PART II

Cross-sector and cross-level policy and administration responses

Introduction

This section of the handbook deals with public administration issues that cross sectors and policy areas. The first three chapters address how to effectively respond to public problems that government cannot solve on its own. Collaborative governance, co-production and citizen engagement are suggested as alternatives to the traditional governing modes in dealing with the inter-dependent and wicked problems that governments frequently face. The middle chapters of this section analyze specific governance issues such as risk governance, governance changes and federalism. The discussion of governance is then expanded in the final chapters of this section and linked to a variety of policy domains: emergency and crisis management, regulatory reform, global health and global cultural heritage policies.

In Chapter 13, “Collaborative governance”, Denita Cepiku from Italy argues that a collaboration-based approach is the most effective mode to solve complex and interdependent public problems. As an alternative to hierarchy and competition, collaborative governance includes inter-institutional networks, public–private partnerships, joined-up government and co-production.

After defining collaborative governance, the chapter explains through three different theoretical bases why organizations work together. A series of interesting cases show how collaboration can contribute to the solving of public problems. The later part of the chapter explains how to cope with management challenges. Professor Cepiku argues that since the collaborative approach is not without limits, public managers should pay careful attention to institutional design choices and process management, leadership and performance management of collaborative arrangements.

While Chapter 13 is a broad review of interdependent collaborative approaches, Chapter 14 focuses more explicitly on co-production as one form of collaboration. In his chapter, titled “Citizen co-production of public services: meanings, processes, antecedents and consequences”, John Alford from Australia explores important facets of co-production. Drawing mainly on theory-building or case analysis, Professor Alford addresses two key questions about co-production: when should it be utilized and how can it be elicited?

In addressing the first question, the author explains that replacing the old one-size-fits-all approach, a contingent approach now prevails with regard to the utilization of co-production.
The contingent approach makes clear that whether the benefits of utilizing co-production outweigh the associated costs depends on the situation. And the answer, in turn, depends on the nature of the service, the context, staff capabilities and the degree of inter-dependency between the actors. The chapter also identifies multiple drivers of co-production: the motivations and capacities of the co-producer; perceptions of service itself; and satisfaction with the government’s communication, consultation and overall performance.

In Chapter 15, Reto Steiner and Claire Kaiser from Switzerland note that public participation is an essential aspect of the democratic way of governing. Based on an extensive analysis of international democratic theory and participation literature, the chapter titled “Democracy and citizens’ engagement” provides an overview of the relationship between democracy and citizen engagement. This chapter fits with the preceding two chapters by sharing the same theme – that is the role of citizens – but takes an explicitly international perspective.

The authors note a decrease in optimism about democracy despite the increased number of democratic systems worldwide. The chapter classifies political participation into two contrasting camps. In the “old” democracies, the idea of citizens’ engagement is seen as generally positive resulting in few harms; whereas the “new” democracies have a variety of concerns with regard to effectiveness of democratic processes and structures. The authors make it clear that more citizen participation is not always, or necessarily, better. For example, despite many advantages, citizens’ engagement in the public affairs can at times entail serious risks and may not produce better outcomes than decisions made by politicians or administrators. Furthermore, heightened citizen participation does not directly solve problems like poverty, crime and others. Thus, the authors conclude that citizen engagement should not be understood as a panacea.

Chapter 16, “The public policy context for risk governance and social innovation”, explains that to achieve successful innovation in public policy, public managers have to pay due attention to the associated risks. Noting that the current literature does not adequately discuss the nexus between risk and social innovation in public policy, Sarah-Sophie Flemig and Stephen Osborne from the United Kingdom introduce two key propositions and suggest a holistic framework of risk management and social innovation in public policy.

The first proposition is: risk management approaches should distinguish between risk and uncertainty. Known risks can encourage innovation in public policy by providing the opportunity to find new ways of thinking, but may also function as barriers to innovation. Uncertainty, on the other hand, cannot be known ex ante but may provide a jolt to spur innovation. The second proposition suggests that risk management should differentiate between hard management such as regulation and rules and soft management such as delegation of risk management, communication and deliberation. From an overview of past studies Flemig and Osborne reveal that risk management is closely related to blame avoidance, and policy-makers are prone to “playing safe”. The authors conclude that to bring about innovation in public policy and programs it is essential to skillfully manage risks.

Jenny M. Lewis of Australia takes on the question of how governance has changed in different policy sectors and nations. Chapter 17, “Governance change across policy sectors and nations”, shows how theoretical arguments can be integrated with empirical case studies. Professor Lewis first proposes a framework for analyzing governance change, and then applies this framework to policy domains by examining health policy in Australia and the Netherlands with a comparative lens.

The proposed framework has three dimensions: institutions, politics and ideation. First, as historical and sociological features of the state, national health insurance can be seen as an institution. Second, since politics is the power relation between state and non-state actors, the relationship between the state and the medical profession is a political variable. Finally, ideation
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is defined as the dominant ideas underpinning a policy sector, with foundational models of health and illness paramount in this regard. The comparison of recent reforms in governance of health policy in Australia and the Netherlands reveals contrasting results. The chapter demonstrates how existing institutions, different political systems, and societal traditions shape governance change. Professor Lewis concludes by noting that the three concepts may also be useful to understanding governance changes in other policy areas.

