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NO LONGER PRO-EUROPEAN?

Politicisation and contestation of Europe in Italy

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Politicising Europe in Italy: long-term trends

Although one of the founding members of the EU, for a long time (1940s–1970s) Italy was characterised by a polarisation of the Italian party system that also affected politicisation of the issue of European integration. The country was divided between fervent Europhilia on the side of government parties and hard Euroscepticism on the side of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the second-largest Italian party and main opposition force (it was never in government). In this context, the pro-European governments represented membership of the EEC not just as a matter of economic interest: it was a choice for the Western camp, one that found its other main pillar in membership of NATO. This conception of two nested supranational communities (one strategic and one mainly economic) developed among Italian government parties (particularly the Christian Democrats, DC) in a context of bilateralism and Cold War, when the country was under the double pressure resulting from physical proximity to the Warsaw Pact bloc and significant popular support for the PCI (the largest communist party in Western democracies) domestically. Thus, the choice of the Italian government to join the Common Market was part of a broader strategy primarily inspired by Atlanticism, so the EEC was not considered as a potential third force, but rather as a means of stabilising capitalism, consolidating democracy and developing interdependences within the framework of the Western strategic alliance. Conversely, for the same reasons, the Italian left (including the socialists until the 1950s; then only the communists) rejected the Common Market, which they considered an engine of capitalism and a tool of American influence in Europe.

However, from the 1970s, as a consequence of international developments in Soviet imperialism (such as the repression of the Prague Spring), ideological revision by some prominent left-wing thinkers and widespread benevolent attitudes towards the West and the EEC among leftist voters (Isernia and Ammendola, 2005), the PCI started a process of realignment on the issue of European integration that finally took the party closer to the continental mainstream. Consequently, the positions on the European issue gradually became linear, moving from polarised positions on the EEC (centrist principled support vs. leftist rejection) to a simplified version of widespread support. Radicalism on the EEC was gradually banned from the political discourse.
of the main political actors and their reciprocal distance became drastically reduced. Indeed, once the PCI changed its position and supported Italian participation in the European Community, particularly after it was renamed Party of Left Democrats (PDS, later simply DS) in 1991, no party of any significance could be found that would question Italian participation in the integration process.

Thus, consensus on European integration developed in Italy after a process of realignment taking over three decades that, in the end, transformed the country into one of the most pro-European member states (Conti and Verzichelli, 2012). Party consensus on the EEC/EU was shared by Italian citizens as well, who, in the same period, proved amongst the most Europhile in the whole continent (Bellucci and Serricchio, 2012). In the Italian case the permissive consensus on European integration was not the result of a choice of the elites that citizens would tolerate but not share; on the contrary it was a phenomenon rooted in widespread consensus between elites and masses. Such popular support was determined by several factors: identification with the Western camp and the Atlantic community (Isernia and Ammendola, 2005), greater trust in the European level of government than in the domestic government, which was considered inefficient and corrupt (Battistelli and Bellucci, 2002), and perceived economic benefits of membership (Italy was a net recipient in the EEC/EU budget).

Finally, consensus involved most Italian socio-economic and technocratic elites as well. On the one hand, the majority of employers saw the advantage in being allowed access to a broader market and a consequent higher demand for Italian goods abroad. Indeed, the Common Market was a driving factor in the export-driven economic boom of the 1960s in Italy, since exports have always been crucial for the Italian economy whose internal demand has maintained comparatively low rates (whereas savings have instead been high). On the other hand, unions saw the free movement of labour as an opportunity for the economic migrants of the Mezzogiorno and hoped that membership of the EEC/EU would push the country to develop a welfare state as modern as in other member states such as France and Germany (until the 1970s the Italian welfare was still based on a corporatist non-universalistic model). Finally, experts and top-level technocrats (particularly those operating in crucial ministries in the economic field and foreign affairs, or in the Bank of Italy) have always supported putting the country at the heart of the integration process and complying with the main EU challenges. Even more, they have contributed to binding the country to the most ambitious European commitments when the domestic political scene was more unstable (as in the early 1990s because of the transition from the First to the Second Republic), thus promoting domestic stabilisation by securing the government agenda within a European frame (Dyson and Featherstone, 1996). Actually, these elites considered the European external constraint necessary in order to stop the distributive laxity and abuse of public spending of the Italian government and to rescue the country from drifts caused by political clientelism and corruption (Cotta and Isernia, 1996; Ferrera and Gualmini, 1999).

