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RELIGION AND CIVIL SOCIETY

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Introduction

The term ‘civil society’ refers to the network of associations and organisations situated between, on the one hand, the state and political society (political associations and parties), and on the other, kinship and friendship networks. It thus includes an array of organisations, associations and networks, ranging from sports and youth clubs to charities, voluntary organisations and religious groups, newspapers and other independent media producers, social movements and single-issue lobby groups. In most understandings, civil society may be regulated but not controlled by the state, and market relations are generally excluded, though this is contested. Some critics have argued that the state is so important in structuring civil society that it cannot be properly conceptualised as an autonomous sphere. Civil society is generally conceived as an area of free association rather than obligation, where individuals choose to join together for a broad range of reasons.

This voluntary basis of participation in civil society has been seen as important for the role that civil society is sometimes ascribed in providing the social pre-conditions of democracy. This is because it provides a training ground for democratic deliberation and participation, and channels through which grassroots issues can be brought to public attention in the public sphere. Civil society and the ‘public sphere’ – spaces for public debate – are sometimes conflated; but as Bryant argues, the public sphere may be distinguished as the communicative part of civil society, which also consists of ‘association, autonomy, civility’. Just as conceptualising civil society as free from the state has been criticised as naïve, so conceptualising participation in it as voluntary is sometimes seen as problematic, because this presupposes a Western, individualised choosing subject. Hence it is unable to reflect adequately the cultural and religious diversity which may in practice support democracy.

The evidence presented here is aimed to show that the relationship between religion and civil society, and the relationship between civil society and democracy, are complex and multiply contingent. Civil society is just one factor shaping democratisation and the functioning of democracy, and religions are just one group of actors or set of cultural resources, which take, or are used to, support different stances over time. Nonetheless, it will be argued that to focus the lens of analysis on the associations, groups and organisations that comprise civil society as a site of collective action that impinges on politics, can produce
distinctive and valuable insights into the dynamics of religion and politics in contemporary societies.

Civil society is a contested concept, with arguments centred not only on its cultural assumptions, but also its scope, utility as an analytic concept, (given the normative properties associated with it), its relation to democratisation and its compatibility with various religions. In the context of religion and politics, an emphasis on religion in civil society may serve to shift debate away from preoccupations with religious institutions, hierarchies and state, and towards religion’s influence in contemporary societies through non-state actors such as voluntary organisations, social movements, single-issue lobby groups and environmental pressure groups, all of which may be conceptualised as part of civil society. Some have argued that as close ties between religion and state have loosened in many Western societies, so civil society has become a significant arena for public religious action.6

The account that follows will introduce debates concerning the concept of civil society, distinguishing between phases in its development and proposing a distinction which allows both normative and analytic uses of the concept to continue without confusion. It will consider Poland as arguably the paradigmatic case for the revival of the term in the context of religious mobilisation in the 1980s, but where in a consolidated democracy religion in the political context has become a resource mobilised mostly by the nationalist right; its controversial application to Islam and in particular in Egypt as an influential society in the Arab world, in the light of the events of the ‘Arab Spring’ and its aftermath (2011); and finally the significance of changes in the media through which religious images and discourses are communicated for the changing relationship between religion and civil society.

**Development of the concept**

Like many political concepts, civil society has ancient Greek origins, but its modern sense derives from the Enlightenment. Since European Enlightenment thinkers were often involved in struggles for the emergence of modern progressive politics, in which religion was usually involved in defending the *ancien régime*, religion came to be associated with the legitimisation of the old order and with opposition to civil society. On the other hand, in North America, because religion and church were constitutionally separated from the formation of the new state, religion in civil society fulfilled an important role in integrating a predominantly immigrant society, and was not seen as anti-modern.

Relatively little used in academic or popular circles from the 1840s to the 1970s (for reasons considered below), in the 1980s, the term was popularised by opposition groups struggling against totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe, Latin America and South Africa, with Christian churches playing a prominent role in some cases. But it was not until the 1990s that religion in civil society began to receive substantial academic attention, heralded in 1994 by José Casanova’s *Public Religions in the Modern World*.

For Casanova, a strong religion–state relationship, whereby religion directly influences state policy and the state intervenes in religious organisations, is incompatible both normatively, and in the long term empirically, with democratic forms of modernity. Therefore, civil society becomes the main locus for religious action in such societies; indeed religions are even able to ‘deprivatise’, that is play an increased public role, especially in protesting against injustices arguably caused by state and/or market. Casanova points to the examples of post-Vatican II Catholicism (with its embrace of human rights and democracy) in Brazil, the United States and Poland in the 1980s and early 1990s, to illustrate the vital public role that religion can play.
in the civil societies of quite diverse modern states, both in helping to establish democracy in Brazil and Poland, and in supporting democratic debate in America. Drawing on Habermas’ terminology of ‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’, Casanova argues that in these cases religion served to defend the ‘communicative spaces’ of the lifeworld against the intrusions of ‘the system’.

Others have developed the argument further, applying it to cases more culturally distant from the North American and Western European cultural contexts in which the civil society concept evolved. Indeed, in a range of societies from the Middle East to Sub-Saharan Africa to South and South East Asia, religion has also come to prominence in spaces and organisations intermediate between kin and state, often providing social and welfare support for marginalised groups in the context of failing states, sometimes criticising states and markets for failing to meet a range of citizens’ needs, from democratic participation to food, health care and sanitation. However, critics argue that religion (and some religions in particular) is unsuited to these roles – below we shall consider Ernest Gellner’s claim that Islam and civil society are incompatible.

