In this chapter we introduce and discuss the significance of social ‘theory’ and ‘reflexivity’ with respect to their importance in conducting and producing meaningful qualitative research that has a clear purpose (see Markula and Silk, 2011). Given the tenets of physical cultural studies (PCS) and its concerns with social injustices and inequitable sets of relations of power, we focus predominantly on theories associated with what Sparkes and Smith (2014) call critical or openly ideological research. Accordingly, we focus on theories and associated research practices that eschew the notion of an objective or disinterested social scientist and with an underpinning purpose ‘orientated toward social and individual transformation’ (ibid.: 49–50). In this manner, we concur with Bourdieu’s call against the fetishism of theory, within which some researchers seem more inclined to dwell on theoretical concepts ‘instead of making them work … [and] putting them into action’ (cited in Brandao, 2010: 231). In paraphrasing Marx we accordingly desire to make social theory and reflexive processes work, not just to know and represent the world but as tools to potentially change it.

Social theory is typically defined as a logically interrelated set of propositions that provides explanations of human actions, interactions and meaning-making processes. To explain this definition of social theory to undergraduate students we often draw from Chris Collins and Steve Jackson’s (2007) analogy of theory as a road map. We explain that physical reality is complex and it can be difficult to navigate in unknown territories. Hence a map or GPS system can aid exploration by directing attention to aspects deemed relevant, such as roads, geographical features and relative distances. We then explain that social reality is perhaps more complex than physical geography and that a good social theory, like a map, can direct attention to select aspects of social reality – such as the workings of power or gender construction processes – that allow researchers to navigate, explore, interpret and draw conclusions. Thus we introduce and understand social theory as a tool, heuristic device and as a framework for interpretation (Thorpe, 2011).

Although social theory can illuminate, it can also work to obscure focus. We, accordingly, emphasize that social theory should not be understood as a definitive explanation of social reality but as a conceptual framework that needs ongoing testing, refining and critical reflection. As such, we highlight the necessary dialogue between theory and research, and concur with Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 16), who exclaimed that ‘research without theory is blind, and theory without research is empty’. The relationship between theory and research, in this
manner, is ‘dynamically intertwined, mutually influential, and constantly changing’ (Scott and Garner, 2013: 87).

Given the importance of theory to the research process it is not surprising that it has been defined as the ‘heart and soul of sociology’ (Thorpe, 2011: 12). Social theory, for example, encourages analysis of select topics, shapes the types of research questions asked and how researchers ‘do’ research (e.g., strategies for analysis of discourse), focuses interpretation of findings, impacts the quality of the research findings and, in turn, contours and refines theoretical understandings. Theory can correspondingly be understood as located within a discourse of methodology, with recognition that methodology involves an ongoing negotiation between theory and method (Scott and Garner, 2013). The research process, therefore, is never atheoretical and it is always more than just selecting a ‘method’ (Schwandt, 2000).

Yet perhaps the greatest indication of the significance of theory to critical research is with respect to how theory shapes the identities of researchers themselves. As examples, we know scholars who identify themselves, or at least their research selves, as Marxists, figurationalists or Foucauldians. This subjective investment can subsequently underpin academic debates and perhaps even influence power relations between scholars in a particular field of study or be associated with the acceptance or rejection of papers in select journals (e.g., see Dunning and Rojek, 1992, regarding the critiques and counter-critiques of figurational theory). A cultural studies approach, in contrast, would question the value of a researcher solely identifying with a specific theorist; as theory within cultural studies is always negotiated and developed in relation to diverse cultural contexts and changing political landscapes (King, 2005).

Commentators on research issues, however, more typically discuss the influence of biography on the research process. Indeed, the types of theories that researchers use depend, in part, on their life experiences, subjectivities and how they have been socialized/disciplined into the art of doing research. Sparkes and Smith contend:

we conduct inquiry via a particular (research) paradigm because it embodies assumptions about the world that we believe in and supports values that we hold dear. And, because we hold these assumptions and values we conduct inquiry according to the precepts of that paradigm.

( Sparkes and Smith, 2014: 9)

Correspondingly, they suggest that ‘it is not the research “problem” or question that drives a study, but, either implicitly or explicitly, our assumptions and theoretical orientations’ (ibid.: 9). This recognition underpins the importance, dare we say necessity, for researchers to critically reflect on the intimate links between their biographies, theoretical assumptions and research approaches.

