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

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13
The multicultural idea and Western Muslims

Anna Triandafyllidou

Multiculturalism is "dead" but Muslims are still "a problem"

The last decade of the twentieth century had been characterized by an optimistic view that Western liberal democracies had found appropriate ways to accommodate cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity. Several European countries, like the Netherlands, Britain, and Sweden, were recognized as "champions" of multiculturalism in that they allowed for migrant and native communities to create their own institutions and maintain their cultural or religious traditions. While policy approaches and political ideologies on how to accommodate diversity differed, the overall framework of recognizing not only individual but also collective difference and making room for it was largely labeled "multiculturalism." Multiculturalism became the official motto also in Australia and Canada, which incorporated it in their very national self-definition as migrant nations. It seemed that along with the reconnection of Europe and the implosion of the Communist regimes in 1989, the 1990s were also bringing forward a new and promising perspective on reconciling the tensions that ethnic and religious diversity may create in a society and ensuring equality for all.

The start of the new century brought about bitter disillusionment. The attack on the Twin Towers in New York City, now known as 9/11, became a symbolic but also real turning point both in global geopolitics and as regards the policies for accommodating diversity. At the geopolitical level, 9/11 was the origin of the US attack and war in Afghanistan and in Iraq. The speech of the then President of the USA George W. Bush introduced new terms to refer to the Western coalition and the Muslim Other when he spoke of the alliance of "the good" against "the evil." The evil was the network of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations known as Al-Qaeda. However, in common parlance, the discourse often slipped to portray all Muslims as potentially "the evil" that the West had to guard itself against.

In Europe, the 2000s were marked by increasing tensions between national majorities and marginalized Muslim communities. In some cases (such as in northern England in the summer of 2001 or in France in the winter of 2005) these conflicts included a strong socio-economic marginalization component. In other instances, as in the case of the bomb attack in Madrid in spring 2004 and in London in the summer of 2005, these events were inscribed in the wider framework of international terrorism and conflict between "the West" and "Islam." The

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growing suspicion towards Muslims was reinforced after the Danish cartoon crisis in 2006 following the publication of pictures of the Prophet Muhammad by a Danish newspaper. Extreme right-wing politicians such as Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, the Front National in France or the Northern League in Italy gained votes by playing on the electorate's fears of the "Muslim."

The end of the 2000s was characterized by yet another negative development: the global financial crisis. The overhauling of the global economy also soon became an acute internal European economic crisis with important political implications. Indeed the crisis has provided fruitful ground for further exacerbation of social tensions and a concrete rise in racism and xenophobia towards minorities and migrants in general, Muslims in particular. Such developments were particularly pronounced in the countries most hit by the economic crisis, notably Greece and Cyprus, but also Spain and Italy.

During the first years of the twenty-first century, politicians and academics have been intensely debating what should be done to enhance civic cohesion in European societies. One question raised by these debates is *how much* or *what kind of* cultural diversity can truly be accommodated within liberal and secular democracies. Some thinkers and politicians have advanced the claim that Muslim diversity is not of the kind that can be accommodated in European societies because their cultural traditions and religious faith are incompatible with secular democratic states. Others have argued that Muslims can be accommodated in European liberal democracies provided they adhere to a set of civic values that lie at the heart of European democratic traditions and that reflect the secular nature of society and politics in Europe. Others still have questioned the kind of secularism that underpins state institutions in Europe and have pointed to the unequal treatment of majority vs. minority, and in particular of Islam, the youngest religion in Europe, in many areas of public life.

In policy terms, the main conclusion drawn from such debates has been that multicultural policies have failed and that returning to a civic assimilation approach (emphasizing national culture and values) would be desirable. The start of the new decade (2010s) has been marked by considerable pessimism, particularly in comparison to the rise of multicultural citizenship ideals and policies in the 1990s, and general optimism regarding the accommodation of Muslim claims and needs in European societies. The global and European economic crisis makes the picture particularly gloomy; the perceived competition for scarce jobs or limited welfare resources leads to xenophobic and racist incidents against people of Asian or African origin (people with darker skin or who "look foreign"). Such incidents have dramatically increased in southern Europe during the last couple of years.

This chapter seeks to provide an overview of recent developments concerning Muslims and multiculturalism in the West today. It starts with an overview of the Muslim populations that live in Western countries, notably Europe and North America. It then proceeds with a short discussion of what multiculturalism is and what the "multiculturalism backlash" has concentrated on in recent years. The fourth section (pp. 221–5) provides an overview of the multicultural idea and how it has been interpreted and applied in different countries. The concluding section (p. 225) draws up some general remarks concerning the future of the multicultural idea as a response to Muslim claims for accommodating their cultural and religious traditions in Western countries.