The discussion of governance in Chapter 18, “Devolution and federalism”, takes on a different, but central, dimension of public policy and administration: intergovernmental relations. Public managers today find themselves in the situation where many issues cannot be tackled without coordination and negotiation between different levels of government in a nation. Owen E. Hughes of Australia reminds us that in decentralized governance, found in many nations including the US, Canada, Russia, China, Australia, Brazil and others, no single level of government has sole jurisdiction over a policy issue or field. Even in nations with more centralized forms of government, such as France, there is tension between the national level and the local level. The chapter explains that the formal kind of federalism where there is a clear division of power between governments is no longer realistic.

Professor Hughes provides three approaches to conceptualize federalism: coordinate, cooperative or organic. He then outlines the positive aspects of the federal system of government under which most of the world’s population lives, as well as its limitations. For example, federalism can enhance consensus as national and sub-national governments must reach agreement, but also simultaneously stimulate conflicts between the two levels of government. The result, as the author explains, is that managers in government are often involved in what may well be difficult processes across the levels of government, where they are required to come up with solutions for which they often have no formal authority.

Through a case study, Fatih Demiroz and Naim Kapucu of the US illustrate that disaster management, arguably a key role of the state, is by its very nature a collaborative endeavor. Chapter 19, titled “Emergency and crisis management: the Soma mine accident case, Turkey”, shows that collaborative arrangements are required to effectively respond to emergency situations. The central question in this chapter is how governance can succeed when stakeholders hold conflicting views about policy objectives. By taking on a tragic mining accident that happened in 2014 in Turkey in which hundreds of miners were trapped and killed, the authors describe what role collaborative public management plays and, in turn, what role leadership plays in the accident.

The authors make clear that a national or organizational leader’s communication skills are a critical factor in emergency management, and this holds true in collaborative governance as well. The reader will learn in this chapter how a leader’s timely and effective communication with media and public reduces social costs in emergency situations. Four main components of communication are identified: tell the truth; send a complete message; provide timely information; and work hard to resolve problems and let the public know of such efforts.

Chapter 20, “Regulatory reform and the better regulation agenda: traveling from center to periphery”, written by Alketa Peci of Brazil, studies the processes and outcomes of regulatory reforms and the recent development of better regulation in Latin America, with a focus on Brazil. Professor Peci sees two forces playing major roles in shaping the regulatory reforms in the region: pressure from international sources upon Latin America, and domestic forces that support more effective regulation.

In studying international forces, the chapter reveals how economic liberalization and international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or World Bank have been central to the diffusion of regulatory reforms
in Latin America. However, Professor Peci reveals that domestic factors have also been decisive in influencing regulatory diffusion in the region. In this regard, she focuses on two key processes of regulatory reforms: (1) the adoption of independent or semi-autonomous regulatory agencies, and (2) the adoption of a better regulation agenda. The chapter concludes that the success of regulatory reform in Latin America, and especially in Brazil, Chile and Mexico, is in part due to strong professional bureaucracies that have pursued innovation, resisted political pressure and gained legitimacy.

In Chapter 21, “Global health”, Eduardo Missoni from Italy describes the complex governance system of global health, in which a balance of power is critical yet hard to achieve due to many actors who influence policies. After providing a historical review of global health policies, the author identifies the main actors involved in public health at the global level. His analysis includes the “leadership and authority” agencies such as the World Health Organization, the World Bank, and other UN system entities, and the World Trade Organization, transnational companies, and transnational hybrid organizations, and shows how their actions interweave and influence the formation of global health policies.

Although Professor Missoni does not deny the contribution the international institutions made to fill the global health governance gap, he makes clear that due to their powerful influence, effective regulation and normative actions both at global and national levels are not likely to function properly, and as a result, the governance system fails to fulfill its mission. He concludes by calling for an enhanced governance framework for global health.

Chapter 22, “Global cultural heritage policies and their management: the case of Italian UNESCO World Heritage Sites”, written by Marianna Elmi and Alessandro Hinna from Italy, analyzes the execution of global cultural policies from a multilevel network perspective. The chapter identifies the main actors, describes the processes and points out the management strategies used in implementing World Heritage policies.

The authors see the implementation of UNESCO World Heritage policy as a multi-level process since it has three dimensions: the presence of multiple organizations; the collaborative nature of the interaction of actors; and the establishment of a coordinating body and coordination strategies. The complex characteristics make a single simple solution impossible and entail managerial challenges.

By adopting a case study of Italian UNESCO World Heritage Sites, the chapter shows that the policy implemented through network structures can result in a lack of cooperation between actors and may fail to produce expected results. The authors argue the policies can only succeed with the contribution of all related organizations and institutions, including the sharing of resources, tasks, and responsibilities.
COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

Denita Cepiku

Introduction

The need for public managers to work across organizations and societal sectors is not new although the number and scale of complex problems, their global nature and interdependency has escalated in the past two decades (Huxham 2000). Simultaneously, there has been a change in government roles, as they become more demanding but also more indirect. The collaboration-based public administration approach to decision-making and service delivery is also considered a reaction to the institutional fragmentation and contraposition created by previous public sector reforms such as the New Public Management.

