Citizenship is most often conceptualized with respect to theories of political rights and duties of membership in a defined community. *Modern* citizenship in western democracies begins with the nation-state scale as the defined community of greatest relevance. The codification and institutionalization of individual freedoms at the national level was one of the key components of the growth of citizenship as it originated in Britain in the seventeenth century. It reflected a shift from local, communal relations and social rights rooted in village membership into a sense of a national community and of individual rights guaranteed by a state.

Citizenship is also conceptualized vis-à-vis forms of status and feelings of belonging or alienation, sometimes referred to as cultural citizenship (Ong 2003). It is also often theorized as encompassing behaviour, or citizenship ‘acts’ – the demonstrative practices of community members that indicate acceptance and support of the community or a willingness and desire to make changes to it (Nielsen and Isin 2008). Additionally, the idea of governing through citizenship in the sense of regulating and managing individual and community behaviour via liberal citizenship rationalities and practices is an important subject of scholarly attention (Hindess 2002; Ong 2006).

In all of these conceptualizations citizenship must be understood first and foremost as a process, as something that mutates and transforms through time and in place (Marston and Mitchell 2005). Signifying the mutable quality of citizenship, the British sociologist T.H. Marshall famously delineated three different periods of citizenship formation (Marshall and Bottomore 1992). In Marshall’s view, citizenship was seen to follow a positive trajectory of ever-greater inclusiveness and expansiveness with respect to individual rights and entitlements. Hence the first period of citizenship, in the eighteenth century, encompassed forms of entitlements such as *habeas corpus* and trial by jury; the second era in the nineteenth century saw the institutionalization of parliamentary rights and the enfranchisement of working men; and the third (mid-twentieth century) included welfare supports and subsidies in the arenas of health and education.

While Marshall’s insights have been helpful vis-à-vis his recognition of the mutability of citizenship, his theory was also limited in scope. In addition to his neglect of gender, he maintained a fundamentally blinkered desire to trace what he saw as the fulfilment of the promise of liberalism over time (a scholarly position critiqued by many, see, e.g. Vogel 1991; Barbalet 1988; Turner 1986). Writing from his own position in post-war Great Britain and the height of Keynesian ideals and welfare state expansion, he theorized a seemingly natural progression between economic development and the growth of civil society.
Numerous scholars have discussed the lack of any necessary link between economic development and the growth of civil society, or the expansion of political space as a logical outcome of capitalist development (see, e.g. Mann 1987). Indeed, historical research indicates that the frontiers of citizenship can contract as well as expand under different circumstances (Turner 1986). Despite these critiques, Marshall’s conception of the transformative nature of citizenship remains useful vis-à-vis understanding the ever-present but also ever-changing connections between citizenship formation and capitalism, and between liberalism, capitalism, and nationalism. His theoretical framework is also useful as a backdrop and foil for further examinations of the constitution of neoliberal citizenship in the contemporary moment.

Marshall’s assumption of a necessary progression from a citizenship based primarily on economic status to a more open and democratic one established liberalism as a political formation inherently compatible with both nation-building and capitalist development. For Marshall this was an intersection of processes that he believed could only improve on the emancipatory promise of liberalism through time. Instead, many scholars have noted how the relationship between capitalism and liberalism in recent years has been marked rather by an aggressive assault on Keynesian redistributive models – a distinctly regressive rolling back of welfare social protections over the past three to four decades (Peck 2001; Peck and Tickell 2002). At the same time, the chummy, naturalized connections between the spaces of the territorial nation-state and the experiences of a citizenship ‘community’ have likewise been torn asunder.

In this chapter I investigate and critique the assumption of the benign and ultimately progressive nature of liberalism by focusing on current struggles over citizenship formation within the last few decades. I do this through an examination of some of the transformations in financial markets, spaces of nationalism, and forms of liberal governance in juxtaposition with changes in the policies and practices of citizenship in western democracies. Specific transformations I examine include the rise of liberalized markets and more flexible and financially based regimes of capital accumulation; the global flows and disarticulation of citizenship and national territory; and systems of governance involving the growth of entrepreneurialism and constitution of universal ‘free’ subjects – juxtaposed with forms of enclaving and exclusion in which the ‘ungovernable’ are forever rendered as surplus populations. I look in detail at these broad and interlinked changes and struggles as they impact citizenship – drawing attention, in particular, to the spatial component of each transformative process.

