The study of religion and political parties represents a relatively understudied subfield of research that has nevertheless recently witnessed a resurgence of scholarly interest given its increasing global significance. Initially focused on the intersection of religious cleavages and party formation in Western democracies in the mid-twentieth century, the field has expanded both in terms of geographic breadth to cover the non-Western world – in part due to the spread of multi-party elections and the rise of party politics around the globe – and in terms of the depth in scope of inquiry to focus beyond the subject of social cleavages to analyse the complexity and multiplicity of forms by which religion and political parties may interact. The recent victories of Islamic political parties in the Middle East as a consequence of the Arab Spring, for example, as was the case with the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt, Ennahda in Tunisia, and the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco, underscore the growing significance of the intersection of religion and political parties in shaping the contemporary world. Especially in light of their different political manifestations despite their proclaimed adherence to the same religion, Islam, the rise to power of these parties serves to drive in the need for further research on questions of religion and political parties with regards to areas such as democratization, party platform formation, party moderation and secularization, and social constituency representation and interest articulation.

The renewed focus on religion and political parties, however, occurred much earlier as political events in the 1980s reminded social scientists of the power of religion to influence parties and social movements across different regions of the world. The Iranian revolution depicted how a religious movement could overthrow a regime once seen as the exemplar of secularization in the region and establish a modern religious and revolutionary party, the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), to rule. In the United States, the rise of the Christian Right showed how religious movements can evolve along with political parties, changing both in the process. The role of the Pope and the Catholic Church in supporting Solidarity in Poland demonstrated the power of religious groups to mount movements and parties that challenge non-democratic regimes. Moreover, the Church’s more complex role with post-independence political parties in Poland showed that democracy does not simplify the relationships between religious institutions and parties as one may assume.
Like the broader field of religion and politics, the study of religion and political parties had been stunted earlier by the secularization paradigm. Modernization and secularization theories channelled scholarly attention away from religious politics and predicted that the importance of religion on politics would decline—a position that failed to explain the resurgence of religion in many political systems in the world. Although secularization has clearly occurred in many countries, there has been a substantial revival of religion in many parts of the globe. The impact of religion on politics has not declined but rather changed in complex ways, while the separation of religion and state has paradoxically decreased with higher socio-economic development throughout the world.

Yet, the study of religion and political parties, the subject of this chapter, has been a difficult area for inquiry due to the complexity of the interrelationship between the two. Although there are a number of studies of religion and parties in particular nations, there is less comparative analysis on this theme because of the complex variety of relationships in play. Consider just a few examples:

- In officially secular India, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) first came to power in the 1990s after staging a 10,000 kilometre march that sought to destroy an ancient mosque that was alleged to be built on the remains of Rama’s temple. And in 2014, the BJP won the majority of seats in the parliament—the first time any single party has accomplished such a feat since 1984—propelling BJP party leader Narendra Modi to the position of Prime Minister of India.

- In the United States, known for separation of church and state, candidates of both parties make speeches from church pulpits. Today candidates from both parties speak openly of their faith and its implication for their policies.

- In Turkey, a secular state with a large Muslim majority, parties that are insufficiently secular have traditionally been banned. The ruling party—the Justice and Development Party (AKP)—is mildly Islamist, but attempts to balance its rhetoric with the secular goals of many national actors. More recently, however, critics fear a creeping Islamizing agenda by the ruling party and the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

- In the Netherlands, three confessional parties once represented distinctive pillars of politics. These three parties merged in 1980 but their strength declined with secularization. By 2002, a new party—the Pim Fortuyn List—that focused anger toward Muslim immigrants became for a time the largest party, while the Party for Freedom, which has an anti-Islam platform, has consistently gained a strong parliamentary presence in the country, for example becoming the third-largest party in parliament following the 2010 elections.

- In Japan, a secular society where citizens mix elements of Buddhism and Shinto, one faction of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is especially open to Shinto nationalism. The internal party cleavage is symbolized by the multiple visits of former Prime Minister Koizumi to a shrine to the war dead, and, following a controversial interlude, Prime Minister Abe’s visit in 2013.

These cases obviously differ greatly along many dimensions, only one of which is religious denomination. Some feature religious parties, in other cases religious citizens are factions in a party, or secular citizens react to immigration by those of another faith.

In this chapter, we do not seek to offer a comprehensive theory of religion and political parties. Instead, we begin with a discussion of the various ways that religion and political parties
can intersect, and then consider three sets of cases that have provoked considerable scholarship in recent years – Christian Democratic parties in Europe, religion and parties in the United States, and Islamic parties in the Middle East.¹⁸

**Religion and political parties: a theoretical overview**

Any comparative discussion of religion and political parties is complicated because of conceptual difficulties with both terms. Religious institutions can include hierarchical bodies like the Catholic Church, which can negotiate separate agreements with political leaders in different countries,¹⁹ and institutions in more decentralized traditions such as Sunni Islam, and evangelical Protestantism. Institutions can mean the top leadership of denominations, or specific congregations.²⁰

But religion is more than institutions. Religious bodies and traditions can spawn an ‘associational nexus’ that support religious parties.²¹ Lay activists in the Catholic Church in Europe created civil society organizations that were linked to the Church in various ways, and this in turn led to the formation of Christian Democratic parties, sometimes against the opposition of church leaders. In the US, social and political groups channel religious enthusiasm toward political parties, and in India Hindu social groups rather than religious institutions sparked the rise of the BJP. On the other hand, religious parties can also create their associational nexus, as Hezbollah has done in Lebanon.²²

Finally, religion can provide the energy to social movements that seek to change the assumptions, values, and routines of society.²³ These social movements can spark political parties, but parties can also help to spark social movements by channelling resources. These social movements can cut across religious institutions, and they can occur without active support from religious leaders – indeed they can occur despite their strong opposition.