Similarly, evidence of collaborative governance can be found decades afore but it has multiplied since the mid-1990s (Friend et al. 1974). Achieving environmental sustainability, reducing poverty, alleviating global health problems, homeland and urban security, improving quality of life of the elderly, social inclusion of immigrants, urban renewal, territorial development, recovery from drug addiction, emergency management, raising school standards, improving community wellbeing, reducing youth unemployment, cannot be solved by any single organization, be it public, non-profit, business, or civil society association. Attempts to reduce fragmentation include inter-institutional networks, public–private partnerships, joined up government (horizontal coordination and integration between departments and agencies within government), and users’ engagement through co-production.

While policy makers and public managers now feel confident that collaboration is the most effective answer to such problems, less attention is paid to what it requires to function properly and achieve its aims. Management mechanisms and systems are reasonably expected to change in collaborative settings compared to how they work in traditional organizations.

The chapter provides an integrated framework for understanding collaborative governance, regardless of the specific forms (networks, co-production, public–private partnerships) or labels (coordination, cooperation, collaboration, collaborative public management, collaborative governance, civic engagement) it may assume (O’Leary and Vij 2012). Competencies required by public managers who engage in hybrid modes of service provision are identified and recommendations for policy makers drawn.
The central thesis of the chapter is the imperative of going beyond the early years’ euphoria, adopting what Alford and Hughes (2008) call public value pragmatism: this means abandoning the cult of collaboration considered a panacea and addressing the managerial challenges of collaborative, non-hierarchical environments.

**Defining collaborative governance**

Collaborative governance theory draws on a variety of disciplines such as political science, public administration, urban affairs, social welfare, public management, and organizational/sociological research (Keast et al. 2014). Collaborative governance can be defined by considering the two words that compose it. The term *governance* is loaded with ambiguity and several definitions, normative and positive, can be found in the literature (Cepiku 2013; Frederickson 2005). In this chapter, a neutral definition has been chosen, which allows the meaning to be carried by the word collaboration rather than governance. Thus, governance refers to “government’s ability to make and enforce rules and to deliver services” (Fukuyama 2013: 350).

*Collaboration* is a relationship “intended to increase public value by […] working together rather than separately” (Bardach 1998: 8; Huxham 1996). It “is based on the value of reciprocity and can include the public” (Agranoff and McGuire 2003: 4). It is part of a continuum that goes from: (1) cooperation, which is short term, informal and limited to sharing information, to (2) coordination, in which organizations remain separate but contribute to a specific, agreed program of action, and to (3) collaboration: long-term, risky, needing system changes and based on strong linkages with a commitment to common missions and part of a total picture (Mandell and Keast 2008).

Alternatives to collaboration are hierarchy and competition, both practiced in the public sector and well known under the headings of Weberianism and New Public Management. Different from hierarchy and competition, collaboration is voluntary; partners can step out at any time if they are not satisfied or aware of the value achieved through it (Hill and Lynn 2003: 65).

Collaborative governance is, thus, a hybrid mode of decision making and service provision in which a public agency deliberately and directly engages non-state entities in a formal, consensual, and collective decision-making process to manage programs, and to solve problems that cannot be easily or at all solved by single organizations (Ansell and Gash 2007: 544; Agranoff and McGuire 2003). This definition belies the reality of numerous collaborative forms, each entailing specific management issues (Huxham 2000: 341).

Collaboration can be institutional or individual; in other terms, it can take place mainly among organizations or among people. This distinction, though helpful to categorize empirical evidence, is fine line: collaboration among institutions is always carried out by people interactions; on the other hand, individual collaboration has a short life if it is not embedded in an institutional framework.

**Why collaborate? Rationale and drivers to collaboration**

Organizations and people work together to achieve collaborative advantage, i.e. something that could not be realized by acting alone (Huxham 1996). Bretschneider et al. (2012) identify three different approaches to understand incentives to collaborate: (1) theories of organizational behavior; (2) public value theory; and (3) the availability of performance information. Organization theories refer mainly to resource dependency theory, according to which individual organizations do not have all the resources they need to achieve their goals (Pfeffer...
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and Salancik 1978). Public value theory is more recent. Public managers are willing to give away some of their autonomy if they feel that public value will be more easily and effectively created through a joint collaborative effort. Finally, performance information can be a motivator for the sharing or reallocation of resources among organizations.

Two recurring concepts in collaborative governance theory are wicked problems and interdependency. Wicked problems are unstructured as causes and effects are difficult to identify and continuously evolving. They cross multiple policy domains, levels of government and jurisdictions and, consequently, several stakeholders, each bringing in different views, priorities, values, cultural and political backgrounds and championing alternative solutions (Weber and Khademian 2008). If not managed, this multiplicity easily translates in conflict.

Interdependency is created when no single actor, public or private, has all knowledge, information, or power required to solve complex, dynamic and diversified problems. No actor has sufficient overview to make the application of the needed instrument effective or sufficient action potential to dominate unilaterally in a particular governing model (Kooiman 1993: 4). Collaborative arrangements are established when there is a wicked problem and the multiple actors involved are aware of the interdependency and recognize a certain value of working with others (Mandell 2010; Kickert et al. 1997: 6). Since collaboration is voluntary, collaborative interactions to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes, are rooted in trust and regulated by shared rules, instead of sovereign authority.

