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Regime Support

Pedro C. Magalhães

Introduction
What do citizens think about the political regimes they live under and how do they view other conceivable ways of organizing the polity? How do we explain changes or continuity in these attitudes and what consequences do they hold for the functioning and stability of the political system? These are all questions that have been posed with increasing frequency by comparative researchers since the publication of Almond and Verba’s (1963) pioneering work *The Civic Culture* in the early 1960s. While the conclusions that have been reached have differed across time and space, scholars have been largely united in their choice of methodology, with most relying on large-scale survey data to measure and test their core concepts. The release of Eurobarometer data from 1970 onward in particular prompted a rush of interest in comparing citizen attitudes toward their governing institutions. A decade later, both the European Values Study and the World Value Survey (EVS/WVS) began, alongside a range of other resources, providing further impetus to development of this literature. In this chapter we provide an overview of the work that these initiatives fostered, with specific reference to understanding cross-national patterns in popular support for political regimes. We begin by defining the central object of study – that is, regime support. We then profile the main research questions that have been investigated in relation to regime support across countries, and the empirical findings that have been produced. We move on to discuss the measurement problems that such research has faced and evaluate how well these challenges have been overcome. Finally, we focus on outlining the main questions that remain for this line of research to address.

The theoretical importance of regime support
Support, according to Easton, a pioneer in the study of political systems, is “an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or negatively” (Easton 1975: 436). The focus of this chapter is on those studies that have examined support for a particular type of object – the political regime – which again, following Easton’s thinking, we define as “the so-called rules of the game […], the constitutional principles […] governing the way in which resolutions of differences of claims are to take place” (Easton 1957: 392). To further distinguish the concept of interest, Easton helpfully contrasted it with two other major...
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objects or components of the system – first, the wider political community and, second, the more specific actors that constituted the political authorities. While the former comprises the entire set of actors – understood as a collective – within a given system, the latter refers to the specific personnel that make up the government. In profiling studies of regime support, therefore, we are not including analyses of trends in identification with the nation-state or “in-group or we-group feeling” that characterizes support for the political community (Easton 1957: 392). Nor are we interested in work that centers on measuring changes in support for the political authorities – that is, “those who are responsible for the day-to-day actions taken in the name of a political system” (Easton 1975: 437).

There are several compelling reasons for narrowing the lens to examine orientations to the political regime rather than focusing on these other dimensions of public support. Perhaps the most compelling of these is the lack of attention they have received in the literature to date, relative to their overall contribution to the functioning of the polity. Easton himself expressed concerns about the extent to which empirical research on political support has been dominated by a focus on the “allocative aspects” of political systems – that is, those dealing with the relationships among the leaders, the policies, and the led, rather than more fundamental concerns about deeper attachments to the polity. As he notes, while the former studies are important, discontent with governments and their policies is “not always, or even usually, the signal for basic political change” (Easton 1975: 436).

By contrast, regime support, as the inter-war period revealed, is critical to understanding the survival of democracies. According to Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), it is when regimes face “crises of effectiveness, such as depressions or lost wars” that their “legitimacy” or capacity to “engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society” becomes crucial for understanding their chances of survival (1959: 86). Along the same lines, Linz saw regime legitimacy – the belief “that these political institutions are the best to govern the country in which they live; that they are better than the alternatives; and that they deserve obedience” – as central to the fate of democracies in the aftermath of the Great Depression, protecting those where legitimacy was high (Linz 2001: 92, see also Linz 1976).

Beyond the challenges of defining regime support and specifying its theoretical and substantive political importance, there is also the task of measuring it, and demonstrating its relevance empirically. Difficulties in this respect abound and are often noted in the literature: “there are doubts about the efficiency of empirical research when trying to isolate the different types of support, as public sentiments can blend adjacent orientations and indicators of public support frequently overlap between levels” (Torcal and Moncagatta 2011: 2565). How have these doubts been dealt with? In the section that follows, we address this question.

