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Democratization and human rights in Southeast Asia

Sorpong Peou

The collapse of socialism within the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War led Howard J. Wiarda to raise the question of whether comparative politics was dead (Wiarda 1998, 1999). Evidently, however, this field of study is still alive and well today, especially when we study political dynamics in Southeast Asia where political development presents a theoretical and empirical challenge to the study of regime change and human rights. The 11 states of this region have developed various types of political regime, and all of them, including democratic regimes, have proved unable to effectively protect and promote human rights.

To advance the above arguments, this chapter is divided into three parts. Part one sets the conceptual stage for empirical analysis of political regimes and human rights performance in Southeast Asia. This part discusses what liberal democracy is not and what it is. Liberal democracy is the antithesis of dictatorship; however, this form of democracy is about not only free and fair elections but also respect for political rights and civil liberties. This part further discusses an academic debate on whether democracies help advance other human rights. Part two discusses the political regimes in Southeast Asia. Of the 11 regimes, 7 are somewhere between dictatorship and illiberal democracy. Only four states can be considered democratic in the liberal sense of the term, and these remain unconsolidated; however, they continue to violate certain political rights and civil liberties. Their socioeconomic rights records are also far from ideal, despite some improvements in recent years. Part three further explains the blemished rights records: the democratic transitions resulted primarily from political elite fragmentation, rather than from cultural transformation, economic development, and effective institutional development within the state and civil society. In addition, armed forces in particular were not effectively subject to civilian or democratic control; external powers, often driven by their own security interests, were often part of the problem.

Political regimes and human rights

Conceptually, democracy as a system of government is the antithesis of dictatorship. Dictatorship refers to rule unrestrained by law. Rulers are not elected and thus not held accountable to their citizens. Dictators may continue to rule for indefinite periods of time or for life. Changes of government come about only when dictators die or by revolution, coup d’état, war, and so on.
Dictators control public institutions, such as the military, the judiciary, the legislature, and mass media communications. They eliminate active opposition and cover up their absolute rule with ideological rationalization. Civil society does not exist; if it does, it remains extremely weak or lacks political independence and succumbs to state control.

Dictatorship can take various forms. It can be military, such as the dictatorship that existed before World War II in Japan. There are examples of monarchical dictatorship, such as that of Louis XIV of France who declared himself to be the state (Je suis l’etat) (Rowen 1969). Dictatorship can also be civilian in nature, when backed by the armed forces, as in the case of Nazi Germany. Radical dictatorship includes those based on Marxism–Leninism: the communist party retains full control over society and does not allow opposition parties to compete in elections. Electoral competition only takes place within the communist party and among party members. Radical dictatorships are also based on the monopolization of the economic realm. Collectivism is the conceptual pillar of economic order, known as the planned or command economy. This form of dictatorship may adopt a policy of economic liberalization but not the policy of political openness. While dictatorship has several forms, it can be either “hard” or “soft,” depending on the level of political repression or violence to maintain the incumbent political regime.

The softer end of hybrid regimes may include authoritarian or electoral authoritarian regimes. They have been called “electoral authoritarian,” “pseudo-democratic,” and “virtual-democratic” (Diamond 1999: 15–16). They are similar to what Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way call “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2002). Such regimes have multiparty systems that are supposed to be electorally competitive, but hegemonic parties still dominate the political arena. According to Larry Diamond, a hegemonic party system is one “in which a relatively institutionalized ruling party monopolizes the political arena, using coercion, patronage, media control, and other means to deny formally legal opposition parties any real chance of competing for power” (2002: 25). Hegemonic parties win almost all the seats after elections and leave almost nothing or little for the opposition. Elections are not free and fair. Political “incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate election results” (Levitsky and Way 2002: 53). Media institutions are state-owned, heavily censored, and systematically repressed. Opposition party members and critics of government policies “may be jailed, exiled, or—less frequently—even assaulted or murdered” (ibid.). Hegemonic parties use brutal force, instead of relying on more subtle forms of making the playing field uneven, such as bribery, co-option and subtle forms of persecution including legal actions to harass or persecute critics. The legislature and judiciary are subject to the manipulation of the executive. The system of institutional checks and balances exists but remains extremely weak.

