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PART IV

Knowledge productions
Neoliberalism is a changing dynamic phenomenon crystallizing as an idea and ideology in the inter-war period, becoming internationalized and institutionalized as a credo for the Mont Pelerin Society (originally the Acton–Tocqueville Society) in 1947, and a set of policies in the service of economic liberalism with the ascendancy to power of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in 1979–80 to develop as the supreme reigning economic paradigm of the major world policy agencies and the Western world-view in the last 35 years (Peters 2011). It has demonstrated its remarkable capacity for survival in light of world events, even strengthening its dominance after the global financial crisis (GFC). Against the grain of core ideological beliefs, neoliberal officials and politicians intervened directly in the market using vast amounts of public money to bail out struggling banks on the basis of the slogan ‘too big to fail’. Some critics suggested that this central contradiction did little to injure the policy status of neoliberalism. Indeed, financialization and the growth of finance capitalism that led to the global financial meltdown were largely a result of the repeal of financial regulation, especially the so-called Glass–Steagall Act in 1999 that had originally limited commercial bank securities activities and affiliations.

The GFC drew attention to market volatility, to knock-on effects of ‘too big to fail’ entities, the dangers of high levels of public debt and the risks associated with the massive growth and expansiveness of the finance sector vis-à-vis the real productive economy. Suddenly, the role of the state and other extra-state agencies was back on the policy agenda as governments explored the scope of new regulatory tools designed to restructure banks, introduce new capital reserve levels and monitor professional standards. Greater thought has been given to the threats that the finance sector pose to the economy as a whole, and European governments in particular have sought to deal with these problems by pursuing austerity measures designed to cut levels of unsustainable public debt. Even with the deepest recession since the 1930s – followed by the slowest economic recovery for more than a century, nationalization of banks and historically high unemployment – neoliberalism survived calls to return to new forms of Keynesian economics and today there is little evidence of paradigm change.

In the aftermath of the crisis neoliberalism has grown stronger. Philip Mirowski (2013) argues that the true nature of neoliberalism has gone unrecognized by its critics because they have failed to understand the movement’s intellectual history, the way it has transformed everyday life, and what constitutes opposition to it. Michel Foucault was one of the very first to explore both the conceptual genealogy of neoliberalism and neoliberalism as one of the four main forms
of economic liberalism emerging in the early twentieth century with links back to the late sixteenth century. Foucault’s account of neoliberalism linking it to forms of governmentality provides an understanding of its inherent longevity, its tenacity and resistance to all counter-evidence, and its dynamic ever-changing character. The other major long-term historical tendency (of capitalism), not mentioned by Foucault because it only became evident in the years after his death, is the dominance of finance culture, financialization and the increasing formalization, mathematicization, autonomization and automation of finance markets (Peters et al. 2015).

One of the four main forms of economic liberalism analysed by Michel Foucault (2008) in his historical treatment of the birth of neoliberalism in The Birth of Biopolitics was American neoliberalism, represented by the late Gary Becker. It was Becker (1962) who, on the basis of Theo Schultz’s work and others, introduced the concept and theory of human capital into political economy, privileging education in his analysis. This chapter traces the inception of human capital theory and analyses it in terms of Foucault’s analysis of how Becker developed an approach that is not a conception of labour power so much as a ‘capital-ability’. Foucault captures this point in the following comment: ‘the replacement every time of homo economicus as partner of exchange with a homo economicus as entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of his earnings’ (Foucault 2008: 226).

Foucault and governmentality

Foucault’s overriding interest was not in ‘knowledge as ideology’, as Marxists would have it, where bourgeois knowledge – say, modern liberal economics – is considered as false knowledge or bad science. Nor was he interested in ‘knowledge as theory’, the construction of classical liberalism that erects the notion of disinterested knowledge based on inherited philosophical distinctions from the Greeks, including Platonic epistemology, that is endorsed by the Kantian separation of schema/content, distinguishing the analytic enterprise. Rather, Foucault examined practices of knowledge produced through the relations of power. He examined how these practices augment and refine the efficacy and instrumentality of power in its exercise over both individuals and populations, and also in large measure helped to shape the constitution of subjectivity. Fundamental to Foucault’s governmentality studies is the understanding that Western society professed to be based on principles of liberty and the Rule of Law and is said to derive the legitimation of the state from political philosophies that elucidated these very principles. Yet, as a matter of historical fact, Western society has employed technologies of power that operate on forms of disciplinary order or were based on biopolitical techniques that bypassed the law and its freedoms altogether. As Colin Gordon (2001: xxvi) puts it so starkly: ‘Foucault embraced Nietzsche as the thinker, who transforms Western philosophy by rejecting its founding disjunction of power and knowledge as myth’. By this, Gordon means that the rationalities of Western politics, from the time of the Greeks, had incorporated techniques of power specific to Western practices of government, first, in the expert knowledges of the Greek tyrant, and second, in the concept of pastoral power that characterized ecclesiastical government.

