Corruption in post-communist Europe has been a common topic in both popular and academic literature. Scandals about politicians taking kick-backs and bribes, appointing party loyalists, business connections, or friends to important positions in the state administration, and buying and controlling votes have brought governments out of power, caused concern in Brussels, and lowered public trust in democratic politics throughout the region. The academic literature on corruption, and combatting corruption specifically, naturally reflects the development of this process. As corruption came to be seen as a ubiquitous phenomenon taking various forms in post-communist Europe, attempts at explaining it focused mostly on the legacy of the previous regimes (Sajó 1998; Karklins 2002, 2005; Holmes 2006). Further variation in the practice of corruption and criticisms of the overzealous theorising linking current levels of malfeasance to the nature of the old regimes (Sajó 1998, 37–38) ushered in a plethora of new, more specific arguments. They emphasise the role of democratic institutional reform, liberalisation and privatisation, party competition, EU accession, and new political actors in curbing and preventing corruption. More recently, scholars turned their attention to the possible consequences of the abuse of public office in Eastern Europe for political culture and participation (Kolarska-Bobinska 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Tavits 2008; Kostadinova 2009).

This chapter will present the main arguments in the literature on combatting corruption as it developed through these stages, its findings and conclusions, as well as the methodological challenges faced by those researching corruption. It begins with a review of the more conceptual and descriptive literature on the extent and type of corruption in post-communist Europe and then moves on to introduce the major hopefuls of combatting corruption with attention to specific arguments and approaches. The chapter concludes by outlining the major lessons from the literature and a potential research agenda. The main argument of this piece is that despite significant achievements, research on combatting corruption in Eastern Europe is often driven by the anti-corruption policy agenda and remains limited by data quality and availability.

It should be noted, however, that in addition to the academic literature, numerous international bodies such as Transparency International (TI), the World Bank (WB) and the European Union (EU) have taken on a major role in defining the study of corruption in the region. They have commissioned a variety of reports on its nature, causes, and consequences and engaged scholars in their anti-corruption efforts (Kaufmann et al. 1999; World Bank 2000; Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2013). While complete separation of these two strands of the literature is impossible...
given the use of TI and WB indicators and measures in a large part of the literature, the present focus will remain on academic approaches to the study of corruption and the ways to curb it in post-communist Europe.

The ubiquitous nature of corruption

That post-communist states are arenas for diverse and extensive corrupt exchanges, and that their omnipresence is an accepted reality of political life, has become a truism in academic and policy research on corruption (Holmes 2013, 1163). A series of books and articles have outlined the pervasive nature of political corruption, while attempting to define its features and mechanisms. A lot has been achieved, yet deficiencies in the general literature on the topic challenge the research effort and continue to present scholars with certain methodological challenges.

The definition of political corruption continues to trouble political theorists and practitioners, almost as much as its practice troubles international and national political organisations. Probably the most commonly used understanding of corruption is the one also applied by the biggest anti-corruption advocacy organisation, Transparency International – “the misuse of public office for private gain” – but what exactly office and gain may mean remains subject to various interpretations (Kostadinova 2012, 6–7; Philp 2015, 20–22). While such a definition clearly includes the act of taking bribes in exchange for public decisions and is quite appropriate for comparative research, it might leave other forms of corrupt exchange out. Therefore, some researchers prefer to use more specific definitions relevant to the research question addressed in a particular study. For example, studying state capture in Hungary, Fazekas and Tóth (2016) specify grand corruption as “the allocation and performance of public procurement contracts by bending prior explicit rules.”

For Eastern Europe, corruption has been well documented by a plethora of works and reports (e.g. Holmes 2006, 109–111; Kostadinova 2012, 29; Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2013, 14–15), but popular and academic accounts of post-1989 politics also point to phenomena such as party patronage and clientelism as widespread practices across the region. Further, academic research has shown a high proclivity of political parties to engage in appointing party candidates to various administrative positions and to the jobs in public companies (e.g. Gwiazda 2008; Kopecký and Spirova 2011a; Xhaferaj 2013; Dragojević and Konitzer 2013; Volintiru 2015; also Meyer-Sahling in this volume), significant levels of party politicization of ministerial bureaucracies (e.g. Meyer-Sahling 2008; Dimitrov, Goetz and Wollmann 2006), and a general trend towards the use and misuse of the state and its resources for partisan purposes (e.g. Kopecký 2006; O’Dwyer 2006; Grzymała-Busse 2007). Understanding and identifying ways to combat corruption must thus also consult works that incorporate a wider conception of corrupt exchange and its determinants.