Discontent is not the same as (il)legitimacy

The new impetus to undertake empirical study of regime support was inspired by three key post-war developments. The first was the already mentioned expansion in the availability of comparative survey data. The second was the growing concern with the “legitimacy crisis” that Western democracies were seen to be experiencing during the 1970s (Habermas 1976) and its attitudinal manifestation in increasing rates of citizen “dissatisfaction with and lack of confidence in the functioning of the institutions of democratic government” (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975: 158–159). Finally, there was the so-called “third wave of democratization” which raised questions about the extent to which newer democracies enjoyed the kind of popular support that would favor their survival (Huntington 1991).
As new sources of comparative data became available, the question of whether the West was facing a “crisis of democracy” became easier to answer. By the mid-1990s, analysis of Eurobarometer data for the Beliefs in Government project had shown that such fears were largely unfounded. The major conclusion reached was that “there is no pervasive or general trend toward decreasing satisfaction with the way democracy works in the member states of the European Union,” and the same applied to confidence in institutions (Kaase and Newton 1995: 61; see also Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995).

Even more optimistically, subsequent empirical work conducted in the late 1990s by Montero, Gunther, and Torcal on the newly democratized case of Spain (1997) revealed that even if negative trends on these indicators had been in evidence, this did not spell disaster for democracy. Instead these authors showed convincingly that while levels of “satisfaction with the way Spanish democracy works” had fluctuated widely over time, in line with evaluations of the political and economic situation, a large and stable majority of citizens still agreed with the notion that “democracy is the best system for a country like ours” (Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997). In addition, factor analysis of individual survey responses revealed that while the items measuring opinions of democratic performance loaded strongly on a “political discontent” factor, a preference for “democracy” as the best system available, as well as other more abstract measures of regime level support, constituted an independent factor. Analysis by Klingemann (1999), using World Values Survey (WVS) data from 38 countries, confirmed this split in citizens’ political outlook, concluding that citizens do appear to separate support for “democracy” as a regime and their satisfaction with how the regime is currently performing or the level of confidence they place in the regime’s institutions (1999: 37).

Closer analysis of the underlying correlates and drivers of “political discontent” as compared with more overt preference for democracy as a regime have helped to tease out these differences in attitudinal orientations. For example, “satisfaction with the way democracy works” appears in many comparative studies to be driven by economic outcomes, objective or perceived (Quaranta and Martini 2016). These motives are further enhanced under conditions of low economic development (Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010) and where lines of governing responsibility are clear (Criado and Herreros 2007). In addition, partisanship is important, with positive orientations increasing when one’s party is in power, and particularly so in majoritarian political systems (Anderson and Guillory 1997). More generally, the quality of governance in the country also plays a role (Wagner, Schneider, and Halla 2009; Linde 2012) with perceptions of low procedural fairness in particular found to be significant in determining levels of dissatisfaction (Magalhães 2016).

By contrast, accounting for variance on the extent to which individuals in different contexts are likely to see democracy as intrinsically preferable to other regime types has proven more difficult. Much less variance is typically explained by similar explanatory models and some contradictory results have emerged. At the individual level, education, income, postmaterial values, and social trust are generally found to be the strongest predictors of positive attitudes toward democratic government. At the macro level, economic development and a longer history of liberal democracy appear to be among the most consistent correlates (see Dalton 2004; Zmerli and Newton 2008; Huang, Chang, and Chu 2008; Staton and Reenock 2008; Norris 2011). These findings are returned to below when we turn to unpack thorny questions of causality and endogeneity in the formation of regime preferences. The main point emerging from this discussion, however, is that negative orientations toward democracy are not necessarily linked to feelings of discontent with regime performance or with the political authorities. Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish empirically, and not just conceptually or theoretically, between citizens’ perceptions of democratic legitimacy and their feelings of political discontent.
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Deepening our understanding of “regime support”

The findings from this growing body of empirical literature helped move scholarly opinion toward a more positive view of support for democracy globally. “By the mid-1990s democracy has come to be widely regarded as the ideal form of government in the countries where we have evidence in Western and Eastern Europe, North and South America, and Asia” (Norris 1999: 17; see also Chapter 18 by Norris in this volume). Such optimism was not universally shared, however. In particular, Mishler and Rose (2001) argued against what they saw as the “idealist approach” that characterized these studies, whereby it was assumed that citizens knew what democracy meant and how it ought to work. This, they argued was a problematic assumption, especially in those countries where experience with actual democratic governance was absent or limited (Mishler and Rose 2001). Norris herself shared some of these concerns, noting that “abstract approval of the broad ideals and principles of democracy may be rooted in shallow support for particular aspects, like tolerance of dissenting views or minority rights.” Such distinctions meant that it was important “to go much further to deepen our analysis of what people understand by the principles and values of democracy” (Norris 1999: 17). The research that ensued in response to this challenge can be seen as having taken three main directions.

