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IS INDIA A SOUTH ASIAN OR AN ASIAN POWER?

Manjeet S. Pardesi

Introduction

India has aspired to play the role of a major power in Asia since its independence in 1947. However, the most widely accepted view of India in the extant literature is merely that of a ‘limited hegemon’ at the South Asian level (Basrur 2011: 181). In other words, India is regarded as a regional power as opposed to a major power. In fact, it is even believed that unless India is able to establish its primacy in its immediate neighbourhood in South Asia, it is unlikely to emerge as a major power (Mohan 2007). This chapter argues that these views notwithstanding, India has transcended the boundaries of South Asia and has emerged as a major power in Asia. While India is not a regional hegemon in South Asia as it has not been able to translate its overwhelming material preponderance in that region into primacy due to the challenge posed by Pakistan (and its partnerships with the United States and China), the gradual economic rise of India over the past two decades has given it the economic and military wherewithal to become a significant actor in the emerging balance of power politics in East Asia in general, and more specifically in Southeast Asia.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into three main sections. The next section provides a brief overview of India’s foreign and security policy immediately after independence when it actually played the role of a major power in Asia. However, India’s disastrous defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War reduced India’s status to that of a regional power in South Asia. The subsequent section will focus on India’s foreign and security policy in the aftermath of 1962 until the end of the Cold War in 1991. It will be shown that in spite of the successful vivisection of its subcontinental rival Pakistan in 1971, India was neither able to emerge as a regional hegemon in South Asia nor was it able to transcend its home region and play the role of a major power in Asia during this period. The systemic and domestic sources of India’s inability to do so will be discussed here. Focusing on the post-Cold War period, the third section will demonstrate that India’s gradual embrace of the market after its 1991 economic reforms and the simultaneous launch of its ‘Look East’ policy have now transformed India into a major power in Asia even as it has not been able to emerge as the undisputed regional hegemon in South Asia. It will be shown that even though India has not been able to establish its primacy in South Asia due to the challenge posed by Pakistan, India has emerged as a significant actor in the Asian balance of power.
Manjeet S. Pardesi

India as an Asian great power, 1947–1962

India accepted the security conception of the erstwhile British Raj after independence (while rejecting the security practices of the Raj as Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, did not aspire to play an imperial role in the subcontinent). By claiming itself to be the successor state of the Raj, independent India sought to refashion itself as the ‘paramount power’ in the subcontinent. Paramountcy implied the strategic subordination of the small states in the subcontinent to India while recognizing and accepting their independent status. This was most aptly demonstrated in India’s relations with the Himalayan states of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim. The treaties that India signed with these states in 1949 and 1950 made New Delhi in charge of their foreign and security policy. Notably, India became the only state in post-war (and post-colonial) Asia with its own protectorates with these treaties.

In spite of the 1947–1948 India–Pakistan War, the strategic implications of the partition of the subcontinent were not immediately apparent to India’s post-independence leadership. In fact, immediately after independence, Nehru doubted the viability of the Pakistani state and believed that the partition of the subcontinent was temporary (Heimsath and Mansingh 1971: 121, 142). Furthermore, the division of Asia into distinct sub-regions like South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia was not yet apparent to the countries of this region or to the wider world. In October 1949, in a letter to India’s chief ministers, Nehru asserted that ‘the future of Asia will be powerfully determined by the future of India. India becomes more and more the pivot of Asia’ (Gopal 1979: 59). Furthermore, Nehru felt that even as India was ‘not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there’ (Nehru 1989: 536).

More importantly, Nehru’s India played the role of a major power in Asia commensurate with this idea. Under Nehru’s leadership, India organized the Asian Relations Conference a few months before the country’s independence in March–April 1947. This was the first regional gathering of countries and colonial territories from all across Asia (Asian Relations 1948). In January 1949, India organized the Conference on Indonesia. This was the first conference organized by an Asian government to deal with a specific Asian issue – Indonesian independence. This conference ultimately influenced Indonesia’s independence from the Dutch because of the impact that it had at the United Nations (Ton 1963: 98–102). A month later, India organized a conference of Commonwealth countries on Burma following which Burma became the first country to receive military aid from India (to help Burma with internal security issues). At the same time, New Delhi also cancelled the debts owed by the Burmese government to the Indian government incurred during its separation from British India in 1937 (Singh 1979: 56–59).

