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Introduction

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1

Introduction
The ‘Great Transformation’ of European politics: a holistic view
José M. Magone

Introduction: a guide to the complex world of European politics

‘Ich bin ein Berliner.’ The famous statement made by US President John F. Kennedy in front of the Rathaus Schöneberg building (City Council of West Berlin at the time) on 26 June 1963, now over 50 years ago, remains an important turning point in European politics. Although Kennedy directed some belligerent language towards the Communist regime in the German Democratic Republic and the Berlin Wall erected in 1961 by the East German leadership, this had only rhetorical significance in the context of the bond established between West Berlin and the United States. Kennedy clearly sought to express his solidarity with West Berlin – or rather, as Andreas Daum calls it, America’s Berlin, thus named since the famous airlift of 1948 countered the Soviet blockade of the Western half of the city (Daum 2008: 39). In reality, Kennedy was pursuing a new policy of détente with the Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev; the questions of Berlin and Germany were secondary to the overall global Cold War between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. This policy of détente was expressed on the same day in Kennedy’s speech after receiving an honorary doctoral degree from the Free University of Berlin (Daum 2008: 156–65).

Berlin was to remain an important setting for world politics until the end of the Cold War in 1989. The efforts of Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan to improve relations between the two superpowers had the important side effect of preparing the conditions for the reunification of the city (after the fall of the Wall on 9 November 1989) and Germany itself (on 3 October 1990). Simultaneously, the emergence of the newly unified Germany had the spill-over effect of creating an opportunity for the unification of Europe. The fall of the Iron Curtain during the second half of 1989 represented one of the most spectacular transformations in European history. A domino effect of transition from Communist rule to liberal democracy and from planned to market economies affected most of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This type of democratization had already taken place in Southern Europe after 1974, such that at the end of the millennium, apart from Belarus, all countries in Europe were more or less functional liberal democracies sustained by liberal market economies. The role of European integration in shaping this new regional community of democratic states cannot be
underestimated. The Council of Europe, the European Union, the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) and the more international Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (the descendant of the OEEC) laid out the foundations for the construction and advancement of these liberal democracies and social market economies.

In this reconfiguration of European politics, due to its geostrategic position and its size (in terms of area, population and gross domestic product), Germany remains the central country in Europe. It is one of the historical ‘big three’ countries (along with France and the United Kingdom), and its elites have always been very pro-active in promoting the European integration process as a means of overcoming past actions, but also as a way to recreate a new German identity in which the European dimension plays an intrinsic role (Schild 2003; Patterson 2011). One of the reasons why Kennedy came to Berlin was the fact that France’s president, Charles de Gaulle, was pushing for a more independent foreign policy and had obtained the support of German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer for the Franco-German Élysée Treaty (signed on 22 January 1963). Although this was just a bilateral agreement for more intensive cooperation between the two countries, it became (and still remains) one of the most important informal motors of European integration. The Franco-German friendship between two formerly bitter enemies, particularly since the nineteenth century, has been a central pillar of the peaceful coexistence of European states since 1945 (Defrance 2013; Klünemann 2013; Pfeil 2013; Schwarzer 2013). However, the Franco-German cooperation has not been consistently stable and intense throughout the past fifty years. This cooperation has depended strongly on common interests, and above all on the chemistry between French presidents and German chancellors. While there was quite a high level of cooperation between France and Germany during the management of the Eurocrisis due to the good relationship between President Nicolas Sarkozy and Chancellor Angela Merkel (referred to in the tabloids as ‘Merkozy’), Merkel has had difficulties maintaining the same close relationship with President François Hollande (Cole 2008; Hilz 2013). The Franco-German friendship is so crucial for European integration because the United Kingdom is hesitant to take part in the ongoing construction of the European Union. As Hussein Kassim has shown, British Prime Minister Tony Blair tried to be more pro-active in shaping the European Union between 1997 and 2007; however, this was apparently a step too far. The lack of support from the predominantly Eurosceptic British population and divisions within both main political parties were major factors leading him to moderate his position. This became quite clear during the negotiations over the Constitutional Treaty in the Convention on the Future of the European Union in 2002–3 and in the negotiation of the budget during the British EU presidency in 2005. Although pro-active and constructive, the British government was forced to deal with an overwhelmingly negative and Eurosceptic population at home that opposed many of the policies of the Labour government (Kassim 2008: 177–78, 180; for more detail on the evolution of the relationship between Britain and the EU, see Geddes 2013: Ch. 2, 3, 4).

In this sense, 1963 was also the year of a new orientation for Europeans, following the strong positive input of the United States in the reconstruction and unification of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan (1947–53), the establishment of the Organisation of European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the tentative engagement in the first steps towards European integration through the Schuman Plan, which contributed to the reconciliation between France and Germany. For the United States, it was quite frustrating that Western Europe was divided into so many small national markets, preventing the application of an economies-of-scale approach on the part of US industries. The preferred model was a European-wide integrated market similar to that of the United States (Milward 1984: 169, 180; Clemens 2008: 95–6). This US influence on Western Europe and the Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe are
essential elements in the understanding of modern European politics. The legacies of these post-war influences still play a role in shaping the behaviour of political elites and (at the least) the older generations of European populations.

According to the sociologist Piotr Sztompka, the transitional events in Germany and Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 can be regarded as epochal turning points similar to the French Revolution in 1789 and the Russian Revolution in 1917. It is important to note that such transitions are traumatic for the people involved, signifying that many populations in Central and Eastern Europe are still in the process of dealing with these transformations. Many developments in national politics in Central and Eastern Europe are related to still unfinished business in terms of social, cultural and political adjustment to the new reality. The divisions in societies such as Hungary, Latvia (between pro-German and pro-Russian Latvians, and between ethnic Latvians and the country’s Russian minority), Poland and several countries in the Western Balkans are still deep and will need to be addressed peacefully over time. The changes occurred so quickly that there was no time to reflect upon them (Sztompka 1993, 1996, 2000). The ‘politics of memory’ have become an important new dimension in many European countries, including Germany, Spain, Hungary and Poland. Paul Preston’s book on the Spanish Holocaust illustrates that the negative past related to the Spanish Civil War (1936–9) and the authoritarian dictatorship of general Francisco Franco (1939–75) remains in the present in the context of democratic societies if there is no attempt to truthfully address it. In this regard, lustration processes in Central and Eastern Europe have also attracted some degree of public attention (Aguilar Fernandez 2008; David 2004; Sikkink 2011; Preston 2012).

In view of the increasingly complex web of European politics – at local, national, European and transnational levels – this Handbook can serve as a modest guide, allowing insight into this dynamic world. It is intended to provide any reader with a useful instrument for location of the most relevant information and further reading on particular aspects of European politics. Consequently, the Handbook does not claim to be a comprehensive authority, but merely a first examination of this extraordinary world of European politics at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

We focus primarily on contemporary European politics, but always reflecting on the change that has taken place since the end of the 1960s. Our approach is comparative: the diversity and commonalities across the different countries of Europe are at the heart of this Handbook. The national level is our main focus; however, like a kaleidoscope, we often change perspectives in order to better understand what is happening at different levels of political systems. Since the Treaty of the European Union was ratified in 1993, the European Union has become an important factor in an ever-increasing number of regimes of shared, pooled sovereignty, such as the Economic and Monetary Union, the coordination of employment policies, trans-European networks, common spaces of citizenship, security and liberty, and (last but certainly not least) common foreign and security policy. This Handbook seeks to present a valuable guide to this new and unique system, allowing readers to obtain a better understanding of the emerging multilevel European governance system that links national polities to the European level and even to the global level.

We have set out to achieve three main purposes. First, we seek to provide to the interested reader well-informed and comprehensively researched information on specific aspects of European politics. Some of the chapters use textboxes to highlight important concepts in particular areas. Second, we attempt to reduce the complexity of European politics by analytically examining various aspects in more detail. Of course, there are limits to the in-depth study of particular aspects of European politics; however, the Handbook is thorough enough to present an excellent first mapping of the subject. Finally, we seek to motivate readers to continue their
inquiries by providing them with a comprehensive literature review in each chapter and a commented bibliography at the end of the Handbook.

Four main topics will be addressed in the following sections. In the first section, we contextualize European politics within the broader tendencies of world politics. James Rosenau’s concept and framework of ‘turbulence’ in world politics is applied to explain how the global, European and national levels form part of the same complex web of transformations. In the second section, we conceptualize ‘European politics’ as comprising the entire continent, from Lisbon and Dublin to Kiev, Chisinau and Ankara. We link this discussion to what we call the ‘Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century’ in an allusion to the book by Karl Polanyi published in 1944 (now experiencing a revival after decades of neglect). The third section reflects on the democratization of the continent, first in Southern Europe and then in the Central and Eastern European countries. This is complemented by a bird’s-eye view of European politics today, in which the role of the European Union in shaping this process is highlighted. The fourth section discusses the values of Europeanism and the place of Europe in the world. This is followed by a short review of the chapters in the Handbook and some brief conclusions.

Turbulence and change in global politics: the impact on European politics

In the ‘brave new world’ of global politics, in order to get a sense of how realities have changed, a systematic guide to important phenomena and events is an absolute necessity. In 1990, James A. Rosenau characterized world politics as turbulent and unpredictable. According to this scholar, the new turbulent world can be conceptualized through three interconnected parameters: structural, relational and orientational factors. His point of departure was the change and major transformations that occurred in the period after 1950 (Rosenau 1990: 10).