In the end, at least since the 1980s, for different and often asymmetric reasons, the most important Italian political actors converged in supporting European integration. However, the end of the so-called First Republic in 1993 – that was mainly due to corruption scandals involving the main political parties, and to the end of the communist/anti-communist confrontation – marked the disappearance of the traditional parties (DC, PCI and other smaller parties governing in coalition with the Christian Democrats for several decades, including the socialist PSI), a depolarisation of the party system, and the creation of a new party system based on bipolarity and alternation in government. At the same time, negotiations for European Monetary Union were taking place. As we have seen, in the past, few voices were heard outside the two positions of principled support (definitely prevailing in the long term) and principled rejection of the
Common Market (declining over time), since any pragmatic approach to the issue of European integration was scantly represented in the Italian party system. But since 1994, for the first time all positions – from hard Euroscepticism, to pragmatic attitudes, to principled pro-Europeanism – have been represented, which has thus made Europe a divisive issue and one of renewed politicisation and increased salience.

A first discontinuity to note concerns the new centre-right parties, which have shown clear signs of Euroscepticism from the very beginning. Their political discourse has been described as moving back and forth from soft Euroscepticism to vagueness to broad unspecific pro-Europeanism. On the other side of the political spectrum, the literature documents that the Italian centre-left has Europe at the centre of its programme more than the right does and that the former has firmly developed the traditional commitment of the Italian governments of the First Republic to the idea of a united Europe (Conti and Memoli, 2010). It is worth noting that several authors maintain that across Europe, parties have swapped their positions on the EU and from the 1990s the left has become more pro-European than the right (Gabel and Hix, 2002; Ladrech, 2000). Although other authors (Conti, 2014) contend that left and right exert an influence on attitudes towards the EU that is not linear, it is a matter of fact that Italy is in line with the above pattern, as in this country the centre-left really has become more pro-European than the centre-right.

Second, at the extremes of the political spectrum, hard Euroscepticism has become a remarkable feature, though not a stable one. The small Communist party Rifondazione Comunista showed signs of strong opposition to European integration, for example, by voting in parliament against the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. At the other extreme of the political spectrum, the Northern League (LN) has also criticised the achievements of European integration and voted against the ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (but in favour of the Lisbon Treaty). However, the fact that these parties have been in government several times made their stance rather ambivalent and their anti-European rhetoric has rarely been followed by coherent institutional behaviour but rather by alignment with the mainstream parties (Conti and De Giorgi, 2011). Rifondazione Comunista and the Northern League have become electorally weak in recent times, particularly the former, which has become unimportant and since 2008 has not been represented in the Italian parliament. However, a new Internet party (the Five Star Movement, M5S) made its appearance on the political scene in 2012 with an unprecedented success in the general elections of 2013, when, in a context of a fragmented party system, it became the largest party with over 25 per cent of the vote. The M5S failed to reach a majority in parliament only because the Italian electoral law benefits substantially those parties that make pre-electoral alliances. For this reason this party gained 40 per cent of seats less than the Democratic Party (PD, a merger of PDS-DS and other centrist parties such as Margherita), which came second in the elections but gained a generous seat bonus thanks to its pre-electoral alliance with other smaller parties. Despite the asymmetrical allocation of seats in parliament, for the first time since the deradicalisation of the PCI, the Italian party system finds in a radical force such as M5S one of its main internal units and a tendency toward polarisation again. The ideological character of the M5S is indeed protest-based, with a charismatic leader and a populist rhetoric, a mix of extreme left/right preferences and a hard Eurosceptic stance. Being an anti-establishment party, the M5S has refused cooperation with any other party in parliament. This has made the legislative process more disputed and polarised but has also made its capacity to influence the conduct of the Italian government on European issues directly very limited.