Alexander distinguishes between three uses and historical phases in the development of this concept. While the history of the concept can be traced from Aristotle’s *politike koinonia* (political community) through its Roman translation *societas civilis*, to the medieval city state its modern history begins with Hobbes (1588–1679), Locke (1632–1704) and Montesquieu (1689–1755). Each conceived of civil society as ‘an inclusive, umbrella-like concept referring to a plethora of institutions outside the state’, which Alexander designates ‘Civil Society I’ (CSI). It was developed as an attempt to manage a sense of breakdown of the old feudal social order, understood as sanctioned by God, and to defend what the emerging middle classes saw as their civility against the unruly masses.

In respect of religion, not all CSI thinkers were hostile. Visiting America in the 1830s, de Tocqueville saw the churches freed from the ties of state as a key constituent of American civil society and hence democracy. However, soon after de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* (1840), Karl Marx began a series of writings (1842–5) which linked civil society to capitalist domination. In Marx’s understanding:

> Not only is civil society now simply a field of play of egotistical, purely private interests, but it is now treated as a superstructure, a legal and political arena produced as camouflage for the domination of commodities and the capitalist class.

This marks the beginning of a second historical phase in the concept’s development (CSII), a critique so influential that it both largely put the concept out of circulation for a century and set the pattern for subsequent critiques of CSI, including of its recent revival.

This revival occurred first in Eastern Europe in the early 1980s, followed by its rapid worldwide dissemination to the Middle East, Africa and South America, where it became a powerful source of mobilisation against repressive states. The idea of the spontaneous self-organisation of society also appealed in a Western context in which the limits of state intervention, especially of the welfare state, seemed to be increasingly exposed. But the difficulties of post-Communist reconstruction, the limitations of Western strategies to promote civil society in developing societies and the problems of applying the concept cross-culturally, together with criticisms of the CSII kind – that civil society is really a front for vested interests – have produced disillusionment with it. However, Alexander argues that as these challenges have also led to the emergence of the refined concept ‘CSIII’, ‘more precise and more specific than the all-inclusive umbrella idea of CSI, more general and inclusive than the narrowly reductionist association of CSII’, proposing a definition as follows:
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Civil society should be conceived as a solidary sphere in which a certain kind of universalising community comes gradually to be defined and to a certain degree enforced. To the degree that this solidary community exists, it is exhibited by ‘public opinion’, possesses its own cultural codes and narratives in a democratic idiom, is patterned by a set of peculiar institutions, most notably legal and journalistic ones, and is visible in historically distinctive sets of interactional practices like civility, equality, criticism, and respect. This kind of community can never exist as such; it can only exist ‘to one degree or another’.

This normative concept recognises the contingency of the democratising effects of empirical civil society, and overcomes the negative narrowness of CSII, pointing to the potential modes through which civil society may exercise democratising effects. However, it conflates civil society with the public sphere, and problematically locates state institutions – law – in civil society; the issue here is that the space of civil society needs legal protection, but that does not make the law part of civil society.

Alexander’s definition illustrates ongoing attempts to refine the concept of civil society in response to criticisms generated by its recent widespread revival, while his delineation of three phases/uses is helpful in guiding discussion. It has also been suggested that a distinction between empirical and normative civil society is helpful to distinguish between potential/imagined and actual effects of the non-state-, non-kinship-based associations, networks and organisations commonly identified with civil society, and that this sphere of activities is worthy of closer observation and analysis, especially as a site of the activity of religious groups, who arguably have been particularly prominent in this sphere since the 1970s. In the following sections we consider some examples of civil society as a site of religious resurgence, and the consequences for the relationship between religion and politics.

Poland

According to Kumar, ‘It was above all the rise of Solidarity in Poland that sparked off the enthusiasm’ for civil society in Eastern Europe. With its visibly Catholic symbols – for example in the distribution of holy communion to striking workers at the Gdansk shipyard by Catholic priests in 1981 – Poland was also the most visible instance of the role of religion in the revival of civil society in Eastern Europe. Symbolically, discursively and organisationally, the Catholic Church was crucial to the mobilisation of the Solidarity movement, and demonstrates the politically mobilising power of religion at the heart of Europe, arguably the most secular continent on earth. Since the fall of communism, however, the role of religion in civil society has been less prominent, and arguably more associated with the attempts to impose a religious order on society than the nurturing of spaces of free association and democratic deepening. Furthermore, critics argue that looking back at the historical record, Poland is highly problematic as a paradigm either of the role of civil society in modern politics or of religion in civil society.

First, there are problems with identifying Solidarity as a civil society organisation. Shortly before his death in 1984, Michel Foucault criticised the concept of civil society in relation to Poland: ‘when one assimilates the powerful social movement that has just traversed that country to a revolt of civil society against state, one misunderstands the complexity and multiplicity of the confrontations’.

For Foucault, the civil society label obscures the complexity of social and political relations in a particular, dualistic, kind of way: ‘It’s . . . never exempt from a sort of Manichaeism that
afflicts the notion of “state” with a pejorative connotation while idealizing “society” as a good, living, warm whole."^{24}

While Foucault rarely used the concept of civil society, his work is relevant to its conceptualisation. Foucault argued that much modern social and political theory misunderstands power as centralised in the state. Instead, he saw power as far more diffuse and pervasive, vested in the intellectual ‘disciplines’ which seek to objectify knowledge,^{25} and in the ‘disciplinary’ practices of modern medical and welfare systems (especially asylums and prisons).^{26} Seen in this way, civil society becomes less a free space for the jostling of diverse groupings giving rise to a public sphere in which a free exchange of views can occur, and more a complex network of power relations, with power being exercised not only through individuals and institutions, but through disciplinary discourses and practices.