Overall, conceptual and operational definitions of corruption may vary across the actors involved and the forms it takes (Neshkova and Rosenbaum 2015, 99). Given the importance of phenomena such as patronage, influence peddling, clientelism, and institutional capture in the region, much of the influential scholarship in the field includes them as corrupt activities, without applying a broader definition as a starting point (Karklins 2005; Holmes 2006). This review will incorporate a similar approach; it will cover both the literature that deals specifically with corruption (however defined) and the literature that deals with notions such as patronage (political appointments in the state apparatus) and clientelism (the exchange of monetary and non-monetary rewards for electoral benefits such as votes). We believe that this choice is justified because these phenomena are often conceptually and empirically overlapping, and because they all have been extremely relevant to the political development of Eastern Europe.
The legacy of communism

One trend throughout the early literature has to do with the inevitable nature of corruption in post-communist Europe. It was assumed that links to the previous one-party regime in terms of inherited structures of interaction and citizen-state relationships, make people consider corruption inevitable and continue to engage in bribe-giving as part of everyday life. This literature focuses on describing the different types of corruption that seemed rampant in the region and on identifying their roots. Most influential in this regard is probably Rasma Karklins’s work that develops a typology of post-communist corruption (Karklins 2002, 2005). In her book *The System Made Me Do It* (2005, 25), she differentiates several types of corruption: everyday interactions between officials and citizens (e.g. bribery); interactions between public institutions (e.g. profiteering from privatisation or public procurement); and influence on political institutions (e.g. state capture and buying votes). Her detailed description and illustrations clearly link current rates of malfeasance with features inherited from the previous regimes, a politicised and all-powerful bureaucracy, and uncontested political elite.

In a similar vein, Holmes (2006) defines and describes corruption as omnipresent in Eastern Europe and attributes some of its persistence to the legacy of the communist regimes. In terms of both political culture and path dependent institutional developments, the post-communist world, in his view, emerges as particularly prone to sustain corruption. The hierarchical nature of the regimes, the blurred borders between state and party and private and public, the development logic of the state, and the absence of any alternatives to power are among the strongest legacies of the communist era that potentially lead to a “rotten state” (Holmes 2006, 179–187). A similar line of thought is followed by Kostadinova in her discussion of the sources of corruption in post-communist Europe, although then she moves on to identify more significant explanations in the current institutional and political context (Kostadinova 2012, 26–28). Focusing on party patronage, a path dependency pattern is observed by Kopecký and Spirova, who link the nature of the communist regimes – patrimonial in Bulgaria and bureaucratic in Czechoslovakia – to the extent and nature of post-1989 party patronage (Kopecký and Spirova 2011b, 900–904).

Such arguments, of course, made corruption an almost self-fulfilling prophecy in the new democracies of Eastern Europe, but do not reveal much about the causal mechanisms leading to corruption. The transition from communism to democracy opened up these political systems to myriad new factors and influences with a potential to also affect the likelihood of political elites and the public to engage in corrupt behaviour.

The promise of institutional reform

Institutions and legislation supporting integrity and the rule of law were among the first weapons chosen in the struggle against corruption (Lederman et al. 2005). The post-communist countries implemented numerous institutional reforms in the late 1990s and the early 2000s in order to reduce corruption, partly driven by domestic forces and partly by the need to comply with EU and other international requirements. After the start of the democratic transition, various legislative acts were passed to provide for more transparency and integrity in public life (Batory 2012, 66–68; Holmes 2006, 223–229). Legal codes were adapted to penalise activities such as conflict of interest and bribery, and to improve financial supervision and regulate party finance and public procurement (Ilstens et al. 2002, Grzymała-Busse 2007, Kostadinova 2012, 169–173). New civil service legislation set professionalisation and political autonomy as core principles in the reform of the East European bureaucracies (Nunberg 1999, Neshkova and Kostadinova 2012;
also Meyer-Sahling in this volume); state subsidies were provided for political parties in most states of the region (Casal Bertoa and Spirova, forthcoming). In fact, as Karklins argues “by late 2003 many states in the region had adopted most of the recommended anti-corruption laws and institutions” (Karklins 2005, 125).