Foucault’s lectures on governmentality were first delivered in a course he gave at the Collège de France, entitled Sécurité, Territoire, Population (2004a), during the 1977–8 academic year. While the essays ‘Governmentality’ and ‘Questions of Method’ were published in 1978 and 1980, respectively, and translated into English in the collection The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Burchell et al. 1991), it is only in the last few years that the course itself has been transcribed from original tapes and published for the first time (Foucault 2004a), along with the sequel Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France, (1978–1979) (Foucault 2004b). The governmentality
literature in English, roughly speaking, dates from the 1991 collection and has now grown quite substantially (see, for example, Miller and Rose 1990; Barry et al. 1996; Dean 1999; Rose 1999). As a number of scholars have pointed out Foucault relied on a group of researchers to help him in his endeavours: François Ewald, Pasquale Pasquino, Daniel Defert, Giovanna Procacci, Jacques Donzelot, on governmentality; François Ewald, Catherine Mevel, Éliane Allo, Nathalie Coppinger and Pasquale Pasquino, François Delaporte and Anne-Marie Moulin, on the birth of biopolitics. These researchers working with Foucault in the late 1970s constitute the first generation of governmentality studies scholars and many have gone on to publish significant works too numerous to list here. In the field of education as yet not a great deal has focused specifically on governmentality.

In these governmentality studies from the late 1970s Foucault held a course on the major forms of neoliberalism, examining three theoretical schools: German ordoliberalism, the Austrian school characterized by Hayek; and American neoliberalism in the form of the Chicago school and characterized by Gary Becker. Among Foucault’s great insights in his work on governmentality was the critical link he observed in liberalism between the governance of the self and government of the state — understood as the exercise of political sovereignty over a territory and its population. He focuses on government as a set of practices legitimated by specific rationalities and saw that these three schools of contemporary economic liberalism focused on the question of too much government — a permanent critique of the state that Foucault considers as a set of techniques for governing the self through the market. Liberal modes of governing, Foucault tells us, are distinguished, in general, by the ways in which they utilize the capacities of free-acting subjects and, consequently, modes of government differ according to the value and definition accorded the concept of freedom. These different mentalities of rule turn on whether freedom is seen as a natural attribute as with the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, a product of rational choice-making, or, as with Hayek, a civilizational artefact theorized as both negative and anti-naturalist.

Foucault’s account of German ordoliberalism, examines a configuration based on the theoretical configuration of economics and law developed at the University of Freiberg by W. Eucken and F. Böhm that views the market contingently as developing historically within a judicial-legal framework. The economy is thus based on a concept of the Rule of Law, anchored in a notion of individual rights, property rights and contractual freedom that constitutes, in effect, an economic constitution. German neoliberal economists (Müller-Armack, Röpke, Rüstow) invented the term ‘social market economy’ which shared certain features with the Freiburg model of law and economics but also differed from it in terms of the ‘ethics’ of the market (as did Hayek in The Constitution of Liberty, 1960). This formulation of the ‘social market economy’ proved significant not only in terms of the postwar reconstruction of the (West) German economy through Erhard, as Minister and Chancellor, but also as the basis of the European Union’s ‘social model’.

