Part IX

Europe and the world
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Introduction and review

Attempts to think about European foreign policy are often frustrated by uncertainties about how to define basic terms such as ‘state’ or ‘foreign policy’. Definitional problems are compounded by the unique nature of the EU. Clearly, the international system is populated with important non-state actors, but there is a tendency to see foreign policy as essentially an act of government and therefore exclusive to states.

(Allen 1998: 43)

As David Allen observed almost two decades ago, thinking about European foreign policy (EFP) can be frustrated by the uncertainties of terms and definitions, as well as by the exclusive tendencies of foreign policy analysis. As a prominent scholar of EFP (understood as the nexus between European Union and member state foreign policies), Allen’s scholarly career coincided with the early formative period of 1978–2012. During this period, Allen consistently made a case for the need to understand EFP at both the national and European levels beyond the nation-state (Allen 1978).

As Allen’s insights from 1998 suggest, the uncertainties over how to interpret EFP are multiplied in a more global era reconfigured by globalizing, multilateralizing and multipolarizing processes. In order to make greater sense of EFP in a global political-cultural context, this chapter will consider the ways in which political theories and cultural myths co-constitute each other in both symbolic and substantive terms. EFP is understood here to involve the international, supranational and transnational policy processes of European states and institutions in relation to the rest of the world. In this respect, the study of EFP includes an analysis of the engagements of European states in international and multilateral diplomacy, the interregional and multipolar interactions of European international organizations, and the behaviour of European non-governmental actors working through the above agents as part of transnational and globalizing activism. As Allen acknowledged, ‘states have no monopoly on international activity but they do have a relatively exclusive claim on the idea of foreign policy’ (Allen 1998: 43).

The chapter adopts a pan-European approach in analysing EFP at the interfaces of these international, supranational and transnational policy processes. This analysis includes the
consideration of the foreign policies of EU and non-EU states, as well as the impact of the European integration processes on both members and non-members alike. In a similar vein, the chapter seeks to review the literature on collective European activity, whether international, supranational or transnational, in order to identify common patterns. Theory is defined as an ‘explanation of observed regularities’ that constitute a ‘particular conception of the world’ (Bryman 2012: 21; Gramsci 1971: 9). In this chapter, EFP is examined through the lens of political theory, defined as ‘a commitment to theorise, critique, and diagnose the norms, practices, and organisation of political action in the past and present, in our own places and elsewhere’ (Dryzek et al. 2008: 4; Manners 2013: 474). However, it is important to recall the centrality of power in predetermining the questions asked and the theories used: ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ since ‘theory constitutes as well as explains the questions it asks (and those it does not ask)’ (Cox 1981: 128; Hoskyns 2004: 224; Manners 2007: 78). Myths are understood here as ‘stories that are of psychological importance to a community’ (Morales 2007: 3). In this respect, ‘a myth consists in the re-elaboration of a narrative that answers the human need for significance’ (Bottici and Challand 2013: 89). Drawing on Roland Barthes, Cynthia Weber argues that the ‘myth function in IR theory is the transformation of what is particular, cultural and ideological (like a story told by an IR tradition) into what appears to be universal, natural and purely empirical’ (Weber 2001: 6–7). In this chapter, the ‘mythology of the EU in world politics can be told and untold in many different ways. . . . In this respect the mythology of global Europe is part of our everyday existence, part of the EU in and of the world’ (Manners 2010a: 67–8).

