The two pillars of state regulation of European Islam

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European nations face a paradox: even though they seek to facilitate the socioeconomic integration of Muslims, anti-terrorism and security concerns fuel a desire to compromise liberties and restrict Islam from the public space. At the same time, this visibility of Islam in public spaces has re-opened heated discussions on the nature and content of European secularisms. State actions are critical in both the securitization and the reshaping of Islam in secular spaces. These two processes are paradoxically centripetal: the former tends to construct Islam as an exception, while the second tends to normalize Islam to include it into the state-church template specific to each country.

Securitization: the embodiment of Islam as an exception

The securitization paradigm encompasses the multifaceted process through which the normal rule of law is suspended in favour of exceptional measures justified by extraordinary situations that threaten the survival of the political community. As noted by Weaver and Buzan, the authors of this initial paradigm, securitization operates outside the domain of ‘normal politics’ because it aims to respond to an existential threat. In the case of Islam, it involves political actors who comprehend Islam as an existential threat to European and American political and secular order and thereby argue for extraordinary measures to contain it. A successful securitization rests on the capacity of a securitizing actor (primarily state officials and politicians) to ‘speak security’; namely, to present a certain problem as a significant menace that challenges the survival of a referent group or community, in a way that resonates with a ‘significant audience’. In this regard, Islamic extremism, especially since 9/11 and 7/7, has become a key security issue across the Atlantic.

The dominant paradigm within securitization studies pays attention to the securitization of Islam through extraordinary speech acts, such as the justification for the War on Terror and the persistent conflation of Islam with political violence. Our analysis however, departs from the dominant securitization approach by analyzing measures not directly related to terrorism, such
as immigration policies and administrative measures limiting Islamic practices. In other words, we focus political actions targeting Muslims within the bounds of regular political procedures. In this regard, legal constraints and the subsequent securitization of Islam reinforce the perception of Islam and Muslims as the typical ‘others within the West’. Consequently, Muslims are under increased political scrutiny and control, especially those who assert their religious affiliation through dress code and engagement in public religious activities. Furthermore, the signs of these activities, such as mosques and minarets, but also dress code, Islamic education, halal meat, etc., have become highly suspect.

**Chasing the imams**

The expulsion of imams is a first example of this phenomenon. Their exclusion has become a pattern across Europe. Often based on dubious grounds and anti-terrorist invocations, these actions highlight the precarious status of the profession.

From 2001 to 2004, France expelled more than twenty-five imams and proposed a law that would ease the deportation process. The case of Abdelkader Bouziane perfectly illustrates the situation. After the publication of several statements in a controversial interview that seemed to condone violence against women, a Salafi imam in Vénissieux (Greater Lyon) was hastily expelled from France on April 21, 2004, on the grounds of being a major threat to the state and public security (‘nécessité impérieuse pour la sûreté de l’État et la sécurité publique’). After Bouziane appealed the court’s decision, he was granted the right to return to France. His good fortune did not last long as he would soon be expelled again. This time, a note by the French Intelligence Service accusing Bouziane of having issued a fatwa against American interests in Iraq was invoked in court, but no further evidence was presented to substantiate the accusation. The case raised complicated questions of legal hermeneutics, as the Correctional Court eventually decided that Bouziane’s controversial declarations were made in the context of a reference to the Qur’an and could not constitute an incitement to violate a person’s physical integrity. Judge Fernand Schir concluded that ‘the Jurisdiction has no right . . . to intrude in a domain which belongs to religious conscience’. The case raised complicated questions of legal hermeneutics, as the Correctional Court eventually decided that Bouziane’s controversial declarations were made in the context of a reference to the Qur’an and could not constitute an incitement to violate a person’s physical integrity. Judge Fernand Schir concluded that ‘the Jurisdiction has no right . . . to intrude in a domain which belongs to religious conscience’.

In the Netherlands, the concern of controlling imams was channelled into providing mandatory civic training sessions for clergy personnel. At present, there is still no state-sponsored imam programme despite efforts to establish such a facility. While the admission of foreign imams to the Netherlands cannot be prevented due to principles of religious freedom and equal treatment, a mandatory civic integration programme for immigrant ‘clergy’ was adopted in 2002. This training programme is officially destined for all kinds of immigrant religious personnel, although it is first and foremost intended for new imams and, to a lesser extent, Hindu teachers.

In the United Kingdom, the education and training of imams has been institutionalized and managed professionally since 1981. The establishment of the Muslim College in London was driven by the need to employ locally educated imams to better answer contemporary tensions. Currently, there are two institutions dedicated to the training of imams: the Muslim College in London established in 1981, as mentioned above, and the Markfield Institute of Higher Education in Leicestershire, where an ambitious set of courses was established in 2000. Instead of using the term ‘imam’ in the United Kingdom, preference is given to employing the term ‘Muslim faith leader’ in order to avoid working with different interpretations of the profession within Sunni and Shia Islam. Thus, other roles – chaplain, teacher, youth worker, and the like – often make up part of an imam’s responsibilities.

