The relationship of self to society, person to others, life to environment, defines the path of growth and survival. A flower blooming in the shade of other plants may be protected from the heat of the sun, or its growth may be stunted from lack of light. The wolf knows the joy of conquest when the pack pulls down a ton of moose to start a week-long winter feast. In other times, on other days, that same pack may turn inward on that wolf, now perhaps sick or injured, and make a feast of her as well. As humankind came of age as an expressly social animal, others became sources of resource and protection, symbiotically creating a social whole much greater than the sum of its parts. At the same time, others could turn, either individually or collectively, into the gravest of threats to the people near them. Personal security is never guaranteed by social relationships.

Although social relationships do not guarantee personal security, they do form the context in which security—and threat—occurs. Terrorism is a social act and a social problem, and thus has social solutions. Such social contexts embody the domain of social and behavioral scientists representing a multitude of disciplines. The remainder of this chapter seeks to frame and integrate four chapters that present multiple perspectives on terrorism and personal security in our society. Principles of psychology, political science, biology, and international relations are woven through these chapters to deliver interdisciplinary perspectives to deepen the understanding of modern-day threats and our reactions to those threats.

**Fear as a Value Proposition**

Fettweis’ essay describing fear as both a convenient tool for manipulating electorates and an embedded characteristic of societies is a stage setter for understanding cultural influences on perceived personal security. The author offers insights into why people in general, and people in the United States in particular, sense external threat beyond its rational probability of occurring, and subsequently allow this sense to influence their emotions, perceptions, and decisions. In casting American society as receptive to delusions of danger, he reveals a vulnerability to terrorism unique to the United States. The locus of this vulnerability is what Fettweis calls a geopolitical fear, a widely shared anxiety about the dangerous nature of the outside world.

In a country as safe and relatively isolated as the United States, the emotion of fear is relatively easy to portray as irrational—Fettweis goes so far as to refer to Saddam Hussein’s regime as “more . . . harmless than anyone had imagined before the invasion. . . .” In the information age, however, two related phenomena seem to enact a populist fear. First, we are now treated to near
real-time reporting of the terrible exploits of bad actors. In the specific case of the Hussein regime, for example, the Anfal campaign against the Kurds was sufficiently publicized in the West to have become common knowledge, and the images attendant to the slaughter of more than 180,000 Kurds were reported consistently. The images taken from the gassing deaths of more than 5,000 Kurds in Halabja on March 16–17, 1988 (as well as the wounding and permanent disfigurement of 10,000 more), created an image of the Hussein regime that few would identify as “harmless” and influenced people’s perceptions of the likelihood that Hussein would use weapons of mass destruction if he had the opportunity.

The second phenomenon that affects populist fear (and Fettweis makes this point well) is the Judeo-Christian notion that evil is to be feared in and of itself, before its instrumental manifestation in an actual attack or capability. Evil is dispositional; security is situational. Thus, even if there is no clear and present danger of a despot or a terrorist operationalizing evil intent, their willingness to commit evil acts is viewed by many as something to be feared. Based on personal experience, veterans who are in well-secured areas of war zones nonetheless harbor feelings of unease and threat, knowing that they are in a country where more than a million people would kill them if they could.

Fettweis’ recognition that much of this fear is engendered within the population itself (and in particular, the US population), and not merely the result of fear appeals by fear entrepreneurs, is powerful. In effect, Fettweis argues that fear appeals do not create anxiety in an additive way but instead act as multipliers for anxieties that emerge for other reasons—top down meets bottom up. This is a critically important distinction for those who would seek to reduce fear and anxiety, and the effect of terrorism, in the United States and globally.

**Safe From What, and At What Cost?**

Mueller and Stewart’s chapter complements Fettweis’ observations in that it adds qualitative and quantitative definition to what is rational fear and rational acceptance of risk to threat. They also extend the argument of irrational fear, revealing current expenditures for national security to be, by orders of magnitude, not cost effective. Mueller and Stewart extend their analysis well beyond that argument, however, to problem framing for policy makers and counter-terrorism strategists. They argue that the central question is not whether or not a given strategy increases public safety but, comparatively, whether the money appropriated for solutions to one type of threat to personal security would be more efficient at enhancing public safety if directed toward another type of threat. Policy analysts will find this chapter tremendously useful in helping to determine how to allocate scarce resources in a rational manner.