Western Muslims

Triandafyllidou (2010) classifies the Muslim populations that inhabit Europe into two broad categories: native and immigrant. Native Muslims settled on the European continent during the

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expansive movements of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, or are native populations that converted to Islam under Ottoman rule. Thus they are mainly found in central, Eastern, and southeastern Europe (including Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Greece, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Serbia) and in Russia. The number of Muslims that are native to countries of the European Union at this point in time remains relatively small, given that most of the southeastern and Eastern European countries do not yet form part of the EU. There are no native Muslims in North America by contrast – they have instead followed more recent immigration routes along with other Europeans and Asians to the "new continent."

Immigrant Muslim populations in Europe include economic immigrants or asylum seekers from Turkey, the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia and mainly arrived in Europe during the second half of the twentieth century as a result of postwar population movements. They have settled, in their vast majority, in the industrialized and economically developed countries of northern and Eastern Europe (including Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark).

The offspring of these post-World War II immigrant populations are now considered native to Europe as they are second- or third-generation immigrants. We place them, however, in this second "category" of European Muslims because they did not reside in their current countries of residence when these countries emerged as nation-states. Among European Muslims of non-European origin we should include the large number of Muslims that have arrived during the last two decades and have settled in southern European countries, notably Italy, Spain, and Greece. They originate from the Maghreb, Southeast Asia, or the Middle East.

Data on religious affiliation are not consistently registered in European countries since religion is considered to be an aspect of citizens' private lives and could become grounds for discrimination. Thus in most European countries there are no reliable data on the size of Muslim populations. Table 13.1 has been compiled using the data sources available and comparing between them with a view to presenting an overview of the places of settlement of Muslims in wider Europe.[1]

European Muslims are estimated to number between 14 and 18 million (see also Aluffi Beck-Peccoz and Zincone 2004: vii). The largest Muslim population is found in France (approximately 5 million), followed by Germany (approximately 3 million), the United Kingdom (more than 2 million), Italy (between 1 and 1.5 million) and the Netherlands (approximately 1 million).

Concerning Europe, Table 13.1 suggests a native vs. migrant Muslim distribution along a rough Eastern–Western Europe axis. Native Muslims are found only in central and southeast Europe, while immigrant Muslims are concentrated in Western and northern Europe. Among EU countries, it is only in Bulgaria (1 million approx.), Greece (85,000), and Romania (70,000) that we find native Muslim minorities. And of these three countries it is only in Greece that Muslims coexist with immigrant Muslim populations. Native Muslim minorities in Bulgaria and Romania enjoy a special status of rights, public recognition, and political representation, related to and organized on the basis of their ethnic background (in Bulgaria they are Turks and to a lesser extent Pomak and Roma; in Romania they are Tatars and Turks) rather than their religion. By contrast, in Greece (see Triandafyllidou 2010b), native Muslims (of Turkish, Pomak, or Roma ethnicity) receive state recognition and special rights on the basis of their religious minority identity rather than their ethnicity.

A different case is Turkey, whose belonging to Europe and/or the EU may be seen as a contested issue. Turkey is a majority Muslim country with a total population of approx. 70 million people.

At the geographical outer border of Europe, Russia is also an interesting case. It has a large Muslim population, which is, however, geographically concentrated in a few regions. As of

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Table 13.1 Muslim populations in Europe and North America

Country	*Estimate of Muslim population (including non-citizens)*	*Source*
Austria	340,000–475,000	Wieshaider 2004–Pew Report 2011, estimate for 2010
Belgium	320,000–638,000	Hallet 2004–Pew Report 2011, estimate for 2010
Bulgaria	746,000	Zhelyazkova et al. 2011
Canada	940,000	Pew Report 2011, estimate for 2010
France	4.7–5 million	Pew Report 2011, estimate for 2010–Rohe 2004
Germany	3.8–4.3 million	Faas 2010, Pew Report 2011 (estimate for 2010: 4.1 million)
Greece	525,000	Triandafyllidou 2010, Pew Report 2011
Italy	1–1.58 million	Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2007–Pew Report 2011, estimate for 2010
Netherlands	0.9–1.1 million	Pew Report 2011, estimate for 2010–ter Wal 2007
Portugal	30,000–65,000	Leitão 2004–Pew Report 2011, estimate for 2010
Romania	70,000	Iordache 2004
Russia	16.4 million	Pew Report 2011
Spain	0.7–1 million	González Enríquez 2007–Pew Report 2011, estimate for 2010
Sweden	350,000–450,000	Otterbeck 2004–Pew Report 2011, estimate for 2010
Turkey	75 million	Pew Report 2011, estimate for 2010
UK	1.6–2.9 million	Modood and Meer 2010–Pew Report 2011, estimate for 2010
USA	2.75 million	Pew Report 2011

Source: Author's own compilation from a variety of sources.

