The Big Picture

Turnout at the macro-level

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This chapter examines the “big picture” of electoral turnout: research at the aggregate or macro-level in search of temporal, contextual, and institutional explanations of variation in turnout. It begins with a brief review of the field and its methodology, moving on to assess the extent of change over time. It reviews debates and empirical evidence about the possible consequences of variation in turnout for partisan politics, public policy, and social and economic inequality. It concludes by addressing the reasons for variation in turnout, with particular attention to the order of elections, competitiveness, and electoral systems.

Development of the field and its methodology

Systematic aggregate-level cross-national analysis of electoral turnout began in the 1980s as a growing time series of continuously democratic elections began to accumulate (see, for example, Powell 1980). Countries and the elections nested within them could be treated as “country-election” cases. By the 1990s, as the number of individual-level sample-survey election studies multiplied around the world, research mixing aggregate and individual-level data began to emerge. Since 1996, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) has been collecting data from election studies around the world, providing easy access. Multi-level models make it possible to combine analysis at both the aggregate and individual levels, estimating not only the direct effects of macro-variables but also the extent to which their effects run through and interact with other explanatory variables at the individual level. This approach is now at the cutting edge of both aggregate and individual-level observational electoral research on turnout. This chapter will therefore address the use of macro-level explanatory variables both in aggregate-level and in some multi-level analyses of turnout.

From the research so far, one set of findings stands out. Between-country differences in turnout cannot be explained by individual-level differences within them: indeed between-country differences in turnout exceed differences that are the consequence of individual-level characteristics. Change over time within countries is strongly shaped by processes of generational replacement that can be modeled at both the individual and aggregate levels (Franklin 2004; Franklin, Lyons, and Marsh 2004; van der Brug and Franklin in this volume). But between-country differences also are generally much greater than those associated with change over time.
Aggregate-level electoral research presents methodological challenges. Countries differ in their cultures, in their social and economic development, and in their institutions. Change in these variables is slow. Institutional change is rare. Change within countries occurs more in the character of elections: in how much elections are perceived to matter, changes in the nature and strategies of actors, and in consequent voter perceptions of efficacy. Examining temporal change, one can cautiously make causal inferences. But because many country characteristics are within-country constants, modeling those relies on cross-sectional variation (for important exceptions, see Franklin 2004; Vowles, Katz, and Stevens 2015), and thus there is rarely empirical evidence of causality: such inferences rely largely on theory.

Time series analysis within cross-sectional panels presents further challenges. Trending in dependent and independent variables presents dangers of spurious correlation. Autocorrelation and the possible presence of unit roots in dependent variables add to the difficulties, as does the risk of heteroscedasticity. All these can be addressed through batteries of diagnostic tests and “fixes” (Beck and Katz 1995; Beck 2001; Wooldridge 2002; Wilson and Butler 2007). Over the years, awareness of such problems has grown and standards in recent research (following the hugely influential Beck and Katz 1995) are higher than in the past.

Up, down, or trendless?

Debate continues about electoral turnout trends. The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) maintains a valuable database on electoral turnout around the world. The IDEA data estimate turnout as a percentage of those registered to vote, and also on an age-eligible population basis. These distinct statistics are the focus of another debate in the literature. Turnout on a registration basis excludes those not registered, which can be a significant number. Some people may be registered more than once. The list may contain people who have died or left the country. Turnout on an age-eligible population basis requires census data based estimates, and in many countries the denominator of the fraction will contain non-citizens, non-residents, and others ineligible to vote. The choice between the two means of estimation is difficult: some analysts choose one, some the other, and increasingly both (Geys 2006: 638–640).

Some may argue that seeking to generalize about turnout trends internationally is pointless: there is too much inexplicable country-level variation, and too much potential for error. Nonetheless, there remains a demand for systematic descriptions of this kind. IDEA provides further information in its database: the type of election (European Union, parliamentary, or presidential), whether or not voting is compulsory, and the Freedom House score of political and civil rights, the latter only available in the data from the beginning of Freedom House data collection from the early 1970s.

