The Routledge Handbook of Elections, Voting Behavior and Public Opinion

Justin Fisher, Edward Fieldhouse, Mark N. Franklin, Rachel Gibson, Marta Cantijoch, Christopher Wlezien

Party identification

Publication details
Shaun Bowler
Published online on: 26 Sep 2017

Accessed on: 09 Sep 2023

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Introduction

The classical definition of party identification is that it is a “sense of personal attachment which the individual feels towards the [party] of his (sic) choice” (Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954: 88–89). That is, voters have long-running attachments to particular parties regardless of candidates or issues in specific elections. Voters may defect from “their” party every now and then—they may choose a candidate from another party—but over the long run, more often than not, voters will have a homing tendency and return to support “their” party for which they have a sense of attachment. Party identification is probably the central conceptual building block in behavioral research and is a standard, one might even say required, factor to be included in models of vote choice, being seen as a precursor to the vote and party preference. One crude indication of its importance is found in Google Scholar where a search for the terms “party identification” AND “political science” produces over 27,000 results. Clearly, such a large literature presents challenges for any review. This chapter on party identification is therefore necessarily limited and organizes a discussion of party identification around three main questions. The first question is: what does party identification do? The second is: how (and why) do people develop party identification? And the third question asks: what kinds of variations do we see in party identification?

What does party identification do?

One of the more important features of party identification is that it not only helps to shape choices directly by capturing a long-term loyalty or standing decision to support a given party, it also shapes choices indirectly by helping make sense of information we receive. Perhaps the clearest way in which this happens is when considering economic information. We know that voters take government performance into account when making their choices: incumbents are punished for bad performance news, rewarded for good. But what makes performance “good” or “bad” is not simply a matter of an objective number but may also be subject to interpretation. Once there is room for interpretation there is room for information to be filtered by party identification. A 7 percent unemployment rate under a Conservative government may be seen as a good level of unemployment so far as Conservative identifiers are concerned, not so good if the
Party identification

voter identifies with Labour (see, for example, Wlezien, Franklin and Twigg 1997). It is not just economic news that is filtered in this way. Anduiza, Gallego and Muñoz (2013) show that party identifiers are even willing to turn a blind eye toward corruption.

Party identifications also provide short cuts that reduce the amount of information voters need to process. Voters do not need to develop complex ideologies or think out positions for specific issues; using parties as heuristics allows people to develop information short cuts and to cue-take from party leaders. Brader, Tucker and Duell (2013), for example, demonstrate some of the limits to cue-taking but also show it in action, concluding that more established parties are likely to be able to send cues that voters respond to with regard to specific policies.

Party identifications are also associated with several positive attributes that help support what was termed in early literature as a “democratic political culture.” We know that party identification is associated with interest in politics and elections. Those with strong identifications are more likely to be engaged in the system – to pay attention to politics and to turn out and vote. That said, one of the difficulties of this list of functions is that the direction(s) of causal relationships are not always clearly established or simple. Take, for example the relationship between party identification and interest in politics: is it the case that those who are interested in politics develop a party identification? Or does party id strengthen an interest in politics? Or does the relationship go both ways? At the very least, what this discussion suggests is that the familiar model specifications in which party is included side by side with interest, or, alternatively, where interest is predicted by partisanship, probably over-states the size of the relationship.

Party identification is also useful at the level of the system as well as individual voters. Party loyalties help promote turnout and also provide a tie between individuals and the political system and gives people a way of locating themselves in the wide political context. These effects, in addition to the individual level effects on interest, attention and turnout, are all consistent with a vibrant and active democratic process and so are valuable from a system perspective. Consequently, aggregate levels of party identification among the electorate are often seen as a marker for the overall health of a democratic system since those levels are associated with levels of engagement and turnout.

Figure 12.1 displays aggregate level data from CSES 2 and CSES 3. We find a bivariate correlation of 0.41 (p = 0.0002, N = 75) between the national level percentage of people who identify with a party and the national level percentage of people who respond that elections make a difference. A similar, if somewhat weaker, relationship exists between the aggregate level percentage of those who say they are close to a party with the percentage of those responding that they are “very” satisfied with democracy (correlation = 0.26, p = 0.019, N = 78). We will return to definitional issues relating to “closeness” to a party and other issues arising from Figure 12.1 below. For the moment, the point made by Figure 12.1 is simply to provide some evidence that there is indeed a relationship between partisanship and system level indicators of democratic health.