Flexible regimes of capital accumulation and flexible citizenship

We are now in an era of intensified market liberalization, with increasingly unhindered and accelerated flows of capital, commodities, and information across the globe. The greater flexibility of financial systems and increasing mobility of finance is strongly connected with the movements of people both within states and also across international borders (Castles and Miller 2014). The greater speed of capital, its developing and dislocating effects and increased pressures on livelihoods and the mobility of people, all have a strong impact on why, where, and how people move, who moves, and what happens in the process. In this section I investigate three features of the rise of liberalized markets and more flexible regimes of capital accumulation on citizenship: these are transnationalism and flow; mobility and differential speed; and place-based vs free-floating identities.

Transnationalism and flow

The increased flexibility of financial systems under neoliberalism has led to an increased amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) originating in wealthier countries and directed to less
developed nations (Dicken 2015). With increased capital investment and decreased forms of state regulation there is frequently an increase in wealth polarization and loss of livelihoods for populations at the bottom of the economic pyramid (Sparke 2013). Moreover, as capital rapidly enters into circulation it often disrupts traditional means of support, uproots and dislocates poor and primarily rural populations, and often forces them into motion (Sassen 1990).

This type of forced mobility is evident historically, especially in the era of rapid industrialization in the nineteenth century; it is also apparent in recent years. Over the last few decades, with the (re)liberalization of finance and global FDI in the neoliberal era, we can observe another period of major economic migration, one encompassing new migration regions and hotspots as well as different forms of movement both domestically and across international borders (Salt 1989; Castles and Miller 2014). As in the past, these economic migrations operate in relation to the flows of capital as well as to migration policy regimes that are in place in various nation-states.

One of the most important developments in this recent migration stream as it impacts citizenship formation is the rise of transnational migration. This is a pattern of migration involving frequent communication, journeys, and often flows of money and goods between communities located in sending and receiving societies. Transnational movement has been aided by technological advances in transportation and communication. As in the case of earlier eras, however, it is a process that also remains profoundly connected to market expansion and rapid flows of investment into new geographical regions.

While, historically, migrants have often moved back and forth between their leaving society and host society, the neoliberal period has seen an accelerated and intensified version of this phenomenon, where the connections are maintained between cross-border communities in a deep and almost simultaneous manner. Indeed, researchers have observed that contemporary migrants often participate with equal interest and intensity in both sending and receiving societies. The migrants create ties and allegiances to more than one national community and nourish ‘multi-stranded social relations (linking) together their societies of origin and settlement’ (Basch et al. 1994: 6; Faist and Ozveren 2004; Levitt 2001).

A number of scholars have explored the shifting meanings of citizenship in the context of these new forms of transnational migration and transnational governance (Smith 2003; van Bochove et al. 2010). For example, the rights and responsibilities of migrants have become increasingly complex, where a migrant may obtain the right to vote in a local election or participate in a discussion about the provision of local services beyond territorial membership but at the same time be denied formal citizenship rights at the national scale (Bauböck 2005). Additionally, the supranational state system of the European Union (EU) complicates matters even further, as membership rights can become blurred in the context of ‘post-national’ or multi-level systems of governance (Soysal 1994; Olsen 2012).

Transnationalism is intricately connected to the rise of these kinds of differential regimes of citizenship, and also to the changing relationship of the state to its most mobile citizens and denizens. How can the state control the finances and maintain the allegiance of its citizens who may be living across one or more national borders? Some states have offered the prospect of dual citizenship while others rely on more punitive sanctions and regulations, particularly around property ownership and inheritance laws. But in almost all cases these laws or policies are never set in stone but rather are characterized by expedient transitions from one form of citizenship formation to another depending on the larger political and economic context in which actors are operating.

The flexible nature of the current regime of capital accumulation and the state’s highly contextual response in terms of legal rights and policies has been matched by flexible citizenship strategies by many migrants. Ong (1999), for example, has documented the strategies through
which some diasporic Chinese migrants locate family members in multiple nation-states in order to obtain citizenship and greater protections in the face of potential harm or adversity. Additionally, the flexible citizenship strategy adopted by migrants can aid in business dealings in which information and personal ties are used to advantage in multiple locales.

