Silent minority

Celebrated difference, caste difference, and the Hinduization of independent India

Rupa Viswanath

Every schoolchild in India is taught the credo of ‘unity in diversity’, the formula popularized by Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India’s first prime minister, who instituted it as state policy. The phrase is represented, for instance, in the ubiquitous cheap posters that paper classroom walls showing colourful tableaux of Indians in regional dress, and of various religious and sectarian persuasions. The poster children of Indian diversity are India’s many languages and religions. The dark horse is caste. Representative images of different castes never appear on classroom walls. The former, in short, are the kinds of diversity that Indian political leaders proudly showcase; the latter is an embarrassment, best relegated to the past as quickly as possible.1 When scholars, public intellectuals and media figures speak of religious and linguistic diversity, the focus is almost invariably on the Indian state’s protection of religious minorities, religions other than Hinduism.2 But where languages are arguably based in pre-existing (linguistic) practices,3 religious majorities and minorities are created entirely by the state itself. Moreover, while the focus of both official and academic diversity talk is on how minorities are managed, what is less noticed is how majorities are thereby constituted. It is this aspect of ‘diversity management’ – what might be called its silent partner – that this essay discusses. I will argue that although religion (a form of ‘good diversity’) is seen as distinct from caste (a diversity meant to be ultimately eradicated), the two are in fact inseparably linked in the processes by which the Indian state creates and maintains its Hindu majority. I begin with a brief overview of mainstream diversity talk in postcolonial Indian statecraft and in academic discourse. I then turn to how caste difference has been conceived by the postcolonial state and targeted by its policies. This will illustrate the unacknowledged processes by which an overwhelming ‘Hindu’ majority population was created by the Indian state.4

It will also demonstrate that, although state responses to religion in India are widely understood to be a form of what Nancy Fraser has called ‘recognition’, while policies on caste are seen to be a matter of ‘redistribution’, in fact both of these responses equally deny these groups’ political autonomy.5
Multiculturalism avant la lettre? Diversity management as national incorporation

During the colonial period, the Indian people were represented as so deeply divided that genuine nationhood – understood to require ethnic and cultural homogeneity – was all but impossible. This view was challenged by Indian nationalists, not by denying difference, but by claiming that national identity could encompass it, though the achievement of nationhood was understood to require a concerted and programmatic effort (see Roy 2006: 19–21). Following India’s independence from British rule in 1947, the recognition, protection and even cultivation of diversity have continued to be regarded by nationalist elites as essential to the success of the postcolonial polity. Drafted in the wake of an event that revealed diversity’s most threatening aspect – the bloody partition of British India into India and Pakistan on the basis of religious difference – the Indian Constitution promises religious and linguistic minorities a variety of rights. ‘Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.’ (Constitution of India, part III, article 29). This promise of ‘conservation’ includes for all ‘minorities, whether based on religion or language . . . the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice’ (ibid. article 30). In the parlance of the constitution – framed prior to the ascendancy of the language of multiculturalism in political theoretic discourse – all these measures were attempts to protect what was called India’s ‘composite culture’. Indeed, the duties enjoined upon India’s citizens, the counterbalance to the rights just described, include the duty ‘. . . to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities’ (Constitution of India, part IVA, 51A). In short, not only the state but also its citizenry must ‘value and preserve the rich heritage of [India’s] composite culture’ by both acknowledging and transcending subnational difference (ibid.).

The Constitution asserts that the population is naturally diverse in a way requiring a specific kind of governance and a certain type of citizen: Indian differences, then, as Srirupa Roy has observed, are most often understood as primordial: ‘The interested origins and power effects . . . [of “diversity”] – the fact that diversity is as much of a “made” as it is a “found” formation – are removed from our line of sight’ (Roy 2006: 7). A correlate of the assumption that India’s ‘deep diversity’ must be managed by the state has been a trend in commentaries on Indian democracy to portray democracy’s very existence in India as in some way an ‘exceptional’ phenomenon, an enduring ‘paradox’ or ‘puzzle’ requiring special explanation.6

