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The self-organizing city
An analysis of the institutionalization of organic urban development in the Netherlands

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Abstract
Due to the impact of the global financial crisis on the Dutch real estate market, the poor financial position of municipalities that resulted from that, and their reluctance to continue with proactive public land development, and an ongoing shift from greenfield development to urban transformation, private sector-led organic urban development increasingly seems to replace the predominant comprehensive, integrated approach to planning and real estate development in the Netherlands. The question we address in this chapter is to what extent these “new” organic development approaches have been institutionalized in the Netherlands. We use insights from theories on institutional change to create a better understanding of the way new planning and development practices institutionalize, and to “measure” whether the new practices have exceeded the threshold of institutionalized behavior. The issue has been further explored in a study of the city of The Hague. We were able to study in-depth characteristics of all urban development projects initiated in The Hague between 2008 and 2015. Our research shows that urban developments in The Hague have indeed become more “organic,” though there is still a prominent role for the municipality. Instead of “traditional” large private development companies, end-users and investors with a long-term interest increasingly appear to take initiatives for new developments. The results of our study may relate to debates taking place in many countries regarding shifting public and private sector roles in planning and development projects.

Introduction
Dutch cities have for a long time relied on a comprehensive, integrated approach to planning and real estate development, based on a public land development model (Needham, 2007; Buitelaar, 2010; van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013). The defining feature of this approach is that the municipality purchases the land earmarked for development. The municipality then prepares the land for further development (including all necessary infrastructure works), before
it sells the serviced land to developers and/or housing associations. The system aims to provide both high-quality development locations and cheap land for subsidized social housing. For years, this policy has allowed municipalities to make profits with which other municipal facilities could be funded. Also, as landowners, municipalities were in a good position to negotiate with private developers about the desired development of the location. Private developers appreciated the model, because it reduced their financial risks, while still being able to make a profit (Faludi and Van der Valk, 1994), provided them with high-quality locations and helped to control competitive developments elsewhere. Recent years have shown the downside of this development model: the economic and financial crisis led to a downturn in the demand for new housing, private developers stopped buying building plots from municipalities, and municipalities lost hundreds of millions of euros, mainly because of unanticipated increased interest costs (van der Krabben and Heurkens, 2015). As a consequence, calls for a change in the practice of area development in the Netherlands have increased in recent years.

In response to these developments, some, such as Urhahn Urban Design (2010, pp. 1–3) call for an approach based on small-scale, process-oriented developments that are user-oriented and reflect common values. Buitelaar, Galle, and Sorel (2014), foreseeing a period in which growth is not guaranteed and urban area development has structurally changed, take over this plea and advocate a more organic approach to area development. A growing attention to self-organization, spontaneous order, and organic area development is not limited to the Netherlands, but can be found across many developed countries (Alfasi and Portugali, 2007; Andersson and Moroni, 2014; Moroni, 2015).

The question we address in this chapter is whether these “new” organic development approaches have been institutionalized in the Netherlands. The issue has been further explored in a study of the city of The Hague. We were able to study in-depth characteristics of all urban development projects initiated in The Hague between 2008 and 2015. This analysis provides insights into, among other things, the type and size of projects, the scale of the projects, the role of the municipality, and the role of private actors, the development approach and the management of the project. On the basis of institutional theory we first analyze the extent to which institutional change towards and institutionalization of organic urban development have taken place, and second, what the underlying determinants are. For the first part we make use of quantitative empirical data, for the second part information is used that is derived from interviews with the main stakeholders in the city of The Hague (both public and private) involved in urban development (the municipality, housing associations, developers, and investors). In the concluding section of the chapter we discuss what the impact of these changes may be on the outcome of land and real estate development in the Netherlands. In addition, we focus on possible implications elsewhere of our attempt to measure institutions, change and institutionalization in land development.