However, if one distinguishes between empirical and normative civil society, it is possible to accept these insights without discarding the term. Empirical civil society may always be embedded in the kind of power relations Foucault describes, making its normative (democratising) functions contingent and even fragile; yet the contingency of normative civil society does not preclude its possibility. However, his more specific criticisms in the Polish case of the oversimplification of the complexity of ‘confrontations’ and of the valorised binary structure of civil society (‘good’) vs. state (‘bad’) require further attention.

The coalition of forces brought together under the banner of Solidarity was complex, consisting of groups with very little in common beyond opposition to the state’s suppression of independent elements in society. It included labour movements, journalists and groups in the Catholic Church, and its fragmentation after 1989 testifies to its internal incoherence. If civil society is taken to imply a harmonious unity, this is indeed an oversimplification. But if these are seen as elements in an empirical civil society whose character and effects are a matter of empirical enquiry rather than presumption, then the civil society label becomes quite useful.

The strong valorisation of civil society against the state and the aim of building a parallel society to undermine the state’s functional legitimacy were vital tactics of opposition to state repression. However, they became dysfunctional in a democratic state. Here, while civil society needs to retain its independence, it is not necessary for it to function as a coherent opposition, and a stance of critical engagement towards different elements within itself and towards the state becomes more appropriate. It has been argued that the conditions under which Solidarity flourished in Poland ‘limit its usefulness as a general model’ of civil society.^{27} Instead it seems better to see Poland as a model for what civil society groups can achieve when they act together under conditions of repressive government, conditions which may now be rare in Europe, but which remain common across the world, as we shall discuss further below in relation to Egypt. Civil society, then, adopts different roles under different conditions.

But how far does the role of the Polish Catholic Church (PCC) in supporting the Solidarity movement provide a paradigm for the role of religion in civil society? As we saw above, Casanova stresses the background to Catholic action in the reforms of the Second Vatican council and its support for human rights and democracy. However, Casanova also recognises the strongly nationalistic character of the PCC, and, writing in the early 1990s, set an agenda for steps which the PCC needed to take to complete the transformation from civil society in opposition to civil society in democracy. He argued that the PCC needed to (i) stop ‘competing with the state over the symbolic representation of the Polish nation’, (ii) ‘fully accept the principle of separation of church and state, and [hence] . . . permit public issues to be resolved through institutional democratic channels’ and (iii) ‘accept the principle of self-organization of an autonomous civil society . . . [rather than] promote the principle of a homogeneous Polish
Catholic community’. We can use these criteria to guide discussion as to how far the PCC can properly be seen as a paradigm of religious action in civil society.

The PCC’s actions since 1989, and the uses of popular Catholicism by a range of actors not officially sanctioned by the church, both need to be put in context. In the last twenty-five years democratic politics and the legal foundation of civil society have both become firmly established in Poland.

First, the Polish government has enacted some of the strongest legislation in Central-Eastern Europe to guarantee the rights of civil society organisations and support their fiscal autonomy by encouraging citizens to donate to them. First, while this has led to criticisms that some of these measures have led to an ‘NGOisation’ of the civil society sector, favouring larger established organisations over smaller, newer arrivals and stifling collective action, it is clear that the sector has become both securely established and legally protected. Second, in spite of turbulence in the political system – frequent changes of government and the fission and creation of political parties – all administrations have in practice followed similar economic policies, seen rapid economic growth (though increased disparities of wealth) and achieved full European Union (EU) and NATO membership.

However, Poland’s accession to the secular-oriented EU has paradoxically been accompanied by the increasing electoral success of religiously nationalist parties, first the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin), formed in 1991, and later Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), who led ruling coalitions from 2005 to 2007. During this period, close relationships developed between elements in the PCC, Law and Justice ministers and the media group responsible for Radio Maryja (a right-wing Catholic radio station, created in 1991) and its related television network (created in 2003). In spite of increasing its national share of the vote in 2007 (which fell only slightly in 2011) it has been in opposition since 2007 due to the success of the rival Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska). A split in in Law and Justice in 2012 led to the formation of an even more staunchly religious nationalist party, United Poland (Soldara Polska, SP).

This situation has meant that, regarding Casanova’s first question (i), while the PCC has not generally had to compete with the Polish state to represent the nation, because most governments have been more or less willing to place the church at the centre of the state’s representation of the nation, this has not prevented unofficial religious groups, some quite powerful, from engaging in such competition, as we shall see further below. Concerning (ii), the PCC has been unwilling on a number of key issues to ‘permit public issues to be resolved through institutional democratic channels’. First, in the immediate post-Communist period (in 1989 and 1993 respectively) on the issues of religious education (RE) in schools and restriction of Poland’s previously relatively liberal abortion laws, the PCC did not seek merely to present its case in public debate and leave the outcome up to the democratic process, but rather to influence government policy by negotiating directly with ministers. In the case of RE the process bypassed the Sejm (Parliament) altogether. Subsequently, on a series of issues including homosexual marriage, further RE related issues and references to Christianity in the Polish and European constitutions, the PCC has continued to influence public policy through direct government contacts rather than by opening up debate to include the wider civil society. As contributors to a debate on the influence of the PCC in the pages of the daily newspaper Rzeczposolita wrote in 2003:

If we are to be a civil society, various agreements made over the heads of society, for example the decision of the government not to hold a referendum over abortion or the ‘back door introduction’ of religious education into schools should again be made public.
The relationship between the PCC, media and government in Poland thus raises doubts about the extent to which the PCC fully ‘accept[s] the principle of self-organization of an autonomous civil society’; while there is little evidence that the PCC seeks to stifle free speech, its actions seem more consistent with ‘promote[ing] the principle of a homogeneous Polish Catholic community’ than actively encouraging the expression of diverse opinions, particularly where such expression might lead to a conclusion contrary to the teaching of the church.32

Concerning (iii), while civil society in Poland has been firmly established through legal means, meaning that the church has in practice had to accept the existence of an autonomous civil society, the PCC’s actions in attempting to bypass democratic deliberation again suggest that it is more oriented to ‘promote[ing] the principle of a homogeneous Polish Catholic community’ than encouraging a variety of voices to influence policy debates.