**Mobility and differential speed**

Another effect of market liberalization has to do with speed and the nature of contemporary mobility. In investigating both the rules and the opportunities related to cross-border movements under neoliberalism it becomes apparent that differential speed is a significant ramification of the financial and technological changes of the past few decades. Neoliberal policy related to cross-border movement, manifested in free trade agreements such as NAFTA, for example, enables expedited forms of movement for some, but significantly slower movement (or no movement) for others.

Business elites and the wealthy become ‘super’ citizens, who are able to move faster and with greater mobility across borders with the aid of various kinds of expedited border-crossing programmes and passes; these include mundane, yet influential programmes such as first- and business-class passage on flights, TSA (Transportation Security Administration) ‘pre-check’ lines, and preferred flyer arrangements at airport terminals worldwide; they also include Smart Border programmes such as the Nexus lane at the US–Canada border. In contrast, second-class citizens, third-country nationals, denizens, and irregular migrants are the ‘sub’ citizen masses, who are constrained and forced to move more and more slowly across borders, if at all. Thus the values and benefits of citizenship can be considered in relation to the lack of those values and benefits for others.

Sparke (2006, 2004) has written extensively about the relational nature of expedited border-crossing programmes for the elite business classes, and the slowdowns related to increased securitization and anti-immigrant sentiment in the USA for others. Indeed, during the immediate post-2001 era, the exclusions related to nationalist sentiment and to the fear of terrorist attack included not just decreased mobility for the ‘sub’ classes, but also what he terms a kind of ‘carceral cosmopolitanism’: anti-immigrant forms of forced movement such as expedited removal and extraordinary rendition. He notes how this ‘neoliberal nexus’ of national securitization vis-à-vis the movement of immigrants and the poor should always be seen in relation to the expedition of transnational movement for capital and the elite.

The biopolitical nature of this altered terrain of political citizenship is likewise evident at many borders around the globe. On an individual basis it occurs with respect to the many forms of monitoring and surveillance that occur directly on the body; these include iris scans, heat detectors (for fevers ostensibly caused by flu pandemics), full body scans, and required thumb-printing in the USA and many other societies worldwide. Additionally, the broader regimes of biopolitical control of the type discussed by Foucault (2010) are manifested in the norms of mobility management that pervade every aspect of citizenship as it plays out at the border and beyond; these include the assumptions of value and self-care that marks the responsible and moral individual as an ‘economic-rational actor’ (Lemke 2001: 197). The fast-moving businessman is thus seen to deserve the perks of unfettered movement as he embodies (quite literally) the values of the entrepreneurial market society.

**Place-based versus free-floating actors**

The economic-rational actors of contemporary citizenship regimes are not just fast and efficient as they move across borders, they are also inherently free-floating. The preferred neoliberal
subject lacks deep allegiance to a single locale, operating rather as an entity responsible to the networks and flows of the system itself. Flexible regimes of capital accumulation act to erode the sticky particularity of place-bound actors in favour of transnational subjects operating above and beyond any one locale. These newly formed transnational spaces and actors have ramifications for citizenship vis-à-vis attitudes and practices in the arenas of culture, health, and responsibility for the care of others and the planet itself.

The economic value placed on the free-floating subject simultaneously vaunts the seeming neutrality of the mobile elite and erodes the respect and dignity of those seen as bound to specific cultural traditions and locales. This often has a gendered component to it, where women are represented as hindered by the sticky particularities of place-bound ascriptions and practices, whereas businessmen are constituted as free-floating and universalist. Additionally, these divergent cultural norms are frequently portrayed in spatial terms, where the culturally bound woman harkens back to a pre-modern, rural location, whereas the liberal and secular male is represented as modern precisely because he lacks any specific grounding in place or tradition (Gökariksel and Mitchell 2005).

Another major implication of the free-floating subject of neoliberal citizenship is in the attitudes towards the care of people and the environment. The responsibility to the environment is frequently diminished with a loss of allegiance to specific locales (Mason 2009). And with respect to the care of people, forms of social reproduction that necessarily take place in place such as education and elder care are also greatly affected by the peripatetic nature of elite movement and the greater value placed on flow and a free-floating orientation (Mitchell et al. 2004; Strauss and Meehan 2015).