2009, four out of five Muslims in Russia resided in two of the seven federal districts, the Volga and Southern districts. More specifically, in 2009 they were concentrated in five traditionally Muslim homelands: Dagestan (16.3 percent of all Muslims), Bashkortostan (14.6 percent), Tatarstan (13.5 percent), Chechnya (7.4 percent), and Kabardino-Balkaria (4.7 percent). Smaller numbers of Muslims lived in three other Muslim homelands: Ingushetia (3.0 percent of all Muslims), Karachaevo-Cherkessia (1.9 percent), and Adygea (0.8 percent). Altogether, about two-thirds of all Muslims in Russia (62.3 percent) resided in one of the traditionally Muslim homelands (Pew Report 2011). In addition, it should be noted that Moscow has become a migration magnet for people from elsewhere in Russia, as well as beyond Russia. More than 600,000 Muslims reside in Moscow (3.7 percent of all Muslims in Russia) and an additional 517,000 live in the oil-rich Tyumen region (3.0 percent), which borders Kazakhstan to the south (Pew Report 2011).

Muslims in North America are mainly a migrant population. In the case of the USA they are generally rather recent arrivals to the country. More than one in four US Muslim adults arrived in the country after 2000 (Pew Report 2011). In addition, nearly two-thirds of all US Muslims (63 percent) were born abroad. About one in five (22 percent) are a third, fourth, or later generation of Americans, while 15 percent are second generation. This distribution testifies to a recently arrived population. However, they are characterized by very high rates of naturalization, as among those who arrived in the 1990s or earlier nearly all are US citizens (80 percent of those who arrived in the 1990s, 95 percent of those who arrived in the 1980s, and virtually all of earlier arrivals). Even among recent arrivals 42 percent have already been naturalized. This testifies to a well-integrated population (Pew Report 2011).

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As regards countries and regions of origin, Muslims in the USA come from seventy-seven different countries but their main region of origin is the Arab countries (accounting for 41 percent of foreign-born US Muslims, or 26 percent of all Muslim Americans). Southeast Asia is the second main region of origin (for about 26 percent of all Muslim Americans and 16 percent of all US Muslim citizens), while Pakistan is the single largest country of origin, accounting for 14 percent of first-generation immigrants of Muslim religion and 9 percent of all US Muslims. Other important regions of origin for US Muslims are sub-Saharan Africa and Europe (Pew Report 2011). The same is true for Muslims in Canada, who also come from a large variety of countries, including not only war-torn countries like Somalia, Iraq, and Bosnia, but also Albania and Bangladesh. They are generally recent immigrants or refugees and come to Canada for employment and to seek a better life (Pew Report 2011).

Overall there is thus an important difference between central Eastern, east Eastern and southeastern Europe on one hand and Western/northern Europe or North America on the other, as in the former region there are large native Muslim communities, while in the latter Muslims are immigrants and relatively recent arrivals.

Actually it is perhaps the integration of migrant Muslims, and particularly in Europe, that has hit the headlines several times in the last decades and this is the topic that the rest of this chapter concentrates on, notably the main concepts used to make sense of integration, and in particular how these concepts have translated into policies in specific European countries and the challenges that Muslims have posed to such policies.

Dealing with cultural diversity: from tolerance to multiculturalism

One of the first concepts put forward to deal with religious diversity in Europe has been the notion of tolerance. In its basic form, tolerance means to refrain from objecting to something with which one does not agree. It involves that one rejects a belief or a behavior, that one believes her/his objection to this behavior or idea is legitimate, and that one decides to tolerate this negative behavior along with its possible consequences (King 1997: 25). As King argues, tolerance is meaningful when the "tolerator" has the power to suspend an act but does not exert this power. It can also be seen as a liberty which obtains only when a response which has a genuine negative motivation (to suppress the particular behavior or action) is voluntarily suspended (King 1997).[2]

The term tolerance is generally used to refer to the principle and the virtue of being tolerant, while the term toleration refers to the actual behavior or practice that "tolerates." However, often the two are used interchangeably to describe contexts where practices or attitudes that are disapproved of are allowed to exist. It should be noted that tolerance as a principle also requires that discriminatory practices or behaviors towards those who engage in the "tolerated" practices are prohibited. In other words, it may also be seen as a prohibition of discrimination.