In 2010, the Muslim Faith Leadership Training Review, which evaluates current training provisions for imams and examines how to build the capacity of Islamic seminaries, identified
crucial areas of improvement needed in the training and education of Muslim faith leaders. For example, the review pointed out that extra work needed to be accomplished with regards to the roles and perspectives of women; the integration of theological insights with practical experience in initial training; professional development; and better facilitation of relations with the government.9

In Germany, top security and law officials agreed to enact new computer surveillance regulations, which were feared by Muslim leaders, to pay more attention to imams than to their Christian counterparts. The framework, designed by Interior Minister Wolfgang Schüble of the centre-right Christian Democrats (CDU) and Justice Minister Brigitte Zypries of the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD), has allowed federal security officials to monitor computers in cases related to terrorism or other serious crimes. The new framework complies with a legal ruling made by the country’s highest court in February 2009.10

The establishment of Islamic studies at universities in Germany has also been a political concern, particularly since 9/11. In 2004, the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DTB, an extension of the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs) financed two chairs at Frankfurt’s Goethe University. In 2005, the University of Munster established the first study course for Islamic religious teaching (Islamkunde) while the University of Osnabrück followed suit in 2007. In 2009, a new Islamic school was established to train Muslim clergymen in Berlin. The first of its kind in the German capital, the school has the capacity for sixty-eight students and offers six-year training courses to future imams.11

Most of Germany’s imams grew up and received religious training outside of the country, often in Turkey. Turkey’s religious affairs office regularly sends theologians to over 800 German mosques, but few come with German language skills. As such, the government established ‘Imams for Integration’, which is a joint initiative organized by the Goethe Institute, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), and the German association of Turkish Muslim congregations (DITIB) that also complements the efforts of the Islamic studies programmes at the aforementioned universities and schools. The programme consists of 500 hours of German language classes and 12 days of lessons on intercultural and German topics, such as the powers of the state, life in a pluralistic society, religious diversity, the educational system, migration, and community work. Overall, the four-month study programme aims to exploit imams’ potential to be forces for integration and is designed to make them fluent in German culture and language.12

The desire to establish a German Islamic theology appears to have become a common cause for all the major political parties in Germany. Islamic theology and the education of Islamic religious teachers and imams are viewed by many as the magic formula for the integration of Muslims. But universities are not necessarily prepared for this major project. They might only succeed if competition between various academic institutions is encouraged, and if different educational models are experimented with. In this context, special attention must be paid to the promotion of young academics in the field of Islamic theology, because at present there are virtually no eligible German-speaking Islamic theologians available to take up such a cause.13

**Restraints on Islamic practices**

Convergent with our research, Jonathan Fox and Yasemin Akbaba documented the actual restriction of religious practices across eighty-six religious minorities in twenty-seven Western democracies from 1990 to 2008.14 They identified a significant increase in discrimination against Islam in particular, especially post-9/11, which wasn’t reflected in the level of intolerance against majority religions, nor against other minority religions. According to our own
research, the restrictions affect primarily mosque buildings and activities, modes of Islamic education, women’s dress code, and other aspects of Islamic practices.

Mosques

It is important to note that extreme political proposals such as banning mosques cannot be legally implemented, as they would violate constitutional rights of freedom of religion and equal treatment of all citizens.

In Germany, right-wing radicals established the country’s first anti-Islamic party, which launched a vehement national campaign against the building of mosques in 2005. The movement started off as ‘Pro Cologne’, to protest the establishment of a mosque in Cologne, and has since gained significant numbers of followers. In addition, several other groups such as the ‘Pro NRW’ (Pro North Rhine-Westphalia) initiated campaigns for similar purposes. The group, which holds five city council seats but currently does not hold any seats in the House of Representatives, aims to create alliances with other far-right groups, such as Austria’s Freedom Party (FPO), to generate larger national and international support for its cause. This initiative directly influenced the campaign of the two Swiss right-wing parties (SVP and EDU) that led to the much mediatized ban of minarets in Switzerland after the Egerkingen Committee, a group composed of leaders of both right-wing political parties, launched a referendum to ban the construction of minarets that was approved by 57.6 per cent of voters in 2009. The ban reflected a fear of Islamic fundamentalism, yet ‘the Federal Council [took] the view that a ban on the construction of new minarets [was] not a feasible means of countering extremists tendencies’ and ultimately declared the ban illegal.

In the United Kingdom, the construction of mosques is not a political issue any more. Similarly, in France, the project of devising a ‘French Islam’ has ironically provided impetus to a greater legitimacy of Islamic practices, including the construction of ‘transparent’ mosques approved by local political authorities as counterpoints to an informal ‘Islam of the caves’. The construction of minarets, however legal, is usually discouraged to meet neighborhood demands.

Resistance however has not completely disappeared and surfaces in local policies of municipalities. A 2004 study commissioned by the Fonds d’Action et de Soutien pour l’Intégration et la Lutte contre les Discriminations (FASILD) established a typology of mayoral attitudes to the construction of visible Muslim places of worship. It revealed a remarkable diversity of attitudes, which demonstrates that any explanation in terms of macro-sociological models of state-church relations is unable to seize the full complexity of the realities on the ground.

Islamic schools and Islamic education

A second major restriction on the practice of Islam across Western Europe concerns the development of Muslim schools as well as the status of Islamic education in public schools when allowed. This restriction is not grounded in any empirical evidence that Islamic schools are obstructive to integration. In the Netherlands, for instance, these reports have concluded that on the whole, Islamic schools do not obstruct immigrant integration. Investigations by the Inspectorate of Education in 2005 concluded that almost all Islamic schools have an open attitude toward Dutch society and play a positive role in creating the necessary conditions for social cohesion. Michael Merry and Geert Driessen, leading experts on Islamic schools in the Netherlands, write that there is a broader attempt to openly discuss the Dutch school system but Muslims are commonly seen as a threatening political presence in a way that the
other groups generally are not. Equality on paper, therefore, has not translated into equality in practice. Notwithstanding the positive reports issued by the Dutch Inspectorate of Education, Islamic schools continue to be viewed with distrust, and elections make Islamic schools easy targets for vilification, as unemployment and crime turn popular opinion against the presence of a visible minority groups. In the wake of the Theo van Gogh murder, some mosques and Islamic schools became targets either for vandalism or arson.21

