Neoliberalism, taken to indicate social practices that enact multiple extensions of market logics, may be presumed to signal a kind of anti- or post-geopolitics. After all, the most famous adjective to describe the desired global space of neoliberalism is ‘flat’ (Friedman 2005; Ohmae 1991). The flatness indicates the eroded significance of national boundaries and of differences of most sorts between people and places across the planet (Brown 2006: 699). Geopolitics, by contrast, relies on a world whose surface is not flat. It is, rather, a world exhaustively divided into differentiated territorial states. Moreover, geopolitics understands each state as having its own interests and as pursuing these with force when and where it is expedient.

In geopolitics the capacitated actors defining the world’s surface are taken to be states acting on behalf of their own (national) societies. The goals are (national) security and (relative) power. However, in a neoliberal flat world, the capacitated actors are identified as capital. Most obviously this includes corporations, acting on behalf of their investors and managers. But, since neoliberalism re-casts society as individuals understood as human capital, then individuals (who may be employees/employers, consumers, producers, investors, etc.) are individuated capitals themselves too. Instead of states and their respective national societies, the flat neoliberal world is populated by corporations and by individuals understood as, and who understand themselves as, ‘little specks of capital’ (Brown 2014a). Both firms and individuals are organized by, and themselves organize, market logics. And, they relate to one another through market logics (of price, choice, enterprise and, above all, competition) rather than geopolitical logics (of identity, territory, force, war). This thumbnail sketch of the differences between geopolitical and neoliberal rationalities and logics, though crude and overstated, serves to highlight the point that one might expect that, as neoliberalism has become an increasingly salient feature of life across the globe, geopolitics as a mode of state practice would fade away.

This chapter argues that there has, indeed, been a change in how geopolitics works, but that this is better understood as a reworking of geopolitics than its redundancy. Geopolitical imperatives remain salient, but their content and conduct are being constantly reworked as political and social life move in neoliberal directions. Geopolitics and economics have never been separate pure logics (see Mercille 2008 on the Vietnam War, for example), so the point is not so much that they are intertwined, but that contemporary neoliberal market-based logics are coming to rework the nature and practice of geopolitics. Geopolitics can be thought of as one ‘technology of rule’ and neoliberalism can be thought of a parcel of market-based ‘technologies of rule’ and,
as many analysts of neoliberal governmentality have shown, it is not a case of either/or. It is not state (or plan) or market (Teivainen 2002; Lemke 2013; Brown 2014b). Geopolitical logics and techniques work with, rework, and are reworked by, market-based logics and techniques, meaning we need to ‘attend to the co-existence, complementarity and interference of different technologies of rule’ (Lemke 2013: 41) or their ‘hybridization’ (Essex 2012). Moreover, these interactions and meldings of geopolitical and neoliberal technologies of rule are highly contingent outcomes of social and political practices of all sorts. So, as Clive Barnett noted, this entails viewing ‘political rationalities as emergent qualities of dynamic interactions’ (Barnett 2009: 284). The result of these contingent intersections may be a set of practices that we might identify as neoliberal geopolitics. But this is a highly contingent and variable outcome, not some necessary corollary of an epoch-change, nor of some singular logic of the state or of the market.

The actual trends and examples discussed in much (though not all) the literature on neoliberalism and also in this chapter are, it should be noted, drawn mainly from the global North, and from the USA and Europe in particular. These are not selected because they are to be construed as some kind of leading edge, or as in some ways exemplary, but rather simply because they are familiar to the author. As many have pointed out, the direction neoliberalism takes is highly contextual and there is no singular neoliberal geopolitics that can be identified as operating everywhere in the same way (see, for example, Brenner et al. 2010 on ‘variegated neoliberalization’, and Springer 2011 on ‘articulated neoliberalism’).

Taking cues from the theorization and diagnosis of neoliberalism offered by Michel Foucault in his 1978–9 lectures, and from the contemporary work of scholars such as Wendy Brown and Thomas Lemke, I treat a neoliberal geopolitics as one facet of a complex situation in which ‘the market, competition, and so the enterprise’, emerge ‘into what could be called the formative power of society’ (Foucault 2008: 148). This is not to say that with neoliberalism there occurs a replacement of the political with the economic; and it is not to say that the state is merely positioned as a servant of economic interests. It is more a case of proliferating and diverse situations in which there is a re-making of the political (of the state and of citizens) through market logics. As Wendy Brown has put it:

more than simply facilitating the economy, the state itself must construct and construe itself in market terms, as well as develop policies and promulgate a political culture that figures citizens exhaustively as rational economic actors in every sphere of life.