Historically, the development of a body of theory on the subject of toleration began in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in response to the Protestant Reformation and the Wars of Religion. It started as a response to conflict among Christian denominations and the persecution of witchcraft and heresy. In the sixteenth and seventeenth century, writers such as Montaigne (Langer 2005) questioned the morality of religious persecution and offered arguments supporting toleration. In the seventeenth century the concept of toleration was taken up by English thinkers such as John Milton and was further developed in the late seventeenth century by John Locke in his *Letters Concerning Toleration* and in his *Two Treatises on Government* (Kaplan 2007; Mendus 1988). Enlightenment philosophers such as Voltaire in France and Lessing in Germany further developed the notion of religious tolerance, although these ideas did not prevent

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intolerance and violence in early modern Europe (Zagorin 2005). Tolerance was then understood in reference to religious diversity (the dominant religion's toleration of minority religious groups), while today the concept is applied to all forms of difference, including race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, and gender.

Already in the Enlightenment years, a distinction was made between mere toleration (i.e. forbearance and the permission given by adherents of a dominant religion to religious minorities to exist although they are seen as mistaken and harmful) and the higher-level concept of religious liberty, which involves equality between all religions and the prohibition of discrimination among them (Zagorin 2005). Indeed, this distinction is probably the main weakness or the main strength of the concept of tolerance. Some thinkers see tolerance as primarily a practical consideration, since each society or state has to set the limits of what and whom it tolerates and what or whom it does not tolerate; tolerance then becomes important as a way to approach issues of diversity and discrimination against minorities (for further discussion, see Mendus and Edwards 1987; Mendus 1988; King 1997). Then there are others, such as Galeotti (2002), who propose an advanced concept of toleration that involves not only acceptance and recognition of diversity, but also a combating of negative stereotypes and identities surrounding minority groups.

In contrast, for many political theorists today and in political discourse in general, toleration of something or someone implies a negative view and hence a form of discrimination. Despite the more open and progressive origins of the concept, in current discourse we "tolerate" something "bad" that we do not want to suppress for various reasons, but which we do not consider legitimate. In other words, toleration today is certainly more about "not objecting" to something rather than about "embracing" it, let alone respecting it.

Political scientists who are in favor of an egalitarian, thick concept of tolerance actually usually privilege the notion of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism and the notion of multicultural citizenship (Modood et al. 2006) respond to the need for a normative and theoretical perspective for dealing with diversity. Diversity may be defined as value heterogeneity (Rawls 1993), as groups oppressed on the basis of their "difference" (Young 1990), as historic cultural communities (Taylor 1994), or as indigenous peoples and ethnicities in multi-ethnic states (Kymlicka 1995). It is generally understood that the presence of new, especially non-white, ethnic and religious groups formed by migration alongside native groups, and their quests for tolerance and recognition, are the main constituents of contemporary diversity.

There have, however, been different views on what are the normative and conceptual principles on which multiculturalism rests, and a divergent set of programs on what kind of policies multiculturalism should support. Vertovec (1998) identifies eight types, while Delanty (2003) proposes nine different varieties of multiculturalism. Indeed, what probably is characteristic of the multicultural idea is the fact that it provides for a loose framework within which different norms and different policies can fit. However, there are a number of common features that bring the different multiculturalism approaches together into a minimal common framework on what multiculturalism entails: (1) the recognition that cultural and religious diversity is a good thing that has to be preserved and to be allowed to exist in societies regardless of whether a minority is a native historical minority or a post-migration community; (2) the acknowledgment that for different cultural and religious communities to flourish there is a need to acknowledge not only individual rights and claims but also collective rights; (3) that such a recognition of group rights and claims has to respect the fundamental principles of liberalism and democracy. One might argue that multiculturalism also entails a fourth element: a preference for contextual answers to claims rather than one-size-fits-all solutions. In fact it is this very element that probably makes multiculturalism a loose normative and policy framework rather than an actual specific model of policies and practices.