Nevertheless, Minister of Education van der Hoeven decided in the spring of 2004 that any new Islamic school must have a school board that only comprises members of Dutch nationality. A general ban on Islamic schools would demand a change of the Dutch constitution, however, and would imply that other denominational schools would also be closed down. Consequently, a ferocious public debate emerged, initiated by Ayaan Hirsi Ali and others. As of 2006, there were 46 Islamic primary schools in the Netherlands with a potential stipulated need of 120 such schools.22

In most of the German states religious education is part of public schools’ standard curriculum. Teachers of religion need permission from both the state and their church to practice. Islamic instructors have, however, very often been denied permission to teach Islam by regional governments due to the lack of a clear hierarchy within Muslim organizations, unlike the Protestant church. No single leader is appointed to deal with the matter, which complicates government relations. The practice of teaching Islam in German schools thus becomes very controversial.23 While Muslim migrant organizations regard themselves as the voice of Muslims in Germany, officials state that only about 20 per cent of Muslims are actual members of these organizations. 24 A clear Muslim representative is therefore lacking.

Religious education for Muslims in Germany is thus practised very differently from other classes on religion and is often incorporated into native language courses.25 These classes serve as a proxy for teaching Islam even if they are lawfully open to all students. Since 2000, various test projects have been launched to experiment with new possibilities for teaching religion to Muslims in the German language. While in North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria these initiatives were led by the state, in Berlin26 and Baden-Württemberg Islamic organizations are closely involved in their development and realization. In Berlin, the Islamic Federation was authorized to teach Islam, although the decision was heavily criticized by the media in 2004 due to the ‘Islamist’ background of the Federation.27 In 2003, Bremen established religious courses (Islamkunde) for Muslims in German under state control without the participation of Islamic organizations, mainly to counter the conservative and sometimes Islamist orientation of some of these organizations. Such initiative clearly oversteps the legitimacy of the state in religious matters even though the German concept of secularism is not based on a radical separation of church and state. But, according to the legal status of religion (Staatskirchenrecht), the state’s right to regulate religious communities is limited, while religious organizations are encouraged to maintain a strong public presence and to partake in various social and cultural tasks of the state. As a result, the Christian churches and the Jewish community have their own official representatives; they are entitled to membership in various bodies to which the state has delegated certain tasks such as the provision of social services. Such liberties are still not granted to Muslim organizations, as they often operate in a specific political context characterized by a tight cooperation between the state and religious communities.28 The controversial discussions concerning the state’s role in teaching religion to Muslims in German continue to this day.

In the United Kingdom, both schools that receive state funding and private Islamic schools without accreditation from the government provide religious education. There are 140 private Islamic schools, 11 of which are state funded.29 Research by the Muslim Council of Britain
found that Muslims identified access to quality education as the issue most important to them. But the majority of Muslims continue to be educated in non-Muslim state schools and many Muslim communities have expressed concern about the ability of these schools to meet their pupils’ (language) needs. Many Muslim children will learn to read Arabic in order to read the Qur’an, irrespective of its availability as a curriculum option. Such classes take place in mosques but the quality of the language tuition is unregulated. From 1997 until 2010 when it left office, the Labour government extended state-funding opportunities to include minority faiths. At present, seven Muslim schools receive state funding, including Al Furqan School in Birmingham, Islamia School in London, and Feversham College in Bradford, while an additional quarter of England’s independent Muslim schools would be interested in receiving monetary aid. Controversy exists over the expansion of state-funded religious schools as they could potentially hurt multiculturalism and limit integration.

In France, there are currently nine Islamic schools, some of which emerged as a consequence of the 2004 law prohibiting religious signs in public schools. A growing number of Muslim parents are seeking to educate their children in confessional schools. In the 2000s, Islamic schools were opened in Aubervilliers (2001), in Lille (2003, Lycée Averroes), and in Lyon (2007, Lycée Al Kindi), joining a school established in La Réunion several decades ago. A year later, another Muslim private school was opened in the Parisian suburb of Vitry-sur-Seine (Val-de-Marne). The Lycée Averroes is under contract with the state. In addition to state-mandated courses, the schools offer classes on Arabic and Islam.

Dress code: hijab ban for students

A third field of restrictions on Islamic practices discusses hijab and niqab bans. In 2004, a law was adopted that prohibited the use of religious signs in French public schools based on the need to defend the principle of laïcité. Although the measure did not affect Muslims alone, its main motivation was to ban the hijab. Such a limitation is related to the redefinition of secular space, even though it was greatly influenced by the post-9/11 securitization process.

In Germany, some educators regarded the headscarf as a symbol of backwardness, women’s oppression, and exclusion from society. They see it as their ‘moral duty’ to try to reduce the number of headscarves at their schools, as they think this will support the girls’ enhanced integration in society. A Protestant secondary school in Gelsenkirchen, for instance, only allows female Muslim students to wear a headscarf on two conditions. They have to be fourteen or older (the official age of religious maturity in Germany) and are obliged to pass a test from the school council about their reasons for wearing the scarf. This way, the school’s headmaster declared he wanted to find out whether the girls decided to wear the headscarf for their own reasons or whether they were forced by their families or the surrounding Muslim community. In other schools, psychological pressure is exerted on parents not to ‘force’ their daughters to wear this ‘sign of disintegration’ by suggesting they would otherwise face significant problems at school and in society.