The structural parameter has seen the replacement of the dominant realist Western state system by a bifurcated system in which states are no longer the sole actors. On the contrary, new actors (including non-governmental organizations [NGOs], private governance entities such as rating agencies, and international and supranational organizations like the United Nations and the European Union, respectively) cooperate but also compete with states. In this context, one should not neglect the growing importance of the large transnational corporations that sometimes have more financial power than states (Rosenau 1990: 100). Hedley Bull describes this new world as ‘neo-medievalism’, in reference to the overlapping authorities lacking clearly defined borders characteristic of the Middle Ages (Bull 2002: 245–57). The most dramatic change can be witnessed in the nation-state as a ‘power container’, as Anthony Giddens has characterized it. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, by hardening its borders to the outside, the European nation-state (France being the best example in this regard) began to structure its national territory. War played a major role in creating this new state system based on nation-states with definite borders. The Westphalia peace treaty in 1648 is an important turning point in the emergence of the nation-state as a power container (Giddens 1982). Until well into the second half of the twentieth century, one could still refer to the world as an international society of states; however, the contemporary nation-state is no longer the sole actor in the emerging global political system (Attinà 2011). The ‘denationalization’ of the nation-state is one of the major characteristics of this power shift to other private governance and civil society entities. Increasingly, areas that were once monopolized by national sovereignty are now governed either at the supranational level or internationally (see Zürn 1998; see Chapter 50). The hollowing out of the nation-state as a ‘power container’ has structurally transformed the relationship between countries in Europe. The rise of supranationalism was a response to a decline in national steering ability in this
increasingly turbulent world. In a very interesting project, Stefan Leibfried and Michael Zürn illustrate how this hollowing-out of the state has taken place since the 1960s. The so-called Trentes Glorieuses (the ‘glorious thirty years’ of stability, wealth and high growth rates between 1945 and 1975) were replaced by more turbulent decades of state transformation. The following state transformations have occurred simultaneously but at different rates: changes in the resources monopoly of the territorial state (T), the legal and rule-of-law dimension of the state (RU), the democratic legitimacy of the state (D) and the dimension of the welfare state, also called the intervention state (I). The authors use the acronym TRUDI to characterize the configuration of this national constellation that began to evolve in the nineteenth century and reached a peak during the second half of the twentieth century (Leibfried and Zürn 2005: 3). All of these dimensions have undergone significant transformations, particularly in Europe. The monopoly of resources of the territorial state, its power over taxation and its sovereignty over security forces are being challenged by a number of shared regimes that constrain the power of the nation-state. Today, a percentage of national tax revenues (about 1 per cent of the gross national income [GNI]) must be transferred to the European Union, and parts of national budgets are also directed to other international organizations. However, a large portion is used to service national debt to international lenders. The minimalist budget of the EU provides the member states with the ability to join forces when international peacekeeping forces are requested and deployed by the United Nations. Sharing this burden has become a common policy in many areas of the European Union (see Chapter 49). European politics are thus no longer based on traditional independent national sovereignty, but rather on interdependent pooled shared sovereignty (Leibfried and Zürn 2005: 17–22; see Chapters 10, 41). William Wallace characterizes the multilevel governance system of the EU as post-sovereign, claiming that the division between supranational and domestic politics and policy-making have become quite blurred in recent years (Wallace 2005: 491–4).

In terms of the legal dimension of the state, national law has been superseded by European law in the European Union. International law and international criminal law have become important areas in which all European countries are signatories. In this sense, national law must take into account European and international law (Craig 2003; see Chapters 8, 10, 15). The European Convention on Human Rights is an important constraint on European states. The extradition of terrorist suspects, cases involving euthanasia and other difficult matters are now adjudicated in Strasbourg, and member states of the Council of Europe must comply with the resulting rulings (see Chapter 15). A so-called ‘cascade of justice’ when crimes against humanity are committed has contributed to the globalization of criminal law. The International Criminal Law, founded on 1 January 2002, is the new institution responsible for much of this development (see the excellent book by Sikkink 2011; Leibfried and Zürn 2005: 22). Although the nation-state remains the locus of democratic legitimacy, we now observe the emergence of other political arenas, such as the European and global levels. Despite the strong democratic deficit at the European level (Haller 2008; for a contrasting opinion, see Moravcsik 2008), growing cooperation between national social movements and the creation of supranational advocacy coalitions are changing the nature of European politics. The financial crisis and the Eurocrisis between 2008 and 2011 have shown that a multilevel public space is gradually developing in the European Union (see Chapter 47). In addition, global social movements have been able to join forces, facilitated by new technologies. Within the nation-state, heterogeneity and multiculturalism are challenging preconceptions about national identities, and integration policies have had to be devised in order to maintain stability in the political system (Leibfried and Zürn 2005: 22–5; Joppke 2007; see Chapters 4, 44). The policy and welfare dimension is changing at a rapid pace. The Single European Market (SEM) has become a major factor in transforming
previously protected areas of nation-states. The welfare state is being challenged by the privatization and liberalization of public utilities and policies. Other principles such as social investment and flexicurity have evolved, clearly ‘re-commodifying’ job seekers. Employability has become a central category of the Single European Market. Mobility, particularly for young people, has become imperative in order to overcome the ‘lost generation’ syndrome of young people in Spain, Portugal and Greece (indignados, geração á rasca). High levels of youth unemployment across the European Union, particularly in the Southern European countries Spain, Greece and Portugal, have led to collective action by young people against what has been referred to as the ‘precariat’ (in allusion to the word proletariat) – people working under bad temporary work conditions as the normal situation (Leibfried and Zürn 2005: 23–5; see Chapters 35, 47; Ferrera 2005, 2008; Hemerijk 2013; on Southern European social movements, see Lima and Martín Artiles 2013: 356–9). In Europe, most countries have become quite decentralized or have at least experienced a movement in this direction. Exceptions to the rule (but under considerable pressure to make reforms) are highly centralized states such as Portugal, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. Spain, Ireland and the United Kingdom are good examples of the devolution of autonomy to subnational units over recent decades (Keating 1998, 2008). This process of devolution has effects on subnational democracy; clearly, the more involved citizens are in the policy-making process, the better the quality of public policies. Genuine consultation and cooperation with public authorities are essential elements of a vital democracy (Hendriks 2010; see Chapter 23).

In many ways, the multilevel governance paradigm of the European Union has contributed to this decentralization and enhancement of autonomy. This was the only way to adequately adjust to the demands for a more sophisticated model of public policy. The governance model is more than formalized government. Whereas the traditional definition of formalized government would rely on a classical Weberian bureaucracy featuring a strict separation between the public and private sector, governance promotes cooperation between the public and private sector, with the civil service coming under considerable pressure to fulfil efficiency criteria that were developed in the private sector and imported to the public sector. One of the goals of such public–private partnerships is to get good value for taxpayers’ money. In addition to cooperation between the public bureaucratic sector and the private economic sector, governance envisages a growing engagement of civil society in policy-making. In a simplified fashion, one can define governance as more than the sum of the interactions between public institutions, private economic actors (enterprises, rating agencies) and civil society organizations (non-governmental organizations, charities and so on). A complex, multilevel web of networks connecting these three kinds of actors has been replacing the traditional Weberian model of government and public administration. This mix of supposedly more efficient relationships between the public and private sector should result in the more efficient production of public goods and implementation of public policy (Peters 1996: 13–16; Rosenau 2000: 4–5; Peters 2003: 124–6; Rhodes 2003: 66; see Chapter 34).

Relationally, the new information society has transformed the rigid set of relationships that previously existed at various levels. These structural changes have contributed to a shift in the relationships between citizens and the state, but also in what is considered to be power. Francis Bacon’s statement ‘Knowledge is power’ (in Religious Meditations of Heresies, published in 1597) has changed the way in which individuals perceive themselves. In comparison to the period before 1950, populations have a higher level of education and easier access to information. The World Wide Web has certainly reduced the power of states and governments drastically. Julian Assange’s Wikileaks and Edward Snowden’s revelations of the US spy programme Prism II, managed by the National Security Agency (NSA), have granted unprecedented power to
individual citizens (see Castells 1997, 2000b). According to Thomas L. Friedman in his bestseller *The World Is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century*, we are witnessing a change in globalization, which was originally dominated by nation-states (Globalization 1.0); these nation-states were first replaced by transnational corporations (Globalization 2.0) and now the corporations are being replaced by individuals (Globalization 3.0). The new technologies and their convergence in terms of usage have empowered the individual. The Internet is a powerful instrument for citizens around the world (Friedman 2007: 10–12). According to Alvin Toeffler, these developments indicate a shift in power at different levels of an emerging global governance system. He recognizes three forms of power: physical violence, wealth and knowledge. According to Toeffler, this power shift also entails a shift from crude, physical forms of power to more sophisticated, wealth-related forms, eventually leading to the highly developed form of knowledge (Toeffler 1991: 13).

As Chris Rumford and Didem Buhari-Gulmez describe in their chapter (Chapter 50) in this volume, the former nation-state is being affected by a ‘denationalization’ process that is clearly related to the decline of the Euro-centric worldview of the nineteenth century. The separation between national and global is becoming quite porous (see above and Zürn 1998). A *globalization* process is taking place that is changing politics fundamentally. Time and space are converging and modifying the way we perceive politics. As mentioned above, Internet platforms have created the foundations for this new type of politics, clearly placing political elites under considerable pressure. Specific identities are being reinterpreted in universal frames. Traditional societies and particularly religious thinking are being challenged by globalized universal values, often leading to conflicts in post-modern societies. The *Kulturkampf* of political elites in certain European countries (such as France, Belgium and Switzerland) between the universal and particular in relation to more traditional interpretations of Islam can be seen as a good example of this globalization trend (Robertson 1992: 173–4; for a more detailed theoretical discussion of ‘glocal religion’, see Beyer 2008: 98–104; Gustavsson 2013; for a more critical review of debates in key European countries, see Chapter 4).

In terms of attitudes, orientations towards hierarchical structures have been replaced with flatter, performance-related views. Individuals’ skill sets (including social and intellectual skills) have become crucial in work settings, but also in everyday life in general. Communication has become quite important; Facebook, Flickr and other social media have played a significant role in the changing attitudes of young people in relation to each other, but also in the wider world. According to Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, the world of ‘materialist values’ based on the consumerist culture of the 1950s and 1960s has undergone a silent revolution ushering in ‘postmaterialist values’, whereby self-expressive forms of action are central (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 56; Inglehart 2008; see also the critical review of the conceptualization from a theoretical-sociological perspective by Gustavsson 2012). Moreover, the rigid structures of the 1950s within public administration, political parties, churches and interest groups have been replaced by the more flexible forms found in non-governmental organizations and in spontaneous demonstrations such as the *Indignados* and *Occupy* movements (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 31, 262; Lima and Martín Artíes 2013: 356–9; see Chapter 47). Again, social media play a major role in sustaining these movements over the long term. According to the sociologist Mikael Carleheden, a micro-sociological approach to social change based on Max Weber’s concept of the ‘conduct of life’ (*Lebensführung*) can explain what is happening to society and also politics in the Western world. Instead of looking at the macrostructures of society, the examination of the ‘conduct of life’ of people and their structural transformations when aggregated represents a more productive way to conceptualize social and political change. Carleheden also asserts that we are now in a new stage of modern capitalism. The first phase of capitalism was very much dominated by asceticism,
as exemplified by Benjamin Franklin and the Protestant ethic in the Weberian sense. In the twentieth century, this was replaced by the age of organization; bureaucratized rules shaped the world of most people living between 1900 and 1980. However, since the 1980s we have observed the erosion of this organizational social character of the conduct of life, replaced by the age of authenticity, in which organizational modernity is viewed as suffocating. Post-materialist values have led to the explosion of a conduct of life as the search for identity, self-expression and diversity in lifestyles. The new technologies play a major role in universalizing these patterns (Carleheden 2006: 62–9). This theory has been confirmed by the sociologist Manuel Castells, who characterizes the power of identity as a crucial and distinctive element of the network society in the information age. However, identity can also lead to progressive supportive social movements, such as women’s groups fighting the eroding patriarchal society or conservative organizations battling immigration, multiculturalism or other phenomena that might impact their idealized ‘heartland’ values (for a theoretical sociological reflection, see Castells 1997: Ch. 1, 2; on ‘heartland’, see Taggart 2004; on gender and European politics, see Chapter 46).