At an individual level, citizens are motivated by different reasons to collaborate with public sector professionals (Alford 2014). These include both material self-interest and intrinsic rewards such as satisfying the need to feel competent and self-determining sociality (sense of belonging). The way in which these motivations affect the willingness of people to collaborate or co-produce depends on personal features, on the kind and salience of the service provided, on transaction costs that make voice more relevant than exit, and ease of involvement, among others.

Box 13.1 Killing two birds with one stone: administrative barter in Italian cities

The global economic and financial crisis has a scissor effect on local governments, due to decreased tax revenues and increased demand for social services. Indeed, some cities are able to collect no more than half of the taxes due. A higher demand for welfare services leaves fewer resources available for services such as the maintenance of schools, parks and green urban areas.

The Italian government has envisaged a possible solution with a law approved in November 2014 (nr. 164), the so-called administrative barter (baratto amministrativo), which gives citizens the possibility to pay lower taxes if they are willing to contribute to the maintenance, improvement and embellishment of their territory. It is interesting to note that citizens are not merely executors of local government projects but make their own project proposals on urban regeneration. Moreover, priority is given to projects submitted through civil society associations rather than individually.

It is still too early to assess the effects of the law on the spread of individual and collective co-production practices. Some local governments have already turned down this possibility, as the amount of unpaid taxes is too large to give away. Others have adopted detailed regulations that enable the active participation of citizens and their associations to urban management policies.
Box 13.2 NASA taps citizen-scientists to find novel ways to use earth science dataset

NASA is well known as an innovator that employs some of the smartest people alive. The agency has recently announced two related Earth science challenges designed to take ideas from a much large source: the public.

The challenges give citizens a chance to provide NASA with new ways to make use of the extensive datasets its Earth science satellites capture, much of which are available to the public through the Open NASA Earth Exchange, or OpenNEX. OpenNEX is a data, supercomputing and knowledge platform hosted on the Amazon Web Services cloud, where academics, developers and users can search through a massive collection of climate and Earth science datasets. NASA already collects the data, but the public could help the agency better figure out to do with it.

The challenges come in two phases. The first is the ideation stage, which will offer as much as $10,000 in awards for ideas that lead to “novel uses of the datasets.” The second aspect is the builder phase that will build off the ideas generated during the ideation stage and will offer between $30,000 and $50,000 in awards for the development of applications or algorithms that promote climate resilience using OpenNEX datasets.

The OpenNEX challenges also address policy mandates on big data, open data and climate data from the Obama administration, but bringing innovation from outside the agency is likely where its biggest efforts will lie.

Speaking at the Amazon Web Services symposium in Washington, DC, […] Tsengar Lee, program manager in the Earth Science Division of the Science Mission Directorate at NASA Headquarters, said building the data simply isn’t enough: “The agency wants to maximize its uses. The expectation was if you build the data, they will come, but that was not the case,” Lee said.


One of the main motivations of public agencies to collaborate with citizens and civil service organizations in delivering public services is achieving strong user and citizen engagement per se (OECD 2011: 48). For instance, collaboration with citizens in designing and delivering healthcare services has been proven to improve implementation processes and strengthen compliance.

Other determinants include governance drivers, such as low administrative capacity of public sector, and logistical drivers, deriving from the intrinsic nature of the specific public service (Bovaird 2007; Joshi and Moore 2004: 855). For instance, monitoring the quality of lake water or parks or urban streets can be far more effective and less expensive if communities and residents are involved (OECD 2011).

Modes of collaborative governance: networks and co-production

Several forms and modes of collaborative governance exist. Two main arrangements are inter-institutional networks and co-production.

Networks are relatively stable patterns of social relations among interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and programs and that are being formed, reproduced and changed by an ecology of games between these actors (Kickert et al. 1997). They include multiple organizations, tied by some form of structural interdependence in which one unit is
not the subordinate of others by virtue of its formal position (O’Toole 1997: 45). They are often viewed as pooled authority systems that are based more on expertise than on position (Agranoff 2003: 11). Milward and Provan (2006: 11) distinguish among service implementation, information diffusion, problem solving, and community capacity building networks.

A second form of collaborative governance is co-production, first studied in the late 1970s (Parks et al. 1981; Ostrom et al. 1978; see chapter 14 in this handbook). Co-production can be defined as “the mix of activities that both public service agents and citizens contribute to the provision of public services. The former are involved as professionals, or ‘regular producers’, while ‘citizen production’ is based on voluntary efforts by individuals and groups to enhance the quality and/or quantity of the services they use” (Parks et al. 1981). Co-production transforms the relationship between service users and providers, enabling the user to take more control and ownership. It contributes to aligning results with citizens’ aspirations and needs and can lead to better outcomes and make better use of resources, thereby reducing the need for expensive services.

Another interesting form of co-production is user innovation, which encompasses an understanding of key user needs and their systematic involvement in the innovation process (Wise and Høgenhaven 2008). The organization makes use of assets from other organizations and individuals to discover, develop and implement ideas within and outside its boundaries (Eggers and Singh 2009: 98; Bommert 2010). Benefits include improved awareness of social problems, more effective practices based on broad citizen experience, and increased trust between government and citizens. Key conditions that enable user innovation are found at different levels: public policies and country traditions of stakeholder involvement at the macro level; legal and institutional conditions at for participatory governance in specific policy fields at the meso level, power resource asymmetries, incentives and past experiences at the organizational level (Sørensen and Torfing 2011: 860). User innovation has an impact on organizational structures and behaviors and requires a focus on expertise rather than on position (Meijer 2014: 213).