Political parties might appear at first to be easier to define. Scholars generally agree that parties create programmes and ideological packages that articulate societal goals, aggregate and articulate societal interests, mobilize the public, and recruit elites who stand for the party in elections to acquire offices in government.²⁴ But in practice, parties are more difficult to distinguish from other political groups. In many multi-party systems, minor parties form and dissolve as quickly as other political organizations,²⁵ while religious social movements may recruit candidates and support them within parties to try to win office.²⁶ In many countries, religious groups act as ‘indirect parties’.²⁷

Moreover, recognizing religious parties is more complex than it might initially seem. Although many political parties have standing programmes that can be analysed, increasingly parties are using these programmes as electoral vehicles to attract votes and thus using secular language to state their goals.²⁸ Many religious parties have secularized over time, while officially secular political parties have developed a stronger tie with religious groups.²⁹ In some countries such as Turkey, explicitly religious parties are barred, but some secular parties nevertheless make implicit and explicit religious appeals. And even explicitly religious parties frequently win power with non-religious appeals, including those based on class and economic policy: the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) in Algeria used economic class appeals to win votes,³⁰ the BJP in India won power in part by its critique of ruling party economic policies,³¹ and religious parties in Israel frequently win votes through policies toward school, housing, and other issues.³² Meanwhile secular parties may compete for the votes of religious citizens by couching their programmes in moral language, even using specifically religious language in narrowly cast communications (e.g. through mail or phone).³³

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Religious parties may vary in their support for democratic institutions and practices, and thus some may be conceived as not parties, but rather vehicles for the elimination of parties. Some Catholic parties in the inter-war period in Europe sought to end democratic governance, and there is a lively debate today over whether Islamic parties will be supportive of democratic processes if or when they win power.

But religious influence on parties does not end with religious parties. Sometimes religious bodies and associations stand outside the party system to pressurize all parties, trying to structure the Constitution or the political debate as a societal force, as has been the case in Poland. In other cases, political parties may align with different religious groups, and/or compete for the allegiance of some religious voters, as has been the case in the United States. It is because of these differences and the variety of configurations on the interplay between religion and political parties that some scholars have used the concept ‘religiously oriented party’ rather than a religious political party, with Ozzano identifying five distinct types of religiously oriented parties: the conservative, the progressive, the nationalist, the fundamentalist, and the camp party types. This classification is based on multiple factors such as party ideology, party goals, and the party’s social base of support.

On the other hand, religion can also influence party systems by creating explicitly secular parties that stand in opposition to religious forces. This has been true in Southern Europe, in Turkey, and to a certain extent in the United States, as the evangelical mobilization into politics has pushed seculars to the Democratic side. And many right-wing parties in Europe have adopted anti-Muslim slogans. In summary, the relation between religion and political parties is complex because of the multiple ways in which religion can be analysed – doctrinally, institutionally, and socially – and the diverse configurations that can form between religion and political parties. Therefore, an analytical framework is needed in order to approach this topic more theoretically in a comparative perspective.

A framework for the study of religion and political parties

Most research on religion and political parties has centred on Western Europe, and in other Western liberal democracies. This work has frequently focused on the way that political parties develop to compete along the main social divisions, or cleavages, in a country. Lipset and Rokkan suggest that there are four main cleavages in Western societies that are sources of conflict: the centre–periphery divide, the church–state divide, the land–industry cleavage, and the divide between the capitalists and workers. They argue that the class cleavage is most important and predict that class will gain in importance as other pre-modern cleavages, such as religion, disappear. Some observers have reported declining salience of religion for voting in Europe, although evidence is clearly mixed.

The view of religion as one of several social cleavages remains the dominant model for political party analysis, particularly in democratic polities. Yet Rosenblum argues that ‘The standard thesis on party formation simply assumes that where religious cleavages are politically salient, religious-based parties will arise. This leaves the black box of party-formation unopened.’ The standard thesis may not be helpful in understanding the rise of the BJP in India at a time when religious cleavages were not especially high, or the emergence of two parties representing Shiite religious interests (Amal and Hezbollah) in Lebanon. And it does little to help us understand the prominence of religious actors in Republican Party politics in the past twenty years in the US.

Several key factors must be considered in order to fully understand the relationship between religion and political parties.
Regime type

Although most work on religion and political parties has focused on liberal democracies for obvious reasons, religious parties also operate in secular competitive authoritarian regimes that hold elections, such as Jordan and Yemen. They exist in theocratic regimes that hold elections, such as Iran, and do not in sultanistic religious regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan under the Taliban. Parties may perform different tasks in non-democratic systems, but recognizing them as parties allows us to broaden our thinking about parties and religion.

Religious marketplace

Religious cleavages come from religious differences, but nations differ in the type of religious differences that might be politically relevant. Many nations (such as Shi’a Islamic Iran and Catholic Poland) have overwhelming religious majorities, but voters divide on how much direct influence religious institutions should have on politics.47 In other countries, such as Turkey, an overwhelming majority of religious citizens share a particular faith, but there are strong anti-clerical elements in politics, and a religious–secular divide. In other countries such as Belgium and Brazil, a religious majority is challenged by a new faith, either via conversion or immigration.48 Elsewhere, for example in India and Japan, different religious traditions may compete or cooperate.49 And in a few countries such as the US, there are many competing religious traditions vying to define the dominant values of the society.

Religious institutional structure

Some religious institutions are in a better position to bargain with political parties than others. In particular, scholars have argued that the Catholic Church as a hierarchical (and non-democratic) institution is better situated to negotiate the realm of democratic politics than more decentralized faiths such as Protestant evangelicalism and Islam.50 Some scholars have even portrayed the Catholic Church as a rational actor negotiating with the state, constrained by paths previously taken in national history.51 Kalyvas argues that Islamic parties, such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, are less likely to be able to integrate into a democratic polity because of the less hierarchical nature of Islamic religious institutions.52

The associational nexus of religion and political parties

Religious institutions generally create a host of associations that are involved in community and charitable work, that help to organize social life, and provide a supplement to religious activities. Churches, temples, and mosques sponsor schools, sports associations, prayer groups, hospitals, service organizations to the poor and elderly, and special ministries. Religious enthusiasts may create social movements with related associations that try to change societal views and policies.

