


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### “If the King Had Really Been a Father to Us”

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## “IF THE KING HAD REALLY BEEN A FATHER TO US”

Failed food diplomacy in eighteenth-century Sierra Leone

*Rachel B. Herrmann*

The British were floundering. It was October 1794, and the colony at Freetown, Sierra Leone, perched precariously on the brink of food insecurity.<sup>1</sup> French sailors, caught up in the fervor of the Napoleonic wars, had struck the coast of Freetown only a month prior. Although British Governor Zachary Macaulay felt dismayed to hear the attackers “usher in” and conclude each meal with a rendition of “the Marseilles Hymn”—no doubt doubly insulting because the Frenchmen were eating the colonists’ food—he likely worried more about the aggressors’ destruction of Freetown’s edible stores.<sup>2</sup> He witnessed “a parcel of Frenchmen emptying a case of Port Wine into their stomachs,” and the killing of livestock, including fourteen dozen of his own fowls and “not less than 12 hundred Hogs killed in the Town.”<sup>3</sup> Although the colony’s black Loyalists had survived relatively unscathed (Macaulay reported “no appearance of want among them”), they remained significantly discontented with the white Sierra Leone Council’s political rule, and thus disinclined to tend their crops.<sup>4</sup>

Nearby, transforming indigenous African politics posed still greater challenges to British power. In 1794 a man named Bai Farama, the newest ruler, demanded a meeting with Zachary Macaulay. Macaulay, overwhelmed in the wake of the French attack, sent fellow council member James Watt in his stead. When asked why Macaulay declined to appear, Watt betrayed the weakness of the British position. If King Farama “had really been a father to us,” said Watt, “he would have sent down rice and Stock to us before this.” Macaulay remained busy “find[ing] Victuals for all the people at Sierra Leone.”<sup>5</sup> Watt committed a double blunder. He disclosed the fact that colonists in Freetown remained unable to feed themselves. More important, he revealed the willingness of his fellow Britons to accept indigenous African leaders’ paternalistic rule of British colonists. Despite the fact that Watt questioned Farama’s capacity to reign, his use of the word “father” pointed to a reversal of traditional British relationships with people in the places they sought to colonize.

In eighteenth-century Sierra Leone, the history of consumable goods such as rice, poultry, cattle, goat meat, and alcohol reveals a stark and unexpected power imbalance between Britons and indigenous Africans. The successful practice of food diplomacy—the use of these commodities to gain and maintain alliances—determined whether or not peace prevailed in the colony and its surrounding regions.<sup>6</sup> Africans rather than Britons, however, delineated the rules, meaning that Britons made compromises about food diplomacy more frequently than they dictated its terms. Colonial organizers may have envisioned the Sierra Leone

scheme as a way to undergird British commercial might and to spread Christianity throughout the western coast of Africa, but in reality the colony’s food insecurity led to their dependence on indigenous Africans.

Historians have pointed to the slave trade in West Africa as a representative example of British weakness in an age otherwise characterized by British imperial ascendancy.<sup>7</sup> Scholars have also described the struggles of the approximately 1,200 black Loyalists who departed, first from the American colonies, and then from Nova Scotia to begin their lives anew in Sierra Leone. They have mapped the Loyalists’ conflicts with the Sierra Leone Company in London and its council members in Freetown.<sup>8</sup> In these interpretations black Loyalists enjoy greater control over their affairs than their enslaved counterparts in the former American colonies, but once they reach Africa, indigenous Africans, not black Loyalists *or* white Britons, remain in control of the currents of the Atlantic slave trade.

Writing food into this narrative makes it clear that colonists’ struggles in late eighteenth-century Sierra Leone extended far beyond the slave trade. Despite the fact that the colony of Freetown, financed by abolitionists, tried to avoid contact with slave traders, British officials met indigenous African leaders to fight food battles on a daily basis.<sup>9</sup> Over time, as the colony stabilized, food exchanges between white colonists and indigenous Africans betrayed the continuing uncertainty of the British position. At least until the early 1800s, British failure to learn the intricacies of African food diplomacy caused the colonial project to flounder. And what started as congenial misunderstandings between Britons and Africans eventually blossomed into conflict.

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British organizers conceived of the Sierra Leone colony with three overlapping goals in mind, each of which failed to a degree. These failures point to British officials’ inability to establish a position of strength in Sierra Leone. First, they sought to provide blacks with a new place to live.<sup>10</sup> Second, they hoped to find and grow valuable merchantable commodities. Finally, they sought to spread the message of Christianity through Africa. A group of over 1,190 people embarked from Nova Scotia in January 1792 under the guidance of the abolitionist Reverend John Clarkson. By March the colonists arrived at a place called Granville Town and renamed it Free Town (over time, it became Freetown).<sup>11</sup> They built their colony in the shadow of mountains that appeared “to rise gradually from the sea to a stupendous height, richly wooded and beautifully ornamented.”<sup>12</sup>

From the outset, British disorganization undermined the colony’s ability to feed itself, despite numerous attempts to do so. Unlike earlier entities such as the Virginia Company (which organized the Jamestown colony), the Sierra Leone Company was cognizant of the necessity of obtaining foodstuffs.<sup>13</sup> Thomas Clarkson, one of the organizers of the Sierra Leone Company (and Superintendent John Clarkson’s older brother), proclaimed that “Nothing is more important” than “immediately putting into Cultivation such a Spot of Land as shall ensure [colonists] Provisions.”<sup>14</sup> Other planners indicated the necessity of procuring and sheltering cattle. “I am told that Cattle from the [Banana] Islands do not thrive so well as those from the Continent, because they cannot endure the nightly Rain,” warned Granville Sharp.<sup>15</sup> It seemed as though everyone in London had something to say about food planning. Still, it became difficult for these men to achieve their objectives, given the fact that interpersonal difficulties plagued the Sierra Leone Council during the first months of colonization. Councilmen began quarreling with each other even before all their ships reached Africa.

John Clarkson remained frustrated that the Sierra Leone Company had named him superintendent rather than governor because the position gave him no power over his fellow council members. Alexander Falconbridge, a Bristol surgeon and fervent convert to abolition, was vexed that the Sierra Leone Company chose John Clarkson as superintendent, rather than him. Falconbridge was confined to the role of chief commercial agent—a job he performed poorly before dying (probably from the effects of drink).<sup>16</sup> Former Governor Henry Dalrymple defected to found a rival colony at Bulama. Dr John Bell (physician) drank heavily and died in mid-March. James Cocks (surveyor) possessed little practical experience. Richard Pepys (works engineer) was a poor planner and stubbornly averse to receiving advice. Charles Taylor (doctor) proved disinclined to tend to the sick. Storekeeper John Wakerell and plantation manager James Watt also possessed little to recommend them.<sup>17</sup> The Councilmen allowed themselves extra food and liquor when the rest of the colonists ate reduced rations, and sold ship's stores to Africans instead of distributing them.<sup>18</sup> "Never were characters worse adapted to manage any purpose of magnitude," remarked Falconbridge's wife Anna Maria.<sup>19</sup>

Arguably, John Clarkson retained the most sympathetic attitude toward the black Loyalist colonists, and set out intending to provide food for the maintenance of their well-being. Before embarkation from Nova Scotia in 1791, Clarkson bought and inspected provisions and daily issued bread, butter, potatoes, cornmeal, rice porridge, meat, and fish.<sup>20</sup> He also received word that the directors of the Sierra Leone Company made a relatively last-minute decision to provide colonists with full provisions for three months, and half provisions for another three; they intended these supplies to stretch until the colonists could plant and harvest crops.<sup>21</sup> By July 1792—halfway through their first year in Freetown—the Sierra Leone Company had recanted on its stance regarding John Clarkson's relatively powerless position as superintendent, and named him governor with the ability to make decisions that overrode those of other council members.<sup>22</sup>

Despite Clarkson's pre-voyage preparations and expanded authority, however, he still struggled to supply the colony with adequate sustenance. The expedition across the Atlantic did not go smoothly. Six people died before leaving Nova Scotia, probably from typhoid fever, and another sixty-five expired from further contagion once the ships were underway. Clarkson himself fell dangerously ill, suffering from fainting spells and memory loss.<sup>23</sup> His state of health upon arrival in Sierra Leone may have contributed to his sending contradictory reports back to London about the colony's food security. In a letter to Clarkson, colonial organizer Henry Thornton expressed his surprise at information regarding food supply that Clarkson had provided. Clarkson had apparently said that he did "not think at all about it," but Thornton had also heard about a journey upriver to obtain additional provisions—a point that contradicted Clarkson's claim that the colony remained well-fed.<sup>24</sup> In another letter, Thornton complained that the Sierra Leone Company had heard "nothing as to the means you are taking or intending to take for a supply of fresh provisions."<sup>25</sup>

In fact, Clarkson had formulated a plan, but he refrained from sharing it with the Sierra Leone Company. Clarkson sympathized with the new colonists, but remained reluctant to trust them entirely to provide for themselves. He wrote that because the Loyalists had "*their provisions found them,*" a great deal of "vice and every species of wickedness and discontent . . . [was] spreading in the colony."<sup>26</sup> He sought to exercise his rule through the careful doling out of food stores. He disagreed with the Sierra Leone Company's six-month plan for provisioning, and upon arrival he worked out a system of labor-for-food instead.<sup>27</sup> Despite these alterations, the Loyalists trusted Clarkson, and generally accepted his authority.