The earliest literature on EFP was clearly constrained by the Cold War, as the ground-breaking edited volumes by Wallace and Paterson (1978), Allen et al. (1982), Hill (1983) and Allen and Pijpers (1984) illustrate. These works were primarily concerned with describing the emergence of EFP within the confines of contemporary theoretical limits. In the post-Cold War era, a number of collected works have provided common ground for rethinking EFP, including Carlsnaes and Smith (1994), Hill (1996), Peterson and Sjursen (1998), Carlsnaes et al. (2004), Tonra and Christiansen (2004) and Lucarelli and Manners (2006a). In contrast to Cold War scholarship, this research pushed the empirical and theoretical boundaries beyond EU/member state distinctions, to explore non-state-centric thinking. By the early twenty-first century, two strands of literature on EFP had emerged, focusing on EU and member state foreign policies, respectively. Among the most widely read contributions on EU foreign policy are Whitman (1998), Bretherton and Vogler (2002/2006), H. Smith (2002), K. Smith (2003), Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008), Hill and Smith (2011) and Whitman (2011). In parallel, a somewhat lesser-read literature on member state foreign policies can be found in works such as Manners and Whitman (2000), Tonra (2001), Hocking and Spence (2005), Gross (2009), Wong and Hill (2012) and Hadfield et al. (2014).

Any review of this literature would illustrate the extent to which the analysts are working within and with a series of theories and myths that underlie the workings of EFP – sometimes explicitly, but often implicitly. This chapter places particular emphasis on identifying the theories and myths that have shaped and been shaped by EFP analysis. To this end, the chapter interweaves the literature, theories and myths that constitute our understanding of EFP in a more global era reconfigured by globalizing, multilateralizing and multipolarizing processes. This interweaving is structured by the historical narratives of the Cold War, post-Cold War and War on Terror eras. These historical narratives provide a framework for the analysis of the theories and myths, literature and practice of EFP throughout the chapter. The investigation goes beyond simply analysing the primary and secondary literature to examine the cultural (re)configuration of the myths and ideas of EFP through an analysis of popular culture. The chapter concludes
with a review of the main arguments regarding the interactions of the three policy processes, the co-constitution of the theories and myths of EFP, and the evolving combination of the fixity of statism with the fluidity of polarism in a more global era of European politics.

The Cold War era: theories and myths of bipolarism in the 1980s

The Cold War is over. The risk of a global nuclear war has practically disappeared. The Iron Curtain is gone. Germany has united, which is a momentous milestone in the history of Europe. There is not a single country on our continent which would not regard itself as fully sovereign and independent. The USSR and the USA, the two nuclear superpowers, have moved from confrontation to interaction and, in some important cases, partnership. This has had a decisive effect on the entire international climate.

(Mikhail Gorbachev, Nobel Peace Prize Lecture, 1991)

Mikhail Gorbachev’s Nobel Peace Prize Lecture reminds us of the Cold War conditions that had structured thinking on both the theories and myths of EFP during the preceding four decades. The risk of global nuclear war, the Iron Curtain, a divided Germany and superpower confrontation were all conditioning features of the Cold War context of EFP in the 1980s. The Cold War era created a particular theoretical myth that predetermined EFP – namely, that the world was structured by a bipolar balance of power that was stable and inevitable. There are three approaches to understanding theories and myths of EFP in the period of Cold War bipolarism: state-centric balancing, liberal interdependence and structural ownership. What these concepts had in common was an emphasis on the material origins of international relations and EFP. However, as Gorbachev also noted in his acceptance speech, ‘the year 1990 represents a turning point. . . . We have begun resolutely to tear down the material foundations of a military, political and ideological confrontation’ (Gorbachev, 1990). His remarks remind us that the foundations of the theories and myths underlying EFP during the Cold War were themselves ideas whose time had passed by 1990.

State-centric balancing

State-centric theories of International Relations (IR) are commonly, and misleadingly, labelled ‘realism’ (IR–realism) by their adherents because they seem to realistically capture the world. State-centric approaches were the most common method of understanding the theories and myths of EFP during the Cold War, and residual aspects of IR–realism remain important in both unipolar and multipolar thinking in the 2000s and 2010s. Within this approach, following Allen, foreign policy is reserved for the activities of government and is exclusive to states. Within IR–realism, foreign policy is driven either by state or ‘national’ interests (such as survival) or by the distribution of ‘power’ (such as military capabilities) in the international system. Despite these contradictions in IR–realism, state-centric theories have sought to explain EFP by focusing on national interests and/or power-seeking in foreign policy. Within EFP, the theoretical expectations of state-centric theories were that European states would use their foreign policies to balance one another and/or balance external powers such as the USA or USSR. Many of these historical dimensions of EFP are represented in works such as Allen and Wallace (1977), Allen and Pijpers (1984), Nuttall (1992), Hill and Stavridis (1996) and Mockli (2008). Although none of these scholars adheres to state-centric theories of EFP, this literature illustrates the pervasive assumptions of national interest and/or balanced bipolarism inherent in EFP.
Liberal interdependence