It is likely, however, that the electoral success of a fiercely Eurosceptic party like the M5S marks the end of the honeymoon between the Italians and Europe. Indeed, in recent times an
increase in Euroscepticism has concerned public opinion as well as socio-economic elites. As to the former, the fall in public support for the EU has been impressive over the past twenty years, to the point that in the last decade the attitudes of the Italians have become more pessimistic than the European average, mainly because of perceived threats to their personal economic security and to their identity and values. Italians consider the most recent steps in European integration (monetary union, measures to manage financial instability such as the Fiscal Compact, enlargements) as the main determinants of the worsening of their economic condition and social security, as well as a threat to their culture and way of life (trust in other Europeans has reached a negative peak: see Bellucci and Serricchio, 2012). Considering that the centre-right had a majority and was in government for most of the recent past (in 2001–6 and 2008–11, then again in a grand coalition in 2012–13), one could argue that both Italian citizens and the government have shared a broad Eurosceptic stance. It is also possible that these two actors have exerted a mutual influence on each other, as parties represent citizens and the latter are indeed influenced by party discourse and ideology. Additionally, the fact that a party such as the M5S became so popular confirms that in the country there is a large electoral market available for a Eurosceptical platform.

The Italian socio-economic elites have also become more cautious about the EU. Their support for the integration process has become more contingent on costs and benefits as long as they have started to perceive the impact of the EU on their interests less favourably in consequence of increased competitive pressures from the Common Market and the Eurozone. Their approach to the issue of European integration has become more pragmatic; for example they now express mixed views on EU institutions and policies and they support inter-governmentalism as a decision-making mode more than supranationalism, because in their view national interests can be better defended through the influence and veto power of national governments (De Giorgi and Verzichelli, 2012).

Certainly, the increased resistance to the EU and to European integration by a substantial part of public opinion, socio-economic elites and by so many major parties marks a shift in the widespread attitudes of Italians and, in the future, could give birth to an enduring social bloc that may change the overall relationship between Italy and Europe.

Different views on EU integration

Among the parties of the Second Republic, the major forces of the centre-right, Forza Italia and the National Alliance (AN) that merged into the People of Freedom Party (PDL) in 2008, but then split again into Forza Italia and several small parties in 2013, showed from their origins clear hints of Euroscepticism. Their political discourse has moved back and forth from soft Euroscepticism to vagueness to broad unspecific pro-Europeanism, where the latter is mainly comprised of a supportive rhetoric largely used to gain domestic and international legitimacy for those parties whose leadership (respectively, the media tycoon Berlusconi and the post-fascist Fini) was distrusted by many, both domestically and internationally. Indeed, their support for European integration was rarely issue-specific. Throughout their life Forza Italia and National Alliance alternated hints of support for the general idea of integration with issue-specific Eurosceptical stances. In particular, the record of Forza Italia – until 2007 the largest Italian party and the main component of every centre-right coalition government – and of the PDL (the largest party in government in 2008–11) is striking. Forza Italia started in 1994 with a rather pro-European stance, but over time became more reticent with the lowest level of programmatic commitment to EU issues in the entire party system, while AN’s rhetoric referred more intensely to the EU, but alternated pro-European and Eurosceptical stances.
Forza Italia and National Alliance agreed on the broad principle of the defence of national interests and on a preference for intergovernmentalism within the EU. Otherwise, on other issues the distance between the positions of these two parties was remarkable. For instance, AN was very interested in the EU playing an autonomous (even from NATO) international role, something that in the end would indirectly enhance the international role of Italy (otherwise a middle-ranking power with limited international influence). AN also showed an interest in the capacity of the EU to protect European economies from the challenges of globalisation. The focus was on the protection of goods produced in the EU from the low-cost products of non-EU countries. Ultimately the party saw in the European arena an environment in which a defensive strategy of economic protectionism could more successfully be achieved. On the other hand, the priority of Forza Italia was to create an ever-larger free-market area, more than a federal and politically integrated entity (several times the party proposed Russian and Israeli membership of the EU). The issue of the international role of the EU was instead little developed by Forza Italia, but its preference was openly for a predominant role for NATO. The stance of the PDL on the EU was hesitant and confused, probably as a result of different orientations of its internal factions linked either to Christian Democrat ideology, conservative neo-liberal thinking or political nationalism.