The self-organizing city

Many “mature” European cities increasingly focus on policies of urban transformation and renewal – often as part of broader urban regeneration policies – but face a common set of challenges with regard to the implementation of these projects. Typical urban transformation projects may concern the transformation of brownfield sites, the redevelopment of inner-city shopping areas, waterfront and dockland redevelopment projects, and the renovation of post-war social housing blocks. Some of the most significant obstacles to the implementation of such projects may relate to periods of economic downturn and reduced market demand, but various studies have also revealed more fundamental/structural obstacles, such as (institutional) barriers
to the assembly of land and properties, shortcomings in existing value capturing mechanisms to cover public infrastructure costs, suboptimal public–private cooperation, and increased complexity of the projects themselves (Adams et al., 2002; Buitelaar et al., 2008. Typical for this kind of complex land and property development project is the wide range of stakeholders involved – such as landowners, municipalities, investors, property developers, construction companies, architects, infrastructure providers, and housing corporations – that must try to reach an agreement on planning, development, and financial issues, although they often have partly contradictory interests, which may prevent them from reaching such an agreement (Samsura et al., 2010).

Partly as a response to this changing context, many European cities are now embarking on a variety of innovative experiments with respect to governance arrangements and financial packages for urban transformation (van der Krabben and Needham, 2008; Nordahl, 2014; Adams, 2015). Particular interest goes to self-organizing urban governance, for one reason because it will reduce public sector responsibility and (financial) involvement. But also more principally, because some expect self-organization to create cities that are more dynamic and better meet people’s demands, which are therefore more resilient and sustainable (Urbahn Urban Design, 2010; Buitelaar, Galle, and Sorel, 2014). Portugali (2000) refers to the concept of the self-organizing city as urban development that arises out of the spontaneous local interactions between stakeholders based on the initial conditions chosen/caused by the stakeholders themselves, without active and goal-oriented government intervention. The role of government is to create a basic legal framework (an urban code), without a particular urban order in mind, within which self-organization among local actors takes place (Moroni, 2015).

Promoting self-organization seems to go hand in hand – at least in the Netherlands – with a development strategy to which we refer here as organic area development, as opposed to integrated area development. In comparison with more plan-led integrated development, this organic approach aims for smaller scales and is more strategic, process-oriented, with a stronger role for end-users at the expense of large developer firms (see Figure 13.1). Especially in the Netherlands, with its strongly institutionalized planning culture (CEC, 1997; Alterman, 2001), this type of planning and development certainly deviates from development practices in past decades in Dutch cities. But also in many other advanced economies, albeit to a lesser extent, this type of development has received (renewed) attention in recent years (Tira et al., 2011; Squires and Lord, 2012; Alfas and Portugali, 2007; Moroni, 2015).

**Dutch urban development in an international context**

Urban development in the Netherlands since the Second World War has been based on a kind of “blueprint” or “end-state planning” (Needham, 1997, 2007; Buitelaar, 2010; Mori, 1998).

A collaboration between private and public actors was established with arrangement about the building program, the urban design as well as phasing of the various aspects of the area development, supported by a land account, upon which the plan would ultimately be turned into a legally binding land-use plan.

(Buitelaar and Brogman, 2016, p. 7)

The tradition of large-scale integrated urban development – residential development in particular – seems to relate for some practical reasons to (social) housing policy, and to urban design principles. From a practical point of view, integrated land development seems to be efficient, particularly in the Randstad region, where development land usually is below sea level.
and requires huge investments to make it suitable for development (Buitelaar and Witte, 2011; Tennekes, Harbers, and Buitelaar, 2015). Also from a practical point of view, integrated land development enables the placing of infrastructure in an efficient way as an integral part of the phased development of an entire area. With regard to housing policy, the integrated development of land was effective in reserving sufficient land in residential development areas for social housing. Finally, with regard to urban design principles, one may argue that a tradition has developed in the Netherlands that appreciates an integrated design for residential areas based on a rather detailed blueprint for that area (Buitelaar, Galle, and Sorel, 2011).

The blueprint planning and development approach used to go hand in hand with a public land development model. One of the objectives of municipal land policies is to make sure that sufficient land becomes available for planned urban development, be it greenfield development or infills or brownfield development. Often this requires a form of land assembly, since the required subdivision for the new development does not match up with the existing ownership structure (van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013). The land assembly policies adopted by municipalities depend on, among other things, sometimes long-standing traditions in both urban planning and land policies (Healey, 2004), the policy instruments that cities have at their disposal, municipal finance (e.g. how cities finance their infrastructure; legal restrictions for municipalities to invest in land development), and market conditions (i.e. a so-called public goods argument: public authorities “produce” building land, because the private sector does not produce it in time and/or sufficiently; van der Krabben and Buitelaar, 2011).