The short answer to the question of what do party identifications do is that “they do a lot.” Given the value of partisanship to both citizens and political systems alike it is not surprising that a large body of literature has considered how citizens acquire partisanship.

Why (and how) do we have party identifications?

One of the major distinctions to be made is whether partisanship is either a consequence of socialization or simply a matter of habituation. Both strands of thought are present in the
literature and, as we will see, both are able to point to evidence in their support. Although the degree to which party identification is seen as a property of one rather than the other does seem to depend in part on where, and when, we look. We begin, however, where the literature on party identification began, which is an understanding of party id in terms of socialization.

The earliest work on party identification, that of the 1960s and 1970s, emphasized childhood socialization and that children “acquired” the party loyalties of their parents. Research shows that children share the party loyalties of their parents to a surprising degree. One set of scholars highlight that the size of effect is comparable to religiosity:

The high levels of concordance [between parents and children] found for partisan orientations compare favorably with those for levels of religiosity, as indexed by frequency of church attendance and beliefs about the inerrancy of the Bible. Parents are expected to exert a powerful influence on the religious practices and beliefs of their children.

(Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009: 796)

A more recent body of work has begun to revisit those earlier findings and found that those earlier findings largely persist (Jennings and Markus 1984; Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009)

As expected (…), children are more likely to adopt their parents’ political orientations if the family is highly politicized and if the parents provide consistent cues over time. The direct transmission model is robust, as it withstands an extensive set of controls. Early acquisition of parental characteristics influences the subsequent nature of adult political development.

(Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009: 782)

Other work on the psychology of vote choice anchored an understanding of partisanship in social identity theory in which citizens chose to identify with a group and/or the relationship between parties and groups (left parties and labor unions; center-right parties and religious
Party identification

affiliation) meant that voters would acquire partisanship more or less as part of their group-based social identity. To the extent that groups in society are becoming more complex and/or people join multiple groups then we may see these kinds of relationships shift. While there has been some renewal of interest in childhood and adolescent socialization processes, there has been less new work on the social identity basis of partisanship. Green, Palmaquist and Schickler (2004) represent something of an exception but there is less work done in the comparative context (Green, Palmaquist and Schickler 2004; Sapiro 2004). One exception is that of Huber, Kernell and Leoni (2005) with a study that uses a 25-country sample from CSES 1 and concludes that: “We find that voters are most likely to form party attachments when group identities are salient and complimentary” (Huber, Kernell and Leoni 2005: 365).

If partisanship is seen as something that develops from fundamental social contexts like family or group this suggests that citizens acquire – and so hold onto – partisanship in an almost unthinking and unconscious way. To borrow a phrase from Medeiros and Noël, these works reinforce the sense that party identification can be seen as a “prepolitical and arational” foundation of political behavior, a “psychological attachment” based on affect more than on cognition, and one likely to stand the test of time because it was anchored in “a person’s self-concept” (Medeiros and Noël 2013: 3–4).

To the extent that party identifications are rooted in “arational” factors there may be no need to explain why people choose to have them. The answer is that it simply is not a choice for people. Yet, despite the socialization processes and identifications and despite the usefulness of party identification, it is less clear why voters have them in the first place. That is, it is worth asking whether, left to themselves, voters would choose to acquire a party identification. While party identifications have many benefits once acquired, those benefits may not provide sufficient reason for an individual to acquire a party identification to begin with. It would likely seem to be the case that individual voters may care very little for system level functions – for example, they may care little that get out the vote campaigns are easier for parties if voters are staunch partisans. Voters may even not care too much about how party identifications may make them feel better about the political system. After all, a body of evidence shows that, for many people, politics is not just low salience but an irritant (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). In acquiring a party identification voters choose a number of frustrations – including the frustration for many minor party supporters of supporting a party that never wins. To borrow an analogy from the sporting world, it is almost as if someone who does not like soccer becomes a fan of a team perennially at the bottom of the league. On the face of it, then, it is surprising that voters keep hold of party identification, especially in the face of repeated frustrations and irritations. Yet the evidence suggests voters not only hold on to party identifications but that those identifications strengthen over the life cycle.