Refining measures of democratic support

The first line of enquiry focused primarily on methodological issues and sought to refine existing measures and indicators of democratic support. Looking at EVS and WVS data from the late 1990s that extended to around 80 percent of the world’s population, Inglehart (2003: 52) noted that, “in the median country, fully 92 percent of those interviewed gave a positive account of democracy.” And yet, “when one probes deeper, one finds disturbing evidence that mass support is not nearly as solid” (2003: 52). For example, majorities in several of these same countries endorsed the notion that “a strong leader […] does not have to bother with elections or parliament.” To address the apparent contradiction, Inglehart proposed a more balanced multi-item index to measure regime support – the “Democracy/Autocracy” index. This essentially involved subtracting the level of support for non-democratic forms of governance from the levels of support for democracy.

Use of the new adjusted measure of support, with some variation, has been adopted in subsequent studies. The change has led to distinctly more negative conclusions being drawn, particularly among the more recently democratized states. In a study of those countries included in the Afrobarometer, “recalculating the proportions that both say democracy is preferable and reject all three authoritarian alternatives reveals that only a minority (48 percent) can be labeled as ‘committed democrats.’” Such a finding “warrants a sober assessment of the depth of democratic legitimacy in Africa” (Mattes and Bratton 2007: 194). Analysis of Asia Barometer data by Chu et al. (2008) has concluded that “most East Asian democracies do not enjoy deep legitimation” (28), and studies of the Latino Barometer data have found that “opponents of authoritarian rule […] constitute a small minority of less than one-quarter” (Shin 2007: 274). Among the newer democracies of Europe, a similar story emerges, with “relative support for democracy” being found to be “ten times higher in Germany than in Bulgaria and more than four times higher in non-English-speaking protestant Western Europe than in post-communist Eastern Europe” (Dalton and Shin 2014: 108). Overall, therefore, it seems that “in the eyes of global citizenries, democracy is yet to become the final achievement of history” (Dalton and Shin 2014: 108).

While use of these more refined measures helped to update and modify contemporary understanding of the extent of support that democratic systems enjoyed worldwide, it did not lead to
any re-specification of its correlates. If anything, the new measures helped to reinforce the relevance of existing explanatory variables, with solid democratic support appearing to be most strongly prevalent among richer and older democracies (Dalton and Shin 2014: 98). At the individual level, the known effects of education and income are also reemphasized (de Jonge 2016). On the other hand, as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) show, the “democratic-autocracy” index was a much stronger predictor of whether a country was likely to be democratic than simpler measures of support for democracy. Therefore, our understanding of regime support seems to have improved with these refined measures. First, they seem to have helped correcting for the large overstatement of support for democracy that resulted from employing more simplistic measures. Second, their correlates emerged much more clearly than before (de Jonge 2016).

There remain, however, a number of causes for concern. These are primarily methodological and center on the robustness and validity of the “democracy-autocracy index” for cross-national research. In particular, items measuring support for democracy were found to lack equivalence across countries and recommendations against their inclusion in the index issued (Ariely and Davidov 2011). In addition, the “rejection of autocracy” items failed to load on the main construct in around one out of four countries examined. Finally, even for those cases where the items did load, partial scalar invariance cannot be established, making the widespread practice of comparing mean values across countries unadvisable (Ariely and Davidov 2011: 279).

**Focusing on regime principles**

Given the problems associated with soliciting overt preferences for “democracy” as a measure of support, several alternative methods have been proposed. One widely adopted approach has been to avoid the inclusion of any survey questions that refer directly to the regime “type” altogether. Instead, items tapping support for regime *principles* are used. Here, the focus turns primarily to the endorsement of democratic norms and practices by citizens, rather than to overt preferences for abstract regime types.

Schedler and Sarsfield (2007), for example, used cluster analysis to segment the Mexican electorate into groups based on their orientation to liberal values such as freedom of organization and expression and political equality. Their findings revealed that only one of the groups (corresponding to about 14 percent of the sample) displayed consistent support for liberal values. All other respondents were classified as “non-democrats” or to have inconsistent attitudes whereby they supported democracy in the abstract but exhibited low tolerance for dissenting views and discriminatory attitudes to minorities. Carlin and Singer (2011) extended this analysis by examining support for “polyarchy” across 12 Latin American democracies. Polyarchy was defined using a multi-item indicator that tapped opposition to censorship, support for the participation of those who oppose the regime, support for limits to executive authority, and rejection of the admissibility of suspending the legislature and the Supreme Court. The findings supported those of Schedler and Sarsfield in that only 18 percent of citizens were identified as consistent supporters of “polyarchy,” while most presented “a mixed profile” (2011: 1510).

