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THE NEIGHBOURS OF THE EU’S NEIGHBOURS

Overcoming geographical silos

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Introduction: reviewing key policies in a deteriorating strategic context

In 2002 and 2003, both the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the part of the European Security Strategy (ESS) dealing with the EU’s neighbourhood aimed to promote ‘security, stability and prosperity in a ring of well-governed countries to the East and South of the European Union (EU)’ (European Council 2002: point 22; European Council 2003: 8).

More than a decade later, the EU’s neighbourhood has become politically more unstable and insecure, and both the ENP and the ESS underwent major reviews in 2015. While the review of the ENP was published in November 2015 (European Commission and High Representative 2015b), the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini, presented the new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy – a (thematically) global strategy rather than just a security strategy – in June 2016 (European External Action Service 2016).

Among the questions raised by the joint consultation paper of the European Commission and High Representative (2015a: 4), which prepared the review of the ENP, was the geographical scope of the future policy: ‘many of the challenges that need to be tackled by the EU and its neighbours together, cannot be adequately addressed without considering, or in some cases co-operating with, the neighbours of the neighbours’.

The spillover of violence from the civil war in Libya into Mali, in 2013, and from the ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq into Syria, as well as the waves of migrants and refugees from Africa and Asia crossing the Mediterranean Sea, or following the route through the Balkans, are just a few recent examples to illustrate the regions’ interconnectedness. This is also reflected in the strategic assessment presented to the European Council in June 2015 entitled ‘The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex world’ (European External Action Service 2015). Two major questions stand out in the ENP review:

Geographically, the ENP is confronted with the differences between and within each region, as well as the tight interlinkages – for good or ill – between the EU’s neighbours and the neighbours’ own neighbouring countries and regions. Conceptually,
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the ENP was premised on the notion of ‘enlargement lite’, the relevance and effectiveness of which are now being called into question.

(ibid.: 15)

The Council of the European Union (2015a: point 2) called to make the ENP ‘more political and responsive to the diverse challenges in the neighbourhood’ and to take into consideration the ENP countries’ broader geographical context and ‘their relations with their neighbours’ (ibid. point 5). The European Parliament (2015: point 53) stressed that ‘the EU should realistically consider the different policy options that its partners face, as well as how to build bridges with their neighbours on different levels’. In 2006, the European Commission (Commission of the European Communities 2006) had already called for working with the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours in Central Asia, the Gulf and Africa. Yet, this appeal gained ground only recently in the policy debate, as well as in the scholarly literature (Gstöhl and Lannon 2014; 2015), and among think tanks (Grevi 2014; Biscop 2014; Lehne 2014).

This chapter asks how the various legal, policy and strategic frameworks designed by the EU for its neighbours, and their neighbours, could be better integrated, or at least linked by developing transnational and cross-regional cooperation initiatives. It argues that, given the rapid development of the trans-regional challenges, which the EU is facing in its broader neighbourhood, and because the ENP and ESS were both under review most recently, there was an opportunity to develop a more consistent cross-regional approach. The ENP is a composite, cross-sector policy, requiring the comprehensive approach that the new Global Strategy aims at also. However, this opportunity was only partially seized. The neighbours of the EU’s neighbours are only briefly mentioned in the proposals for the ENP review for the sake of the stabilisation of the broader neighbourhood (European Commission and High Representative 2015b), whereas the EU Global Strategy emphasises the need for the EU to promote resilience in its surrounding regions (European External Action Service 2016), yet without identifying new or innovative instruments to address, in concrete terms, the challenges posed by the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours.

The chapter first briefly outlines the challenges that the interconnectedness of many problems in the broader neighbourhood pose. It then presents an overview of the fragmentation of the EU’s current frameworks in these regions. It concludes that the review of the ENP could have been better coordinated with the ESS review and that a joined-up approach requires, as stressed by the European External Action Service (2015: 19), ‘the end of geographical silos’.

The trans-regional challenges in the EU’s broader neighbourhood

Paradoxically, not all direct neighbours of the EU are included in the ENP framework, while some of the ENP partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Jordan) are not direct neighbours of the EU. Therefore, the concept of the ‘neighbours of the EU’s neighbours’ should not be interpreted in a strictly geographical sense – as those countries which share a terrestrial or maritime border with a neighbour of the EU – but understood from a broader geopolitical perspective. The following (sub-)regions are, besides Turkey and Russia, of special importance:

- in Africa: the Sahel at large and the Horn of Africa;
- in the Middle East: the Arabian Peninsula with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Yemen, as well as Iraq and Iran; and
- in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Linkages with other Asian countries, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, must be taken into consideration, for example in the field of counter-terrorism (Lannon 2014).