He returned to London for a brief trip at the start of 1793, when the Sierra Leone Company summarily fired him.<sup>28</sup>

Other elements remained beyond Clarkson’s control. Ship stores were poor from the start. En route to Sierra Leone a little earlier in the century, Anna Maria Falconbridge remarked that her vessel carried “not a thing on board, but salt beef, so hard, we were obliged to chop it with an axe, and some mouldy, rotten biscuits.”<sup>29</sup> Provisions for the black Loyalists proved little better, and within three months of their arrival food supplies ran low, despite the fact that transport ships had supplied several thousand pounds of beef, bread, pork, and rice. Colonists began eating half rations by 7 April. In May John Clarkson received a letter from a man whose family was “quite starving.” “We have had not a bit of bread for near three weeks,” he wrote, and “only half a pound of meat a day ... I and my wife are dying by inches, really, for want of proper support.” With dismay, Clarkson wrote about “the confusion and irregularity in distributing provisions.”<sup>30</sup> He doubtless contributed to part of this disorder, but managed to remedy the situation with his new labor-for-food system, at least until his departure from the colony.

Other officials’ inability to cooperate meant that their missions to obtain additional food supplies rarely succeeded. In February 1792, before all of the ships had made landfall, works engineer Richard Pepys suggested that one of the other captains “go with his Vessel” to Susu Country “and other parts of the Coast northward to purchase live Stock & provisions for this Settlement.”<sup>31</sup> The captain, however, “demanded” such “high Terms” for this service that the Council decided to abandon the plan by March.<sup>32</sup> The company’s dearth of ships prohibited extensive voyaging elsewhere. In August Alexander Falconbridge offered to “make a trip to purchase stock for the Colony,” but John Clarkson observed that “from his constant drinking, he has rendered himself incapable of being trusted.”<sup>33</sup> In November 1792 James Watt went “up one of the rivers after fresh provisions but,” for some unstated reason, “had failed in his object.”<sup>34</sup> By January 1793, “there [was] neither beef, Pork, flower, or any kind of provision sufficient to last the colony a week.”<sup>35</sup>

Even when men managed to obtain domesticated animals to feed the colonists, the animals seldom survived the trip back to Freetown. A ship called the *Providence* carrying twenty-one sheep, for example, lost sixteen “in the course of an hour.”<sup>36</sup> And when the animals *did* arrive alive, it took colonists some time to realize that the kernel and leaves of an unidentified tree posed “a mortal poison” to cattle, goats, and pigs, all of whom would eat the vegetation unless carefully monitored.<sup>37</sup>

Prepared foodstuffs fared little better because of landing and storage issues. Anna Maria Falconbridge pointed out that most of “the landing places are generally bad, in consequence of the shore being bound with iron rocks, and an ugly surge most commonly breaking on them.”<sup>38</sup> Casks of meat, rum, and wine washed away before colonists found time to put them into storage.<sup>39</sup> Two months into living in Sierra Leone no one had erected a storehouse for provisions, and the one they eventually constructed fared badly.<sup>40</sup> Clarkson complained that within the storage unit “different articles and provisions” were “stowed one above another,” meaning that if one item leaked it ruined everything nearby. The “damaged cheese and biscuits, with other articles in a state of putrefaction” engendered “a stench about the storehouse.” Furthermore, a mush of spoiled food “allowed to lie and soak into the ground” outside made Clarkson worried for the health of storehouse employees.<sup>41</sup> Internecine councils’ quarrels, colonial officials’ inability to obtain domesticated animals from nearby regions, the high cost of procuring provisions, the difficulties

in landing them, and the problem of storing them quickly necessitated that colonists turn to indigenous Africans for food supplies.

Sierra Leone possessed no large kingdoms at the moment of British arrival; indigenous African leaders maintained power locally. The Temne lived inland, on the Bullum Shore and at the mouth of the Scarcies River, having migrated from Futa Jallon sometime in the fourteenth or fifteenth century.<sup>42</sup> When the colonists landed in 1792, a regent the British referred to as King Naimbana ranked high in the hierarchy, and the Sierra Leone Company purchased land from him.<sup>43</sup> Lesser rulers paid tribute to Naimbana, as did other nearby families. In February 1793 Naimbana died, and in July of that year his son, Henry Granville Naimbana, also met his end. Bai Farama (also known as King Farama) took Naimbana's place, but it took a year for the power transfer to take effect.<sup>44</sup> Because Africans conceived of payment for land as a form of rent rather than a final sale, officials found themselves obligated to repurchase land as each new leader assumed power.<sup>45</sup> When Thomas Clarkson made plans for Freetown, he warned John that he would need to "make Treaties of perpetual Alliance with Nambana & the other Kings."<sup>46</sup> His missive betrayed his concern that colonists would prove unable to maintain amity without frequent meetings with local leaders, who made it clear that their rule superseded British strength.

At first the Company hoped to employ local populations to grow crops that would feed the colony. "Rice & Malaguitta Pepper," speculated Thomas Clarkson, "should be produced by the Natives alone because ... no cultivation on the part of the Settlers could produce it better."<sup>47</sup> Colonists would raise cotton, indigo, potash, sugar, and tobacco.<sup>48</sup> Colonial investors assumed that they would be able to "make colonists of such native laborers as are found after some tryal of their industry" after providing them "small lots of Land."<sup>49</sup> They surmised that they could persuade some of the colony's "trusty Blacks" to "converse with the natives & draw them to work for us."<sup>50</sup> Abolitionist William Wilberforce suggested that colonists could convince "one or more of the Natives to board & lodge with them," and inculcate Africans with "our language & religion, habits of industry," and "the mode of cultivating lands."<sup>51</sup>

Ultimately the plan to convince Africans to grow crops for the colony did not succeed. The proposal to house Africans with black Loyalists was predicated on the hypothesis that the two groups shared a language, but many of the Loyalists by this point in the eighteenth century had been born in North America; of the approximately 1,300 colonists who arrived in Sierra Leone (including over a hundred white employees), less than one-fourth hailed from West or Central African communities.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, labor standards were different in Sierra Leone. The colonists did not control enough land for farming. Governor Macaulay bemoaned "the want of any constraining power over the natives," "their very great indolence," and the absence "of an overseer in the field which is customary & indeed necessary."<sup>53</sup> Despite the fact that Macaulay and others remained committed to creating new lives for former slaves, officials remained too reliant on established ideas of black labor; they assumed that Africans, though not enslaved by the Company, would require someone to monitor their time in the fields. Organizers also entertained odd notions about African versus black Loyalist knowledge of food production. In addition, it is important to note that few of these crops—with the exception of sugar (which organizers probably envisioned as an export commodity) and rice—yield edible produce. Colonial planners could not trust that African labor would reasonably guarantee the colony's food security.

Conflicts with indigenous Africans and the Sierra Leone Company's policy regarding slavery also made it difficult to obtain food. As a colony founded by abolitionists who were

committed to providing a home for former slaves, Freetown remained problematically located in the midst of slave-trading societies.<sup>54</sup> From 1760 to 1780, for example, one out of every five people sold into the Atlantic slave trade hailed from the Sierra Leone coast.<sup>55</sup> The Company’s stance on slavery may have limited colonial officials’ contact with passing slave ships that might have otherwise provided food to the struggling colony.

In the wake of John Clarkson’s departure, the colony remained troubled from within. Land allotment issues engendered clashes between the black Loyalists and the Sierra Leone Council, and culminated in the Loyalists’ 1800 rebellion.<sup>56</sup> Although the Council tried many of the rebels, exiled some, and executed a couple of them, the following year one of the men remaining at large assisted Farama and other indigenous Africans in an attack on nearby Fort Thornton.<sup>57</sup> They struck again in 1802.<sup>58</sup> Africans thus possessed the capacity to isolate Britons inside of Freetown and prevent them from accessing external supplies. After exhausting all available options and acknowledging that their relations with Africans remained uncertain, colonial officials finally admitted their dependency on indigenous African food supplies.

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As colonists set about asking Africans for food, they had to learn the customs of indigenous food diplomacy. Food diplomacy had existed in a number of iterations well before the eighteenth century. Because other types of diplomacy—such as fur and trade diplomacy—began to falter on the eve of the American Revolution, British officials in North America became much more concerned with their ability to use food (in addition to furs and trade goods) to broker allegiances.<sup>59</sup> Military leaders convinced Iroquois Indians to fight for them by holding meetings where they distributed generous portions of meat and alcohol. They maintained those loyalties by provisioning the women and children of Indian warriors when Americans destroyed Native villages, and consequently large caches of food, during John Sullivan’s campaign of 1779. During the course of the war, however, Northern Indians conceived of a different version of food diplomacy that dictated that their allies needed to share the experience of hunger, and they subsequently deprived British soldiers of food when they went out on combined missions.<sup>60</sup>

Although the British officials in Sierra Leone had not personally lived through the North American conflict, by the end of the Revolution food diplomacy had become a much more recognizable form of communication in the British Atlantic in general. The act of trying to use food to maintain power probably came naturally to Sierra Leone Council members; but they would not have been surprised to find that power slip from their grasp. As newcomers to an area where British influence remained limited, men such as Clarkson could not expect a speedy ascent to the top of the extant indigenous hierarchy.