Insightfully, Mueller and Stewart acknowledge that policy analysts are somewhat distanced from the politicians and bureaucrats who are most often charged with the allocation of resources for the public good. Leaders who take political capital into consideration are viewed as not only resourcing public fears but having a bias toward over-estimating the political accountability if their area of responsibility absorbs a terrorist attack. This is an important insight for practitioners for whom meta-awareness of their own biases may lead to more rational and cost effective approaches to security. The authors of the current chapter have seen this phenomenon play out with military commanders who squandered resources on base security in efforts to maximize protection of their men and women. The irony of this strategy was that it took resources away from effective patrolling and the conduct of the unit’s primary mission—an approach that caused even greater risk to the organization over time.

One timely example of this are recently announced cuts in the federal air marshal program, including the closing of six field offices (Costello, 2014). Sequestration and other budget issues have forced a relook at expenditures related to the program. In 2009 a Congressman questioning the effectiveness of the program cited an average of 4.2 arrests per year at a cost of $200 million
per arrest, yet there has been little change in the program until now (Duncan Blasts “Useless” Air Marshal Service, 2009). Such cutbacks are news only if the public believes that the presence of air marshals is either a deterrent to terrorism or an effective defense against a terrorist act.

### Into the Extreme Psyche

Insofar as Mueller and Stewart show us the mind of the policy maker and politician, Schori-Eyal and Kruglanski show us the mind of the terrorist herself. The chapter is extraordinarily pragmatic in terms of shaping long term efforts to blunt the recruiting and effectiveness of terrorist organizations. Much as it is easier to defuse a bomb if one understands its wiring, Schori-Eyal and Kruglanski’s detail of the psychology of extremism is a blueprint for effective approaches to counter terrorism.

For example, one approach that follows from their blueprint is the notion of manipulating perceived significance among individuals who form the recruiting base for extreme organizations or who identify with ideologies that could lead to the use of terrorism as a method. Whether managing the loss of personal significance or engineering its gain, non-governmental organizations or information operations planners can develop approaches to enhance significance in constructive ways. Similarly, care to avoid or repair the loss of significance, experienced through existential insecurity, could affect the propensity to radicalize to achieve the goal of gaining personal significance. In the preface of this handbook, Carroll, Arkin, and Wichman suggest that loss is the lynch pin of personal security concerns. Based on Frijda’s law of concern, they define personal security as the “freedom from concern over loss” and personal insecurity as the “state of concern over loss.” According to either definition the emotion associated with the felt concern will lead to action. Therefore, if perceived losses of significance are repaired or prevented in the first place, the individual motivation to perform extremist violence would be reduced. Currently, military planners, for example, are charting an exit from Afghanistan that no doubt will include information management, and precisely how the soldiers and citizens of Afghanistan are treated during this major withdrawal will affect the propensity of young men and women to radicalize. Significance gain and loss should therefore be a major consideration in plans that might otherwise be purely logistical, and military, governmental, and non-governmental organizations can share in the effort.

Similarly, one can take Schori-Eyal and Kruglanski’s deconstruction of ideology into its three components: a grievance or injustice, a culprit perceived or portrayed as responsible for the injustice, and a morally warranted and effective method of removing the injustice—terrorism justified. Each of the three components forms a point of vulnerability that, if exploited, could undermine radicalization and terrorism. The typical reaction to terrorist acts is moral outrage, yet Schori-Eyal and Kruglanski’s analysis reveals that the act would likely not have occurred unless, in the mind of the terrorist, it was morally justified at the outset. A more constructive reaction, then, would be to question and deny the culpability of victims and potential victims.

Schori-Eyal and Kruglanski’s third and final component of radicalization toward violence is a collectivist shift toward group norm-based solutions to threat. Much like the other components of radicalization, this level of understanding gives rise to practical approaches toward increasing stability and decreasing radicalization. The emphasis on individual accountability, individual performance, and a focus on individuation in school settings, for example, could make it more difficult for terrorists to radicalize youth. Its deconstruction of the path to a radicalized terrorist makes this particular chapter enormously valuable to those whose aim is to undo terrorism at its source.