Despite the intense legislating and establishment of various anti-corruption bodies, evidence for institutional effectiveness in the fight against corruption remains scarce. In their study on post-1989 administrative reform, Neshkova and Kostadinova (2012) confirm that the very adoption of a civil service act affects the opportunity structure of party patronage and hence, reduces corruption in the political system. Yet, many scholars conclude that the existence of relevant legislation “appears to have had little effect,” as Karklins (2005, 125–145) puts it. She provides a rich and multifaceted discussion of accountability and the different degrees to which it had been instituted in ten post-communist states, to just conclude that the ultimate challenge everywhere was implementation and not absence of strict provisions (Karklins 2005, 125–145). In a similar vein, Batory argues that despite a coherent set of anti-bribery laws in Hungary, “citizens have a multitude of reasons not to comply with anti-graft laws, and relatively few do comply, on either instrumental or normative grounds” (Batory 2012, 78).

The big question for practitioners and scholars is whether the reason for the lack of a satisfactory effect of the numerous structures created in the name of reducing corruption is in their design or in the level of compliance by politicians, bureaucrats, and ordinary people. Looking at a larger number of countries, Bugaric maintains that the institutions of the rule of law remain simply underdeveloped and non-institutionalised, partly because the institutional process ignored local culture, norms and traditions, and copied Western traditions instead (Bugaric 2015). Further, researchers who assess the role of party finance regulation warn that insufficient enforcement of the requirements for disclosure is the biggest problem for the failure to increase transparency (van Biezen and Kopecký 2001, Walecki 2005). The common conclusion of these studies points to the need of developing context-relevant institutions supported by strong and empowered social and political actors, if corruption is to be curbed for good.

The promise of liberalisation

The introduction of the free market in Eastern Europe was another reform that gave hope in fighting corruption. As the previous state monopoly over politics and the economy was seen as the main culprit for cementing corruption in the new democratic systems, liberalisation and privatisation were expected to generate new incentives and subject corruption to the control of competition. That this was not going to work out became evident rather quickly, as the challenges of the triple political/economic/social transition emerged.

New economic practices co-existing with old habits at a time when political structures were fragile and legal frameworks in flux, opened up new spaces for corrupt exchange (Holmes 2006, 187–191; Schmidt 2007, 210–212; Jordan 2002, 20). Mafia-like criminal networks emerged in several post-communist countries, most notably Russia, and engaged in high-level corruption (Glinkina 1998; Ledeneva 1998; Volkov 2002; Varese 1997). Similar but less intense trends were also observed in Bulgaria, where shady economic interests took over state structures and “predatory” elites weakened the capacity of the state to resist malfeasance (Ganev 2007, 178–180, Kostadinova 2012, 97–106). As market economies developed and institutionalised, so did suspicious links between business and politics. The simpler models of bribery and embezzlement of the 1990s were transformed into more structured clientelistic networks that maintained a stable system of corrupt exchanges in many post-communist states (Kostadinova 2012, 95–125; Jordan 2002; Engler 2016).
The literature on the interplay between market economy and political corruption of various forms remains somewhat limited in terms of comparative span, while rich in detailed discussion of single cases. Exactly because of the nature of the relationship between economic groups and political elites, one that requires an intimate knowledge of who does what, when, and how during a covert exchange, research is often limited to single case studies. While there are enough studies on some states, we lack a good understanding of how the same process evolved in other places. This trend has been partially countered by research in the area of petty corruption. For example, recent scholarship analyses the impact of market competition on bribe-paying from a comparative perspective in Eastern Europe. Using survey data from fifteen post-communist states, Diaby and Sylwester (2015) conclude that greater market competition among firms is associated with greater bribe payments, a conclusion also supported partially by Duvanova (2014). Overall, this lacuna, arguably identifiable in most research on corruption, still remains urgent to fill, especially with regards to the role of both domestic and international economic liberalisation.

The promise of political competition

Competition of a different kind – within the party system – is, arguably, an important mechanism of control over corruption, because political parties are often the main loci of corrupt exchanges. This argument, popular in the general literature on political corruption, has certainly reverberated in the post-communist scholarship as well. Competition is supposed to limit political corruption in two ways. First, competitive elections motivate political parties to refrain from engagement in improper activities, fearing that voters may punish such behaviour at the ballot box, and second political parties may also “keep each other in check,” thus lowering the overall levels of political corruption (Della Porta 2004; Johnston 2002).