Van der Krabben and Jacobs (2013) distinguish between four main types of land development models: a public comprehensive model (public purchase and development of land), a public planning-led quasi market model (public purchase of land in order to enable a private sector-led (re)development program for a specific area), a private market model (private purchase of land, if necessary and when desirable supported by expropriation by a public authority), and an urban land readjustment model (landowners in a certain area engage in a joint venture; the readjustment of ownership brings all owners into the best position to (re)develop). Dutch municipalities have had a reputation internationally for applying a public comprehensive land development model on a wide scale (CEC, 1997; Alterman, 2001; Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016; Valtonen et al., 2017). While in many countries, local authorities do purchase land now and then, mainly in urban transformation areas, to support future private development in that area, only a few countries – as far as we are aware in Europe, besides the Netherlands only Finland and Sweden – apply such a proactive plan-led approach to land development. Dutch cities used to purchase and develop (almost) all (future) building land within a city “to guarantee building developments according to public policies, to realize full cost recovery of all public works via the sale of building plots and to capture at least part of the surplus value of the land (after a change in use), to use that for public use” (van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013, p. 775). Though the public development of land may be risky for public authorities and does not guarantee future urban development, because this still depends on market conditions for real estate markets, Dutch cities nevertheless relied on it for many decades.

The tradition of large-scale integrated development supported by a public land development model may be long-standing in the Netherlands, but nevertheless came under discussion after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. The subsequent decline of property and housing markets induced a reduction in demand for new housing and building land, which brought both municipalities and private developers, both holding substantial land banks, into financial trouble (Deloitte, 2013; Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016). More or less at the same time, in many Dutch cities spatial planning strategies shifted from a dominant focus on greenfield residential developments towards a greater emphasis on urban transformation (Buitelaar, 2010).
Compared to greenfield development, a large-scale integrated end-state planning approach for urban transformation may often be more complicated and more risky, due to fragmented ownership structures and potential hold-out problems, for instance (Adams et al., 2002) and relatively high costs of buying out of properties that are still in use and/or related to contaminated land.

As a response, municipalities have become much more reluctant to apply the “blueprint” model to new development, while they seem to have left at the same time the idea of taking an “active” role in the actual implementation of plans (Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016). As an alternative, a new “organic” development approach (Figure 13.1) has been introduced. Whether this new approach has already been “institutionalized” remains to be seen.

Understanding and “measuring” institutional change and institutionalization

Actions by agents such as action within land and real estate development processes are not voluntaristic. They are constrained and enabled, thus influenced, by the context within which they take place. “Doing – the central thread of practice – is not just doing in and of itself … but is always doing in a historical and social context that gives structure and meaning to what we do” (Laws and Hajer, 2006: 411). That context is made of institutions, which can be defined as the man-made structures that guide and give meaning to human interaction (North, 1990).

![Figure 13.1 Integrated and organic urban development](source: Buitelaar, Galle and Sorel, 2014)
This shows that the relation between institutions and actors must be seen as reciprocal; institutions are actively created, changed, and maintained through action (Buitelaar, Galle, and Sorel, 2011). The reciprocity between actors and institutions has become known as “the duality of structure” (Giddens, 1984). Patsy Healey emphasized the relevance of this notion for the land development process long ago (Healey, 1992).

Institutions can be formal in the sense that they are written down in laws, zoning plans, ordinances, etc., and legally enforceable by the court, or they can be informal. Informal institutions are non-legal and unwritten rules such as taboos, conventions, and codes of conduct. Institutions emerge through social interaction and are the result of imitation and repetition of behavior (Zijderveld, 2000). This is especially the case with informal institutions but to a large extent also applies to formal institutions. Those are not designed overnight either. Law making, for instance, is an often cumbersome process. And when rules are finally adopted they often do not instantly become what we consider institutions. “Legislation, for instance, while formalized through a distinct decree, takes shape gradually, within evolving patterns of social expectations. Moreover, the formal act of commencement must be followed by practices of validation in social interaction” (Dembski and Salet, 2010: 618). Without that taking place, without really impacting on the behavior of those they target, formal rules are not institutions, but just a collection of words on paper.