Finally, although the new technologies have empowered individuals and permitted greater authenticity, the other side of the coin is the potential for the abuse of power and the development of an Orwellian ‘Big Brother’ surveillance society based on advanced techniques of manipulation that may thwart democracy and establish totalitarian rule. The US National Security Agency spying scandal demonstrates the plausibility of such large-scale surveillance taking place; in this sense, democratic accountability and transparency have become important vehicles for keeping national secret services in check. This danger might come not only from the public sector, but also from private enterprises active on the Internet, using and passing on private data to other enterprises in order to better track and target consumers. According to David Murakami Wood and C. William Webster, the bad example set by the British surveillance society is slowly gaining ground in most European countries. The domestication and normalization of surveillance, primarily for security reasons, has become taken for granted, a reality that makes George Orwell’s 1984 scenario a potentially irreversible feature of European politics (Murakami Wood and Webster 2009: 266–9; see the special issue on the politics of CCTV in Europe and beyond by Norris et al. 2004; see also the excellent Chapter 7).

The ‘Great Transformation’ of the European political economy and politics: the return of Karl Polanyi

Karl Polanyi’s legacy: there is no ‘invisible hand’ in the market economy

In this section, I take inspiration from the work of Karl Polanyi, author of The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times, which was published in 1944, shortly before the end of the Second World War. This excellent book serves as a historical sociology of knowledge, analysing the beginning of the modern world from the Industrial Revolution until the collapse of the capitalist economy in 1929. Polanyi’s humane perspective illustrates how markets can sometimes become an objectified reality over which its creators, human beings, lose control due to erroneous perceptions of market sustainability (Polanyi 1957 [1944]: 3–4). Adam Smith’s famous dictum of the ‘invisible hand’ regulating the markets was then and still is very much alive (Smith 1999 [1776]: Book IV, Ch. 2, para. 9: 32). Despite the collapse of the capitalist economy in the crash of 1929 and subsequent market failures, even today this neo-liberal ideology of the market remains almost a dogmatic truth. What is often forgotten is that the collapse of the capitalist economy in 1929 led to the emergence of populist alternatives such as National Socialism and Fascism. Communism was another alternative to the
failing capitalist market economy. However, none of these movements was able to develop an attractive alternative economic model; nor did they devise a better political system than democracy. On the contrary, they all became authoritarian or totalitarian experiments in which repression and censorship dominated (Polanyi 1957 [1944]: 237–48). The big exception in Europe was the path taken by the Nordic countries. In his seminal book *Politics against Markets*, Gösta Esping-Andersen argues that the capitalist economy must be tamed by a responsible and imaginative leadership. This would not have been possible in the Nordic countries without strong social-democratic movements and parties. However, social-democratic parties were not strong enough on their own to reform the state or develop the social policies for which Scandinavia is famous. The crucial element of social-democratic success was the ability to be flexible and build coalitions with other social groups and their parties. In the 1930s, it was in particular a coalition with the farmers’ parties (which were quite strong in Scandinavia) that contributed to this transformation (Esping-Andersen 1985: 37).

A state of permanent turbulence has led to a second great transformation beginning in the late 1960s and extending until today. Dealing with this state of turbulence has created considerable pressure on European politics. The recent financial and Eurocrisis that began in the United States due to the speculative and irresponsible behaviour of some investment banks and hedge funds drove not just European countries but much of the world to the brink of collapse (Lewis 2011: ix–xxi). In Europe, the post-war period was shaped by the consequences of Polanyi’s Great Transformation. As a result, strong welfare states were established in most European countries. A modern country that became a member of the European Community/European Union (EC/EU) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was expected to have welfare policies in place to compensate for the imbalances created by markets. Politics was thought to be capable of taming markets. However, after 30 years of uninterrupted economic growth and wealth redistribution, the imbalances had shifted to the social dimension of the market. The retrenchment of the welfare state began, exacerbating the conflict between trade unions and governments, the latter being committed to the liberalization and privatization of the enormous public sector. Thatcherism and Reaganomics spearheaded this shift from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism. This period of organized capitalism came abruptly to an end when the social costs of the model began to affect the competitiveness of the national European economies. Organized capitalism was replaced by a disorganized model in the 1980s. The neo-corporatist structures that had ensured stability were in a state of crisis, and governments had difficulties in shifting from a Keynesian to a neo-liberal approach to the economy. In particular, countries in continental Western Europe experienced major problems as they attempted to cope with this transition. Despite this resistance, budgetary realities forced West European countries to privatize their huge public sectors and liberalize their economies (Jessop 2002).

The best example of these trends is the Netherlands, which began to reform its economic structures towards privatization and liberalization in 1982. Reform has been a constant project ever since. The so-called ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ between the social partners allowed for the transformation of the Dutch economy, but simultaneously preserved the social peace (Hendriks 2001; Touwen 2008: 439–64).

In 1985, the Single European Market programme of the EC/EU was intended to prevent any further disorganization of capitalism in Europe. In order to improve the competitiveness of the world economy, a bold European approach was necessary. President of the European Commission Jacques Delors imbued the European integration process with this new dynamic by pushing forward the SEM programme. The main task of the programme involved the coordination and supervision of the deregulation of national markets and the establishment of
José M. Magone

re-regulation at the supranational level. The SEM was not devised by the technocratic elites in Brussels; rather, it was a cry for help from European industrialists in the context of growing competition from Japan and a declining economy in the United States. The European Roundtable of Industrialists, founded in 1983 and originally based in Paris, became a powerful lobbying group in support of the creation of a ‘New Europe’ based on a new political-economic framework. The final goal was the establishment of a unified single market. In particular, French President François Mitterrand and the leadership of the French Socialist Party were lobbied by these industrialists to move in this direction. In many ways, the White Paper on the Single European Market programme presented by Lord Cockfield in the Delors European Commission in 1985 was almost a carbon-copy of the memorandum presented by the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) that same year. In this sense, European integration was very much propelled by industrial interests in a larger unified market (Cowles 1995; Ross 1995).

In the three decades since, the relationship between the supranational and the national level has changed considerably. A new multilevel European political system that comprises supranational, national and regional levels has emerged. Pressures for change have grown over time. The impetus for Europeanization coming from the supranational level (focused on the construction of a unified single European market) has increased, producing varying patterns of compliance among the member states (Börzel 1998; Falkner et al. 2005; Börzel 2001; Börzel et al. 2010).

Although a great deal has been achieved in terms of intensive integration, the single European market is still incomplete. One of the major problems in the creation of this unified market is the so-called ‘joint decision-making trap’, exemplifying the inability of many countries to give up their interests and move towards this new ‘Europe’ proposed by the business community (see Chapter 38). One good example of this is the failure to create a single European Company Statute (Societas Europea). Instead, there are 28 different versions with different national rules of the game (see Chapter 39).

This means that methodological nationalism has not yet been replaced by a methodological Europeanism. The cultural foundations of a unified market are still in the making. The Euro has been an important instrument in realizing this cultural integration of the market, although the recent Eurocrisis and financial crisis have demonstrated that the competitive national state still remains the mindset of most national politicians and populations. The almost non-existent political union, the incomplete single European market and a highly asymmetric Economic and Monetary Union have sustained the diversity and heterogeneity of national economies instead of harmonizing them (see Chapters 39, 40, 41).

Despite the neo-liberal undertones of the SEM, Polanyi’s influence can be found in Brussels as well, according to James Caporaso and Sidney Tarrow. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has become an important agent in the struggle to tame European capitalism. Several times it has acted in favour of social policy arguments in order to prevent market failure. The ECJ is often called upon by civil society groups to rule on highly political issues (Cichowski 2007; Caporaso and Tarrow 2009: 611–14; see Chapter 15).

Polanyi’s lessons drawn from the ‘Great Transformation’ are an integral part of European politics. The most sophisticated national welfare states of the world are found in the European Union, and policy-makers in the European Commission have been shaped by this social dimension of national markets. According to a survey undertaken by Liesbet Hooghe at the beginning of the millennium among high-ranking civil servants in the European Commission, a strong majority (80 per cent) supported a regulated and coordinated form of capitalism, while just 20 per cent wanted a pure liberal market economy. Eighty per cent leaned towards supranationalism, with only 20 per cent preferring intergovernmentalism in terms of European
integration. Fifty per cent advocated a balance between technocracy and democracy as the best form of European integration; 25 per cent placed a strong emphasis on technocracy, and 25 per cent on democracy. A vast majority advocated neo-corporatist arrangements with interest groups, while a minority preferred pluralism (Hooghe 2001: 92; see also Hooghe 1998).

**European politics between la longue durée and everyday life**

The great French historian Fernand Braudel developed the concept of time frames as a way of analysing historical phenomena. According to Braudel, there are three essential time frames: *le temps événementiel* (everyday life, as captured by the journalist or chronicler), *la longue durée* (periods between ten and 50 years) and *le temps structurel* or *civilisation* (periods of immutable change lasting centuries) (Braudel 1993: 34–5).

In this context, the *Handbook* focuses mainly on the relationship between everyday life and *la longue durée*. As mentioned above, we concentrate on change over the past half-century, seeking to identify patterns of change but also exceptions to the rule in various dimensions of European politics. Moreover, according to the perspective applied and the topic addressed in this volume, different *longues durées* with different time frames within the multilevel European and global governance may emerge. However, at the same time, we have also attempted to illustrate change through a micro-perspective of European politics. This ambitious multi-temporal perspective may be stronger in some chapters than in others. However, one should keep in mind that *la longue durée* is contextualized within the civilization of capitalism that emerged in the fifteenth century and expanded extensively and intensively across the globe. The European Union is one of the regions (along with North America) in which capitalism has long been an intrinsic factor in political mechanisms (Braudel 1993: 387–9).