A more democratic form of government may be labeled as illiberal. This type of political regime looks similar to “delegative democracy” advanced by Guillermo A. O’Donnell (1994). In delegative democracies, basic democratic standards are generally met, but levels of accountability are still low. Opposition parties expect to gain more seats—because elections become freer and fairer—and to have more influence within the legislature, but they are still predictably unable to defeat the incumbent in a decisive way. Elections are conducted only to serve as a means to back the ruling elite’s strategy for development and to continue legitimizing its performance—not to remove the incumbent from power. As far as procedural issues are concerned, democracy is largely viewed as “justification” for, or legitimization of, the dominant party’s electoral victory. Meanwhile, the rule of law, the protection of political and civil liberties and an institutional separation of powers may exist in theory but not necessarily in practice. The individual does not fully enjoy the right to life and freedom, and freedom of religion and speech. Elected officials remain unconstrained, as they seek to stay in power (Zakaria 1997).
Democracies are liberal not only when they hold regular, free, and fair elections with a degree of uncertainty (not unpredictability) about the outcome but also when their political regimes respect individual human rights and freedoms, most notably political rights and civil liberties. Elections are a political mechanism designed to ensure peaceful competition for power, but they do not make countries liberally democratic unless elected leaders represent citizens’ interests. Liberal-democratic regimes thus have at least four basic features, discussed in the work of Larry Diamond (1999: 13–15). First, elections are contestable in a free and fair manner. Samuel Huntington’s procedural definition of democracy provides a starting point. In his words:

a twentieth-century political system [is considered] democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.

(Huntington 1991: 6–7)

Second, free and fair elections alone do not make a society democratic. Elections are “only one step, an important virtue of governance, but are not the only one virtue” (Zakaria 1997: 40). The third feature of liberal democracy is that elected representatives possess real authority to govern without being subject to undemocratic acts of subversion, such as military coups, insurgency movements and terrorism. In other words, democratic politics is the “only game in town.” The fourth feature of democracy is associated with political rights and civil liberties. George Sørensen lists all three dimensions of procedural democracy: “competition, participation, and civil and political liberties” (Sørensen 1993: 23–4). Democracy is liberal only if it is based on “constitutional liberalism,” which goes beyond the procedures for selecting government (competitive, multiparty elections). The term “liberal” emphasizes individual liberty, but the term “constitutional” is associated with the individual right to life and property, and freedom of religion and speech. These individual rights are secured by “checks on the power of each branch of government, equality under the law, impartial courts and tribunals, and separation of church and state” (Zakaria 1997: 26). In other words, liberal democracy is one that can be characterized as “a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property” (ibid.: 22). In short, liberal democracy is a system of government, but becoming democratic is a process moving from democratic transition to consolidation when all four features are evident.

The question remains: Do states that become democratic also effectively advance human rights other than political rights and civil liberties? While it is clear that undemocratic states suppress political rights and civil liberties and electoral/illiberal democracies try to limit civil and political rights, the question is whether liberal democracies can also advance other human rights defined in broader socioeconomic and cultural terms. Proponents of liberal democracy have made the case that this political system can also help advance socioeconomic rights, although they do not define them in terms of socioeconomic equality. Economic freedom is more important than socioeconomic equality. For liberals, however, authoritarian states are among the poorest in the world (Neier 1993: 44). Wealth is not accumulated at the expense of liberal values or human rights, including socioeconomic rights and development rights. According to one scholar (Kim 1997: 1124), “political freedom makes a contribution in its own right to economic growth.” Japan, for instance, had a “50-year history of coexistence between economic development and democratic practices” (ibid.: 1125). Liberal democracies are thus capable of advancing the rights of people to basic human needs, such as food, education, and shelter.
The demo-prosperity perspective, however, remains controversial. Some scholars question whether democracies perform economically better than autocracies (Polterovich and Popov 2007: 27). The 1997 Asian financial and economic crisis provides case studies for testing the demo-prosperity proposition. Democracies in East Asia were not exempted from the crisis. Japan, for instance, entered a recession and South Korea faced similar financial and economic woes.