### The Utility of Biological Adaptation

Sagarin’s chapter on the ecology and evolution of personal security lends an organic quality to a topic most often articulated using psychological or organizational behavior approaches. The
recurrence and duality of individual and collective actions and interests are key to understanding the relationship of people to protectors, where decentralized observation and interconnectedness with others formed the basis for security. This point was recently and graphically illustrated on a trip taken by one of the authors of the current chapter. As the author approached his gate at Washington’s Dulles airport, he noticed a floating arc of blue uniforms—14 TSA agents (and two dogs) organically forming a living filter around the neighboring gate. It happened that the gate in question was an international flight to Moscow during both the Sochi Winter Olympics and the initial period of revolt and unrest in the Ukraine. The concern for safety was practical, but the ring of watchful eyes was organic and the vigilance was decentralized and redundant. No one was entering the gate area without eye to eye contact with another alert, sensing human being.

Issues in personal security hinge on uncertainty and lack of situational awareness, because if one has certainty and perfect situational awareness, one can take steps to mitigate threat or damage. Sagarin’s ecological view addresses this issue not by attempting to increase certainty and awareness but by adding decentralization and redundancy as a hedge to cover a myriad of possible outcomes. It is a compelling perspective and a useful strategy for both maintaining security and responding to extant crises.

**Points of Intersection**

The overall topic that binds the focal chapters together is personal security, and there are key points made in each of the chapters that emerge as recurring themes. Ultimately, it is the power of fear perceptions that drives the behavior examined in each focal chapter. The perception of fear is so powerful because it is believed to be justified by the presence of a perceived threat, basically by the concern for loss. Also, the perception of fear is complicated by the complex relationship between the individual and the collective. Additionally, all the chapters address the need for, or recognition of, the concept of acceptable risk.

First, it is important to acknowledge that perceptions ultimately drive human behavior. In the case of the focal chapters each examines the perception of fear in society based on the belief that people, individually and collectively, are under the cloud of a looming threat. Fettweis plainly states that it is fear that drove the United States to “blunder” into conflicts like Iraq. This widespread geopolitical fear, currently fueled by terrorism, holds the United States and many other countries hostage, preventing people from seeing world realistically, as a safer place than ever before. The constant fear felt by the populace puts personal security efforts needlessly into overdrive and allows fear appeals to amplify the country’s focus security efforts.

Mueller and Stewart echo similar points to Fettweis when they discuss the persistence of fear in society despite evidence to the contrary. The irrational anxiety associated with the fears held by many in the Western world results in wasted resources being dedicated to personal security with minimal effect. Fettweis highlights that not only do policy makers allow emotion to drive decisions but they actually manipulate emotions (in particular, fear) to their own advantage to obtain or maintain status and power. Mueller and Stewart argue that policy makers have a moral, ethical, and fiscal responsibility to prevent irrational emotions from guiding policy decisions. If possible, resources must be more appropriately and effectively allocated. The recent Pentagon announcement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel that the military is shrinking its size and expenditures to “meet the reality of the world as it is today” is an example of policy makers heeding Mueller and Stewart’s admonition (Chuck Hagel to Propose Big Cuts, 2014).

Schori-Eyal and Kruglanski examine fear from the perspective of the extremist. They seek to explain why someone would forgo their own personal security and be willing to sacrifice their life and the lives of others for an ideology. The specific causes of individual involvement in terrorist activities have been explored (see Horgan, 2005, pp. 80–96, as a reference). However, Schori-Eyal
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and Kruglanski focus on the basic underlying motivations of the individual extremist. Specifically, they suggest that it is the fear of having a life without meaning (existential insecurity) that drives individuals to take up the extremist mantle. The extremist seeks a type of self-realization that can take the form of increased social status, group approval, or even cultural approval. For example, fear of the erosion of the Islamist way of life inspires the jihadists to take up arms and risk their personal security for social recognition of their sacrifice.

Sagarin also discusses the ecology of fear that drives organisms at the individual and collective level to adapt and overcome, to survive. Constant stress induced by fear heightens individual awareness of potential threats, leading to collective level action to combat the danger. The perception of fear inspires action like the emplacement of security procedures. Ultimately, these security measures increase the safety and potential survival of the organism. Each of the chapters examines the central theme, from a differing perspective, that the perception of fear heavily influences how people see the world and how they react to it.