It is possible, however, to see voters developing party identifications without having the need to invoke social identity theory or childhood socialization as explanations. Before moving on to develop this point, it is important to note that, even in the earlier work on party identification socialization, life experiences had some role to play. Someone’s life experiences could interrupt and in some instances over-ride early socialization. Dinas’ (2014) work is perhaps the best recent example of demonstrating this point. For Dinas, the combination of politically engaged parents with politically engaged children can lead to changes in political views later in life that may lead people to differ from their parents. Nevertheless, despite the role of experiences, the received view of partisanship often emphasized socialization processes within the family, or within social groups.

A consideration of life experiences helps to open the door to explanations of party identification not grounded in socialization but grounded more in habituation. While socialization
processes of various kinds may provide a sufficient explanation for the existence of party identification, such processes may not provide a necessary explanation. After all, parties and party government are a highly visible, even ever-present, part of society. Even between elections it is hard to avoid seeing or hearing from the main political parties. It is thus hard for citizens to avoid having some response to political parties as agents or actors in the society. At election time the prominence of political parties in the media and public debate peaks. This prominence of political parties must go some way to explaining why people may acquire partisanship independent of the kind of long-term socialization/social identity processes.

One group of voters that is interesting in terms of whether/how voters develop partisanship separate from socialization are citizens in the new democracies. In these countries party systems were formed anew, implying that there is no relevant childhood socialization experience. In the wave of democratizations in the 1990s and 2000s, people were suddenly asked about their relationship to parties. Again referring back to Figure 12.1 and the CSES aggregate level data, simply distinguishing between “old” and “new” (< 25 years old) democracies with a dummy variable produces a correlation of –0.31 (p = 0.005, N = 78). Dalton and Weldon (2007: 192) rightly note the chicken and egg problem for new democracies: partisanship promotes stable party systems, which in turn promote partisanship, but when party systems are unstable and/or electoral volatility is high there may be a less stable set of party identifications among individual voters. Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) highlight the importance of the conditions at the start of democratic formation as a factor shaping the stability of party systems: they find that newer democracies tend to have higher levels of volatility, which is consistent with there being lower levels of partisanship in newer democracies.

Even if we see party identification as a response to circumstance – to “nature” not “nurture” – there still remains a role for socialization in the acquisition of party id. For example, “the third-wave democracies also display evidence of latent socialization carried over from the old regime. The results suggest that party identities can develop in new democracies if the party system creates the conditions to develop these bonds” (Dalton and Weldon 2007: 179). But citizens in new democracies do eventually begin to acquire partisanship, even absent socialization processes of the kind seen in more established democracies, in part because elections are held, and so parties become prominent mobilizing forces (Dalton and Weldon 2007: 192). A version of this pattern is also seen in Kroh (2014), who shows that partisanship is endogenous to the system, coming about as a consequence of holding elections.

Adult immigrants are also interesting from the point of view of understanding whether partisanship can develop absent socialization. Such voters do not have childhood experiences that socialize them into the party system of their new home. Immigrants may bring with them party leanings from their previous home (Wals 2011, 2013) – hence there is still scope for a version of the socialization argument – but obviously that scope is limited. In new democracies, some families still have memories of pre-dictatorship political patterns and some immigrants may remember the affiliations/orientations of their native country. In both instances, those memories may persist and color current orientations. But, while there may be some similarities between ideology of parties between the old and new countries, or the same country in a previous generation, the current set of parties facing voters will be quite different. Even immigrants from one established democracy to another and with similar institutions – say Canada to the UK or vice versa – will face a very different choice set: the NDP is not the same as the Labour Party and the Canadian Conservative Party has a different set of concerns than the UK Conservative Party. Once in their new home, however, it is expected that people will acquire party attachments as part of their new citizenship. In fact, acquiring a party identification is almost seen as part and parcel of citizenship for new citizens.
A body of literature in the US case has begun to address the question of how people orient themselves to their new home (see, for example, Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlker 1991; Wong 2000; Hajnal and Lee 2011). As we saw in the case of new democracies, the longer a person is in the political system the more likely it is that s/he will develop a party predisposition. Wong (2000), for example, finds that:

A strong relationship between the number of years an immigrant has lived in the US and the acquisition of partisanship is found. Further analysis shows that naturalization, gains in English language skills, and media use also contribute to immigrants’ acquisition of partisanship. This study reveals that a process of reinforcement through exposure to the political system underlies the development of political attitudes across diverse immigrant groups.