For national presidential and parliamentary elections, Figure 5.1 shows the trend of turnout change over this period in countries that have consistently scored one or two on the Freedom House Index, and in which an uninterrupted time series begins at some point in the 1970s or earlier: 31 relatively long-term free or full democracies with populations over 200,000. The data are averaged over five-year time periods, allowing most countries to contribute at least one election to each estimate. Regardless of use of the registration or age-eligible base, average turnout is down by 11–12 percent from a peak in the period around 1980 to the present: by 77 to 65 percent on an age-eligible base, and 82 to 71 percent on a registration base. The peak is not at the beginning of the time series, but part way in. Examination of data prior to the 1970s suggests increasing turnout to about 1980 from a somewhat lower level in 1945, but the mix of countries in the earlier period is a smaller subset. In various regressions unreported here, fixed
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country effects models controlling for lagged turnout, compulsory voting, parliamentary versus presidential, and population show that variation between countries is far greater than change over time, but change over time is highly significant, its slope after those controls closely reflecting those in Figure 5.1.

The consequences of turnout variation

Does the level of turnout matter, and if so, how and why? Normative debates inevitably enter the picture. For some, high turnout is intrinsically a “good” that maximizes inclusiveness, a key conceptual element of democracy (Dahl 1973). For others, high turnout is to be valued or not valued because of its consequences, with normative principles still very much in the debate.

From evidence indicating that many people know little about politics, some infer that the votes of people who are ill-informed about politics are not worth having, and the democratic process might be better off without them (for example, Caplan 2006; Rosema 2007; Brennan 2009). In a canonical contribution, Converse (1964) reported that repeated survey research indicates low levels of ideological consistency among many citizens, over time and even within an interview. In response to survey questions to which they did not know how to respond, people were sometimes prone to construct “non-attitudes.” There are very few people who know enough about politics to fit into a model of the fully informed citizen (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Bartels 2008; but see Bolstad in this volume, and Erikson in this volume). Low knowledge is also found among many people who vote regularly. Claims about “low quality voters” fail to consider the threshold below which, on those assumptions, one might decide that even people who vote now might be better off not doing so.

The majority of citizens are not perfect deliberators. Even the most informed often fail to change their opinions when confronted by contrary evidence (Kuklinski et al. 2000; Taber and Lodge 2006). High levels of knowledge do not guarantee well-considered choices. Given this, there is a case for valuing everyone’s preferences: the more who are counted, the more likely a
collective choice will be better for everyone (Surowiecki 2004). While a high number of completely random choices among the uninformed would do nothing to enhance elections (Katz 1997: 245), if those choices are random they are unlikely to create bias. There may be very few choices made that are completely random: voters can often get by with very little information and still make the choices that they would have made with more information (Popkin 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992; Lupia 1994). Such cues may be biased, but so may be the sources of information from which more knowledgeable voters draw: they too may have cognitive biases. The debate about whether or not we should value maximum or minimum turnout in terms of vote “quality” is at heart normative, and cannot be resolved by empirical analysis.

However, empirical research can seek to uncover the consequences of differential turnout on which basis some judgments might be made. Key (1949: 527) observed that politicians are “under no compulsion to pay much heed to classes and groups of citizens that do not vote.” As Burnham (1987: 99) put it, “if you don’t vote, you don’t count.” In the United States and elsewhere, those who are less likely to vote are to be found among the young, those on low incomes, and those with low levels of education (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995; Leighley and Nagler 2013) – often the same individuals. One might therefore expect less government attentiveness to the young, the poor, and the less educated, among whom low turnout is concentrated (Solt 2010). Studies of turnout and policy bias across the American states confirm the claim that unequal participation, income inequality, and policy bias are linked, some pointing the causal arrow in one direction, some in the other, and some denying a relationship. Avery (2015) reviews the literature. Using a variety of robustness tests, he confirms that the strongest evidence supports causality from turnout bias through policy bias to inequality.