As a result of the economic crisis and the related austerity measures, the EU has become a more contentious issue in recent times, also because of greater politicisation by the PDL, as was shown for example in the general elections of 2013. Some of the patterns already at work in the party system were reinforced on this occasion and the PDL developed its critical stance into bitter antagonism against EU institutions. In particular, the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, Olli Rehn, was represented by the party as an enemy of the Italian state and, together with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, a conspirator against Italians’ national interests. The electoral campaign conducted by the PDL built on stories of socio-economic panic and conspiracy against Italy. For example, Berlusconi accused the EU technocracy of forcing his government (in office in 2008–11) to resign, under the threat of economic sanctions against the country. According to Berlusconi’s accusations, the EU exerted pressure to replace his government with one led by the former European Commissioner Mario Monti, in order to make the Italian executive more acquiescent to German and EU interests and demands. This is clear evidence of how the PDL has made efforts to demarcate itself from the mainstream and politicise the EU issue in order to give representation to an emerging split that divides advocates and opponents of the EU within Italian society.

At the other end of the political spectrum, from the early 1990s the Italian centre-left has placed Europe at the heart of its programme. The Italian People’s Party/Margherita – a party which then merged with the Democratic Party – developed the traditional commitment of the Christian Democrats to the idea of a united Europe, while the social democrats (PDS-DS) reflected the positive international commitment of this family of parties. These two parties put forward within the country the principle of an ever-closer union. When in government, they appointed Romano Prodi (President of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004) prime minister twice. Both parties supported indeed the idea of a federal Europe and, therefore, of intense political integration. For this reason they were also in favour of supranational decision-making and critical of intergovernmentalism. Specifically, they supported the reinforcement of the EP and the Commission to the detriment of the Council and the overall improvement of popular legitimacy and powers of EU institutions through the direct election of the President of the Commission. They proposed EU (either exclusive or shared) involvement in the management of many policies as yet not so Europeanised, such as foreign and defence, justice, immigration and social policies. They were also in favour of a strong role for the EU in the
international arena and the creation of an independent European military force, while in their view NATO should be transformed into an instrument of the United Nations. Finally, they proposed a permanent seat for the EU on the Security Council. Since 2007, the Democratic Party has proved coherent with the pro-European line of its founders. During the electoral campaign of 2013, there was indeed an attempt by the PD to put on the agenda the issues of economic growth and the relaxation of EU austerity measures, still within a framework of general loyalty and commitment to the EU process. It was not until 2014 that a newly formed coalition cabinet led by the new PD secretary Matteo Renzi announced a project of renegotiation of the Eurozone criteria and, in particular of the maximum allowed ratio of the annual general government deficit relative to gross domestic product. The idea is to allow Eurozone countries to exceed this ratio (3 per cent) for investments in infrastructure and measures to combat the crisis. Although at the time of writing the exact nature of these proposed measures is not clear, nor the terms of the supposed negotiation with the EU, it is interesting to note that under the pressure of a growing Eurosceptical front, a government led by the PD has for the first time introduced a critical note in its representation of the EU, arguing that its external influence is not entirely positive, but that it creates obstacles to growth and to overcoming the economic crisis in the country. It might be an exaggeration to interpret this as a shift in the attitudes of the centre-left towards the EU. Still, it is a sign of growing competition on the EU in a context of growing Euroscepticism on the part of citizens. Increasingly, parties including the PD respond to citizens’ fears and perceived threats by promising the defence of national interests from the EU.

The 2013 general elections saw the creation of a new party (Civic Choice) led by the incumbent prime minister Mario Monti. This party and its leader made loyalty to the EU a firm priority. Needless to say, Monti’s government gained an international reputation for its capacity to respond positively to EU recommendations and create a climate of international trust in the Italian government. Many austerity measures have been introduced under this government to meet EU demands and to comply with the competitive pressures imposed on Eurozone countries. The fact that during the same elections, the commissioner Rehn made a public endorsement of the Italian pro-European parties, in particular Monti’s Civic Choice, contributed to the bitterness of the campaign and to increasing domestic polarisation with regard to the EU whose institutions became an easy target for political rivalry. After a disappointing result in the 2013 elections, the Europhile Civic Choice party split into many different factions of limited importance and, although represented in government with a limited presence and role, it has almost disappeared from the political scene and the electoral market.

