) (2007) *La Quête de reconnaissance. Nouveau phénomène social total*, Paris: La Découverte/MAUSS.
- Césari, J. (1998) *Musulmans et Républicains: Les Jeunes, l'Islam et la France*, Paris: Editions Complexe.
- Césari, J. and McLoughlin, S. (eds.) (2005) *European Muslims and the Secular State*, Farnham: Ashgate.
- Coolsaet, R. (ed.) (2011) *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences*, 2nd ed., Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate.
- Dakhli, J. and Vincent, B. (2011) *Les Musulmans dans l'histoire de l'Europe: I. Une intégration invisible*, Paris: Albin Michel.
- Danchin, P.G. (2011) "Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights," *Virginia Journal of International Law* 32: 643–747.
- Dassetto, F. (1988) *Le Tabligh en Belgique. Diffuser l'Islam sur les traces du Prophète*, Sybydi Papers no. 2, Brussels and Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia.
- (1990) "Visibilisation de l'Islam dans l'espace public," in Bastenier, A. and Dassetto, F. (eds.) *Immigrations et nouveaux pluralismes: une confrontation de sociétés*, Brussels: De Boeck.
- (1996) *La Construction de l'Islam européen. Approche socio-anthropologique*, Paris: L'Harmattan.
- (1999) "Leaders and Leadership in Islam and Transplanted Islam in Europe," in Helander, E. (ed.) *Religion and Social Transitions*, Helsinki: Department of Practical Theology.
- (ed.) (2000) *Paroles d'Islam. Individus, sociétés et discours dans l'Islam européen contemporain. Islamic Words: Individuals, Societies and Discourse in Contemporary European Islam*, Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose.
- (2011) *L'Iris et le croissant: Bruxelles et l'Islam au défi de la co-inclusion*, Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses universitaires de Louvain.
- (2012) "Sharia4 ... all, éléments d'analyse et de réflexion à propos d'un groupe extrémiste," *Papers Online du Centre Interdisciplinaire d'Etudes de l'Islam dans le Monde Contemporain*, www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/epl-corta/documents/Sharia4all.pdf (accessed February 1, 2013).
- Dassetto, F. and Bastenier, A. (1984) *L'Islam transplanté. Vie et organisation des minorités musulmanes de Belgique*, Antwerp and Brussels: EPO.
- (1991) *Europa: nuova frontiera dell'Islam*, rev. ed., Rome: Edizioni Lavoro.
- Dassetto, F., Ferrari, S., and Maréchal, B. (2007) *Islam in the European Union: What's at Stake in the Future?*, Report for the European Parliament – Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, Brussels: European Parliament.
- De Changy, J., Dassetto, F., and Maréchal, B. (2007) *Relations et co-inclusion: Islam en Belgique*, Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Djelloul, G. (2013) *Parcours de féministes musulmanes belges, de l'engagement dans l'Islam aux droits des femmes?*, Louvain-la-Neuve: Académia-Bruylant.
- El Asri, F. (2014) *Rythmes et voix d'Islam. Enquête auprès d'artistes musulmans européens*, Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses universitaires de Louvain.
- Fadil, N. (2008) *Submitting to God, Submitting to the Self: Secular and Religious Trajectories of Second Generation Maghrebi in Belgium*, Leuven: Lirias KU Leuven.
- Ferrari, S. (2007) "Juridical Profiles and Political Management of Muslims' Presence in Europe," in Dassetto, F., Ferrari, S., and Maréchal, B. *Islam in the European Union: What's at Stake in the Future?*, Report for the European Parliament – Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, Brussels: European Parliament.
- Foblets, M.-Cl. (2003) "Muslim Family Laws before the Courts in Europe: A Conditional Recognition," in Maréchal, B., Allievi, S., Dassetto, F., and Nielsen, J. (eds.) *Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society*, Leiden: Brill.

- Frégosi, F. (2009) "Formes de mobilisation collective des musulmans en France et en Europe," *Revue internationale de politique comparée*, De Boeck University, 1(16): 41–61.