Comparative work by Booth and Seligson (2009) measuring support for principles of democratic participation also found surprisingly modest levels of endorsement, with countries scoring an average of 68 on a scale of 0 to 100. In line with the findings of other studies, it was those nations with a longer democratic history that proved most supportive. Furthermore, at the individual level, education, political knowledge, media exposure, and social trust were all associated with a greater commitment to democracy participatory principles (Booth and Seligson 2009: 121–124).
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The move to focus on regime principles, therefore, ultimately helped to underscore the growing impression that global preferences for “democracy” were not as deeply rooted as scholars had previously thought to be the case. Instead such preferences were seen as essentially coexisting alongside a range of less liberal views which questioned the importance of dissent and the exercise of political freedoms, particularly among ethnic minorities, as well as the value of political participation itself.

The meanings of democracy

A third approach to improving our understanding of the nature of regime support has been to explore where the disjuncture between overt preferences and deeper attitudes stems from. This has shifted the focus of enquiry onto more psychological and interpretive factors in a bid to understand the meaning assigned by people to the very concept of “democracy.” The results obtained in these studies, as one might expect, depend to a significant degree on how the questions are asked. When an open-ended format is used, we see a predominantly liberal understanding emerging (Fuchs and Roller 2006; Camp 2001). As one set of authors neatly summarized it, “When people say that democracy is the best form of government, they are thinking in terms of the freedom and liberty it provides” (Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007: 10).

However, a significant minority of citizens also associate a more specific set of socioeconomic outcomes with democracy, such as “jobs for all,” universal access to education, income equality, or the elimination of poverty. Moreover, the weight given to these “goods” varies by country (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007; de Regt 2013). While this multitude of meanings can emerge in response to open-ended questions, (Canache 2012), such variations are more evident when we move to closed-ended items. The WVS, for example, has measured popular understandings of “democracy” across a range of dimensions since 2005. This has included support for the “procedural” elements of democracy – that is, legal protections of civil rights, gender equality, and the operation of free elections. It has also covered the pursuit of more substantive goals or outcomes, such as income redistribution, prosperity, and law and order.

While the procedural understanding has proven to be “the most widespread and popular interpretation across all types of societies,” the more substantive and instrumental interpretations are in fact only slightly less common among Western European publics, according to Norris (2011). More recent evidence from a study using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) lends further support to the idea that citizens harbor an expansive and multifaceted definition of democracy. In addition to an adherence to classic liberal democratic principles, many Europeans also see ideals of direct democracy and social justice as key components of any well-functioning democracy. As the authors conclude, “The European’s vision of democracy is […] not limited to the liberal democratic model. […] Their views of democracy often include substantive elements, above all the idea that the government should protect its citizens against poverty” (Kriesi and Morlino 2016: 309).

As well as identifying the differing understandings of democracy, scholars have also been interested in what drives them. Explanations centering on advances in human development appear to be of particular relevance in this regard. Welzel (2011), for example, has shown that economic and cognitive resources are significantly and positively correlated with stronger endorsements of autonomy, freedom of choice, and emancipation, which in turn align most closely to a procedural understanding of democracy. However, the notion of a “developmental universalism” (Welzel 2011: 1), whereby an emancipatory logic emerges across cultures as human capital expands, has been challenged by other scholars who argue that the effects of the political and institutional context needs to be considered. Work by Ceka and Magalhães (2016),
for instance, has found that systems with a longer experience of democracy and also of direct democracy mechanisms do see a positive association between individuals’ socioeconomic status and endorsement for both liberal and direct democracy views. However, in countries with the opposite features, the opposite occurs. Those of higher socioeconomic status are more likely to espouse views about democracy that conform to the status quo – that is, the existing institutions of a country (Ceka and Magalhães 2016: 110). A similar emphasis on the importance of political context in determining individuals’ outlook on democracy is also present in Franklin and Riera’s (2016) analysis of European societies. Here they show how historically defined cohorts of individuals – socialized during or after the prevalence of “cleavage politics” in each country – tend to adhere to different views about what democratic representation should mean.