(Wong 2000: 341)

The experience from both new democracies and new citizens shows that early socialization is not a necessary condition for the acquisition of party affiliation. People can, and do, develop party identifications simply as a consequence of being in the system itself. To use the phrase from Medeiros and Noël, there can be a “cognitive basis” to partisanship. In itself this should not be surprising; parties and elections are prominent features of news and life in any democracy. It seems reasonable, then, to expect people to develop some kind of response to political parties. While there is scope for an argument based in socialization processes, it seems that a socialization argument is unlikely to offer a complete understanding of party identification. Nevertheless, it does seem that a cognitive argument may also fail to offer a complete explanation of party identification; a point we return to below.

How does party identification vary?

We consider two sources of variation: variation across countries and over time.

As the simple descriptive patterns in Figure 12.1 show, the level of attachment to political parties varies considerably across nations. Averaged across all countries, 44 percent of people said they were close to a political party. The range around that average, however, is substantial, spreading from around 6 percent at the low end (Thailand) to 80 percent at the high end (Australia). As we noted above, some of that variation is attributable to variation in the stage of democratic development. But other cross-system variations are attributable to other factors.

One misleadingly simple issue is that of translating party identification into languages other than English. Schickler and Green (1997: 454) and Sinnott (1998), for example, document issues with translation between countries. Appendix A lists some notes on question wording taken from the CSES 3 survey, which give a sense of the different wording across nations. Even accepting that the phrasing “close to” is a reasonable representation of party identification as a concept we can see that the concept does not always travel easily across linguistic boundaries.

For Blais et al. (2001), survey responses on party identification are strongly affected by question wording and the relationship between party identification and variables such as party and leader ratings and voting behavior “does not quite conform to theoretical expectations” (Blais et al. 2001: 5). The results of Blais et al. are worth quoting at some length:

The traditional question wording suggests that somewhere between two thirds (in Canada) and seven eighths (in Britain) of the electorate think of themselves as partisans. Yet, when the same people are asked if they think of themselves as close to
a party, the percentages of identifiers drop to between two and three fifths (Canada and the United States respectively). The overall average for the three countries goes from 76% to 48%.

(Blais et al. 2001: 18)\(^4\)

At least one part of the issue is what to do with respondents who say they have “no identification” (Blais et al. 2001: 18). In the US case this has also surfaced in terms of how to address “independents” or those who “identify” as Independent. In 1954, the time of *The American Voter*, roughly 97 percent of the California electorate were registered either Democrat or Republican. By 2014 the share of registration by the two main parties had dropped to around 72 percent with roughly 25 percent of Californians reporting that they were “Independent.” Independent voters are a source of some discussion within the US literature. For the most part, these have been interpreted as being partisans “really.” In surveys, Independents are pushed to respond to a question over which of the two parties they really prefer. In this way the standard 5-point scale (Strong Democrats, Weak Democrats, Independents, Weak Republicans, Strong Republicans) can become a one-dimensional 7-point scale (Strong Democrats, Weak Democrats, Independents, Leaning Democrat, Independents, Leaning Republican, Weak Republicans, Strong Republicans). Part of the problem with doing this, even if Independents are “really” some form of partisan, is it undermines the argument to the effect that partisanship is a meaningful or appealing form of social identity. If social identity is an important component of partisanship then if a sizable share of voters see a social desirability bias pressing toward denying that identity it is hard to see how partisanship overall functions in the way it was originally thought. More worrisome for those who see partisanship in largely one-dimensional terms is that many Independents simply are not “really” partisans. Some Independents are quite critical of parties and the party system and their independent status does not so much reflect a lack of affect so much as disaffection from the choices on offer. In other words, in the US context, it seems that while some Independents are “really” partisan supporters of the two main parties some others are quite different. In practice, however, voters are generally presented with just two parties from which to choose, meaning that when we look at voting, Independents appear partisan.