A sketch of the changes that have taken place in this *longue durée*, or great transformation, since the 1960s and 1970s can be found in Figure 1.1. All of these transformations are discussed in greater detail in each of the chapters of this *Handbook*.

As discussed throughout this *Handbook*, at least seven dimensions of change in European politics can be recognized. None of these dimensions can be isolated from the others; they are merely analytically differentiated in Figure 1.1.

**The state**

The most significant transformations can be found in the state. New Public Management, a philosophy that advocates that the state should adopt more efficient mechanisms to ensure quality within its administrative services, has transformed the citizen into a customer of these services. On the one hand, e-government has facilitated access to information, although a digital divide can be observed in some countries. All of the countries in the European Union have been engaged in public administration and public sector reform for several decades now. The intended outcome is a lean, efficient state compatible with the new governance paradigm (see Chapter 34).

**Subnational government**

Years ago, Stein Rokkan described a silent revolution in the nation-states of Western Europe related to subnational government. Today, this silent revolution is taken for granted. The vast majority of countries feature a decentralized or at least deconcentrated state structure. The highest level of decentralization can be found in federal Germany, Austria and Belgium. In contrast, Portugal and Greece remain among the most centralized countries in the European Union, with highly inefficient bureaucratic machineries (see Chapter 23; Keating 2008; Hendriks 2010).
Welfare state

Europeans are quite attached to their welfare state. Welfarism is a major aspect of Europeanism. However, social expenditures have increased considerably over the past 70 years. Welfare policies are by far the largest expenditure item in national budgets. Most countries spend at least 50 per cent of their budget on social policies. A large part of this is financed through external debt, further constraining the fiscal room for manoeuvre (Ferrera 2005, 2008; Hemerijk 2013; Chapter 35).

Society

Until the 1960s, the nation-state tried to construct an imagined homogeneous community that clearly represented its core national identity. Today, increasingly, areas that the state had previously
monopolized are being ‘denationalized’, as Chris Rumford and Didem Buhari-Gulmez describe in the final chapter of the *Handbook* (Chapter 50), citing the research of Michael Zürn (1998). This denationalization of society is creating a new ‘glocalized’ world society. New technologies have facilitated improvements in global communication. The so-called ‘Facebook generation’ is embedded in national societies, but also at the same time in global virtual communities. Moreover, immigration has considerably changed the outlook of imagined national communities that were once taken for granted. Today, the challenge for most countries is the integration of existing large ethnic groups, such as the Turkish populations in Germany and the Netherlands, North African ethnic groups in France and Spain, and the Muslim population (especially from Pakistan) in the United Kingdom. At the same time, European politics must deal with the growing impact of populist and xenophobic movements (e.g. the Swiss People’s Party [SVP], the British National Party [BNP], the National-Democratic Party of Germany [NPD] and the Freedom Party in the Netherlands [PVV]). All of these parties present, with varying intensity, the idea of an imaginary ‘heartland’ of national values and (in extreme cases) ethnic homogeneity as the preferred society (Taggart 2000; Decker 2013; see Chapters 7, 27, 44).

**Economy**

*La longue durée* since the 1960s has seen the realization of a new economic reality. After decades of industrial capitalism confined to the nation-state but featuring a growing trend of globalization (particularly when Japan and the Asian tigers entered the scene in the 1980s), we are now experiencing the rise and probably also the decline of financial capitalism in its fiercest form in Europe. Financial capitalism has very much been supported by the new technologies that have enabled trading seven days week, around the clock. Computers with sophisticated programmes began to take over economic indices. Reaganomics and Thatcherism contributed to this emergence of more speculative financial capitalism. The financial crisis in the United States and the subsequent Eurocrisis have forced governments to intervene heavily in the economy and rescue their national banking sectors. As a consequence, most European governments have had to increase their debt ceiling, in some cases (such as Ireland, Greece and Portugal) with catastrophic consequences (Lewis 2011; Magone 2011b). Potential positive outcomes of this crisis may include the return of regulatory frameworks, improvements in the information strategies of customers, and greater cooperation in the European Union and particularly in the Eurozone through the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM), a huge bailout fund for countries that find themselves in difficulty and cannot get any money from the markets. Moreover, a banking union will be established in November 2014. This means that a department of the European Central Bank will be granted the ability to supervise, control and intervene when banks are failing, a pan-European approach that emulates similar institutions in the United States (see Chapter 41).

**Interest intermediation**

One of the successes of the *Trentes Glorieuses* was the establishment of a permanent dialogue with the social partners, the national trade unions and business confederations. This improved the long-term stability of European economies. The neo-corporatist model was quite strong in the smaller democracies, such as Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg; however, the Nordic countries followed similar policies. The UK, Germany and France also regarded negotiation and cooperation with the social partners as important. However, in the 1970s the intransigency of trade union confederations and employers’ organizations led to the end of organized capitalism, with disorganized capitalism taking over. Trade union confederations lost influence due to high levels of unemployment and economic stagnation. In Britain, Margaret
José M. Magone

Thatcher became famous for her belligerent attitude towards trade unions. According to Philippe Schmitter and Jürgen Grote (1997), neo-corporatism re-emerged in a softer form in the 1990s. In part, this was related to the highly propagandistic European social model presented by Jacques Delors’s European Commission, but governments also needed the social partners to contribute to the adoption of difficult policies in order to enhance the competitiveness of national economies. For example, the Wassenaar Agreement in the Netherlands in 1982 allowed for the establishment of a more dynamic economy referred to as the Polder model (Hendriks 2001; Touwen 2008). The Treaty of the European Union, in which Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was enshrined, started a process of economic and monetary convergence that culminated in the adoption of the Euro in 2002 by 13 member states of the European Union. As a consequence of this effort by governments, growth and stability pacts had to be signed with the social partners. However, the highly diverse European economy also led to mixed results of such social pacts, as John Kelly and Kerstin Hamann analyse in Chapter 42. The European economy is still a work in progress; at this point, it is quite asymmetrical in terms of economic development, welfare states, taxation systems and systems of interest intermediation, as Chapter 39 highlights.

World politics

After 1945, realism remained the primary approach to international relations. The Cold War strengthened this paradigm of state relations, in which power and self-interest are the main principles in a global system dominated by states. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, new non-statal powerful actors began to populate the world arena. Hedley Bull (2002) identifies this change as ‘neo-medievalism’: As in the Middle Ages, authorities overlapping that of the state constrain countries in their pursuit of power and self-interest. In the European Union, there has been a growing cooperation in immigration management through Frontex; the strong commitment to multilateralism is represented by the network of United Nations organizations.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union is fully committed to the multilateralism symbolized by the United Nations (European Commission 2001, 2003). Some countries are still vacillating between unilateral and multilateral approaches to foreign policy and security, but the room for manoeuvre for go-it-alone policies is now much more limited (see Chapter 49 on CFSP in this volume; for a critical view on Europe in the world, see Chapters 48, 50).

In summary, la longue durée of European politics is producing new relationships within and between national polities, but also outside national polities. These new forms of politics include elements of the past but are also characterized by novelty. One certainty is that the imagined homogenous national community within a European state with full sovereignty (in the sense of a power container) has been replaced by a new heterogeneous national community (with the possible exception of Poland, Greece and Portugal) within a polity with shared sovereignty in many policy areas.

The emergence of pan-European politics

In 1972, in his innovative and erudite book on the politics of Western Europe, Gordon Smith outlined an interesting characterization of his geographical focus. He asserts as follows:

‘Western Europe’ in this book is simply Europe minus the Communist states; it is notoriously difficult to define and justify any particular ‘area’ to be taken as the springboard
for comparison, and the motley of European states is no exception. It is possible to point
to their common reliance on a market economy and to their shared historical experiences;
yet both features apply to a number of non-European countries as well. However, for the
states with which we are concerned there is an important additional factor which involves
an element of self-selection. This is the momentum towards economic and political
integration, which in varying degrees affects them all. Ortega y Gasset viewed the feeling
for and the idea of ‘nationality’ as Europe’s ‘most characteristic’ discovery. Yet at the present
time a reverse process is under way – a movement beyond the nation-state as the means
of political innovation; it is relevant therefore that the final chapter should be concerned
with the problems and forms of European integration.

(Smith 1972: x)

‘Europe minus the Communist countries’ includes Portugal, Spain and Greece, which were at
that time ruled by dictatorships, but not the Communist countries that were behind the Iron
Curtain. The Cold War was a major factor in establishing two kinds of Europe, the ‘Old’ and
‘New’ Europe that are still in the process of converging towards a single entity in terms of
conceptualization. European politics existed before and after the Cold War, a period defined
as spanning from 1947 to 1989. The Cold War split Europe into Western pro-American Europe
and an Eastern Europe dominated by the Soviet Union. It is important to recall this division,
because in the frenzy after 1989 the unification of the continent was much more difficult than
first anticipated. A pan-European approach to politics began to emerge only in the late 1990s
or following the turn of the new millennium.

The use of the term ‘New Europe’ is a reference to the Great Transformation in pan-European
politics since the 1960s. The détente between the two superpowers, the United States and the
Soviet Union, was an important precondition for this transformation – in particular the Helsinki
process leading up to the Conference of Security Cooperation in Europe in 1975. In November
1990, this valuable arena became an organization based in Vienna and Warsaw; it now deals
with difficult conflicts, mainly those on the periphery of the European continent (see Galbreath

As the developments in the field of ‘European politics’ show, it took until the accession of
Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union in 2004 and 2007 for the West
and East research agendas to be merged into one.