In 1951, India signed a treaty of friendship with Indonesia that had security-related undertones. This was Indonesia’s first such treaty with a foreign country (Ton 1963: 109). A few months later, India signed a similar treaty with Burma. While India rejected Burma’s call for an alliance of Southeast Asian countries to be led by New Delhi, the Indian and the Burmese leaderships maintained a very close relationship in their early post-colonial years and India even counselled Burma on that country’s internal security issues (Ton 1963: 174–177). India also signed a treaty with the Philippines in 1952 which was tantamount to a non-aggression pact that took added significance in an environment in which China, postwar/postcolonial Asia’s other great power, appeared threatening as a result of the developments in Korea and Indo-China (Ton 1963: 267). In the mid-1950s, as a result of India’s active diplomatic role in Indo-China, each of the three International Commissions of Supervision and Control for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos that were created in Geneva in 1954 was
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headed by an Indian chairman (SarDesai 1968: 4–5). In the coming years, India also signed security arrangements with the Indonesian air force (1956), navy (1958), and army (1960).

India’s attempt to play the role of a major power was not limited to Southeast Asia only as New Delhi was also actively involved in Northeast Asian affairs. After the de facto division of the Korean peninsula in the aftermath of the Second World War, India’s K. P. S. Menon (who eventually served as India’s first foreign secretary) was appointed the chairman of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (Pak 2000: 5). India also played an important role as the diplomatic interlocutor between China and the United States during the Korean War (1950–1953) in the absence of direct diplomatic relations between them. India had already recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by this time (despite American opposition) even as India was viewed as a communist sympathizer in Washington (Truman 1956: 362). This was unfortunate because India’s support for the US-sponsored resolutions on Korea had annoyed the Soviet Union and China who had begun to suspect India’s non-aligned credentials (Kim 2010). India also played a leading role in the post-war Korean settlement that was stuck on the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs). After Indian lobbying at the United Nations, India’s Lieutenant General K. S. Thimayya was appointed as the chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and Major General S. P. P. Thorat led some 6,000 Indian troops and administrative personnel in the Custodian Force that landed in Korea and actually implemented the exchange of some 23,000 POWs.

India also played an important role in bringing Japan back into the comity of nations in Asia in the aftermath of the Second World War. At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, Judge Radhabinod Pal, the only Indian justice out of a total of eleven declared all twenty-five Japanese top leaders charged with Class A war crimes as not guilty (Kei 2007). Later, India felt that the San Francisco Peace Treaty was unfair to Japan and therefore signed a separate peace treaty that not only waived all wartime reparations, but was also post-war Japan’s first treaty with an Asian state (the ‘sham’ Japanese treaty with Nationalist China ending the state of war with China notwithstanding) (Sato 2005). India also invited Japan to the first Asian Games in New Delhi in 1951 even though Japan had not been invited to the 1948 London Olympics. Similarly, under Nehru’s leadership, Japan was invited to the 1955 Bandung Conference even though Japan became a member of the United Nations only in 1956.

Throughout the 1950s, India not only championed for the inclusion of the PRC in the United Nations Security Council, but also introduced Communist China and its Premier Zhou Enlai to the Afro-Asian countries at Bandung in 1955 (Mukherji 2008). While legitimizing China’s military invasion and annexation of Tibet by signing the 1954 Panchsheel agreement, Nehru’s India also tried to play the role of a diplomatic interlocutor between China and Tibet when New Delhi granted refuge to the Dalai Lama in the aftermath of the 1959 Lhasa Uprising (Pardesi 2011: 102–105). However, Sino-Indian relations rapidly deteriorated as a consequence and China launched a short but swift attack in late 1962 as Beijing (erroneously) feared that India wanted to convert Tibet into its pre-1950–1951 status as a buffer state between India and China (Garver 2006). India’s disastrous defeat in 1962 removed India from the rank of a major power in Asia for the remainder of the Cold War.