In the last form of neoliberalism he examines American neoliberalism and, in particular, the form he attributes to Gary Becker under the description of human capital theory that privileges an analysis of investment in education. Foucault (2008) asks the question ‘what does it mean to form human capital, and so to form these kinds of abilities-machines which will produce income, which will be remunerated by income?’, and he responds to his own question with the following account:

It means, of course, making what are called educational investments. In truth, we have not had to wait for the neo-liberals to measure some of the effects of these educational investments, whether this involves school instruction strictly speaking, or professional training, and so on. But the neo-liberals lay stress on the fact that what should be called
educational investment is much broader than simple schooling or professional training and that many more elements than these enter into the formation of human capital? What constitutes this investment that forms an abilities-machine? Experimentally, on the basis of observations, we know it is constituted by, for example, the time parents devote to their children outside of simple educational activities strictly speaking. We know that the number of hours a mother spends with her child, even when it is still in the cradle, will be very important for the formation of an abilities-machine, or for the formation of a human capital, and that the child will be much more adaptive if in fact its parents or its mother spend more rather than less time with him or her. This means that it must be possible to analyse the simple time parents spend feeding their children, or giving them affection as investment which can form human capital. Time spent, care given, as well as the parents’ education because we know quite precisely that for an equal time spent with their children, more educated parents will form a higher human capital than parents with less education – in short, the set of cultural stimuli received by the child, will all contribute to the formation of those elements that can make up a human capital.

(2008: 229)

**Responsibilization of self**

The ‘responsibilization of the self’ – turning individuals into moral agents and the promotion of new relations between government and self-government – has served to promote and rationalize programs of individualized ‘social insurance’ and risk management. By defining Foucault as part of the critical tradition we can get some purchase on his theoretical innovations – particularly his impulse to historicize questions of ontology and subjectivity by inserting them into systems or structures of thought/discourse (an approach that contrasts with the abstract category of the Cartesian–Kantian subject). His notion of governmentality was developed and played out against these tendencies.

Foucault’s account of classical liberalism is related to a set of discourses about government embedded in the ‘reason of state’ (ragione di stato) literature of the later Italian renaissance, beginning with Giovanni Botera and Machiavelli, and later in the emergence of the ‘science of police’ (polizeiwissenschaft) in eighteenth-century Germany, where it was considered a science of internal order of the community. Reason of state reinforces the state by basing the art of government on reason rather than God’s wisdom or the prince’s strategy. It is, essentially, a set of techniques that conform to rational principles that are based on new forms of expert knowledges about the state – its measurement and so-called ‘political arithmetic’ – and issues in a kind of pastoral care that teaches social virtues and civil prudence. This new art of government represents a break with Christian doctrine as it progressively becomes concerned with the emergence of civil society based on rights. Foucault’s genealogy of the emerging political rationality grafts reason of state onto the ‘science of police’ (polizeiwissenschaft), which comes to prominence with the rise of market towns. The police are a condition of existence of the new towns and co-extensive with the rise of mercantilism, in particular, regulating and protecting the market mechanism. They are a correlate of the rise of capitalism and the new science of political economy.

On Foucault’s account liberalism stands in ambiguous relation to this literature and tradition; it is both heir and critic. Within liberalism the notion of ‘economy’ enters into political science in two ways: it refers to a form of government informed by the precepts of political economy, on the one hand, and on the other, to a government concerned with economizing its own efforts and costs, where government has become its own problem. It is in the latter sense, which
Adam Smith identified as a distinctively modern form or style of government, that we can speak properly of the critique of state reason.

Foucault, in historicized Kantian terms, spoke of governmentality as implying the relation of the self to itself (and to others), referring explicitly to the problem of ethical self-constitution and regulation. Governmentality is thus defined as the set of practices and strategies that individuals in their freedom use to control or govern themselves and others. Such an enquiry into power bypasses the subject of law, or the legal concept of the subject, that is demanded by an analysis of power based upon the institution of political society. Foucault's point is that if you can conceive of the subject only as a subject of law — that is, as one who either has rights or does not — then it is difficult to bring out the freedom of the subject and the ethical self-constitution inherent in games of freedom.