With regard to post-communist politics, the impact of party competition on reducing corruption has been examined, qualified, and challenged on several – theoretical and empirical – grounds. Grzymała-Busse (2007) sees strong, “robust” party competition as a major constraint on corruption. Based on empirical evidence from nine Eastern European countries, she specifies that none but only a well-organised and effective opposition can discourage party elites inclined to engage in corrupt exchanges. Analysing the Bulgarian case, however, Krastev and Ganev (2004) argue that the political urgency of anti-corruption may have counterproductive results, as allegations of systemic office abuse can be used for unfair political competition by political opponents. They maintain that this was the case during the 2001 electoral competition between incumbents and newcomers in Bulgaria, in line with what Smilov has argued might be case in Eastern Europe overall (Smilov 2007).

It is the unstable nature of the young party systems in Eastern Europe that have made researchers quite sceptical. Their central argument is that the potential of political competition to curb corruption is conditioned by the degree to which such competition is “stable” or “institutionalised” (Johnston 2002; O’Dwyer 2004, 2006). This has been evident throughout the region, as Grzymała-Busse’s (2007) analysis on the temptation of elites to exploit the post-1989 state and other scholarship show. In party systems that are constantly in flux, with parties disappearing and new parties arising before every election, the disciplining function of elections declines, and political parties attempt to maximize their short-term benefits by engaging in corruption while in power. Moreover, such “under-institutionalized” or “unstable” party systems are also characterised by a high degree of fragmentation, which renders effective competition between political parties more difficult due to coordination costs. Hence, party systems in which the opposition is fragmented, consisting of a multitude of political formations, coordinated and effective
contestation vis-à-vis the incumbent party or parties becomes less likely (O’Dwyer 2004, 2006). Party competition as such does not need to and has not produced less corrupt governments.

More recently, Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012) have challenged the role of party competition to control corrupt activities even more fundamentally. Focusing on the impact of government alternation on senior civil service politicisation, they argue that it is party alternation in government, a direct result of the pattern of competition that made senior civil service politicisation possible (Meyer-Sahling and Veen 2012, 17–18). In a systematic study of the politicisation of corruption in electoral campaigns from 1981 to 2011 in Europe, Bägenholm and Charron (2014) still find out that the use of corruption for campaign purposes has been increasing in Eastern Europe and that “parties have benefited electorally from politicizing corruption – in particular in more highly corrupt settings.” Thus, the utility of competition as an effective deterrent of corruption remains a disputed topic with empirical results pointing in different directions.

The promise of EU membership

A lot of hope was put in the ability of the EU accession process to impact reforms in various spheres of political and economic life in the post-communist countries, and combatting corruption is not an exception. Somewhat reflecting the European accession process itself, the main arguments advanced in the literature in the 2000s focus on “conditionality,” and in the 2010s on “backsliding.”

It should be noted that the conditionality mechanism – imposing the reduction of malfeasance as a condition for accession to the EU – could not be applied directly in this case, since corruption control was not part of the acquis of the EU.¹ Still, conditionality could impact the level of corruption in indirect ways, and earlier literature remained moderately optimistic about the ability of the EU integration process to facilitate change (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006; Kopecký and Spirova 2011b). In this regard, the imposition of the Control and Verification Mechanism on Bulgaria and Romania after their 2007 accession was the first notable illustration that fighting corruption is taking a more centre stage in the accession process (Vachudova 2009, 48–51).

How effective has this new policy tool been so far? The evidence for the promise of the EU accession process can be characterized as mixed. Batory (2010) finds no “substitute for the impact of the EU in instigating corruption related reforms” but does remain sceptical about the sustained impact of conditionally in post-2004 Hungary. Spendzharova and Vachudova (2012), on their part, stress the important incentives generated through the monitoring exercised by the European Commission over the performance of post-communist governments. The question they raise is whether the possibility for EU sanctions due to lack of results in controlling corruption would be an effective instrument forcing governing elites to expose and sanction malpractice. Finally, Kostadinova’s work incorporates comparative analysis of six Balkan countries at various stages of EU integration over the period 1996–2008. Her regression results confirm that advancement towards accession did help limit the spread of corruption, independent from the influence of economic liberalisation and the material and technological capacity of states (Kostadinova 2012).