The transnational or trans-regional challenges that the EU and its neighbours are currently facing are numerous. With regard to the problems and potential areas of cooperation in the broader neighbourhood, the EU institutions have, among others, identified the following issues: human, drugs and arms trafficking; organised crime; weapons proliferation; terrorism; piracy; regional conflicts; humanitarian crises; environmental pollution; nuclear hazards; communicable diseases; illegal immigration; border management; regional infrastructures; water and energy issues (Commission of the European Communities 2003: 6; European External Action Service 2011: 1; Council of the European Union 2007a: 3). The African sub-region faces numerous challenges related to extreme poverty and food crises, but also fragile statehood.

Among the security challenges in the ENP countries are longstanding conflicts: the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; the Western Sahara; the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’ in the post-Soviet space – Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria; alongside the more recent conflicts in Libya, Syria and Ukraine. Although the EU has progressively become more involved in the management of some of the protracted conflicts in its neighbourhood – through diplomacy and different negotiating formats, missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and sanctions – its engagement has varied considerably across regions (Noutcheva 2015; Popescu 2011). Despite the reinforcement of the CSDP provisions with the Lisbon Treaty, Blockmans and Wessel (2011: 101) identify a ‘flagrant lack of common vision on how to tackle and resolve disputes on the borders of the European Union’.

In the EU’s broader neighbourhood intra-state conflicts abound, whereas inter-state conflicts are less frequent. According to Kartsonaki and Wolff (2015), there are clear links between conflicts in countries such as Mali, Iraq or Sudan/South Sudan, and conflicts in the more immediate neighbourhood of the ENP. The security challenges that these countries face combine with a range of other challenges related to state fragility and poor living conditions (ibid.).

Many of these challenges are closely interlinked and of a trans-regional nature. Therefore, they should be prioritised when defining inter-regional or cross-border cooperation (Lannon 2015). Despite these many pressing challenges transcending the boundaries of the EU’s neighbours, the EU has different policy frameworks in place with the neighbours of its neighbours. The lack of a strategic vision has led to the neglect of the inter-linkages between the EU’s direct neighbours and the latter’s own neighbours. Yet, the general objectives of the ENP and the ESS – security, stability, prosperity – cannot be achieved if the regional environments and realities of the EU’s partners are not properly kept in mind when designing national and (sub-)regional initiatives.

The EU’s fragmented policy frameworks

The EU has concluded various types of agreements with the neighbours of its neighbours. It provides them with financial and humanitarian assistance, aims to promote democracy and human rights, as well as trade and development, and has also put a few (sub-)regional strategies in place: for the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. It also carries out a few missions and operations under the CSDP in these regions.

Africa and the Mediterranean

The EU’s overall approach to Africa concentrates on development and security issues. The Joint Africa–EU Strategy adopted in 2007 aims ‘to bridge the development divide between
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Africa and Europe through the strengthening of economic co-operation and the promotion of sustainable development in both continents, living side by side in peace, security, prosperity, solidarity and human dignity’ (Council of the European Union 2007b: point 4).

However, the EU’s approach towards its direct neighbours in North Africa and the Near East (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and, in principle, Syria) is mainly defined by the ENP frameworks for cooperation (regional, inter-regional and cross-border dimensions) and residuals of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP; the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements), while the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meetings, now framed by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), are still difficult to relaunch. The EU’s relations with the sub-Saharan African countries, including the neighbours of the above-mentioned EU neighbours – Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan and (by geopolitical extension) South Sudan and Somalia – are formally placed under the Cotonou Agreement concluded with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states (Lannon 2014).

At the bilateral level, the EU has concluded Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and is negotiating Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) with Morocco and Tunisia. At the multilateral level, the 1995 Barcelona Declaration foresaw the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, and Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt entered the Agadir Free Trade Agreement (Lannon 2013). For the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and regional groupings of the ACP countries are to progressively establish free trade areas. The countries of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, together with other ACP countries, have been split into four different regional groupings to negotiate EPAs with the EU. These EPA negotiations have encountered many obstacles, because they base trade no longer on the principle of non-reciprocity with the whole ACP group, but on reciprocal, comprehensive Free Trade Areas (FTAs) with several sub-groups (Pape 2013). The least developed countries among the African neighbours of EU’s neighbours, profit from the EU’s unilateral ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative and have little incentive to sign up to such EPA. Whereas the Southern Mediterranean partners benefit from the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the main geographical financial instrument for the ACP countries is the European Development Fund (EDF).