Liberal theories of IR provided a more thorough way to capture the complexities of EFP during the Cold War by emphasizing the importance of interrogating both ‘national’ interests and the distribution of ‘power’. This extension of EFP beyond assumptions of national interest facilitated a more comprehensive understanding of the domestic sources of foreign policy, for example in the study of West European reactions to the Falklands/Malvinas conflict (Hill and Stavridis 1996). The opening up of EFP to the changing distributions of ‘power’ reflected the impact of economic interdependence on foreign policy in the 1970s (Cooper 1968, 1972). Theories of liberal interdependence also reflected the increasingly inseparable interactions between domestic and economic factors in EFP, the study of European Community external policies and the emergent European Political Cooperation (Sjöstedt 1977; Nuttall 1992).

Structural ownership

Both state-centric and liberal interdependence theories of EFP called attention to the economic structure of international relations and, more importantly, to the question of who owned what within this structure. Both Marxist and Gramscian theories of capitalist hegemony at the time argued that EFP was shaped by material interests, not just in the form of ‘national’ economic interests, but also in terms of a national and increasingly transnational capitalist class. The Suez Crisis of 1956 and the consequences of the 1973 Arab–Israeli War brought home to foreign policy analysts that both decolonization and OPEC were having a profound impact on EFP (Galtung 1973; Allen and Pijpers 1984). The implications for European integration and EFP (with respect to relations with the USA and Japan during the 1980s) reflected both these longer-term consequences and the relative decline of European hegemony in terms of structural ownership of the world. The structural consequences of these shifts in ownership were identified by the leading scholar in international political economy, Susan Strange, whose predictions of the retreat of the state, casino capitalism and mad money gradually came true throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Strange 1971, 1996, 1997, 1998).

Cold War myths of European foreign policy

During the 1970s and 1980s, the emergent field of EFP was powerfully shaped by mutually reinforcing theories and myths concerning the nature of international relations and the role of states within these relations. Within Europe, popular culture and foreign policy myths played a profound role in this process, as reflected in popular novels, films and video games. Whereas novels and films were the most culturally significant media types of the twentieth century, video games have become the defining media of the twenty-first century (Lipschutz 2001; Weber 2001; Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2009; Chatfield 2011). The novels and film adaptations of writers such as Graham Greene, Ian Fleming and John le Carré helped portray and constitute Cold War Europe through their fictional worlds of travel, espionage and foreign policy. These works, e.g. The Third Man and From Russia with Love, and the worlds of James Bond and George Smiley achieved iconic status as they effectively mythologized the Cold War. However, this cultural (re)construction of Cold War foreign policy has continued into the post-Cold War era, in films such as The Lives of Others (directed by Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck, 2006) and The Farewell Affair (directed by Christian Carion, 2009).

More importantly for the post-Cold War generations, the foreign policy assumptions of the Cold War are being (re)produced through top-selling video and computer games such as

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Civilization and Supreme Ruler: Cold War (Chaplin 2007). Grand strategy computer games, including Sid Meier’s Civilization (MicroProse, 1991) and Europa Universalis (Paradox Development Studio, 2000), have acculturated a generation of players to the idea of a world made up of civilizations or empires that compete through exploration, diplomacy and warfare. Europa Universalis and its sequels specifically recreate a version of the European state system during the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries in which gamers vie for supremacy through the exploitation of colonial wealth, diplomacy and military might. What these strategy games (and many more like them) teach is that civilizations, empires and states have employed comparable expansionist foreign policies in which economic trade, diplomacy and conflict are the natural components of international competition. Specifically Cold War-themed computer games such as Tom Clancy’s Red Storm games The Hunt for Red October (1987), Red Storm Rising (1988) and, more recently, Supreme Ruler: Cold War (BattleGoat, 2011) reinforce this cultural perspective. Cold War computer games like these emphasize the bipolar character of global competition, in which technological innovation, trade, diplomacy and espionage are almost always precursors to inevitable military conflict.