Local African groups observed some customs that appeared similar to European foodways. One ruler was “said to expend annually” fifty puncheons “Of Rum in drams, treating his Negroe acquaintance.”<sup>61</sup> The British would have been familiar with the use of alcohol to smooth the way for meetings, especially in the case of North American Indian treaties.<sup>62</sup> Gender roles also mimicked Native American divisions in food production and consumption. Indigenous women, according to Anna Maria Falconbridge, were “obliged to till the ground, and do all laborious work,” and during meals, the men “seldom suffer a woman to sit down or eat with them.”<sup>63</sup> John Clarkson voiced a similar statement after a meal with a man named King Jimmy, during which he noticed “that the women did not sit at the same table as the king,” and “When we sat down to dinner, the queen with her

daughters and other attendants sat down on the ground outside the tent.”<sup>64</sup> Although Falconbridge’s and Clarkson’s observations may have been partly misinformed (one wonders, for example, how everyone ate when English observers were absent, and whether lower-ranked Africans practiced similar segregations), their description of these customs sheds light on differences between Africans and colonists. The fact that they mentioned them at all suggests the degree to which colonists attempted to identify such dissimilarities.

Other practices deviated from the familiar, and underscored British powerlessness. John Clarkson commented that although nearby rulers “levy no taxes on their subjects,” come harvest time each family presented “a present of two or three bushels of rice.” They expected their slaves to offer up “three or four bushels of rice per year, perhaps also a couple or more of fowls, a fathom of cloth, a goat, or sheep or the like.”<sup>65</sup> These customs of taxing slaves doubtless puzzled colonists. Britons acquainted with feudalism may have recognized such forms of tribute, but few people would expect slaves to give away hard-won produce grown on private garden plots.<sup>66</sup> More significantly, as non-producers of food, colonists could not expect to provide levies of rice or domesticated animals to the rulers like Farama who claimed them as subjects. Thus British colonists’ state of dependency at times placed them even lower on a scale of power than the slave societies they decried.

Initially, colonists’ knowledge of African poisoning practices also made them reluctant to accept food and drink from Natives. Thomas Clarkson warned his brother that he needed to “take Care how you eat with the Natives, who have the art of poysonry.”<sup>67</sup> Olaudah Equiano, who claimed to have been kidnapped from the nearby Guinea coast, opined, “natives are extremely cautious about poison. When they buy any eatable the seller kisses it all round before the buyer, to shew him it is not poisoned; and the same is done when any meat or drink is presented, particularly to a stranger.”<sup>68</sup> John Clarkson found a similar echo of this practice during a visit with King Jimmy. He wrote that when Jimmy offered him wine and water, he placed “his glass to his own mouth first,” and then “gave it to me afterwards” to set Clarkson at ease.<sup>69</sup> Yet some suspicions remained, and with good reason: as late as 1797 black Loyalists caught Temne in the act of poisoning their animals, and possibly fueling suspicions about the existence of tainted meat.<sup>70</sup>

All the same, the British needed food, and in light of their failures to employ Africans to grow it for them, they began to accept it from nearby populations. In the April of their arrival, when some of the men had not yet moved from ship to land, a group of Temne brought “a small species of deer which they had shot” on board Clarkson’s ship the *Amy*.<sup>71</sup> By March the people “of the Timmany nation” came “every day to the settlement in great numbers, bringing with them ... Anana’s Banana’s, Plantains, Limes, Oranges, Cassada &c,” which they exchanged with colonists for “Biscuit, Beef, Soap and Spirits.”<sup>72</sup> By October 1792 Clarkson reported that almost 150 Temne came to town each day. Each Temne trader had “among our settlers one whom he calls his friend, with whom he barter for commodities.”<sup>73</sup> Britons enjoyed the most success obtaining supplies from the portions of the coast to the south and east of Freetown; to the north, powerful Fula merchants made it more difficult to procure supplies—though it was nearly always indigenous Africans who chose when to provide colonists with commodities.<sup>74</sup>

As the colony’s position stabilized, officials began to reciprocate by sending comestible goods—oftentimes alcohol—to indigenous African leaders. Alcohol was one of the few commodities that Africans actively sought from the British (though their access to other European and non-European traders once again meant that Britons did not enjoy as much



control as they may have preferred). During a 1795 meeting with Furry Canaba, a leader near Robana, Canaba willingly accepted the case of gin the British brought him, “notwithstanding his being of the Mandingo religion,” whose observers normally eschewed alcohol.<sup>75</sup> At times officials offered spirits in response to requests from nearby regents. When Farama assumed Naimbana’s place in the ruling hierarchy, the Council sent him “a Puncheon of Rum” in answer to his application for one.<sup>76</sup>

At other times Britons sent alcohol preemptively, to maintain good relations. When John Clarkson went to visit Naimbana in 1792—notably, during the height of food shortages in Freetown—he did so with a puncheon of rum in hand.<sup>77</sup> After Clarkson departed from the colony, King Jimmy visited Isaac DuBois and expressed his “regreat” at “not seeing Mr Clarkson before he went away.” DuBois witnessed “several tears fall from his eyes,” and thought it prudent to comfort “the King with a Glass of wine”—again, possibly because food supplies stood at a nadir, and the black Loyalists were discontented. Jimmy departed Freetown “in good humor.”<sup>78</sup> Just as colonists had to repurchase land from Africans, colonial officials realized that they needed to offer gifts of alcohol when new leaders assumed command. In spite of their efforts to portray Africans like Jimmy as thankful, it seems doubtful that the British enjoyed the option of refusal.

When Britons offered other commodities to indigenous African rulers, those gifts usually functioned as symbolic or prestige items, rather than as food that would provide sustenance; Africans, in other words, rarely *needed* the edible goods that Britons gave them. Furry Canaba “expressed a wish” to James Watt for butter, cheese, flour, nutmeg, sugar, and a tea kettle.<sup>79</sup> Butter and cheese may have been difficult to produce in an area where cattle did not flourish; flour was likely wheat flour, and thus harder to obtain than rice; sugar and nutmeg would have been expensive items; and the tea kettle would have allowed a limited number of African rulers to replicate British tea-drinking. Other tokens proved more substantial, but still superfluous for Africans’ survival. In December 1795, for example, the Council recorded sending a civet of rice and a cask of bread to the Duke of Clarence, forty-seven pounds of fresh beef to King Jimmy, and twenty pounds of rice, twenty-five pounds of fresh beef, and two bottles of wine to Mahomadas Samba.<sup>80</sup> Such presents, consequently, allowed the British to participate in the exchange of food, but allowed Africans to retain the upper hand.

As Britons and Africans increasingly shared food and alcohol with each other, the two groups enjoyed a brief period during which they engaged in what historian Richard White has dubbed “creative misunderstandings.” White is very clear about what conditions engender the existence of what he calls the “middle ground”: “A confrontation between imperial or state regimes and non-state forms of social organization, a rough balance of power, a mutual need or a desire for what the other possesses, and an inability of one side to commandeer enough force to compel the other to do what it desired.” These circumstances do not preclude violence, he argues, “but the critical element is mediation.”<sup>81</sup> In Sierra Leone, imperial officials in Freetown faced the local influence of indigenous African rulers; with respect to power, the British may have remained dependent on Africans for food, but during the early years of colonization they rarely suffered the threat of Africans attacking Freetown. Both sides wanted something from the other—Englishmen needed food while Africans wanted trade goods, symbolic food gifts, and alcohol. Africans and Britons continuously negotiated their disagreements because force was a less appealing option. For about half a decade they peacefully exchanged food, before these exchanges deteriorated into ongoing conflict.

During these early years a shared meal could function well enough to quash rumors of indigenous African attacks. In January 1793 Isaac DuBois woke to a midnight report “that King Jemmys people were in the Town” intending to strike. The black Loyalists were in a panic (they were the ones who roused DuBois), and had set about telling people that Governor “Dawes was sending for every body & arming them.”<sup>82</sup> In reality Jimmy was not in Freetown; he arrived the next day with Signior Domingo, an African-Portuguese man who ruled at Foro Bay, to the eastward.<sup>83</sup> The two men “said they were much offended that such doubts were entertained of their friendship as to suppose they would make War without a cause.” Afterward, “they dined with Mr Dawes,” and then visited DuBois to reiterate their peaceful message: that Jimmy “hoped always to be friends.”<sup>84</sup> Jimmy came into town with a diplomatic communication, a point he drove home by remaining long enough to partake of colonists’ food.<sup>85</sup> In this case, a visit and a meal calmed officials and colonists alike.

Such shared meals occasioned different sorts of diplomacy. Sometimes, Britons found themselves trying to change African foodways. At other times, they had to disguise their disgust and silently eat the things Africans served them. And during other moments, indigenous Africans educated Britons about the proper ways to break bread. The Temne custom of separating men and women during mealtimes raised British hackles. When Clarkson went to visit Jimmy he attempted to erase this division. Despite the fact that Jimmy “would have sent” the women “something on his own plate during dinner, as he did” previously, Clarkson decided otherwise. As soon as everyone was seated, he took hold of the first dish, and “said to the king, ‘Now king, I will show you my country fash,’ and immediately sent the plate to the queen, and continued helping the remainder of the females.” In addition to sending food to the women, Clarkson personally served them, physically diminishing the space between them. His actions sent several messages: he implied that he was sharing *his* country’s superior custom; that he knew better than Jimmy; and that the ladies present deserved greater attention than Jimmy paid them. Clarkson reported that his serving the women out of turn “occasioned a general laugh,” but there is really no way to know whether or not Jimmy took Clarkson’s challenge with good humor.<sup>86</sup> Perhaps he found the situation funny—but perhaps he thought it a bit presumptuous for a guest to alter serving etiquette.