Comparative work raises the question of whether the concept of party identification travels outside the US. Thomassen (1993) goes furthest to unsettle the value of party identification as a concept outside the US by arguing that, at least in the Dutch case, “party identification is not causally prior to the vote but simply a reflection of the vote and therefore causally posterior” (Thomassen 1993: 266) in part because there is instability over time – partisanship will track vote choice. Possibly related to Thomassen’s concern, the long-standing discussion in political science relates to whether party identification is multi-dimensional or not, even in the US case. In the US the existence of a two-party system means that partisanship is sometimes represented as an interval level scale ranging from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican. In multiparty systems, such a representation does not make much sense (are weakly identifying German Greens to the left of or the right of strongly identifying SPD supporters?) but even in the US case the argument is persuasive that there is, in effect, both a policy distance dimension and also an affective dimension.

Other sources of cross-national variation are more systematic. At least some of the differences involve institutional variation: some institutions reinforce partisanship. At its simplest, ballots can differ in their presentation of what voters are choosing between – parties or candidates. Electoral systems will also permit or deny voters the opportunity to vote for one or many candidates. Furthermore, electoral systems – through their effects on the incentives facing parties and candidates – will offer many or few choices. Where voters are given multiple choices over
Party identification

candidates and parties – as under the Single Transferable Vote – it is likely that they will be less dug in on party choices. Huber, Kernell and Leoni (2005) find “that institutions that assist voters in retrospectively evaluating parties – specifically, strong party discipline and few parties in government – increase partisanship” (Huber, Kernell and Leoni 2005: 365). We see institutional effects, too, within the US. Norrander, for example, finds that “cross-state variation in independent identification is due to variations in state political characteristics such as interparty competition organizational strength of parties, type of primary, and primary turnout” (Norrander 1989: 516; see also Burden and Greene 2000).

Change over time is the other element of how partisanship may vary. Different schools of thought emphasize different sides of this coin: those grounded more in psychology and sociology emphasizing the stability of party attachments. Not surprisingly, if one’s relationship to parties is anchored in one’s sense of self then it is likely to be more stable than unstable over time. Sources of change in party id within an individual have, then, tended to come from models more grounded in economics. The standard way of seeing change at work is in Fiorina’s “retrospective voting” model in which partisanship is seen as a summary measure updated by performance assessments. If – as does seem to be the case – party operates as a strong perceptual filter, then the rate of updating will necessarily be affected: strong partisans will only very slowly take on board negative information about their party. Neundorf and Adams (2015) show that issue preferences both influence partisanship but are, in turn, influenced by partisanship.

Neundorf, Stegmueller and Scotto (2011) use German panel data to show that the electorate – perhaps not surprisingly – is heterogeneous: there are groups of stable partisans with a strong affective attachment and others who are more performance driven and – hence – more fluid or “flexible.” These authors argue for a concept of bounded partisanship in which voters stay within a particular party but with varying degrees of attachment. So, in a sense, they rely on multi-dimensionality to explore variation in affect as much as variation across party. Flexible partisans do not necessarily move to another party but, rather, to some version of “independence” (Neundorf, Stegmueller and Scotto 2011: 476). This is evidence that is, at least in passing, consistent with the idea that partisanship is two- and not one-dimensional. That is, partisan Social Democrats may blow hot and cold on their party over time, but remain Social Democrats; which means, in turn, that what we mean by stability or instability in party identification turns, at least in part, on whether we are considering change in the degree of affect toward the same party over time a measure of instability or just wish to consider change in party preference over time.

Discussion

This review has highlighted several persistent difficulties about the measure and use of party identification as a concept. There are, for example, questions about measurement which, at the very least, mean that it is probably not appropriate to treat party identification as an interval measure in statistical models (see in particular Neundorf, Stegmueller and Scotto 2011 and the literature reviewed there) in part because the measure is multi- rather than uni-dimensional. There is also a lot to be said for a cognitive approach to partisanship because such a model offers a way to explain change in partisanship over time by an individual. Arguments about socialization and generational change can help us understand change at the level of the cohort or possibly level of the electorate but seem less well-suited to helping understand change at the level of the individual. More to the point, experience of both adult immigrants and newly emerged democracies suggest that while socialization arguments may well explain party identification they fail to specify necessary conditions. That is, it is possible for party identification to develop absent socialization. Moreover, one of the consistent patterns we see in the literature is that party
identification is endogenous to many features of the system. At its narrowest, party identification is endogenous to choosing from the set of parties running. This choice set obviously varies cross-nationally but can also vary within a nation across federal boundaries: the Scottish National Party does not run in England, the Christian Social Union does not run candidates outside Bavaria and so on. But it also seems to be the case that features of party loyalty vary by electoral system and other institutional arrangements. These variations in party identification by context would seem more amenable to analysis based on a cognitive approach to party identification. They are also, to some extent, under-studied. How and why voters change party allegiance – and the role of the parties themselves in conditioning those changes – seem to be not well understood.