The post-Cold War era: theories and myths of multilateralism in the 1990s

In the 21st Century I believe the mission of the United Nations will be defined by a new, more profound, awareness of the sanctity and dignity of every human life, regardless of race or religion. This will require us to look beyond the framework of states, and beneath the surface of nations or communities. We must focus, as never before, on improving the conditions of the individual men and women who give the state or nation its richness and character.

(Annan 2001)

Ten years after Gorbachev’s speech, Kofi Annan’s Nobel Peace Prize Lecture evokes a very different world in which the ‘framework of states’ had given way to a more global context, with the United Nations serving as the primary framework for multilateralism. In the post-Cold War period, a united Germany and a reunited Europe were the leitmotifs of an EFP that had shifted from the state-centrism of the Cold War to the multilateralism of the 1990s. The immediate post-Cold War period generated a new theoretical myth that influenced EFP – the advent of globalization with associated demands for better regional and global governance. In the 1990s, three different approaches were important to the understanding of the theories and myths of EFP in the period of post-Cold War multilateralism: social construction, post-structural deconstruction and transnational capital. These particular approaches shared an emphasis on the ideational foundations of global relations and EFP. As Kofi Annan stated in his acceptance speech, ‘the idea that there is one people in possession of the truth, one answer to the world’s ills, or one solution to humanity’s needs, has done untold harm throughout history – especially in the last century’ (Annan 2001). His comment serves as a reminder of the dangers that the possession of, and belief in, absolute ideas and truths about global politics provided for the ideational basis of theories and myths of EFP during the immediate post-Cold War period.

Social construction

The collapse of Cold War myths concerning the bipolar stability of IR suggested to many the need to examine what the revolutions in Eastern Europe implied about the ‘power of ideas and
norms rather than the power of empirical force’ (Manners 2002: 238). Drawing on the sociological work of the 1960s and 1970s, in particular that of Anthony Giddens, early social constructivists began to raise questions about the reality of IR, EFP and European integration (Wendt 1992; Laffan 1996; Christiansen et al. 1999). In the social constructivist perspective, foreign policy is constructed through the interactions between the norms and rules of state societies and international society. During the 1990s, social constructivists were increasingly interested in how EFP was constituted in terms of norms and identity, for example in the response to the situation in Yugoslavia, as well as diplomatic rules and culture (Jørgensen 1997; Lucarelli 1997; Tonra 1997). Social constructivist theories seeking to understand identity conflicts over ethnicity in Yugoslavia and Rwanda became accepted in the study of EFP. By the end of the 1990s, social constructivist interpretations were found in most mainstream texts on EFP, including Manners and Whitman (2000), Tonra (2001), Bretherton and Vogler (2002/2006), Carlsnaes et al. (2004), Tonra and Christiansen (2004) and Lucarelli and Manners (2006a).

Post-structural deconstruction

Although the post-positivist revolution in IR pre-dated the arrival of social construction, post-structural EFP analysis took longer to gain significant traction (Smith 1994). The collapse of IR theories raised profound questions, not only concerning the nature of international relations and foreign policy, but also with regard to how we might interpret and study the apparently rigid structures of the post-Cold War world. Increasingly, EFP analyses followed the knowledge/power traditions of French and American IR post-structuralism, as represented by Michel Foucault (1989), Jacques Derrida (1988) and Der Derian and Shapiro (1989). Post-structuralist scholars of EFP in the 1990s were particularly focused on the discourses through which the self/other and domestic/foreign were spoken and made real (Holm 1997; Larsen 1997; Diez 1999). Ole Wæver (1994) asked whether post-structural researchers should be ‘resisting the temptation of post foreign policy analysis’, a question he answered positively in a volume edited with Lene Hansen on Nordic identity and policy in relation to European integration (Hansen and Wæver 2001). Post-structuralist scholarship developed significantly in its second decade as the securitizing events of the 2000s took hold over EFP after the attacks in New York, Kabul, Baghdad, Madrid and London. Within this context, post-structuralist EFP analysis has focused on the foreign policy of small states, regional identity and security policy (Larsen 2005; Pace 2005; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006).