High economic growth rates alone, however, do not show whether socioeconomic rights are effectively protected or promoted. Several indicators can be used to compare the various types of government: the right to basic goods and services that guarantee human survival, workers’ rights, minority rights, women’s rights, and so on. The right to basic goods and services can be measured in terms of human development—a composite statistic of life expectancy, education and income indices. Women’s economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival and political empowerment can be used to measure gender gaps and to assess whether such gaps narrow or widen. Workers’ rights include their right to negotiate their pay, benefits, and safe working conditions as well as their right to form unions and bargain collectively. Minority rights (in religious, racial, ethnic, and sexual terms) include the right for a minority group to enjoy its cultural values, practice its religion and use its language without fear of discrimination. Women’s rights are denied when women are trafficked into sex slavery as well as when they are deprived of access to education, work, and political participation.

In short, this part of the chapter has advanced the argument that democracy is the antithesis of dictatorship and that democratization is a political process that begins with movement toward competitive, free, and fair elections and respect for political rights and civil liberties. Liberal democracy is not only about multiparty elections but also about protection of such rights and liberties. The question is whether countries that become democratic in the liberal sense of the term are also capable of advancing other human rights defined in socioeconomic terms. The answer to this question may ultimately lie in how democratization as a political process evolves.

**Democratizing regimes and rights performance in Southeast Asia**

Of the 11 states in Southeast Asia, seven can be regarded as authoritarian or undemocratic and, at best, illiberally democratic. Myanmar still holds on to military rule, whereas Brunei remains under absolute monarchical control. The two electorally noncompetitive regimes are those that exist in Laos and Vietnam, because of their one-party systems. Singapore, Cambodia, and Malaysia still maintain hegemonic party systems, which keep electoral competition in favor of the ruling parties (see Suggested Readings). Only four states have become liberally more democratic: they are Timor-Leste, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. These democracies remain unconsolidated, however: they have been unable to fully advance the causes of human rights, including political and civil rights.

Timor-Leste is neither a dictatorship nor an electoral or illiberal democracy: it has become liberally democratic, but its democracy remains unconsolidated. Until its independence in 1999, it was under the colonial rule of Indonesia which was then an illiberal democracy. The road to multiparty democracy in Timor-Leste began with an interim UN authority (UNTAET—United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) tasked with a Security Council mandate to set up a democratic government. In 2001, the people of Timor-Leste elected a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution. The state has since held elections on a regular basis. In April 2002, presidential elections took place. In the last two presidential elections, no party used force to compete and maintain power. Election results show that no political party in Timor-Leste has emerged as the hegemonic force capable of monopolizing power. In general, the presidential, legislative and local elections in Timor-Leste throughout the 2000s were
relatively free and fair because no party has been in the position to dominate the electoral process. The transfers of power in the post-election periods were relatively peaceful. No violent incidents occurred during the presidential and parliamentary elections in March–April and July 2012, and the UN Integrated Mission ended in December.

Since independence, the people of Timor-Leste have not experienced the level of human rights violations under Indonesian rule, but human rights violations still exist. Civil liberties are generally respected, although journalists continue to exercise self-censorship. Socioeconomic rights have not significantly improved since their country gained independence in 1999. In terms of socioeconomic performance, the country remains least developed among the Southeast Asian states. Its Human Development Index is quite low (0.576) (see Table 3.1). In 2012, 41 percent of the population lived in multidimensional poverty and the country ranks 134 among 187 countries (Table 3.1). Labor rights are officially protected: workers have the right to form unions, bargain collectively, and strike. Ethnic groups exist—Timorese (comprising 12 ethnic groups that represent 78 percent of the population), Indonesian (20 percent), and Chinese (2 percent)—but ethnic violence has declined dramatically, especially when compared to the late 1990s. In terms of the Gender Inequality Index, Timor-Leste ranks 134 among 187 countries (Table 3.1). Freedom House (2013a) reports the persistence of discrimination and gender inequality, despite the fact that women’s rights are constitutionally guaranteed and women hold 25 of the 65 parliamentary seats. Domestic violence remains widespread. Women and girls are still trafficked into forced labor and prostitution (ibid.).