Democratization and anticipatory Europeanization in Southern,
Central and Eastern Europe

Part of the significance of the Southern European transitions to democracy was that they initiated
a worldwide process towards democratization. According to Samuel Huntington, the third wave
of democratization started on 25 April 1974 in Portugal (Huntington 1991: 3–5). The wave
had a domino effect in Central and Eastern Europe 15 years later. The democratic transitions
in Southern Europe occurred during the détente period of the Cold War. The left-wing Zeitgeist
of the 1970s was a cause of great concern for the Nixon administration. All three authoritarian
dictatorships had been loyal supporters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO):
Portugal and Greece were members, and Spain under Franco had a strong relationship with
the United States. The most worrying case for the Nixon administration was Portugal, which
underwent a revolution between 25 April 1974 and 25 November 1975. The external dimension
democratization cannot be underestimated. There was a considerable effort on the part of
the superpowers, particularly the United States, to keep Southern Europe within its sphere of
influence. Eventually, all three new democracies consolidated before they joined the EU/EC. Greece joined the EC in 1981, and Portugal and Spain followed suit in 1986. Greece had already started its process of integration with the country’s association agreement in 1962; although the process was frozen during the military dictatorship (1967–74), it still joined much sooner than Portugal and Spain. Portugal and Spain had to wait eight years to become members, a delay that sometimes frustrated Iberian politicians. However, the Southern European enlargement was an important step towards the creation of a heterogeneous, diverse EC/EU in economic, political, social and cultural terms. Although Italy had been a founding member since 1952/1957, the inclusion of more Southern European countries clearly contributed to a shift from a community of homogeneous developed democracies sustained by strong economies to a mixed community in which community transfers from the North to the South through a new cohesion policy were necessary. This was the compensatory instrument that the ‘Club Med’ countries (Portugal, Spain and Greece) negotiated in exchange for support of the European Commission’s Single European Programme (Dinan 2004: 225–7).

The EC/EU was an important factor in strengthening democratic political institutions in these countries before they became members. Attila Ágh introduces the concept of ‘anticipatory Europeanization’ in his analysis of Central and Eastern European countries, a term that he defines as follows:

[The] Europeanization of the candidate countries covers two major periods. The first one is an anticipative Europeanization as general democratization; the second is an adaptive one with an EU specific democratization. In fact, in the first period general democratization covers a field that may also be called modernization and/or liberalization, since it is a catching up period with many tasks characteristics of the former historical developments of the developed countries. The second period, in turn, is closer to their recent history and shows similarities with the case of the Mediterranean member states.

Ágh 2003: 91

Precisely the same process had already taken place in Southern Europe, including the Italy of the 1950s, but in a much softer version. Southern European enlargement happened at a time when the European integration process was stagnant and dominated by the member states; in contrast, in 1993 (the official start of the process of enlargement for the Central and Eastern European countries), the European Union had been established, clearly shifting power away from the nation-state to the supranational institution. Several processes were taking place (such as the implementation of the SEM, the EMU, etc.) that put member states under constant Europeanizing pressures. As a result, whereas the Southern European enlargement was characterized by a light touch approach, the Central and Eastern European expansion was quite tough, involving annual screening of national development, the implementation of a much larger aquis communautaire of 80,000 pages and stronger conditionality in most areas, including democratic practices (see Smith 1999; Pridham 2005). It took over a decade for most countries to become members; for Bulgaria and Romania, it took 12 years (Lippert 2003: 91). Meanwhile, not only Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU, but also Croatia as the twenty-eighth member in 2013.

It is clear that adaptive democratization and Europeanization were especially demanding for Central and Eastern European countries, but anticipative democratization and Europeanization – taking place before and in parallel with the former process – were even more difficult and painful for these countries. In some ways, these processes are intertwined through political, economic, legal and human rights conditionality (the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’).
Introduction

In 1993, the Copenhagen criteria were established during the Danish presidency of the European Union, placing all of the candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe under considerable pressure. Political, economic and human rights conditionality were introduced in order to transform these countries into something more ‘similar’ to the Western part of the European Union. The Copenhagen criteria are as follows:

- political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
- acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (see also Lippert 2003; European Council 1993: 13; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2013).

Southern Europe had to focus only on political democratization, as all three former dictatorships had inherited what Giovanni Arrighi calls ‘market fascism’, a capitalist economy dominated by an authoritarian regime (Arrighi 1985: 268). In contrast, the Central and Eastern European countries had to undertake a triple transition from an authoritarian-totalitarian political structure to liberal democracy, from a planned economy to a liberal market economy and from a socially secure state to an incipient welfare state. Although these countries successfully embarked on a transformation of their political systems, economies and welfare states, a number of loose ends still continue to haunt them (some countries more than others). Over the past 25 years, political and economic institutional engineering and transfer from the West to Central and Eastern Europe through anticipative and adaptive Europeanization and democratization have became a major aspect of European politics (see von Beyme 1996: 158–9; the excellent Elster et al. 1998; Whitehead 2001a, 2001b; Pridham 2005).

This process is far from over, as is evident from the ongoing monitoring of the situation in Bulgaria and Romania, which at the time of writing were still not Schengen Area members due to opposition from the Netherlands, Finland and Germany (Euractiv 2013). This indicates that, culturally speaking, Southern, Central and Eastern Europe are still on the road towards a more substantive democracy. Although parts of Southern Europe (in particular Spain and Italy) have made great leaps forward in the development of a more sophisticated civil society, Portugal, Greece and most Central and Eastern European countries are still lagging behind (see the excellent Chapter 45).

According to the Eurobarometer studies, there has been a considerable decline in satisfaction with regard to how democracy works in the respondents’ countries, but also concerning democracy in the European Union. Citizens in all Southern, Central and Eastern European democracies are overwhelmingly dissatisfied with how democracy works; the only exception is Poland, probably due to the country’s high level of stability over the past five years and its booming economy (see Eurobarometer 2011: 48; 2013: Annex, Question A1, T1).

This indicates that a large number of member states are beginning to show signs of the syndrome of dissatisfied societies. Here, reference should be made to the outstanding studies conducted by Leonardo Morlino and Marco Tarchi on Italy as a dissatisfied society. In several publications, the two authors have shown that Italy has been permanently dissatisfied with national democracy since at least the 1970s. They also differentiate between instrumental and ideological dissatisfaction. Instrumental dissatisfaction refers mainly to the poor performance of institutions and policy-making that could be overcome by improvements in the short, medium and long term. More difficult to remedy is what is defined as ideological dissatisfaction – the outright
rejection of democracy (Morlino and Tarchi 1996, 2006). Thus far, most of the dissatisfaction in Europe can be categorized as instrumental rather than ideological.

In sum, any country that wants to join the European Union will be compelled to redesign its political, economic and social institutions in order to obtain a good fit with the emerging constitutional order of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty (already acting as a constitution in all but name) set out the expected political, economic and social institutional framework for the member states (see Christiansen and Reh 2009). There is a growing congruence between the supranational and national constitutional orders. But what are the main aspects of this European constitutional order? This is defined in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty of the European Union (the first part of the Lisbon Treaty). Article 2 sets out what national democracy in the European should represent:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

(Treaty of the European Union, Art. 2)

However, Article 3 already looks forward towards a Single European Market and its associated policies beyond the nation-state. The three first paragraphs of Article 3 again define the policies of embedded markets as described by Karl Polanyi:

1. The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.
2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.
3. The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.

It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.

It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.

(Treaty of the European Union, Art. 3)

Any deviation from these provisions may lead to sanctions, although such mechanisms are still in the making.

Comparing the politics of liberal democracy in a pan-European perspective

In this sense, we come full circle back to the seminal text of Gordon Smith on the politics of Western Europe, which focuses on a comparison of the politics of liberal democracies in Europe.
According to Smith, a typical liberal democracy provides three things: mechanisms of political choice, a balanced political structure and a stable political system. All three, though analytically separated, are mutually related (Smith 1972: 1). As he sees it, the emphasis of liberal democracies on freedom of choice ‘is in its origins an economic freedom rather than a political one, that is to say, one bound up with the free operation of the market system’ (ibid.). The author goes on to present the various conditions for a market economy, such as the ‘ability for individuals to accumulate capital, the mobility of both capital and labour, the basic freedom of market forces to provide the most favourable situation for the exercise of rational economic choice’ (ibid.: 2). He then engages in an insightful discussion of this relationship:

The demand for political choice acted as an important supplement to the market economy, but it was not primarily a democratic demand, rather a way of securing the foundations of the whole system. Each with its own set of institutions, economic and political choice developed in tandem.

(Smith 1972: 2)

The analysis of this evolutionary process exhibits a British bias; however, this is quite understandable. Britain was the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, and therefore the centre of Polanyi’s Great Transformation, later copied by all other continental European countries; in addition, it is the site of the mother of all parliaments, the Westminster model. In spite of all its imperfections, British parliamentarianism remains at the heart of European parliamentarianism, even though each national tradition has led to different institutional designs and political cultures (see Finer 1999: 1335–6, 1374–6; see also Chapters 19, 20, 21). The idea of ‘Her/His Majesty’s loyal opposition’ became the norm also in republican polities. This brilliant invention came to be much more cooperative and consensual on the continent and the Nordic countries than in the Anglo-Saxon countries, becoming routinized and professionalized over time. In many new democracies of Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, the ‘opposition’ is still in the process of institutionalization. Political choice means that governments in power must respect the elected opposition in parliament, since any of the parties may be in power in the next legislature period, and therefore the party in government may become the new opposition. This civilized behaviour between government and opposition can only evolve over several decades into the complex relationship we observe in established democracies, comprising both formal and informal instruments (Dahl 1966; Helms 2008). This internalization of the rules of cooperation and consensualism are still in the making in many Southern, Central and Eastern European democracies. The culture of parliamentarianism requires decades to establish.

However, there is also the danger that political choice can become less visible if adversarial forms of behaviour in European democracies become less common. New challenger parties may then emerge to defy the incumbents. The recent rise of new extreme right-wing, populist, Eurosceptic and anti-party movements are part of this renewal of democracy. The extreme forms of parties on the left and the right are forbidden in some countries due to their historical legacy, but allowed in others. In Germany and Spain, there are regular discussions about introducing a ban on the National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD) and the parties attached to the Basque terrorist organization ‘Freedom and Basque Country’ (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, ETA), respectively. In both cases, the parties feature ideologies that seek to alter the national democracy.

This example clearly shows that European politics must take into account the temporal dimension. Some national democracies already have a long-standing history of government and opposition. They have a repertoire of democratic rules and practice to deal with incumbents
and new challengers. This process is easier in the consensus democracies in the Nordic countries and West Central Europe. In the new democracies, despite the demands of the Eurocrisis and the financial crisis, cooperation between the political parties is still a work in progress. Parties in Portugal, Spain, Greece and most Central and Eastern European countries (particularly Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania) are still learning to work together in the national interest when necessary rather than blindly pursuing partisan interests. In contrast, the case of Germany should be noted. In spite of the antagonism between the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), these parties decided to form a grand coalition in 2005; this political cooperation was clearly an important factor behind Germany’s ability to shake off the financial and Eurocrisis more quickly than most other European countries. A similar grand coalition emerged following the general elections of 2013.