Transnational capital

The post-Cold War period also prompted a rethinking of Marxist and Gramscian theories of capitalist hegemony, in particular through the rearticulation of neo-Gramscian theories of transnational capitalist class. With globalization seemingly the driving force of post-Cold War global politics, such approaches sought to understand both the role of transnational capital in shaping EFP and the responses in terms of regional and global governance. Neo-Gramscian scholars argued that the definition, pursuit and aim of foreign policy were increasingly shaped by satisfying and servicing the needs of a footloose, tax-free class of hegemonic financiers. The widespread practices of offshore financing, private banking and the outsourcing of production during the 1990s demonstrated these consequences. The foreign policy interest in oil-producing states, such as Iraq, Iran and Kuwait, together with the relative lack of interest in states such as Sudan, Somalia and Afghanistan during the 1990s, seems to confirm this interpretation of transnational capital. The study of transnational capital has demonstrated the importance of the
political economy of EFP, particularly in understanding the historical materialism of European relations with the world (Cafruny and Peters 1998; Bieler 2002; Bohle 2006; Manners 2007; Bailey 2013).

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During the 1990s, the developing field of EFP was also reshaped by changing interpretations of theories and myths concerning the role of foreign policy actors within global politics. Although novels and personal accounts still played an important role, in the 1990s they were quickly superseded by films and documentaries in the popular cultural media. Authors such as le Carré and Clancy continued to write semi-fictionalized accounts of foreign policy, such as *The Constant Gardner* (le Carré 2001), *Politika* (Clancy 1997) and *Ruthless.com* (Clancy 1998), but personal accounts like Michael Nicholson’s (1994) *Natasha’s Story* and Roméo Dallaire’s (2003) *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* had greater overall impact. Films such as *Welcome to Sarajevo* (directed by Michael Winterbottom, 1997, based on *Natasha’s Story*), *The Peacemaker* (directed by Mimi Leder, 1997) and *No Man’s Land* (directed by Danis Tanović, 2001) clearly expressed the culpability and the consequences of the failure of EFP and the UN in Yugoslavia. Other films, including *Hotel Rwanda* (directed by Terry George, 2004), *The Constant Gardener* (directed by Fernando Meirelles, 2005), *The Interpreter* (directed by Sydney Pollack, 2005) and *The Whistleblower* (directed by Larysa Kondracki, 2010), have all contributed to a distinctly post-Cold War understanding of EFP and the international issues of genocide, neo-colonial exploitation, the UN and the International Criminal Court, and UN-sanctioned human trafficking.

The post-Cold War theories and myths of EFP can also be found in the video games and computer games of generation Y, although two different genres emerged in the 1990s. The first EFP-related gaming genre recognized the importance of domestic politics and corporate power in foreign policy, as seen in the 1990s world of post-communist governments and corporate globalization. Tom Clancy’s Red Storm game *Politika* (1997) is a strategy game centred on post-communist Russia in which players lead one of the eight main factions (the KGB, the Church, Reformers, the Mafia, Communists, the Military, Nationalists or Separatists) struggling for power following the sudden death of President Boris Yeltsin. In contrast, *Ruthless.com* (1998) focuses on corporate raiding in a global marketplace, with the gamer playing the CEO of a software company that experiences legal, security-related and computer attacks. This genre acknowledges that in the post-Cold War world domestic politics and corporate power are as important as terrorists, drug lords and political extremists for EFP. The second EFP-related gaming genre has tended to overlook the changes in foreign policy resulting from the end of the Cold War, as seen in examples such as *Spycraft: The Great Game* (Activision, 1996) and *World in Conflict* (Massive Entertainment/Ubisoft, 2007). Whereas *Spycraft* focuses on CIA-KGB relations in the context of a post-Cold War nuclear arms treaty, the best-selling *World in Conflict* is set in an alternative post-1989 universe in which gamers play as either the USA/NATO or the Soviet Union. Ignoring the changing realities of domestic and corporate power, this second genre emphasizes the continuity of conflict between the two superpowers in the 1990s.