On this basis I accept the theoretical promise of the problematic made explicit by these so-called Anglo-Foucauldians (e.g. Barry et al. 1996). First, a neo-Foucauldian approach to the sociology of governance avoids interpreting liberalism as an ideology, a political philosophy, or an economic theory, but instead reconfigures it as a form of governmentality that emphasizes the question of how power is exercised. Second, such an approach makes central the notion of the self-limiting state, which, in contrast to the administrative (or ‘police’) state, brings together in a productive way questions of ethics and technique through the ‘responsibilization’ of moral agents and the active reconstruction of the relation between government and self-government. Third, it proposes an investigation of neoliberalism as an intensification of an economy of moral regulation first developed by liberals and not merely or primarily as a political reaction against ‘big government’ or the so-called bureaucratic welfare state of the postwar Keynesian settlement. Indeed, as Barry et al. (ibid.) point out, some who adopt this view approach the era of postwar welfarism as an aberrant episode that has little to do with liberalism as such. Fourth, the approach facilitates an understanding of neoliberalism’s distinctive features. For instance, it understands neoliberalism in terms of its replacement of the natural and spontaneous order characteristic of Hayekian liberalism with ‘artificially arranged or contrived forms of the free, entrepreneurial and competitive conduct of economic-rational individuals’ (Burchell 1996: 23). And, further, it understands neoliberalism through the development of ‘a new relation between expertise and politics’ (ibid.), especially in the realm of welfare, where an actuarial rationality and new forms of prudentialism manifest and constitute themselves discursively in the language of ‘purchaser-provider’, audit, performance, and ‘risk management’.

Neoliberalism can be seen as an intensification of moral regulation resulting from the radical withdrawal of government and the responsibilization of individuals through economics. It emerges as an actuarial form of governance that promotes an actuarial rationality through encouraging a political regime of ethical self-constitution as consumer-citizens. Responsibilization refers to modern forms of self-government that require individuals to make choices about lifestyles, their bodies, their education, and their health at critical points in the life cycle, such as giving birth, starting school, going to university, taking a first job, getting married, and retiring. Choice assumes a much wider role under neoliberalism: it is not simply ‘consumer sovereignty’ but rather a moralization and responsibilization, a regulated transfer of choice-making responsibility from the state to the individual in the social market. Specifically, neoliberalism has led to the dismantling of labour laws that were an important component of the welfare state and to increased reliance on privatized forms of welfare that often involve tougher accountability mechanisms and security/video surveillance.

A genealogy of the entrepreneurial self reveals that it is relations that one establishes with oneself through forms of personal investment (including education, viewed as an investment) and insurance that become the central ethical and political components of a new individualized,
customized, and privatized consumer welfare economy. In this novel form of governance, responsibilized individuals are called upon to apply certain managerial, economic, and actuarial techniques to themselves as citizen-consumer subjects – calculating the risks and returns on investment in such areas as education, health, employment, and retirement. This process is both self-constituting and self-consuming. It is self-constituting in the Foucauldian sense that the choices we make shape us as moral, economic, and political agents. It is self-consuming in the sense that the entrepreneurial self creates and constructs him- or herself through acts of consumption.

**Foucault on American neoliberalism: enter Gary Becker**

In *The Birth of Biopolitics* Foucault (2008) provides an account of how American neoliberalism is a form of governmentality based on the production of subjectivity, and, in particular, how individuals are constituted as subjects of ‘human capital’ (Read 2009). Seven of the 12 lectures are devoted to German and American neoliberalism. In the ninth lecture he looks explicitly at American neoliberalism to focus on its differences with the German versions and its claim to global status, turning immediately to human capital theory as both an extension of economic analysis including the classical analysis of labour and its imperial extension to *all forms* of behaviour (those areas previously considered to belong to the noneconomic realm). In this context Foucault examines the epistemological transformation that American neoliberal effects in the shift from an analysis of economic processes to one that focuses on the production of human subjectivity through the redefinition of *homo economicus* as ‘entrepreneur of himself’. In this same context, he examines the constitutive elements of human capital in terms of its innate elements and genetic improvements and the problem of the formation of human capital in education and health that together represent a new model of growth and economic innovation.

In the tenth lecture again he discusses American neoliberalism, including the application of the human capital model to the realm of the social and the generalizability of the enterprise form to the social field. In this lecture he also discusses aspects of American neo-liberalism in relation to delinquency and penal reform, *homo economicus* as the criminal subject and the consequences of this analysis for displacing the criminal subject and ‘disciplinary society’. In the 11th lecture he returns to the question of how *homo economicus* in American neoliberalism becomes generalizable to every form of behaviour. This is the genealogy of *homo economicus* that begins as the basic element of the new governmental reason that appeared in the eighteenth century, before Walras and Pareto. In Hume and British empiricism we witness the ‘subject of interest’ that is differentiated from the legal subject and juridical will, representing contrasting logics of the market and the contract. He also charts and discusses the economic subject’s relationship with political power in Condorcet and Adam Smith, the link between the individual’s pursuit of profit and the growth of collective wealth. In this environment political economy emerges as as critique of governmental reason.