We can therefore differentiate European democracies according to the longevity of their stable democratic government and opposition. Moreover, we can distinguish between continuous and discontinuous democracies. Furthermore, after 1989 additional nation-states emerged in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Balkans. Despite the countries’ shared liberal democratic values, the national expression of democracy is and will remain quite diverse in Europe (see Table 1.1).

A second factor that may allow us to get a sense of the diversity of European democracies is the fact that some countries have a qualitatively stronger democratic political culture than others. The Nordic countries are recognized as having the highest level of democracy in a variety of dimensions. This also applies to their generous welfare states. The Western Balkans, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania are located on the other side of the spectrum. A tentative typology along a substantive-procedural democracy dimension may allow us to understand the difficulties in comparing democratic political systems in Europe. ‘Procedural democracy’ means that a given country has routinized and institutionalized procedures of democracy, allowing alternation in power to occur in a peaceful way following regular elections. ‘Substantive democracy’ goes beyond this minimalist interpretation of democracy, comprising not only a fully institutionalized and sophisticated procedural democracy, but also a system that is sustained by the strong engagement of its citizens through associationism and participation, featuring a high level of equality of opportunities and a strong social market economy. A socialized (taken for granted) culture of the rule of law and measures guarding against political corruption are further factors that form part of a strong substantive democracy (see Morlino 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Morlino 2012). Such a state is a ‘vital democracy’, in the sense of Frank Hendriks (2010), because this democratic nature finds expression at the subnational level as well. Whereas a procedural democracy is a top-down process, substantive democracy is a balanced political culture with top-down and bottom-up inputs. One important element of a substantive democracy is a high level of cooperation between the government and the opposition. According to Arend Lijphart, one should differentiate between majoritarian and consensus democracies. The UK is a traditional majoritarian democracy, but one can observe similar majoritarian tendencies in many other European countries. The core of consensus democracies is located in West Central Europe (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, Switzerland, but also Germany) and the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland). According to Lijphart, consensus democracies are more efficient and perform better than majoritarian democracies. Cooperation between smaller parties leads to improved long-term planning in policy-making that includes input from the main forces in the country (Lijphart 1999: 273–4; see Table 1.2).

A bird’s-eye view of the quality of democracy in most European countries can be provided through two indices. One is the Democracy Index developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit, now in its fifth edition since 2008. This measure uses five dimensions in order to
Table 1.1 Continuous, discontinuous and new democracies

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<th>Continuous democracies (nineteenth century)</th>
<th>Discontinuous democracies</th>
<th>New countries and democracies</th>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malta (since 1960)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (since 1960)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland (since 1945)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF DEMOCRACIES PER PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACCUMULATED NUMBER OF DEMOCRACIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Introduction

approximate the quality of democracy in 165 democracies. One interesting aspect of this index is that a distinction is made between full substantive democracies and other systems. Democracies that do not fulfil the highest standards are considered flawed or hybrid democracies. Whereas flawed democracies exhibit deficits in certain dimensions, hybrid democracies still include authoritarian tendencies, political corruption and other negative aspects. In order to make analytical differentiations between the various categories of countries, I have divided the groups into strong, medium and weak (see Table 1.3). Moreover, I have characterized full democracies as ‘substantive’, and those that are flawed as ‘procedural’. Of course, one should always be aware that typologies are only crude maps, not capable of expressing in depth the nature of each of these democracies.

Out of the 54 flawed democracies, 18 are located in Europe. The three hybrid regimes located in Europe are on its periphery. Bosnia-Herzegovina is still characterized by ethnic divisions and
conflict, despite attempts to institutionally engineer a culture of consensus. Albania still remains characterized by high levels of political corruption and party political fragmentation. Even more problematic are the larger states of Ukraine and Turkey. Ukraine’s major difficulty in establishing a proper democracy is related to respect for the opposition. Professionalization and routinization are still lacking in the country’s highly divided society, part of which supports stronger ties to Europe and part of which still has a strong bond with Russia. Geographically, this is expressed through an East–West cleavage. Turkey has made significant efforts to move towards democratic rule; however, the dominance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the fragmentation of the party system have raised concerns about the country’s rule of law, respect for the opposition and extra-parliamentary civil society in general.

Naturally, the Democracy Index changes over time. However, one can identify sustainable substantive democracies as well as some democracies that have not yet reached that standard. The cases of Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy belong to this latter category. All of these countries have already achieved a high level of democratic quality, but in many dimensions they lag behind the more substantive democracies. The substandard functioning of their governments, their low levels of political participation and ongoing problems in their political cultures clearly contribute to their position straddling the line between full and flawed democracies. Probably the most extraordinary success stories have been the Czech Republic and Spain, countries that are clearly moving up the ladder, even though there are still problems that must be overcome in order for them to become full democracies.

The Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) of the Bertelsmann Foundation are a further useful index providing an overview of how states rank in comparison to each other in terms of their ability to implement reforms. This measure concentrates on the member states of the OECD. It comprises three indices: the Policy Performance Index identifies the profile of strengths and weaknesses in economic, social and environmental policies, the Democracy Index identifies
Table 1.3 Democracy Index (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Overall score</th>
<th>(I) Electoral process and pluralism</th>
<th>(II) Functioning of government</th>
<th>(III) Political participation</th>
<th>(IV) Political culture</th>
<th>(V) Civil liberties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FULL DEMOCRACIES/SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.93</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.73</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>9.44</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.65</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>9.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td>9.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>9.29</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.06</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>9.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEDIUM FULL DEMOCRACIES/MEDIUM SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>8.93</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>9.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8.88</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>9.99</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.62</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>9.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.56</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>7.86</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.34</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.28</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>9.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEAK FULL DEMOCRACIES/WEAK SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>9.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>8.21</td>
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<td>7.50</td>
<td>9.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.02</td>
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<td>7.50</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>9.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FLAWED DEMOCRACIES/PROCEDURAL DEMOCRACIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>9.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>8.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>8.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>9.58</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>8.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>9.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7.61</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>8.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEDIUM FLAWED DEMOCRACIES/MEDIUM PROCEDURAL DEMOCRACIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7.29</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7.05</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXTREMELY FLAWED DEMOCRACIES/WEAK PROCEDURAL DEMOCRACIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>8.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6.72</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>8.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6.54</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>7.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>7.94</td>
</tr>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6.16</td>
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<td>4.64</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>7.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>7.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HYBRID DEMOCRACIES (MIXTURE BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>7.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>6.79</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>7.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>7.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation based on the Economist Intelligence Unit (2013: 3–8).

Note: 10 = full substantive democracy; 0 = authoritarian regime. In 2012, 25 democracies were full democracies; of these 25 nations, 16 were located in Europe. Most of them are long-standing continuous democracies.
Table 1.4 Sustainable governance in OECD countries in Europe, based on Bertelsmann’s indicators (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High level of sustainable national governance</th>
<th>Medium level of sustainable national governance</th>
<th>Low level of sustainable national governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Sum of values of three indices: Policy Performance Index (0–10), Democracy Quality Index (0–10), Governance Index (0–10). The highest value is 10 and lower 0. High level of sustainable national governance score of over 20; medium level of national sustainable score between 19 and 17; low level of national sustainable governance score below 17.

the strengths and weaknesses of the democratic framework and the Governance Index looks at the ability of the state machinery to implement reforms. It focuses predominantly on steering capabilities and the accountability of the government in each OECD country and beyond.

As Table 1.4 shows, the cleavage between full substantive and procedural democracies becomes quite clear in terms of governance. A more detailed study of the country reports identifies as a key variable in most procedural democracies the deficit in bottom-up input by civil society. Italy represents quite a negative case in this regard: the country certainly has a stronger civil society than most of the new democracies, but it is struggling to move towards a more sustainable governance approach in dealing with public policy.

In terms of Europeanization, Table 1.4 indicates that some countries have had more difficulty in complying with and implementing EU legislation than others. Recent studies by Gerda Falkner et al. (2005) and Tanja Börzel et al. (2010) show that differentiated Europeanization is still a major problem in the establishment of a homogeneous single European market. Different levels of political, economic and social development prevent the creation of a level playing field in the European Union. Chapter 38, by Gerda Falkner, on the joint decision-making trap in European policy-making processes demonstrates that national interest still very much shapes final compromises in EU legislation.

Europeanism and European politics: the recognition of ‘many Europes’?

Although there has been a great deal of change since the 1960s, European politics continues to display a high level of continuity in terms of the values and preferences of Europeans. Like the ideology of Americanism, with its ‘rags to riches’ mythology, emphasis on freedom and
Table 1.5 Patterns of European values and attitudes before and after 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Before 1979</th>
<th>After 1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIETY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remodeled identities</td>
<td>Strong nation-state, single identity</td>
<td>Waning national identity, moving towards multiple identities (regional, national and European)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redefining the family</td>
<td>Dominance of the nuclear family</td>
<td>Plurality of family forms, patchwork families, same-sex families, traditional nuclear family, singles; the aging of society/demographic change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communitarianism</td>
<td>Embedded role of the individual in the community always central</td>
<td>Despite the erosion of the community towards the individualization of society, still remains a major feature of European politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>Tendency to emphasize homogeneity in national identity</td>
<td>Recognition of ethnic diversity due to groups within the respective countries (Catalonia, Flanders, Scotland) or immigrant communities (Turkish population in Germany, African and Muslim populations in the UK, the Netherlands and France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion/secularization</td>
<td>Decline of religious communities</td>
<td>Continuous decline of religious communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STATE, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY-MAKING</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The collective society</td>
<td>State as economic manager and guarantor of social welfare</td>
<td>State as economic manager and guarantor of social welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfarism</td>
<td>Equality of results (in terms of benefits) over equality of opportunities</td>
<td>Equality of results (in terms of benefits) over equality of opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The civilian-industrial complex</td>
<td>Limited role for the military</td>
<td>Limited role for the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable development</td>
<td>Exponential growth ideology dominant</td>
<td>Sustainable development, balance between environment and economy; the needs of future generations should not be compromised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work to live</td>
<td>Traditional rigid forms of working time organization</td>
<td>More flexible forms of work/life balance; enhancement of quality of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAW</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal rights</td>
<td>Emphasis on individual rights, non-adversarial style of law, negotiation rather than confrontation through law</td>
<td>Emphasis on individual rights, non-adversarial style of law, negotiation rather than confrontation through law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to capital punishment</td>
<td>Still common in some countries before 1979</td>
<td>No membership in the EU without a ban on capital punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPEAN INTER-STATE GOVERNANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetual peace</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Democratic peace, the Kantian model of perpetual peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GLOBAL GOVERNANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitanism</td>
<td>Strong nation-state-centric thinking</td>
<td>Growing importance of glocalization; the local and global have become one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism within the framework of a reformed United Nations</td>
<td>Growing importance of cooperation and consensus in international organizations</td>
<td>European Union as an important coordinator of European policies, even if national interests (France, the UK) still play a role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian power</td>
<td>Avoidance of war outside Europe (exceptions: Portugal, Spain, France, the UK)</td>
<td>Emphasis on soft power mechanisms such as diplomacy, particularly through the EU, participation in peacekeeping operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smart power</td>
<td>Contextualized in the Cold War, dominance of US or Soviet Union as hegemon</td>
<td>Through the European Union, moving towards smart power, emphasizing proportionality in the use of instruments related to hard and soft power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