On other visits Britons enjoyed less choice over what and how they ate. When colonist James Strand went to stay with Naimbana for a few days, he brought along “a few presents” so that Naimbana would “supply me with fresh provisions.”<sup>87</sup> Yet even when Britons brought presents to local rulers to get what they wanted, there was no way to guarantee that they would enjoy the repast that awaited them. One day Strand described his dismay at “the sight” of “an eagles talon stuck up in the dish” that appeared for him. Though Strand was surprised, he “was prevailed on for want of something else, to eat of the Fricassee,” indicating that during this moment he must have initially refused the dish, and that his hosts spent time convincing him to try it. Unfortunately he found his “weak stomach unable to digest eagles,” and he reported “suffering woefully in this experimt.” Did Strand become ill in public? Or did he retreat to suffer privately? Strand’s account is silent on the matter. He did begin to “think of effecting [his] retreat,” and confirmed this decision after being “shewn a huge Crocodile that Evening ... which though they assured me seriously of the contrary, I apprehended they might smuggle into ... a plate of fricassee.”<sup>88</sup> The British had to stomach a few unfamiliar meals rather than go hungry, and different ideas about taste meant that hilarity sometimes ensued.

British notions of Christian superiority over nonbelievers also colored their judgment of African foodways. In 1793 Zachary Macaulay visited Signior Domingo and Pa Sirey, another ruler of Port Loko. Macaulay described Sirey as “a Marabou or Mahometean [Muslim] priest” involved “in assisting” other Africans “at their Sacrifices to the Devil.” Immediately thereafter, Macaulay commented that “Their meal consisted of nothing but Rice moistened with Palm oil and washed down with Water.” “The warm admirers of patriarchal Simplicity might here have gratified their taste,” he observed, “but for my own part I felt no inclination to change a piece of cold Mutton & a bottle of wine I had with me, for the honour of dining on rice & palm oil even with Majesty.”<sup>89</sup> His notion of the Muslim faith may have influenced Macaulay’s willingness to eat his host’s food, as evidenced by his displeasure that their meal included no alcohol. Still, it is notable that even though Macaulay suspected his hosts of making sacrifices to the devil, he ate their food without comment and saved his reflections for his journal. At least in the early 1790s Britons successfully concealed their disgust with “patriarchal” African religion and foodways.

Yet sometimes even though Britons thought they had behaved in an acceptable manner, indigenous Africans made it clear that officials had somehow erred in their practice of food diplomacy. When James Watt was on his way to Furry Canaba’s in 1795, a group of runners from a nearby town stopped him. Before intimating “the disappointment the Head Man felt at our not calling in our way up,” the deputy offered Watt and his party “some clean Rice,” and apologized “for the want of Fowls to render it more worthy.”<sup>90</sup> The message here seemed clear: Watt had offended a local leader by neglecting to pay him a visit. The gift of rice was meant to maintain good relations while also rebuking Watt, who could have obtained a tastier repast by appearing in person. Generally, English visitors who cut their stay short received rough rice; hosts offered live fowls to those who lingered longer; and esteemed visitors ate fully cooked meals, with meat included.<sup>91</sup> Women, however, may have received special treatment; Anna Maria Falconbridge wrote that “Wherever” she went, “there was commonly a fowl boiled for me.”<sup>92</sup>

These moments effectively reinforced the fact that although Britons could and did use food to maintain peace (just as Africans did), they rarely held the upper hand. When British officials tried to curtail supplies of alcohol to indigenous African leaders, the two groups clashed. By October 1793 Zachary Macaulay complained that colonists found themselves “much pestered” by visiting Africans bearing “some present of Rice or Fowls ... with a view of having it returned in Liquor.”<sup>93</sup> Macaulay called these items presents, but it is clear that Natives expected the colonists to reciprocate in kind. When told that Macaulay would not trade with them, Farama’s representatives clarified that “they did not mean trade”; they meant a “present” for Farama. Farama even charged Macaulay with treating “the King’s messengers with Contempt when they came to ask for liquor.”<sup>94</sup> Englishmen did not comprehend the fact that when African rulers demanded alcohol, they were suggesting that presents of food or drink were compulsory commodities in keeping the peace.

Attempts to enact analogous changes among other African rulers proved similarly unsuccessful. In November 1793 regents called King James, Pa London, and Prince George “came to renew their application for Rum.” Governor William Dawes refused them, but knew he could not send them away empty-handed. Tellingly, he offered them food instead of drink. The men “partook of our dinner ... with tolerable humor.”<sup>95</sup> This moment testifies to the extent to which white Councilmen viewed exchanges of food as a way to prevent conflict, even during a time when people disagreed about the distribution of alcohol.

The Council enjoyed more luck curtailing the sale of alcohol to non-ruling Natives. By 1794 the Council observed a “general rule of not making any considerable presents of Liquor to Natives.”<sup>96</sup> When these Africans appeared hoping to exchange edibles for alcohol, the colonists “receive[d] their present paying them somewhat less than its value, but absolutely refusing the demand for Liquor.”<sup>97</sup> The Council’s use of the term “present” acknowledged African ideas about the term, given the fact that the colonists now knew they had to offer something in exchange. But by proffering less and less money colonists nevertheless hoped to restrict the practice.<sup>98</sup> Britons thus exerted power in their dealings with non-elite Natives, but this act meant little to the ruling indigenous regents in the area.

At other times, even the act of sitting down to share a meal could result in clashes. Some incidents seemed relatively innocuous, as in the instance shortly after the colonists’ arrival in 1792, when a ruler named Yamacopra—mother to Naimbana’s son, Henry Granville Naimbana—met John Clarkson in an unusual gathering at tea. During this meeting, wrote Clarkson, Yamacopra “contrived to steal a teaspoon.” An unidentified British lady, “who suspected her majesty,” noticed “the spoon under the queen’s wrapping cloth” and “pulled it out.” An embarrassed Yamacopra, in a state of “much uneasiness ... took great pains to convince us it must have got there by mistake.”<sup>99</sup> Clarkson presented Yamacopra’s discomfort jokingly, even though he admitted that a British woman literally reached into Yamacopra’s bosom in the company of a number of men in order to retrieve the spoon. John Clarkson knew that the Temne did not treat Yamacopra as a dominant ruler. She was “an old queen,” he wrote, “who does not appear to have much power.”<sup>100</sup> Colonists could afford to call her out because she possessed little influence at this time. In emphasizing the fact that Yamacopra’s theft took place during teatime (a meal at the height of British propriety), Clarkson implicitly underscored the obnoxiousness of her crime. He could do so, however, because teatime meetings rarely occurred (one thinks of Furry Canaba having to ask for a tea kettle), so he did not have to risk a clash with a more important personage.

Such incidents sometimes escalated, and in this instance Yamacopra made use of the little power she did enjoy to turn that British ceremony on its head by accusing Britons of poisoning her son with a cup of chamomile tea.<sup>101</sup> John Frederick Naimbana, King Naimbana’s eldest son, travelled from Sierra Leone to England in 1791 with Alexander and Anna Maria Falconbridge.<sup>102</sup> After beginning a study of the Bible and the Hebrew language, he was baptized into the Anglican Church as Henry Granville Naimbana in Clapham, London in October 1792. Soon afterward, he set out on his return, intending to preach Christianity in Africa—but he became mysteriously ill en route.<sup>103</sup> By the time his vessel landed, Henry’s fever had progressed too far, and he never reawakened.<sup>104</sup> On 18 July 1793 colonists in Freetown received word of his death, and events quickly accelerated.<sup>105</sup>

Yamacopra wrote a letter that voiced her charge of foul play, and Henry’s brother Bartholomew delivered it to Freetown.<sup>106</sup> British officials met the Temne at a *palaver*, or meeting, to resolve the issue. Signior Domingo “opened the business,” speaking “in the Timmaney language.”<sup>107</sup> Because Yamacopra had yet to arrive, he conveyed the substance of her complaint: she accused Captain Woolis, the ship’s captain, of poisoning “her Son while at sea with a cup of tea.” Yamacopra “demanded that the sum of 600 bars Should be instantly paid to her, in which case she would drop all thoughts of war.”<sup>108</sup>

The British may have known that Yamacopra’s threat was largely bluster. Although the Temne possessed the capacity to attack the British, they had thus far refrained from doing so; the meeting was a diplomatic attempt to maintain peace. Perhaps Yamacopra knew this, because in her letter she also offered an alternate option: if Captain Woolis denied the

charge and refused to pay the fine, Yamacopra suggested that he undergo the traditional Temne trial-by-fire experience: the drinking of “red water,” brewed from the deadly Calabar bean. According to Temne law, when accused persons drank red water, only the innocent survived. But in Anna Maria Falconbridge’s estimation the people passing judgment possessed more of a say in the matter, making the beverage “strong or weak, as they are inclined by circumstances.”<sup>109</sup> “Guilty” people died, whereas “innocent” people merely became very ill.<sup>110</sup>

Even at the climax of this *palaver*, room for compromise remained. Temne, not British, actions made it clear that Woolis would not need to undergo the red water ordeal. When Yamacopra suggested it, the Temne released “Such a general burst of laughter” that Zachary Macaulay believed “they regarded” the idea “as absurd and impracticable.”<sup>111</sup> It seemed as though the Temne possessed little wish to follow up on this portion of Yamacopra’s accusation. Maybe so, but Governor William Dawes still demanded, on Woolis’s behalf—and in adherence to British legal traditions—to hear the evidence against him. They brought forward the original accuser, a man named James, whom Henry Granville Naimbana had dismissed from his shipboard cabin and Captain Woolis had “put ... before the mast ... to do some duty.”<sup>112</sup> It seemed that the switch had injured James’s pride, leading him to suggest the poisoning attempt. Now, however, he admitted that although someone had prepared chamomile tea for Henry, he “could not Say” whether someone “had put poison there.”<sup>113</sup>

Yamacopra’s arrival the next day saved the unfortunate Woolis. British attendees convinced Henry’s mother that she needed a witness to confirm Woolis’s guilt. In light of the unconvincing evidence (as well as clear lack of support from fellow Temne leaders), Yamacopra let the poison charge drop, and Woolis was free to go.<sup>114</sup> Although the two sides had reached an agreement that avoided bloodshed, the incident demonstrated the extent to which fears and accusations about poison persistently undergirded British–Temne interactions.