In this contribution we are concerned about measuring the degree of institutional change (i.e. from integrated to organic development) or institutionalization (i.e. of organic development). We contend that the change and institutionalization can be measured by the extent to which a particular behavior occurs. Is it widespread or occasional behavior? Obviously, it is matter of degree and it is arbitrary to say when behavior has exceeded the threshold of institutionalized behavior (Buitelaar, Galle, and Sorel, 2011).

It is important at this point to emphasize that institutions and behavior are ontologically distinct (Hodgson, 2004). However, behavior provides an indication of the presence and influence of institutions. Repetition of behavior by one actor – in other words routine behavior – and imitation of it by others can be seen as the result of institutions. One-off behavior has then become institutionalized. In other words, when rules genuinely affect actors and their behavior in the sense that it shows repetition and imitation, whether in an intended direction or not, and becomes predictable to some extent, those rules can be said to have become institutions.

We consider organic and integrated development as types of collective behavior, as outcomes of the interaction between actors and institutions. In Figure 13.1 we distinguished between seven features of organic (and integrated) development. Based on what we outlined above, we can say that the more a development conforms to the seven features, the more it can be considered “organic.” And when the scale at which this occurs – in terms of the number of practices – is increasing, we say that organic development is institutionalizing and that there is an institutional change away from integrated development. The case of The Hague is used to illustrate how this might work and to indicate, for one city, to what extent this process of institutionalizing actually has taken place.

**Institutional change in urban development in The Hague**

To analyze the degree to which “new” organic development approaches have institutionalized and the factors that have allowed for or hampered this, urban development practices in the city of The Hague have been studied in more detail. Both data on development projects and interviews with key stakeholders have been used to retrieve the necessary information.
The data

The empirical data have been derived from the Database Programmering Gemeente Den Haag (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015) (based on earlier work by Grommen, 2015). This database contains information on the status of developments taking place, in various stages, between January 2008 and January 2015 within the municipality of The Hague. For each of the intermediate years, the status of the different projects on 1 January has been registered in the database. The database contains over 3500 unique records (i.e. urban development projects). Each record covers one project for one year. A project thus occurs only once per year. In addition, the database contains information on the development of housing, commercial real estate, and public space, the stage the project is at, the developer involved, and the role of the municipality. This research does not take into account all seven dimensions from Figure 13.1, but focuses on the three dimensions for which empirical data are available: the scale of the project, the developer involved, and the role of the municipality.

The scale of projects

The scale of projects is measured by the number of houses being planned and the number of square meters of commercial real estate. Commercial real estate consists of spaces for leisure and catering, offices, businesses, and other services such as schools.

The developer type

The data allow for distinguishing between different types of developers that are responsible for real estate development or construction of public spaces. In this research, the following five categories are distinguished:

- Municipality: real estate development is carried out by the municipality or one of the municipal services.
- Housing association: a housing association or developer under direct control of a housing association is responsible for development.
- Real estate developer: develops a project aimed at making profits before selling its share to end-users or investors.
- Investor: involved in land development aimed at long-term property investment and returns. This includes investment firms with and without a development branch and other firms who realize property for their own investment portfolio.
- End-user: the developer is also the user of the property after completion.

The role of the municipality

To measure the role of the municipality, three types of municipal involvement have been identified without having data on the exact (financial) commitments made by parties.

a First, the municipality alone can take care of the land development or land and real estate development. In the latter case the municipality is fully responsible for the resulting costs and benefits of both the land and the real estate development stage.

b Second, in a public–private partnership (PPP) multiple parties take care of the development of an area, usually only the land development stage, with the municipality
being one of them. The PPPs often take shape in a joint venture, a dedicated and separate legal entity, in which parties participate proportionately to the amount and value of the land they put in.

c  Third, the municipality takes no financial risks and plays no role beyond its public planning powers; it takes a facilitative or enabling role. Private parties take care of all costs and benefits associated with the development of land and real estate.

Interviews

For this study a number of interviews with professionals have been conducted so as to obtain a greater understanding of the causal factors behind the results of our data analysis. Municipal employees, people working for housing associations, real estate developers, and investors were approached. They were selected on the basis of the findings of the quantitative analysis; their role has often changed, as we will see in the descriptive statistics. We considered them to be the most appropriate actors to help us explain continuity and change in urban development practices in The Hague. This led to a total of seven interviews. The interviewees were asked to give their professional interpretation of the changes (if any) that have taken place. Interviews were conducted between 30 April 2015 and 16 June 2015.