The political regime in Thailand is far from democratically consolidated. For many years after the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932, the military dominated politics. During the 1960s and 1970s, except during a short period from 1973 to 1976, “the military ruled with dictatorial power” (Bunbongkarn 1999: 162). Overall, the state in Thailand was “soft” compared with other strong states in East Asia (Laothamatas 1992: 153–71). For others, the political regime between 1978 and 1988 remained semi-democratic (Samudavanija 1989). Still for others, Thailand has now become more democratic. Political parties and the House of Representatives facilitated democratic norms with the aim of achieving full democracy (Funston 2001: 368). But according to Suchit Bunbongkarn, democratic consolidation “is yet to be achieved” (1999: 175;

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Sources: UNDP 2013; World Economic Forum 2013
see also Samudavanija and Chotiya 1998). One reason is that military influence on politics remains. As recently as late in November 2013, massive antigovernment protests by opposition demonstrators (known as Yellow Shirts) were stepped up in their attempts to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. In addition, minorities still do not enjoy full rights as other Thai citizens. Since its landslide victory in the 2011 election, the current government “has not yet addressed . . . many serious human rights problems, including lack of accountability for the 2010 political violence, abuses in southern border provinces, free speech restrictions, and violations of refugee and migrant rights” (Human Rights Watch 2013c; see also Connors 2011).

Thailand’s socioeconomic rights have improved when assessed in terms of Human Development Index (0.69 in 2012, ranking 103 of 187 countries) and poverty reduction effort: 13.2 percent in 2011 (World Bank 2014). Workers’ rights are limited, however. Strikes are legal and collective bargaining is allowed, but less than 2 percent of the workers are unionized (Freedom House 2014). Labor laws have been poorly enforced. Child labor still exists. Like migrant workers in Malaysia, those in Thailand (including two million of registered workers and the same number of those unregistered) are subject to working long hours and living in poor conditions (Guest 2010). Many receive less than minimum wages. Minorities still do not enjoy full rights as other Thai citizens do. Between 700,000 and 800,000 members of hill tribes do not have citizenships, are ineligible to vote, cannot own land, and are unprotected by labor laws. They also lack access to health care and education. In recent years, the government has made it easier for them to obtain citizenship, but the process remains complex and inefficient. Muslims in the four southern provinces, numbering about four million, continue to face and are still under scrutiny for security reasons because of ongoing insurgency (Corben 2014). Human Rights Watch continues to document the Thai security forces’ policy of “disappearing” used as a tool against suspected Malay Muslim separatists in the southern provinces. Most of the enforced disappearances took place when Thaksin was prime minister. Muslims who were killed (such as the 7 protesters who were shot dead and 78 others who were suffocated or crushed to death on 25 October 2004 in Tak Bai) did not receive justice (Human Rights Watch 2007b, 2007c). Other ethnic minorities have been subject to mistreatment. For instance, some 5,000 ethnic Hmong from Laos who were detained by the Thai authorities after June 2007 left Huay Nam Khao camp, but only 3,700 returned the day after. The other 1,300 refugees were missing and the Thai authorities provided no information. It was reported that the Thai army rounded up 800 of the protestors and sent them back to Laos (Human Rights Watch 2008a). Karen refugees from Myanmar living in Thailand have also been subject to abuse from the Thai security forces. Some refugees have been forced back to Myanmar, despite the fact that they had run away from armed violence and human rights violations and would face persecution and violent reprisals by the Burmese forces upon their arrival (Human Rights Watch 2008b). Women’s rights have also been violated. They remain underrepresented in government. Domestic violence remains a problem. Tens of thousands of women and children still work in the prostitution industry (at least 200,000), many of whom have been trafficked from villages to cities. In terms of gender gap, Thailand still ranks high: 103 among 187 countries (Table 3.1).