socialization into a civil religion centred on the Constitution and the founding fathers (Gebhardt 1992 [1976]), one can speak of a Europeanism that clearly comprises a set of attitudes and values that Europeans more or less share, from Lisbon and Dublin to Vilnius and Nicosia (if not beyond). John McCormick has made an effort to find out what this ‘Europeanism’ entails, and certainly the task is not an easy one. In the end, McCormick came up with a set of values that are changing but also exhibit a relatively high level of continuity. His work was influenced by an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung by two eminent European intellectuals, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 31 May 2003, republished in Levy et al. 2005; see Table 1.5).

McCormick identifies certain important aspects of this Europeanism. Nevertheless, he is quite cautious, making an important differentiation between Europeanism, which is made up of absolute values that have become taken for granted as a legacy of history in a common space, and Europeanness, basically referring to the adoption of these values. Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and most countries in the Western Balkans have adopted these values. The matter becomes more complicated if we want to find out more about European identity. Is the European Union the sole reference point for European identity, or are there many Europes that are persistently left out of the European narrative (Rumford 2009: 2–4; Magone 2009)? This point is also emphasized by Thomas Risse, who demonstrates that different political cultures and identities are still at work in the European integration process. However, he also identifies an emerging multilevel European public space in which debates about Europe have become more common (Risse 2010: 126–56). Chapter 47, by Donatella della Porta and Louise Parks, suggests that there is a growing focus on the European level in order to prevent certain policies from being enacted. The financial crisis and the Eurocrisis have contributed to the contestation of European approaches.

The diversity of national cultures has produced a unique set of policies in which the national and supranational levels have merged into a new constellation. One of the best examples is European law, which clearly exhibits elements of the various legal cultures of Europe. In spite of this, all members of the European Union voluntarily comply (more or less successfully) with European law (Stone Sweet 2000; Craig 2003; see Chapters 10, 15). This demonstrates the sophisticated level that the European Union has reached in terms of a unique polity in the world. As John McCormick asserts, the European Union seems to have embarked on the project of a democratic peace, or rather a Kantian perpetual peace (McCormick 2010: 193–9). After two horrendous world wars in the twentieth century and other major conflicts such as those in the Western Balkans, most European countries are engaged in constructing a common European Union, in spite of all their national differences. Peace is taken for granted by most Europeans, such that it has become quite difficult for nation-states to recruit people for their armies, in part due to demographic changes and also in part because military service in most countries is now voluntary.

Norbert Elias’s civilizing process of affect control and the growing tolerance of otherness has become a reality that is taken for granted by Europeans, such that they are often not aware how far they have come in this regard. Like Polanyi, Elias has also been recently rediscovered by European integration specialists seeking to characterize what is happening in Europe. Current European politics is the product of a long-term psycho- and sociogenetic process. This process is not unilinear – trial and error and wrong turns are also a part of it; however, all these experiences accumulate to form a sociology of knowledge of the civilizing process (Elias 1976, vol. I: Intro., vii–lxxii; vol. II: 312–454; Linklater 2011: 438–44).

As Laurence Whitehead rightly asserts, Europe has become a regional community of democratic states that have clearly adopted common principles and values, even though there
is some diversity in the interpretation of nationally defined liberal democracies (Whitehead 2001a: 395–8, 410). These principles are not set out by the European Union alone, but also (more importantly) by the intergovernmental Council of Europe. The Council of Europe was founded in 1948 and comprises all European countries, even some that may be considered outer Europe such as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is a powerful symbolic institution that contributes to a democratic peace in Europe that now has lasted for over six decades. The Council of Europe is also the core international organization representing the many Europes that still exist. It is often forgotten that Europe invented the international organization in the nineteenth century (Reinalda 2009: 11). The Vienna Congress of 1815 had to develop mechanisms to monitor the decisions taken there. Around 18 follow-up conferences took place until the middle of the century, establishing what Katherine Holsti calls a first international governance system to prevent conflict. This is also clearly the origin of the hundred years of peace discussed in Polanyi’s book. This means that, as a process, an international governance system ensuring democratic peace began about two hundred years ago (Holsti 2000: 36).

The structure of the Handbook

The Handbook consists of nine parts and comprises 50 chapters (see Table 1.6). All of these chapters are self-contained; however, references to other chapters are made throughout the book, such that there is a possibility for further reading. The nine parts are as follows:

1 Historical and theoretical background
2 The political system and institutions of the European Union
3 National political systems and institutions in European politics
4 Political elites in European politics
5 Party systems and political parties
6 Public administration and patterns of policy-making in European politics
7 The political economy of Europe
8 Civil society and social movements in European politics
9 Europe and the world

Part I: Historical and theoretical background

The Handbook begins with some historical overviews and theoretical reflections on specific aspects of European politics. It starts with a review of the legacy left by Stein Rokkan written by Daniel-Louis Seiler (Chapter 2). Although Rokkan focused primarily on Western Europe, he still remains an important reference on continuity and change in European politics. This is followed by a chapter by John Loughlin (Chapter 3) exploring the important role that religion has played, historically and even today, in the shaping of most national political systems. Gina Gustavsson’s chapter (Chapter 4) offers a critical political-theoretical review of the debates related to exclusionary liberalism and their different aspects. Antonio Varsori then gives an important review of the history and historiography of the European Union since its beginnings (Chapter 5), and Attila Ágh reflects on the more recent development of the European Union (Chapter 6). Juliet Lodge delineates the development of a ‘Fortress Europe’ targeting the security aspects of the Single European Market (Chapter 7). She focuses mainly on the use of the new technologies to ensure surveillance of the single European market and its external borders. Finally, this section is complemented by a theoretical discussion by Mary Volcansek of the American influences on the European legal space (Chapter 8).
Table 1.6: Overview of chapters in the Handbook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part I</th>
<th>Part II</th>
<th>Part III</th>
<th>Part IV</th>
<th>Part V</th>
<th>Part VI</th>
<th>Part VII</th>
<th>Part VIII</th>
<th>Part IX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History and theory</td>
<td>EU political system</td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Political elites</td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Public administration and policy-making</td>
<td>Political economy</td>
<td>Civil society and social movements</td>
<td>Europe and the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Seiler</td>
<td>C9 Eising</td>
<td>C17 Pasquino</td>
<td>C24 Verzichelli &amp; Cotta</td>
<td>C27 Wolinetz</td>
<td>C34 Colino &amp; del Pino</td>
<td>C39 Höpner &amp; Schäfer</td>
<td>C44 Wallace Goodman</td>
<td>C48 Manners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The legacy of Multilevel Governments</td>
<td>Multilevel governance in Europe</td>
<td>Parliamentary elites</td>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>Patterns of public administration</td>
<td>Political economy</td>
<td>Immigration and integration policies</td>
<td>Theories and myths EU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 Loughlin</td>
<td>C10 Pernice</td>
<td>C18 Elgie</td>
<td>C25 Best &amp; Semenova</td>
<td>C28 Katz</td>
<td>C35 Hemerijck</td>
<td>C40 Bongardt</td>
<td>C45 Maloney</td>
<td>C49 Sjursen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion and politics</td>
<td>Multilevel constitutionalism</td>
<td>Heads of state</td>
<td>Parliamentary elites in CEECs</td>
<td>Party system change in Western Europe</td>
<td>Welfare states</td>
<td>Europe 2020</td>
<td>Participation &amp; associationalism</td>
<td>Common foreign and security policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4 Gustavsson</td>
<td>C11 Dinan</td>
<td>C19 Norton</td>
<td>C26 Dumont &amp; Verzichelli</td>
<td>C29 Lewis</td>
<td>C36 Bull &amp; Newell</td>
<td>C41 Torres</td>
<td>C46 Woodward</td>
<td>C50 Rumford &amp; Buhari-Gulmez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary European liberalism</td>
<td>Political system of the EU</td>
<td>Parliaments</td>
<td>Selection and de-selection of ministers</td>
<td>Party system change in Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Political corruption</td>
<td>Political EMU</td>
<td>Gender and politics in Europe</td>
<td>World society turn in European studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5 Varsori</td>
<td>C12 Lewis</td>
<td>C20 Saalfeld</td>
<td>C21 Auel</td>
<td>C30 Riera</td>
<td>C37 Kassim</td>
<td>C42 Kelly</td>
<td>C47 della Porta</td>
<td>C51 Rumford &amp; Buhari-Gulmez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of European integration</td>
<td>Council of the EU</td>
<td>Executive-legislative relations</td>
<td>Europeanization of national parliaments</td>
<td>Electoral systems</td>
<td>National EU policy coordination</td>
<td>Social pacts and interest intermediation</td>
<td>and Partners</td>
<td>Interest groups in the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6 Ágh</td>
<td>C13 Cini</td>
<td>C21 Auel</td>
<td>C31 Jalali &amp; Silva</td>
<td>C38 Falkner</td>
<td>C43 Greenwood</td>
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<td>Berlin Wall aftermath</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>Europeanization of national parliaments</td>
<td>Party patronage</td>
<td>Europeanization of policy-making</td>
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<td>C7 Lodge</td>
<td>C14 Raunio</td>
<td>C22 Rehder</td>
<td>C31 Jalali &amp; Silva</td>
<td>C38 Falkner</td>
<td>C43 Greenwood</td>
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<td>Fortress Europe</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>Judicial politics in Europe</td>
<td>Europeanization of party politics</td>
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<td>C8 Volcansek</td>
<td>C15 Harmsen &amp; MacAuliffe</td>
<td>C23 Lidström, Hendriks &amp; Loughlin</td>
<td>C33 Hanley</td>
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<tr>
<td>Americanization of European law</td>
<td>ECJ and ECHR</td>
<td>Local &amp; regional democracy</td>
<td>European parties</td>
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<td>C16 Schmidt</td>
<td>Democracy in Europe</td>
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Part II: The political system and institutions of the European Union