Three types of difference are invoked in scholarly discussions of Indian diversity: language, religion and caste. We will focus on the latter for the bulk of this essay. Let us first briefly consider the policies framed, bearing in mind what we have seen in Constitutional rhetoric, with respect to the former two. In standard accounts of the postcolonial Indian polity, one learns that linguistic diversity has been successfully ‘managed’ by federalism. Power was devolved onto linguistically organized states in India primarily during the first two decades following independence. Far from strengthening centrifugal forces at play in the polity, Nehru’s management of linguistic diversity, properly balanced power, strengthened the fidelity of states to the union and ‘has indeed been among the more successful experiments of institutional engineering in the history of modern India’ (Jayal 2006: 48). There are admitted exceptions: the union’s abrogation of its promise to the United Nations in 1947 to allow Kashmir’s citizenry to determine by plebiscite its national status (i.e. whether to be subsumed within India or Pakistan), and its suppression of calls for self-determination by the peoples of the northeastern states, for example (see Anderson 2012a, b; Baruah 2011). These are decried, but as egregious exceptions in an otherwise successful
policy regime. Less often discussed in mainstream accounts of diversity management are initiatives in the name of development in so-called ‘tribal’ regions that are rich in natural resources. These have involved massive enclosures of commons and forced displacement, which more quietly and routinely violate the enshrined rights of cultural and linguistic preservation (Baviskar 2004).

What about religious difference? Notwithstanding all the unique aspects of postcolonial Indian secularism that many authors have debated (see Bhargava 2004a), it shares at least one central structural characteristic with Western secular democracies, namely that legally protected religious autonomy is exercised only in very circumscribed spheres largely corresponding to what is identified as the ‘private’. While the Indian public has often been described as distinct from Western secular polities insofar as public displays of religion (including, for example, in government offices and in the symbols of state) are commonplace, citizens’ religiously defined rights are confined to the private and educational domains, and primarily to the arena of the family. India, since its independence, has had distinct sets of religious community-specific ‘personal laws’ that govern marriage, inheritance and related matters. This has been most relevant in the case of Muslims, who represent the largest religious minority, but personal laws optionally extend to Hindus, Christians and Parsis (aka Zoroastrians) as well.

The political rights held by religious minorities during the colonial period, the most significant of which was that religious minorities were permitted to have separate electorates, were denounced by Congress Party leaders (who were overwhelmingly high-caste Hindus) as an instance of the colonizer’s divide-and-rule strategy. In independent India the political rights of religious minorities were replaced by cultural protections. As many have noted, this has provided manifest opportunities for the capture of community representation by conservative elements – in short, the stifling of intra-community dissent, leading to several egregious and highly publicized cases of gender injustice (see Chatterjee 2004). But the more significant feature from the perspective of this essay is the replacement of political rights, especially electorally mediated representation, by non-democratically defined cultural protections.

India’s policies on linguistic diversity, in which major regional language groups were granted their own states, poses a contrasting case to religion with respect to the sharing of power. However, although some measure of autonomy has been granted to linguistic states, the union has done so only after having extracted the pledge to renounce for evermore any claim to independent national status. As federal systems go, India’s falls squarely on the more centralized end of the spectrum, with, moreover, the central government retaining considerably more power than in comparable federal states, including the power to dissolve effectively state governments at will. In short, the celebration of diversity in India is carefully framed in ways that reinforce the absolute political unity of the country by reducing internal others (non-Hindu populations and formerly distinct regional political identities) to anodyne expressions of cultural and linguistic diversity within a highly centralized federal system.

The absolute foreclosure by the dominant-caste–Hindu political culture in India of independent minority political representation has been accompanied by the steady decline of a once thriving Indian Muslim population, which now ranks among the lowest of all Indian groups in terms of education, literacy and income (Jaffrelot 2012). And as we will see, the situation of the lowest castes, those formerly known as untouchables and now referred to as Dalits, has shown some signs of improvement in the post-independence decades, but lags scandalously behind the rest of the population. Dalits, furthermore, continue to be the victims of widespread caste-based violence in most parts of rural India. Yet India’s diversity policies are nevertheless frequently described in glowing terms as successful multiculturalism avant la lettre. Echoing official discourse, one prominent author writes,
India was among the first few democracies to embark on the multicultural path. At a time when Western liberalism advocated neutrality and a difference-blind approach, India acknowledged the rights of minorities and valued cultural diversity. This was an innovative and bold initiative that defied the thinking of its time.