Among the many CSDP missions in the region have been the EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic, the EUCAP Sahel Niger, the EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUCAP Nestor, the EUTM Mali and the EUTM Somalia, as well as the EUAVSEC South Sudan mission and the EUNAVFOR Somalia (Atalanta). The EU also provided assistance to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Bailes and Dunay 2015; Kartsonaki and Wolff 2015). All these missions took place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and mainly in the Sahel and Horn of Africa. In response to the problems in these regions, the EU has in recent years developed specific sub-regional strategies. The EU’s ‘Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel’ recognises that the challenges faced by the three core Sahel states (Mauritania, Mali and Niger) affect neighbouring countries like Algeria, Libya or Morocco (European External Action Service 2011). It acknowledges that ‘the absence of a sub-regional organisation encompassing all the Sahel and Maghreb states [is likely to] lead to unilateral or poorly coordinated action and hamper credible and effective regional initiatives’ (ibid.: 3). The ‘Horn of Africa Strategy’ (Council of the European Union 2011) builds on the earlier ‘EU Policy on the Horn of Africa’, which emphasised that ‘[a]ll individual countries of the sub-region have seen their domestic conflicts influenced by, or having implications on, the neighbourhood’ (Council of the European Union 2009: 8). The turmoil in Mali in 2013 revealed how closely connected the EU’s immediate neighbourhood is to the Sahel. Nevertheless, the EU’s free trade projects in the Mediterranean and ACP regions are not (planned to be) linked to each other. The case of Mauritania illustrates the arbitrariness of the cooperation
frameworks: this ACP country is a member of the EMP and of the UfM, but – unlike the other countries of the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) established in 1989 – it has not been included in the ENP.

The Middle East and the Arab countries

Turning to the Middle East, the EU has – since the ill-fated Euro-Arab Dialogue with the League of Arab States (1973–1990) – divided the Arab countries into different frameworks of cooperation. In addition to the EMP/ENP/UfM, covering most of the Arab Maghreb and Mashreq countries, and the Cotonou Agreement, which includes Arab ACP countries such as the Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania and, in principle, also Sudan and Somalia, the EU has established an inter-regional relationship with the GCC. The 1988 Cooperation Agreement committed the European Economic Community (EEC) and the GCC to enter ‘into discussions concerning the negotiation of an agreement aimed at the expansion of trade’ (EEC-GCC Cooperation Agreement 1989: Art. 11). Negotiations regarding an FTA have been initiated, in 1990, but were suspended in 2008 (European Commission 2016). Two other Arab countries, Iraq and Yemen, have been left out of any multilateral institutional arrangement with the European Union, while a Cooperation Agreement was concluded with Yemen in 1998. Two years after the 2003 US-led military intervention in Iraq, the EU established the civilian EUJUST LEX Iraq mission to strengthen the rule of law and to promote the respect for human rights, and in 2012 concluded a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Iraq. As far as Iran is concerned, negotiations were put on hold from 2005, due to the country’s nuclear activities. The three countries benefit from the EU’s general Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), whereas the Partnership Instrument is the framework for financial cooperation between the EU and the GCC countries (as well as other high-income countries).

The EU’s relations with the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Iran, combine bilateral and inter-regional aspects. The 2004 ‘EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East’ (SPMME) was a first attempt to overcome this fragmentation (European Council 2005). Although it embraced the Arab Mediterranean countries and Israel, the members of the GCC – Yemen, Iraq, Iran and possibly Turkey – it still relied on existing instruments and mechanisms and clearly distinguished between the countries of the EMP and those east of Jordan (ibid.: point 49). Nevertheless, it did consider the progressive future establishment of regional free trade agreements, such as the linking of the Euro-Mediterranean and EU-GCC FTAs. The original proposal from the European Commission and High Representative (2003) to envisage a regional strategy for the ‘Wider Middle East’ was not followed up in the SPMME. A few years later, instead of embedding the newly created UfM in this Strategic Partnership to connect Europe, the Mediterranean, the Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq, the EU’s policies remained compartmentalised (Lannon 2008).

Central Asia and the Black Sea

The EU’s relations with Central Asia are mainly based on bilateralism, accompanied by a regional strategy, and a strong focus on energy security. Central Asia is, for the time being, the least conflict-affected area of the EU’s broader neighbourhood, but the European Commission supports the Border Management in Central Asia Programme (BOMCA). The EU concluded bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, while the PCA concluded with Turkmenistan in 1998 has still not been ratified.
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due to human rights concerns. Kazakhstan, a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), has in December 2015 signed an Enhanced PCA with the EU.