While a more cognitive approach does have considerable promise, especially when it comes to understanding changes in identification, such an approach cannot help explain the affective component of party identification. If there is anything distinctive about partisanship as a concept it is that affective component. We know from work in other areas of political behavior (e.g., Valentino et al. 2011) that the emotional aspect to politics is an important one. At the risk of some over-simplifying, there are at least some analogies between party identification and sport fandom, although it is possible to over-state the correspondence. For example:

> All of which translate fairly readily into reactions at election time and relate to the politically relevant factors noted earlier, such as interest in and engagement with the political process, although the analogy does fall down when pushed too far. Nevertheless, discussing these issues is easier if we do conceptualize partisanship as multi-dimensional rather than uni-dimensional since that does allow us to break apart the question of party choice from the question of affect. It is entirely possible, of course, that ideology and affect are correlated: more extreme parties may be associated with more extreme affect. But we can only explore these issues if we adopt a more multi-dimensional approach to party identification.

Party identification has been an invaluable construct in helping us to understand a range of political behaviors among mass publics since its introduction into the discipline. But there are some difficulties to be aware of even as we continue to rely on party identification as a concept. Despite its flaws, however, there seems to be no construct in the literature ready to rival party identification as a guide to vote voice. Party identification will remain a central component of our understanding political behavior for the foreseeable future.

**Appendix A: selected notes on wording of “close to a party” question from CSES 3 codebook**

**ELECTION STUDY NOTES – AUSTRALIA (2007):**
This variable was reconstructed from party identification question B1: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Liberal, Labor, National or what?”

**ELECTION STUDY NOTES – BRAZIL (2010):**
The wording in the Brazilian questionnaire slightly deviates from the original CSES question. It was asked as follows: “In general, is there any political party that you like?”
Party identification

ELECTION STUDY NOTES – LATVIA (2010):
The wording in the Latvian questionnaire deviates from the CSES standard. The question asked was: “Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?”

ELECTION STUDY NOTES – MEXICO (2009):
Note that the Mexican wording deviates from the original CSES question. It was asked as follows: “Regardless of which party you voted for during the last election, in general, do you sympathize with any political party in particular?”

ELECTION STUDY NOTES – NETHERLANDS (2010):
Question text: “Do you think of yourself as an adherent to a certain political party?”

ELECTION STUDY NOTES – TAIWAN (2008):
Note that in the Taiwanese election study specific parties were named within the question text. It was asked as follows: “Among the main political parties in our country, including the KMT, DPP, NP, PFP and TSU, do you think of yourself as leaning towards any particular party?”

ELECTION STUDY NOTES – UNITED STATES (2008):
1 “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican or an Independent?”
2 “If R considers self a Democrat/Republican: Would you call yourself a strong or a not very strong Democrat/Republican?”
3 “If R’s party preference is Independent, no preference, other, don’t know: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?”

Notes
1 Available from: www.cses.org/datacenter/download.htm. Party identifiers are those coded as replying yes to the question “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?” The variable “elections make a difference” is the percentage of people who respond with a 4 or 5 to the question: “Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won’t make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a big difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card (where ONE means that voting won’t make any difference to what happens and FIVE means that voting can make a big difference), where would you place yourself?”
2 Some work suggests even more fundamental processes at work. Gerber et al. (2012) note the role of personality and partisanship. A somewhat more extreme version of this is found in the current literature on the genetic basis of politics. Settle, Dawes and Fowler (2009), for example, discuss the inheritability of party identifications – that is, there is a component of partisanship due to nature and not simply nurture. The findings on heritability are new and not uncontroversial. The more standard view of partisanship invokes processes of socialization.
3 One exception would be socialization into Communist parties in the case of post-Communist societies.
4 Although Schickler and Green (1997) find a great deal of stability over panels (see, for example, Tables 2a and 2b: 469–470), they generally report stability for Germany and the UK slightly different for Canada – average R2 between panels in the high 0.9s for Germany and UK, more like 0.8 for Canada.

References