Challenges

Overall, therefore, some agreement does appear to have been reached within the literature over the nature of regime support in general, and the state of support for democratic regime types more specifically. First, it would seem that Easton was correct about the need to distinguish between attitudes toward specific actors within a polity and attachment to more abstract rules of governance. It seems that citizens are indeed able to express support or discontent for political authorities while also holding “respect for the offices themselves, for the way in which they are ordered, and for the community of which they are a part” (Easton 1975: 437). Second, it is also clear that we should not assume that those who express an overt preference for democracy as a regime type automatically hold negative views of other regime types. Support for democracy does not preclude support for rival systems that are distinctly non-democratic. Nor is it the case that those expressing support for democracy in the abstract are necessarily strong proponents of basic liberal democratic principles, or even understand “democracy” as a concept at all, let alone according to the classic liberal procedural definition.

However, despite having reached something of a substantive consensus on key aspects of regime support, a number of challenges and concerns do still remain for the literature to address. Below we focus on two of these in more detail. The first centers on measurement issues and the second on problems of causal modeling, and particularly how to distinguish between the causes and consequences of regime support.

Measurement

The ability of researchers to introduce new levels and sub-domains to the concept of “regime support” has not been matched by their ability to devise reliable and valid measurements for all of them. For example, the sub-division of Easton’s “regime support” into support for regime principles, performance, and institutions (Norris 1999: 11), or the notion that each of those levels should be seen as having “diffuse” and “specific,” or “affective” and “evaluative” components (Torcal and Moncagatta 2011: 2565; Dalton 2004: 23), while acceptable readings of past theoretical work, have been difficult to validate empirically. Even the validity of one of the most widely used survey items to measure support for democracy – whether an individual is “satisfied with how democracy works” – is contested (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001; Linde and Eckman 2003; but see Quaranta 2017 for a recent validation).

This lack of consensus over issues of measurement has resulted in varying and even contradictory conclusions being reached regarding trends in the nature and level of regime support over time. One of the core areas of debate has centered on the growth of a group of critical but engaged citizens, identified initially by Klingemann as “dissatisfied democrats.” Even in
introducing the concept, however, Klingemann was quick to acknowledge the problems it raised for measurement and operationalization, noting that “change over time … is difficult to assess” (1999: 49). Thus, for some scholars, the evidence clearly indicates that “citizens have grown more distant from political parties, more critical of political elites and political institutions, and less positive about government” (Dalton 2004: 45–46). For others, the picture is much more blurred in that “overall fluctuations over time usually prove far more common than straightforward linear or uniform downward trends” (Norris 2011: 82).

While measurement issues may not be the only cause of these contrasting diagnoses of current democratic conditions, certainly a stronger consensus and consistency in the core variables used would contribute greatly to moving the literature forward. In particular, some agreement on the use of multi-item indicators, as well on avoiding those items known to be problematic, would constitute important first steps in this direction (Booth and Seligson 2009). Some recent diagnostics of new “trends” in democratic support still seem to stem from excessive reliance in single-item indicators and “overt” preferences (see Foa and Munck 2016). More investigation of the cross-national equivalence of regime support measures should also be undertaken, rather than simply assumed (Ariely and Davidov 2011; Davidov et al. 2014). Finally, most measures of “regime support” in comparative survey research have centered on popular feelings about democracy. Gauging the support for autocratic regimes has been largely dismissed given their reliance on coercion, co-optation, and performance (economic or otherwise) for their survival (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Geddes 1999). Where such perceptions are measured they are usually regarded simply as an additional indicator of democratic support, or more accurately, lack thereof. However, it is entirely possible that support for these regimes represents a deeper and more positive endorsement of them on ideological, religious, nationalistic, or traditional or charismatic grounds (Gerschewski 2013: 20). It is thus a future challenge for the literature to develop new measures that better capture support for non-democratic regimes. In setting such a goal, it is of course important that we keep in mind the challenges that any cross-national fieldwork presents to consistency and reliability of data collection, particularly so when that includes non-democracies (Romero 2004).