**Foundational, grounded and critical-reflexive theories**

To further examine the links between self and theory, we explore a framework of thinking proposed by Scott and Garner (2013) that consists of the three broad types of theories: foundational, grounded and critical-reflexive. *Foundational theories* are broad ways of ‘explaining what we observe in daily life at the microlevel and macrolevel’ (ibid.: 88). A foundational theory (such as Marxism, symbolic interactionism or conflict theories) helps establish the purpose of the research, guides the types of questions asked, and provides somewhat ‘grand’ explanatory frameworks that can be generally applied to different contexts. Although clearly useful, foundational theories have been critiqued for producing ‘normative’ or seemingly
circular research processes. That is, the prime conclusions reflect and/or reproduce the theoretical underpinnings and rarely produce findings that challenge or change the theoretical assumptions.

Grounded theories, in contrast, claim to begin analysis without a priori concepts through observations and the collection of empirical data in a manner that works towards building a theoretical perspective from the ‘ground up’. Such an approach allegedly reduces the ‘bias’ of a theoretically driven examination and, therefore, counters the critique directed at foundational theories. Yet postmodern critiques of grounded theory suggest that it is disingenuous to claim that data is collected without theoretical guidance.

The broad criticisms directed at foundational and grounded theories have led to increased calls for reflexive sociology or for critically reflexive theorizing, in which researchers attempt to examine and acknowledge how their subjectivities, life experiences, theorizing and research approaches are interlinked. The subsequent ‘theory-research-self’ dialogue acknowledges that research is always inductive and deductive, and that theory always involves both foundational and grounded processes.

The calls for reflexive sociology can be traced back to the 1960s and the numerous ‘turns’ (e.g. linguistic, rhetorical, narrative, poststructural, ethical, reflexive) that have shaped the manner in which social science research has been conducted and represented. These ‘multiple turns, which some refer to broadly as the postmodern turn, have blurred in a manner to disrupt universal truth claims, the possibility of researching from a position of “nowhere”, and transcendent assertions of validity’ (Pringle and Phillips, 2013: 2). The theoretical tools that gained favour in this context shunned the tenets of positivism or modernist ways of researching and were deemed to be post-positivist or, more specifically, anti-positivist, critical and self-reflexive (Markula and Silk, 2011). Within the sociology of sport and PCS, the postmodern turn has accordingly encouraged scholars to draw increasingly on qualitative research approaches and to be more transparent with respect to how ‘data’ is collected, analysed and represented. A greater awareness of the politics and responsibilities associated with the research act has also occurred (Denzin, 1997). This broad epistemological shift has been associated with the acknowledgement that ‘truth’ is not discovered by researchers but is constructed within the research process. Concomitantly, concern has also been directed to the processes associated with theorizing or how researchers ‘do’ theory.

**Doing theory**

Cultural studies, although difficult to demarcate, has been characterized in part through its interdisciplinary proclivities and its use of multiple theoretical and methodological approaches. As such, cultural studies has never been dominated by a particular theoretical approach. The PCS project similarly embraces a multiplicity of theoretical and research approaches. Grossberg (1997), however, noted that the underpinning linkage between these (perpetual) diversities was the need for cultural studies researchers to adopt a ‘radical contextualism’ as he argued that ‘context is everything and everything is context for cultural studies’ (ibid.: 7–8). This foregrounding of context is based on the understanding that cultural practices and entities can only be interpreted in relation to the context that constituted them. Hence, the need for researchers to examine the complex array of diverse factors that shape particular contexts and their respective articulations.

King (2005: 24) explained that within cultural studies the process of theorizing is ‘developed in relation to changing epistemological and political conditions and thus is itself radically contextualised’. King drew from Nelson (1994: 202) to clarify further that the process of theorizing is ‘inescapably grounded in contemporary life and current politics’ and given that
contemporary contexts are always in processes of change, researchers should constantly reflect upon the theoretical tools that they adopt: do they work? Do they help produce new insights? Or do they reaffirm what is already known? In this respect, researchers need to challenge their theoretical lens, test it in new contexts and if it is found wanting, be prepared to modify or search for alternative theoretical tools.