(2006: 694)

She elaborates:

The state itself is enfolded and animated by market rationality, not simply profitability, but a generalized calculation of cost and benefit becomes the measure of all state practices. Political discourse on all matters is framed in entrepreneurial terms; the state must not simply concern itself with the market but think and behave like a market actor across all of its functions, including law.

(Brown 2003: n.p., emphasis in original)

To explore the content and conduct of neoliberal geopolitics, this chapter proceeds by tracing the fortunes of the concept ‘geoeconomics’ as a term deployed to capture the changed orientation and operation of geopolitics. The term itself can be easily critiqued as a crude one, relying on a realist conception of the state, but it can usefully be examined as a kind of indicator of how neoliberal geopolitics coalesces and functions, at least in the USA and selected states in Europe.
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After a brief history of the deployment of the idea of geoeconomics, the chapter turns to consider examples that may be taken to indicate various aspects of a neoliberal geopolitics.

Geoeconomics

US-based military strategist and writer Edward Luttwak, in a 1998/1990 article on National Interest and in a subsequent book (1998[1990], 1993), made the case for ‘geoeconomics’. He noted that ‘as the relevance of military threats and military alliances wanes, geoeconomic priorities and modalities are becoming dominant in state action’ (1998[1990]: 127). This was a time in the USA when there was considerable anxiety about the implications of globalization, about the relative rise of Japan as an economic power, and about changes to come from the end of the Cold War. Popular analyses by authors such as Paul Kennedy (1989), Kenichi Ohmae (1991), Francis Fukuyama (1992), and Samuel Huntington (1993) variously proclaimed the dawn of a new phase in world politics. Luttwak’s description of a new era defined by geoeconomics, distinguished from the previous era of geopolitics, drew on many of the same motifs of globalization and, though it did not sell as many copies as these other popular narratives, it struck a chord.

In fact, Luttwak did not claim a simple model of history in which a pure form of geoeconomics completely erased a previously prevailing pure geopolitical form of inter-state relations. Unlike many popular analysts, he argued that states’ capacities to act were not diminished in the face of globalization. Instead, he proposed ‘a much less complete transformation of state action’ (1998[1990]: 127) in which states still were significant geopolitical actors with fundamentally unchanged (realist) goals. To achieve these goals, though, Luttwak argued that states (especially the more powerful) were changing their strategies and tools, looking more to the geoeconomic rather than the geopolitical. He wrote of an ‘admixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce – or, as Clausewitz would have written, the logic of war in the grammar of commerce’ (ibid.: 126). In the USA in the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially during the first Clinton administration, there was much debate over globalization, national competitiveness, the value of free trade, and the utility of strategic trade policies. Luttwak’s views reflect this period, to be sure, but his work did identify that, for some states, economic rationalities and market-based modes of calculating and acting were coming to ‘trump’ any other rationalities (including geopolitical). He stated decisively that ‘there is no superior modality’ to geoeconomics (ibid.: 128, emphasis original).

As Matthew Sparke has noted, Luttwak’s idea of geoeconomics is useful inasmuch as it ‘gets at the way in which a more or less geopolitical phenomena (of imagining territory as a mode of political intervention and governance) is closely articulated with a whole series of economic imperatives, ideas and ideologies’ (Sparke 1998: 69–70). Luttwak himself claimed that the geoeconomic modality arose from two dynamics: first, the needs of state bureaucrats to find a new post–Cold War rationale for themselves, and, second, the ‘instrumentalization of the state by economic interest groups that seek to manipulate its activities on the international scene for their own purposes’ (Luttwak 1998[1990]: 126; see also Aligica 2002). This points us towards the potential utility of examining exactly which bureaucrats and which ‘economic interest groups’ find the resources of state power useful, in what ways that happens, and with what effects.