Democracy in the Philippines also remains unconsolidated. The Marcos dictatorship ended in 1986 and the country has since become a presidential democracy and there have been calls for the adoption of a parliamentary system. The number of political parties remains large. National elections have been held on a regular basis and are still based on the right of suffrage of all Filipino citizens at the age of 18. The country, however, witnessed a climate of fear. Overall, the rule of law did not prevail over the political and military elites (Rogers 2004). As noted, the military has been deeply active in politics for more than 30 years. The successive presidents have not
only been unable to control the military effectively but also depended on members of the armed forces to implement measures aimed at placating restless officers. Political rights and civil liberties continue to be violated (Human Rights Watch 2007a: 11). Raul Pangalangan, for instance, writes: “More than twenty years after the restoration of democracy, the Philippines is facing a repeat of the human rights nightmare experienced under Ferdinand Marcos.” In his analysis: “The human toll is familiar: extrajudicial killings, disappearances, the intimidation or killing of witnesses and the assassination of lawyers.” The government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was repressive: it “deployed the formalist approach and harnessed legal arguments to excuse human rights violators” (Pangalangan 2011: 56). According to Human Rights Watch’s 2013 World Report, the subsequent government did better: “extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances have decreased since [President Benigno S.] Aquino took office in 2010.” However, the report further states, “harassment and violence against political activists and journalists continue. No one was convicted in any extrajudicial killing case since Aquino became president” (Human Rights Watch 2013b).

Overall, the democratic regime has been slow in meeting certain socioeconomic and minority rights. The poverty rate has declined, but only slowly: to 25.2 percent in 2012 from 26.3 percent in 2009 and 26 percent in 2006 (Diokno 2013). The labor rights are limited despite the fact workers can form independent unions, bargain collectively, and strike. The Muslim minority group represents between 5 and 9 percent of the total population, and its members have experienced various forms of discrimination because the majority groups are Christians and have been a source of armed separatist movement (Freedom House 2013b). Gender gaps have been narrowed significantly: the country ranks fifth among 187 countries (Table 3.1). Women have now enjoyed more socioeconomic rights, especially in the areas of health and education. According to Freedom House (2013b), however, “The trafficking of women and girls abroad and internally for forced labor and prostitution remains a major problem, despite anti-trafficking efforts by the government and civil society.”

Indonesian democracy has become more liberal but remains unconsolidated. After gaining political independence, the country experimented with democracy, but differences between the new political elites led to the breakdown of new political institutions. The birth of “guided democracy” arrived when Sukarno banned elections in 1959, thus making the state more like a dictatorship. Guided democracy came to an end in the mid-1960s after General Suharto’s successful military efforts to crush the coup attempt in 1965 and his successful moves against the communist movement. Under Suharto’s New Order, only three political parties were allowed to exist. Some scholars adopted the concept of “authoritarian corporatism” to describe the system (Robison 1993: 41). For others, Indonesia was a semi-democracy. In fact, democracy under Suharto was quite illiberal. On 21 May 1998, Suharto finally ended his 32-year political career. His long-term protégé Vice President B.J. Habibie assumed the presidency. Between 1999 and 2014, the country held four national elections. The first multiparty elections took place in 1999, marking Indonesia’s transition to liberal democracy. In the 2004 and 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections, a new opposition party won. Retired Army General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of the Democratic Party of Indonesia (founded in 2001) defeated incumbent president Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–4) whose party (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle or PDI-P) won only 18.55 percent and 14.03 percent of the vote in 2004 and 2009 respectively (Sherlock 2009). The fourth parliamentary elections, which took place in April 2014, showed that no party emerged as the dominant player. Preliminary counts showed that PDI-P emerged on top with 18.9 percent of the poll, whereas the Golkar Party (formerly Suharto’s hegemonic party) came in a close second with 14.8 percent. Neither of these parties even reached the 25 percent threshold needed for them to field a candidate...
for the July 2014 presidential elections), and neither would emerge as the decisive winner (Kapoor 2014).

Indonesian democracy remains unconsolidated, however. Civil liberties have been better respected, but are far from ideal. Citizens enjoy freedom of worship, but serious human rights problems still exist (Ford 2011). According to Human Rights Watch’s 2013 World Report: “Violence and discrimination against religious minorities, particularly Ahmadiyah, Bahai, Christians, and Shia deepened. Lack of accountability for abuses by police and military forces continues to affect the lives of residents in Papua and West Papua provinces” (2013a). Freedom of the press has become more evident in recent years, but members of the media still express concern about threats from authorities. Journalists still practice self-censorship. Violence against the press increased in 2012 (Freedom House 2013c). Freedom of demonstration in places like West Papua remains subject to repression (Asian Human Rights Commission 2014). Indonesia’s socioeconomic and other human rights have improved, with its Human Development Index measured at 0.629 (ranking 121) and the level of poverty cut to 12.5 percent in 2012 (Table 3.1). In terms of the Gender Gap Index, Indonesia ranks 95 among 187 countries (Table 3.1).