Hall (1992: 280) personalized this process of critically engaging with a theory by using the metaphor of ‘wrestling with the angels’. He explained this metaphor with reference to his struggle to read and accept Althusser’s version of Marx:

I remember looking at the idea of ‘theoretical practice’ in Reading Capital and thinking, ‘I’ve gone as far in this book as it is proper to go.’ I felt, I will not give an inch to this profound misreading, this super-structuralist mistranslation, of classical Marxism, unless he beats me down, unless he defeats me in the spirit. He’ll have to march over me to convince me. I warred with him, to the death.

(Hall, 1992: 280)

Hall’s vivid account of wrestling with, or testing, Althusser’s theorizing reinforces the notion that research should not be theory-driven and theories should not be mobilized unreflexively. Taking inspiration from Hall’s (1992) notion of wrestling with the angels, Thorpe (2011) adopts an explicitly PCS approach to theory, suggesting that one needs to push, pull and stretch a theory in relation to the empirical evidence to test its veracity for ‘explaining particular aspects of contemporary society and/or the physically active body’ (ibid.: 269). Similarly, Andrews and Silk (2015) suggest that a PCS approach to theory does not involve a ‘slavish adherence to a singular theoretical position’ but rather a ‘critical engagement with theory: grappling with specific theories to see what is useful and appropriate within a particular empirical site, and disregarding/re-working that which is not’ (ibid.: 88). Continuing, they proclaim that PCS requires ‘the development of a broad-ranging and flexible theoretical vocabulary able to meet the extensive interpretive demands of its diverse empirical remit’ (ibid.). As Hall (1992) suggests, all of this wrestling, stretching and grappling with social theory is a personal journey for the researcher in relation to their project, their politics, and individual ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions. Thus, PCS approaches to theory must also be highly reflexive of how and why we are using theory in a particular historical context, and the strengths and limitations of such approaches (Andrews and Silk, 2015; Thorpe, 2011; King, 2005). In the following section, we explore the potential and concerns of the turn to reflexivity and the implication for our approaches to theory.

Reflexivity

The ‘reflexive turn’ in the social sciences and humanities has been such that many contemporary ethnographers seem to agree in the virtue of reflexivity in the theoretical and research practice (Foley, 2002), and consider it to be important to defining and judging the quality of research. At its most basic level, in the context of social research, reflexivity refers to ‘a turning back on oneself, a process of self-reference’, and understanding that the ‘products of research are affected by the personnel and process of doing research’ (Davies, 1999: 4). In other words, reflexivity is a ‘continuing mode of self-analysis and political awareness’ (Callaway, 1992: 33), in which the researcher is expected to be ‘critically conscious through personal accounting’ of how their own ‘self-location (across, for example, gender, race, class, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality), position, and interests influence all stages of the research process’ (Pillow, 2003: 178).
Reflexivity is a ‘prevalent trend’ in contemporary qualitative inquiry (ibid.: 180), yet the ‘problem of reflexivity’ and the ways in which ‘our subjectivity becomes entangled in the lives of others’ (Denzin, 1997: 27), is certainly not new. In fact, sociologists and anthropologists have been concerned with such issues for at least 40 years, and philosophers for considerably longer (see Lynch, 2000; Pillow, 2003). Despite a long history, many contemporary forms of reflexivity continue to be ‘indebted to the Enlightenment conception of self-reflection as a uniquely human cognitive capacity that enables progressive understanding of the human predicament’ (Lynch, 2000: 34). In the current cultural moment, reflexivity is most commonly used to refer to a method that all qualitative researchers ‘can and should use to legitimize, validate, and question research practices and representations’ (Pillow, 2003: 175).