When considering the influence of religion on civil society in Poland more broadly, the activities of groups beyond the official church but drawing on Catholic identity must also be considered. For some elements in Polish Catholicism, the church leadership’s aim of securing a legal footing for Catholic moral dominance does not go far enough. The 1990s also saw the birth of a media empire which, across multiple platforms, pushed for an exclusivist Polish nationalism rooted in popular Catholicism, beginning with the radio station Radio Maryja, founded in 1994 and led by a Redemptorist monk, Father Tadeusz Rydzyk. By 2007 the media outlets of the Radio Maryja Group included a daily newspaper (Nasz Dziennik, ‘Our Daily’), a TV station (TV Trwam), a private university in Toruń, a charitable foundation (Lux Veritatis), a museum and several other projects – all with a strongly nationalist-Catholic profile, often in conflict with the PCC’s official position.33

Indeed, the media presence of religiously identified actors increased substantially during this period, with repercussions in political and social life. For example, Rydzyk actively participated in the creation of an ultra-nationalist political party, the League of Polish Families, in 1999, and later switched his allegiance to the more electorally successful Law and Justice Party. In the social field, the discourse of Nasz Dziennik, which has a daily circulation of approximately 200,00034 and is the only Catholic daily newspaper, has been shown to propagate negative stereotypes of religious and other minorities, for example contributing to a shift in the use of the Polish term for ‘sect’ to a more pejorative connotation.35 These negative stereotypes of internal and external ‘others’ both reinforce and reconfigure their circulation in popular culture, often continuing habits and practices developed under state socialism:

The culture of prejudice, surveillance, suspicion and intolerance developed during socialism lingers with force. A deluge of anti-semitic, anti-immigrant and racist graffiti everywhere on the streets bears witness to a rise of old and new phobias about difference in this supposedly homogenous society.36

Nasz Dziennik draws on these currents to generate a sense of the majority as oppressed and marginalised.37 Such defensive and suspicious attitudes towards difference are even turned inwards against ethnic Poles who seek to access fertility treatments such as in vitro fertilisation, considered routine in most Western societies but widely viewed in the press, on social media and even by academics at Catholic universities as ‘unnatural’ and connected with difficulties and illness for those conceived in this way.38 The representations produced in this discussion are often deeply stigmatising, viewing children conceived in this way as ‘monsters’.

Returning to Radio Maryja as the most successful religious broadcaster in Poland, it is important to note that this success is not limited to popularity as a source of entertainment or profit. Rather, many of its estimated one million regular listeners become actively engaged:
‘Listening to the Radio [sic] is often accompanied by various other forms of activity: pilgrimages, demonstrations, petition signing, direct lobbying with [sic] local MPs etc. No other social movement in Poland can claim success of similar proportions.’

Thus in Poland, the religious symbols that were used powerfully in political protest against communist rule and have come to be more widely distributed and used, attracting growing media attention, inspiring increased levels of religious activism in politics and broadening the scope and extent of claims-making by religious actors, have all been found. Indeed, all the elements of what has been described as religious ‘republicisation’ are present here. This process has been sustained beyond the immediate transition period, partly because the church leadership was successful in negotiating a privileged place for the church and its teachings in school curricula and legislation, and partly because of private initiative often in conflict with official church teaching and guidance, exemplified in the activities of Father Rydzyk’s media empire. In the political process, religious discourse and support has been important for the mobilisation of political parties, including the League of Polish Families, Law and Justice and United Poland. This has occurred in spite of steady declines in religious participation among the Polish population.

But what do these developments mean for the relationship between religion and civil society? While religion was clearly symbolically important and institutionally influential in the fall of communism, the extent to which this can be attributed to religious action in civil society is questionable, while the link between religion and civil society in the post-Communist period has become even more complex and contested. However, while there are concerns about the compatibility of religion and civil society raised by the Polish Catholic case, such concerns have been raised most acutely in relation to Islam. Yet across the Muslim world there has been a large growth in the number and activities of Islamic Private Voluntary Organisations (PVOs), exercising a range of education, health and social welfare functions, which organisationally fit the criteria of empirical civil society, being neither state nor kinship based, nor run for profit. The following sections will first examine some of the objections that have been made to the conjunction of Islam and civil society in principle, and then consider the case of Islam in Egypt, beginning with PVOs in the 1980s and 1990s, and moving on to the events of the Arab Spring and its aftermath.

**Islam and civil society**

Islam is the main example of a religious tradition widely considered in the West to be in tension if not outright conflict with the normative tradition of civil society, perceptions deepened by the events of 11 September 2001. It is therefore more important than ever to consider the evidence for incompatibility argument to date. In his influential *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* the late Ernest Gellner claimed that Islam is fundamentally un secularisable, concluding from this that Islam is also incompatible with civil society, both normatively and empirically. Gellner understands secularisation as the declining social significance of religion – ‘in industrial or industrializing societies religion loses much of its erstwhile hold over men and society’. Where religion remains socially significant, argues Gellner, the development of individual autonomy is constrained. This in turn constrains the development of civil society because: ‘Individuals, who are not able to act independently of the community of believers, cannot become the building-stones of the kind of intermediary organizations on which civil society is built’.