**The War on Terror era: theories and myths of unilateralism in the 2000s**

To begin with, I believe that all nations – strong and weak alike – must adhere to standards that govern the use of force. I – like any head of state – reserve the right to act unilaterally...
Ian Manners

if necessary to defend my nation. Nevertheless, I am convinced that adhering to standards, international standards, strengthens those who do, and isolates and weakens those who don’t.

(Obama 2009)

Just eight years after Annan accepted his medal, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to US President Barack Obama for his rejection of the unilateral worldview of George W. Bush (Grunwald 2009). The intervening period had seen a transformation in EFP and its analysis, similar to the changes following the end of the Cold War. The War on Terror (WoT) was a defining feature of EFP from the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 to the death of Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011. During the Bush presidency, January 2001 to January 2009, the multilateralism of the 1990s was displaced by American unilaterality of the 2000s. During the WoT era a specific theoretical myth of EFP emerged – namely that Bush’s unilaterality intentionally sought to divide European states; however, a more multilateral response resulted as European foreign policy influence declined during the 2000s. In the 2000s, three different approaches were developed to understand theories and myths of EFP in the period of WoT unilaterality: socialization, diplomatic habitus and critical social theories. As Barack Obama argued in his Nobel Prize Lecture, ‘adhering to standards, international standards, strengthens those who do, and isolates and weakens those who don’t’ (Obama 2009). His comment speaks to the power of international standard-setting and the weakness of the use of force during the WoT period.

Socialization

During the 2000s, an increasing number of scholars began to apply concepts of Europeanization and socialization to the study of EFP. Within the Europeanization approach, Tonra (2001), Wong (2005), Miskimmon (2007) and Gross (2009), among many others, sought to theorize the ‘domestic implications of European integration’ (Lynggaard 2011: 18) for both EFP and the target states of EFP. Most of the scholars working within the Europeanization approach drew explicitly on new institutionalist theories, including historical, sociological and rational institutionalism. Thus, this move towards Europeanization and socialization stemmed partly from the social constructivism of the 1990s, as the EFP theories of liberal constructivism and rhetorical action illustrate (Lucarelli and Manners 2006b: 210; Kissack 2010: 24). Liberal constructivism, as found in the ‘boomerang-spiral’ model (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999) anchored in the work of Martha Finnemore, sought to examine the mobilization of networks of transnational advocacy activists around policy principles in attempts to bring about change in other areas or arenas, usually human rights (see, for example, Joachim and Dembinski 2011).

The combination of rationalism and constructivism was developed in ‘rhetorical action’ theory (Schimmelfennig 2003), which can help explain the ways in which ‘least receptive’ or ‘peripheral’ states become rhetorically entrapped in EFP multilateralism (Kissack 2010: 159).

Diplomatic habitus

The application of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ to describe the socially acquired and embodied systems of cultural reproduction in EFP proved fruitful in the late 2000s (Bourdieu 1977; Manners and Whitman 2003: 397; Lucarelli and Manners 2006b: 210). More specifically, practice analysis in EFP has employed a Bourdieu-inspired approach based on the understanding of practices as competent performances (Adler and Pouliot 2011) in the study of action and interaction. This practice analysis is based on interviews with the diplomats, negotiators, policy-
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makes and everyday participants who engage in EFP (Mérand 2008; Adler-Nissen 2013a, 2013b). As Adler-Nissen (2008) has described, the in-depth and often repeated interviews focus on the perceptions and working experiences of practitioners and participants in an attempt to uncover their daily practices and more or less conscious strategies in their engagements with one another. This approach to the diplomatic habitus of EFP places an emphasis on understanding the important analytical aspects of practice: performance, patterns, competence, background knowledge and the creation of discursive and material worlds (Adler and Pouliot 2011).