Hijab ban for teachers

The restriction of hijab for teachers also is more closely related to secular values than security concerns even though the post-9/11 context made it more legitimate to raise such issues, as mentioned before.

Due to a decision of the German Supreme Court on July 30 2003, wearing of a headscarf cannot be a cause for dismissal yet, in many cases, it is the reason for not getting a job at all.
Teachers in particular suffer from this restriction. Fereshta Ludin is a young Muslim teacher of Afghan origin whose case stood at the centre of a debate in Baden-Württemberg in 2003 on Muslim teachers’ right to dress according to Islamic principles. According to the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, the headscarf was at odds with basic Christian values and constitutional secularism alike. As a symbol of backward and fundamentalist Islamic attitudes, the ministry stated that the hijab opposed the principles of freedom of thought and the equality of the sexes in German society.32

The decision of the German Supreme Court in 2003 was followed by a still continuing, very emotional discussion among politicians, journalists, and the wider public on the reasons why some young Muslim academics maintain a strong attachment to wearing a headscarf, to what extent they are indoctrinated by extremist organizations, and how far teachers at state schools should appear ‘neutral’ while performing their jobs. As a consequence of this ongoing discussion, seven of the sixteen states’ parliaments are preoccupied with the preparation of a ‘law against specific religious symbols that threaten to disrupt the political or religious concord in schools’ or a ‘law against religious symbols with a demonstrative character’ or a general ‘law against all religious signs worn or used by teachers in state schools’.33 On March 13 2015, the Federal Constitutional Court put an end to this ongoing discussion by declaring that to ban veils for teachers was an infringement on religious freedom.

Burqa and niqab ban

The recent increase of burqa bans is directly related to the perception of assertive Muslims as ‘the enemy’. On April 26 2006, a proposal to ban the niqab in France from all ‘Republican territories’ was discussed at the National Assembly under the title of ‘Law proposal seeking to fight against infringements to women’s dignity resulting from certain religious practices’ by Jacques Myard from the centre-right UMP.34 The proposal recommends criminalizing both the practice of wearing and the encouragement to wear the niqab, as well as expelling foreigners found guilty of the offence, again based on the need to defend laïcité. The initiative eventually led to a complete ban of the burqa in France in 2010.

The law took effect in April 2011, and there have been varied responses to the ban, with supporters stating that ‘The face is a [sic] dignity of a person. The face is your passport . . . so when you refuse me to see you, I am a victim’, and covered women responding that ‘under no circumstances [will I] stop wearing my veil’.35 The ban received worldwide media coverage since it was the first measure of its sort in Europe and beyond. The international public outside of Europe mostly reacted with astonishment at the apparent infringement of human rights in (formerly) liberal Europe and openly questioned the effectiveness – as not the aggressors but the presumed victims are punished – and proportionality – very small numbers of women actually wear the burqa in Europe – of the ban.36

Other countries experienced similar restrictive actions. In 2010, the Belgian lower house of parliament passed a ban on the burqa as the first country in Europe, which couldn’t be enforced until 2011 for lack of a legitimate government. This is remarkable due to the country’s non-explicit secular character, which stands in stark contrast to France’s clear stance on laïcité. The law was authored by Daniel Bacquelaine, who said that the ‘burqa is incompatible with basic security as everyone in public must be recognizable and clashes with the principles of an emancipated society that respects the rights of all’.37 The lower house of parliament overwhelmingly voted in favour of the law; not a single MP voted against the measure and two people abstained.38 Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch called upon members to vote against the law.
In the Netherlands, when the far-right MP Geert Wilders suggested in 2005 that a ban on the burqa was necessary for ‘security reasons’, Minister Verdonk happily took up the suggestion and promised to investigate the matter. The investigation eventually led to the approval by the Dutch cabinet of the ban in all public spaces in January 2012, which was supposed to take effect in 2013 but was not implemented. Critics have argued that the number of Muslim women actually wearing the burqa in the Netherlands is so small (ranging from a handful to around 100) that a special ‘legal ban on the burqa’ mainly serves political interests of politicians who want to show that they are ‘tough on Islam’. In several Dutch cities, such as Amsterdam and Utrecht, policy proposals have been introduced to reduce the unemployment benefits for women wearing a burqa. Local authorities argue that by wearing it, women seriously reduce their chances of finding a job in the Netherlands. At the time of this writing, the law was not passed yet.

In Germany, the Christian Democrats (CDU) of the state of Hesse have reignited the debate on the January 2012 burqa ban. Politician Alexander Bauer led the discussion on behalf of his party, which also is inclined to impose a ban on full-face veils. People have to be willing to ‘show their face’ if they live in Germany, he is alleged to have said. As in France, it has become a major political issue.

In the same vein, Britain has declared that it would not follow France in banning Muslim women from wearing a burqa in public as such a move would run contrary to the conventions of a ‘tolerant and respectful society’. Immigration Minister Damian Green said that the move to ban women from wearing veils would be ‘rather un-British’, in an interview with *The Sunday Telegraph*, despite a recent opinion poll showing widespread public support for such an action. Claiming it would be ‘undesirable’ for Parliament to vote on a burqa ban in Britain similar to that approved in France, he said:

> We’re a tolerant and mutually respectful society . . . Very few women in France actually wear the burqa. They [the French parliament] are doing it for demonstration effects. The French political culture is very different. They are an aggressively secular state. They can ban the burqa, they ban crucifixes in schools, and things like that. We have schools run explicitly by religions. I think there’s absolutely no read-across to immigration policy from what the French are doing about the burqa.