Second, the next major theme is that the power of fear is enhanced by the complex interplay between the perceptions and actions of the individual and the collective. Sagarin’s chapter aptly highlights that the individual and the collective are dependent on each other. Individual fear inspires collective level measures to be taken, like security procedures being put into place, consequently influencing perceptions and actions at the individual level. Fettweis points out that some individuals and agencies aim to manipulate the collective’s underlying national fear through fear appeals. Fear appeals inspire more fear at the individual level and ultimately drive support for a political agenda or specific organization. Mueller and Stewart quickly point out the motivation for agencies like the Department of Homeland Security to stoke the flames of fear to gain further support and increase resource allocation for their agency. As already discussed, fear appeals do not create the fear that drives, at times, irrational action, but they multiply its effect. Individual fear, collective fear, and policy makers’ actions interact to magnify the perceived threat in a given situation.

Schori-Eyal and Kruglanski discuss the power of the collective when it influences the individual’s willingness to forgo personal security to pursue violent action in support of the collective’s ideology. In the individual’s quest to achieve self-actualization, which is a direct result of what the collective perceives to be meaningful, the individual can develop psychological insecurity when the path to achieving significance is not clear or is blocked. Psychological insecurity can lead individuals to take actions in support of the collective cause because they may receive increased status or connectedness with the larger group, which can reestablish a sense of psychological security. Schori-Eyal and Kruglanski identify that for violent action to take place two elements must be satisfied by the collective’s ideology. First, the collective that the individual identifies with must promote an ideology that is supportive of the use of violence, which can include self-sacrifice, as a means to achieve significance. Next, individuals must be socialized to develop a collective consciousness. Only then will the individual will see violent action that puts their personal security at risk as a means to achieving individual significance by furthering the collective cause. Once the individual develops the collective consciousness, their individual function is to be prepared to terminate themselves for the advancement of the collective. In all the chapters it is the complex relationship between the individual and the collective that determines subsequent actions.

Last, the final recurring theme is the concept of acceptable risk. The willingness of the individual to sacrifice for the larger group echoes Sagarin’s observation that biologically some cells’ function is to self-terminate so the larger organism is able to complete its development, enabling the organism (the collective) to survive and thrive in a given environment. The individual cell is terminated to support the higher-level organism’s survival. It is hard to deny the parallel between the individual action of the extremist described by Schori-Eyal and Kruglanski and Sagarin’s observation of individual cell termination. Based on terror management theory, Schori-Eyal and Kruglanski argue that individuals in the extremist organization realize their own mortality and
take action, sacrificing themselves, for the good of the group. The individuals accept their role, their function, to further the cause of the organization. Based on the collectivist shift previously described, they find personal significance through the advancement of the collective’s ideology.

Mueller and Stewart address acceptable risk in a slightly less extreme manner. In line with the discussion of policy decision making based on logical reasoning, Mueller and Stewart suggest examining how many lives are actually saved by the monumental amount of money spent on personal security in recent years. Taking emotion out of the equation, it is essential to conduct a cost–benefit analysis to assess the effectiveness of those efforts and to determine where prudent security precautions end and wasteful illogical spending begins. The individual must accept some level of risk to prevent the unnecessary exhaustion of group resources. If it is not possible to take emotion out of the equation, the geopolitical fear that Fettweis describes will continue to make the United States prone to the manipulation of fear appeals and collective action will be primarily driven by an irrational fear of losing power, influence, and status globally.

**Key Observations for Leaders and Policy Makers**

**Fear as a Primary Security Issue**

Napoleon Bonaparte is commonly credited with saying, “Leaders are dealers in hope.” If leaders are dealers in hope, then the four chapters that are the subject of this integration have all suggested that leaders must also be experts at managing fear. Each chapter provides a unique interpretation of fear that has significant implications for leaders. This suggests that if populations may be influenced by fear, then fear itself is a *primary security issue*. As suggested by the preface, fear is an emotional consequence that results from concern over anticipated losses. Therefore, alleviating personal insecurity is a *primary security issue*. As Schori-Eyal and Kruglanski aptly explain, being free from the concern of loss (to live without fear of loss) is a basic motivation.

To dispel fear, though, is not a simple task for leaders and policy makers. Fettweis argues that Americans, in particular, are predisposed to fear and that such a predisposition makes them prey to both the media (which may benefit from manufactured crises) and politicians (who may exert greater influence when backed by the motivation of fear and anxiety). It is important for leaders and policy makers to view fear as an emotion experienced by the population, not a circumstance that is inherent to any particular situation. Anecdotally, Franklin Roosevelt’s inauguration speech is a superb example of a leader actively framing fear as a primary security issue (Roosevelt, 1933, p. 11):

> So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance. In every dark hour of our national life a leadership of frankness and vigor has met with that understanding and support of the people themselves which is essential to victory.