Critical social theory

During the 1990s, EFP scholars began to apply the concept of international identity and critical social theory to interrogate the interactions between the EU and its member states (Manners and Whitman 1998, 2000, 2003; Whitman 1998; Manners 2000). The normative power approach to EFP is based on social theory’s understanding of human action and social institutions (Giddens 1984: xvi; Manners and Whitman 2003: 394). More specifically, the normative power approach is located in critical social theory, ‘the interpenetrating body of work which demands and produces critique in four senses’ (Calhoun 1995: 35; Manners 2007: 82; 2011: 227): (1) critical engagement with the social world; (2) a critical account of the theorist’s social and personal conditions; (3) critical re-examination of the theorist’s conceptual frameworks; and (4) critical confrontation with other works of social explanation. The central research question of the normative power approach to EFP involves the understanding of normative power in global politics, with a particular focus on the EU and its member states. It draws on critical social theory to analyse the use of ‘normative justification’ in EFP, as found in over a dozen analyses over the past decade (Adler et al. 2006; Lucarelli and Manners 2006a; Sjursen 2006; Aggestam 2008; Laïdi 2008a, 2008b; Tocci 2008; Gerrits 2009; Kissack 2010; Manners 2010b; Sicurelli 2010; Whitman 2011; Kavalski 2012; Woolcock 2012; Whitman and Nicolaïdis 2013).

War on Terror myths of European foreign policy

By the 2000s, the global context of EFP had been radically altered, as reflected in the theories and myths that constitute the field. Not only had George W. Bush’s unilateralism undermined the multilateral world of the 1990s, but the WoT had shifted the focus of EFP from normative concerns (such as genocide and human rights) to security issues and restrictions of liberty. The world in which these changes were taking place was also rapidly transforming, with its technology, media and social landscapes radically altered by the end of the 2000s. The twenty-first century is no longer governed by traditional media and cultural forms, but by the instantaneous and global consequences of the internetworked age. Films capturing this tectonic shift dominate the popular understanding of the 2000s, such as the failures of the WoT captured in *Syriana* (directed by Stephen Gaghan, 2005), *Body of Lies* (directed by Ridley Scott, 2008) and *Green Zone* (directed by Paul Greengrass, 2010). However, a far broader repertoire of films has demonstrated the diverse nature of the issues affecting EFP in the 2000s, such as *The Day after Tomorrow* (directed by Roland Emmerich, 2004) with regard to climate change, *The Girl in the Café* (directed by David Yates, 2005) on the G8, *Battle in Seattle* (directed by Stuart Townsend, 2007) on the WTO, *The International* (directed by Tom Tykwer, 2009) on international banking crime and *Four Lions* (directed by Chris Morris, 2010) on home-grown terrorist jihadists.

The era of WoT unilateralism has found its greatest expression in video and computer gaming, an industry that now outsells the film and music industries (Sample 2008). Two major
video-gaming franchises, Electronic Arts’ Battlefield and Medal of Honor, present gaming scenarios set in Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran that feature Middle Eastern opponents as well as terrorists. Computer games from the early years of the WoT era, such as Battlefield 2 (Electronic Arts, 2005) and Shattered Union (2K Games, 2005), tended to view the WoT and US unilateralism within a Cold War-like paradigm of conflictual power blocs. In Battlefield 2, gamers play as the USA, China, Russia, the EU or a fictional Middle Eastern Coalition. Battlefield 2: Euro Force expansion (Electronic Arts, 2006) features an EU army, including contemporary military hardware such as the Eurofighter. In a parallel universe, Shattered Union mimics the controversial 2000 US presidential election, with a similar scenario set in the late 2000s/early 2010s. Gamers can choose to play as occupying powers in the US, such as the EU or Russia, or as secessionist states like California or Texas in this counterfactual second American civil war context. In contrast, later computer games, such as the thirteenth instalment in the Medal of Honor series (Electronic Arts, 2010) and Battlefield 3 (Electronic Arts, 2011), generally viewed the twenty-first century global War on Terror as defying national boundaries, with scenarios set in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Spain, Bosnia, Kurdistan and Iran, while terrorists plan and execute attacks in US and European cities. Best-selling computer game franchises such as these illustrate how the bipolarism and multilateralism of previous decades have given way to the WoT, black ops and cyberspying that increasingly constitute the political and popular culture of EFP in the twenty-first century.