However, by the turn of the millennium, the term geoeconomics had faded away. Then the events of 11 September 2001, the military operations by the USA and allies in Afghanistan from October 2001, and the 2003 US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq seemed to signal the apparent return of geopolitics and the logic of war, and geoeconomics seemed much less relevant. It appeared that geoeconomics had been ‘a creature of the early and mid-1990s’ only
(Thirlwell 2010: 9). Nonetheless, after a period of dormancy, the term has been revived, making something of a comeback in more recent years (Aligica 2002; Thirlwell 2010).

Thus, in 2011 Robert Youngs wrote, from his perspective in a European think tank that ‘A concept that found itself out of favour in the more optimistic and less ribald 1990s has been dusted off’, explaining that ‘the euro crisis and shifts in global power require a more assertive focus on immediate economic interests’ and have prompted a “return of geo-economics”’ (Youngs 2011: 13). Geoeconomics maintained some currency in the world of US think tanks too. For example, in 2000 the Council of Foreign Relations established a Center for Geoeconomic Studies, using geoeconomics to indicate an interest in ‘how economic and political forces interact to influence world affairs’ (CFR 2015). Meanwhile, in France, economist Pascal Lorot and colleagues at the think tank Institut Choiseul have promoted geoeconomics as an area of enquiry, founding the journal Géoéconomie in 1997 (see Lorot 1999, 2001: 46).

In the borderlands between popular business school approaches to understanding the world economy and policy-wonkdom, Swedish management professor, Klaus Solberg Soilen, has recently promoted geoeconomics reconceptualized along the lines of another influential analysis of the early 1990s, that of the ‘competitive advantage of nations’ advanced by Michael Porter (Porter 1990). Competition, for Soilen, is the key to understanding geoeconomics. He states, ‘What has changed in the 21st century is that the aim is no longer to fight a political ideology with another one, but to become more practical, to develop the most competitive society. The difference is paramount’ (2010: n.p., see also 2012).

More recently, a deeper attempt to engage with geoeconomics has been made by Paul Dragos Aligica and colleagues based at the Mercatus Institute, a pro-free market think tank hosted by George Mason University in the USA (Aligica 2002; Aligica and Tarko 2012). Aligica and Tarko, for example, have asked whether geoeconomic actions on the part of states (especially those characterized by so-called state capitalism) can be explained as contingent outcomes of rent-seeking behaviours. So, for example they see how states might use state-owned enterprises, national oil companies, or sovereign wealth funds to generate revenue when tax regimes are weak, not as a grand strategy, but as a result of rent-seeking by individuals and institutions.

The earlier 1990s formulations of geoeconomics were reactions to a time in which the rise of Japan and the problems and possibilities of trade were key, while the more recent formulations tend, inevitably, to focus on the rise of China and on the problems and possibilities of finance. In more recent work, the 2008 and onward economic crisis, and the problems of the eurozone, are featured frequently. The recent works using the term ‘geoeconomics’ are not, by and large, informed by either political economy or governmentality approaches to neoliberalism. Nonetheless, there are several ways in which they point to features of the contemporary character and operations of political and economic life that are identified as significant by scholars of neoliberalism.

In geography, Matt Sparke has offered analyses of contemporary states’ strategies in which he has mobilized a modified understanding of geoeconomics that highlights the ways in which global-local relations are re-imagined (Sparke 2005, 2007; Sparke and Lawson 2003; see also Hyndman 1996; Coleman 2007). In a similar vein, recent work by Sami Moisio and Anssi Paasi has explicative changing geoeconomic considerations and ‘market calculations’ ‘increasingly govern the social in the state’s [internal] welfare policies’ (2013: 268). The relationship between geoeconomics and neoliberal governance was a central concern of Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith in a 2009 paper. Picking up on Sparke’s earlier analyses, they linked the ‘rise of the geoeconomic’ and the ‘erosion of geopolitical calculation’ to pervasive concerns with security: They pointed to ‘an emerging geography of economy and security’ with ‘attendant social forms’ (Cowen and Smith 2009: 22–3). In related work, Jamey Essex focuses on the productive
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discursive elements of both geopolitics and geoeconomics in his study of USAID. He stresses the 'overlaps and tensions' between them (2013: 8) and the way institutional actors strategically select elements of each discursive resource. In 2003, Roberts et al. investigated the way elements of neoliberalism were 'interarticulat[ed] with certain dangerous supplements, including, not least of all, the violence of American military force' in shaping and carrying out the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq (2003: 887). They noted the 'more open, systematic, globally ambitious, and quasi-corporate economic style' of US war-making (ibid.: 888) and how it was legitimated in terms of a neoliberal insistence on integration into the world economy. The work of John Morrissey (2008, 2011) has focused on the role of neoliberal technologies, such as risk assessment, in the US military's interventions in the Middle East. Simon Springer has carefully attended to how, in some times and some places, neoliberalism intersects with Orientalism and colonialist/racist mappings of global spaces and their populations, to promote and legitimize forcible integration as ‘civilizing’ (Springer 2009, 2013). Whether or not these developments are labelled ‘neoliberal geopolitics’, each of these geographical analyses raises questions about the nature of the contemporary neoliberalized state and about the reconfigured relations between states, capital, and subjects/citizens.