Following this theoretical and historical contextualization of European politics, the Handbook moves on to chapters related to the multilevel governance system of the European Union. The Handbook focuses not only on national politics, but also on the growing importance of the European Union and other European institutions such as the Council of Europe, the OECD and the OSCE in shaping values, legislation and public policy in national polities. However, the vast majority of European countries are members of the European Union, and thus also part of this larger political system. Therefore, this section of the Handbook seeks to delineate the institutional setting of this multilevel system. The first chapter, by Rainer Eising (Chapter 9), provides a thorough overview of the EU’s multilevel governance system, which is still just a heuristic device to map and better understand this polity. Central to the understanding of the European Union is its democratic legitimacy. Ingolf Pernice outlines the making of a multilevel non-hierarchical constitutionalism between the national and the European levels (Chapter 10). It clearly focuses quite a lot on the impact of the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) on further European integration. The centrality of the rulings of the GFCC for the further development of European integration has been one of the most interesting phenomena in this interaction between the national and supranational levels. This is followed by a chapter by Desmond Dinan on the complex political system of the European Union (Chapter 11). This sets the framework for three further contributions on the institutional decision-making of the EU, namely overviews of the European Council by Jeffrey Lewis (Chapter 12), the European Commission by Michele Cini (Chapter 13) and the European Parliament by Tapio Raunio (Chapter 14). A further chapter by Robert Harmsen and Karen MacAuliffe (Chapter 15) explores the impact of the European Courts on European politics, namely the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, the latter attached to the Council of Europe. Vivien Schmidt (Chapter 16) reviews the literature on the way democracy is organized in the EU, developing a new model for assessing it based on the system theory of David Easton. She analyses the democratic deficit of EU institutions not only from an input–output perspective, but also from the point of view of throughput, the processes that are happening in the ‘institutional black box’.

Part III: National political systems and institutions in European politics

Part III of the Handbook focuses on the national political systems. Gianfranco Pasquino gives an overview of the diversity of government in Europe (Chapter 17). The dominance of the semi-presidential and the parliamentary government models are particularly emphasized. This is complemented by a contribution on the heads of state in Europe and their influence in national politics by Robert Elgie (Chapter 18). In both chapters one can find typologies of governments and how politics plays out within them. Continuity and change in parliamentarianism in Europe is thoroughly analysed by Philip Norton (Chapter 19), who focuses his contribution on the growing dissemination of common parliamentary norms across the continent, particularly among the new democracies. The role of the Internet in improving the connection between MPs and citizens is stressed. This is followed by a thorough chapter on executive–legislative relations by Thomas Saalfeld (Chapter 20). He uses a rational choice model based on principal–agent theory to analyse patterns of executive–legislative relations. The chapter is an empirical tour de force introducing also comparative insights between established and new democracies. This is complemented by a study by Katrin Auel on the Europeanization of national parliaments and their ability to influence European politics (Chapter 21). The issue of ‘strategic Europeanization’
is highlighted in this contribution. After this, Britta Rehder provides an excellent overview of judicial politics in Europe (Chapter 22). Her focuses are the constitutional courts and the issue of judicial review in European countries. The last chapter in Part III deals with subnational democracy. Anders Lidström, Frank Hendriks and John Loughlin (Chapter 23) apply both a state traditions approach and also a typology of democracies in order to obtain some insight into patterns of subnational democracy.

**Part IV: Political elites in European politics**

Part IV attempts to study patterns in the recruitment, selection and behaviour of political elites in Europe. Luca Verzichelli and Maurizio Cotta (Chapter 24) take a longitudinal historical approach in analysing the changing configurations of political elites across several European countries, based on a dataset created by a research team coordinated by the authors. This is complemented by a chapter by Heinrich Best and Elena Semenova on the development of political elites in post-1990 Europe (Chapter 25). The last chapter deals with hiring and firing of ministerial elites. This is based on empirical research of a project in which Patrick Dumont is a coordinator, and therefore quite innovative and new insights are presented in this chapter co-authored with Luca Verzichelli (Chapter 26).

**Part V: Party systems and political parties**

The centrality of political parties and party systems is acknowledged in this *Handbook*. Part V starts with a comprehensive review by Stephen Wolinetz of the changing nature of political parties since the nineteenth century (Chapter 27). Richard S. Katz (Chapter 28) and Paul G. Lewis (Chapter 29) then provide excellent overviews of party systems in Western and Eastern Europe, respectively. Pedro Riera has the onerous task of describing the impact of electoral systems in different European countries (Chapter 30). His study is quite thorough and shows preferences from proportional representation systems to more mixed ones. This is followed by a contribution on the difficult subject of party patronage. Carlos Jalali and Patricia Silva (Chapter 31) report on an international project coordinated by the late Peter Mair with Petr Kopecky and Maria Spirova, in which both authors took part. They provide innovative data related to a party patronage index. The last two chapters deal with the growing interaction of national parties in a multilevel governance setting. Robert Ladrech explores how national parties are being Europeanized in Chapter 32, while David Hanley presents an overview of the still embryonic development of transnational European parties (Chapter 33).

**Part VI: Public administration and patterns of policy-making in European politics**

In Part VI of the *Handbook*, the focus is on patterns of public administration and policy-making in European countries. César Colino and Eloísa del Pino provide an excellent comprehensive overview of public administrative reform in a pan-European perspective (Chapter 34). They also focus on the Europeanization processes related to the European Administrative Space. The new trends in public administration are also an important part of the chapter. This is followed by a chapter on welfare systems in Europe, in which Anton Hemerijk explores the replacement of the social protection rationale by one of social investment (Chapter 35). This is a quite thorough study of welfare reform from a pan-European perspective. The impact of political corruption in European politics is analysed by Martin Bull and James Newell (Chapter 36). The diversity
of levels of political corruption and the difficulty of measuring the phenomenon are highlighted by the authors. Nevertheless, the authors try to identify patterns of political corruption. The chapter also includes a discussion of international and European networks and benchmarking measures intended to combat political corruption. Hussein Kassim’s chapter on national EU policy coordination (Chapter 37) gives an excellent overview of the linkage between national and supranational administrative structures, exhibiting the high degree of diversity in the models of national EU policy coordination. The final chapter, by Gerda Falkner (Chapter 38), illustrates the difficulties of taking EU-wide policy-making decisions. As in highly decentralized federal systems such as Germany, the EU is often affected by a decision-making trap (concept developed by Fritz Scharpf) that leads to blockades and inertia in its further development.

Part VII: The political economy of Europe

Gerda Falkner’s article is an ideal transition to this section on the political economy of Europe. The heterogeneity and diversity of national political economies has also affected the creation of the Single European Market. Martin Höpner and Armin Schäfer provide a thorough analysis of this diversity (Chapter 39), indicating that the European Union is still far from being a homogeneous whole. Heterogeneity in the varieties of national capitalism and also uneven implementation of the Single European Market programme have created a very unbalanced European political economy. This argument is backed up with concrete examples and empirical data.

This is followed by a complementary chapter by Annette Bongardt on the Single European Market programme and the impact of the new Europe 2020 strategy (Chapter 40). The problems of implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy are highlighted. A crucial chapter is Francisco Torres’s account of Economic and Monetary Union (Chapter 41), which takes into account the recent developments since the Eurocrisis began in 2009. In particular, the asymmetry between the economic and the monetary pillar of EMU is critically dissected and analysed. A chapter on the social pacts in the European Union by John Kelly and Kerstin Hamann (Chapter 42) explains how a light neo-corporatist approach to interest intermediation between labour and capital still persists in Europe despite a considerable degree of liberalization since the 1980s. Part VII is completed by a chapter by Justin Greenwood on Eurogroups and patterns of lobbying (Chapter 43).

Part VIII: Civil society and social movements in European politics

The role of civil society and social movements in Europe should not be underestimated; the Handbook therefore includes chapters on various related issues that are relevant in national societies but also at the European level. One crucial chapter is that by Sara Wallace Goodman (Chapter 44), who analyses the policies of immigration and integration across Europe. The chapter is extremely thorough and quite detailed in its comparative analysis. Jan van Deth and William Maloney (Chapter 45) explore the levels of political participation and associationism in Europe, on the basis of the authors’ cross-national research spanning more than a decade. This is followed by a study by Alison Woodward on gender and European politics (Chapter 46), exploring in particular what Manuel Castells has referred to as the ‘end of patriarchalism’ (Castells 1997: Ch. 4). Then follows a quite innovative contribution by Donatella della Porta and Louisa Parks on contentious politics in the European Union, addressing the anti-globalization movements and youth protest in Southern Europe (Chapter 47).
Part IX: Europe and the world

The final section of the Handbook includes critical studies on the relationship between Europe and the rest of the world. Ian Manners explores the myths and theories of European foreign policy (Chapter 48). Manners delineates the development of European foreign policy from a theoretical perspective. He also contextualizes this development in the evolving popular culture in terms of movies and video games. This mix makes the chapter quite an interesting read. Helene Sjursen considers the development and contributions of the CFSP (Chapter 49). This well-researched chapter based on decades of study is characterized by a critical approach. Finally, Chris Rumford and Didem Buhari-Gulmez critically review the relationship between Europe and the rest of the world from a sociological theory perspective (Chapter 50). In comparison to the other chapters, their approach is that of Europe-in-the-world. They use the world society approach to show how Europe is perceived and related to in a globalized setting.

In sum, as noted at the very beginning of this introductory chapter, the Handbook is intended to be a guide to the complex world of European politics as it begins to unfold in the twenty-first century. The hope is that it may provide a platform for further in-depth research on particular aspects of European politics.

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Introduction


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Introduction


Introduction


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