(Mahajan 2005: 288f.)

With respect to the empirical effects and specific stipulations of policy, however, India is perhaps more prosaically described as assimilationist or incorporative – and therefore somewhat less than ‘bold’ for its time. It was perhaps innovative in making a virtue – ‘diversity’ – of irreducibly political difference; India undoubtedly did not pursue nation-building in the same way as more overtly homogenizing nation-states, such as France. Yet however much the leadership of the early postcolonial nation-state may have genuinely cherished diversity, as seems to have been the case with Nehru (see Khilnani 2011; Parekh 1991), it is useful to recognize that unity-in-diversity rhetoric enabled policies that served to reinforce the hegemony of the Congress Party and the very specific set of social and cultural fractions it represented (Jaffrelot 2003).

Caste difference: a distinctive mode of incorporation

I turn now to the kind of difference whose resilience is usually not celebrated in the same manner as religious and linguistic diversity. It is necessary at the outset to mark a distinction between different possible meanings of caste difference that generic discussions of ‘caste’ tend to overlook (see also Jodhka, this volume). On one hand, there are the multiple and often trivial differences among particular castes, understood as locally or regionally specific endogamous jatis. Caste in this sense is accurately described as ‘revolving around differences in tiny details’. The multiplex caste differences of this sort are not of any great political significance, and do not necessarily entail systematic and intractable power differential. On the other hand, there is the singular division between Dalit castes and all others, which for clarity I will describe as ‘Dalit difference’.

What exactly makes Dalit difference distinctive and a special problem for both the state and nation? What defines Dalits as a class is not any shared culture, ritual or religious practices or language. Nor do they constitute a single endogamous group, or jati; Dalits, like other Indians, are subdivided into innumerable regionally and linguistically specific jatis, each with its own origin myths and traditions. Dalit difference is qualitatively distinct from all other sorts of caste difference in at least three ways. First, historically Dalits were hereditarily unfree labourers who were actively barred from acquiring land in India’s major agrarian regions. Though their enslavement was made illegal in British India in 1843, and ceased to be an effective reality in most of the subcontinent by the early twentieth century (Viswanath 2014), poverty and landlessness are endemic among Dalits to the present day (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 2000), and modern forms of (largely non-hereditary) bondage remain the lot of a non-trivial minority (Breman 2013). Second, they were and still are distinguished spatially from all others in rural India. All other castes in a village, though segregated residentially from one another on different streets, nevertheless share what is seen as the village proper, the main settlement. Dalit settlements are kept at a physical distance from all others, in what has been called India’s ‘hidden apartheid’ (Human Rights Watch 2007; Teltumbde 2010). This spatial segregation is not simply a ‘superstitious’ adherence to ideas of purity and impurity. It also entails differential access to all village resources: pasturage, roads and, perhaps most importantly, water sources. Finally, Dalits are regarded by most Hindus as ritually defiling, and by caste people of all religions in India as lazy, dirty, immoral and intellectually inferior.
Dalits are thus a permanent, hereditary underclass comparable to a race, and their relationship to the dominant national community has always been awkward and fraught with tensions. The exclusion from temples underscores the fact that, in former times, Dalits were not considered Hindus, and this past resurfaces in ordinary language today – it is not uncommon for Dalits to refer to all other castes as ‘Hindus’ in contrast to themselves (see Searle-Chatterjee 1994, 2008; Roberts forthcoming). Even though Dalits worshipped gods that are today considered Hindu gods, Dalits were excluded as a matter of definition from the Hindu fold, and even in the early decades of the twentieth century one could, for example, ask of someone, ‘Is he a Hindu or a Pariah?’ (Viswanath 2014: chap. 1). Thus, when Indian census takers in the late nineteenth century were instructed by the British to record Dalits as Hindus, they frequently balked, finding the categorization both puzzling and offensive (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 2000 quoted in Roberts, forthcoming).