Drawing on international evidence, the debate is more strongly contested. Many argue that low turnout tends to generate a bias among those who can or do vote toward those on higher incomes (for example, references in Lijphart 1997; Giger, Rosset, and Bernauer 2012). Again, policy consequences are identified. As in the American literature, these are not necessarily reflected in the partisan composition of governments or legislatures (Grofman, Owen, and Collet 1999; Bernhagen and Marsh 2007). Instead, the case is made in terms of policy outcomes. Governments of left or right alike will deliver public policy in the interests of the young and poor if those groups vote at levels comparable to the rest of the population (Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Mahler 2008; Boix 2003: 184–191). Otherwise, policies will target the better off (Griffin and Newman 2013). Policies aimed to benefit the young and poor reduce inequality and provide incentives for people in those groups to vote, potentially breaking the cycle of inequality in both participation and incomes. Compulsory voting is often recommended to achieve better representation of those on lower incomes (Fowler 2013; Carey and Horuichi 2014).

There are findings that more equal societies tend to have higher turnout (Mahler 2002). However, the relationship between inequality and turnout remains contested. In a study containing data from 101 countries between 1970 and 2010, Stockemer and Scruggs (2012) find no such relationship, whether for developed countries separately or throughout their full dataset. Their estimate of inequality comes from Gini coefficients. Solt’s (2008) study is a multi-level analysis based on 23 developed countries merging aggregate and survey data from the 1980s and 1990s. Developed countries are the focus. Solt argues that in less developed countries clientelistic politics will distribute goods to groups powerful enough to claim them, not promoting equality. Because his analysis is multi-level, Solt can interact the Gini coefficient with household income and estimate effects on the basis of income quintiles. He finds that inequality minimizes turnout most among the poor.

This is the key claim in the debate: not so much that inequality is associated with low turnout overall, but that inequality is associated with lower turnout among the poor. Kasara and
Suryanarayan (2015) argue that under conditions of high state capacity and redistribution of incomes that reduce inequality, the rich may be disposed to vote more than the poor in order to reduce their tax exposure. But they question Solt’s finding that the poor are less likely to vote in developed countries where inequality is high. In less developed countries, where state capacity to redistribute is low and inequality is high, the rich have less need to vote, and the poor may be more likely to do so because of vote-buying and clientelism. The relationships between inequality, state capacity, redistribution, and turnout therefore remain unclear. At high levels of inequality, redistributive spending is low, and turnout has slightly negative effects on the size of government (Ansell and Samuels, 2014: 141–170; Boix 2003: 191). Progress toward greater consensus in this debate requires multi-level models because both macro- and micro-level data are needed.

Before turning to review three of the main areas of research in the aggregate-level study of turnout, one should note the very useful meta-analysis of the literature up to 2006 provided by Geys (2006). Summarizing findings about which there is no space to discuss here, Geys found that the majority of studies that included it found an effect for population size: turnout is lower in larger countries, higher in smaller ones. Population concentration in urban versus rural areas is much less frequently found to have an effect. Work based on aggregate measurements of individual-level characteristics indicates that stability of population and asset ownership as measured by the proportion of home-owners also had consistent effects when tested. Ethnic heterogeneity tends to reduce turnout, in proportion to the size of minority groups. Past levels of turnout are also a good predictor of present turnout. Campaign expenditure is another good predictor, with some effects for its tone and negative/positive balance. Compulsory voting delivers one of the most robust positive findings for turnout, depending on its level of enforcement. Ease of registration and ease of voting generally also tend to have consistent positive effects.

The differences of “order”

The establishment of direct elections to the European Parliament was a landmark in the development of electoral politics: the first major experiment in cross-national democracy. In terms of turnout, the result has been disappointing. This experience led analysts to the concept of “second-order elections,” those deemed to be of relatively low importance by voters, parties, and the mass media (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). National elections determining the holders of state executive power are “first order.” Lower-level federal, regional, and local elections also fall into the “second-order” category. Second-order election behavior is shaped by the politics of the related first-order elections, citizens taking cues from the performance of their national governments, not so much from politics at the second-order level.

Second-order election theory is most applied to European Parliamentary elections. Low turnout is a major indicator of second-order status, raising issues of circularity given that low turnout is one of the theory’s key predictions. Research in the Netherlands indicates that the prediction of low turnout, while confirmed at the aggregate level, is less well supported by individual-level data. Because turnout in second-order elections is more affected by mobilization, the absence of mobilization may be more important than perceptions of voters and non-voters themselves (Lefevre and Van Aelst 2014). The alternative claim that apathy and skepticism about the European project itself may outweigh perceptions of “less at stake” is either refuted (Franklin and Hobolt 2011) or shown to be weak (Schmitt, Sanz, and Braun 2008). Switching into non-voting is also related to discontent among those who had voted for the incumbent national government, although only where party systems are most institutionally entrenched in Western...
Europe, where the European election was timed near the middle of the national electoral cycle, and found more strongly under single-party governments (Schmitt, Sanz, and Braun 2008).