This section challenges each stage of Gellner’s argument. First, Gellner neglects the different ways in which modernity has been mediated to different regions and hence the
consequences of this for modern institutional forms and discourses, including civil society. In particular, modernity was mediated to most Muslim majority societies either through colonial imposition or through indigenous elites responding to external pressures. In either case, for many people, ‘everyday life . . . kept its own laws and customs, though often rigidified by colonial intervention or “indirect rule”’ so that new discourses of civil and political rights did not become woven into the fabric of everyday life.45 Furthermore:

The key actor [in modernisation] is . . . a modernizing part of the ruling body, trying to adapt both the state and society to external challenge and threat. Cleavage patterns tend to run both between modern and anti-modern parts of the elite and between the former and anti-modernists among the people, with the latter sometimes winning, as in Afghanistan and Iran. In this complex pattern of conflicts and alliances, . . . the meaning of popular rights is ambiguous, not seldom rejected by (large parts) of the people as anti-traditional.46

Under these conditions, one might anticipate ambivalent attitudes to modern discourses, including civil society; certainly this has occurred with other modern discourses such as democracy and human rights, with Muslims taking up a full range of positions on the compatibility or incompatibility of the relationship between Islam and both democracy and human rights.47 This diversity contradicts the simplistic essentialist position that Gellner attributes to Islam – the view that Islam insists that all aspects of life should directly governed by its unchanging precepts. This contemporary diversity is underscored by the historical diversity of Muslim-majority societies, contra Gellner. Gellner argues that the differentiation of society necessary for a thriving civil society is constantly reined in by revivals of tribal Islam, bursting in from the nomadic periphery to ‘cleanse’ and reform ‘corrupt’ urban Islam.48 But, as Lapidus argues:

The Middle Eastern Islamic heritage provides not one but two basic constellations of historical society, two golden ages, two paradigms, each of which has generated its own repertoire of political institutions and political theory. The first is the society integrated in all dimensions, political, social, and moral, under the aegis of Islam. The prototype is the unification of Arabia under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century . . . The second historical paradigm is the imperial Islamic society built not on Arabian or tribal templates but on the differentiated structures of previous Islamic societies . . . Thus, despite the common statement that Islam is a total way of life defining political as well as social and family matters, most Muslim societies . . . were in fact built around separate institutions of state and religion.49

Furthermore, Muslim thought contains its own resources for distinguishing between religious and secular planes, in the distinction that the ulama (religious scholars) in classical period made between ibadat (religious duties) and muamalat (social relations). As Tariq Ramadan argues:

Many Muslims have continued down through the ages to say formulaically, as if they were presenting evidence: ‘There is no difference, for us, between public and private, religion and politics, Islam encompasses all areas.’ Many orientalists have fallen into step with them, . . . But one has the right to ask whether these statements are based on sound evidence. . . . The work of categorization left by scholars through the ages is phenomenal . . . A careful reading of these works reveals that very precise modes
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of grasping the sources were set down very early. . . . In the area of religious practice (al-ibadat), it was determined that it was the texts that were the only ultimate reference because the revealed rites are fixed and not subject to human reason . . . In the wider area of human and social affairs, the established methodology is exactly the opposite: . . . everything is permitted except that which is explicitly forbidden in a text (or recognised as such by specialists). Thus the scope for the exercise of reason and creativity is huge.50

Gellner’s account also neglects the central historical factors that have shaped the emergence of modern political Islam – namely the crisis in nationalist ideologies and the failure of both socialist and capitalist development models in many parts of the Muslim world.51 In addition, it flies in the face of the fact that where Islamic groups have been permitted to enter the democratic process as legitimate political parties, they have regularly shown themselves both willing and able to follow democratic procedures:

Beyond the Arab world, Islamists have regularly run for elections in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Turkey since the 1980s. In Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union, Islamists have peacefully been engaging in local and municipal politics . . . It is important to note that in three of the biggest Muslim countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh and Turkey) women have recently been elected to the top executive office in the land . . . The important thing in all these cases is that Islamic parties have accepted the rules of the democratic game and are playing it peaceably and in an orderly manner.52

Furthermore, other discourses dependent on strong individuation – such as human rights – have also taken firm root in many Muslim societies, such that, in spite of the ambivalence associated with them, they now form part of the terms of public debate. This is illustrated by Dwyer’s conversations with intellectuals about human rights in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt in the late 1980s, many of whom were active in human rights organisations. Tunisia, in particular, provides a good example of a reforming Islamist movement specifically seeking to articulate its vision in terms of human rights without eliding tensions between the valuing individual autonomy and of kinship bonds.53 In his study, Dwyer shows the extent to which human rights discourse, contested and polysemous as it is, has penetrated contemporary Middle Eastern societies. As he concludes:

Few Middle Easterners I spoke to seem ready to dismiss the idea from their cultural repertoire: they may challenge its foundations, or its provenance, or the content given it by specific groups, but the concept itself has come to constitute a symbol of great power.54

Thus we may conclude that Gellner essentialises connections between Islam, civil society and democratisation which are in fact contingent. Islam is not necessarily incompatible normatively or practically with structural differentiation (indeed, Muslim tradition contains resources for making distinctions between different spheres of life), and many Muslim societies in practice support both diverse civil societies and democracy, even though, and perhaps unsurprisingly given the manner of the conditions of modernisation, these discourses remain contested. Given this general situation, we turn next to consider the articulation of religion and civil society in practice in the particular case of Egypt.
Islam and civil society in Egypt