It is from these lay groups that religious parties typically spring,53 and it is from them that pressure is exerted on existing parties to adopt religiously based policies.54 The interests of the associational nexus of religion may differ from those of official religious elites, who may oppose the formation of religious parties or the alliance with more secular parties because they will likely lose control of the religious message. By entering into the political process, religious organizations change, with some becoming ‘acculturated’ to democratic norms. ‘By means of the associational nexus religious parties integrate political activity with social and spiritual life.
Organizing politics

Seen as part of this web of associations with overlapping affiliations, religious parties appear more like membership groups than other parties.55

Political parties can create their own associational nexus as well, frequently creating groups specifically to appeal to particular types of voters – including religious ones. There are cases in which religious parties not only establish and institutionalize an associational nexus but also instigate and lead an entire social movement, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is often difficult to distinguish between associations spawned by religious organizations and activists and those created by political parties.

The nature of the party system

Party systems vary across countries, changing greatly the incentives for religious activists and political activists to interact in particular ways. Various electoral rules produce incentives for parties to form, or for interests to work with larger, catch-all parties.56 Path-dependent trajectories of party development, and party response to minor party encroachment, can also influence the way that religion affects parties. For all of these reasons, religious institutions and activists are more likely to back established parties in some countries, creating factions which support religious agendas, and more likely to form political parties in other countries – and in some cases (e.g. Israel), multiple parties.

The stance of religious groups toward the state and government

Religious organizations vary in their stance toward the state and government. Some early Catholic parties in the inter-war period endorsed an end to democratic elections, and backed authoritarian movements in various European countries. Some Islamic parties similarly endorse Islamic states with theocratic rule.57 History suggests that Catholic parties became viable democratic actors as a result of engagement in the political realm. Whether Islamic parties can similarly accommodate to democratic norms constitutes one of the critical debates in the field of democratization today.

Religious groups that support democratic involvement vary in their prophetic stance against government policies. In many countries, churches and other formal religious institutions are established, funded by the government – and in some cases government has some control over the content of sermons. In other cases, religious parties may define a prophetic critique of government policies when in the opposition, but change their focus when they join a majority coalition. When religious groups form or support a political party, they may lose some ability to critique the party programme. This was evident in the United States, when the Concerned Women for America, a Christian Right women’s group that is generally associated with the Grand Old Party (GOP), took no position on a Republican sponsored welfare reform bill that forced poor women to get jobs and place their children in childcare, even though this went against one of the group’s core principles regarding motherhood.58

The religious orientation of the party

As discussed earlier, the role that religion plays within a political party is multi-faceted. Some parties may be explicitly religious; others may be secular but have religiously rooted social platforms or represent the interests of a religious social constituency. Likewise, some parties may be secular and espouse positions that are critical of other religious denominations, such as anti-Islamic parties in Europe. For our purposes in this chapter, we use Ozzano’s classification
of religiously oriented parties. The conservative party refers to broader, catch-all parties that are influenced by religious policy agendas; the progressive party is a centre-left party and has more progressive interpretations of religious doctrine; the religious nationalist party subsumes religious values to nationalist and ethnic ideology; the fundamentalist party is a mass party that wants to organize state and society on religion and religious law; and, finally, the camp party promotes the interests of a specific religious group without propagating an all-encompassing religious ideology for state and society.

Next, we investigate three cases of religion and political parties. We begin with a discussion of Christian Democratic parties and the Catholic Church in Europe. Christian Democratic parties share elements of a common programme but they differ in many ways, in part because of the different associational networks to which they are attached. Once seen as declining because of secularization in Europe, they have enjoyed a revival in recent years. Afterwards, we also

Table 12.1 Major dimensions on religion and political parties in five sample cases, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western Europe</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Christian Democrats (and allies)</td>
<td>Republican Party (GOP); Democratic Party (D)</td>
<td>Islamic Action Front</td>
<td>Islah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime type</td>
<td>Liberal democracy</td>
<td>Liberal democracy</td>
<td>Electoral authoritarian: constitutional monarchy</td>
<td>Electoral authoritarian: presidential republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party system</td>
<td>Mostly proportional representation</td>
<td>First past the post – single member district</td>
<td>Single non-transferable vote</td>
<td>First-past-the-post – single member district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associational nexus</td>
<td>Broad; connected</td>
<td>Broad; independent</td>
<td>Cohesive; mixed independence</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious institutional structures</td>
<td>Hierarchical (Catholicism)</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious marketplace</td>
<td>Catholic majority with sizable secular population; some with Protestant and Muslim minorities</td>
<td>Diverse; Christian majority</td>
<td>Sunni majority</td>
<td>Muslim majority; Sunni–Shi’a split</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance towards the state</td>
<td>Pro-state</td>
<td>Pro-state</td>
<td>Mildly anti-state</td>
<td>Pro-state; more recent shift to mildly anti-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious orientation</td>
<td>Conservative (GOP); progressive (D)</td>
<td>Conservative (GOP); progressive (D)</td>
<td>Fundamentalist</td>
<td>Fundamentalist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
look at the US, where religious discourse in elections is increasing. Social movement organizations seek to link the political parties to groups of religious voters, and mobilize religion into parties. Finally, we examine Islamic parties in the Middle East. There popular social movements and religious parties interact in intricate ways within the context of non-liberal polities, supporting and opposing states with planned strategies.