**Causes and consequences**

Investigation of the factors associated with support for democracy at the macro level has thus far identified two main correlates – the length of time a country has lived under democratic rule and its level of economic prosperity. These relationships are mirrored to a degree at the micro level, in that citizens with greater material and cognitive resources exhibit a stronger commitment to democratic rules and principles. The extent to which causation can be inferred from these associations, however, and the precise mechanism through which it occurs, is a topic of ongoing debate.

In essence, the argument centers around the age-old “chicken and egg” dilemma that has dominated the study of the structure and performance of democratic institutions *writ large*. Are institutions simply reflective of the political culture within which they exist or do they have an independent capacity to inflict change on that society? The debate gained fresh impetus from the late 1980s onward through works that sought to resolve the dilemma through comparative empirical analysis. In the context of regime support studies, the debate essentially coalesced into opposition between those who saw “emancipative values” and human development as the key drivers behind citizen preferences for democracy (Inglehart 1988) and those who prioritized “institutional learning” and the importance of regime performance as the main generator of such support (Muller and Seligson 1994).
Despite the strenuous claims put forward on both sides, the empirical evidence has remained somewhat inconclusive. While the human development thesis does appear to be consistently supported by cross-sectional analyses, the application of more complex longitudinal models and data has indicated a negligible impact of values over time, or at best suggested a pattern of reverse causation (Hadenius and Teorell 2005; Dahlum and Knutsen 2017; for responses, see Welzel and Inglehart 2006; Welzel, Inglehart, and Kruse 2017). Furthermore, new questions have arisen about the long-standing Eastonian belief in the orthogonality of political discontent and perceived regime legitimacy. According to this widely accepted logic, citizen dissatisfaction with the outer workings of government does not necessarily indicate something is rotten at the heart of the regime and that it is in danger of imminent collapse. What happens, however, when this discontent persists over time? When does persistent dissatisfaction with a government’s economic and/or political performance become corrosive of regime legitimacy? Easton himself noted the potential for “…spill-over effects from evaluations of a series of outputs and of performance over a long-period of time” (Easton 1975: 446). Given the growing evidence showing that regime support can be affected by performance-related factors such as government effectiveness (Magalhães 2014), economic evaluations (Singh and Carlin 2014), or incumbent approval (de Jonge 2016), it would seem that the causal pendulum may now be swinging in support of the institutional learning perspective.

We should perhaps not be entirely surprised that so many questions still remain unanswered within this literature. Comparative survey research is a relatively new and resource-intensive endeavor. Repeated measures of political attitudes have become more common in cross-national surveys but still trail some way behind traditional socioeconomic and behavioral indicators in the prominence and priority ascribed to them. Furthermore, even if more survey measures are adopted, one of course still faces the intrinsic limitations of this type of observational data, particularly for drawing causal inferences. The experimental or quasi-experimental approaches that are now emerging in the field thus present a particularly exciting new mode of enquiry to deal precisely with this problem (Bloom and Arikan 2013; Alkon and Wang 2016). More generally, however, a resolution of these controversies cannot lie solely with empirical or methodological developments, it must involve theoretical advances. In a nutshell, rather than seeing the main challenge for future research as the ability to nail down or prove which is the core driver of citizen perceptions – values, learning, or performance – researchers should instead view the process in a much more joined-up manner, with the primary aim being to map and model the interactive and mutually reinforcing dynamics between these forces in the creation of citizens’ political attitudes (Besley and Persson 2016).

Notes

1 For analyses of these developments and available resources, see, for example, Heath, Fisher, and Smith (2005), Kittilson (2007), and Norris (2009).
2 For an earlier work confirming the multidimensional nature of support (for community, regime, and authorities), see Kornberg and Clarke (1992).
3 See also Gunther, Montero, and Torcal (2007), using Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) data, and Belluci and Memoli (2012), using European Values Study (EVS) data.
4 See also Welzel (2013) and Norris (2011). Ariely (2015), however, notes that the factor solution separating procedural, instrumental, illiberal, and social views, which emerged with the pooled dataset, does not emerge in many countries. Only in the procedural dimension emerges a “common conception of the procedures of democracy that enables cross-national comparison” (Ariely 2015: 622).
5 Although it is suggestive to see that many of the correlates of satisfaction of democracy that emerge in the literature – economy, ideology, partisanship, corruption – are exactly the same as those of trust in institutions, and in fact, of government approval and even voting for the incumbent.
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Several works on “Asian values” have come closest to addressing this problem. See, for example, Park and Shin (2006).

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