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As Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010: 3) point out, multiculturalism applies in several areas of public and social life, involving a variety of practices. Thus, in the area of law multiculturalism suggests the need to make exemptions to general rules in order to accommodate minority claims (e.g. allow Sikhs to wear a turban even when riding a motorcycle). In the area of language policy it suggests that multiple languages should be used to communicate essential public policy information. In the area of religion multiculturalism involves the accommodation of minority religions, permitting and even supporting the establishment of new places of worship or cemeteries. The list of practices and policies that fall within the notion of multiculturalism is long and varied. It is sufficient perhaps to say that multiculturalism tends to privilege positive answers that open up new channels and create new services in response to minority and migrant claims. It is less often the case that multiculturalism functions through prohibitions or monitoring, although this may also be the case, as, for instance, with regard to ensuring non-discrimination in broadcasting and the media.

While reviewing the full range of normative and policy approaches to multiculturalism goes beyond the scope of this chapter, it is useful to consider the main features of multiculturalism and its efforts to balance individual vs. group rights and claims in liberal democratic societies as these are expressed in the work of Tariq Modood.

Modood (2013) sees as a constitutive aspect of multiculturalism the idea that the social world is made up of individuals as well as groups, and that groups are as "real" as individuals in terms of their function in the social world. He acknowledges that there are different types of social attributes that form the basis of group identities, notably race, religion, and ethnicity, and hence that there are different types of "diversity" with which a democratic and plural society has to come to terms. Moreover, he notes that not all groups experience their group identity with the same intensity or with reference to the same realms of life. Thus, some minority groups may be more concerned with socio-economic disadvantage and prioritize education and professional advancement, while other groups may concentrate their claims and actions in the cultural and symbolic realm of recognition.

Moreover, Modood notes, members of a group may experience their group identity with varying degrees of intensity and may see it as relevant in different modes and in different realms of their lives. Indeed, while (British) Muslims are often portrayed as a monolithic block of people with a strong religious identity, Modood notes that

> For some Muslims – like most Jews in Britain today – being Muslim is a matter of community membership and heritage; for others it is a few simple precepts about self, compassion, justice and the afterlife; for some others it is a worldwide movement armed with a counter-ideology of modernity; and so on. Some Muslims are devout but apolitical; some are political but do not see their politics as being "Islamic" (indeed, may even be anti-"Islamic"). Some identify more with a nationality of origin, such as Turkish; others with the nationality of settlement and perhaps citizenship, such as French. … So it is no more plausible to ascribe a particular politics (religious or otherwise) to all Muslims as it to all women or members of the working class.
>
> *(Modood 2013: 124)*

Having said this, Modood, nevertheless, warns against the danger of excessive recognition of individual difference that would lead us to believe that the dominant form of life is a "hybridic, multiculture, urban melange." He points out that, instead, the different types and degrees of "groupness" professed by different minorities in different contexts should alert us to the fact that a multicultural approach to accommodating diversity needs to be flexible enough to offer to

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each minority a mode of representation and participation in the national whole that is commensurate with its needs and wishes. This political perspective on multiculturalism, offered by Modood (2013), argues for greater recognition of and respect for minority difference, and is closely knit with socio-political realities in modern communities. In other words, while the concepts on which this approach is based remain constant – democratic liberalism, moderate secularism, and religious pluralism – its actual applications, in terms of the institutions that it will be expressed through and the practices that it will inform, remain subject to the specificities of each national context and its corresponding minorities.

In recent years multiculturalism as a concept and as a framework that guides policy-making in the field of cultural and religious diversity has come under attack. Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010: 6–9) summarize these critiques in seven main points, which I would rather summarize in four. First, multiculturalism is a single doctrine that eventually puts the state to the service of left-wing liberals and ethnic minority activities, leading eventually to the "racial, ethnic and cultural balkanisation" of society, as Melanie Phillips (2006) put it. A second critique is that multiculturalism stifles debate because it imposes too much political correctness and deals with cultural and religious diversity as if they were taboo issues. It thus denies real problems like the failure to socio-economically integrate minorities or immigrants at school or in the labor market. The third and perhaps most pervasive critique is that multiculturalism leads to parallel societies rather than providing a framework for integrating minorities and as such undermines the existence of a common set of values that keep a society together. A fourth main point is that multiculturalism supports reprehensible practices such as honor killings, female genital mutilation, or overall the oppression of women, and in addition provides a haven for Islamic terrorists precisely because it involves too much of a laissez-faire policy towards minorities.