The disarticulations of nation, citizenship, and territory

The greater flexibility of financial systems and global flows characteristic of neoliberalism is paralleled by a disarticulation of citizenship from national territory. The result of both geopolitical and geoeconomic forces, this has implications for the production of ideas and institutions that extend the reach of the state and its sovereign will beyond territorial boundaries. It is also implicated in the rise of supra state and sub-state entities and actors and the actions of those both enabling and contesting the simultaneous expansion and contraction of state practices.

Sovereignty across borders

In one study of the expanded reach of the sovereign state across international borders and protocols Elden (2009) examined how the concept of territorial integrity was disrupted following the attacks of 9/11 and the aggressive ensuing stance by the Bush administration. Although the relationship between territory and sovereignty was considered inviolate since the modern formation of nations, this notion was called into question by the war on terror. Open military intervention into the sovereign affairs of other nations could be legitimized as long as the proper justifications were offered up to the global community.

This leads us to a number of interesting questions vis-à-vis the functioning of citizenship across borders. If sovereignty is increasingly unconstrained by national territory in the war on terror era, what does this mean for citizenship? How do western states seek to administer their populations – as well as those of so-called ‘failed states’ – outside of territorial borders? What are the new strategies and tactics employed by individuals and populations that operate in liminal and transnational sites, both inside and outside the spaces of liberal governance?

With respect to state regimes of governance and political attitudes on transnational practices, these are ultimately dependent on context. In some situations states want to capture migrant
remittances and allegiances and thus encourage dual citizenship and transnational lifestyles; in others, states frown on the loss of loyalty perceived in dual citizenship claims and cross-border practices. Meanwhile, both state actors and non-state actors seek to gain advantages within the systems in which they are imbricated. For the transnational elite, cross-border movements occur in many directions and take many forms, but the relative lack of friction at the border distinguishes their mobility from the movements of the less privileged.

The movements of this transnational class are critical to study as this elite group often has an outsized impact on the communities in which they operate. They might head up research and design teams in Singapore or Hong Kong, oversee factory production in China, and be involved with their children’s education in Canada; in each setting their views on education, culture, or democratic citizenship can be significant. In a study of Hong Kong migrants in Vancouver, BC, for example, Mitchell (2004) showed how the Chinese immigrants’ presumed tastes in homes influenced the types of house styles and gardens built by developers hoping to make money from this wealthy and highly kinetic population. When the new aesthetics became part of a fractious public debate, the existing democratic system and practices of local governance emerged as another important topic of discussion. Thus, in addition to debates about landscapes and lifestyles, the norms and practices of participatory citizenship were also impacted by this encounter.

**The rise of supra state and sub-state citizenship formations**

The disarticulation of national territory and citizenship is also manifested in the growth of multiple institutions at scales other than that of the nation-state. These include supra state formations such as the EU as well as sub-state organizations at regional and urban scales of governance. They also include systems of transnational governance that are largely orchestrated around and through non-state actors such as transnational social and environmental movements and solidarity organizations.

Transnational governance is a critical feature of contemporary society as it involves policy coordination across national borders, primarily by non-state actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This form of transnationalism is distinct from supranational governance (such as the International Criminal Court) because it does not subsume national institutions but rather operates more informally to address specific problems impacting more than one area of jurisdiction. It has become particularly important to study in the era of global climate change and other profound cross-border problems as new actors and networks have emerged alongside more traditional national, international, and intergovernmental organizations.

Some of the key questions that arise with the institutionalization of transnational concepts of membership in late welfare states have to do with the quality and meaning of social citizenship in these formulations as well as the development of civil society and the practices of democracy. A number of scholars have argued that the social citizenship rights and entitlements that were won through the Keynesian era have been eroded through scale bending or ‘jumping scale’ to supra and sub-national governance levels (e.g. Swyngedouw 1996; Smith 2004). With the reconfiguration of national governance and citizenship entitlements and claims under neoliberal globalization, ensuing forms of restructuring often result in the production of alternative scales and sites that are ultimately exclusionary and authoritative. In this view, rescaling practices have given rise to new global and local or ‘glocal’ forms of governance, many of which lead to the loss of various social and economic protections for previously marginalized social groups.