Reduced to a South Asian power, 1962–1991

The 1962 Sino-Indian War proved to the world-at-large that India needed external support to meet the Chinese challenge. India sought and received military support from the
United States (and other Western powers like the United Kingdom) during the war and in its immediate aftermath (Hoffmann 1990: 196–200, 206–210). As such, India was hardly capable of providing leadership in Southeast Asia that was in the midst of a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. India’s vociferous opposition to the growing American involvement in Vietnam after 1964 further alienated many pro-Western states in Southeast Asia (Thakur 1979). Much to New Delhi’s disappointment, India was not extended an invitation when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional grouping, was formed in 1967. In the meantime, India’s relations with Indonesia dramatically deteriorated when Indonesia threatened to open another front against India during the 1965 India–Pakistan War (Ayoob 1990: 41). While this was largely a result of the fact that India was critical of Indonesia’s policy of Konfrontasi, it was becoming clear by the mid-1960s that the subcontinent would remain the primary area of concern for Indian foreign policy.

During the 1962 Sino-Indian War, more than half of the Indian army was facing Pakistan as New Delhi feared that Pakistan would open a second-front against India (Heimsath and Mansingh 1971: 171). China and Pakistan had dramatically transformed their relationship since 1962, and China issued an ‘ultimatum’ to India during the 1965 India–Pakistan War (Garver 2001: 194–204). Coming soon after China’s first nuclear test in 1964, this threat had an added significance for India. While India embarked upon its own nuclear programme in the aftermath of this threat (Pardesi, forthcoming), New Delhi realized that the China–Pakistan nexus would mean that India would not be able to play any significant role outside of the subcontinent for the time being. For example, when Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew asked for India’s assistance to train and equip the city-state’s military after its independence in 1965, New Delhi chose not to respond (Huxley 2000: 11). Similarly, while the Indian navy announced its intention to assume the functions of the British navy after Britain’s 1967 decision to withdraw from the ‘east of Suez’, India did not have the resources to play such a role (Thomas 1975–1976). This was despite the fact the Singapore’s Lee had mentioned that he would welcome an Indian naval presence in Southeast Asia (Ghoshal 1996: 96).

By 1971, systemic factors had further circumscribed India’s role beyond the confines of South Asia. After taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet split, the United States had formed a ‘tacit’ alliance with China by this time, an endeavour in which Pakistan had played a crucial role (Aijazuddin 2000). In the meanwhile, faced with the possibility of a US–China–Pakistan entente, India signed a treaty with the former Soviet Union on the eve of the 1971 Bangladesh War (Mastny 2010). While India emerged as the predominant regional power in South Asia after the successful vivisection of Pakistan in 1971, it was unable to project its military power beyond its home region. In part, this was a result of the fact the pro-Western states of Southeast Asia became suspicious of India as they saw Soviet power lurking behind India’s recent success. These perceptual factors apart, systemic and domestic-level factors continued to stymie India’s efforts to play a larger role in Asia.

To begin with, Pakistan embarked on its own nuclear programme after 1971. China also began assisting Pakistan’s nuclear efforts after India’s first nuclear blast in 1974 (Garver 2001: 324–331). For China, Pakistan had emerged as a low-cost proxy to keep India focused on South Asian affairs instead of challenging China at a pan-Asian level, especially in East Asia (Paul 2003). In 1978, China and Pakistan formally announced the opening of the Karakoram Highway linking Pakistan’s Gilgit-Baltistan region with China’s Xinjiang. During the opening of the Karakoram Highway, China’s deputy Prime Minister Li Xiannian noted that the highway allowed China ‘to give military aid to Pakistan’ (Topping 1979). In the meanwhile, China had also provided Pakistan with enough weapons-grade uranium for two atomic bombs by 1982 (Smith and Warrick 2009), and may also have provided Islamabad
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with a ‘proven nuclear weapons design’ by 1983 (Special National Intelligence Estimate 1983: 7).

In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan re-emerged as an important partner for the United States to counter Soviet expansionism in South-Central Asia. ‘The military importance of weapons transfers from the U.S.A. was historically crucial. Pakistan would not have become a serious military power without U.S. equipment’ (Cohen 1980: 104). The external military support that Pakistan received from its extra-regional partners in Beijing and Washington prevented India from emerging as the undisputed regional hegemon in South Asia throughout the Cold War. However, systemic factors were not alone in conspiring against India’s bid for regional paramountcy and its consequent inability to project power outside South Asia. India’s domestic economic weakness was equally responsible for this outcome.