Although, as Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010: 18) point out, the backlash against multiculturalism in public and political debates has not led to such a wholesale reorientation of migrant integration policies, it would be fair to affirm that in several European countries with relatively large Muslim immigrant populations the 2000s have been marked by several new measures that included the tightening up of naturalization provisions and the introduction of civic integration tests, not only for naturalization but also for legal immigration. In the next section I discuss briefly how five European countries have reoriented their migrant integration and naturalization policies, emphasizing how such developments were a reaction to the concern that Muslim populations are not successfully integrated and remain rather socio-economically but also culturally marginalized.

National interpretations of the multicultural idea

From multiculturalism to civic assimilationism: the Netherlands

The first case is the Netherlands, a country that has been considered a forerunner in multicultural policies since the 1980s but which has in recent years become a champion of civic assimilationism. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Netherlands had a liberal entry and naturalization policy and also allowed migrant communities to set up their own cultural and religious institutions largely within the framework of the pillar model of Dutch society. This has changed during the last decade as there has been a widespread recognition by politicians, and to a certain extent by scholars, that Dutch multiculturalism has failed to achieve its objectives, notably to allow minorities to retain their cultures but also to ensure social cohesion and socio-economic integration of migrants in Dutch society. The perceived failure of the Dutch multiculturalism

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model focused on both socio-economic and cultural issues: the significantly higher percentage of people of migrant backgrounds who were dependent on welfare (compared to natives), the higher rates of school abandonment and unemployment among second-generation migrant youth, but also the perceived lack of integration of certain communities within the Dutch polity, notably the inability of people to speak Dutch and to participate in public and political life. While the debate has been generalized, the groups that it focused on in the Netherlands were Moroccans and Turks (the two largest immigrant communities in the country), which were quickly lumped together as "Muslims."

In the 2000s, the Netherlands has discontinued some emblematic multiculturalist policies such as dual citizenship programs, national-level funding for minority group organizations and activities supporting cultural difference. At the same time it has introduced some policies specifically tailored to ignore ethnic minority differences such as reallocating the small percentage of public broadcasting time dedicated to multicultural issues and ceasing to monitor the rates of labor market participation by ethnic minorities (Entzinger 2007, 2003; Van De Vijver et al. 2006). Integration courses have been introduced for all immigrants (both newcomers and earlier arrivals) and a civic integration test is held in the migrants' country of origin before they arrive in the Netherlands (ter Wal 2007; Vasta 2007; Sunier 2010). The "drastic break with multiculturalism" (Entzinger 2007: 201) made by the Dutch has been widely recorded and may be said to have kicked off the "failure of multiculturalism" debate.

Reluctant multiculturalism: Germany

Germany is a second case of special interest as it is home to one of the largest Muslim communities in Europe. Germany was a latecomer to, if ever a follower of, multicultural policies for Muslim migrant integration. Following decades of pursuing an ethno-national citizenship, Germany has since the late 1990s undergone significant changes in its management of immigration, integration, and its conception of citizenship. Thus, and after federal policies had previously focused almost entirely on the control and return of migrants (Schönwälder 2001), in 1998 the Red–Green government characterized Germany as an "immigration country" and amended the Citizenship Law (2000) to introduce the principle of *ius soli*. These developments have been accompanied by others such as the introduction of the Immigration Law (2005), which encourages the cultivation of "integration strategies," and which in turn was followed by the invitation to migrants and civil society actors to take part in a National Integration Summit (2006). Yet the content of this "integration" has also included a nationalist imperative, whereby newcomers are expected to undertake 300–600 hours of German-language classes and lessons on German society and history (Jacobs and Rea 2007)

The key word for the last decade in the German public and policy debate on migration and cultural difference has been "integration." Integration has been conceived mainly as a socio-economic issue: integration policies have privileged the education and labor market insertion of the second generation rather than an opening up of German national identity to recognizing that it's becoming multi-ethnic and multi-religious. Indeed, in recent years the debate over a German *Leitkultur*, which seeks the promotion of a German "leading culture," has become more explicit than in its traditional conception of ethnic citizenship. Indeed, this is despite, or perhaps because of, significant movement away from the latter, at least in law (Mühe 2010).

The accommodation of Muslim demands for cultural or religious issues has been much more hesitant, and public discourses, like the "famous" Thilo Sarrazin debate, have generally stigmatized Muslims as backward, uneducated, violent, and incapable of integrating into German

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society. Thus, while the 2000 Citizenship Law was much more liberal, it led to a higher level of scrutiny of naturalization applications and a growing suspicion towards Muslims (Schiffauer 2006; Green, 2005). Indeed this trend culminated in the 2010 declaration by Chancellor Angela Merkel that multiculturalism has failed in Germany, even if in reality Germany had never applied any multicultural policies.