As we have already mentioned, at the extremes of the political spectrum, throughout the past two decades Euroscepticism has been a solid feature. The small Communist party Rifondazione Comunista showed strong signs of opposition to European integration and the radical right-wing party, the Northern League, also held positions of fierce opposition to the EU. After the decline of the Northern League and the Communists, the M5S developed those parties’ stances, which have taken it to unprecedented electoral success. In the past, the anti-capitalist Rifondazione Comunista defined the EU as an instrument of Americanisation and as an enemy, like other international technocratic powers such as the IMF and the WTO. The party voted against the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and fiercely opposed monetary union and the creation of a European Central Bank. The reconstructed communists opposed the involvement of the EU in most policy fields, with the exception of social policy, where, in their view, the role of the EU in promoting best welfare practices could be beneficial in overcoming asymmetries across the member states. It is interesting to note that, contrary to the centre-left, in its discourse Rifondazione mainly presented the negative outcomes of the integration process and its external
constraints on Italy. It defined European politics as a cause of the diminishing quality of life of lower classes and disadvantaged social groups and of stagnation in consumer demand. Rifondazione started a process of realignment from the mid-2000s that eventually led to the party becoming part of a government led by Europhile Prime Minister Romano Prodi in 2006–7. However, after this period the party became largely irrelevant with minimal electoral support and little coalition potential; hence its shift was not really conducive to any major change on the left of the political spectrum, beyond a simple decline of this area.

At the other end of the political spectrum, the regionalist Northern League (LN) strongly criticised the results that European integration had achieved as well. While defending intergovernmentalism within the EU, it accused the European institutions of aiming at a process of state-building whose final goal is to replace nation states with a new undemocratic superstate. It expressed a pessimistic evaluation of the EU’s impact on the main goal promoted by the party – the self-determination of the Northern regions of Italy – as well as on its targeted social groups – such as farmers, milk producers and small firms. LN rejected EU policy competence in most fields and framed stories of moral panic when describing the integration process, anticipating immigrant flows from the new member states and candidate countries, job losses and mounting unemployment of Italian citizens. Interestingly, the Northern League presents the preservation of the European meta-culture – rooted in Christianity and set apart from the other cultures – as a main political goal. Actually, the discourse on a shared identity among Europeans has become a central point in the rhetoric of this party. However, it is one used to justify another theme on which the party exerts a sort of issue-ownership within the system: the rejection of non-EU citizens (particularly Muslims), considered aliens and enemies of European civilisation. Indeed, this discourse does not include any reference to the shared identity of Europeans based on the common experience of the EU process and is not conducive to building a European identity, but rather to marking distance from non-Europeans, sometimes with overtly xenophobic tones.

Finally, the M5S is a new party with no past record before 2013, when it contested national elections for the first time. On this occasion the party leader, Beppe Grillo, made the EU central to its campaign. Interestingly, the Eurosceptical discourse of Grillo is similar to – but much more radical than – the recent discourse of the centre-right. Furthermore it develops many old Eurosceptic arguments made by the radical left and right. This phenomenon shows that competition has developed at the Eurosceptic end of the political spectrum and that a growing number of parties now give salience to a pessimistic representation of Europe. During the campaign, the M5S insisted in particular on stories of conspiracy on the part of the EU and other European countries against Italy. Grillo contended that the European Central Bank lent money to Italian banks to make them buy Italian government bonds that before were held by German and French banks. This would serve as a means to free France and Germany from toxic assets, while shifting to Italy the whole burden of financial uncertainty and indebtedness. Additionally, many times Grillo proposed a referendum on Italy leaving the Eurozone. Rejection of the EU by this party is therefore important in all aspects of the integration process, including policy, institutional representation and identity. At the time of writing, the future of this party is very uncertain, and it remains to be seen whether it will survive the institutionalisation and political responsibility that are normally associated with parties with such a large share of the vote. The 5SM is a personality-based party lacking a central office and subject to the discretionary decisions of the party leader. It delegates its main political choices and policy stances to a single leader who decides every time, often following public opinion and without necessarily formalising it in a programmatic platform. Thus, we have limited systematic information on the overall stance of this party and it is difficult to assess whether the party rank and file all
share the same Europhobic attitude. Ultimately, it is interesting to note that a party with such a hard Eurosceptical stance could be so successful in Italy. It is a clear sign of a shift in the attitudes of citizens towards Europe and of its impact on the party system.