- (2012) "Muslim Collective Mobilisations in Contemporary Europe: New Issues and New Types of Involvement," in *Conference of the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, Vienna, June 4–6, unpublished paper.
- Garay, A. (2005) "L'Islam et l'ordre public européen vus par la CEDH," *Revue belge de droit international* 82(1): 117–55.
- Gerholm, T. and Lithman, Y.G. (eds.) (1988) *The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe*, London: Mansell.
- Goffman, E. (1967) *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior*, New York: Random House.
- Guénif-Souilamas, N. and Macé, E. (2004) *Les Féministes et le garçon arabe*, La Tour d'Aigues: Editions de l'Aube.
- Haenni, P. (2005) *L'Islam de marché. L'Autre révolution conservatrice*, Paris: Seuil.
- (2009) "The Economic Politics of Muslim Consumption," in Pink, J. (ed.) *Muslim Societies in the Age of Mass Consumption: Politics, Culture and Identity between the Local and the Global*, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Honneth, A. (2002) *La Lutte pour la reconnaissance*, Paris: Cerf.
- Hunter, S. (ed.) (2002) *Islam, Europe's Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape*, Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Ion, J. (1997) *La Fin des militants?*, Paris: Les Editions de l'Atelier.
- Jeldtoft, N. (2009) "Defining Muslims," in Nielsen, J.S., Akgönül, S., Alibašić, A., Maréchal, B., and Moe, C. (eds.) *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, vol. I, Leiden and Boston: Brill, pp. 9–14.
- Klausen, J. (2009) *The Cartoons that Shook the World*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., and Passy, F. (2005) *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Krafuss, J. (2005) "L'Influence de la religion musulmane dans l'aide humanitaire," *Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge* 87: 123–8.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995) *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, P. (2007) *Young, British and Muslim*, London: Continuum.
- McLoughlin, S. (2005) "The State, New Muslim Leaderships and Islam as a Resource for Engagement in Britain," in Cesari, J. and McLoughlin, S. (eds.) *European Muslims and the Secular State*, Farnham: Ashgate.
- Malik, J. and Hinnells, J. (eds.) (2006) *Sufism in the West*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Mandaville, P. (2011) "Transnational Muslim Solidarities and Everyday Life," *Nation and Nationalisms (Journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism)* 17(1): 7–24.
- Maréchal, B. (ed.) (2002) *L'Islam et les musulmans dans l'Europe élargie: radioscopie – A Guidebook on Islam and Muslims in the Wide Contemporary Europe*, Louvain-la-Neuve: Académia-Bruylant.
- (2008) *The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourses*, Leiden: Brill.
- (2012) "The European Muslim Brothers' Quest to Become a Social (Cultural) Movement," in Meijer, R. and Bakker, E. (eds.) *The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe*, London: Columbia University Press/Hurst.
- Maréchal, B., Allievi, S., Dassetto, F., and Nielsen, J. (2003) *Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society*, Leiden: Brill.
- Martiniello, M., Réa, A., and Dassetto, F. (eds.) (2007) *La Belgique face aux nouvelles migrations: menace ou chance?*, coll. *Intellection*, no. 4, Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia-Bruylant.
- Masud, K. (ed.) (2000) *Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama'at as a Transnational Movement for Faith Renewal*, Leiden: Brill.
- Meijer, R. (2009) *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*, London: Hurst.
- Meijer, R. and Bakker, E. (eds.) (2012) *The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe*, London: Columbia University Press/Hurst.
- Nielsen, J.S. (1992) *Muslims in Western Europe*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- (1999) *Towards a European Islam*, London: Macmillan Press.
- (ed.) (2013) *Muslim Political Participation in Europe*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Nielsen, J.S., Akgönül, S., Alibašić, A., Maréchal, B., and Moe, C. (eds.) (2009) *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, vol. 1, Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- (2010) *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, vol. 2, Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Nielsen, J.S., Akgönül, S., Alibašić, A., Goddard, H., and Maréchal, B. (eds.) (2011) *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, vol. 3, Leiden and Boston: Brill.