According to Lynch (2000: 26), reflexivity, or being reflexive, ‘is often claimed as a methodological virtue and source of superior insight, perspicacity or awareness’, but it can be still very ‘difficult to establish just what is being claimed’. In response to concerns that reflexivity is increasingly becoming an over-used, under-defined, and hollow term (also see Kenway and McLeod, 2004; Maton, 2003), some scholars have offered typologies to illustrate its multiple uses. For example, Denzin (1997: 218–223) identifies five differing types of reflexivity in use in qualitative research, including methodological, intertextual, standpoint, queer and feminist reflexivity; Pillow (2003) identifies four strategies of reflexivity that also ‘highlight the difficulties and tensions in shifts from modern to postmodern understandings of doing qualitative research’ (ibid.: 180); and Lynch (2000: 27) offers an ‘inventory of reflexivities’ with the aim to ‘demonstrate the diversity of meanings and uses of the concept’. In this chapter, however, we focus on the critical social sciences, post-structuralist and feminist theoretical approaches to reflexivity, as we argue they have played the most important roles in yielding questions about what a researcher can know, their relationships with their projects and participants, and their ability to represent the lives of others. In fact, reflexivity and critical reflection have been developed and explored in feminist literature for several decades (Ryan and Golden, 2006). Groundbreaking feminist researchers have contributed concepts of ‘strong reflexivity’ (Harding, 1996) and ‘situated knowledges’ (Haraway, 1991) as part of a feminist critique of mainstream scientific methods that privilege particular notions of objectivity, scientific detachment and value neutrality (Speer, 2002; Daley, 2010). In so doing, feminist theory and feminist scholars have greatly extended our thinking about, and use of, reflexivity by ‘situating reflexivity as primary to feminist research and methodology’ (Pillow, 2003: 178). As Pillow reminds us, reflexivity under feminism is ‘not only about investigating the power embedded in one’s research’ but also about ‘doing research differently’, including more equitable relationships with participants, creating research that is empowering for women, and always linked to political action (ibid.: 178).

Many critical scholars of sport and physical culture are also leaning into the so-called ‘reflexive turn’. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, a group of sport researchers embraced autoethnography and narrative approaches to offer new ways of representing their own and others sporting, moving, researching bodies (see, for example, Denison and Rinehart, 2000), and this trend has been picked up again by a number of contemporary PCS scholars. Others opt to (re)write themselves into their methods. For example, Belinda Wheaton (2002) wrote openly about her multiple positions in windsurfing culture and how these enabled and constrained her access to various groups of participants; Ben Carrington (2008) developed an ‘epistemological framework for a reflexive cultural studies/critical sociology of sport’ based on a ‘rereading’ of the ‘moments of silence’ in his previous ethnographic work on race, culture and identity in British cricket (ibid.: 424); and Jason Laurendeau (2011) presented an affective autoethnography that reveals his own reflexive engagements with issues of masculinity, family and the ethics of risk-taking in extreme sports such as BASE jumping.
Many other physical cultural scholars are also offering thoughtful, compelling and care-fully crafted reflexive works, yet their acts and representations of reflexivity tend to be conducted individually and retrospectively, with few details as to how they developed such critical self-analysis and political awareness. In other words, we rarely hear about their 'methods of reflexivity', or the processes they have worked through to determine which aspects of their (fluid and multiple) identities are of significance at various stages in their projects (i.e. developing research questions, adoption of particular theoretical frameworks, interviewing, data analysis, writing up). As Grosz (1995) points out, there are 'limits to reflexivity' and to the extent to which we can develop a critical awareness of all the various 'influences on our research both at the time of conducting it and in the years that follow' (ibid.: 13). Continuing, she suggests that it may be more useful to think in terms of 'degrees of reflexivity' (ibid.), with 'some influences being easier to identify and articulate' at the time of our work, while others 'may take time, distance and detachment from the research' (Mauthner and Doucet, 2003: 425).

To date, few physical cultural scholars have explained the methods or strategies they have developed to help them critically reflect upon the multiple and fluid dimensions of their identities, and the influence their current positionings and personal histories have on their projects. Taking inspiration from post-structural feminist theorizing, however, a few feminist scholars of sport and physical culture are acknowledging the difficulties of developing such reflexivity, and are exploring the potential of collaborative approaches for facilitating and supporting more reflexive research practices and politics, both individually and collectively, and both during the research process and retrospectively (see, for example, Olive and Thorpe, 2011; Pavlidis and Olive, 2014; Thorpe, Barbour and Bruce, 2011). In so doing, some are engaging with Couldry’s (1996) assertion that “self-reflexivity” is not a license for autobiographical writing, but rather ‘a theoretically informed examination of the conditions for the emergence of “selves”’ (ibid.: 315). Thorpe (2009, 2011), for example, engages with the theoretical concepts of Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault and post-structural feminist theorists, to inform her own reflexive research practices, as well as understandings of her participants’ abilities to reflect critically on aspects of their own subjectivities. She further explores these ideas in collaboration with colleagues, and particularly the potential of Bourdieu’s notion of field-crossing for enhancing researcher reflexivity (Thorpe, Barbour and Bruce, 2011; Olive and Thorpe, 2011). By no means does Bourdieu offer all the answers to ‘doing’ reflexivity, but by reflecting on the process these scholars point to the value of theoretically informed collaborations for enhancing researcher reflexivity at different stages in the research journey, and particularly for helping scholars access those ‘blind spots’ in their own identities that may ‘never be comprehensively executed by the individual knower’ (Pels, 2000: 17).