In the course of discussion, Foucault mentions Gary Becker 12 times, as the Vice-President of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1989, winner of the Nobel Prize in 1992 and author of ‘Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis’, published in the *Journal of Political Economy* in 1962, and considerably expanded into *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education* in 1964. He regards Becker as ‘the most radical of the American neo-liberals’ and writes:

Becker says: Basically, economic analysis can perfectly well find its points of anchorage and effectiveness if an individual’s conduct answers to the single clause that the conduct in question reacts to reality in a non-random way. That is to say, any conduct which responds systematically to modifications in the variables of the environment, in other words, any
conduct, as Becker says, which ‘accepts reality,’ must be susceptible to economic analysis. Homo economicus is someone who accepts reality. Rational conduct is any conduct which is sensitive to modifications in the variables of the environment and which responds to this in a non-random way, in a systematic way, and economics can therefore be defined as the science of the systematic nature of responses to environmental variables.

(Foucault 2008: 269)

The importance of this ‘colossal definition’ is to make economic analysis amenable to behavioural techniques, defined in its purest form by B.F. Skinner, where conduct can be understood ‘simply in seeing how, through mechanisms of reinforcement, a given play of stimuli entail responses whose systematic nature can be observed and on the basis of which other variables of behavior can be introduced’ (Foucault 2008: 270). This speaks to Becker’s analysis which inherently points to manipulation and control of the subject. But there is another more important aspect in which Foucault is interested. In the eighteenth century,

Homo oeconomicus is someone who pursues his own interest, and whose interest is such that it converges spontaneously with the interest of others. From the point of view of a theory of government, homo oeconomicus is the person who must be let alone.

(Ibid.)

Yet, in Becker’s definition,

_homo oeconomicus_, that is to say, the person who accepts reality or who responds systematically to modifications in the variables of the environment, appears precisely as someone manageable, someone who responds systematically to systematic modifications artificially introduced into the environment. *Homo oeconomicus* is someone who is eminently governable.

(Ibid.)

Thus, Foucault argues, ‘From being the intangible partner of _laissez-faire_, homo oeconomicus now becomes the correlate of a governmentality which will act on the environment and systematically modify its variables’ (ibid.: 270–1). This is Becker’s major innovation and Foucault leaves us in no doubt that the grim methodology of human capital leaves little room for human freedom. As Jason Read (2009) argues:

The nexus between the production of a particular conception of human nature, a particular formation of subjectivity, and a particular political ideology, a particular way of thinking about politics is at the center of Michel Foucault’s research. As much as Foucault characterized his own project as studying ‘…the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects,’ this process has always intersected with regimes of power/knowledge. Thus, it would appear that Foucault’s work takes up exactly what writers on neoliberalism find to be so vexing: the manner in which neoliberalism is not just a manner of governing states or economies, but is intimately tied to the government of the individual, to a particular manner of living.

(26–7)

In an extraordinary interview, the near unimaginable happens at the University of Chicago on 9 May 2012 with an encounter between Gary Becker, who held the position of University
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Professor in Economics, Booth School of Business, and Sociology at the University of Chicago and is the Chair of the Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics, and François Ewald who is titular Professor and Chair of Insurance Studies at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers and Director of the Ecole nationale d’assurances. The conversation was chaired by Bernard E. Harcourt, who is the Julius Kreeger Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. I say ‘nearly unimaginable’ for two reasons. First, because François Ewald is considered by some the closest person to a living Foucault (who died in 1984) and worked as his primary assistant interlocutor at the Collège de France from 1976–84, as well as currently being the founder of the Michel Foucault Centre. Second, because Gary Becker died some two years later, on 3 May 2014.

In this engagement, to my utter astonishment, Ewald describes Foucault lectures as the place ‘where he (Foucault) made the apology of neoliberalism – especially the apology of Gary Becker, who is referred to … as the most radical representative of American neoliberalism’ (Ewald, in Becker et al., 2012: 4).