The Catholic Church and political parties in Europe

In Western Europe, Christian Democratic parties with strong links to Catholic religious institutions and civil society are active in most countries. In Eastern Europe, the Church has played an active role in some countries in designing constitutions, but has been less willing to back particular parties. In general, Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe have been less studied than parties on the left, but in recent years a significant amount of scholarship has focused on the relationship of the Catholic Church and political parties.60

Western European nations with Christian Democratic parties share certain characteristics that help to structure the interaction between religion and politics. All are liberal democracies with multi-party systems, interacting with a hierarchical church which has both national and international elements. They differ somewhat in the religious marketplace – the Netherlands and Germany have substantial Protestant populations – but overall share a growing secularization and an influx of new Muslim citizens. They are all embedded in networks of associations, which differ slightly from country to country. They are supportive of the state, but their position on church–state issues varies because of varying histories and different sets of state subsidies and limitations.

The relationship between the Church and parties in Europe is theoretically interesting, for several reasons. First, because early manifestations of Catholic political parties in Europe frequently staked anti-democratic positions, their participation in the electoral process may have implications for the position of Islamic parties in regards to democracy.61 Second, the Catholic Church is the most hierarchical religious institution in the world, capable of negotiating concordats with various governments that differ in important ways, and thus allow consideration of the Church as a single rational actor.62 Third, distinctive paths that some countries have taken to democracy have also altered the incentives for the Church to back or oppose particular parties.63 Finally, the existence of a family of Christian Democratic parties allows us to consider the various ways that religious and social organization can affect party politics.64

Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe mostly grew out of civil society organizations that were affiliated with the Catholic Church, and with some Protestant churches as well. These parties shared certain ideological tenets but not a single programme. Christian Democratic parties are generally categorized as centre-right, supportive of the welfare state, federalism, and morally conservative policies. The parties have loosely affiliated in the context of the European Union.65

The historical paths of these parties differed, and this has affected their relationships to the Church and to other political forces. In Germany, the Church chose to ally itself with a party that combined Catholics and Protestants, rather than with another solely Catholic party that was forming at the same time. With little remaining of the once vibrant Catholic civil society in Germany and a strong regional division of religion, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) seemed to Catholic and Protestant actors alike a better bet than separate confessional parties. In the Netherlands, separate confessional parties competed for many years, but finally merged in 1980. In Belgium, in contrast, a Christian Democratic party formed early to protect Catholic schools, but later split along linguistic lines.
The parties have developed differently because of their competition in the electoral arena. In some countries, Christian Democratic parties have been seen as the main opposition to leftist anti-clerical parties, whereas in other countries Christian Democrats have had to fend off challenges by nationalist parties of the Right. In many cases, the parties historically competed by building ties to civil society organizations. In Italy, Church leaders used available resources, including denial of sacraments, to marshal support for the Christian Democratic party, but also mobilized the extensive Catholic network of organizations. In France, priests joined unions and used persuasion, and also created new social organizations that were affiliated with the Christian Democrats. The associational nexus of these parties varies – trade unions have been associated with the party in Austria but not Germany, and in Belgium and Italy the party has had official organizations that represented women, students, and farmers.

Over the past three decades, the vote share of Christian Democratic parties declined in much of Europe as the population became more secular, although there is some evidence of a resurgence in recent years. Electoral volatility has increased, with new social movement parties and populist parties playing an increased role. Some of these new populist parties have strong anti-Muslim positions in response to immigration.

Christian Democratic parties have reacted to changed political conditions in different ways. Some have sought to co-opt support for rightist and populist parties, and staked their identity around the Christian heritage of Europe, while others have opened themselves to Muslims and other non-Christian groups and sought to attract younger voters who are not drawn to the party’s religious heritage. Some have broadened their agenda to become ‘catch-all’ parties of the centre and centre-right, whereas others have criticized neo-liberal economic reforms that have occurred across the continent. All have sought to retain their links to civil society organizations, but in much of Europe these organizations are in decline. Yet it is too early to write off Christian Democratic parties, especially given their renewed success in national and European elections in recent years. Even the diffuse religious identities of Western Europeans may become re-politicized under the right circumstances.

Although Christian Democratic parties have formed in most West European democracies, the relationship between religion and parties in the new European democracies has followed a different course. The collapse of communist governments throughout Eastern and Central Europe altered the political balance in the West, but it also created space for new party systems in the recently established democracies. Many of these new countries were heavily secular, but some retained significant Catholic populations and institutions. The Church was strongest in Poland, where it was linked to a rich array of social institutions including the Solidarity trade union. The Church provided valuable infrastructure to civil society as it resisted the communist rule, but the transition to multi-party democracy was more complicated.

The Church negotiated with political leaders over the Constitution and protections for religious institutions. Yet when the Solidarity movement split into rival factions and Poland emerged with dozens of political parties, the Church chose not to endorse a political party, including some that were explicitly Catholic in ideology. This path was perhaps different from that in Italy in the post-war period because of doctrinal shifts in the role of the Church in politics. The complex and rapidly shifting partisan structure of Polish politics also made choosing a party to support problematic, but made choosing which one to oppose far easier. This became more salient as party coalitions formed on the left and right.

In other countries, the Church had a more complex task. In Slovakia, for example, issues relating to Hungarian minorities made it difficult for the Church to become involved in partisan politics, because the Hungarian Church was actively involved in nationalistic
expression. The Church has been involved with a Christian Democratic party formation, although the rapid formation and mergers of political parties has made any stable alliance problematic.