The Minister’s comments could have dismayed the growing number of British supporters of such a ban – a ‘YouGov’ survey found in July 2010 that 67 per cent of respondents wanted the wearing of full-face veils to be made illegal. His comments also came after the new head of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) said that the United Kingdom was the most welcoming country in Europe for Muslims.

**Islamic slaughter (halal meat)**

Finally, restrictions on the practice of Islam also encompass rules regarding the slaughter of halal meat. Unlike the Jewish community in Germany, the Muslim community is not generally permitted to slaughter animals according to the rules of Islam (halal). A 2002 decision of the German Supreme Court, however, allowed Muslims to receive exceptional permission for slaughter during Islamic feasts without anaesthetizing the animal. In North Rhine-Westphalia, exceptions are granted on the condition that customers are practising Muslims and bound to eating halal meat according to religious traditions. Yet, this exception concerns Alawis specifically.
Securitization and secularization

In the Netherlands, the debate on halal slaughter methods poses significant problems as well. Despite the attempts of the Dutch Party for Animals to impose a ban on ritual killings in 2011, the Dutch Senate rejected such a law later that year. Instead, the government insisted that new research be initiated to identify ways to slaughter animals that are in line with both animal rights standards and ritual procedure. It agreed to such a measure after an earlier decision of the lower house outlawing ritual killing methods of animals was met with an outcry from the public, including Muslims and Jews, on the grounds that it was an infringement upon religious freedom.

In France, the controversial discussion on halal meat flared up during the 2012 presidential elections, which made political fodder for left-wing detractors. President Sarkozy’s decision to make the labelling of halal meat an election issue by vocally denouncing the practice in public speeches has infuriated Muslims and disappointed many who oppose far-right Front National leader Marine Le Pen’s discriminatory tactics. Both leaders were accused in the press of ‘whipping up an artificial controversy’ in desperate attempts to appease voters. Kamel Saidi, a halal restaurant owner in his thirties, commented that ‘[i]t is depressing that all we are trying to do is find our place in society, and there is no recognition of this, just suspicion. Once again, it’s as if the whole Muslim community is suspect.’

In search of the good Muslim: how European states are reshaping Islam

One of the fundamental principles of secularity, differentiation of religion and politics, does not actually equate to the separation of church and state. If this were the case, France would be the only secular country in Europe. Rather, it refers to differentiation and cooperation between church and state.

The differentiation takes three main forms across Europe and the United States. The first form includes the existence of a state religion as well as the extension of rights to other religious groups, as is the case in the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries. The second form entails formal agreements of cooperation between state and religious institutions, as is the case in Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands. The third form is the separation between state and religious institutions, as is the case for France and the United States.

Cooperation between state and religious institutions also is implemented in different ways: either the state provides for the teaching of religion in public schools and grants religious organizations free access to public-owned media, or it gives direct/indirect funding to religious institutions. Usually, religious organizations must comply with specific state requirements in order to receive this conditional support. For example, religious groups must organize local and national representative bodies to serve as counterparts to state institutions. In countries where a denominational teaching of religion is offered in public schools, as is the case in Germany and Spain, the religious community is required to design a central religious authority that serves as an interlocutor with the state. This authority gives credentials to teachers who teach in public schools, cooperates with state agencies to train the teachers, and approves curricula. For groups with strong religious infrastructure, like the Catholic Church, such requirements are easy to fulfill. But for other groups, like Muslims, such institutions have often been built from scratch. The situation is very different in the case of American secularism, which does necessitate the same level of cooperation between the state and religious organizations. There is no need for a grand mufti or centralized religious institution to serve as interlocutor with state or national government.
Due to these particular circumstances, facilitating the cooperation between the state and Muslim groups has been a common concern of European governments and has led to the creation of Muslim representative bodies in Belgium, Spain, and France. For state agents, these bodies are aimed at reducing the gap between the political and legal status enjoyed by other religious groups and Muslims. They also are seen as a way to assuage feelings of discrimination that could potentially fuel Islamic radicalism and, ultimately, to ensure that the leadership of Muslim organizations falls into the hands of ‘moderates’.

As noted by many scholars from Fetzer and Soper to Laurence, these representative bodies are the outcome of successive state actions to create umbrella organizations by gathering the most ‘representative’ Islamic organizations and facilitating elections from the Muslim population to create institutions (assembly and executive committee). Even in the United Kingdom, the MCB has gained status as a representative body, especially after the 7/7 attacks and the increasing concern on security.

Interestingly, this institutional integration of Islam within the dominant framework of European secularisms shows the willingness – even the eagerness in some cases – of major Muslim organizations to cooperate with the state. However, such cooperation is rarely presented in the public discourse as a positive sign of Muslim integration within secular cultures, and the dominant rhetoric continues to describe Islam in opposition to secularism.

At a deeper and even less explored level, the state has become an active agent in reshaping Islam by creating new Islamic institutions and leaders. Those leaders are state-appointed or bureaucratic leaders who often compete or conflict with other religious leaders who derive their authority from other sources, such as scholarly expertise or transnational networks.

The heads of the new representative bodies are increasingly supplanting the bureaucratic leaders of the countries of origin, revealing a profile of leadership tailored to the specifics of European secular states. Most of them have secular backgrounds with some Islamic knowledge. For example, Mohammed Moussaoui, the current head of the CFCM in France, born in East Morocco, became a French citizen in 2008. He obtained his diploma in mathematics and physics in 1984 in Morocco, and his doctorate in mathematics in 1990 from the University of Montpellier. In Morocco he received training in theology and delivered khotbas (Friday sermons) for twenty years. He was elected president of the French Council of Muslim Faith (CFCM) and currently holds this position today.