Box 13.3 Patient innovation

User innovation can be feasible and rewarding even in a highly professionalized area such as healthcare. Patients can become experts in their own conditions and are the only people who are present at all stages during the provision of care: from diagnosis to recovery (Rathert et al. 2011). Especially in chronic and rare diseases, users or patients know things that many professionals may not know and their engagement can make a service more effective by the extent to which they go along with its requirements (users as critical success factors; self-management of long-term conditions; Bovaird 2007). Moreover, supporting user innovation is key to implementing innovative ways of addressing such diseases at reasonable costs (Von Hippel et al. 2011).

The increasing availability of medical information on the internet and stronger patient communities are some of the drivers to more active patients.

Recent evidence from rare diseases has highlighted the necessity of professional support to complement patients’ lack of expert knowledge. The combination of a service-oriented working climate and an efficient cooperation and mindset of healthcare professionals to motivate and support patient innovation has the potential to foster patients’ innovative stimuli (Henrike and Schultz 2013).
Public managers must revisit their outlook on the roles that they and the public should play in public services. The ways in which organizational cultures mediate patients’ empowerment matters. Patients make a transition from simple users and choosers to makers and shapers of health services (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000).

Cross-sector collaboration and community engagement are relevant and equally spread at local and global levels. They are increasingly being adopted in global development strategies, including the post-2015 Development Agenda that will follow the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.1

Especially in developing countries, they tend to be initiated by international institutions or philanthropic organizations or even self-organized communities rather than by public agencies (Cepiku and Giordano 2014).

Box 13.4 Tigray: a community-based network to fight malaria

Malaria is an entirely preventable and treatable mosquito-borne illness that accounted for 207 million cases and 627,000 deaths in 2012. Remedies include insecticidal nets and artemisinin-based combination therapies. Health costs of malaria stand for 40 per cent of public health expenditures and 30–50 per cent of inpatient hospital admissions (WHO 2013).

Despite steep increases in global malaria financing since 2003, people continue to die. The “unclearly defined potpourri” of corporate giving, philanthropic and CSR projects, although may do good for a while, lacks effectiveness in the longer-term. Low access to health structures, inadequate diagnosis, low provider compliance and patient adherence to therapy, bring down the impact of treatment from a 98 per cent of clinical efficacy of the drugs to a 37 per cent real effectiveness.

The Tigray project, named after the Ethiopian region in which it was implemented, sheds some light on how collaborative governance can dramatically improve the impact of traditional intervention strategies, be they State-centered or philanthropic.

From 2005 to 2009, a global public–private network was created including as partners Novartis Italia, the Italian Ministry of Health, the WHO, the Tigray Health Bureau, and two local hospitals. It made use of community health workers (CHWs) to provide diagnosis and treatment of malaria. CHWs are subsistence farmers, members of the communities where they work, supported by the health system, and who have shorter training than professional workers.

During the project, 98 health workers were trained in malaria diagnosis and treatment, including 33 CHWs. With a limited US$569,901 investment, they treated 130,000 people in their villages, approximately 58 per cent of all suspected and confirmed cases of malaria.

The collaboration-based strategy led to a 40 per cent reduction in malaria deaths compared to the traditional hospital-based approach. Caseload for health structures was reduced of one fourth and proper diagnosis saved US$1,41 per patient examined. Services provided by CHWs were assessed as more appropriate to health needs than those of clinic-based services, less expensive, and able to foster self-reliance and local participation.
Columbia University, has estimated that financing needs of 1 million CHWs in Africa would be US$2.3 billion per year, 0.005 per cent of donor GDP. This collaborative approach among international institutions and donors, local authorities and recipient communities is considered the most effective and less expensive to achieve the health-related Millennium Development Goals (Earth Institute 2011).

Source: Adapted from Cepiku 2014.

Management challenges in coping with collaborative governance

Collaborative governance is not immune to failure, just as market and hierarchy. Still, there are policy issues that can only be satisfactorily solved through collaboration. Critical aspects of collaboration are varied commitment to common goals and different perspectives of the actors involved on the nature of the problem, the desired solution or the best organizational arrangements, culture clash, power issues, loss of autonomy, coordination fatigue and commitment of time and costs, lack of incentives to cooperate and blockades to collective action, potential for reduced accountability by participants and closeness, few rewards for role in the collaborative setting as compared to role in organizations, absence of important actors, poorly deployed resources, erroneous task integration, among others (Kenis and Provan, 2009: 444; Mandell and Keast, 2008; Kickert et al. 1997: 9, 167; Provan and Milward 1995). Well-known trade-offs and tensions intrinsic to collaborative governance include efficiency versus inclusiveness and equity, internal versus external legitimacy, and flexibility versus stability. For instance, in community collaborations there is a risk of less vocal citizens or those “willing but unable” to participate (OECD 2011). Co-production may be accessible only to specific social groups, thus worsening the gap between advantaged and disadvantaged social classes (Brandsen and Helderman 2012; Bovaird and Downe 2008).