The growth of Islam in the public life of modern Muslim-majority societies is a widespread phenomenon, but Egypt may be regarded as a lead society for several reasons, and hence its discussion as a case here. Egypt has the largest Arab population of any state, is host to the most influential intellectual establishment in the Sunni Muslim world, the ancient Al-Azhar university (a complex public institution combining the functions of: ‘mosque, university, state legitimisation, interpretative authority and centre of Islamic propaganda all in one’), and is the cradle of the earliest and most influential modern political Islamic movement, known as Ikhwan or the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928. Not only has this been ‘arguably the strongest’ Islamic movement ‘in any Arab, or possibly Muslim country at the present time’, but also its writings and role model have been influential for political Islamic movements across the Muslim world. Furthermore, Egypt has and more non-governmental organisations (NGOs) than the rest of the Arab world put together, indicative of a diverse and complex modern society. In addition, it was a significant site in the major upheavals of the Arab Spring of 2011, when a series of popular demonstrations threatened to overthrow authoritarian regimes across the Middle East. In practice, only in Tunisia does it appear that lasting change resulting in a democratic government and a relatively free civil society has resulted; movements either failed to unseat their rulers (Bahrain), produced protracted civil war (Syria, Libya), or were reversed through military intervention (Egypt). We shall assess what role the relationship between religion and civil society seems to have played in these outcomes, centring on Egypt.

As with communist Poland, the mobilisation of religion in civil society in Egypt has occurred under conditions of authoritarian government. The Egyptian parliament under Mubarak (1981–2011) ‘serve[d] as an instrument of state policy rather than a constraint upon it’, and whereas ‘civil society . . . in its liberal conception . . . is not merely a sphere outside government but rather one endowed with a legally mandated autonomy, involving legal rights and protections backed by the law-state’, such legal protection is largely absent in Egypt. Through the 1990s the Mubarak regime seized control of thousands of private mosques, requiring preachers to conform to government standards. It also sought closer control of Al-Azhar and increased the latter’s censorship powers, thus seeking to strengthen its hold on public religion. Authoritarian control tends to produce an opposition marked by its experience of authoritarianism; yet there were signs that in spite of a repressive state some Islamic movements developed Islamic identity as a source of political mobilisation in an inclusive direction: the election of Muslim brothers to the leadership of professional associations (e.g. the pharmacists) while drawing a substantial proportion of the Coptic Christian vote was one small sign of this.

In the absence of a strong independent trade union movement, and forbidden to form their own political parties, such professional associations provided a platform on which the Muslim Brotherhood was able to mobilise politically. These ‘syndicates’ were originally established by the government as an alternative to independent trade unions, but, as the Polish case also shows, under certain conditions such bodies can take on an independent life. Their free elections provided a rare opportunity for democracy in a context where government-run elections were widely reported to be rigged, and with the restoration of an unreformed military to power under General al-Sisi, confirmed in the presidential elections of May 2014, it seems likely that this practice will return, as has the restrictive legislation of the Mubarak era in areas such as the banning of political parties based on religion (banned again), harsh sentences in the courts for regime critics such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and leniency and exoneration for military leaders such as Mubarak.
Between 1984 and 1992 the Brotherhood gained control of the Egyptian Bar Association, the Engineers’ Association, and the Medical Association. Initially, while they were able to gain power in these elite professional bodies, Islamists were less successful in the associations of less prestigious professions. In an Egyptian context, these include those of teachers, agronomists and vets, ‘sectors characterised by low wages, poor working conditions, and low social status’.62 It may be noted that this greater influence in the elite professions contradicts the stereotype that Islamists recruit mostly from the poorest sections of society. However, by 1997 Islamists had also won control of the agronomists and pharmacists’ unions, the latter a particularly notable victory as approximately 30 per cent of pharmacists at that time were Coptic Christians.63

As the reliance on the Coptic vote in the pharmacists’ case suggests, the Brotherhood owed its success less to a strident Islamic political identity than to achievement in delivering services to members, as one Coptic Christian commented: ‘We can trust the Islamists to work for us, no matter what problems we face. This isn’t a syndicate for Muslims. It’s a syndicate for pharmacists.’64

The Brotherhood’s participation also increased electoral turnout, and some commitment to pluralism was shown, for example in the decision in 1992 ‘not to contest 5 of the 25 seats on the Medical Association Board in 1992, to allow for other voices: they won the other 20’.65 Islamists particularly targeted younger members, building on their high profile in most universities, and on the frustrations of graduates qualified beyond the level of work that the public sector-dominated economy was (and still is) able to offer them – hence ‘accountants waiting tables . . . lawyers . . . working the fields’.66 Hence the Islamist leadership of professional associations ‘initiated projects in the areas of housing, health care, and insurance’.57 They produced creative solutions to practical problems such as providing shared cars for lawyers with meetings all over Cairo but too poor to afford them, and loans to help people set up home and get married – huge expenses in Egypt for all but the wealthiest.68

Beyond the interests of their professional groups, Islamists also sought to build on traditions in these professions of a sense of social responsibility and of acting as advocates for ‘the Egyptian people’ (al-sha'b).69 Concretely, after the 1992 earthquake volunteers from the Medical Association arrived on the scene first in many of the worst-affected areas, prompting government suspicion that the Brotherhood was attempting to create ‘a state within a state’,70 a military response and further repressive measures. These included ‘Law 100’ (1993), which required a 50 per cent voter turnout in syndicate elections (or the government nominates the syndicate board itself), and the hirasa laws, which have empowered the government to take the syndicates under direct control, in spite of legal challenges.71 However, as Abdo concludes:

Despite these setbacks, the syndicate movement under the new Islamists has touched Egyptian society in a way few could have imagined . . . In a society bereft of democracy they proved free elections and free debate were in fact possible. In a nation crying out for moral guidance, they successfully married a vision of social justice, rooted in the Koran, with the demands and stresses of modern life. . .