Some recent geographical analyses of neoliberalism draw upon Foucault's lectures on neoliberalism. For the purposes here, Foucault's observation that ‘The market economy does not take something away from government. Rather, it indicates, it constitutes the general index in which one must place the rule for defining all governmental action’ (2008: 121) is a significant starting point. While earlier investigations of neoliberalism tended to regard the extension of state activities as a contradiction within neoliberal logic (see Barnett 2009 for a critical overview), more recent work is more in line with Foucault’s idea that market logics come to define, rather than diminish, governmental action. Relatedly, Foucault’s stress that neoliberalism is characterized by a market logic that is not based on supply and demand and on trading, but rather is based on competition and enterprise, is important. Foucault said: ‘the market that the neoliberals are thinking about is a society in which the regulatory principle should not be so much the exchange of commodities as the mechanisms of competition’ (2008: 147), a point he summed up by saying this is ‘Not a supermarket society, but an enterprise society’ (ibid.). Wendy Brown (2014a, 2014b), in particular, has traced the implications of the enterprise form, and, as Jason Read has noted:

The shift from exchange to competition has profound effects: while exchange was considered to be natural, competition is understood by the neoliberals of the twentieth century to be an artificial relation that must be protected against the tendency for markets to form monopolies and interventions by the state. Competition necessitates a constant intervention on the part of the state, not on the market, but on the conditions of the market.

(2009: 28)

Several researchers have taken this so-called governmentality approach, inspired by Foucault’s ideas, and focused on how subjectivity gets reworked under these conditions (see, for example, Larner 2000; Walker et al. 2008). Here, though, my interest lies in how the ‘regulatory principle’ of competition relates to states’ foreign policies: in how such forms of neoliberal geopolitics might be operating in the contemporary world.

The US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq (and to an extent the US-led war in Afghanistan) has been treated by many analysts as exemplifying a form of neoliberal geopolitics (Roberts et al. 2003; Cowen and Smith 2009). Indeed, the spectacularly bald manner in which
the economic interests of the USA and US-based firms were promoted and secured through military force in Iraq cannot be ignored. From the privatization of force itself (Gallagher 2012) and the pervasive role of contractors in all aspects of the occupation (Roberts 2013) to the explicitly geoeconomic aim and calculus of the 2003–4 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq (Morrissey 2008, 2011), the market, indeed, provided the 'general index' for the occupation's technologies of rule.

The rule of the CPA in Iraq might stand as an historically pivotal moment in the geohistory of neoliberal geopolitics, but there are a proliferating number of phenomena that one can identify as entailing neoliberal geopolitics. One could point, first, to the ways in which development has been re-cast as a project saturated with the logics and technologies of competition and enterprise. For example, US foreign assistance for development (as a subset of foreign aid), relies much more now on private corporations and organizations which, in many cases, bid to win contracts to ‘deliver’ development programmes as technologies of rule through ‘soft Power’ (Roberts 2014). The USA’s Millenium Challenge Corporation, established in 2004 to operationalize performance-based funding for economic development projects, evinces neoliberal development in a corporate form, as a facet of neoliberal geopolitics (Soederberg 2004; Mawdsley 2007; Roberts 2013). A second example of the ways organizational forms and practices of geopolitics have shifted more fully to the index of the market could be drawn from the area of intelligence. Like development assistance, US intelligence is more and more carried out by private corporations. More significantly, through the use of volunteered information and open source processes, intelligence is relying on market-indexed technologies of rule and risk developing around and through the phenomenon of big data (Crampton et al. 2013). To develop these points a little further I turn now to a different example of geopolitics indexed to the market: a recent series of high-profile trade missions to India undertaken by the British government.