But this state of affairs changed dramatically by the early decades of the twentieth century. Including Dalits within the category Hindu – administratively if not socially – came to be portrayed by Gandhi and the Congress Party as a matter of pressing national interest. This is because the British, as previously discussed, accorded political representation on the basis of religious community. Representing Dalits as within the Hindu fold, and thereby covering over the fact that Hindu once had a caste-specific meaning, ensured that Hindus would retain a firm numerical majority. This incorporative political strategy on the part of non-Dalit Hindus has been aptly termed a ‘politics of numbers’, insofar as it was driven by the new conditions instituted by the British expansion of the franchise and the introduction of forms of representative governance to the colony. At first pursued primarily by those known as Hindu nationalists, incorporating Dalits within Hinduism was embraced by M.K. Gandhi in the 1930s. In this way Gandhi systematically blurred the distinction between national and Hindu communal interest, though he was not the only one to do so.

The larger backdrop of political activity at the time was what historian Sumit Sarkar has described as a late-colonial nationalism that subtly but unmistakably relied on Hindu imagery and modes of mobilization even while seeking to project itself as the legitimate representative of all Indians irrespective of religion. The assassination of Gandhi by Hindu nationalists, who were unhappy with what they saw as his willingness to accommodate Muslims, rendered explicit appeals to Hindu majoritarianism taboo. Gandhi’s assassination also helped cement Congress’s long-standing attempts to project itself as a non-sectarian alternative, an effort that took more substantial form when Nehru, a staunch secularist and advocate of the ‘scientific temperament’, was placed at the helm of independent India’s first government. But with respect to the problem of Dalit difference, the Hinduizing project of the state never flagged. The majority of Dalits in postcolonial India are now Hindu as a matter of law.

How is this so? First, the postcolonial state defined Hinduism officially as the default religion of all Indians, by deeming everyone Hindu who is born in India of Indian parents so long as they were not specifically affiliated with one of the ‘minority’ religions (Galanter 1971; Ludden 1996; Sen 2007). In this way, Hinduism was treated as a residual category, encompassing millions of adivasis (a.k.a. tribals), whose connection to Hinduism was ambiguous at best, and Dalits, who, as we have seen, had previously been excluded from the Hindu fold. Between this and the Partition of British India into Congress–controlled India and an explicitly Muslim Pakistan, Hinduism was constituted as the ‘majority religion’. The re-definition of Hinduism according to nationalist ‘blood and soil’ criteria has been enshrined in the law: the legal test of whether a person is a Hindu ... starts with ethnic and geographical tests, which ... can be rebutted not by proof of absence of belief or presence of disbelief.
but only by proof of exclusive adherence (or conversion) to a foreign (i.e. a non-Hindu) faith.

(Derrett 1968: 52)

That is, anyone practising or professing anything at all, so long as she refrains from explicitly adhering to Christianity or Islam – even a committed atheist – is, legally speaking, a Hindu. Little trace now remains in the discourse of the state that, at one time, Dalits might just as easily have been construed as another subnational minority.

What do Dalits themselves have to say about this? In the 1930s, politically active Dalits under the revered activist and intellectual Dr B.R. Ambedkar, insisted that their outsider status be recognized politically by granting them separate electorates. The idea was that they themselves, and not non-Dalits, would choose who would represent them in public office. A separate electorate was granted to Muslims as a result of the Indian Councils Act of 1909, and, although at first unhappy about this, Indian nationalists became reconciled to it (Bose and Jalal 2004: 84). In a fateful turn in the building of an anti-colonial nationalist consensus, Gandhi resolutely opposed giving Dalits similar political autonomy when the British tried to grant them this in 1932, insisting that Dalits could not be separated from the Hindu community, and that the problems they faced had to be considered as matters within the Hindu fold, which he proposed social reform and attitudinal change could ‘purify’. B.R. Ambedkar, the civil rights lawyer who led the Dalits, pleaded for separate electorates to be granted for the temporary period of a decade, just long enough that Dalits could attain some measure of political equality before becoming part of the general electorate. But Gandhi’s opposition to this prospect was so marked that he undertook a ‘fast-unto-death’ in protest. Given Gandhi’s enormous stature as a national hero, his illness or death would have meant a massive retaliation against Dalits across India, so Ambedkar was forced to capitulate, and in 1932 he signed the Poona Pact. The pact foreclosed, once and for all, the possibility that Dalits could independently elect their own representatives.26