New Delhi’s adoption of socialist and autarchic economic policies, especially from the mid-1960s onwards, meant that the Indian economy grew very slowly for the rest of the Cold War (especially when compared with Japan and the East and Southeast Asian ‘tiger economies’) (Panagariya 2008: 47–77). India’s model of import-substitution industrialization also resulted in the lack of any meaningful economic interaction with East and Southeast Asia’s export-oriented economies. The ‘oil shocks’ of the 1970s compounded India’s problems as they used up India’s scarce resources that might have been used to project India’s power eastwards, especially after 1971 (Thomas 1982). India was also concerned about the efforts of Iran to play the role of a regional power in South Asia. In 1972, the Shah of Iran had declared that any attack on Pakistan would be tantamount to an attack on Iran and that Tehran was committed to the territorial integrity of Pakistan (Sen Gupta 1975: 178–180).

Consequently, New Delhi largely focused on subcontinental affairs during this period. In the aftermath of the 1971 Bangladesh War when the United States sent the USS Enterprise (that was believed to be nuclear-armed by strategists in New Delhi) into the Bay of Bengal, India adopted its own version of the Monroe Doctrine – the so-called Indira Doctrine (Cohen 2001: 137–138). According to the Indira Doctrine, South Asia was India’s sphere of influence and India would not tolerate the intervention of any extra-regional power here unless it was on India’s terms. At the same time, India would not intervene in the domestic affairs of the regional states unless requested to do so. While India had provided military assistance to Sri Lanka in 1971 (Manor and Segal 1985), the Indira Doctrine was more forcefully implemented in the 1980s when India intervened in the Sri Lankan civil war (1983–1990),3 prevented a coup in the Maldives (1988), and blockaded Nepal (1989–90) (Hagerty 1991). These developments and the rapid build-up of India’s naval power in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the late 1980s emerged as a major cause of concern for several Southeast Asian states (many of which have sizeable populations of Indian-origin) (Gordon 1995: 293–295). Southeast Asian perceptions of India began to change only after the end of the Cold War.

After 1991 – India re-emerges as a major power in Asia

The end of the Cold War coincided with a major balance-of-payments crisis for India. This led the Indian government of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh to launch a series of structural reforms as India began to embrace the market by launching a new industrial policy while reforming its financial sector as well. East Asia featured prominently at this critical juncture for New Delhi. Financial assistance from Japan (and its powerful position in international organizations such as the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank) provided India with structural adjustment loans to implement these reforms (Sato 2012: 462). At the same time, India also drew inspiration from the East/Southeast Asian ‘tigers’ for its economic reforms (Singh 2006).

In tandem with these reforms, India also embarked upon a comprehensive ‘Look East’ strategy as it not only sought economic partners in East and Southeast Asia, a region that was emerging as one of the most dynamic centres of the world economy, but New Delhi also sought closer politico-military ties with the states of this region, especially in Southeast Asia. In addition to domestic economic changes, systemic factors also aligned to support India’s ‘Look East’ strategy. The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union meant that the Southeast Asian states began to view India favourably. This was especially true because India had no sources of bilateral disputes, especially territorial disputes (whether land or maritime), with any state in Southeast Asia. This was important simply because China was becoming militarily assertive in Southeast Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s with its claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands. At the same time, there were some concerns about America’s continued military presence in Southeast Asia at this time as witnessed by its withdrawal from the Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines in 1992. In this era of strategic uncertainty, the Southeast Asian states also began to look towards India as a potential balancer of China’s power in the region.

To be sure, the early 1990s was a particularly difficult time for India–Pakistan relations. Pakistan’s support for the insurgencies in the Indian states of Punjab and Kashmir had continued to stifle any progress in their bilateral relations (Ganguly 1997). However, the success of India’s nascent economic reforms called for a greater engagement with East and Southeast Asia, while the government of Prime Minister Rao also took advantage of the structural opportunity to build politico-military relationships with several Southeast Asian states on a bilateral basis (Pardesi 2010). India began conducting joint naval exercises with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in the vicinity of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as early as 1991. India and Singapore also began conducting the Lion King annual bilateral anti-submarine warfare exercises in 1993. At the same time, India began a programme to train Malaysian pilots and ground supporting staff for the MiG-29 aircraft, while upgrading its defence cooperation with Vietnam.