Multiculturalism reconsidered: Britain and Sweden

Britain and Sweden are among the few European countries that have not turned away from the ideals and policies of multiculturalism. Although the British government introduced a "Life in the United Kingdom test" (a civic integration test) and civic ceremonies in an attempt to retrieve cohesion based on an inclusive understanding of Britishness, particularly in the aftermath of the July 2005 London bombings, politicians and political theorists have emphasized the importance of reorganizing or reconsidering rather than abandoning multiculturalism (Modood and Meer 2010; Modood 2013).

Meer and Modood (2011) argue that in the case of Britain the reorientation (rather than abandonment) of multiculturalism has come from the center-left, beginning with proposals to remake Britishness under the terms of "Cool Britannia" and "re-branding Britain" (Leonard 1997). Not only was this a strand within what is probably the most multiculturalist government Britain has had (1997–2001), but the ideas of rethinking and remaking Britishness in response to ethnic diversity were stimulated by ethnic minority intellectuals (Gilroy 1987; Modood 1992; CMEB 2000).

Following perhaps from the civil unrest in northern English towns in the summer of 2001, there has been a strong public debate on whether knowledge of one of the national languages (English mainly, but also Welsh or Scottish/Gaelic) should be a requirement for long-term residence and naturalization. Indeed the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002) explicitly introduced a test (implemented in 2005) for residents seeking British citizenship. Thus, applicants should show "a sufficient knowledge of English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic" and also "a sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom" (Home Office 2002: 11). Those immigrants seeking to settle in the UK (applying for "indefinite leave to remain") equally have to pass the test, which has effectively been implemented since April 2, 2007. If applicants do not have sufficient knowledge of English, they are required to attend English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) and citizenship classes. The government has, however, insisted that "it would be unfair for migrants to have to answer questions on British history that many British people would have difficulties with" (McNulty, quoted in Kiwan 2008: 69). Accordingly, the emphasis is on the experience of living in Britain rather an attempt to test Britishness in terms of scholastic knowledge.

The arrival of the Conservative Party in power (in coalition) in 2010, however, marked a new turning point in British policy, with a certain shift away from multicultural accommodation of ethnic and religious diversity. The Prime Minister David Cameron called for a more "muscular liberalism" that would leave less space for appreciating the collective needs and religious specificities of minority groups, notably Muslims. This, however, has not yet translated into concrete policy changes or, rather, remains a discourse that seems to be destined more for internal consumption than an effective new guide for policy design.

In Sweden, another stronghold of multiculturalism, the multicultural approach to cultural and religious diversity has been predicated on a strong social welfare system and a political ideology that, though secular, has allowed for Muslims to express their identities on an individual and collective level. In this sense Sweden is different from Britain, as migrants, and

particularly Muslims, have been expected to integrate through strong social welfare and employment policies. This welfare framework was seen as somehow neutralizing cultural or religious diversity, which, however, could be expressed freely and could take advantage of state funding for cultural and religious associations. In recent years, however, there has been rising concern with the poor educational and labor market performance of some Muslim groups. This has led to a reconsideration of the multiculturalism and welfare model, with now a greater emphasis on individual responsibility during the integration process in the destination country (Otterbeck 2010). The shift in multicultural policies has been part, though, of a wider shift of the Swedish welfare system and civic culture towards a notion of the individual's responsibility to find employment and integrate in society at large.

Renewed Republicanism: France

In France, the question of migrant integration has largely evolved in relation to nationality laws and citizenship acquisition. The issue became politicized in the 1980s. Right-wing parties have generally advocated a more selective approach to naturalization, especially for the second generation (applying instead of "automatically becoming" French), while left-wing political forces have generally privileged an open access to French nationality for the children of immigrants born in France. While laws on citizenship acquisition have been quite generous in France, allowing for people to acquire citizenship after five years of legal residence, the 2003 Citizenship Law added the requirement of proving sufficient knowledge about the rights and responsibilities of French citizenship. Alongside the Netherlands, the French government considered the possibility of introducing civic tests when implementing the New Reception and Integration Contract (Nouveau contrat d'accueil et d'intégration). Eventually tests were not introduced, but since 2007 newly arrived immigrants have been encouraged through this "contract" to learn French and acquire knowledge of French laws. While naturalization is not obligatory, the compulsory steps that each foreigner should take make it clear that it is a desirable outcome (Escafre-Dublet and Kastoryano 2011).