In summary, religious actors and parties have been critical in the political development of Europe, particularly in the development of democracy in the nineteenth century and in the social movements against Communism in the late twentieth century. Recent declines in religious associational life and the practical non-existence of religious social movements may have left an ideational and associational vacuum for the rise of other political actors. Espousing Christian identity, without religiosity per se, nationalism may grow to be an important social movement in many European states, thus, altering the political landscape of the continent once again. Across the Atlantic, however, religious associational life and movements remain vibrant in the United States. And while Christian Democratic parties in Europe face an uncertain future, some have argued that in the US the Republican Party is now evolving into a Christian Democratic party.72

Religion and political parties in the USA

In the US, it is commonly argued that the party system has changed from one where both parties had allies in differing religious traditions, to one in which Christian conservatives support Republican candidates and more secular citizens vote Democratic. Presidential candidates routinely discuss their personal faith, religious experiences, and even in some cases theology publicly, and some churches are actively involved in electoral politics, despite an official separation of church and state.

The US has an increasingly diverse religious citizenry, with a Christian majority that is divided into several blocs and into hundreds of different denominations. White evangelical Protestants constitute 18 per cent of the public, with white Catholics and white mainline Protestants constituting approximately 14 per cent. African American Protestants and Hispanic Catholics are at around 8 per cent apiece.73 Although politicians occasionally still declare the country to be a ‘Christian nation’, today there are Hindu temples, Buddhist meditation centres, mosques, synagogues, and other non-Christian houses of worship in all major cities and many smaller towns.74

A growing portion of the population is secular, and today more than 22 per cent express no religious affiliation, making them the single largest religious group in America. Among those under 30 years of age, this figure reaches 34 per cent, compared to only 11 per cent of senior citizens. A substantial majority of Americans report attending church at least once a month; many go more than once a week. But recent research suggests a substantial social desirability effect in phone surveys that assess church attendance. One recent study showed that online surveys obtain significantly lower rates of church attendance, with 31 per cent attending weekly or more but 43 per cent attending seldom or never.

The growing numbers of unaffiliated Americans suggests the possibility that a secular majority could emerge in the Democratic Party, although many deeply religious Americans – especially African Americans and Latinos – continue to identify as Democrats.

With so many religious traditions cooperating in some areas but competing to define the dominant worldview of the citizenry, there is no single religious actor that can negotiate with the state. The Catholic Church in the US has sought to exert a unified voice on certain issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage, but American Catholics frequently disagree with Church teachings, and even the lobbying efforts of various Catholic dioceses differ in their
priorities. Protestant denominations are also divided; issues of gay and lesbian rights divide the Episcopal, Methodist, and Presbyterian churches. Evangelical denominations have sought to cooperate within the framework of the National Association of Evangelicals, but they have disagreed publicly about such issues as global warming and torture.

Religious groups have long been a key part of associational life in the US, spawning a rich array of organizations that serve a variety of spiritual and secular purposes. These associations are often associated with particular religious denominations (e.g. Catholic charities), but are often ecumenical efforts by religiously motivated citizens. Churches provide opportunities for their members to acquire political skills, as well as serve the community.

Moreover, religion has been the impetus of many vital social movements that have worked both outside and inside the party system to make substantial changes in American public life. Religion was a major source of mobilization around abolition, temperance, civil rights, and the Christian Right. It played a notable role along with other secular forces in the suffrage and labour movements. In most cases, these movements started outside of the party system, and were eventually accommodated by changes in the programmes of one or both of the major parties.

The first-past-the-post system of American congressional and presidential elections has produced the same two major parties for 150 years. These political parties frequently build close networks with interest groups and social movement organizations. Political elites generally seek to exploit cleavages for political gain, not by forming new political parties, but frequently by forming extra-party organizations that can mobilize voters – including many that seek to mobilize religious voters. These organizations can assist factions within the party in struggles to control nominations and influence the party platform.

Religious groups primarily support the state and are often nationalistic, but they also frequently take a prophetic stance against particular policies. Religious groups lobby both national and state governments, challenge laws in Court, and otherwise contest policy in ways very similar to non-religious groups.

But tax law limits the ability of religious organizations to endorse candidates, affiliate with parties, as well as to lobby government. Churches can do any of these things, but their status as tax-exempt charities may be at stake. For this reason, churches shy away from explicit endorsements of candidates, although some obey the letter but not the spirit of the law.

**Religion and political parties: from denomination to direction?**

In the early years of the twentieth century, Democratic leaders began to assemble a religious coalition that included a variety of different groups. Democratic Party machines in northern cities welcomed Catholic and Jewish immigrants, and the Republican Party opened itself to nativist elements who called for curbs on immigration. Franklin Roosevelt’s coalition sought to incorporate African American Christians and white evangelicals. White mainline Protestants – who were advantaged in socio-economic resources – constituted the backbone of the GOP.

Yet much of the religious alignment in this period was due to non-religious issues. White evangelicals were mostly southern, and that region was solidly Democratic because of racial politics. Catholic and Jewish immigrants were disproportionately working class, and thus benefited from the pro-labour policies of the Democrats. African Americans also benefited from Roosevelt’s economic policies, especially in northern cities. Religion was important in American life, but was not terribly well mobilized in politics. In 1960, John Kennedy won the presidency not by touting his Catholic faith, but by promising not to let it direct his presidency.
Post-New Deal religion and party politics

During the 1960s, African American churches served as a critical infrastructure for the Civil Rights movement. Black pastors became involved in Democratic Party politics, conducting voter registration drives, and inviting Democratic candidates into their churches. Democratic Party operatives cultivated ties to the largest African American churches across the country.

In the late 1970s, Republican leaders helped conservative white fundamentalists and evangelicals build the Christian Right, which was closely linked with the Republican Party. The Christian Right helped the Republicans woo white evangelical voters with more conservative policies on abortion, education, gay rights, and other issues. Republican politicians also helped channel contributions to organizations such as the Moral Majority and later the Christian Coalition, and they in turn helped to register voters and steer them to Republican candidates.

The Republicans also sought to build support among conservative Catholics, stressing the party’s position on abortion and gay rights. Frequently these efforts are coordinated in political groups which receive party support, in other cases they are mounted by individual candidates. In 2004, the Bush campaign sought to mobilize religious voters directly, bypassing social movement organizations. They gathered lists of members from conservative churches, and crafted careful appeals through mail, telemarketing, and other private communications to win their votes.