Although most of these issues can be successfully addressed through effective management, collaborative governance remains a more complex approach and must be adopted only if the problem at hand is not satisfactorily solved by more traditional approaches. Moreover, often there is excessive focus on formally creating collaborative forms such as networks and community partnerships rather than developing systems and structures for managing them and steering competencies.

Managing a public–private partnership, a network or a co-production project is public management in situations of interdependencies. It consists in mutually adjusting the behavior of actors with different objectives and ambitions; coordinating strategies of actors with different goals and preferences with regard to a certain problem; initiating and facilitating interaction processes; creating and changing institutional arrangements for better coordination (Kickert et al. 1997: 10, 43–4; Friend et al. 1974).

Collaborative public management includes designing the most appropriate institutional form, developing management mechanisms, including performance management systems, and ensuring an effective leadership.

Institutional design

Just as there are design choices for organizations, there are design choices for collaborative arrangements and these affect the way collaborative agendas are formed and implemented and have consequences for what can actually be achieved (Kenis and Provan, 2009; Cross et al.
Defining the institutional design of collaboration includes designating the lead organization, influencing formal policy (division of resources and actor positions), defining the rules of entry and, thus, the boundaries of collaboration, influencing values, norms and perceptions (mass information campaigns, social engineering, collective learning processes).

With reference to networks, three ideal types of institutional forms have been identified: self-governance networks; lead-organizational networks; administrative-organization networks (Kenis and Provan 2009; Provan and Milward 1995). The main point for public managers is that the most appropriate institutional design form must be chosen and then implemented and this is critical for the sustainability of collaboration as it evolves.

At an early stage of collaboration and when only a few actors are involved, it may be appropriate to operate as a self-governed network where decisions are taken on the basis of unanimous consensus. This form, however, may prove inefficient with frequent meetings and difficulty in reaching consensus, but the partners do not fear a loss of control. In a lead organization network, one member bears the responsibility for network management. It has a clear direction and is efficient, but the domination by the lead organization may produce lack of commitment by the partners. A crisis of leadership may force the collaborative form to evolve towards a network administrative organization network, in which there is a distinct administrative entity set up to manage the network. It may be both efficient and sustainable, but hierarchy may be perceived and operational costs borne by the members.

Process management

During process management, the organizational structure (roles, rules, positions and resource division) is considered as given. Collaborative interaction process management includes a range of functions from activating collaboration, to arranging and facilitating interaction, brokerage, mediation and arbitration, and legitimacy building.

Identifying, motivating and activating the parties necessary for tackling a particular problem may require an analysis of previous strategies (Kickert et al. 1997). Once the collaborative arrangement has been put in place, mechanisms able to arrange interaction, manage accountability and avoid free rider behavior and premature pulling out are needed. This may require signing a formal agreement and defining, in advance, conflict-regulating mechanisms. Activities of a procedural nature such as ensuring that meeting places and times are agreed upon, notes and minutes are kept, and monitoring the quality of the dialogue are important to facilitate collaborative interaction (Milward and Provan 2006: 18). Brokerage consists in matching problems, solutions and actors.

Mediation and arbitration are carried out when conflict exists and the interaction process finds itself at an impasse. They consist in ensuring that relations are maintained, exploring standpoints, confronting the parties with the perceptions and interests of the “outside world”.

Building and maintaining legitimacy of the collaborative governance strategy is particularly critical, also due to its voluntary nature (Milward and Provan 2006: 19). An effective performance management and communication system and the wise use of early achievements can support this task.

Collaborative leadership

One key feature of collaborative arrangements is that there is no hierarchical authority, no formal subordination, and interaction is based on expertise, trust and legitimacy. For a long
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time, this has translated into the wrong belief that collaborative governance is leaderless (Lipnack and Stamps 1994). On the contrary, leadership is imperative to overcome the several critical aspects and trade-offs that characterize collaborative governance.

This lacuna has exacerbated by a prevailing Weberian approach in leadership studies consisting in a priori locating the leader by office and assuming that whatever functions she/he performs are leadership functions (Lemaire and Provan 2010: 10; Weber 1947). While inappropriate in many traditional organizations, this approach is close to impracticable when it comes to collaborative settings. Traditional leadership theories that assume a leader–follower relationship fail to grasp the very meaning of collaboration (Ospina and Foldy 2010; Vangen and Huxham 2003; Huxham and Vangen, 2000). Even if one partner is more powerful than another, it still lacks hierarchical authority to impose goals, strategies or timeframes over other collaborating partners (Morse 2010). In collaborative settings, leaders need to count on other factors such as positive past experiences, suitable incentives for sharing authority, political consensus and the ability to instill trust (Eglene et al. 2007: 95).

More recently, a bottom-up approach, inspired by the works of Chester Barnard (1938), has emerged, which, first, identifies the key leadership behaviors and functions, and then looks at who exhibits certain behaviors (i.e. performs the executive functions). This approach is in line with what is called distributed or shared leadership (Crosby and Bryson 2010; Bryson and Crosby 1992). Defining leadership by functions, rather than by formal position, allows finding multiple leaders throughout the collaborative arrangement (Lemaire and Provan 2010). Reconceptualizing leadership as a team-level construct shifts the focus from personal traits to steering processes and leadership behaviors. A model by Van Wart (2004, 2008), commonly used in the literature, includes three kinds of behavior: task-oriented, people-oriented and organization-oriented. This model is shown in Table 13.1.