Results

The data have been analyzed for the new projects that were initiated each year. We left out the projects that had already started before 2008 and might have changed in the face of the financial and economic crisis, since those are least likely to reveal potential fundamental shifts in behavioral patterns. Pragmatic decisions and reactions to unanticipated events are more likely to have steered those developments after 2008. A project only counts as new in the first year of appearance in the dataset.

The scale of projects

Figures 13.2 and 13.3 provide key statistics on the scale of new projects. Looking at the data, it is clear that the scale of new developments is decreasing for both the number of housing units and the square meters of commercial space. While the amount of commercial space is decreasing from 2010 on, the amount of housing units starts falling after 2011. This late response is caused by the nature of developments: it is often difficult to scale down planned developments immediately (interview: municipality). This might be related to the low number of projects. The average amount of public space increases substantially in 2010 before dropping sharply in 2012. After this, it recovers again. For all segments, the number of projects seems to be rising again from 2012 on. This trend towards smaller projects can easily be explained. Due to the economic crisis, demand has dropped while insecurity about the available means has grown. In order to minimize risks, developers decreased the size of projects. Smaller projects allow for easier adjustments and a reduced time lapse between investment and return (interviews: housing association; developers; investor).

The developer type

The next step is to analyze the type of developer. Figure 13.4 depicts the developer types for new projects. Combinations in which different developers participate have been
Figure 13.2  The average number of homes per new project in The Hague, 2008–2015

Source: Gemeente Den Haag, 2015

Figure 13.3  The average number of square meters of commercial real estate per new project in The Hague, 2008–2015

Source: Gemeente Den Haag, 2015
deconstructed into individual developer types. This implies that some projects are counted more than once.

Due to the unfavorable economic situation, the ability and willingness of professional developers to realize developments has decreased. Other parties have stepped in to fill the void. The figure shows the increasing financial involvement (expressed in the number and the share of projects) of end-users, investors, and the municipality in the development process. The growing involvement of other types of developers means that different factors need to be taken into account. Investors are becoming more important to finance developments. These investors want to be involved, and in general, they want to be involved early so as to ensure they will have a product that fits their needs in the long run. The increasing involvement of end-users links to the decrease in the average scale of development that we discussed earlier and the shift of a suppliers’ to a buyers’ market, which allows for a greater role for consumers. End-users such as homeowners have no interest in developing large areas, but are focusing on their own needs (i.e. one-off housing) (interviews: municipality; developers; investor). The figure also shows that now the number of projects is growing again, the involvement of professional property developers is rising too. The participation of housing associations, as depicted in the graph, seems to reflect the changed attitude towards housing associations by central government. Historically, housing associations enjoyed a great degree of freedom, their activities were not limited to social housing. Initially, they used this freedom to take over in projects as private parties decreased their participation in urban development projects. However, some housing associations also suffered severe losses due to risky financial activities and in 2012 the Herzieningswet (Revision Act) changed the rules for housing associations. Since then, they have only been allowed to build, develop, and maintain social housing, below a state-defined rent level. In addition, they are allowed to develop projects that form a relevant, societal addition to their real estate, or to develop housing for private rental if the market parties do not do so (interview: housing association).
The role of the municipality

Over the years, the role the municipality plays during the land development stage has changed substantially. To assess this change, this research focuses on two indicators. First, the financial involvement in developments will be discussed. Second, the developments for which the municipality of The Hague is listed as the main land developer have been analyzed.

Figure 13.5 shows that the share of projects developed by the municipality alone is rising. However, more important is the number of privately financed development projects, many of which are developments of single homes by end-users. The number of PPPs gradually decreased, until it rose again. Nevertheless, in relative terms, the share of projects in which land development is carried out in cooperation between private parties and municipalities is decreasing.