The same logic follows in an individual context—a novice mountain climber may experience significant fear, while his climbing guide is entirely unconcerned on the same rock face. Fear is not produced by circumstances or events, although certain circumstances and events are often concurrent with fear. Fear is an emotion based on perceptions, which makes it, potentially, under the control of leaders.

The best way for leaders to manage fear may be to keep it from developing in the first place. Psychologist Brian Germain (2007) writes about fear, “Defending peace is easier than creating peace” (p. 70). His point is that it is difficult to bring fear under control once individuals (or,
collectively, organizations) are experiencing it. Policy makers could powerfully apply the probabilistic approach of the Mueller and Stewart chapter to not only manage resources but also manage and limit the development of fear through rational appeals. Sagarin’s notion of self/non-self-identification and the stabilizing effects of tribal membership relates directly to fear as a primary security issue.

The Relationship Between Individuals and the Collective

Basic human nature is to prefer and seek membership in a group. Humans are, after all, social animals. The catch that accompanies group membership is the requirement to balance personal needs and goals with those of the group (Forsyth, 2010). It is inevitable that individuals and their groups will influence each other in very significant ways (Shaw, 1981). Each of the focal chapters demonstrates very clearly the duality of influence between the individual and the collective. This is evident in the discussion of the propagation of fear, the focus on the survival of the overall organization as opposed to the individual, or the basis of self-actualization being defined by achieving group as opposed to individual objectives.

At times, individuals can become lost in their group, misplacing or losing their sense of self. The deindividuation that occurs can significantly diminish inhibitions and have a profound impact on individual behavior (Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952). Individual responsibility is diffused to the collective and no longer has the same sway. Individuals do not feel the full weight of their actions when they participate in fear mongering or the pursuit of extremist activities to further the group’s objectives. As a result, individual behavior is driven by collective influence to places the individual would never go alone. Helping individuals to rebalance their sense of self with their membership in the collective will encourage more responsible and rational behavior.

The relationship between the individual and the collective in the focal articles echoes key aspects of the group think phenomenon (Janis, 1971). When the cohesiveness of a collective is so strong that it loses its ability to critically evaluate situations, specific symptoms of group think occur. These symptoms include collectives that believe they have the secure moral high ground, rationalize their actions without critical analysis, adopt a stereotyped view of the out-group, put pressure on individuals to conform, and create an environment where individuals self-censor (Janis, 1971, 1982; Janis & Mann, 1977). Many of the symptoms of group think that Janis and colleagues identify are evident throughout the focal articles.

Fettweis alludes to the moral superiority inherent in the United States’ military actions to protect itself or prevent threats from reaching the homeland, seeing the evil in the intent of terrorist organizations. Fettweis goes on to describe the lack of rational decision making that ultimately led to actions in Iraq, for example. Senior defense officials labeled any country or group with views that opposed the United States as terrorists or as part of the axis of evil. Mueller and Stewart describe policy makers who believe they cannot get elected if they do not appear to be in full support of ever increasing security measures to protect the American people, whether the measures are necessary or not. If group think is allowed to take control of the collective, flawed decisions are much more likely to occur and, based on the nature of the discussion, to have significant ramifications for the United States and the rest of the world. To combat these symptoms, collective norms must be established that welcome critiques and require input from individuals willing to play the devil’s advocate (Janis, 1982). Leaders must work to establish environments willing to embrace informed debate.

Heralding Acceptable Risk

In times of crisis people are more susceptible to the purpose, motivation, and direction that leaders can supply (Bass, 1985; Kolditz, 2007; Forsyth, 2010). As discussed, fear is a perception that guides
much of the thinking when it comes to personal security efforts today. As the focal chapters suggest, leaders must prevent or attenuate irrational fears about the severity of the threats that are present and support the acceptance of a reasonable amount of risk when it comes to the allocation of limited resources to support personal security efforts. Leaders must understand the public’s fear but help the public realize the appropriate balance between risk mitigation and irrational resource allocation. Mueller and Stewart go as far as to say that the irresponsible allocation of resources by policy makers is “a profound betrayal of the public trust.” It is ironic that trust is the lynch pin in convincing the public that a more rational approach to personal security efforts is necessary, and trust will ultimately facilitate the public’s acceptance of a reasonable amount of risk.