Others argue, however, that it remains important to interrogate specific cases of glocalization, as some may exhibit positive or ‘complementary’ spaces of citizenship at different scales. Faist (2001), for example, examines citizenship as a ‘nested membership’ category in supranational
entities such as the EU. He argues that European citizenship at different scales of governance can function in complementary ways – in some cases upholding the entitlements of social citizenship in specific contextually dependent situations. However, outside of the EU context most examples of scale-jumping in the neoliberal era have been shown to occur mainly at the expense of welfare protections or the environment.

**Securitization and shifting regimes of migration policy**

The changing nature of the nation-state with respect to citizenship regimes is also evident in new forms of securitization and the rise of so-called fortress enclaves and security states. This is nowhere more apparent than in policies related to migration control and asylum claims in Europe. Huysman (2000, 2006) and Bigo (2002) have shown how new forms of securitization in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s involved the formation of a fortified EU ‘inside’ space, through the conflation of different forms of perceived illegality on the outside. These were those cross-border processes and movements deemed a threat to the community. The blurred and conflated outside forces that were frequently combined into one giant perception of ‘risk’ included immigrants, drug-runners, asylum claimants, refugees, terrorists, and criminals.

In this context, new kinds of barriers to access and to claims to citizenship have proliferated and taken new forms as nation-states use multiple technologies to defer and defeat irregular migrants and asylum-seekers in their quest for entry. Mountz (2011: 118), for example, has investigated the ways in which many advanced industrial nation-states employ new techniques of migration control that involve deflecting or capturing migrants offshore and keeping them from ever reaching sovereign national territory. (Other tactics include payment by wealthy societies for the refugee ‘problem’ to be handled by poorer neighbours.) The new ‘enforcement archipelago’ described by Mountz operates through the use of islands at the periphery of nation-states, where migrants are pre-emptively picked up and detained in remote sites far from the possibilities of asylum claims, judicial review, citizenship opportunities, or even humanitarian aid.

In this work Mountz demonstrates how states are often able to avoid the dictates of international conventions (such as the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees), as well as human rights claims at all scales, through hiding asylum-seekers from public view and keeping human rights monitors away from certain geographical sites. States thus use space – the geography of the islands – and sub-national jurisdictional status to manage their borders and self-perceived rights to administer sovereign territory as they deem fit, creating distinctive ‘graduated zones of sovereignty’ in the process (Ong 2006). These actions take place within the wider war on terror and national justifications for deferred or denied civil rights on the basis of security.

New regimes of securitization that have been put in place during the ‘war on terror’ can thus be seen to have impacted citizenship in innumerable ways. In addition to the new forms of geographical deferral and outsourced detention indicated above, the body of the migrant is increasingly subjected to suspicion and exclusion within nation-states as well. For example, the prior efforts to integrate immigrants through various forms of policies promoting liberal tolerance towards ‘difference’ – particularly the strong multicultural stances taken in countries such as the Netherlands and the UK, have either been ended or transformed into more assimilative platforms over the past decade (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). This shift indicates a move away from the socially liberal era of the incorporation of difference and encouragement of cultural diversity within the nation to a harsher period of citizenship formation dependent on acclimation and assimilation to the dominant culture.

The aggressively anti-multicultural positions taken by conservative politicians such as David Cameron and Angela Merkel, both of whom have derided multiculturalism as a ‘failure’,
reflects the rise of concerns about national security in the wake of Islamic fundamentalism post 9/11 as well the sharpening neoliberal imperative for individuals to evolve and adjust to new circumstances – including both labour market changes and cultural shifts. This push manifests the increasing devolution of responsibility for immigrant integration to the individual, absolving the state of responsibility at the same time as making assimilation imperative. If immigrants are unable to or refuse to assimilate they are coded as security threats. Politically they join the ranks of the monitored margins, those ungovernable subjects inhabiting the liminal spaces on the edges of society; economically they become part of the surplus population, threatening by virtue of their inability to function as *homo economicus* in the neoliberal nation (Bigo 2005).

While the conceptualization of the threatening, unassimilable Other is often constituted in relation to immigrants and security fears, it is also evident in everyday encounters involving forms of difference based on class, race, sexuality, and other manifestations of alterity. And, mirroring the attempted enclaving of national space through border security, fortification, and containment, interior spaces within the nation are also formed into enclaves and similarly policed. These kinds of enclaves take many forms, including monitored residential neighbourhoods and gated communities, clubs, societies, and elite universities – all of which manifest a type of dominant or privileged citizenship existing in relation to the sub-citizenship of the masses. Race, as well as economic standing, often plays a key role in the categorization of who it is that is worthy or not worthy of this privileged citizenship status.