Outside the politics of the European Parliament, local government provides opportunities for second-order analysis. From the beginnings of the systematic analysis of local elections (Morlan 1984), findings of lower turnout are consistent with the theory. However, the categories of first and second order may be too blunt. In the United Kingdom, turnout has tended to be higher in local than European elections because it is perceived that there is more at stake locally than across Europe (Heath et al. 1999). Cross-national comparison including both European and non-European countries indicates that turnout in local elections is not always lower than in national elections. Coining the term “turnout twist,” Horiuchi (2004) has operationalized an independent indicator of how much is at stake from tax revenues and government expenditures that explains such cases.

Second-order election theory comes down to two claims: first, that high-stake elections will affect behavior at low-stake elections. This assumes that the same actors are in play at the different levels; non-partisan local elections do not fit in this picture. Another possibility has also been investigated: behavior at low-stake elections could have marginal but significant effects on those with high stakes. Turnout at United States presidential elections is correlated with that at previous mid-term elections, more so than with turnout at the previous presidential election (Franklin 2004: 107). Direct elections to the European Parliament have reduced turnout in European national parliamentary elections (Franklin and Hobolt 2011). Another “twist” comes from findings that in parliamentary systems where the Head of State is independently elected, turnout in parliamentary elections is adversely affected, although offset if those elections are concurrent (Tavits 2009). Concurrent presidential and legislative elections may boost turnout generally (Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Geys 2006: 652).

The second important claim of second-order theory is that people will vote or not vote according to how much is at stake, usually communicated to the electorate by party mobilization and media coverage. As developed by Horiuchi (2004), independent estimates of what is at stake seem the best way forward. Analysis linking the effects of the character of elections to turnout within individual countries use manifesto data or survey-based perceptions of party differences to show that turnout is higher where elections matter in these terms (see for examples Heath 2007; Vowles, Katz, and Stevens 2015).

The competitiveness model

Theoretically and empirically, the most comprehensive research on turnout at both aggregate and individual levels remains Mark Franklin’s Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies Since 1945 (2004). Franklin develops the insight that elections must matter to encourage people to vote and incorporates it within a general theory of electoral competitiveness. That competition should matter follows from the classic Downsian model where “p,” the probability of one’s vote having an effect, interacts with “b,” the benefits one might anticipate if one’s preferred candidate or party were elected (Downs 1957). Competitiveness is usually identified as the closeness of the race perceived by voters and parties. In district-based systems, parties will tend to target their mobilization efforts in the most competitive areas, reducing “c,” the costs of voting, the third element on the right-hand side of the Downsian equation. Defined broadly, competitiveness tends to particularly encourage young people first entering the electorate to vote, and helps establish a habit of voting or not voting that subsequently “sticks,” reducing the effects of later short-term influences, and establishing the foundations of variations in turnout between generations or age cohorts.
Ups and downs in the development of habits of voting or non-voting might remain relatively constant around a mean without any clear trend toward higher or lower competitiveness. However, in countries where elections have become less competitive and policy differences between parties more narrow, turnout decline is highly likely and non-competitiveness may be the most important driving force. For example, in the case of Britain, it has been claimed that there has been no trend toward lower competitiveness in terms of election margins that can be linked to turnout decline (Heath 2007) or that changes in electoral margins have had little or no effect on turnout (Blais and Rubenson 2013). Contrary evidence also taking account of generational replacement (see van der Brug and Franklin in this volume) is provided by Vowles, Katz, and Stevens (2015).