Other human rights are still subject to repression, however. Religious minorities are still subject to discrimination and violence by Islamist militant groups and often left unprotected by the government (Human Rights Watch 2013d). Women rights also continue to be violated. According to one source: “60 new discriminatory regulations were passed by national and local governments by August 2013. There are already 342 such discriminatory regulations, including 79 local bylaws requiring women to wear the Islamic hijab, or head scarf” (Millane and Conron 2014).

Overall, liberal democracy has made slow progress in Southeast Asia. B. Michael Frolic, in the early 2000s, saw “signs of emerging political liberalization” in the region and made the following observation: “The process is slow and at times uneven, but political change is in the (East) wind” (Frolic 2001: 33, 34). Human rights issues have also become formally part of “Asian values,” especially since 2009 when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations inaugurated the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (Davis and Galligan 2011; Galligan 2011). Still, democratization in this region is far from complete. Even liberal democracies (Timor-Leste, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia) remain unconsolidated: they still violate certain political rights and civil liberties and prove unable to improve other human rights faster than they have. Their socioeconomic rights performance has even been less impressive than that of some less democratic or more authoritarian states (see Table 3.1). This begs the question of why these unconsolidated democracies fall short of meeting human rights standards.

Explaining democratization and the challenge of human rights development

The paragraphs below show that economic and political elite fragmentation and external intervention shed the most light on democratization; however, this political process remains unconsolidated because economic and political elites remain dominant and are thus still prone to repressive action. External actors have not done enough to ensure elite fragmentation and empower civil society.

Different theoretical perspectives on democratization have been advanced (Case 2002: 10–25; Frolic 2001) but none has adequate explanatory power. Culturalist perspectives remain popular in terms of their ability to explain the limits of democratization and rights development in
Southeast Asia. Even scholars who previously advanced structural functionalism modified their earlier thinking. Huntington was among them. In contrast to his earlier argument, that authoritarianism was transitional and part of the democratic process (authoritarianism first for economic development to be followed by political liberalization), Huntington later recognized the importance of cultural factors. Non-liberal traditions like Islam and Confucianism resist democratic values (Huntington 1993, 1987, 1984). Culturalists reject Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” claim about the final triumph of liberal democracy over all other cultural and ideological rivals. They do not say that none of the East Asia states has become democratic (Fukuyama 1992). Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan have become more democratic; however, these democracies are non-liberal. Some use such terms as “soft authoritarianism” (Roy 1994) and “neo-authoritarianism.” Democracy in East Asia is also characterized as “Asian-style” or simply “illiberal” (Bell et al. 1995). The term “Asian-style democracy” has been coined to make the point that this system is anti-liberal (Case 1996; Kausikan 1998). William Case thus makes this prediction: “politics [in the region] will probably evolve in the direction of semi-democracy rather than toward greater regime openness” (Case 1996: 438).

Cultural perspectives have limited explanatory power, however: they do not explain why democracy in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan (in Northeast Asia), Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste (in Southeast Asia), and India (South Asia) emerged and why it has become more liberal than other systems in these regions. Asian cultural values are not anti-democratic or as illiberal as they appear to be (de Bary 1983; Saeed 2011). Confucianism, for instance, has not stopped Taiwan and South Korea becoming more liberally democratic. Neither have Islamic values prevented liberal democracy from emerging in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim state. Buddhism has not done much to impede democratization in Thailand either, despite the political challenges the country continues to face.

Scholars have also been captivated by the positive relationship between economic development and political liberalization. Based on Max Weber’s insight that human history progresses from tradition to modernity, Seymour Martin Lipset’s seminal article makes a correlation between economic development and democratization, advancing the thesis that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1959: 75). More recently, other scholars argue that democracies that enjoy an annual per capita income of more than US$6,000 “are impregnable and can be expected to live forever” (Przeworski et al. 1996: 41). Modernization theory also helps explain democratic development in East Asia (Morley 1999; Lollar 1997: 4; Pei 1994; Han 1993).