According to the Central Asia Strategy, ‘[t]he strong EU commitment towards its eastern neighbours within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy will also bring Europe and Central Asia closer to each other’ (Council of the European Union 2007a: 2). The common challenges notwithstanding, the EU did not pursue a multilateral approach towards the five republics. In June 2015, the Council of the European Union (2015b: point 14) announced that

[i]n order to support better interconnections of the Central Asian countries with both their immediate neighbours and partners further afield, such as the European Union, the EU will take into account existing regional synergies and links with neighbouring countries in implementing its Strategy, thus recognising the strategic position of the Central Asian countries and possibilities to promote regional stability through stronger trade links. The Council thus encourages sharing European standards, experience and best practices in specific sectors, in accordance with the interest and level of ambition of individual Central Asian countries.

The EU’s Black Sea Synergy initiative, launched in 2007, aimed at cooperation with the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, which comprises Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. It envisaged ‘a close link between the Black Sea approach and an EU Strategy for Central Asia’ (Commission of the European Communities 2007: 3). The Black Sea Synergy initiative generated ‘rather limited results’, and given that ‘the Black Sea region is a strategic bridge connecting Europe with the Caspian Sea area, Central Asia and the Middle East’, the European Parliament (2011) has been calling for a proper ‘EU Strategy for the Black Sea’. Regarding financial assistance, the TACIS programme (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States), from 1991 to 2006, covered Central Asia, the Eastern Partnership countries and Russia. For the Central Asian republics, TACIS was then replaced by the broader DCI, while the eastern ENP countries fall under the ENI and Russia is now included in the Partnership Instrument.

**Cross-regional comparison**

In comparison, the current policy frameworks in the EU’s broader neighbourhood appear to be looser from west to east: while in Africa multilateralism and (emerging) inter-regionalism prevail, cooperation in the Middle East is characterised by inter-regionalism and bilateralism and in Central Asia mainly by bilateralism. Among the main shortcomings are, on the one hand, the divisions within the regions (except for Central Asia) and, on the other, the lack of policy linkages and concrete cooperation projects between the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours. Such fragmentation risks leading to ‘patchiness and policy vacuums’ and ‘fails to leverage regional connections’ (Youngs and Echagüe 2010: 27). The EU’s reaction to the ‘Arab Spring’, for instance, overlooked the strong relations of Southern Mediterranean countries with the Gulf monarchies, while regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Iran appear to be engaged in a geopolitical bid seeking to extend their influence across the EU’s broader neighbourhood.

Nevertheless, there are first attempts to better connect the policy frameworks. In its 1998 Cooperation Agreement with Yemen, the EU explicitly foresew that economic and other cooperation may extend to activities under agreements with other countries of the same region.
Two cross-regional programmes are already supported by the ENP’s financial instrument and the DCI: the INOGATE programme (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe), which assists the development of energy cooperation between the EU, the littoral states of the Black and Caspian Seas and their neighbouring countries; and the TRACECA programme (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia), which develops transport between Europe and Asia across the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. The revised Cotonou Agreement of 2010 also contains a clause for cooperation between countries, regions and territories eligible under the ENI, the DCI and the EDF.

On the other hand, the creation of the Eastern Partnership contributed to a more assertive Russia pushing for Eurasian integration in the post-Soviet area, resulting in Armenia and Belarus joining the EEU, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine searching for closer ties with the EU, and Azerbaijan trying to keep distance from both (Delcour and Kostanyan 2014).

Many events in the ENP area have in fact challenged the assumption of a systematic gradual convergence of the neighbouring countries to the EU. In the context of the ESS review, the European External Action Service acknowledged that the EU’s diplomatic, economic, migration, asylum and security policies need to account for the deep connections between Europe’s southern neighbours and their neighbours in the Gulf and sub-Saharan Africa in order to help put out the fires ravaging the region, from Libya to Syria, and Iraq to Yemen.

(2015: 9)

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the intervention of the Russian Federation army in Syria since the end of September 2015 (and notably the launching of missiles from the Caspian and Mediterranean seas) has been shedding light on other connections in the EU’s broader neighbourhood. Indeed, Russia and Turkey, two key players in the area, have developed and are developing their own policies and strategies in neighbourhoods partly shared with the EU.

**Conclusions: coordinating the implementation of the reviewed ENP and the EU Global Strategy**

This chapter examined how the various legal, policy and strategic frameworks designed by the EU for its neighbours and their neighbours could be better integrated, or at least linked by developing transnational and cross-regional concrete cooperation initiatives like the TRACECA programme. It argued that given the rapid development of the trans-regional challenges, which the EU is facing in its broader neighbourhood, the ENP and ESS reviews were opportunities not to be missed to develop a more consistent and coordinated cross-regional approach. Although both documents briefly address the issue of the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours, they do so mainly through the perspectives of political dialogue and the few existing sub-regional frameworks (in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa).