Leadership of collaborative arrangements has been variously labeled as integrative public leadership, collaborative leadership, network leadership, and inter-organizational leadership (Sun and Anderson 2012). The steering role is taken on by “people willing to invest their resources in return for future policies in their favour” (Kingdon 1984: 214). Motives may range from self-interest to genuine concern, including the possibility for an organization to stabilize its environment by building alliances and networks. Leadership in collaborative settings is crucial in matching governing mechanisms to context appropriately and should complement structure (Crosby and Bryson 2010: 224; Martin et al. 2008: 770). Leaders in collaborative settings initiate discussions or joint projects that help others recognize public problems, their stake in those problems, and opportunities to resolve them. The challenge for such leaders is to integrate the interests and actions of multiple stakeholders by appealing to shared goals and structuring deliberative processes by which the stake holders can devise joint, flexible strategies to pursue those goals.

The legitimacy to lead in collaborative settings is generally conferred on those who can “make things happen” (Sun and Anderson 2012; Morse 2010; Huxham and Vangen 2000). It is particularly those participants who have the skills to activate potential partners in a selective way who increase their influence on the collaborative decision-making process. This can lead to situations in which an actor with a relatively small amount of resources wields more influence than an actor who has many resources but lacks the necessary skills. A smart manager will understand that dealing with the network structure will give them a very powerful instrument with which to increase their influence in the collaborative decision-making process (Klijn and Teisman, in Kickert et al. 1997).
Reticulist skills include the ability to assess who should be involved in the interaction and which information should be given to them, the ability to negotiate and mediate, to distinguish among different target groups and adapt approaches to them, have a certain amount of technical expertise and “tactical and strategic” know-how. The ability to retain an independent position and the legitimacy are also important.

Managers involved in collaborative projects need to identify leadership functions that are needed to complement the organizational structure, rough out how these are ensured and who has the most appropriate skills in the network to cover them.

Table 13.1 Leadership behavior categories

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<th>Behavior categories</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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| Task-oriented         | Express a concern for accomplishing the goals of the collaborative arrangement and are aimed at defining and organizing group activities. The primary concern is high efficiency in the use of resources and reliability of operations, products and services. | • Agenda framing.  
• Taking charge when emergencies arise.  
• Making sure individual roles are understood.  
• Scheduling the work to be done.  
• Asking to follow standard rules and regulations.  
• Keeping work moving at a rapid pace.  
• Assigning to particular tasks.  
• Selecting performance measures. |
| People-oriented       | Reflect a concern for the welfare of the participants and a desire to foster good interpersonal relations among members. The primary objective is to ensure commitment and high levels of trust and cooperation. | • Treating all as equals.  
• Freely sharing information and providing the system of communication.  
• Looking out for the personal welfare.  
• Creating trust.  
• Brainstorming.  
• Sharing leadership role.  
• Inspiring enthusiasm and managing commitment.  
• Maintaining a closely knit between single partners and the collaborative arrangement.  
• Permitting participants to set their own pace.  
• Settling conflicts when they occur. |
| Organizational-oriented | The primary objective is to introduce major innovative improvements and adapt to external changes. | • Encouraging support from superiors.  
• Identifying resources.  
• Encouraging support from stakeholders.  
• Establishing a shared vision.  
• Establishing partners’ commitment to joint mission.  
• Publicizing goals and accomplishments.  
• Influencing values and norms.  
• Changing the collaborative institutional structure. |

Managing performance of collaborative arrangements

The voluntary nature of collaborative arrangements makes measurement and use of performance information even more relevant, especially when these are community-based and composed of both public and private actors. A key part of management tasks of collaborative arrangements includes understanding the most relevant performance dimensions, as perceived by the different constituencies, and the determinants that influence performance.

Performance of collaborative arrangements, including effectiveness, needs to be analyzed at multiple levels. According to a conceptual framework originated in the seminal article of Provan and Milward (1995) and further developed in the literature (Cepiku 2014; Klijn et al. 2010), performance of collaborative settings includes: (1) intermediate outcomes in terms of quality of collaboration management; (2) outcomes produced for the benefit of each partner (or organizational-level performance); (3) outcomes achieved for the community at large. Figure 13.1 illustrates this framework.

The quality of collaboration can be assessed by measuring: conflict resolution; the extent to which the collaborative process has encountered stagnations or deadlocks; the productive use and reconciliation of differences in perspectives; and the frequency of interactions between actors (Klijn et al. 2010). Administrative efficiency, inclusiveness of decision-making, stability and flexibility of rules and of the organizational form, and satisfaction of the participants with network management are other criteria useful for assessing the quality of interaction (Mandell and Keast 2008).

The outcomes of the collaboration at the single-partner level refer to the satisfaction of each member with both the management of the interaction and the results coming from collaboration (Crosby and Bryson, 2010: 226).

The outcomes at the environmental level refer to the overall benefits for the community that go beyond partner-increased wellbeing. Beside the direct benefits to the users of the service or the beneficiaries of the policy, positive and negative externalities must be considered such as costs to the community, the social capital created and public perceptions that problems are being solved (Provan and Milward 1995). Collaboration could be a means for achieving broader

Figure 13.1 Performance dimensions and determinants in collaborative arrangements
effects such as enhanced social capital through cohesive communities, shared values, which are the basis for active citizenship, and generation of mutual trust. It can be a means for the strengthening or revitalization of democracy, contributing to the development of a new relationship between citizens and the State based on trust, ethical standards, and accountability (Alford 2014; Cahn and Gray 2012; Pestoff 2006; Ostrom et al. 1978). Particular attention must be paid to negative and unforeseen effects in terms of equity and external accountability and to longer-term impact.