The question of migrant integration and the meaning of French citizenship (which is largely defined in civic and voluntaristic terms) have come center-stage again after the then newly elected President Nicholas Sarkozy created a Ministry of Immigration and National Identity. Among other activities, in 2009 the ministry launched a series of debates on French national identity to take place in all regions of the country. The creation of the ministry and the debates campaign attracted considerable criticism. In 2010 the Ministry of Immigration and National Identity was abolished, though the indirect questioning of naturalized French citizens' loyalty to the country and successful integration continues. Interestingly, in a speech delivered in response to violence which occurred during the summer of 2010 in Grenoble (southeast France), President Sarkozy announced the possibility of stripping offenders of their French nationality if they had been naturalized in the previous ten years.

However, the question of Muslim integration and multiculturalism in France has always been closely related to the issue of *laïcité*. *Laïcité*, defined as the principle and practice of fully separating church and state in all issues of public life, has provided the framework for the coexistence of different faiths in French society. It is embodied in the 1905 law separating church and state, and rules out any official representation of religion in public places. It also implies that religious affiliation is not considered a legitimate basis for the identification of groups. This is seen as a way to guarantee the neutrality of the state and the equal treatment of individuals on the basis of citizenship. The notion of *laïcité* has been increasingly discussed in connection with Islam in the past two decades.

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The approach to issues pertaining to Islam in terms of *laïcité* can be traced back to the first headscarf affair, which took place in 1989 in Creil, an outer suburb of Paris, when the principal of a secondary school took the decision to exclude three girls because he considered that their Muslim headscarves were religious symbols and undermined the principle of *laïcité*. The State Council, however, ruled that the wearing of the headscarf was "not contradictory to the values of the secular and republican school" and left it to the teachers and school heads to decide whether or not pupils were using this as an instrument of proselytism and disturbance of school activities. The 1989 interpretation of *laïcité* by the State Council was later challenged and given a more restrictive twist with the establishment of the Stasi Commission in 2003 and the passing of the 2004 law forbidding the wearing of "ostentatious" religious symbols (including of course Muslim headscarves) in schools.

Conclusion

The new century has been marked by intense debate and policy considerations as to how best to integrate Muslim immigrant populations in Western countries and in particular in Europe. While in the USA perhaps most emphasis has been put on finding out whether Muslim Americans are more or less radical in their views of Islam (Pew Report 2011), in Europe the debate has been quite intense, looking at issues of both socio-economic and cultural integration. Prominent politicians from traditional immigration countries like Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands have to a smaller or larger extent subscribed to the "multiculturalism has failed" debate. Scholars have spoken of the multiculturalism backlash, although on closer scrutiny, apart from an emphasis on civic integration tests, the shift away from multiculturalism has not been as "seismic" as Joppke (2004: 249) predicted.

However, while in northern Europe countries were caught up in concerns with jihadist terrorism and social unrest among immigrant communities, the so-called "new hosts," such as Spain, Italy, and Greece, were "left to their own devices." Struggling with their new realities as immigrant host countries, these countries have been discouraged from even acknowledging their by now *de facto* multicultural and multi-ethnic composition. The perceived failure of the Muslim migrant integration approach adopted by the "old hosts" discourages multicultural integration policies in southern Europe, and reinforces the view that immigration's economic advantages may only be reaped after immigrants become assimilated into the dominant national culture (Zapata-Barrero 2006; Triandafyllidou 2002; Ambrosini 2004). Although immigrant populations in southern Europe are not predominantly Muslim, the question of religious diversity slowly comes to the fore as these populations settle and the Muslim sectors begin expressing their particular needs and wishes (Triandafyllidou 2010; Triandafyllidou et al. 2011).

Notes

1 Most reliable data usually use a combination of sources, including national censuses but also the so-called country of origin principle, for estimating the religion of migrants. In other words, the Muslim migrant population of *X* country of destination is estimated by looking at the countries of origin of the migrants. If a migrant comes from *Y* country of origin where 90 percent of the population are Muslims, it is estimated that 90 percent of the *Y* migrant community at the *X* destination country are Muslims. Thus if there are 100,000 immigrants from the *Y* country in *X* country it is estimated that 90,000 immigrants from *Y* country living in *X* country are Muslims. This method is adopted by the Pew reports on Muslim Americans and Muslims in the world and a number of other studies.

2 This section draws partly on arguments that I have presented already in Triandafyllidou 2010a: ch. 1, Introduction.

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