Much depends on how the electoral margins are used to define competition in terms of the closeness of the race. Most analysts use the vote share gap between first and second place at the election in question, measured at the national level, and the vast majority of studies up to 2006 have found a significant relationship (Geys 2006: 647). Where competition takes place in districts, margins can also be estimated at that level. Even when the race is not close nationally, a close local contest will still have effects (Franklin and Evans 2000). Most analysts calculate an “ex post” margin from the results of the election in question, effectively assuming that voters and non-voters could predict it exactly, thus biasing estimates. “Ex ante” margins work better (Geys 2006: 648). These can come from two sources: the margins from the previous election, or an average of polls, usually taken in the last week of the campaign. However, polls can only be used at the national level as even if there is any district-level polling it is usually fragmentary. The almost invariable choice of vote margins at the national level is, however, peculiar, particularly in non-proportional systems where seat margins at the previous election are a much better guide to the possibility of a change of government. Because there are multiple indicators of closeness, it makes sense to use as many as can be estimated in order to specify the full effects (for example, see Vowles, Katz, and Stevens 2015).

For example, Franklin (2004) incorporates an additional measure in his concept of competitiveness, a measure he later refers to as one of clarity of choices: the size of the largest party relative to 50 percent. Where the largest party receives half the votes, the contest is simplified to one of that party against the rest. As the gap between the largest party and 50 percent increases, the stakes in the contest become harder to assess, so this aspect of competition is also linked to the measure of electoral stakes already discussed.

Where PR systems operate entirely with national lists, there is no district margin to add to the mix. Yet many PR systems do use districts, and/or regional lists, and in these cases district margins can also be estimated. Indeed, at least three means of doing so have been suggested, one angle being to most closely approximate the first/second-place margin approach (Blais and Lago 2009; Grofman and Selb 2009), another being to estimate the chances of the previous plurality party losing its position (Kayser and Lindstadt 2015). Competitiveness can also be measured on a multi-party basis (Endersby, Galatas, and Rackaway 2002). So far, these new and more sophisticated measures of competitiveness have not been applied widely. It remains to be seen whether they will make much difference to what now must be approaching a consensus: close elections do matter.

A question remains: why do they matter? Is it the expectation that a governing executive may be dismissed (Kayser and Lindstadt 2015)? Or is the key mechanism a more general perception of uncertainty? Where polls indicate an incumbent government will be re-elected, or a candidate is strongly entrenched in a safe electoral district, those considering their vote will be very certain that it will make no difference. Where the margin is close, one cannot rule out the chance that one’s vote could make a difference, unlikely though it may be. One might think of
casting a vote in such circumstances as like buying a lottery ticket: one becomes a minor participant in the game. There may be a payoff by way of anticipation of the result and vicarious engagement. However, party elites do most of the thinking of this nature. They mobilize the vote and provide cues, targeting their campaigns in order to maximize turnout among their supporters according to the logic of the system in their country.

The PR debate

One of the most strongly contested debates in the literature on electoral turnout is about the effects of electoral systems. Systematic comparative empirical analysis kicked off in the 1980s, with work by Powell (1980, 1986). Powell found a positive effect for “nationally competitive electoral districts.” Jackman (1987) took up that challenge, adding a variable measuring electoral disproportionality. He also included an estimate of party system fragmentation. While proportionality enhanced turnout, party system fragmentation had the opposite effects. Party system fragmentation increases uncertainty that votes will directly affect executive power, also true of Franklin’s clarity of choices measure. In such circumstances, government formation may be determined more by elite bargaining.

Following Jackman, Blais and Carty (1990) took the analysis further, including elections back to the nineteenth century and employing a pooled time series model, setting the standard for all subsequent studies. They estimated the effects of electoral institutions formally, rather than in terms of proportionality. They estimated the effects of plurality, majority, and majority multi-member districts against PR systems as the reference category. On top of controls including compulsory or voluntary voting, and the logged size of the legislature as proxy for population, they found a 7 percent positive effect for PR against their defined alternatives.

The next step was to expand the analysis beyond the old established democracies, and here the consensus began to break down. Analysis of post-communist countries confirmed the finding (Kostandinova 2003) but no effects were found in Latin America (Pérez-Linán 2001; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004). Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) found only a weak 3 percent positive effect for PR when incorporating both old-established and more recently established democracies. Reviewing the findings, Blais and Aarts (2006) summarized a set of positive effects for turnout under PR, with the exception of Latin America, but were skeptical because of the weakness of the findings and uncertainty about their micro-level foundations.