The Hinduizing tendencies of the postcolonial state are all the more evident in the state’s proffered solution to the problem of Dalit difference. The postcolonial state has instituted what are called ‘reservations’, affirmative action-style policies that provide for a percentage of seats in legislatures, government employment and government-run educational establishments. In 1950 a list of Scheduled Castes (or SCs), castes that were to be named in the ‘schedules’, or lists that determined eligibility for reservations, was included in the Constitution. Who exactly would be considered SC for legal-administrative purposes? ‘No person who professes a religion different from the Hindu [or the Sikh or the Buddhist] religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.’27 Excluded entirely are the vast numbers of Christian and Muslim Dalit converts, who may not benefit from state-sponsored welfare schemes. Even less often publicly acknowledged is the fact that Dalits outside the definition of SC thereby also lose protection under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act (known as the POA),28 a piece of hate crimes-style legislation that is supposed to provide special penalties for SCs against perpetrators of caste-based violence. By excluding Dalits who opt out of Hinduism in favour of Christianity or Islam, the Indian state institutes an official disincentive to out-conversion.29

Over a half a century on, it is widely agreed that policies of reservation have been, if at all, only minimally successful in challenging discrimination and disadvantage (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 2000). Moreover, despite the enactment of a law in 1955 that made practising untouchability a criminal offence and punished lynching and other routine forms of violence against Dalits – primarily attacks by upper-caste employers against Dalits who appear not to ‘know their place’ – remain commonplace in most of rural India. Enforcement of the Act is
extremely rare, and, recalling the situation of African Americans in the post-reconstruction American South, rural police, who invariably belong to the same communities as perpetrators, generally refuse to recognize even the most blatant anti-Dalit atrocities as such. Not infrequently, they are themselves among the attackers (Narula 1999; Roberts 2010). Police are answerable ultimately to the elected representatives at the state level. But due to the aforementioned depoliticization of Dalit difference, even those elected as ‘Dalit representatives’ are chosen by caste people, and accountability remains elusive. The most important advocate for Dalits’ rights in modern India, B.R. Ambedkar, was prescient when in 1930 he unsuccessfully tried to persuade his fellow Indians that Dalits ought to be given political autonomy:

We are often reminded that the problem of the Depressed Classes [a term for Dalit used in the early decades of the century] is a social problem and that its solution lies elsewhere than in politics. We take strong exception to this view. We hold that the problem of the Depressed Classes will never be solved unless they get political power in their own hands. . . . The settlement of our problem must not be left . . . to the shifting sands of sympathy and the good will of the rulers.

(Ambedkar 1982: 503–9)

Notes

1 To cite only the most recent example of what Nicholas Dirks has described as the ‘embarrassment of caste’, the Indian state and prominent Indian sociologists opposed the plea by Dalit groups in India that their plight be represented before the UN’s 2001 Durban Conference on Racism and Xenophobia; see discussion in Natrajan and Greenough (2009: 1–44) and Viswanath (2014). Dirks (2003: 290–6) discusses the ‘embarrassment of caste’ on the part of contemporary Indian intellectuals.

2 The signal distinction between official and academic discourses on diversity is that caste is absent in official celebrations of diversity, such as the Republic Day parades described by Roy (2006: 66–104). In academic discourse, caste is included among the forms of diversity that the state must manage (Jayal 2006; Mahajan 2005; Ruparelia 2008).

3 But see Crystal (1987: 25–33) on the lack of scientific support for the popular idea that languages are naturally distinct, which makes the way languages are defined inherently political. The link the state makes between languages and populations is furthermore premised on a ‘folk ideology [that] assumes monolingualism to be the natural human state of affairs’, and therefore ‘that there should be a one-to-one mapping between languages and speakers’ (Bashkow 2004: 456, n. 14).

4 The Indian state’s creation of Hinduism as the majority religion completed a political project that was initiated by early Hindu nationalists in the late nineteenth century, and supported both actively and passively by the Gandhi-led Congress Party in the decades prior to Indian independence in 1947. On early Hindu nationalism and its precursors, see, respectively, Jaffrelot (2007) and Sharma (2003). On the Hinduization of Indian nationalism under a Gandhian Congress, see William Gould (2004).