Finally, exogenous and endogenous determinants of collaborative performance are necessary for interpreting performance. Exogenous elements include those characteristics over which collaboration managers or partners do not have full control: system stability, resource munificence and cohesion, goal consensus among partners prior to collaboration, competing institutional logics and complementarity of partners, their number and geographical location, trust and previous collaboration history, external legitimation (support from public opinion, community and other stakeholders at inception), purpose of the collaborative arrangement, nature of tasks and severity of the problem, environmental shocks, and number and kind of constituencies, among others (Kenis and Provan 2009; Provan and Milward 1995). The presence and relative relevance of these elements changes from case to case and from one policy sector to another. The context in which collaboration takes place is a relevant determinant of both the quality of interaction and the final outcome produced for the partners and the community.

Endogenous factors, on the other hand, can be instrumentally managed by the collaborative leaders and include the organizational structure, the management processes and the leadership style, assumed to be primary determinants of success and failure (McGuire and Agranoff 2007: 23).

While the majority of the literature on collaboration is quite positive, collaborative governance does not always pursue the public good. Some authors have adopted a more holistic view and focused on dark networks developed around international drug, terror, diamond and weapons trade (Raab and Milward 2003). Conflicts of interest and trade-offs between short- and long-term aims are common in public–private collaborative governance. Performance management systems should be carefully designed to support dialogue, interaction and strategic choice among different strategic policy options and governance arrangements.

**Box 13.5 Large-scale partnerships with the private sector undermine Africans’ land rights, drive inequality and damage the environment**

Government policies and almost US$6 billion in aid money in support of large partnerships with the private sector to fight poverty and food insecurity are risking Africans’ land rights, worsening inequality and damaging the environment.

With growing global demand for natural resources, donors and African governments are looking to capitalize on increasing interest from the private sector in African land. Mega-public–private partnerships (PPP) “growth corridor” projects in Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Ghana and Mozambique illustrate this trend.

“After decades of underinvestment, governments in Africa are turning to partnerships with donor aid agencies and large companies or investors to develop the agriculture sector. This offers the allure of capital, technology and foreign exchange, but the downside risks of this approach are huge – particularly for the land rights of local communities in the investment areas,” says Robin Willoughby, Oxfam’s Policy Adviser on Agriculture and Food Security.
According to Oxfam, long-term development goals have been sacrificed in order to quickly establish mega public–private partnerships, as companies are offered land, tax and trade incentives to enter these schemes. Due to weak land tenure found in many African countries, these land subsidies and transfers are likely to undermine local communities’ land rights. This model also threatens to worsen inequality in African countries, which is already severe across the continent, and damage the environment through the introduction of plantation agriculture.

Rather than prioritizing partnerships between governments and donors with large private sector players, Oxfam is calling for the tried and tested investment to deliver benefits for almost 600 million Africans working in agriculture. This involves public sector investment in smallholder farmers, local markets and regional markets, and strong regulation to ensure that private sector investment can ‘do no harm’ and benefit millions of smallholder producers living in rural areas.


Performance information affects partners’ willingness to collaborate with others and can be used to strengthen commitment and to inform them on the convenience of the collaborative arrangement as compared with other organizational forms (Bretschneider et al. 2012; McGuire and Agranoff 2007: 21).

Policy and operational implications

Several implications originate from the analysis of collaborative governance carried out in this chapter. First and foremost, collaborative governance arrangements are far more complex and difficult to manage than traditional hierarchical organizations, and the likelihood of disappointing outcomes is high (Huxham 2000; Bardach 1998). When desired outcomes can be achieved only through collaboration, public managers must equip themselves with the necessary skills and tools.

Second, this sensibility at the managerial level must go hand in hand with an adaptation of public sector policies to support collaboration. Risk is higher in collaborative settings. If public policies do not acknowledge this, risk adverse behavior may prevent managers from adopting innovative solutions to wicked problems (Osborne and Brown 2010). Lack of collaboration is not the consequence of the stupidity or intransigence of public managers but highlights their ability to comprehend and respond to a myriad of incentives from hierarchical superiors, legislative overseers, and self-appointed accountability holders (Behn 2010: 435).

Too often, networks and co-production are launched as exceptional projects isolated from the rest of the organization. This approach makes them an exit strategy to capacity deficiencies and puts at risk their own sustainability. Instead, integrated planning and management is recommended.

Context – what we called exogenous determinants of performance – matters. Therefore, the launch of large-scale collaboration initiatives should be preceded by interventions aimed at strengthening community ties and inter-institutional collaboration. This also means that collaboration is generally not free but requires resources and investment for its full potential to be realized.
Note

1 Since the 1980s, private foreign investment in developing countries has risen 15-fold; and since 2000, private capital has accounted for 80 per cent of all capital flowing to these countries. Cf. www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2014/04/private-sector-post-2015-agenda.

References


Collaborative governance