Republican policymakers have sought to cement their ties to evangelicals and conservative Catholics with public rhetoric on religion – both explicit language that is accessible to all voters, and more carefully worded language that is understood by particular religious communities. In some ways, the Republican Party has evolved into a type of Christian Democratic party, with the noticeable absence of support for the welfare state. Secular Americans, a rapidly growing portion of the population, have moved to the Democrats in response, as have mainline Protestants with moderate to liberal theology. Journalists frequently argue that the party system is evolving into one pitting a visibly religious party against a secular party.

There is some truth to this claim, for among all three groups of white Christians, the most observant are more likely to vote for the Republicans, and the most secular to support Democrats. Yet among African Americans, among Muslims, and among certain groups of Jews, the most observant are more likely to support Democrats, and this is true among older Catholics as well. Many religious groups have agendas that intersect with both political parties, including a newly engaged group of moderate evangelicals.

Moreover, the two-party system creates incentives for both parties to woo many groups of voters. Catholics and mainline Protestants are currently courted by both parties, whereas African Americans, Jews, and white evangelicals appear to have formed stable relationships with one or the other party. The growing portion of secular voters appears to be currently aligned with the Democratic Party, partially in response to the affiliation of orthodox Protestants with the GOP. But the recent change from the Christian Right to the Tea Party as the organized right of the party may signal an effort by GOP elites to appeal to secular voters on economic issues.

In conclusion, the diversity of American religion and its associational life has complicated the relationship between religious groups and the two political parties. The relationship between parties and social movement organizations is a complicated one, and political parties may compete to win the votes of religious groups. Finally, the US case shows that even in long-established democracies the relationship between parties and religion can change. We now turn our attention to Islamic parties and movements in the Middle East, where the importance of both the nature of party-movement relations and the institutional structures of the regime can be made more explicit.
Islamic parties in the Middle East

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 marked a watershed in the ideological discourse of politics throughout the Islamic world, from one of Western secularism as characterized by Kemal Ataturk to that of the religion of Islam as exemplified by Ayatollah Khomeini. Since then, the relationship between Islam and parties has continued to change, primarily for two reasons. First, in the 1970s and 1980s, most Islamists were reluctant to cooperate with the state, seeking instead a broader pan-Islamic revolution. Second, many regimes banned religious parties, and over time these restrictions have been relaxed in some cases. In particular, the Arab Spring did much to usher in change to party laws in many countries, at least initially, as was particularly striking in Egypt and Tunisia with the emergence of Islamic parties. Nevertheless, reversals of the liberalization experienced by many countries as a result of the Arab Spring, such as the banning of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party following the 2014 military coup in Egypt, continue to demonstrate the difficulties facing formal religious parties in the region. In fact, the role and function of parties continue to be much more restricted than those of the other regions of the world due to the illiberalism that characterizes the region. Political parties are still banned in Saudi Arabia, Libya and the smaller Persian Gulf states, are limited to de-facto secular one-party rule in Syria, and are banned in Egypt and Turkey if based on an explicit religious platform.

Scholarly analysis of political Islam has been dominated by two different conceptual approaches. The first places emphasis on discursive, behavioural and ideological analysis, essentializing and presenting Islam as antithetical to Western concepts like democracy. Within this group, some further argue that Islamic values are incompatible with modernity, and predict an inevitable clash of civilizations. Scholars writing in this tradition have largely ignored the role and function of religious organizations and parties. This view has been criticized for failing to account for differences in Islamic movements and parties, and for having an ethnocentric bias. Middle Eastern regimes use the ‘Islamist threat’ as an excuse to limit democratization and ban religious parties. Thus, ‘[t]he real question is not whether Islamists pose a threat, but what political agendas are served by continuing to paint Islamists as a monolithic, antidemocratic mob’.

Other scholars suggest that Islamic parties may moderate their positions and accept democratic norms as they participate in the democratic process – the ‘participation-moderation’ thesis. In this perspective, democratization, and hence moderation, arises through the strategic interaction of key actors; and ideology and norms may be altered by democratic politics or, at least, by political inclusion in the ‘rules of the game’. Democratic political processes can emerge even among those who lack commitment to democratic norms, hence the phrase ‘democracy without democrats’. As Vali Nasr states, ‘Muslim Democracy rests not on an abstract, carefully thought-out theological and ideological accommodation between Islam and democracy, but rather on a practical synthesis that is emerging in much of the Muslim world in response to the opportunities and demands created by the ballot box’. As a result, ‘change will in turn be the harbinger, not the follower, of more liberal Islamic thought and practice’.

In practice, the ideological positions of Islamic parties and organizations cover a wide spectrum from the conservative application of Shari’a law to more liberal interpretations of religion. Islamic parties may see advantages in participating in elections because ‘they generally have far superior organizational support systems, principally through mosque networks, than do secular parties’. Thus, the associational nexus and societal networks of Islamic religious charities, foundations, schools, hospitals and professional organizations form the support base for many, if not all, Islamic parties. Moderation, through a different but similar mechanism,
may occur by undertaking the difficulty of practical day-to-day governance—what Sheri Berman terms the ‘pothole theory of democracy’.

But the evidence that Islamic parties moderate when they engage in electoral competition is mixed. Recent academic debates have focused upon clarifying the conceptualization and pinpointing the precise meaning of moderation and change. A number of scholars have argued that the term ‘moderation’ oversimplifies the relationship between Islamic movements and democracy. Clark argues that some Islamic parties are labelled moderate because of their short-term tactical decisions, ignoring their long-term Islamic agendas. Wickham suggests that the relationship between Islamic parties and democracies is complex: some parties may accept some aspects of democracy while rejecting others. She also argues that the term assumes a particular direction of change—meaning toward greater liberalization and secularization—that may not be necessarily accurate, and thus demonstrates the need to unpack the concept and disaggregate the ideological and behavioural modifications of actors and institutions, such as political parties. Schwedler likewise argues that ‘moderate and radical might be applied to some positions on a particular issue, but hold little analytic value as wholesale categories of political actors’.