Since then, India has continued to build on its politico-military relationships with the Southeast Asian states, most notably with Singapore and Vietnam. In 2007, India leased its air force base in Kalaikunda in West Bengal to Singapore for the space-constrained city-state to train its air force personnel in India. This was the first instance of a foreign military being granted training facilities in India on a long-term basis. In 2008, the two countries signed a similar agreement allowing the Singapore army to use the facilities of the Indian army in Deolali (Maharashtra) and in Babina (Uttar Pradesh). It has already been speculated in the Singaporean media that the city-state may grant India naval logistics facilities as a quid pro quo (Boey 2003). Similarly, while India has been helping Vietnam upgrade its defence industries since 2000 (while also providing training to Vietnamese scientists in civilian nuclear technology), Vietnam has granted docking rights to the Indian navy at its Nha Trang port (Dutta 2011). India’s only tri-service theatre command at Port Blair in the Andamans and the current (and anticipated access) to the ports in Southeast Asia gives India the ability to project its growing naval and air power in this region (DNA India 2010).

At the same time, India’s budding relationship with the United States has provided an impetus to New Delhi’s relationships with Japan and South Korea, both of which are amongst America’s closest allies in East Asia. The rise of China is an important factor that
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has brought India closer to these Pacific democracies in recent years (Green 2011; Lee 2011). At the same time, the North Korean nuclear issue and the Islamabad-Pyongyang nuclear proliferation axis has further increased South Korea’s and Japan’s interest in building a meaningful strategic relationship with India (Squassoni 2006). Finally, the reliance of these Pacific powers on the Indian Ocean, especially for their energy needs, has led them to establish close maritime links with India, the pre- eminent resident regional power in the Indian Ocean. India and Japan are already conducting joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean and in the waters around Japan (and have also participated in trilateral naval exercises with the United States). In fact, Japan has requested the Indian government to convert the annual US-India naval exercises into trilateral exercises involving Japan as well (Times of India 2014). Similarly, the South Korea–India partnership also ‘has all the hallmarks of becoming a mini-Blue Ocean relationship’ (Lee 2011: 162).

Notably, India is now a member of all ASEAN-centred regional security institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus forum. Furthermore, India has ensonced itself in this larger Asian strategic theatre even as the India–Pakistan rivalry remains strong as ever and their Kashmir dispute remains unresolved.11 Moreover, Pakistan’s close strategic relationship with China continues, while Pakistan has also been able to extract military concessions from the United States for over a decade in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Siddique 2014; Shanker 2013; The Hindu 2014). It is largely believed that if the present trends continue (and if India’s economy recovers) then India will be able to emerge as a great power in Asia even if the India–Pakistan dispute persists as a consequence of the growing economic (and therefore military) differential between these subcontinental rivals (Ganguly 2006). In other words, India is in the process of emerging as a great power in Asia even though India has not been able to emerge as the regional hegemon in South Asia.

Conclusion

India’s quest for the status of a major power in Asia has remained constant in its worldview. According to Nehru, India was bound to play the role of ‘leading and interpreting Asia, and specifically South East Asia to the wider world’ (Brown 2003: 246). The centrality of Southeast Asia in India’s worldview has not diminished more than sixty years after its independence. Explaining the rationale behind India’s ‘Look East’ policy, India’s former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (who was also one of the architects of this policy) noted the following:

[India’s Look East policy] was not merely an external economic policy, it was also a strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and India’s place in the evolving global economy. Most of all it was about reaching out to our [India’s] civilizational neighbours in South East Asia and East Asia. I have always viewed India’s destiny as being linked with that of Asia and moreo [sic] South East Asia.