This particular clash continued beyond the poisoning charge. Even though it seems unlikely that the English poisoned Henry, the circumstances surrounding his death remained troublesome. After *palaver* attendees addressed the question of poison (but before Yamacopra arrived and formally exculpated Woolis), someone read Henry’s will, the contents of which, Macaulay related, “staggered them all very much.” Some of the Temne began “manifesting doubt” concerning its authenticity.<sup>115</sup> It seemed that Henry, on his deathbed, had decided to give the British a very generous gift of food supplies.

As he lay dying on 14 July, Henry had dictated a will that instructed his brother Bartholomew to pay thirteen tons of rice and three cows to the Sierra Leone Company. If Bartholomew possessed no cows to spare, he was to “purchase three cows” to give in Henry’s name. After this bequest, Henry “complained of fatigue” and said, “he would postpone the remainder till he had taken a little rest.” But shortly thereafter, “his fever and Delirium returned with increased violence,” and he died.<sup>116</sup> Although the Temne did not know about this unexpected offering of grain and animals before they accused the British of poisoning Henry, they must have found the will strange nonetheless. Why had Henry bestowed such largesse upon the British colonists? Was there a chance that his conversion to Christianity had committed him so fully to the British that he sought to ensure their continuing presence in Freetown? Or was it possible that the British had manipulated the situation to enhance their food security?

The discovery of Henry’s will occurred at a particularly opportune moment for the British. By mid-1793, Macaulay estimated that the colonists could easily consume a half

ton of rice per day.<sup>117</sup> It remained difficult to maintain cattle, and although the colonists had managed to grow some food crops, the May to August rainy season always reduced stored supplies.<sup>118</sup> This gift not only allowed the fledgling Sierra Leone Company to survive, it also, in effect, guaranteed that the British would remain in Freetown. Perhaps it appeared unlikely that Henry possessed breath enough only to ensure that the colonists were well fed before he died, but the Temne had only recently failed to make a poisoning accusation stick. They reluctantly accepted the will as genuine. In truth, a gift of rice that would provide twenty-six days of food for hungry colonists on the coast of West Africa did not pose a significant enough threat to Temne power.

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When colonists ventured into Africans' territory, however, indigenous leaders demonstrated their strength, Britons felt the middle ground disintegrating underneath their feet, and less-than-creative misunderstandings over food resulted in tense moments. James Watt's journey to Robaga to see Farama witnessed an utter breakdown of British food diplomacy and further emphasis on African paternalism. When, in 1794, Farama became the most powerful regent, Watt found himself headed to see him as Zachary Macaulay's representative. In keeping with established etiquette, Watt was supposed to reaffirm diplomatic relations with this new ruler—a tricky task, given the fact that Farama had seized several of the Sierra Leone Company's ships (they had procured approximately ten ships by that time) during the French attack that September.<sup>119</sup>

Watt reached Pa Kokilly's town first, and blundered almost immediately. There, he was informed that Pa Kokilly had "expected us the former Day, and had kill'd a goat to make [a] good dinner for us." Kokilly "proposed killing another if we would consent to stay all day," but Watt was "urgent to get our business settled," and refused the offer.<sup>120</sup> Kokilly had honored Watt as an important guest by butchering and preparing food for him. By arriving late and neglecting to stay for a meal, Watt inadvertently indicated that Kokilly was a ruling member of little consequence.

Watt continued to Robaga with Kokilly in tow, where Farama and his deputy, Banna, both appeared pleased to see the colonists, and according to custom provided each man in Watt's party with "a live fowl for supper which is Customary."<sup>121</sup> Watt's description of this practice was not entirely correct. As a visitor he could have received rough rice, cooked rice, some meat to cook, or a fully-prepared meal. The fact that his hosts gave him meat seemed appropriate to Watt, and it is true that they did not make him procure it himself. But this meal was already a step down from the one Kokilly offered him, and the fact that he had to prepare some of his own repast did not necessarily bode as well as Watt hoped. Indeed, when Watt subsequently attempted to speak about "the business we came about," Farama and Banna put him off—"they said they cou'd not speak about it" until another ruler named Pa London arrived. Yet when Pa London appeared, those present told him that they still "cou'd not speak," as Pa Arrow remained at large. Watt instructed them to "send for him and every person else" who retained complaints against Governor Macaulay, but it became increasingly clear that Watt would be bound by his hosts' timeline for business, rather than his own.<sup>122</sup> Watt's meal should have signaled the fact that leading rulers found his mission relatively trivial.

The situation really began to deteriorate the next morning, after Watt made two accusations that undercut Farama's food diplomacy, and thus his ability to govern. After

someone informed Watt that the other members of the meeting remained absent—thus necessitating a further delay of business—an unidentified person asked him whether or not “the King did not always take very good care of us?” An already frustrated Watt responded that Farama “appeared to take care of us ‘all same as Leopard take care of Goat.’” Everyone present laughed, but later in the day his hosts cut the *palaver* short by claiming that their complaints against Macaulay were too great, and that only he could answer them.<sup>123</sup> Later, Watt would learn that his indictment of Farama (saying that he treated the Sierra Leone colonists as leopards treated goats) was tantamount to a curse.<sup>124</sup> Leopards, of course, preyed on livestock in the area, and by suggesting that Farama was like a leopard Watt implied that Farama wished the colonists dead.

This allegation alone was likely enough to end the meeting, but Watt made things worse with a second charge. He stated that Macaulay would not appear in person regardless of who wanted him there, because he was obliged to “find Victuals for all the people at Sierra Leone.” “If the King had really been a father to us,” concluded Watt, referring to Farama, “he would have sent down rice and Stock to us before this.”<sup>125</sup> Watt not only suggested that Macaulay was too important and too busy to meet with Farama; he also questioned Farama’s inclination to provide the colonists with sustenance. Coupled with the accusation that Farama wanted the colonists dead, *palaver* attendees could have easily interpreted Watt’s charge to mean that Farama sought to kill the colonists by withholding food.

The next day began as a hungry one for Watt. His hosts provided a breakfast that consisted “of Rice and a single fowl of a very small size” shared among the five other men in his party—a sure sign of his hosts’ growing hostility. Then, other rulers started in again on Watt. Pa London “began to accuse Mr. McCaulay and myself for never coming to see him at his own house.” Rather than apologize for neglecting this necessary custom, Watt explained his absence by stating that he felt “very little encouragement to go” because when “we went it was difficult to get any thing to eat.” After once again accusing an indigenous African ruler of neglecting to feed him sufficiently, Watt turned his attention to critiquing the present situation. “This was now the third Day since we came here,” he observed, “and we had not got at much of any kind of Animal food as to satisfy us.”<sup>126</sup>

Instead of realizing that he had not received meat because he was acting like a rude guest, Watt began to boss his hosts around by suggesting they begin killing animals to feed him. Watt noted that he had seen “several goats in the town,” which he knew “belonged to Pa London.” He said that if Pa London “loved us he would kill a goat for us, altho. we were not at his town.” “In a very bad humour,” Pa London initially refused. “The goats I saw were sent here to do God service,” and London told Watt that he “could not kill them for people.” Watt countered that “if I went to his own town he wou’d have equally as good an excuse.” Enraged, Pa London retired immediately, and came back with a goat “which he killed directly.” Watt related that Pa London performed the butchering “with so bad a grace, that altho rice and water is no palatable diet,” he “wou’d have put up” with such a repast, “rather than eat his goat.”<sup>127</sup> Watt pushed Pa London to cease observing African ideas of food etiquette, and to feed Watt because he demanded it. Pa London’s violent slaughter of the goat demonstrated the extent to which Watt had stepped outside the bounds of conventional food diplomacy. It also boded poorly for Watt’s attempts at securing peace.