Later on, “backsliding” became as popular of a term as conditionality had been before. The expectation was that following accession, the control impact of EU membership would subside and new member states will slide back into old habits. Ivanov (2010) describes how after accession, “Romania regressed from its previous achievements against corruption, and Bulgaria remained reluctant to prosecute senior officials or confront organised crime” (Ivanov 2010, 210). Levitz and Pop-Eleches (2010) find little evidence of backsliding, but later, Kartal’s (2014) systematic analysis of longitudinal data on corruption control in the post-communist EU members showed that in that aspect, state behaviour changed significantly after accession. He concludes
that integration encouraged the formation of anti-corruption coalitions in the candidate states but in the absence of further incentives, the commitment subsided fast after achievement of full membership (Kartal 2014, 953–954).

The promise of anti-system parties

Parallel to the EU integration process in the 2000s, Eastern Europe experienced a surge of numerous anti-establishment political parties. One of their major grievances against the establishment was the high level of (perceived) corruption in the respective countries (Hanley and Sikk 2014). Two major questions have been addressed by research on anti-system parties and corruption: whether the focus on corruption and anti-corruption helps these new parties do well electorally; and whether if successful, parties that build their electoral base by using anti-establishment and anti-corruption rhetoric, act to curb corruption. The answers to both of these questions have, to say the least, not been equivocal.

Anti-establishment parties appeared throughout all of Europe in the 2000s but those have been particularly popular in post-communist Eastern Europe. There, they have also made the biggest electoral gains, arguably because of the high levels of corruption and the high politicization of the issue (Bågenholm and Charron 2014). Hanley and Sikk (2014) and Ecker et al. (2015) qualify as direct the positive link between high corruption and support for anti-establishment parties. In their study which focuses only on East Central Europe, Hanley and Sikk find that relative levels of perceived corruption are important in explaining the electoral breakthrough of anti-establishment parties in post-communist Europe, but the impact of the absolute (high or low) levels remains unclear (Hanley and Sikk 2014, 8–9). In a broader comparative study of support for anti-establishment parties in Europe, including all post-communist EU member states, Ecker et al. (2015, 16–17) find that voters do support newcomers because of widespread corruption among the ruling elite. This trend is strongly influenced by partisan feelings and the belief that a turnover would bring change, thus echoing some of the caveats identified in the discussion of political competition and corruption in more general terms.

Most recently, Engler (2016) and Klašnja et al. (2016) challenged the links between rising levels of corruption and success of new parties even more, developing the argument further theoretically and testing it empirically on both party and voter level. Engler argues that while new parties certainly benefit from the mass distrust in established parties driven by a relative rise of perceived corruption, long-standing corruption may actually have a negative impact on the chances of new players to win. Clientelistic practices – part of real life that shapes the corruption perceptions – allow parties with access to state resources to maintain a strong electoral base. In contrast, “[n]ew parties have access neither to existing clientelist structures nor to state resources that could help to develop such structures, it is more difficult for them to succeed” (Engler 2016, 289). Empirically, Engler’s statistical analysis provides enough evidence to support her argument about the counteracting effects of corruption. Klašnja et al. (2016) argues that corruption influences voting in two distinct ways: experiences of corruption at the individual level and the perception of corruption at the social level impact electoral behaviour through different channels. Personal experiences (which they call pocketbook corruption voting) seem to have a more direct impact on support for the incumbent party (Klašnja et al. 2016, 80).

If anti-corruption appeals have helped anti-establishment parties gain electorally, have they done anything to curb corruption? Early on, Krastev (2004) expressed pessimism about the potential success of such crusader parties to curb corruption and several country examples pointed to the failures of such formations to achieve meaningful results (Spirova 2012; Holmes 2013, 1180). Still, cross-national research by Bågenholm draws a more complicated picture by
examining the emergence and impact of what he calls “anti-corruption parties” from several perspectives. Both Bågenholm (2013, 181) and Bågenholm and Charron (2015) explore the impact anti-corruption parties have had on subsequent levels of corruption and good government. This research (Bågenholm 2013, 177) identifies eighteen parties that focus “on fighting corruption in the election campaign, either by addressing the issue in general terms, . . . or more specifically by accusing the opponents,” and studies their ability to carry out the anti-corruption promise. Two major findings stand out: first, a positive impact for parties such as NDSV in Bulgaria, Res Publica in Estonia, New Era and Law and Justice in Poland, which managed to secure strong positions at the first, breakthrough election. Over the years of their governments, the corruption scores of the countries improved significantly, although this observation remains difficult intuitively since the impact of anti-corruption policies is usually only felt in the medium or longer term. Second, and equally interestingly, “only one of the parties repeated its anti-corruption strategy in the second election,” implying that corruption is a difficult issue to explore for electoral purposes more than once, and even more so from the position of power (Bågenholm 2013, 192–193).