François Ewald was Foucault’s assistant in the 1970s and applied his notion of governmentality to the welfare state in works like ‘L’état Providence’ (1986). Michael C. Behrent (2010) describes Ewald as an ‘antirevolutionary’ Foucault in his work on the French welfare state and goes on to describe Negri’s response to Ewald as someone who repudiates his master:

Calling Ewald a ‘right Foucauldian,’ Antonio Negri, the Italian philosopher, chided Ewald for believing that ‘the law of the market could function without the guarantee of the state,’ predicting the ultimate vindication of the ‘true Foucault,’ who followed Marx in his analysis of power.

Behrent (2010) makes the additional useful observation:

Negri’s characterization of the ‘true Foucault’ rests on a plausible and pervasive view of Foucault’s significance. Perhaps Foucault’s most enduring achievement was his single-minded insistence on the centrality of power to any serious analysis of history and society. He challenged traditional conceptions of power through a number of bracing displacements. Rather than asserting the primacy of economic structures (as did his Marxist contemporaries), he argued for the irreducibility of power relations; instead of identifying power with the state, he probed power’s ‘microphysics’—that is, the ways it is transmitted through such apparently apolitical institutions as schools, prisons, and asylums; and rather than opposing knowledge to power, he revealed their hidden complicities.

He concludes that while Foucault’s thought has been a radical challenge to liberalism and modernity, his influence has been taken up differently by different authors; Ewald represents a conservative, reformist Foucault that has more in common with Becker than one could imagine, and therefore also with neoliberalism and human capital theory.

By comparison Mitchell Dean (2014) suggests:

Rather than an apology for neoliberalism, let us say that Foucault belonged to a present in which neoliberalism was shifting from a militant, if marginal, thought collective to a regime of the government of the state.
At the same time he is keen to point out:

[Foucault’s] work is unable to move beyond the analysis of the rationalities and techniques of neoliberalism and the attempted production of the neoliberal subject to transformations of capital themselves. While Foucault’s analysis can examine how human capital theory enables a rationalization of public authorities, and how the enterprise acts as a paradigm for subjectivity, it fails to capture the intersection of capital and value with such rationalities and technologies.

(Ibid.)

As I commented at the beginning of this chapter, the development of finance culture as it has dominated neoliberalism in the 2000s through mathematical modelling and other formalizable procedures escaped Foucault’s attention for obvious reasons; it is only since the development of the internet, mobile and sophisticated algorithmic high-frequency trading beginning in the late 1990s that finance culture bloomed, well after his death. Dean is surely correct to remind us about Foucault’s ‘present’ and the shifting nature of neoliberalism but what certainly remains to be analysed is the relation of human capital to finance capitalism, in particular to the huge growth of student loans which, in the USA, total some $1.2 trillion as the second most common form of mortgage – not the entrepreneurial self but the ‘indebted self’ – and its political consequences, both for the values of freedom and ‘freedom of enquiry’.

Conclusion

Foucault provides us with a useful genealogy of neoliberalism in its historical development of three main schools and a framework for analysing human capital theory – its shifting emphases towards privatization and responsibilization that have come to characterize a dynamic and moving set of policies and practices. The recent discussion between Ewald and Becker demonstrates conflicting interpretations of Foucault and therefore of neoliberalism.

In its latest phase under the imperatives of finance culture and financialization, neoliberalism and human capital has tended to shift the analysis of responsibilization to notions of debt financing, especially student debt loading, and attendant notions of the ‘indebted self’ that now demand greater attention and the most careful scrutiny.

Acknowledgements

This chapter, especially the second section, draws on earlier work including Peters 2005b and http://educationalfoundations.pbworks.com/f/BesleyPeters2007Seven.pdf, used with permission and in terms of the principles of fair copy.

Notes

1 The governmentality literature has grown up around the journal Economy and Society, and includes the work of Cruickshank, Hindess, Hunter, Lerner, Minson, O’Malley, Owen, and others, as well as those referred to above, most of who have published in Economy and Society.


3 These notes of the meeting are based on the vimeo and transcript of the vimeo available at http://vimeo.com/43984248 and ‘Becker on Ewald on Foucault on Becker: American Neoliberalism and Michel


References