The citizens of the enclave can thus be found at all scales and always express a spatial relation to those *outside* the protected community. Whether this be at the supranational, national, urban, neighbourhood, or club scale, these enclaves work on the basis of exclusion and exclusivity; they are formed in relation to Others who are secondary or surplus populations within the economic formations and formulations of neoliberalism. Elite citizenship is thus paradoxically about both the capacity to be mobile and free-floating and the ability to form and inhabit an enclave. These spaces can thus be configured as nodes in a larger constellation of a citizenship archipelago – where the privileged are connected through transnational travel and yet can land in protected and pleasurable zones around the globe.

**Neoliberal citizenship: subjectivity and governance**

Heretofore I have been mainly concerned with the multiple ways that individuals and populations have been detained, deferred, demoted, excluded, or rendered as surplus from the citizenship norms, rights, and sense of cultural belonging in western democracies under neoliberalism. In this section I look at a seemingly opposite yet parallel condition in which states actively promote citizenship – but in very specific forms. Citizenship is considered here as something that is formative of new ways of being – as a process that helps to constitute subjects in specific contexts. How are subjects constituted and governed as citizens in the neoliberal era? In this section I examine some of the myriad ways in which subjects are both formed as and governed through the discourse and practices of liberal citizenship.

**Constituting the strategic cosmopolitan and lifelong learner**

One of the key institutions through which subjects are formed as citizens is education. Over the past several decades the national systems of education in many advanced western democracies have mirrored broader changes in society. These include a declining rhetoric on the importance of multiculturalism and an increasing interest in the cultivation of young citizens who are nimble, flexible and adaptable learners. These young learners are trained to rely on themselves
and to be less oriented towards tolerance of difference, and more towards a kind of competitive or strategic cosmopolitanism.

The cultivation of these new strategic citizens takes place in the broader context of flexible regimes of accumulation and the disarticulation of nation and territory. As the nation-state has ceased to function as the normative back-stop for democratic practices and understandings, educational imperatives have arisen that serve to reconfigure the child and the student. From what was once the individual citizen prefigured to live and labour for a lifetime in a national community under Fordism, the neoliberal moment has led us to flexible, globally oriented actors, who must strategically learn and re-learn, train and re-train in order to adapt to a flowing and unstable set of living and working environments (Mitchell 2003).

Educational systems strain to keep up with these changes, offering new mission statements, mantras, and curricula on an evolving basis. International schools have skyrocketed in number (Parker 2011). School mission statements – even at the elementary level – rarely miss the opportunity to herald their global curricula, which will help children to be competitive ‘global citizens’ in a rapidly ‘globalizing economy’. Meanwhile, ‘lifelong learning’ is an ongoing favourite catchphrase, appearing in documents promoting citizenship at multiple scales, educational outreach brochures, and primary school curricula in many advanced industrial societies worldwide. Rather than the original conceptualization of lifelong learning as benefiting the ongoing constitution of a thoughtful democratic citizen over the course of a lifetime, the contemporary rendering reflects the imperative to adapt to rapidly changing work environments (Mitchell 2006).

With a declining sense that working with difference is an important strategy of national unification, many nations now tolerate or even encourage the separation out of different ethnic, religious or gender-based groups from the public education system. Parents are encouraged to choose the educational model that will work best for their child, again reflecting the devolution of state-based responsibility and authority (for education in this case) to the individual level. If the parent chooses badly and the child does not succeed, the fault and the ensuing problems are laid squarely on the head of the individual.

In this educational scenario we can see the promotion of freedom as a necessary condition for subjects. In other words, as Rose (1999) has pointed out, freedom is a form of governance in advanced liberalism, one that requires subjects to be free. Parental choice in American schools, now a rallying cry for both conservatives and liberals, both opens the way to the increasing privatization of national systems of public education and simultaneously recruits and inculcates parents into neoliberal assumptions about how to help their children become good global citizens (Mitchell and Lizotte 2014).