Instead of sending Watt home after the failed meeting, his hosts informed him that he was to stay on as Farama’s prisoner while the rest of his company departed for Freetown. After they detained Watt, something curious occurred: Watt was fed an excessive amount

of food. An hour after the rest of Watt's traveling coterie left Robaga, Watt was visited by a woman who gave him oranges. Then Farama "came to bring me some palm wine," and told him "dinner shoud soon be ready." Watt dined with Farama, Pa London, and Bartholomew Naimbana. Two hours after that dinner, Farama's private dinner arrived, and Farama once again invited Watt to partake. Farama also offered him "some gin and water, which was even by me considered as a treat." After this, Watt ate some of Banna's dinner, as well. He concluded, "I had three dinners today, altho while Capt. B and the others were with me we coud hardly get enough to eat."<sup>128</sup>

It proved a significant end to the affair. In overfeeding Watt after depriving him and his companions of meat and other edible goods, Farama demonstrated his ability to observe excellent food diplomacy when he wanted to do so. Especially in the aftermath of Watt's failure to do the same, Farama's generosity demonstrated continuing Temne power. Watt could not force Farama to return the company's ships; he could not persuade them to release him; and he was reduced to complaining that he was hungry. Given Freetown's constantly uncertain position with regard to provisions, it remained clear that the Temne retained control of these interactions. And Pa London's aggressive butchering of the goat foreshadowed future conflicts when British colonists once more transgressed their bounds.

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As the turn of the century approached, relations in Freetown worsened. With the approval of the Sierra Leone Council, black Loyalists began passing food laws that infringed on the foodways of indigenous Africans.<sup>129</sup> The Council's recantation on this position, combined with continuing problems regarding land allotments, resulted in the black Loyalists' decision to rise in rebellion in September of 1800.<sup>130</sup> Temne attacks in 1801 and 1802 threatened the food security of the colony, as did the failure of indigenous Africans' food crops in 1803.<sup>131</sup> In January 1808 the British Crown assumed formal rule of Freetown.<sup>132</sup> Such events demonstrated British officials' inability to adequately govern their colonists, and the metropole's skepticism of their capacity to do so.

Failed British food diplomacy elucidates the prevailing weak British position during the early years of Freetown. The Sierra Leone Company's inability to provide provisions set the stage for low food supplies, a problem that members of the Sierra Leone Council did not remedy upon arrival in West Africa. Long rainy seasons, problems apportioning land, and shoddy storage facilities threatened the colony's food security, quickly necessitating Britons' dependence on Africans for food. Despite the fact that African politics remained in flux, British officials rarely enjoyed much power in their interactions with indigenous African leaders.

Throughout the 1790s Africans and Britons used food diplomacy to communicate through a series of creative misunderstandings that mirror Richard White's concept of the middle ground. This situation was indeed a middle ground in the sense that Britons rarely reveled in the opportunity to dictate the terms of food exchange; sometimes they challenged weaker leaders, and especially women, on points of etiquette, but they seldom did so when venturing beyond the colony's borders. When they strayed far from Freetown they tended to breach the confines of acceptable behavior, thus provoking conflict. When James Watt accused Africans of trying to starve the colony, he found himself symbolically overfed in a display of indigenous might.

The history of the early modern Atlantic is full of examples of starving colonists struggling to survive during the early years of colonization. But whereas colonists such as those



at Roanoke, Jamestown, and Plymouth enjoyed the dubious honor of going hungry first in British North America before depending upon indigenous peoples for food, colonial officials in Sierra Leone could refer to almost two full centuries that might have encouraged them to learn from past examples.<sup>133</sup> They did not. West Africa remained an area where British power was weak, and where paternalistic African rulers dictated the terms of food exchange, and thus, more broadly, of day-to-day existence.

### Notes

- 1 Jennifer Cockrall-King defines food security today as “a catchall term for the level of accessibility to fresh, healthy, nutritious food for a person, family, or community.” Jennifer Cockrall-King, *Food and the City: Urban Agriculture and the New Food Revolution*, Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2012, p. 318. Eighteenth-century versions of food security differed in that class and racial difference obviously altered certain peoples’ access to food. In addition, towns and villages sometimes deliberately made themselves food insecure in order to prevent enemies from carrying away movable crops and meat in the event of an attack.
- 2 29 September 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (3), Macaulay Papers, the Huntington Library, San Marino, CA (hereafter HL). Many of the manuscript citations that follow also appear in Christopher Fyfe, ed., “*Our Children Free and Happy*”: *Letters from Black Settlers in Africa in the 1790s*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991.
- 3 28 September 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (3), Macaulay Papers, HL.
- 4 3 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (4), Macaulay Papers, HL. This evidence challenges the argument that the French attack resulted in a colony-wide food shortage. Wallace Brown, “The Black Loyalists in Sierra Leone,” in John W. Pulis, ed., *Moving On: Black Loyalists in the Afro-Atlantic World*, New York: Garland, 1999, p. 121.
- 5 22 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (5), HL.
- 6 In a modern-day context, a country offers food aid or practices food diplomacy in order to ensure the food security of another country. Many authors assume that US food diplomacy stretches back only as far as the 1950s. One scholar states that the United States instituted food diplomacy with the United States Agricultural Trade and Development Assistance Act of 1954, otherwise known as PL 480, because only by this period had the United States become self-sufficient enough to produce surplus agricultural commodities. B.J.B. Krupadanam, *Food Diplomacy: A Case Study, Indo-US Relations*, New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1985, p. 16. For works that consider the earlier decades of the twentieth century see Kristin L. Ahlberg, “Machiavelli with a Heart: The Johnson Administration’s Food for Peace Program in India, 1965–66,” *Diplomatic History*, vol. 31, no. 4, September 2007, pp. 665–701; Kristin L. Ahlberg, *Transplanting the Great Society: Lyndon Johnson and Food for Peace*, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008; Enrique C. Ochoa, *Feeding Mexico: The Political Uses of Food since 1910*, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2000. Yet I am not the first scholar to notice the presence of food in negotiations between peoples, especially between Indians and Anglos in early America. In historians’ books people break bread together, reference it when they seek to end wars, and attack food stores when peacemaking efforts falter. Richard White’s Indians and Anglos in the *pays d’en haut*, for example, spoke of having “To eat from a common dish” when they wanted to convey feelings of alliance, friendship, and peace. Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011 [1991], pp. 441–2. See also Elizabeth A. Perkins, “Distinctions and Partitions amongst Us: Identity and Interaction in the Revolutionary Ohio Valley,” in Andrew R.L. Cayton and Fredrika J. Teute, eds, *Contact Points: American Frontiers from the Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi, 1750–1830*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, esp. p. 233; Daniel H. Usner, Jr., *Indians, Settlers, & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992, esp. Ch. 6.
- 7 For British weakness in Africa see Trevor Burnard, “The British Atlantic,” in Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 122; Philip D. Morgan, “Africa and the Atlantic, C. 1450 to C. 1820,” in Greene and

- Morgan, *Atlantic History*, p. 225. For the call for Atlantic historians to delve more deeply into the experiences of people in Africa, see Alison Games, "Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities," *American Historical Review*, vol. 111, no. 3, June 2006, 754. For recent work attempting to address this call see David Northrup, "Becoming African: Identity Formation among Liberated Slaves in Nineteenth-century Sierra Leone," *Slavery & Abolition*, vol. 27, no. 1, August 2006, 1–21. For the ascendancy of the British empire in places like India see for example P.J. Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India and America, c. 1750–1783*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- 8 Christopher Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone*, London: Oxford University Press, 1962; James W. St. G. Walker, *The Black Loyalists: The Search for a Promised Land in Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone 1783–1870*, New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976; Ellen Gibson Wilson, *The Loyal Blacks*, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1976; Mary Louise Clifford, *From Slavery to Freetown: Black Loyalists After the American Revolution*, Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1999; Pulis, *Moving On*; Cassandra Pybus, *Epic Journeys of Freedom: Runaway Slaves of the American Revolution and their Global Quest for Liberty*, Boston: Beacon Press, 2006; W. Bryan Rommel-Ruiz, "Colonizing the Black Atlantic: The African Colonization Movements in Postwar Rhode Island and Nova Scotia," *Slavery & Abolition*, vol. 27, no. 3, December 2006, 349–65; James Sidbury, *Becoming African in America: Race and Nation in the Early Black Atlantic*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007; Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011.
  - 9 For a recent essay on British struggles to obtain food in Sierra Leone, see Philip Misevich, "The Sierra Leone Hinterland and the Provisioning of Early Freetown, 1792–1803," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, vol. 9, no. 3, Winter 2008. Online. Available at: <http://muse.jhu.edu> (accessed 21 June 2013).
  - 10 A group of 411 of London's black poor preceded a second group of black Loyalists from Nova Scotia. The black poor departed from the metropole after the very harsh winters of 1784–5 and 1785–6. Mary Beth Norton, "The Fate of Some Black Loyalists of the American Revolution," *Journal of Negro History*, vol. 58, no. 4, October 1973, 407; Ellen Gibson Wilson, *John Clarkson and the African Adventure*, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1980, p. 53; Pybus, *Epic Journeys of Freedom*, pp. 87, 103.
  - 11 Wilson, *John Clarkson and the African Adventure*, pp. 70, 76; Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone*, p. 36; Sidbury, *Becoming African in America*, p. 98.
  - 12 Anna Maria Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages to the River Sierra Leone During the Years 1791–1792–1793*, ed. Christopher Fyfe, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000, p. 16.
  - 13 Early American colonists in Jamestown were more interested in searching for merchantable commodities than they were in growing their own food, and they depended on Indians for gifts of corn and deer meat. Colonists at Plymouth also struggled through periods of intense dearth and hunger. Rachel B. Herrmann, "The 'tragically historie': Cannibalism and Abundance in Colonial Jamestown," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d series, vol. 68, no. 1, January 2011, 47–74.
  - 14 Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, 2 January 1792, f. 66, Add. MS 41262A, the British Library, London, UK (hereafter BL).
  - 15 Granville Sharp to John Clarkson, Garden Court Temple, London, 24 July 1793, f. 154, Add. MS 41262A, BL.
  - 16 Wilson, *John Clarkson and the African Adventure*, pp. 81–2, 117. Falconbridge arrived in Sierra Leone with his wife, Anna Maria, who remained in the colony after his death. She stayed until 1793, and eventually married John Clarkson's friend and correspondent, Isaac DuBois. Anna Maria Falconbridge composed a narrative—written first as letters, with the intent to publish them—that informs portions of this chapter. Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages*, pp. 1, 4, 95.
  - 17 Robin W. Winks, *The Blacks in Canada: A History*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971, pp. 74–5; Wilson, *John Clarkson and the African Adventure*, p. 85; Wilson, *The Loyal Blacks*, pp. 191–2.
  - 18 Wilson, *John Clarkson and the African Adventure*, p. 86.
  - 19 Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages*, p. 74.
  - 20 Wilson, *John Clarkson and the African Adventure*, p. 70.
  - 21 Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, 2 January 1792, f. 68, Add. MS. 41262A, BL.
  - 22 Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, London, 17 July 1792, f. 145, Add. MS 41262A, BL.
  - 23 Wilson, *John Clarkson and the African Adventure*, p. 76; Winks, *The Blacks in Canada*, p. 74.