The 2013 British trade mission to India

My first priority as Prime Minister is to do everything I can to ensure that Britain succeeds in the Global Race. I know we have the great businesses and entrepreneurs to make that possible. But I also know that success in business does not just happen. We cannot rely merely on sentiment and shared history with our trading partners. We have to get out there, make the case for Britain and open doors for British business.

(Cameron 2013)

With these words, the British Prime Minister framed his second visit to India as leader of a large trade delegation (the first one had taken place in 2010). ‘[M]aking the case for Britain’ and ‘open[ing] doors for British business’ is an activist agenda, very much in line with Foucault’s identification of an interventionist neoliberal state, working to secure the conditions to ‘make the market possible’ (2008: 146) but enacted and extended on the basis of a geopolitical imagination (of Britain, of India, of British business and so on). But the Prime Minister, here as in many other speeches and writings, frames the imperative in terms of a race; in fact, the ‘Global Race’ (capitalized in the original). It is hard to think of a metaphor more directly invoking mandatory competition as the condition framing both Britain and ‘British business’ and hence the work of the state:

Rushed into use shortly after the 2012 Olympics, by a party whose key figures went to expensive schools that fetishise sport and general competitiveness, ‘the global race’
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is hardly the most subtle or socially sensitive of rhetorical devices. But it has the advantage of flexibility.

(Beckett 2013: n.p.)

The historical and deeply complex social resonances of the race metaphor lend it plausibility and efficacy, no doubt. It brings with it a host of associated ideas that can be invoked by those wishing to legitimize the practices it is used to describe and sell. Hence:

Britain, the Tories tell us, needs to ‘win’ it, ‘succeed’ in it, and get ‘to the top’ in it; ‘compete’ in it, ‘thrive in’ it, and be ‘strong’ in it; ‘fight’ in it; or merely, ‘equip’ itself for it and ‘get fit for’ it. If Britain fails to do some or all of these things, it will ‘sink’, ‘lose’, ‘fall behind’, be left in ‘the slow lane’, or let ‘others take over’.

(Ibid.)

More generally, these terms apply equally to the individual’s project of being an entrepreneur of him- or herself, responsible for getting into good condition to run the race, investing in their own future (through education, going to the gym, eating healthily etc.) to succeed in the competition (see Lemke 2001; Oksala 2013: 65). The Prime Minister’s delegation to India, framed thus, is drawing on the ‘race’s’ multiple valences to cohere this more recent version of the long-standing practice of the trade mission. A closer look at the composition of the large delegation makes its thoroughly neoliberal character clear. Accompanying the Prime Minister on the 2013 trip was a group comprising: three ministers (the Minister of State – Foreign and Commonwealth Office; the Minister for Universities and Science; and the recently created Minister for Business Engagements with India); over 100 ‘business delegates’ (a group that included many major corporations’ CEOs and more than a half dozen prominent university vice chancellors); eight MPs; plus several diplomats and various other officials (HM Government 2013). These delegates’ work complemented the routine work of diplomatic staff to promote the business interests of their compatriots. A recent research project found that diplomats report spending an increasing proportion of their time on issues broadly construed as ‘commercial diplomacy’ (Kostecki and Naray 2007). The Prime Minister’s delegation brought together high-profile emissaries from the worlds of the state, capital, and academe to join forces in an effort to run the global race on behalf of ‘Britain’, ‘projecting [the principles of a market economy] on to a general art of government’ (Foucault 2008: 131).

More specifically, the Prime Minister hoped he could use the trade delegation’s visit to clinch one of the biggest arms deals in history. He was keen to secure a major deal for aircraft to replace India’s aging MiG-21 fighter jet fleet with the so-called Eurofighter (developed by a consortium of British, German, Italian, and Spanish firms – led by Airbus) and thus win the competition with the Rafale fighter produced by France’s Dassault. In this regard, the visit to India was not unusual. Representing the interests of weapons systems manufacturers is a major part of what the highest-level elected officials do when they visit ‘partner’ countries. In his earlier visit, Cameron had secured a £700 million deal for Hawk training jets, benefiting British-based manufacturers BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce, and during his visit to India in July 2014 the UK’s Foreign Secretary William Hague again promoted the Eurofighter with the newly elected Modi government.