The PR debate inevitably draws on the analysis of electoral competitiveness. If competitiveness is about expectations that a government might be dismissed, those expectations could be weaker under PR where party system fragmentation is high. On the other hand, if competitiveness is about uncertainty, PR maximizes uncertainty, particularly in terms of a vote affecting a single seat shift. PR also means that those wishing to vote for small parties unlikely to win single-member districts can vote without the certainty of knowing their parties will be unsuccessful. For the most part, PR systems abolish safe districts, again removing a source of certainty that many votes will not effectively count.

Indeed Selb (2009) has found the lack of competitiveness in safe districts under plurality systems to be largely responsible for lower turnout than under PR. His data was from aggregate district-level turnout data from 28 national parliamentary elections and 1113 electoral districts. To compare ex post margins comparable with single member plurality districts for multi-member PR districts, for the PR districts he estimated the margin for the contest for the last seat to be allocated (Selb 2009: 537). The data were confined to the old democracies with the addition of a scattering of newer democracies: Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Romania.
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The problem of inconsistencies between the old and the new democracies was addressed by Endersby and Krieckhaus (2008). They criticized the use of registration-base turnout figures. Using an age-eligible base, they found that in fully democratic countries PR increases turnout by 5–10 percentage points compared to plurality-majority systems. The effects are higher in fully democratic countries. PR has no effects in partially democratic countries. This may explain the paucity of findings for Latin America. The use of a registration-based turnout estimate in earlier research also reduces the PR effect. The authors argue strongly for an age-eligible base estimation. Disaggregating non-PR systems, they find that it is majority systems and non-compensatory mixed systems that have the lowest turnout as compared to PR systems. The sign for simple plurality systems is negative but not significant.

However, most of this research has a major weakness. Because systems rarely change, most analysts draw their leverage almost entirely from cross-sectional country differences. Marking further progress in this debate, Cox, Fiva, and Smith (2015) investigate Norway’s 1921 electoral reform and confirm the logic of Selb’s (2009) findings: after change, variance in turnout across districts contracts toward an intermediate level. Where under the previous system the majority of districts were noncompetitive, a change of system to PR will increase average turnout. Turnout goes down in formerly competitive districts where elite mobilization was high, but rises elsewhere to more than compensate.

On the other hand, Vowles’ (2010) macro-micro analysis of New Zealand elections, six before and four after the country’s change to mixed-member PR in 1996, finds no robust electoral system effects. After a short-lived initial upturn, turnout continued to go down in conditions of lower overall vote mobilization, lower levels of national vote competition, disruptive electoral boundary changes, and the replacement of higher-voting earlier generations by lower-voting recent generations. Consistent with the findings of Cox, Fiva, and Smith (2015), district-level variation in turnout was reduced to insignificance. Some models indicated somewhat higher voting among those entering the electorate after the change compared to those beginning to vote before, but these findings were not robust or consistent. Consistent with the finding that “habit” matters (see Dinas in this volume), more elections under the new system may be needed for an identifiable difference to emerge. As things stand, the claim that PR enhances turnout still has the most support, but the debate will continue.

Conclusions

This review of macro-level explanations of variance in turnout illustrates both the strengths and the weaknesses of aggregate-level explanations, despite their strong explanatory power. We can confirm that turnout is declining in countries that have generated a sufficiently long time series for measurement. There is now a reasonable consensus that closeness of electoral margins matters, as well as policy differences between parties. PR does probably promote turnout if it abolishes non-competitive districts. Turnout can be low among the poor, but might be offset by higher turnout among the rich who vote to reduce their tax liabilities where market incomes are unequal but income redistribution is high. Bias in turnout probably does have public policy consequences, with less government attention paid to those who do not vote. But the international findings remain somewhat inconclusive. Aggregate-level analysis alone is insufficient to address many of these problems: the future lies in multi-level analyses bringing together and interacting variables at the macro- and micro-levels.
Notes

1 The CSES website can be accessed at www.cses.org.
2 Countries that have, during the period under study, experienced multiple changes in election rules and practices (e.g., Switzerland) can show turnout variations that rival between-country differences (Franklin 2004: 11, Table 1.1).
3 The countries are Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

References

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