Singh 2005

India does not want Southeast Asia to be dominated by any single great power, least of all by China. In 2005, Pranab Mukherjee, India’s Minister of Defence noted that India’s ‘Look East’ strategy was based on the principle of ‘the maintenance of an equitable strategic balance’ as it was ‘vital for Indian security’ (Mukherjee 2005: 24). These statements are important not only because India now sees itself as indispensable to the strategic balance of power in Asia,
but also because Southeast Asian states view ‘India as adding ballast – that is geostrategic weight – to relations with China’ (Thayer 2011: 314).

While Southeast Asia remains central to India’s ‘Look East’ strategy, India now views itself as a pan-Asian power. According to A. K. Antony, India’s previous Defence Minister, India is ‘an integral part of East Asia’ (Press Information Bureau 2010). Notably, Japan and South Korea also seem to be reciprocating India’s overtures. India and Japan have recently established the so-called ‘2+2 dialogue’ involving their respective foreign and defence secretaries to discuss regional security issues in Asia as well as the region’s evolving strategic architecture (The Economic Times 2010). While this 2+2 dialogue is Japan’s third such relationship after the United States and Australia, it is India’s first such engagement with an external power. Similarly, India, Japan, and the United States have also been holding regular trilateral dialogues since 2011 (Hindustan Times 2013). Likewise, India and South Korea established a strategic partnership in 2010 and have since been holding regular foreign policy and security dialogues (Times of India 2013).

Addressing the senior-most Indian military leadership in late 2013, former Prime Minister Singh noted that the Asia-Pacific region was fast becoming the ‘arena for shaping the behaviour of major powers’. Given that economic power and consequent strategic focus was shifting from the West to the East, Singh told the country’s top military brass that India must be able to ‘institutionally’ grapple with these dramatic transformations especially given the rising tensions in the ‘seas to our [India’s] east and the related “pivot” or “rebalancing” by the US in this area’ (Singh 2013). This is the first time that the Indian government has asked the military to factor in America’s ‘pivot’ to Asia in its planning.

India’s quest to play the role of a major power in Asia is likely to receive a significant boost under the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi that came to power in May 2014. While all Indian governments have sought to promote India as a major power of some consequence, the Hindu right suffers from more status anxiety than the rest. To achieve this status, Modi’s foreign policy is likely to be driven by a desire to bring about India’s economic transformation. Modi is likely to ‘Look East’ in earnest to fuel India’s economic growth. After being shunned in the West for his conduct in the 2002 Hindu–Muslim riots in Gujarat, Modi’s foreign travels (before becoming the country’s Prime Minister) took him to parts of East Asia, including Japan and China. Modi is a great admirer of Japan and is likely to seek closer economic and technological links with Tokyo. While economic links with China will also be enhanced, Modi will seek a balance to ensure India’s national security. India now sees itself as an important part of the larger strategic theatre stretching from the Indian Ocean region into the western Pacific – the so-called Indo-Pacific region – that is emerging as Asia’s new strategic theatre as a consequence of the simultaneous rise of China and India (Medcalf 2013). In fact, the term is also slowly entering the lexicon of the Indian leadership (Singh 2012).

Notes

1 Under the influence of India’s nationalist elite, the departing British cast Pakistan in the role of a seceding state while arguing that the Indian Union would continue to exist.
2 Sikkim was absorbed into the Indian Union in 1975.
3 For example, the United States included Pakistan in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954.
4 ASEAN’s initial members included the following pro-Western regional states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines.
5 This was the first phase of the Sri Lankan civil war that finally ended in 2009.
6 In return for shipping its gold reserves to the Bank of England, India received financial assistance amounting to $210 million from the Bank of England and $195 million from the Bank of Japan.
7 India shares a land border with only one Southeast Asian state, Burma/Myanmar, which was established by their British rulers in 1937. India’s maritime boundaries with Indonesia and Thailand were made permanent in 1978, while India’s maritime border with Burma was finalized in 1987.
8 This agreement was renewed for another five years in 2012.
9 This agreement was also renewed for another five years in 2013.
10 In turn, India is helping Vietnam upgrade this port.
11 After openly going nuclear, India and Pakistan fought a brief but bitter limited conventional war in 1999 in Kargil and experienced a major militarized crisis in 2001–2002 in the aftermath of the December 2001 Pakistan-linked terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament. The Pakistan-linked 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks also caused a major crisis in their bilateral relationship.

References
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