- 24 Henry Thornton to John Clarkson, London, 23 November 1792, f. 204, Add. MS 41262A, BL.
- 25 Henry Thornton to John Clarkson, London, 14 September 1792, f. 180, Add. MS 41262A, BL.
- 26 Rev. E.G. Ingham, *Sierra Leone After a Hundred Years*, London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1968 [London: Seeley and Co. Limited, 1894], p. 65.
- 27 Ingham, *Sierra Leone after a Hundred Years*, p. 65; 19 November 1792, “Diary of Lieutenant J. Clarkson, R.N. (governor, 1792),” *Sierra Leone Studies*, no. VIII, March 1927, 106; Council Minutes, 12 May 1792, ff. 37–38, CO 270/2, TNA. By August 1792, Anna Maria Falconbridge was reporting that employees received two shillings per day in wages, but had to pay four shillings per week for provisions. Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages*, p. 87.
- 28 Before they departed Nova Scotia, Clarkson had made some promises to the black Loyalists that contradicted the Company’s policy on quitrents, or payments levied on land. The Company clung to its initial policy, and Clarkson’s removal made that decision easier. There were also rumors from Freetown—perhaps promulgated by fellow council members—that Clarkson was drunk on the job, quarrelsome, and incapable of working. On 23 April 1793, the day that Clarkson was scheduled to depart London for his wedding, the Sierra Leone Company informed him that his future services were not needed. William Dawes took over as governor. Wilson, *John Clarkson and the African Adventure*, pp. 130–5; Sidbury, *Becoming African in America*, p. 104.
- 29 Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages*, p. 36.
- 30 Ingham, *Sierra Leone After a Hundred Years*, pp. 74, 76.
- 31 Minutes of Council, on board the *Harpy*, Sierra Leone River, 29 February 1792, f. 6, CO 270/2, TNA. As of 1791 the Company owned only three ships (the *Lapwing*, the *Amy*, and the *Harpy*—of 35, 190, and 380 tons, respectively). Misevich, “The Sierra Leone Hinterland and the Provisioning of Early Freetown, 1792–1803.”
- 32 Minutes of Council, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 6 March 1792, f. 8, CO 270/2, TNA.
- 33 7 August 1792, “Diary of Lieutenant J. Clarkson,” p. 2.
- 34 Henry Thornton to John Clarkson, London, 23 November 1792, f. 204, Add. MS 41262A, BL.
- 35 10 January 1793, f. 4, Add. MS 41263, BL.
- 36 12 January 1793, f. 5, Add. MS 41263, BL.
- 37 Ingham, *Sierra Leone After a Hundred Years*, p. 146. It is also possible that cattle did not thrive because of the presence of the tsetse fly, though one article asserts that horses did not become significantly prone to disease from the fly until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. D.C. Dorward and A.I. Payne, “Deforestation, the Decline of the Horse, and the Spread of the Tsetse Fly and Trypanosomiasis (nagana) in Nineteenth Century Sierra Leone,” *Journal of African History*, vol. 16, no. 2, 1975, 239–56, esp. 242–4.
- 38 Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages*, p. 76.
- 39 For meat see 12 January 1793, f. 5, Add. MS 41263, BL; for alcohol see 12 May 1792, f. 38, Add. MS 12131, BL.
- 40 Minutes of Council, Freetown, 20 April 1792, f. 34, CO 270/2, TNA.
- 41 Ingham, *Sierra Leone after a Hundred Years*, pp. 91–2; Wilson, *The Loyal Blacks*, p. 247.
- 42 Sidbury, *Becoming African in America*, p. 98; Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone*, pp. 1–6; Kenneth C. Wylie, *The Political Kingdoms of the Temne: Temne Government in Sierra Leone, 1825–1910*, New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1977, pp. xiii, 3.
- 43 For news of Naimbana’s death see 12 February 1793, f. 15, Add. MS 41263, BL. As Christopher Fyfe has noted in his editor’s remarks to Anna Maria Falconbridge’s *Narrative*, the word “King” is a misnomer for these rulers. Naimbana became king in form only after his death in 1793. Britons used the term because it fit conveniently into their concept of rule, but Temne regents’ rule did not extend as far politically or geographically in comparison. Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages*, n.19, p. 19.
- 44 For primary sources describing the various African groups surrounding Freetown, see 10 and 17 March 1792, ff. 9, 13, Add. MS 41264, BL; 3 October 1792, “Diary of Lieutenant J. Clarkson,” 71; 18 July 1793, *Journal of Zachary Macaulay*, MY 418 (1), ff. 71–2, Macaulay Papers, HL. For secondary works, see Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone*, pp. 10, 54; Wylie, *The Political Kingdoms of the Temne*, p. xv; Clifford, *From Slavery to Freetown*, p. 75.
- 45 On land purchase issues, see Henry Thornton to John Clarkson, London, 14 September 1792, f. 178, Add. MS 41262A, BL.
- 46 Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, 2 January 1792, f. 66, Add. MS 41262A, BL.
- 47 Thomas Clarkson to the Chairman of the Sierra Leone Company, N.D., f. 20, Add. MS 12131, BL.

- 48 Thomas Clarkson to the Chairman of the Sierra Leone Company, N.D., f. 20, Add. MS 12131, BL.
- 49 Henry Thornton to John Clarkson, London, 30 December 1791, f. 41, Add. MS 41262A, BL.
- 50 Henry Thornton to John Clarkson, London, 30 December 1791, f. 41, Add. MS 41262A, BL.
- 51 William Wilberforce to John Clarkson, London, 27 April 1792, f. 82, Add. MS 41262A, BL.
- 52 James Sidbury, "'African' Settlers in the Founding of Freetown," in Suzanna Schwarz, Paul Lovejoy and David Richardson, eds, *Rebuilding Civil Society in Sierra Leone, Past and Present* (forthcoming 2014), p. 4. I am grateful to Jim for sharing a version of this piece before its publication. My citations of page numbers come from the draft document. For the white colonists see Fyfe, "Our Children Free and Happy," p. 6.
- 53 Zachary Macaulay to Henry Thornton, Thornton Hill, 7 June 1797, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (21), HL.
- 54 For example, see Henry Thornton to John Clarkson, London, 30 December 1791, ff. 39–40, Add. MS 41262A, BL.
- 55 Thornton, *Africa and Africans*, p. 315. Before 1750 Senegambia, Sierra Leone, and the Windward Coast were responsible for only 9 percent of the enslaved peoples sent out of Africa, but from 1751 to 1755 that percentage jumped to 22 percent (after 1775 it fell to 12 percent). David Eltis, Philip Morgan, and David Richardson, "Agency and Diaspora in Atlantic History: Reassessing the African Contribution to Rice Cultivation in the Americas," *American Historical Review*, vol. 112, no. 5, December 2007, 1340.
- 56 For descriptions of the events of 1800 see Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone*, pp. 81–7; Pybus, *Epic Journeys of Freedom*, pp. 191–202; Sidbury, *Becoming African in America*, pp. 25–8; Wilson, *The Loyal Blacks*, pp. 383–401; Clifford, *From Slavery to Freetown*, pp. 189–96.
- 57 [N.D., but likely August–November 1801], f. 301, CO 270/6, TNA.
- 58 11 April 1802, f. 79, CO 270/8, TNA.
- 59 Rachel B. Herrmann, "Food and War: Indians, Slaves, and the American Revolution," Ph.D. dissertation, the University of Texas at Austin, 2013, pp. 19–21.
- 60 Herrmann, "Food and War: Indians, Slaves, and the American Revolution," Ch. 3.
- 61 21 April 1792, f. 34, Add. MS 12131, BL.
- 62 See for example Peter C. Mancall, *Deadly Medicine: Indians and Alcohol in Early America*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995.
- 63 Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages*, p. 45.
- 64 Ingham, *Sierra Leone After a Hundred Years*, p. 27.
- 65 3 October 1792, "Diary of Lieutenant J. Clarkson," p. 71.
- 66 On slave gardens see Ira Berlin, "Introduction," in Ira Berlin and Ronald Hoffman, eds, *Slavery and Freedom in the Age of the American Revolution*, Urbana and Chicago: The University of Illinois Press, 1986 [1983], p. xix; Dylan C. Penningroth, *The Claims of Kinfolk: African American Property and Community in the Nineteenth-Century South*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003, Ch. 2, esp. pp. 46–9.
- 67 Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, London, 28 August 1791, f. 12, Add. MS 41262A, BL.
- 68 "THE INTERESTING NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF OLAUDAH EQUIANO, OR GUSTAVUS VASSA, *THE AFRICAN*. WRITTEN BY HIMSELF," London, 1794 [1789], in Vincent Carretta, ed., *Unchained Voices: An Anthology of Black Authors in the English-Speaking World of the Eighteenth Century*, Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996, pp. 283–4. For an in-depth discussion of Equiano's origins, see Vincent Carretta, *Equiano, the African: Biography of a Self-Made Man*, London: Penguin Books, 2006, pp. 4–5.
- 69 Ingham, *Sierra Leone After a Hundred Years*, p. 19.
- 70 12 September 1797, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (22), Macaulay Papers, HL.
- 71 4 April 1792, f. 24, Add. MS 41264, BL.
- 72 "Anana's" are pineapples, from the French *ananas*. 17 March 1792, f. 13, Add. MS 41264, BL.
- 73 23 October 1792, "Diary of Lieutenant J. Clarkson," p. 91. Although white council members claimed the commodities that the Temne traded for fresh fruits, it was the black Loyalists who, in keeping with extant trade etiquette, conveyed these foods throughout the colony. A.G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, p. 63; Misevich, "The Sierra Leone Hinterland and the Provisioning of Early Freetown, 1792–1803"; Winston McGowan, "The Establishment of Long-Distance Trade between Sierra Leone and Its Hinterland, 1787–1821," *Journal of African History*, vol. 31, no. 1, 1990, 37.