The trouble with economic perspectives is that they cannot explain why more economically developed and wealthier states such as Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore remain less democratic and liberal than states that are less economically advanced and less affluent, such as Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Because of economic development, Singapore remains authoritarian. In contrast, Suharto’s New Order disintegrated after the severe financial crisis that began in 1997. Economic development can be used by ruling elites to justify their authoritarian rule. Richard Stubbs and other scholars, for instance, contend that growing prosperity in fact helps legitimize the “staying power of soft authoritarianism” in Southeast Asia (Stubbs 2001: 51). Economic development helps democracy consolidate, but affluence per se is not the key prerequisite for democratic transition.

It also appears that states that have become more democratic and liberal tend to be those where the economic elites have become less dependent on the political elites—a proposition similar to the thesis advanced by Barring Moore (1967; see also Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand provide some evidence: their elites have enjoyed greater
degrees of such independence, whereas economic elites in Singapore and Malaysia remain more dependent on political elites (Sidé 2008).

Class-based perspectives still raise the question of why economic elites in economically less developed states such as Thailand are more liberal than those like Singapore that are economically more advanced. Even in the case of Thailand, the capitalist class has not been successful in promoting or consolidating democracy. Culturalism cannot explain this political variation either. While there seems to be no clear correlation between economic development and liberal middle- and capitalist-class empowerment, economic classes may be empowered by non-economic factors, such as civil society and political elite fragmentation.

States that enjoy greater degrees of liberalization are said to be those that have strong civil society forces. Studies on emergent civil societies in Southeast Asia show a positive relationship between civil society and democratization. Johan Saravanamuttu adopted the notion that civil society is a “third” sector operating in between the public and the private sector. The growth of the ASEAN economies led to the growth of a middle class that “has indeed engendered or minimally provided the condition for the growth of NGOs and CSOs” (Saravanamuttu 2001: 100). In the Philippines and Thailand, the NGO communities engaged in high-profile activism. In his view, “were it not for a strong civil society in the Philippines in the mid-1980s the transition from dictatorship to democracy would not have been possible” (ibid.: 101). According to Garry Rodan, “NGOs played leading and coordinating roles in the [Thai] events of 1991 and 1992 which eventually led to the demise of a military government. Earlier, in 1986, NGOs played a similar role in overthrowing the Marcos regime” (2001: 77). Rodan contends that “the greatest potential of civil society to act as a force for liberal political change derives from its potential to institutionalise the rights of organized citizens to influence the decision-making process.” He adds that “Independent organizations which have a potential mass membership and links with other elements of society can play a critical role in fostering a liberal civil society” (ibid.: 57). Other organizations (including NGOs whose members are drawn from urban intellectuals and middle-class groups) represent a variety of social interests, ranging from labor, women, and environmentalists to social justice and human rights activists.

The jury is still out on the extent to which civil society has been politically effective in pushing the process of democratization. Even Garry Rodan (2001) is careful to qualify the impact of NGO communities and social movements, acknowledging that their influences on political development vary from country to country. But evidence also shows that civil society in Indonesia grew larger during the 1950s and 1960s and even stronger than the one in the 1990s, and yet did not play an effective role in promoting democracy. In the late 1990s, civil society was weaker than in the 1960s and yet President Suharto was overthrown. The Philippines has established one of the largest, best-organized civil society networks in the world (Human Rights Watch 2007a); however, its democratic regime has not consolidated, as is evident by ongoing human rights abuses discussed earlier.

The critical question is how strong economic and social forces are in relation to political and security elites. The experience of Southeast Asia shows that democratization began when political and security elites began to fragment. The fact that none of the political parties in Timor-Leste, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia has become the dominant force in the electoral and political arena shows that the elite structure in these states remains fragmented. This also appears to be the case in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Indonesia. Factional politics within the ruling nationalist party in Taiwan, the Kuomintang, also helps explain democratization in the country. Although initially obsessed with a dream to reunite all of China under Nationalist rule, the Kuomintang regime gave in to political pressure from within, exerted by “a patient but persistent opposition that was driven by sub-ethnic rivalry and the hope of democracy” (Hood
1997: 3). According to Bradley Richardson (1997: 3), “bargained democracy” in postwar Japan was possible because “power is fragmented, conflict is frequent, and issues are contested by parties, interest groups, and organs of governments.” Japan’s power structure was pluralistic, horizontal, conflictual, and decentralized. In short, political elite disintegration makes democratization more likely. Democratic transition can, however, be reversed and democracy is likely to deconsolidate when political and security elites regain cohesion and hegemonic control or when they restore power and prevail upon pro-democracy social forces.