Şemsettin Uğurlu, president of The Executives of Belgian Muslims, is a Turkish Belgian-born Muslim with training in Islamic studies. Before becoming president he was an imam and professor of Islamic religion in Belgium. Additionally, Isabelle Praile, vice president of the organization, is a Belgian-born convert to Shi’ism with a secular background.

The main role of these bodies is to support state actions toward Islam, especially when these actions are seen as hostile to some Islamic practices. For example, Dalil Boubakeur, who in 2003 was the head of the CFCM, initially expressed disagreement with the project of a bill to ban religious signs in French public schools. However, after President Jacques Chirac’s speech on December 17 2003, supporting the bill, Boubakeur changed his position and made an announcement asking Muslims to respect the law if it passed and urging them not to protest. Other members of the CFCM, on the other hand, such as vice president Fouad Alaoui (leader of UOIF, one of the major Islamic organizations in France) criticized the proposed law. In the end the CFCM’s decision not to contest the 2004 headscarf ban has been cited as one reason for its relatively ‘seamless-execution’. Dalil Boubakeur was willing to concede that the ban might be in the best interests of the common good when he stated ‘we believe Muslims must embrace a modern form of Islam in the name of the Republic’.
The CFCM leadership provided the same support to the French state at the time of the debate on the ban of the niqab in 2010. Mohammad Moussaoui declared that he was ‘opposed to the full veil and would try to convince the tiny minority of veiled women that it was not a religious obligation and was out of place in France’. He also declared, ‘Nobody accepts it . . . A veiled woman cannot have a normal social life.’ At the same time, the CFCM ‘warned the government not to expect it to impose a planned ban on full-face veils for women’. They said they wouldn’t impose it on their mosque-goers or be instructed to force the women to unveil. And they said that they would not ‘act as agents of the state’ in helping enforce the ban.

In sum, these new bureaucratic leaders act as mediators between state administrations and Muslim populations. This role was particularly visible at the time of the cartoons crisis when the CFCM leaders were able to call for moderation while at the same time express their disapproval of the caricatures. Initially, Dalil Boubakeur was extremely critical of the newspaper Le Soir’s publication of the twelve caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad (first made notorious by the Danish daily Jyllands-Posten). The CFCM threatened to sue Le Soir but decided against litigation after the newspaper’s owner fired the editor. In his condemnation of the publication, Dalil Boubakeur rejected the idea that Muslim objection to the publication was a sign of radicalism. ‘We attach enormous importance to this image,’ he said, ‘and we will not allow it to be distorted. I myself oppose the extremist forms of Islam; we reject this parallel.’ As a result, the reactions of French Muslims were more muted than in other European countries including the United Kingdom.

At a less explicit level, these representative bodies work as political tools to ‘civilize’ Islam by shaping the image of the ‘good Muslim’. This ‘ideal’ good Muslim is loyal to state institutions and values; subordinates shari’a to state law; refuses transnational allegiances like the Muslim brotherhood; distances himself from ethnic-national allegiances; and supports gender equality and freedom of speech. Through the state’s controlling actions, ‘Muslim’ becomes a political category palatable to the specificity of the country’s public culture. Case in point, some individual members of the German Islamic Conference present themselves by referring to categories such as secular, liberal, or conservative to address public or social issues pertaining to Islam.

According to this nomenclature approved by the German Islamic Conference, a ‘secular’ Muslim advocates the limitation of Islamic practices to private space and rejects Islamism. Turgut Yüksel, a sociologist and founder of the ‘Initiative for secular Muslims in Hessen’, is emblematic of this secular good Muslim of Germany. Similarly, Gönell Halat-Mec, a lawyer who specializes in family law with special focus on migrants, promotes the idea that religion should be a personal and private matter only and critiques religious doctrines that discriminate against women and conflict with the plural democratic societal order.

The ‘liberal’ is different from the secular Muslim, in the sense that he or she expresses attachment to the social visibility of Islam as long as it does not conflict with liberal principles of human rights. Bernd Ridwan Bauknech, a teacher of Islamic studies at a public school, is one of those liberal Muslims whose goal is to assist Muslim students and youngsters in their integration in society without losing their Islamic identity. Sineb el Masrar, chief editor of the women and migrant magazine Gazelle, stands for the recognition of Muslims and their contribution to German society. Another example is Bülent Ucar, professor of Islamic religious education, who promotes mutual participation and recognition between Muslims and non-Muslims as fundamental parts of the integration process. He also advocates state support for the education of imams in Germany.

The ‘conservative’ Muslim category includes traditional religious leaders. Abdelmalik Hibaoui, an imam and preacher, expects the Islam Conference to support the creation of Islamic theology centres at universities. Tuba Isik-Yigit, affiliated with the Center for Theology and
Cultural Sciences at the University of Paderborn, also supports the establishment of centres for theology training and provides support to veiled women.62

Strikingly, state involvement in the redefinition of the good Muslim persona constitutes an unprecedented breach of the rule of non-interference of political institutions with the internal function of a religious group, which is one of the foundational principles of secular legal tradition. Such intrusions have consequences for the internal organization of Islam in Europe by producing new leaders. At the same time, their influence is undermined by international and transnational religious authorities who have a more decisive appeal on Muslim groups. Interestingly, the consequences of these state initiatives have never really been discussed in public space. In fact, there is very little probability that they will be. More heated discussions have taken centre stage in European public discourse, about the ability of Muslims to disconnect religious convictions from public behaviors.