- 74 Misevich, “The Sierra Leone Hinterland and the Provisioning of Early Freetown, 1792–1803.”
- 75 7 February 1795, f. 76, Add. MS 12131, BL.
- 76 2 January 1794, ff. 118–19, CO 270/2, TNA.
- 77 14 May 1792, f. 38, Add. MS 12131, BL.
- 78 3 January 1793, f. 1, Add. MS 41263, BL.
- 79 10 February 1795, f. 54, Add. MS 12131, BL.
- 80 In Council, 16 December 1795, ff. 284–5, CO 270/3, TNA.
- 81 White, *The Middle Ground*, p. xii.
- 82 13 January 1793, f. 5, Add. MS 41263, BL.
- 83 For more on Signior Domingo, see Wilson, *The Loyal Blacks*, p. 245.
- 84 13 January 1793, f. 5, Add. MS 41263, BL.
- 85 The colonists may have suspected Jimmy because previously he had burned Granville Town (the first village of London’s black poor) in 1789 after colonists goaded a passing ship into burning King Jimmy’s town; Jimmy gave the colonists three days to vacate, and torched the town to cinders. Alexander Falconbridge assisted the colonists in the wake of the attack, which may have been partially why he resented Clarkson’s appointment as superintendent over him. Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone*, p. 25; Sidbury, *Becoming African in America*, p. 53; Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages*, p. 4.
- 86 Ingham, *Sierra Leone After a Hundred Years*, p. 27.
- 87 14 June 1792, ff. 39–40, Add. MS 12131, BL.
- 88 The crocodile in question was charged with killing and eating “the Kings youngest Son,” which was why Strand supposed the Temne had killed it. 14 June 1792, ff. 39–40, Add. MS 12131, BL.
- 89 19 June 1793, f. 18, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (1), Macaulay Papers, HL.
- 90 1 February 1795, f. 65, Add. MS 12131, BL.
- 91 See, for example, 20 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (5), Macaulay Papers, HL; 8 February 1795, f. 50 and 1 February 1795, f. 65, Add. MS 12131, BL.
- 92 Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages*, p. 46.
- 93 7 October 1793, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (2), Macaulay Papers, HL.
- 94 22 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (5), Macaulay Papers, HL.
- 95 27 November 1793, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (2), Macaulay Papers, HL.
- 96 2 January 1794, f. 118, CO 270/2, TNA.
- 97 7 October 1793, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (2), Macaulay Papers, HL.
- 98 Africans valued things in cash as well as bars. A bar was originally the quantity of goods that indigenous Africans considered equivalent to a bar of iron because they did not use the paper and metal currency that Europeans used. All goods fetched a price in bars that changed according to demand and supply. On the fluctuation of bars as currency, see Christopher Fyfe’s editor’s note in Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages*, n. 32, p. 35.
- 99 Ingham, *Sierra Leone After a Hundred Years*, pp. 20–1. See also 21 March 1792, f. 15, Add. MS 41264, BL.
- 100 Ingham, *Sierra Leone After a Hundred Years*, p. 20.
- 101 For an in-depth discussion of this incident see Rachel Herrmann, “Death By Chamomile? The Alimentary End of Henry Granville Naimbana,” *The Appendix: A New Journal of Narrative and Experimental History*, vol. 1, no. 1, December 2012, pp. 43–7.
- 102 Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages*, pp. 1, 4, 74, 95.
- 103 For Henry Granville Naimbana’s education by Anna Maria Falconbridge, see Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages*, p. 70; Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone*, p. 30. For his religious inculcation in London see Peter Fryer, *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain*, London: Pluto Press, 1984, p. 427; Cassandra Pybus, “‘A Less Favourable Specimen’: The Abolitionist Response to Self-Emancipated Slaves in Sierra Leone, 1793–1808,” *Parliamentary History*, vol. 26, Issue Supplement S1, June 2007, p. 99, n. 12; for the story of his death by poison, see Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone*, p. 54.
- 104 18 July 1793, Margaret Jean Knutsford, ed., *Life and Letters of Zachary Macaulay*, London: Edward Arnold, 1900, pp. 37–8.
- 105 18 July 1793, ff. 71–2, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (1), HL.
- 106 21 July 1793, ff. 81–2, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (1), HL. It is not entirely clear who was initially responsible for conceiving of the accusation. Bartholomew dictated the letter to

- his translator, Abraham Elliot Griffiths, King Naimbana's secretary and translator. When the Temne met the British, however, the accusation was presented as Yamacopra's.
- 107 2 August 1793, f. 97, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (1), HL.
- 108 2 August 1793, f. 97, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (1), HL. For an explanation of bars see note 98.
- 109 Falconbridge, *Narrative of Two Voyages*, p. 48.
- 110 At times the ordeal seemed so predetermined by the impulse of the judges that some people chose to be sold into slavery (an admission of guilt), rather than leave their fate to chance.
- 111 2 August 1793, f. 98, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (1), HL.
- 112 21 July 1793, f. 82, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (1), HL.
- 113 2 August 1793, ff. 98–9, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (1), HL.
- 114 3 August 1793, f. 101, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (1), HL.
- 115 2 August 1793, f. 99, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (1), HL.
- 116 18 July 1793, ff. 74–5, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (1), HL.
- 117 8 August 1793, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, f. 118, MY 418 (1), Macaulay Papers, HL.
- 118 Clifford, *From Slavery to Freetown*, p. 114.
- 119 18 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (4), HL. On ship growth see Misevich, "The Sierra Leone Hinterland and the Provisioning of Early Freetown, 1792–1803."
- 120 20 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (5), HL.
- 121 20 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (5), HL.
- 122 20 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (5), HL.
- 123 22 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (5), HL.
- 124 24 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (5), HL.
- 125 22 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (5), HL.
- 126 23 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (5), HL.
- 127 23 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (5), HL.
- 128 24 October 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (5), HL.
- 129 See for example Council Minutes, Freetown, 27 May 1793, f. 73, CO 270/2, TNA; 4 July 1793, f. 77, CO 270/2, TNA; 21 August 1794, Journal of Zachary Macaulay, MY 418 (3), Macaulay Papers, HL; Resolutions of Council, 23 August 1794, Freetown, Sierra Leone, ff. 5–6, CO 270/3, TNA; Richard Corankapoor and Thomas Jackson to [the Governor and Council], Free Town, 8 June 1795, f. 175, CO 270/3, TNA; In Council, 9 June 1795, f. 174, CO 270/3, TNA; In Council, 12 October 1795, ff. 230–3, CO 270/3, TNA.
- 130 For the history of these food laws see Herrmann, "Food and War: Indians, Slaves, and the American Revolution," Ch. 8.
- 131 Wallace Brown, "The Black Loyalists in Sierra Leone," p. 122.
- 132 Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone*, p. 97. For the history of the decades that followed see David Lambert, "Sierra Leone and Other Sites in the War of Representation over Slavery," *History Workshop Journal*, vol. 64, no. 1, Autumn 2007, 103–32.
- 133 Michael A. LaCombe, *Political Gastronomy: Food and Authority in the English Atlantic World*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012; Michael A. LaCombe, "'A continuall and dayly Table for Gentlemen of fashion': Humanism, Food, and Authority at Jamestown, 1607–9," *American Historical Review*, vol. 115, no. 3, June 2010, 669–87.