On the whole, the picture of party politicisation and preference formation on Europe could be seen in the light of two points of view proposed by the comparative literature. The first concerns the European vocation of social democrats in several countries (Hix et al., 2007; Ladrech, 2000) that has clearly emerged in Italy as well. The second concerns the Eurosceptical attitudes of parties on the edges of the political spectrum (Szcerbiak and Taggart, 2008) that have also found fertile ground in Italy. The two oldest radical parties (Rifondazione Comunista and the Northern League) have been in government several times in coalition with the mainstream parties, and this contributed to their reducing their anti-EU rhetoric and aligning their institutional behaviour with regard to the EU with that of mainstream parties. However, this is not the case with the M5S, which has taken a confrontational and anti-system stance within the Parliament and whose Euroscepticism seems firmly principled. The Left (Europhilic) and the Right (Eurosceptical) used the EU issue to demarcate themselves from each other. However, of late the EU has become so unpopular with public opinion that the most recent signs are in the direction of an adoption of a critical stance by the centre-left as well.

Ultimately, over a long period of time, Italy evolved from having a polarised party system with polarised attitudes to the EU, to a segmented party system with Euroscepticism confined to its edges, to a segmented party system with a tendency to become polarised again (witness the role of the M5S). Competition over the EU issue has overlapped with – and even strengthened – the dominant pattern of competition in the party system. Indeed, conflict over the European issue produced a divergence when polarisation of the party system was higher and a convergence when polarisation was lower. In this respect, Conti and Verzichelli (2012) proposed the argument of the internalisation of the European issue along the established lines of party division: a process largely characterised by a fit between the conflict over EEC/EU and the domestic patterns of party competition. The European issue has neither disrupted the Italian party system, nor has it created a new cleavage. Typically, Europe becomes more politicised as long as the system becomes more polarised and citizens become more divided. In the end, competition over the EU has been internalised by the patterns of competition characterising the party system, and it might also have contributed to their reinforcement.

**Final remarks**

Italy was a country of extraordinary Europhilia until the mid-1990s. The symbiosis between integration, modernisation and economic stability was very effective in the eyes of domestic politicians and decisionmakers and enjoyed a widespread permissive consensus on the part of citizens. However, this pattern completely changed after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the new parties born after the end of the First Republic have channelled the growing unhappiness of citizens with the EU within the party system. Since the economic crisis, Euroscepticism and protest voting have become more significant in the country, so even mainstream parties have made their anti-EU rhetoric central in their discourse (PDL) or have at least encompassed some aspects of criticism (PD). However, the fact that in Italy the discourse on the EU has become largely Eurosceptical does not mean that the institutional behaviour of parties and of institutions follows the same tendency. On EU matters, after the Europhilic Monti government, Italy had a more divided government based on a grand coalition, which, however, has not changed its behaviour towards the EU. Indeed, changing the roots of loyalty (or even acquiescence) of the Italian government to the EU might prove very difficult for the
Euro sceptical forces even when they are in government, especially in the context of the economic vulnerability of the country. For example, despite a broad debate within the government on the necessity of renegotiating the EU criteria for Eurozone countries, in recent years the loyalty of the Ministry of the Economy to the EU proved very solid. Certainly, the lack of consensus on the EU trajectory and the mounting Euroscepticism on the political scene are emergent phenomena of great interest. However, the Italian government looks very much embedded in a role of a government that rules but does not represent. In particular, it rules under the external constraint of the EU – particularly severe during the economic crisis – but it does not represent those demands of change in the trajectory of the EU that have become so prominent in Italy, once a Europhile country.

Notes

1 As of 2008, the party is not represented in the Italian parliament any more. Therefore it has not participated in the process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.

2 The Democratic Party was created in 2007 when the Left Democrats (DS) merged with Margherita. Today, it is the main party on the centre-left.

3 This party became the largest heir of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which was dissolved in the early 1990s. It has moved from a post-communist legacy to a more moderate social democrat platform. Dissident members of the old PCI created a separate and more extreme party, Rifondazione Comunista, and other fringe parties.

4 For example, it has been shown that, when in government, these parties voted in favour of the ratification of EU legislation as much as the mainstream incumbent parties (Conti and De Giorgi, 2011).

References