**Conclusion and a view to the future: European foreign policy in a post-Western world**

Jean Monnet ends his Memoirs with these words: ‘The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present. And the [European] Community itself is only a stage on the way to the organised world of the future.’ This federalist and cosmopolitan vision is one of the most important contributions that the European Union can bring to a global order in the making. . . . That is the foundation of our multilateral approach for a globalisation based on the twin principles of global solidarity and global responsibility.

(Van Rompuy 2012)

In 2012, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the European Union which ‘for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe’. In concluding this survey of the theories and myths of European foreign policy over the past four decades, it can be suggested that this Nobel Prize represented both the end of a noble narrative about the pacific origins of European integration and the endpoint of meaningfully independent European ‘national’ foreign policies. Although European states continue to perpetuate the myth of national foreign policies, events such as those in Berlin in 1945, Suez in 1956, Sarajevo in 1994 and Syria in 2013 illustrate how EFP has changed over the past seven decades. As Herman Van Rompuy observed in his Nobel Lecture, quoting Jean Monnet, ‘the organised world of the future’ based on ‘a global order in the making’ consists of three different dynamics: globalization, multilateralization and multipolarization.

These three processes can be identified across the three eras considered here. They remain a constant pressure and constraint on EFP, even as the locus of international relations broadens towards more global politics in a post-Western world. The processes currently recognized as globalization (but elsewhere described as modernization, Westernization or [neo-]liberalization) have been discussed in this chapter in terms of liberal interdependence, structural ownership and transnational capital. The processes of multilateralization have been described in terms of
liberal interdependence, social construction and diplomatic habitus, while the processes of multipolarism have been discussed in terms of state-centrism and socialization. Finally, the narratives, processes and eras of EFP presented in the chapter can be deconstructed, critiqued and reconstructed using the approaches of post-structural deconstruction and critical social theory.

In the context of the changing global order, the Eurozone sovereign debt crises and the European External Action Service created by the Treaty of Lisbon, these three processes are found to be driving the newly developing research agenda in EFP. Examples of issues and debates that have emerged in recent research include, first, globalization in relation to EFP – for example in the work of Vivien Schmidt (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013) and Ben Rosamond (2014). Second, there is a continued interest in multilateralism and EFP, as found in the research of Knud Erik Jørgensen (2010; Costa and Jørgensen 2012), Kissack (2010) and Van Schaik (2013), among others. Third, the new global order in the making, shaped by the consequences of the emerging BRICS economies, has attracted considerable research interest in multipolarity and EFP, as explored by Renard and Biscop (2012), Kierkegaard et al. (2012) and Makarychev (2014).

If the popular culture and digital imaginations of the millennial generation are anything to go by, European foreign policy in a post-Western world will be radically different from the twenty-first century transformations that analysts are just coming to terms with. As this chapter has suggested, the theories and myths of EFP have evolved rapidly over the past three decades, playing a constitutive role in the possibilities for future generations. Going beyond the discussion of popular media in the Cold War, post-Cold War and WoT eras, the computer games of today that project strategic gaming and foreign policy into the future say something potentially interesting about the assumptions of twenty-first century EFP. Widely played games such as *Front Mission* (Square Enix, 1995), *Battlefield 2142* (EA Digital Illusions, 2006), Tom Clancy’s *EndWar* (Ubisoft, 2010) and *Command & Conquer: Generals 2* (Electronic Arts, 2013) all feature the European Union as one of the strategic factions in the future of global politics. Whether or not ‘video games are this decade’s cutting-edge art form’ (Lewis 2013), it should be clear to anyone even remotely aware of the new media generation that theories and myths are never the converse of realities and facts in understanding European foreign policy.

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