Recent events have clearly demonstrated that the EU cannot escape geopolitical rivalry in its neighbourhood and that it largely failed to think strategically ahead. For a broader strategic vision, the EU needs to assess its interests and comparative advantages in a region, while considering coherence with its overall external action. Ignoring the interconnections between the EU’s immediate and broader neighbourhood carries the risk of inconsistent and ineffective policies.

While the ENP, for instance, stresses political conditionality regarding democracy and human rights standards in Algeria, the EU needs security cooperation with this pivotal country...
for its Sahel Strategy (Bello 2012). According to Vines and Soliman (2014), the EU has repeatedly criticised Ethiopia for flawed elections, but nevertheless increased its budget support to the Ethiopian government because the country continues to be a strategic ally in the Horn of Africa. Warkotsch and Youngs (2015) argue that concerns about EU energy security and geopolitical interests in the Middle East and in Central Asia militate against a more ambitious promotion of democracy and human rights vis-à-vis political regimes that are not propitious for reforms.

Among the lessons to be drawn from the ‘Arab Spring’ is that the engagement with authoritarian leaderships, for the sake of political stability, should not sideline the EU’s commitment to democracy, rule of law and human rights. In the words of the European External Action Service (2015: 12), ‘stability is no substitute for sustainability’. However, given the current crisis situation, generated by several conflicts in the EU’s broader neighbourhood or beyond (Afghanistan), a number of EU Member States are willing to promote stability, even if the price to pay is to cooperate with authoritarian – if not dictatorial – political regimes.

The ‘values vs. interests’ dilemma is at the core of the strategic reflection that is needed at EU level to improve the consistency of its various bilateral and (sub-)regional initiatives (Noutcheva, Pomorska and Bosse 2013). Kartsonaki and Wolff (2015) find that the EU adopts elements of a norms-driven human security approach most consistently in cases where it can also be considered to have significant security interests of its own. ‘While undeniably part of the EU’s foreign and security policy in the wider neighbourhood, the normative motivations that underpin the human security approach are not a strategic driver of EU action’ (ibid.: 224). Whereas the EU pursues a purposeful and institutionalised rule-transfer vis-à-vis ENP countries, combined with a conditionality policy, there is no comparable ‘external governance’ approach in its broader neighbourhood (Lavenex 2011: 386).

The EU could promote bridge-building between the ENP countries and their neighbours on several levels (Gstöhl 2014): unilaterally, through the funding of cross-framework and cross-regional cooperation, for instance on the basis of specific clauses in financial instruments and/or an own cross-border cooperation programme for the neighbours of EU’s neighbours, and through the inter-linkage of its regional strategies (while embedding them in a broader common strategic framework); bilaterally, through regional cooperation clauses in agreements and through enhanced political dialogue; and multilaterally, through closer cooperation with the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours in regional and global fora. The new trade strategy of October 2015 remains silent on the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours, but it recognises that, contrary to earlier assumptions, not all ENP countries are interested in ‘closer integration with the EU’ and that trade agreements other than the DCFTAs might be needed (European Commission 2015: 34). This demand for more differentiated partnerships was acknowledged by the ENP review a month later (European Commission and High Representative 2015b). The Council of the European Union (2015a: point 5) recognised that ‘the broader geographical context of our partners and their relations with their neighbours are important considerations, impacting upon the ENP’, but it also stressed immediately afterwards that it was ‘the sole right of the EU and its partners to decide in a sovereign way on how they want to proceed in their relations’. The ENP and ESS reviews failed to propose new cross-regional and transnational instruments and programmes to address the manifold concrete challenges (such as migration or terrorism) of the EU’s broader neighbourhood. Coordinating the implementation of the reviewed ENP and the EU Global Strategy will thus be of crucial importance. The neighbours of the EU’s neighbours are on the EU’s political agenda, but what the European External Action Service conceded regarding migration policy applies to external action in general: a joined-up approach ‘requires the end of geographical silos’ (2015: 19).
Notes

1 For an overview of the conflicts in the EU’s wider neighbourhood, within and between the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours, see Kartsonaki and Wolff (2015: 205–209).
2 On the EU’s trade relations with the ENP countries and with the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours, see Gstöhl (2015).
3 On these two specific cases see Lannon (2014: 15).

References

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