**Criticisms of reflexivity**

A growing number of scholars have expressed concerns about the growth in reflexive research (Lynch, 2000; Patai, 1994; Pels, 2000; Pillow, 2003), some of which might also be levelled at those adopting reflexive approaches in physical cultural studies. Lynch (2000), for example, argues that ‘studies of “our own” investigative practices may, in some cases, be interesting, insightful and clearly written, or they may come across as tedious, pretentious and unrevealing’ (ibid.: 47), whereas Pels (2000: 2) is concerned about the ‘romance of reflexivity’, and the tendency for authors to narrate their stories in particular ways that ultimately work to glorify their personal journeys and reflections. Similarly, while some remain adamant that reflexivity is not aiding our attempts to produce better, or more socially significant, research, others are
engaging with such critiques with the aim of offering valuable suggestions as to how we might build upon and extend current understandings of reflexivity.

The work of Wanda Pillow (2003) is particularly noteworthy in her efforts to identify and overcome the pitfalls of reflexivity and to make the personal meaningful in a politically attuned manner. Concerned by the tendency for reflexivity to be used towards ‘confession, catharsis or cure’, she poses a series of questions to all purportedly ‘reflexive’ texts – ‘Did I need the author’s confessional tale to read the data? Did the use of “witnessing” as a metaphor for the researcher aid in my understanding of the research or close off my reading (for who can critique what another has “witnessed”)?’ (ibid.: 183). Continuing, she expresses concern that too many researchers are ‘utilizing reflexivity in ways that are dependent on a modernist subject – a subject that is singular, knowable, and fixable’ (ibid.: 192). However, rather than ‘shrugging off reflexivity’, Pillow advocates a ‘tracing of the problematics of reflexivity’ that involves a repositioning of reflexivity ‘not as clarity, honesty, or humility, but as practices of confounding disruptions – at times even a failure of our language and practices’ (ibid.). She calls for the interruption of ‘comfortable reflexivities’, and a move toward ‘reflexivities of discomfort’ (ibid.: 187). Whereas the former approach works ‘against the critical impetus of reflexivity’ and thus ‘masks continued reliance upon traditional notions of validity, truth, and essence in qualitative research’ (ibid.: 180), the latter postmodern approach to reflexivity ‘accounts for multiplicity without making it singular’ and ‘acknowledges the unknowable without making it familiar’ (ibid.: 181).

Others have also offered valuable suggestions for how to engage in more politically inspired reflexivity with broader social, as opposed to individual, concerns at the core. Good examples include Fine’s (1994: 70) deeply reflexive approach to ‘working the hyphens’ at which ‘Self-Other join in the politics of everyday life’, Richardson’s (1999) guidelines for ‘creative analytic practice’ (CAP) ethnographic approaches with both personal and social impact, and Probyn’s (1993: 3) aim to ‘think the social through myself’, all of which have been taken up and applied across an array of disciplines in highly creative and politically inspired ways.

Many sport and physical cultural scholars continue to use reflexivity as a form of ‘confession, catharsis or cure’ and with the modernist assumptions that positioning oneself in the research will enhance the ‘validity’ of the results and overall quality of the project (Pillow, 2003: 175). Yet others are embracing the more postmodern understandings of reflexivity espoused by Pillow. For example, Fiona McLachlan (2012: 72) drew on the concept of ‘becoming’ to ‘embrace the disruption of linear, coherent, permanent, grounded understandings of objects, subjects and knowledge’, which allowed her ‘to conceptualise and problematise’ her own ‘subjective involvement in analysing the plight of public swimming pools’ (ibid.: 16). Also leaning toward a more postmodern understanding of reflexivity, Joshua Newman (2011) examines the ‘politics of reflexivity and articulation’ in relation to his past experiences and ongoing research on sport in Southern sporting fields. Concluding, he advocates for ‘messier, bottom-up qualitative engagement with the body – a contemplative method of articulation(s) that situates the body among bodies and framed through both the soi and the pour poi’ (ibid.: 553). For Newman (2011: 554), ‘studying the complex relations of the body, the self, and reflexivity’, is important for becoming more aware of, and thus working to limit, ‘the violence created by our “embodied selves” along the way’.