6 An influential example of this sort of talk is Khilnani (1998). See also Lijphart (1996) and Ganguly (2007).

7 A standard scholarly position on Indian secularism, which closely approximates the Government of India’s own self-description, can be found in the writings of Rajeev Bhargava (e.g. Bhargava 2004b: 1–28, 2009: 82–109). The range of existing positions on Indian secularism can be found in the latter volume, and in Rajeswari Sunderrajan and Anuradha Needham (2006). See also Amir Ali (2000), who argues that even in the public square, pace most observers, there has been a relative non-recognition of religious minorities.

8 The observation that India’s policy of cultural protection for minorities empowers the most conservative elements in those communities is frequently seen as being exemplified in the widely discussed case of
Shah Bano, a Muslim woman whose rights to maintenance upon divorce were revoked by the Indian state in deference to the wishes of her ‘community’. This has given rise to a vast literature (Ali 1987; Pathak and Rajan 1989). The intersection of patriarchy, internal minorities and group rights is also of course a mainstay in the broader theoretical literature on multiculturalism. Classic sources include Cohen et al. (1999) and Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev (2005).

By defining religious communities as essentially at odds with one another at the cultural level, the Indian state ironically refines the very problem of ‘tolerance’ that it then goes on to solve (or manage) through its diversity policies. In this, India is not necessarily unique; for a parallel argument with respect to the toleration of religious difference in the contemporary United States, see Brown (2006).

The state governor, a position to which one is appointed by the centre, can move to dissolve the state government upon approval from the president and prime minister (Dasgupta 2001: 49–78).

As Srirupa Roy has put this, in the early decades of postcolonial India ‘the norm of diversity’ was of “an ethnocultural, nonpolitical matrix organized and maintained by the state” (Roy 2006: 20, my emphasis).

The findings on Indian Muslims’ current situation are detailed in an extensive Government of India study entitled Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslims in India: A Report (Government of India 2006). This is widely referred to as the Sachar Committee Report after Rajinder Sachar, the retired Chief Justice of the Delhi Court who headed the commission.

Dalit is the accepted scholarly term for those who were in previous times known by a wide variety of names in India. In addition to ‘untouchable’, terms that were used across India included ‘Pariah’, vanachara, varna, chandala, achut. They are still sometimes referred to, following Gandhian usage, as ‘harijans’, (meaning ‘children of the [Hindu] god Hari’), but this usage has been widely rejected by Dalits as demeaning; see Natrajan and Greenough (2009: 1).

On ubiquitous discrimination against Dalits in education, housing and employment, see Newman and Thorat (2012), and on ongoing violence see Narula (1999).

Using the Constituent Assembly debates to make his case, Christophe Jaffrelot arrives at a more sceptical conclusion, parallel to the one I present, namely that ‘multiculturalism’ is a misleading description of Indian state policies; see Jaffrelot (2004: 126–49).

The absolute hegemony of Congress and the caste- and religion-specific interests it represented began to crumble at the national level only in the 1990s; the best available account of this is Jaffrelot (2003); see also note 18.

In a telling exception, which reflects the wider cultural stereotype that caste endogamy is beneficial to the preservation of culture, the former Commerce Minister Jairam Ramesh ‘spoke proudly of India’s diversity [in 2007] by including . . . a glowing mention of its “4635 largely endogamous communities” – a direct reference to the approximately 3990 caste groups and 645 “tribal” groups in India.’ (Cited in Natrajan 2012.)


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Dalits – despite its officially secular platform (Gould 2004). A concise discussion of these issues can also be found in Sarkar (1996: 270–93).

26 This account of the struggle over the Poona Pact is derived primarily from Anand (2014), Jaffrelot (2005) and Zelliot (2010).

27 The rules regarding Sikhism and Buddhism were amendments to the original statement, and were introduced in 1956 and 1990, respectively: Constitution of India, Scheduled Castes Order of 1950.

28 Although this law was only passed in 1989, it was based on earlier laws, the first of which was the Protection of Civil Rights Act of 1955.

29 The National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities, also known as the Mishra Commission Report after the retired judge who chaired it, made for the first time an official statement that the category of Scheduled Caste should be amended to include Christians and Muslims. The Mishra Report appeared in 2007; the legal definition of SC has yet to be amended; see National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities (2007).

References


Rupa Viswanath