Policy makers today do not have the trust of the people. A Gallup poll on December 5–8, 2013, showed that only 8% of the population surveyed rated Congress as having “high” or “very high” ethical standards, while 54% of the population surveyed rated Congress as having “low” or “very low” ethical standards (Capehart, 2013). If people are concerned for their personal security, it is going to be very difficult for a leader to assuage them of their fear and convince them that they are safer than they think. Only then can the leader present the idea that a measured approach to spending on their safety is appropriate. Policy makers need to focus on gaining the trust of their constituents. Multiple leadership concepts provide insight on how leaders can establish the trust necessary to alleviate public fear and gain support for appropriate risk mitigation efforts and responsible resource allocation.

Three areas will help leaders to reestablish the trust with society necessary to change individual and collective perspectives on the responsible management of resources relating to personal security. Leaders must focus on consistent application of personal values and principles, self-sacrificing behaviors, and clear communication to secure the public’s trust and change public perceptions on resource allocation. First, leaders must be willing to consistently apply their own moral compass and not deviate from it for personal gain. In their work on authentic leadership, George and colleagues are quick to point out that when leaders consistently apply their values, balance their intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, and lead an integrated life, followers know what they can expect from the leader and know that the leader will be there to support them (George & Sims, 2007; George, Sims, McLean, & Mayer, 2007).

The actions that Fettweis and Mueller and Stewart imply in their description of societal leaders relating to their use of geopolitical fear indicate a personal drive to obtain power or maintain resources for their own benefit and not for the benefit of the collective. These actions are a violation of trust and chip away at the strong bond that must be felt between leaders and followers when dealing with matters of such significance. It is the authentic leader who is able to maintain trust with their followers and therefore have a significant influence on their perceptions and subsequent actions (George & Sims, 2007; George et al., 2007).

Multiple leadership concepts discuss the importance of a self-sacrificing approach to leadership. The focal articles imply that the opposite approach is taken by many leaders in society. Leaders use fear to manipulate the perceptions of others to gain status and resources for personal reasons or to further organizational objectives to the detriment of the individual. Transformational leadership theory and in extremis leadership both stress the importance of sacrificing personal gain for the good of the organization and a willingness to share risk with followers to inspire action (Bass, 1985; Kolditz, 2007; Yukl, 2010). If this is not present, followers lose their motivation and commitment to both the organization and the leader. Competence creates respect for the leader, and the willingness to share risk helps solidify trust between the leader and followers (Kolditz, 2007).

Last, adapted from previous versions of the army’s leadership manual, the book Be, Know, Do identifies the significance of the leader’s ability to communicate (Hesselbein & Shinseki, 2004). Once followers feel a connection to the leader, are open to the leader’s message, and have faith that the leader has their best interest in mind, they become more susceptible to the leader’s message.
It is the responsibility of the leader to clearly communicate his or her intent to others. If a leader cannot clearly capture the true significance (or lack thereof) of the threat and the reality of the collective’s available resources, how can the public understand the importance of responsible resource allocation? Transformational leadership identifies a key to leaders’ ability to change their organization as the clear communication of their message/vision to their followers, which provides a meaning to the mission and inspires individual commitment (Bass, 1985; Yukl, 2010).

Trust is a precious resource in all situations. Without trust the relationship between leaders and followers can turn poisonous, causing the relationship to be highly ineffective (Kolditz, 2007). When leaders are asking followers to accept personal risk, leaders must demonstrate their consistent application of their values and principles so followers can come to rely on the leaders’ consistency, leaders must be willing to share risk and sacrifice for their followers to strengthen the leader–follower bond, and they must be able to clearly convey their message so the intent of conserving resources is clear. Once leaders demonstrate these three key facets of leadership, the bond of trust with followers will be established, and leaders will be able to convince followers that it is critical to conserve resources and accept a reasonable amount of risk.

Human beings are social animals, compelled to develop relationships for a multitude of reasons ranging from a desire for companionship to a need to increase feelings of security. The multiple perspectives on personal security presented in the focal chapters provide unique insight that is enhanced by the different approaches used to analyze the topic. While the focal articles use different approaches as the basis of their analysis, key themes emerged to transcend each chapter. The identification of the power of fear, the complexity of the relationship between the individual and the collective, and the importance of accepting a reasonable amount of risk relating to personal security all provide key insights for policy makers to consider as they lead personal security efforts in the future.

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