The new leadership raised standards of living for union members, eased pervasive corruption and cronism, and filled in for an incompetent state that could no longer address the concerns of the middle classes. The syndicates also demonstrated a remarkable degree of democracy, in contrast to the Mubarak regime.72

From the perspective of normative civil society these organisations clearly satisfied the criteria of building trust within the unions and belief in the possibility of change. They also promoted
diversity in terms of the institutional plurality of Egyptian society, and proved respectful of equal rights for the Coptic minority within the orbit of a trade union oriented to reaching out into society to improve the lot of its members. In this last respect they began to heal some of the wounds inflicted on Coptic–Muslim relations by extremist Islamists. But questions remained on the issue of free speech when it comes to offence to or subversion of religious authority; for example in 1996 after a long battle in the courts Islamist lawyers hounded literary scholar Abu Zaid into exile, accusing him of *riddah* (apostasy) for his materialist reading of the Qur’an. How were these questions to be answered after the popular revolutions of 2011? The Islamist government held power so briefly no conclusive answers emerged, but as we shall see further below Muhammad Morsi’s brief presidency was marked by controversy, with critics claiming he sought to impose an Islamist hegemony.

The Arab Spring and the return of authoritarian rule in Egypt: the role of civil society, religion and social media

Commentators vary in their assessment of the role of civil society in the Arab Spring. Some argue that civil society organisations played no significant role at all: while some eventually participated, ‘in no case did they initiate mobilisations’. Others claim that the civil society played such an active role that the popular revolutions in Egypt have ‘undermined the thesis that the weakness of civil society was one of the reasons why Arab countries remained authoritarian’. Partly, as with the Polish case, it depends on how civil society is defined. Beinin’s argument is that not only in Egypt but across the region ‘NGOs, trade unions, professional associations and political parties recognised or tolerated by the old regimes’ were both strongly controlled by governments, and ideologically ill equipped to support the grievances articulated by the mass protests which eventually erupted. These protests were largely against the economic impact of the neo-liberal reforms introduced by the regimes under international, especially US-led, pressure. Civil society organisations hailed by the ‘Washington consensus’ as well positioned to fill the gaps left by state cuts were not best placed to support anti-austerity actions. Thus in Egypt from 2004 Ahmad Nazif’s ‘government of businessmen’ targeted the public sector, commodity subsidies and subsidised local services for cuts, triggering industrial action on a massive scale in a country with highly constrained unions; from 2004 to 2010 an estimated 2–4 million Egyptian workers took part in 2,500–3,500 strikes and other collective actions. And yet: ‘During a protest movement of unprecedented proportions, there were only two civil society organisations working primarily on labor issues with less than half a dozen paid staff between them’. Instead, the popular uprisings were brought about by three largely independent movements protesting about different things: (i) mass protests against hardships caused by economic reforms, linked to the predominantly locally organised labour movement; (ii) urban intellectual protests, mostly articulating political solidarity with the ‘Arab Street’ against the military regime’s foreign policy (e.g. supporting the second Palestinian intifada and protesting against the US invasion of Iraq), but later (in 2010) calling for Mubarak not to run for re-election; and (iii), a group of educated middle class ‘Facebook Youth’, of which the April 6 Youth Movement (A6YM) played an important role, so-named because of its call to support workers forbidden to strike at the Malhalla textile factory on 6 April 2008 (though this group lacked direct contact with the textile workers). It was protest against police brutality articulated by the ‘We are all Khaled Said’ Facebook page which led to the first mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square on 25 January 2011, supported by A6YM, some other youth organisations and small, recognised political parties.
This fragmented opposition was to shape the subsequent failure of Egypt’s brief democratic experiment its first democratically elected president, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi. The lack of a coherent opposition political organisation or programme meant that Morsi did not so much ‘hijack the revolution’ as ‘step . . . into a political vacuum’.82 But rather than seeking to build a broad consensus to ground the fledgling democracy, critics argue that Morsi tried to create ‘an Islamist hegemony’, determining ‘an exclusionary model of transition in Egypt’, in contrast to Tunisia where an ‘inclusive transition has occurred . . . as a consequence of the participation of the opposition in the transition and the decision of the Government not to impose its institutional power’.83 Examples of Morsi’s tendency to authoritarianism include the draft law on Civil Work Entities brought forward by the upper parliamentary house, the Shura Council (one third appointed by him), which would have severely restricted civil society, and was strongly criticised by international human rights bodies.84

What then, was the role of religion in these events? At the level of individual attitudes, one study has used World Values Survey data to examine the relationship between disapproval of authoritarian rule, regular religious practice and ‘emancipatory social capital’, operationalised as participation in elite-challenging actions such ‘signing petitions’, ‘joining in boycotts’ and ‘attending lawful demonstrations’ between 2001 and 2008.85 Egyptians were four times as likely to have taken part in elite-challenging actions as Jordanians, and intriguingly, the relationship between religiosity and elite-challenging actions differed in the two countries: more actively religious Egyptians were more likely to take part in elite-challenging actions, whereas the reverse was the case in Jordan.86 This finding suggests that the impact of Islam on political participation in support of democracy is highly situationally contingent: in both these countries, organisations stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood shaped the main political articulation of Islamist opposition, yet in Jordan, religious participation is associated with political quietism, in Egypt, the reverse. At the level of discourse, in Egypt it may be that the rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood and its record of supporting workers’ rights through professional associations made the more religious more comfortable with assertive political action. What such studies suggest is that while it varies in its effects, the interaction between religion and civil society in the Middle East is a politically significant one, and in Egypt, one that is unlikely to be long silenced by the banning of religion-based political parties, for whom the majority voted in 2012.