- Nielsen, J.S., Akgönül, S., Alibašić, A., and Racijs, E. (eds.) (2012) *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, vol. 4, Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Nonneman, G., Niblock, T., and Szajkowski, B. (eds.) (1996) *Muslim Communities in the New Europe*, New York: Ithaca Press.
- Pędziwiatr, K. (2010) *The New Muslim Elites in European Cities*, Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag.
- Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2010) *Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe*, Washington: Pew Research Center.
- Pink, J. (ed.) (2009) *Muslim Societies in the Age of Mass Consumption: Politics, Culture and Identity between the Local and the Global*, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Poutignat, P. and Streiff-Fénart, J. (1999) *Théories de l'ethnicité*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- Ramoussi, M. (2012) *La Citoyenneté – Clef d'une contribution civilisationnelle des musulmans d'Europe*, La Courneuve: Bayane Editions.
- Rath, J., Penninx, R., Groenendijk, K., and Meyer, A. (2001) *Western Europe and Its Islam*, Leiden, Boston, and Cologne: Brill.
- Reetz, D. (2009) "The Piety of Modernity: The Tablighi Jama'at in Europe," in Mandaville, P. (ed.) *Transnational Islam: Identities, Networks and Movement*, Washington: Pew Forum, unpublished paper.
- Roose, E. (2009) *The Architectural Representation of Islam: Muslim-Commissioned Mosque Design in the Netherlands*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Roy, O. (2002) *L'Islam mondialisé*, Paris: Seuil.
- Schulze, R. (2009) "Da'wah from Saudi Arabia: Transnationalism in the Context of Muslim World League," in Mandaville, P. (ed.) *Transnational Islam: Identities, Networks, and Movements in Public Life*, Washington: Pew Forum, unpublished paper.
- Seddon, M.S., Hussain, D., and Malik, N. (eds.) (2003) *British Muslims: Loyalty and Belonging*, proceedings of a seminar held on May 8, 2002, Markfield: The Islamic Foundation & the Citizen Organizing Foundation.
- Shadid, W.A.R. and van Koningsveld, P.S. (eds.) (1991) *The Integration of Islam and Hinduism in Western Europe*, Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos.
- (1995) *Religious Freedom and the Position of Islam in Western Europe*, Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos.
- (1996) *Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe*, Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos.
- Skovgaard-Petersen, J. and Gräf, B. (eds.) (2009) *Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi*, London: Hurst.
- Sor, K. (2012) "De l'Economie à la finance islamique: itinéraire de l'ajustement d'un produit identitaire à la globalisation libérale," *Religioscope: Etudes et analyses* 25, religion.info/pdf/2012_04_Sor.pdf (accessed February 1, 2013).
- Spielhaus, R. (2011) "Measuring the Muslim: About Statistical Obsessions, Categorisations and the Quantification of Religion," in Nielsen, J.S., Akgönül, S., Alibašić, A., Goddard, H., and Maréchal, B. (eds.) *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, vol. 3, Leiden and Boston: Brill, pp. 695–715.
- Sunier, T. (2009) *Beyond the Domestication of Islam: A Reflection on Research on Islam in European Societies*, inaugural address (November 27), Amsterdam: VU University Amsterdam.
- Welzbacher, C. (2008) *Euro Islam Architecture: New Mosques in the West*, Amsterdam: SUN.
- Vertovec, S. and Peach, C. (eds.) (1997) *Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Vertovec, S. and Rogers, A. (eds.) (1998) *Muslim European Youth: Reproducing Ethnicity, Religion, Culture*, London: Ashgate.
- Westoff, C. and Frejka, T. (2007) "Religiousness and Fertility among European Muslims," *Population and Development Review* 33 (December): 785–809.
- Zibouh, F. (2010) *La Participation politique des élus d'origine maghrébine*, Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia-Brylant.

This page intentionally left blank