Citizenship and governance worldwide

In addition to choice-making and freedom in advanced liberal societies, citizenship is also conducted as a liberal tool of governance in many developing parts of the globe. We can see the positioning and promotion of citizenship as something that operates within and through market norms in developing societies. This promotion is part of a broader liberal project in which advanced western societies shape the actions of developing societies through universalist understandings of democratic practice and good governance. As Hindess (2002: 127–8) succinctly puts it: ‘where the liberal government of non-western populations was once predicated on a denial of citizenship, contemporary liberal attempts to govern the people of the non-western world are increasingly channeled through citizenship itself’.

The channelling that Hindess alludes to incorporates not just the system of states, but also a broader supranational regime. This includes transnational corporations and agencies,
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non-governmental organizations, and other non-profit or non-political bodies. In other words, citizenship governance casts a wide net, and does so in terms of compliance to the norms of liberalism, including assumptions about individual autonomy, good governance and political and economic freedom. Within these norms and buried in plain sight is the image of the market, which serves as the ‘exemplary form of free interaction’ (ibid.: 134). It is the free market that must be encouraged in order for the civilization process to be completed and the residents of the community to be accorded full citizenship status as free and autonomous actors. ‘The ideal image of the market, in effect, provides liberal political reason with a model of the governmental uses of freedom’ (ibid.: 135).

It is also the market that regulates and defines improvement, and thus the liberal project of progress – the progressive development of poorer societies – is administered through the assumptions and practices of freedom. Those perceived as unable or unwilling to be governed through technologies of freedom, such as participation in systems of self-improvement and democratic self-governance, are relegated outside the liberal project. The creation of an outside to the liberal project is reserved for those not worthy of being governed, who are increasingly left as remainders – surplus populations indigestible by the liberal project of citizenship governance.

In her work on development projects in Indonesia Tania Li (2007) has investigated the consistent and ongoing ‘will to improve’ that has shaped colonial and post-colonial relations for centuries. While highlighting the ways in which outside ‘experts’ have set liberal reform projects in motion, she also brings out the multiple ways in which the targets of reform – the people and institutions of the highlands of Sulawesi – negotiate liberal governance regimes. Thus citizenship governance is not all one-way, but involves the various interactions of actors with the specific practices and tools that are brought to bear in the name of the improvement of populations.

Some scholars, such as Ashutosh and Mountz (2011), have interrogated the role of non-state actors in normalizing and entrenching a global liberal citizenship agenda – one that repeatedly returns to the hierarchical power relations between nation-states. Their work investigates, in particular, the work of the International Organization for Migration, showing how this agency represents itself in terms of normative understandings of global humanitarian assistance and human rights yet frequently operates on behalf of nation-states in the promulgation of a wider vision of sovereign control over borders and regimes of governance. These types of international institutions act to regulate and constrain the actions of post-colonial states and their often unwieldy or ‘ungoverned’ populations within the parameters of advanced state norms of good governance; this good governance, moreover, is that in which the free market operates ‘freely’ – often to the advantage of western societies (see also Hindess 2002; Springer 2010).

Conclusion

In this chapter I examined the development and expression of neoliberal citizenship in the context of changes in the workings of capitalism, transformations in nation-state relations, and shifts in forms of governing. Beginning with the important yet limited insights of citizenship scholar T.H. Marshall, I addressed citizenship as a formation – one that is constantly evolving and always constituted in relation to spatial and temporal processes and effects. While Marshall imagined a progressive future of increasing openness and inclusion, the actual workings of neoliberal citizenship indicate more complicated patterns. For some populations contemporary citizenship norms and practices have reflected and in some cases deepened forms of inequity and exclusion. In other cases the freedoms of liberal citizenship have encouraged and facilitated universalist assumptions about rational behaviour and good governance – freedoms that ultimately direct included individuals and populations to market-oriented choices and ways of being.
Ultimately, it is important to foreground the relationality of neoliberal citizenship. For all those who are constituted as legal citizens in the modern era there are others who are deliberately excluded from legality. The speed associated with fast and mobile citizenship often entails the slow-down or obstruction of movement for others. The formation of certain kinds of positive identities and feelings of security vis-à-vis urban, national, or supranational enclaves frequently corresponds with feelings of alienation and fear for those outside these bordered communities. Likewise, healthy bodies and well-educated minds for some citizens are achieved through the ill health and ignorance of others. Space is formative in all of these relational processes – through enclaving, targeting, deterritorialization, and other geographical forms of exclusion and inclusion.

Note


References

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