Looking to the future: civil society, the public sphere and ‘new’ media

One feature of the appropriation of public Islam in Egypt by non-state actors has been the dissemination of Islamic discourses by electronic media, including sermons on audio-cassette, desktop publishing, the Internet and DVDs, and in the Arab Spring, by social media. Some studies have suggested caution about initial assessments attributing great influence to these media. Thus Achilov points out that while Jordan had much higher levels of Facebook participation (30 per cent), compared to Egypt’s 13 per cent, and higher rates of mobile phone penetration, this did not translate into greater political activism.87 Mabon attributes more significance to the impact of Wikileaks revelations but cautions that the impact varies by context, for while: ‘Wikileaks had an undeniable impact upon Tunisia and has been described as playing an integral role within the Tunisian revolution, its impact upon Egypt is less easily ascertained’.88

Nonetheless, it is clear that the proliferation of new media has made censorship much more difficult for states, and created and intensified transnational circuits of communication, which can provide support and legitimacy to protesters. These developments have enabled groups to
mobilise religious counter-publics against official discourses, thus changing the relationship between religion and civil society. But it is not only where routes to democratic participation are blocked that religious imagery and discourse has become politicised through the appropriation of new media.

India is the largest functioning democracy on the planet, a complex society in which an official state secularism minimised the partisan mobilisation of religious discourses at the level of political society for several decades following independence (1947). However, the early 1990s saw the electoral breakthrough of the overtly Hindu nationalist party the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), achieving a consistent period in office from March 1998. What relationship does this development have to religion in civil society? Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the BJP and related organisations are active at the grassroots, running education, training and welfare schemes. But intriguingly their electoral breakthrough occurred only after the screening of two influential Hindu epics on the newly created state national television broadcaster Doordashan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. According to some commentators these broadcasts had the unintended political consequence of creating a new political public sphere linked by a ‘Hinduized visual regime’, both more inclusive and more chaotic than India’s linguistically and socially splintered publics had previously been:

The introduction of a new system of representation, in this case television, set up new circuits of exchange across a split public, thereby casting the existing terms of translation, and the status of the bourgeois public sphere itself, into crisis.

The BJP was able turn the crisis in the bourgeois public sphere and the presentation of an idealised past against which current circumstances could be unfavourably contrasted, to their electoral advantage. Its success also rested on other factors and an uneasy coalition, and its first spell in power ended in defeat by the Congress Party in 2005. At that stage, it looked as if their legacy was to have shifted political discourse in a nationalist direction; while beyond this short-term political impact, commentators predicted that the mass circulation of Hindu epics and their instrumental mobilisation may have enduring consequences for Indian civil society:

Even in the absence of Hindu nationalist domination...we may have in India a Hinduized visual regime, evidenced for example in commodity consumption in daily life, acting as if a kind of lower-order claim than national identity and continuing to have force in politics, albeit of a more dispersed, subtle and less confrontational kind, in a kind of capacitance effect whereby social energy may be accumulated and stored [like electric charge] via allegiance to such images, to be put to use at some future moment, though in ways that would be hard to predict.

The BJP’s landslide victory in the general election of 2014 suggests that even in electoral politics this ‘charge’ is far from spent.

Looking more widely, the emergence of religion circulated by new media as powerful discourse and imagery in the public spheres of modern societies is widespread in many post-colonial contexts. But it is not restricted to here; for example in France, arguably one of the most secular countries in the world:

A new socio-cultural configuration is emerging in which the religious, far from appearing in the form of a tradition resisting modernity, appears instead in the form of a tradition that prevents ultra-modernity from dissolving into a self-destructive
critique. Increasingly, religion provides identities and offers to individuals the possibility of social integration and direction within individualistic and pluralistic societies. . . . It is equally clear, however, that the traditional distrust of religion undoubtedly continues in France.93

Both this mobilisation and distrust of religion are likely to intensify in response to the Charlie Hebdo massacre in January 2015.

Such developments are transforming the relationship between religion and civil society, calling into question long-established assumptions about secularisation, and creating the potential for new forms of political mobilisation and confrontation. Recent history suggests that generalisations are hard to make, but building a careful understanding of the relationship between religion and civil society and the role of various media, while being attentive to local contexts, is critical to grasping the contemporary dynamics of religion and politics in contemporary societies.

Notes
1 Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty*; Bryant, ‘A further comment’.
2 Chandhoke, ‘The “civil” and the “political” in civil society’.
3 Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*.
4 Kumar, ‘Civil society’.
5 Bryant, ‘A further comment’, 498.
6 Casanova, *Public Religions*.
8 Enyedi, ‘Contested politics’; Herbert, *Religion and Civil Society*.
9 Alexander, *Real Civil Societies*.
10 Ibid., 3.
11 Ibid., 4–5.
13 Therborn, ‘Beyond civil society’.
14 Hearn, ‘The “uses and abuses” of civil society in Africa’.
15 Hudick, *NGOs and Civil Society*.
16 Skapska, ‘Learning to be a citizen’.
17 Hann, *Civil Society: Challenging Western Models*.
19 Ibid., 7.
20 Kumar, ‘Civil society’, 386.
22 Bruce, *Choice and Religion*, 117.
23 Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, 167.
24 Ibid., 167–8.
25 Foucault, *The Order of Things*.
26 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.
27 Kumar, ‘Civil society’, 387
33 Fras, *The Catholic Church*.
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