Our research shows that urban developments in The Hague have indeed become more “organic,” though there is still a prominent role for the municipality. Our data indicate a clear trend towards smaller-scale projects. Instead of “traditional” large, private development companies, end-users and investors with a long-term interest increasingly appear to take initiatives for new developments. Though our data do not allow us to analyze all the aspects of a development strategy (indicating either integrated or organic urban development; see Figure 13.1), we may nevertheless conclude for the city of The Hague that a shift in development practices occurs, in favor of smaller-scale projects and more active roles for end-users and investors with a long-term interest.

Conclusion and discussion

Whether organic urban development has been “institutionalized” or has even become mainstream in the Netherlands can of course not yet be derived from this single case study, made over a limited number of years. However, we believe the results of our study, combined

![Figure 13.5](image-url)
with ongoing policy debates in the Netherlands, do allow for some conclusions. First, we have no reason to believe that the changes in the approach to urban development that occurred in The Hague would be very different from what can be found in other Dutch cities. For instance, many cities have adopted a new land policy in which they state that public land development no longer forms the default development model, and instead decide between an active or a more facilitating role, depending on the situation. On the other hand, many municipalities and some of the big nationwide operating private developers still hold huge land banks that allow integrated developments in some locations and it is likely that they will continue with these developments as soon as market conditions allow them to do so.

Second, a new planning law is under preparation, including regulation supporting municipal land policies. This new planning law is expected to take away some current legal obstacles for municipalities – related to the recovery of costs for public works – to provide room for organic development approaches. We therefore assume that after the (expected) introduction of the new planning law in 2018, municipalities will have even better opportunities to apply an organic development approach.

Third, when referring to Portugal’s definition of “self-organisation,” it is obvious that the apparent shift towards organic development has certainly not entirely arisen out of the spontaneous local interactions between stakeholders without any government intervention. On the contrary, the local authorities in The Hague still play an important role in organic urban development, sometimes by participating financially in land acquisition or by initiating cooperation among private actors.

Fourth, we do not expect that in future municipalities will completely abandon the traditional comprehensive integrated development approach, but regional differences may appear. In highly urbanized areas expecting high demand for new housing, both municipalities and big nationwide operating private developers will probably still appreciate the traditional approach for a limited number of greenfield developments, because of the supposed efficiency of the model, next to an organic approach for urban transformation projects. In other regions, with less expected demand for new housing or even demographic decline, a return to integrated development is less likely.

We believe that the results of this study can be relevant for an international audience as well, for various reasons. Changes in (governance) approaches to land and real estate development take place – or at least are being discussed – in other countries as well (Lefcoe, 1977; Tan et al., 2009; Hartmann and Spitz, 2015). As an example, we can refer to recent land reform debates in Scotland, quite in the opposite direction of what we have analyzed in the Netherlands. While Dutch cities now promote private stakeholders’ initiatives for organic urban development as an alternative to public-led development, Adams (2015) has suggested in this land reform debate in Scotland a shift in the opposite direction, towards public-led development as applied in Sweden and the Netherlands, to overcome problems in Scotland (and elsewhere in the UK) with speculative land banking by big private developers. Discussions about paradigm shifts in urban development often concentrate on necessary changes in underlying planning laws – to enable the “new” development model. Such formal, legal changes are of course part of the process of institutionalization as well. However, the analysis of the extent to which organic urban development approaches have institutionalized in The Hague demonstrates the significance of informal processes of institutionalization. The introduction of organic urban development in Dutch cities does not require any changes in planning law in the short term; the main issue is whether both private and public stakeholders are prepared to work in that way.

Apart from the findings regarding development practices for the Dutch case and what this may imply for international land and real estate development practices, we believe that the
research method itself, that is, to identify and measure institutions, institutional change, and institutionalization in land and real estate development, is appropriate to be used elsewhere as well. It helps to shed light on the development of institutions in a longitudinal way, which allows for monitoring institutions, and changes thereof, and therefore provides information upon which decisions to intervene or to refrain from doing that can be based. To be able to provide such information, a lot depends on municipalities’ willingness to collect micro data and the accuracy with which they are registered.

Finally, we did not analyze in the The Hague case what the effect is of the introduction of an alternative development approach on market outcomes, in terms of the quantity, quality, and prices of the real estate “produced.” For further study, both in the Netherlands and elsewhere, it would be interesting to analyze the impact of the institutionalization of a new urban development approach on this type of market outcome.

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