Arms deals have long been components of the geopolitical economy; they are ‘major strands in the warp and woof of international affairs’ (Pierre 1981/2: n.p.). But now it is not just big weapons systems that national leaders undertake to sell. With the rise of the security industries, specializing in everything from counter-terrorism to surveillance and risk analysis, and with the
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blurring of the defence, policing, private security, big data analysis and intelligence domains, commercial diplomacy now also entails promoting firms across these sectors. In the case of the UK–India relationship, for example, it was reported that, a few weeks before Cameron's huge delegation arrived in India, the UK's Minister for Security, James Brokenshire, had been there, leading a delegation of 'homeland security' firms (Statewatch 2013).

Arms deals are often represented in the language of partnership rather than, or alongside, the commercial interests of the firms involved. Indeed, Prime Minister Cameron told his audience in India 'Britain wants to be your partner of choice'. Partnership conjures the enterprise aspect of market rationality and reworks the relationship between places, in this case between Britain and India. (On the uses of the 'partnership narrative' in neoliberalism more generally, see Davies 2007 and Larner and Craig 2005.) The partnership idea is also aligned with the logic of competition, since Britain's trade mission has, of course, to be seen in the context of a world economy whose most dynamic cores are in Asia and in which the relatively troubled economies of Europe and North America are anxious to 'partner' with rising powers — including India. Britain's 2013 delegation followed high-level visits to India from the USA, Germany, and France, each seeking to be India's favourite partner.

The trade mission also highlights the melding of state and corporate interests and identities. As Luttwak noted in his formulation of geoeconomics, there is an 'instrumentalization' of the state which can pre-empt questions about its political implications. Wendy Brown has observed:

Thus, from the 'scandal' of Enron to the 'scandal' of Vice President Cheney delivering Iraq to Halliburton to clean up and rebuild, there is no scandal. Rather, there is only market rationality, a rationality that can encompass even a modest amount of criminality but also treats close state–corporate ties as a potentially positive value — maximizing the aims of each — rather than as a conflict of interest.

(2003: n.p.)

Conclusions

The lurching and highly unevenly distributed contemporary world economy and the foreign policy of the world's states are intertangled and co-constitutive. Older conceptualizations and typologies of states and markets seem no longer relevant. China, in particular seems to confound categories. Is it best understood as 'state capitalism', 'socialism with Chinese characteristics', or 'neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics', or a new version of a 'developmental state'? But, as this chapter has touched upon, the British and US states are no less confounding for those seeking to fit them into simple typologies. Some would look to the term 'geoeconomics' to signal the tendency for states to craft and carry out foreign policy based on economic goals and using market-based strategies, and while the term has not enjoyed much currency in more critical scholarly circles, it does signal some significant aspects of the shifting imagination and practice of geopolitics.

When the desired global space of states is described in terms of partnerships, with states teaming up for a race that is a competition, but one presumed to be a win–win scenario, the market is the rationality holding this contradictory image together. The market is imagined as an arena in which calculating individuals, firms, states, compete, but in which it is possible for even the last one to cross the finish line to have gained in some manner. As Luttwak noted, 'war is a zero-sum encounter' but 'commercial relations need not be, and indeed rarely have been' (1998[1990]: 130). States are both competitors in the race and the coaches/trainers/facility builders/award givers for 'their' (and here there are multiple negotiations and inclusions and exclusions over
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who belongs) firms and citizens, each themselves competing. Such are the conditions in which neoliberal logics rework state practices, including foreign policy. Contemporary forms of neoliberal geopolitics are neither stable nor coherent. Rather, they are a diverse (‘variegated’) mixture of rationalities and strategies, with some succeeding and some failing. But variously neoliberalized states formulate and conduct foreign policy based on and assessed in terms of the ‘Great Race’, of competition and enterprise, mixed with concerns for security and risk.

To more fully understand what is happening, and to resist the easy (but meaningless) diagnosis of everything as neoliberal, it will be important for those interested in the contemporary geopolitical economy to trace how exactly market calculations and the logics of competition and enterprise get reworked by states and rework those states themselves in the process. This does not mean that older ideas, such as crony-capitalism or rent-seeking, are no longer relevant. But seeing how such phenomena interlink with broader social and political (and, even psychological) shifts, as the market becomes the regulatory principle for everything, can help us connect the dots somewhat.

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