One persisting problem with the democracies in Southeast Asia, as mentioned earlier, is that they remain unconsolidated. Part of the problem is that members of their security elites still remain powerful—not effectively subject to democratic control to the extent that the armed forces in consolidated democracies like Japan have been. Throughout the 2000s, for instance, military officers remained politically active: they limited democratic leaders’ ability to enforce democratic rules and human rights. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for instance, was either unwilling or unable to take control of the military. According to Human Rights Watch (2007a: 9), “Human rights activists remain concerned that Arroyo remains beholden to the military officers who put her in power, and that they are preventing her from disciplining those in the military who may be implicated in rights violations.” Although observers tend to think that the 1992 uprising against the Thai military regime marked a turning point in civilian–military relations, the coup against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006 does not appear to give the lasting impression that civilian leadership has now achieved full control over the military. Although democratically elected leaders in Indonesia seem willing and able to comply with democratic rules and human rights norms, “they are either powerless or unwilling to fully reign in the military and the paramilitary groups that help elites stay in power” (Freedman 2007: 214). Other scholars also conclude that “in the cases of Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines . . . the military has remained a significant feature of the state apparatus, either dominating or sustaining order within society” (Ganesan and Kim 2013: 15).

It is worth further noting that external factors have also influenced democratization in East Asia. Following the end of the Cold War, scholars recognized the virtues of international engagement aimed at promoting democracy. The United Nations, for instance, has since engaged in peacebuilding by helping to organize or support elections in post–conflict societies around the world. More states in various regions of the world joined the “third wave” of democratization after the collapse of Soviet dictatorship and the United States emerged as the only superpower in the world. American influences help shed light on democratization in states like Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, which have been close allies of the United States. This does not mean that politico–military alliances with the United States automatically transform states into democracies, as some US allies remain authoritarian. Moreover, we cannot just assume democratization is bound to take place whenever external actors intervene politically or militarily and apply pressure on authoritarian leaders (Peou 2007). Unless external democratic actors get or stay involved in politically fragmented and pluralistic societies like Japan, democratization may not take off and thrive. Unless powerful liberal democracies help effectively create such domestic structures within authoritarian states, liberal democratization is unlikely to emerge and mature (Peou 2000).

Evidence, however, shows that even democratic states like the United States and Japan have not adopted democracy and human rights promotion as their top policy priority. Because of their geo–strategic interests, they have often preferred to work with authoritarian and democratically elected governments, instead of putting pressure on them to respect democratic and human rights. In the case of Southeast Asia, the United States has shown more interest in fighting
the war against terrorism and helping countries in the region deal with the rise of China than in getting them to comply with democratic norms and human rights. In Cambodia, for instance, the United States and Japan have not done enough to defend democracy and human rights because of their concern that political pressure would only push Phnom Penh farther into the China camp (Peou 2007, 2009).

Conclusion

The comparative study of politics in Southeast Asia presents an empirical challenge to theoretical efforts at explaining uneven political development in the region. Some states have become more democratic than others, but none of them has fully and effectively protected or promoted political rights, civil liberties, and socioeconomic rights. The four democracies—Timor-Leste, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia—have also violated certain political rights and civil liberties and have not effectively advanced socioeconomic rights either. The question is why these democratic states have not become more effective defenders of human rights. No single theoretical perspective adequately explains this political problem, but evidence shows some relationship between elite fragmentation and unconsolidated democracy. How exactly political elites fragment to the point where they lose hegemonic control remains a subject of speculation and further research. Evidence shows that democratically elected leaders were either institutionally too weak to conform to human rights standards or simply sought to reassert their control over those who challenged their authority by being complicit with members of the armed forces. Overall, external democratic forces played a positive role in promoting liberal democracy and human rights in the region. Still driven by their security interests, powerful democratic states often lent support to the political regimes that violated human rights. Unless national ruling elites are effectively kept in check and civil society grows institutionally stronger, democracy in the region will not consolidate and human rights are unlikely to be effectively advanced and protected.

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Sorpong Peou


Suggested readings