In sum, while the literature devoted to the anti-system parties has made some contributions, a lot more remains to be done to fully explore the potential for fighting corruption. Establishing that contexts characterised by systemic abuse of public office are favourable to the election of populist formations, is relatively easier and has already been done. It is more challenging to validate the causal link between anti-system parties and reducing corruption, because the thrill of electing a new party that vigorously rejects the corrupt incumbents might simply affect the perception measures used to gauge malfeasance. The attention has to now turn to the question of what policies, if at all, the East European anti-system parties formulate once they win office, and what explains their success/failure in constraining malfeasance.

Conclusion: what have we learned?

Several broad conclusions emerge from this brief review of the literature on combating corruption in the post-communist world. To begin with, research on corruption and anti-corruption remains limited because of the nature and practice of the phenomenon. The challenge is common for all scholarship on the subject, regardless of geographic area and period under investigation.

Corruption is, by nature, a secretive process, and data on it remains difficult to come by (Lambsdorff 2007, 236–237). A lot of the comparative academic research has relied on various indices based on perceptions of the spread and magnitude of corruption developed by experts, the general public, or the business elite. At the very best, these measures are subjective and proxies of the real phenomenon, not direct measures of it for which they have received a healthy dose of criticism (Sik 2002). In contrast, detailed examinations of corrupt practices in particular country contexts provide a very specific account of malfeasance in practice but limit the ability to generalize about the causes and consequences of corruption. The data pitfall remains probably more evident in corruption research than in any other area of political science.

These methodological challenges notwithstanding, certain research questions can still be better analysed by using measures of perceived rather than actual corruption. For example, research on public attitudes and political participation has helped us understand the harmful impact of corruption on institutional confidence and voting in young democracies such as the Eastern European ones (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Kostadinova 2012). In these research designs, how people assess the threat of malfeasance is justifiably a more valid measure because the perception (as biased as it could be sometimes) drives the formation of attitudes and motivation for engagement.
The literature on anti-corruption is also driven by the agenda and activities of various international organisations engaged in the cause of fighting corruption. As the number of experts is limited, however, researchers often end up doing the work in both the applied and the more scientific areas. They become engaged in the policy assessment and revision of anti-corruption policies and simultaneously in their academic exploration. Caught in what Krastev (2004, 5) dubbed an “anti-corruptions consensus,” academic research on the topic is therefore likely to consist of self-fulfilling prophecies.

The focus of the corruption and anti-corruption literature has been shifting over the last two decades to reflect actual policies and the major actors involved. Democratisation, political and economic competition, EU accession, and new anti-corruption parties have all been in the academic spotlight at some point in time, but none of them have been able to provide workable solutions to the “problem of corruption” in post-communist Europe. The results of the scholarly effort remain contradictory, just as in practice the levels of corruption do not seem to decline everywhere and as fast as desired.

What is then to be done? One suggestion drawn upon results of recent empirical analyses points at the need to increase the capacity of the state to reduce corruption among public officials by increasing their salaries and reforming the civil service (Kostadinova 2012, 144; Neshkova and Kostadinova 2012). Others maintain that we need to “focus on the situations rather than on the participants” (Miller 2006). Regardless of how honest officials may be and how critical of corruption citizens are, both would be tempted to engage in a corrupt exchange if they find themselves in situations where it is hard to resist. The probability for such circumstances can be reduced through offering multiple options for service to people and enhancing the ability for appeal before the courts. However, if domestic politics and international actions have failed so far, Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) argues, only collective actions at the grassroots societal levels can help further. In the Eastern European context, such a development would be hampered by a legacy of weak civil societies and a serious deficit of credible leadership. Political science research on corruption will then need to follow suit and refocus its attention on such less traditional foci of anti-corruption activities.

Note

1 Except in limiting the politicisation of the state administration since civil service reform was part of the entry criteria. See the contribution of Meyer-Sahling to this volume.

References


Combatting corruption