This leaves the inclusion-moderation hypothesis approach without a clear causal mechanism for explaining moderation—how it is that inclusion produces moderation, or whether moderation comes about via other mechanisms, such as effective repression, as Hamid and others have argued. Repression or inclusion here seem to be complementary mechanisms—like a carrot and stick strategy—that produces moderation or change. And moderation, on the other hand, remains a vague and open concept, open to debate and contestation.

As a result, ideological commitments setting the boundaries of justifiable action need to be considered as an important dimension in addition to political opportunity structures and the internal group structures and organizations of parties. Comparing the Islamic Action Front (IAF) party in Jordan with the Islah party in Yemen, Schwedler argues that the IAF was successful in moderating while the Islah was not. In this instance, moderation is defined as the shift from ‘a relatively closed worldview to one that is more pluralist and tolerant of alternative perspectives’. In order to see the dynamics of Schwedler’s argument empirically and to explain the implications of the six dimensions identified in the introduction, we will present the details of the IAF and Islah parties as they were before the Arab Spring.

Founded in 1992, the IAF is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. It participates in parliamentary elections, except for a boycott in 1997. Jordan used a bloc voting mechanism that shifted to a single non-transferable vote in the 1990s with a bias toward the rural regions where the Islamic constituency is weaker. Jordan’s government is a constitutional monarchy currently headed by King Abdullah II, and the regime has provided room for political parties. The nation is an overwhelmingly Sunni majority country with a 6 per cent Christian minority. In addition, more than 50 per cent of Jordanians are Palestinian, and this constitutes one of the important constituencies of the IAF. The party has a mildly prophetic (anti-regime) position described by Schwedler as a ‘loyal opposition’, but has links to those in power, including the King. In terms of its structure and organization, the IAF is cohesive with a strong central leadership and is well established in society with clear constituents. Its associational nexus is particularly vibrant. Over time, the IAF has adopted a more democratic discourse, and has justified its cooperation with the left with arguments centred in Islam.

The Islah, or Reform, Party was established in 1990 in a secular presidential republic. It has a first-past-the-post electoral system with single-member districts. While predominantly Muslim, Yemen has a Sunni Muslim majority with a substantial Shi’ite minority. Islah is a Sunni party, and has been until recently a coalition partner of the regime. It had a priestly (pro-regime) position characterized by Schwedler as a regime ‘coalition partner’, but has
increasingly become oppositional and suffered a resounding defeat in local council elections at the hand of the ruling party. Deeply fragmented, the Islah party rests on a constituency based on a weak coalition among diverse social actors who share some common goals. Its associational nexus is relatively weaker and more heterogeneous than that of the IAF’s.

The important implications of the dimensions identified earlier become evident in Schwedler’s analysis of the causal mechanism explaining IAF moderation. Regime type is important, for the uncontested monarchy of Jordan created greater political space for the IAF than the contested presidency in Yemen that limited legitimate competition. Second, the coherent and well-organized structure of the IAF allowed it greater policy-making decisions and adaptations, in contrast to the fragmented Islah party. Finally, the discourse of the IAF became more democratic in nature in contrast to the more conservative discourse of Islah, which suffered from the extremist positions of some of its candidates. By refining the indicators of moderation to include ideological discourse and looking more specifically at the different dimensions of party context in a comparative perspective, Schwedler makes an important contribution to the study of religion and political parties. At the same time, however, it also raises a few concerns that would be important for future study.

Further research is needed on the form and function of the associational nexus. Schwedler encourages future studies to focus upon questions that ‘might explore the dynamics of various publics and the actors who produce them, how narrative spaces shape political practices, and how sites of brokerage facilitate changes in practices as well as ideological commitments’. However, scholars using social movement theory have already accomplished much work on many of these points. Analyses focus upon three elements: resource mobilization bases that exist in society, such as mosques and charities; elites who mobilize and make decisions; and ideology and framing that allows for collective action. But more work needs to be done on identifying the configuration of political parties with movements and their potential effects on political processes. For example, in her studies on Islamic mobilization in Egypt, Carrie Wickham situates the Muslim Brotherhood as only one part of a larger Islamic movement in the country, meaning that in elections it only receives a part of the total votes that might go to those supporting the Islamic movement. At other times, however, she uses Islamic parties and movements interchangeably. The boundaries and processes that define parties and movements thus need greater focus and analysis. In sum, the degree to which an Islamic party can moderate its social constituency may be explained and predicted by the position of the party within the institutional matrix of its respective social movement and the formal and informal structural make-up of the religion itself.

The case of Hezbollah in Lebanon sheds light on the importance of these issues. Lebanon has an ethnically and religiously diverse society managed under a consociational form of democracy that broke down into civil war in 1975 to be re-established in 1990. Officially founded in 1985, Hezbollah, the Shi’a Party of God, became instrumental in the resistance to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Free from the political corruption and patronage politics of Amal, the main party reflecting the Shi’a cleavage within Lebanon, Hezbollah was supported by a growing religious constituency. Two important characteristics allow Hezbollah to serve as an intriguing case on the intersection of religion and political parties. First, the party created the majority of its own associational nexus rather than the other way around. Aided by Iran financially and logistically, the party developed its own organizations involved in the realms of education, reconstruction, health, charity and religion, thus creating a social movement directed by ‘holistic and integrated networks’.