Conclusion

Securitization and secularism shed light on the rise of values-centred liberalism which pitches itself against the recognition of religious and cultural diversity. For example, British Prime Minister David Cameron declared in February 2011 at the annual Munich Security Conference of world leaders: ‘Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism.’63 It is important to emphasize that, historically, political liberalism at the foundation of Western democracies is not necessarily incompatible with the recognition of pluralism. Based on the principle of toleration, the liberal state is traditionally expected to grant equality to citizens of all religious and cultural backgrounds.64

In contrast, the new liberal discourse sees recognition of minority rights as a threat to freedom of expression and women’s rights which are apprehended as the core values of national communities. Hence, it advocates a strong cultural integration of newcomers. As a consequence it has created very significant policy shifts in countries usually characterized by multiculturalism, like the United Kingdom or the Netherlands, in favour of greater cultural homogeneity.

This ‘new integrationism’ is widely shared across European countries and, interestingly, promoted by former left-wing activists. Gender equality and rejection of religious authority, which were primary left-wing topics of struggle in the 1960s, have become in the present decade the legitimate markers of European identity.65

In these conditions, all groups and individuals are required to demonstrate conformity to these liberal values in order to become legitimate members of national communities. The good Muslims label discussed above serves this purpose. It creates a distinction that is supposedly not based on Islam as such but on the adherence of Muslims to liberal values.

This new integrationist discourse goes hand in hand with states’ active policies to transform the behaviours and identities of their Muslim citizens. For example, state-led production of Muslim subjects with the correct moral identity is reflected in various policies: values tests and oaths of allegiance for would-be migrants and citizens; recruitment of good Muslims as state-sponsored role models and community leaders; formal and informal restrictions on Islamic practices seen as extremist or illiberal.

All these policies can be summed up as an attempt to civilize the enemy. Such a project is not only a speech act but translates into discreet or invisible regulations/limitations on Muslim cultural and social practices. Interestingly, most Muslims we interviewed reveal that they are already ‘civilized’ and are trying to find commonality with the dominant group. Most of the time, however, they are silenced or reduced to the reification of their bodies, dress, or minarets.
Notes

1 The chapter is based on excerpts from Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam: Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies, Palgrave, 2013, chapters 5 and 6, by agreement with the publisher.

2 Laustsen and Waever, International Relations Return Exile, 147–75.


6 Tijsen, Inburgering van geestelijke bedienaren.

7 There are currently two institutions dedicated to the training of imams, the Muslim College in London which was established in 1981, and the Markfield Institute of Higher Education in Leicestershire, with an ambitious set of courses which was established in 2000. ‘Islam in the United Kingdom’.

8 Ibid.

9 Mukadam and Scott-Baumann, Development of Muslim Leaders, 9.

10 ‘Councillor shuts down committee for ex-Muslims’, Expatica.

11 ‘Berlin Muslims to train imams at new Islamic school’, Deutsche Welle World.

12 ‘New program aims to integrate Germany’s foreign-trained imams’, Deutsche Welle World.


14 Akbaba and Fox, ‘Religious discrimination against Muslim minorities in Christian majority countries: A unique case?’ 449–70.

15 Brandy and Kleinhubbert, ‘Anti-Islamic party is playing with fear’.

16 Cumming-Bruce and Erlanger, ‘Swiss ban building of minarets on mosques’.

17 McLoughlin, ‘Mosques and public space’.

18 Frégosi, Conditions d’exercice culte musulman en France.


20 Driessen and Merry, ‘Islamic schools in three Western countries’, 422.

21 Ibid., 427.

22 Driessen and Merry, ‘Islamic schools in the Netherlands’, 214–223.

23 Bauer, Kaddor, and Strobel, Islamischer Religionsunterricht.

24 Though the definition of Muslim is derived from country of origin and leaves out any notion of self-definition.

25 Behr, Bochinger and Klinkhammer, Perspektiven Für Die Ausbildung.

26 Relating to the so-called ‘Bremer Klausel’ (clause of Bremen), Berlin has a different law according to religious teaching at public schools. Therefore the Islamic Federation in Berlin was able to obtain the right to carry out Islamic teaching in Berlin’s public schools in the year 2003.

27 Which is linked to Milli Gorus due to the ‘Islamist’ background of the federation (Milli Gorus, the Turkish Islamist group prior to the creation of the AKP).

28 Freedom of religion, guaranteed by article four of the German Basic Law, includes the right to believe or not to believe, to practise or not to practise one’s faith in public, and to maintain religious institutions and organizations. More specifically, religious communities – as well as other ideological groups – can be recognized as corporations of public law (Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts) to whom the state cedes substantial parts of its sovereign rights (Art. 140 of the Basic Law in combination with Art. 137 of the Weimar Constitution).

29 For more information visit http://www.ams-uk.org/.

30 ‘Islam in the United Kingdom’.

31 See http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/education/article2409948.ece (accessed May 19 2008).

32 Cesari, ‘Securitization and religious divides in Europe’.
33 An overview of the laws on dress codes at state schools show that they are more or less neutrally formulated, but in each case it becomes obvious that the legislation intends to ban only the Muslim headscarf.

- Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria (both 2004) have established a school law against specific religious symbols worn by teachers which ‘threaten to disrupt the political or religious concord in schools’. Christian signs are not considered to be threatening to disturb the political or religious concord of the school.
- Hessen (2004) extended its law against specific religious symbols (except Christian signs and symbols) on all state personnel, i.e. not only teachers.
- Saarland and Lower Saxony (2004) have established a law against religious or political demonstrations that are contrary to the neutrality of the state and the religious school peace. They do not directly mention exceptions for Christian symbols, but stress the Christian-based values of education at state schools.
- In Berlin, a law against all signs of religiosity which allow to identify persons as members of a specific religious group (no exception for Christian or ‘occidental’ signs or symbols is mentioned) was put into power in 2005. The law includes personnel at schools, courts and police departments.
- In Bremen (2005) the school law has been changed in so far as teachers in state schools now have to refrain from making their personal faith public, either by words or with signs or symbols. As training programmes are part of the academic teacher education, the consequence is that students with headscarves are not able to complete their training. It is highly questionable if this legal restriction is in line with article 9 of the German Basic Constitutional Law (freedom of choice in education).
- North Rhine-Westphalia is actually on the way to establishing a law against specific religious symbols worn by teachers which ‘threaten to disrupt the political or religious concord in schools’. Here – like in Baden-Württemberg or Bavaria – Christian signs are not considered to disturb the political or religious concord in school.
- The five ‘new states’ (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen and Brandenburg) are not preoccupied with this issue due to a still negligible part of the society being of Muslim faith.

The Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration criticizes the current legislation against teachers wearing a headscarf at German schools in her last report on migrants as anti-integrative and biased against Muslims in general, especially against Muslim women (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Migration, 244). All these laws are open to the interpretative question of how far a headscarf can be identified as a demonstration of religiosity or political demonstration against the neutrality of the state.

The Ludin case demonstrates that German state authorities, much like a considerable part of the population, still tend to regard the headscarf in general as evidence of an undemocratic, theocratic, and thus dogmatic world view. Veiled teachers are suspected of imposing a backward world view on their pupils. They are considered as a potential danger for a democratic and tolerant education.

34 Proposal N° 3056.
35 Newcomb, ‘France first European country to ban burqa’.
36 Official estimates put the number of women wearing the full Islamic veil in France at around 2,000; Samuel, ‘Burka ban’.
37 Wielaard, ‘Belgian lawmakers pass burqa ban’.
38 Waterfield, ‘Belgian MPs vote to ban burqa’.
40 ‘CDU Fordert Burkaverbot in Der Öffentlichkeit’.
41 ‘U.K. minister opposes ban’.
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42 ‘Britain not to ban Muslim women from wearing burqa’.
43 ‘Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Migration’, 246.
44 The Alevi’s are classified as a specific sect within Shia Islam, separate from the dominant Sunni constituency.
45 ‘Dutch compromise on Jews and Muslims ritual slaughter’.
46 Gerdts, ‘Netherlands ritual slaughter ban canceled’.
47 Ibid.
48 Willsher, ‘France’s Muslims hit back at Sarkozy’s policy on halal meat’.
49 Robbers, State and Church in the European Union.
50 Fetzer and Soper, ‘Explaining and accommodation Muslim religious practices’; Laurence, Eman- cipation of Europe’s Muslims.
51 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State.
52 Bureaucratic leaders in Islam are leaders paid by or otherwise associated with the Islamic institutions of influential Muslim countries. In Europe, this influence was exerted throughout the 1960s via national associations or other secular groups. Since the 1980s, however, religious organizations have become the primary means of keeping control over expatriate Muslim populations. This influence is exerted by countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia through associations like the World Islamic League. Paris, Madrid, Milan, Brussels, and Geneva are all home to large mosques controlled by the governments of Algeria, Morocco, or Saudi Arabia. The most recent of these is the mosque of Berlin, which opened on December 5, 2003. This mosque is run by the DITIB (Islamic Union of Turkish Religious Affairs), the religious arm of the Turkish State in Germany.
53 CFCM’s official websites is http://www.embnet.be/.
54 Sebia, ‘Euro-Islam’.
55 Ibid.
56 Ireland, ‘French Muslim Council warns government on veil ban’.
57 Heneghan, ‘French Muslim Council warns government on veil ban’.
58 The reaction to the burqa ban from other representative bodies in Europe was not as conciliatory. In Belgium, a 2009 law made the niqab or any type of face veil subject to penalties, ranging from fines to jail punishment up to seven days. ‘Belgium first to ban burqa and niqab in public spaces,’ Daily News Egypt, April 2, 2010, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Belgium+first+to+ban+burqa+and+niqab+in+public+spaces.-a0222856604. Şemsettin Uğurlu, president of the Muslim Executive of Belgium, says the ban goes against the right to freedom to practise religion in Belgium: ‘We are in a democratic country and every citizen is free to act.’ In the same vein, Isabelle Praile, the vice president of the Muslim Executive of Belgium, warned that the law could set a dangerous precedent. ‘Today it’s the full-face veil, tomorrow the veil, the day after it will be Sikhs turbans and then perhaps it will be mini skirts,’ she said. ‘The wearing of a full-face veil is part of the individual freedoms [protected by Belgian, European and international rights laws].’ Additionally, Praile stated, ‘Personally, I think this law is racist and sexist, because it is again a way to stigmatize Muslims and to maintain the idea that they are dangerous, that they are some extremists or terrorists.’
59 Arnold, ‘Multicultural Europe blamed for cartoon crisis’.
60 Interview with Hamideh Mohagheghi.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 ‘State multiculturalism has failed’.

References


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