Arguably, for reflexivity to make a valuable contribution to PCS it must be more than a ‘methodological tool’ (Pillow, 2003: 175), or theoretical concept. Rather, it must be conceived as an invaluable part of doing embodied, ethical, theoretically informed, and political ethnographic research (Carrington, 2008; England, 1994). In so doing, physical cultural studies scholars might also embrace the challenge of ‘tracing the problematics’ of their own (and others’) variants of reflexivity (Pillow, 2003: 180), and perhaps consider joining the ‘move[ment]
away from comfortable uses of reflexivity’ (ibid.: 175) towards more postmodern understandings of ourselves, and our participants, as ‘multiple, as unknowable, as shifting’ (ibid.: 180).

**Conclusion**

At the heart of the PCS agenda is the aim of constructing and disseminating ‘potentially empowering forms of knowledge and understanding’, particularly in relation to challenging power inequities and social injustices (Andrews, 2008: 54). With similar political intent, Denzin and Lincoln (2005) suggested that the literary and representative themes popularly associated with the postmodern turn in the 1990s, have been eclipsed in more recent years by the ‘struggle to connect qualitative research to the hopes, needs, goals, and promises of a free democratic society’ (ibid.: 3). As such, they encouraged researchers to reflect on processes to ensure their writings were of social and political importance. In following Denzin and Lincoln, we suggest that a key issue in the research process is to consider how *theoretically* sophisticated and reflexive research can be mobilized to imagine more ‘politically expedient physical cultural possibilities’ (Andrews, 2008: 57)?

In order to offer some insight into this question of political import we conclude by drawing from Butler’s (2004) reflections on her groundbreaking text *Gender Trouble* published 14 years earlier. She reflexively acknowledged that in writing about the politics of parody, she used drag as an analogy as it resonated with her biography. She stated, ‘you might as well know … the only way to describe me in my younger years was as a bar dyke who spent her days reading Hegel and her evenings, well, at the gay bar, which occasionally became a drag bar’ (ibid.: 213). And it was in this ‘cultural moment’ that she became committed ‘to the ideal that no one should be forcibly compelled to occupy a gender norm that is undergone, experientially, as an unlivable violation’ (ibid.: 213). Consequently her political aims developed in relation to her life experiences and her desire to *theorize* gender as a performance.

Butler subsequently also developed her argument that ‘theory is itself transformative’ (ibid.: 204). Yet she did not believe that ‘theory is sufficient for social and political transformation’ as ‘something besides theory must take place, such as interventions at social and political levels that involve actions, sustained labor, and institutionalized practice, which are not quite the same as the exercise of theory’ (ibid.: 204–205). Of importance, however, she clarified ‘that in all of these practices, theory is presupposed’ (ibid.: 205). In other words, she stressed that theory underpins these overt political actions as it ‘presupposes a vision of the world, of what is right, of what is just, of what is abhorrent, of what human action is and can be’ (ibid.: 205).

In concluding this chapter, we have drawn closely from Butler to highlight the intersections between biography, reflexivity, theory, politics and the potential for social transformation. Yet we also acknowledge that the use of a particular theory or a reflexive writing style does not come with any political guarantee.

For many, reflexive analysis has the potential to ‘reveal forgotten choices, expose hidden alternatives, lay bare epistemological limits and empower voices’ that may otherwise be silenced by objective discourse (Lynch, 2000: 36). Yet there is also growing concern that the current focus on self-indulgent, narcissistic forms of reflexivity may be ‘undermining the conditions necessary for emancipatory research’ (Pillow, 2003: 176; Patai, 1994). As revealed in this chapter, there are multiple interpretations and usages of reflexivity, some with more emancipatory potential than others. With Lynch (2000), we are conscious that ‘what reflexivity does, what it threatens to expose, what it reveals and who it empowers, depends upon who does it and how they go about it’ (ibid.: 36). Thus, we conclude by arguing that the reflexive turn in PCS is important, only so long as we keep power relations and political injustices at the fore of our work.
References