As a result, changes in the discourse and agenda of Hezbollah led to broader changes in the constituency of the Shi’a movement in Lebanon, in contrast to the effects upon the Islamic
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movement in Egypt or Jordan with similar changes to the Muslim Brotherhood. This was because Hezbollah managed to achieve hegemony as the definitive organizational leader of the Islamic movement and associational nexus in Lebanon. This contrasts with the Muslim Brotherhood, only a component of a larger social network comprising Egyptian and Jordanian Islamic movements. One example of this change includes Hezbollah’s decision to drop its aim of establishing an Islamic Republic in Lebanon and choosing instead to participate in domestic elections.116

Second, more research is necessary on secularization of political parties and any links this may have with religious hierarchy. Hezbollah is also an interesting case in this regard in terms of its religious organizational structure and hierarchy. It follows the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, or the rule of the jurisprudent, developed by Ayatollah Khomeini and institutionalized in Iran after the revolution. The party followed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution until 1989 and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei afterwards. In religious emulation, however, individuals chose their own marja’ al-taqlid, or source of emulation, with many following Ayatollah Fadlallah in Lebanon. Therefore, ‘political allegiance and religious emulation are two separate issues that may or may not overlap for any single person’.117 While much more hierarchical than its Sunni counterpart, the religious structure in Shi’ism is still relatively more decentralized than the Catholic Vatican. Despite its links to Iran, Hezbollah is said to act based on its own interests and platform within the Lebanese polity without overtly taking orders from Iran’s government.118 Is it Hezbollah’s greater hierarchical structure that allows it to be successful in leading a social movement and making effective negotiations with other political players? Do hierarchical organizations and religious structures allow for greater democratic accommodation, as Kalyvas claims, because of the nature of the hierarchy itself, because of the configuration it develops with an associational nexus and social movement, or both? 119

These questions are consequential to future studies of religion and political parties with regards to areas such as democratization, and may shed light on some of the experiences of the Arab Spring. For example, in his study of Mexico, Mantilla shows – counter intuitively – how political democratization and secularization are not necessarily linked causally as one may assume.120 Rather, two different mechanisms produced secularization. The first was the institutions of the state that enabled inter-elite bargaining and negotiations, a process that weakened elite-religious sector ties in civil society that inhibited religious party formation and political activism. The second was the unified Catholic Church hierarchy nationally and transnationally that inhibited religious party formation by undercutting lay religious party actors while strengthening clerical actors and institutions instead. Scholarship can thus be advanced by analysing the more precise mechanisms that produce phenomena such as secularization – or moderation – and de-linking them from teleological theories embedded within the secularization paradigm. These are a few important issues that need to be addressed by future discussions on religion and political parties.

Conclusion

Interaction of religion and political parties takes diverse forms. In Europe, engagement of Christian Democrats in democratic processes in the nineteenth century was seen by some as a threat to democracy, but they were able to form legitimate political parties and compete within the system. The centralized role of the Catholic Church facilitated its ability to guide these parties into democratic politics. In the twentieth century, religious institutions, associations and ideology interacted to form oppositional movements opposed to Communism, particularly in Poland. Yet, the Church did not establish or support a political party, choosing instead
to further its interests from the sidelines. With the weakening of religious associational life throughout Europe, an ideological and institutional vacuum has allowed nationalist groups to form and subsume religious discourse as a form of identity politics. These changes quickly altered the landscape of parties because of the Proportional Representation (PR) systems most European states espouse.

In the US, a vast, diverse, and decentralized associational nexus results in differing religious interests and movements, such as the Christian Right and the Black Protestants. The US two-party system inhibits the formation of a coherent religious party in the face of such diversity. Instead, different religious interests and movements align and support parties in order to best maximize their own interests. Although there has been a socio-moral realignment in US party life, this does not suggest that religious mobilization will necessarily follow a similar pattern in the future. Largely independent of the parties, religious associations can forge their own paths depending on their changing interests and strategies. The Republican Party’s weak ability to turn moral promises into policy results may undermine their religious associational nexus.

In the Middle East, Muslim religious social mobilization and party politics interact in much starker terms. This is because of their mainly oppositional role – in the context of authoritarian politics and the inadequate number and strength of parties that can successfully articulate societal interests. Different configurations of regime types, party politics, and mobilization constitutions alter the way in which religion and political parties interact with one another and, consequently, impact the state.

As a result of this diversity, a parsimonious study of religion and political parties can be a daunting task. We recommend that six dimensions be taken into consideration: regime type, religious marketplace, religious institutional structure, associational nexus, nature of party system, and party and religious groups’ stance toward the state. Furthermore, we propose that future studies on religion and political parties undertake greater analysis on the configurations that may occur between religious movements, associational nexus, and political parties. The position of these variables toward one another, including their power relationships, and the manner in which they link to each other and help construct one another, is very important in determining the constraints and opportunities that face religious parties and their future trajectories.

Notes

1 Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems*.
2 This phenomenon occurred as a result of the third wave of democracy and the end of the Cold War. See Gilbert and Mohseni, ‘Beyond authoritarianism’.
3 Skocpol, ‘Rentier state’.
5 Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism*.
7 Norris and Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular*.
10 Fox, ‘World separation of religion’.
11 Sahu, ‘Religion and politics’.
12 Özbudun, ‘Party prohibition cases’.
13 Kaya, ‘Islamisation of Turkey’; Yesilada and Rubin, *Islamization of Turkey*.
14 Lacardie, ‘Paradise lost’.
15 Van Holsteyn and Irwin, ‘Never a dull moment’.
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16 Vossen, ‘Classifying Wilders’.
17 Toyoda and Tanaka, ‘Religion and politics in Japan’.
18 Generally, the term ‘Islamist’ acts as a marker for those espousing a non-secular political agenda while ‘Islamic’ refers to a denominational category. Since the identification and labelling of parties according to this distinction is a controversial and political task, we use these labels interchangeably in this chapter.
20 Wald, Owen and Hill, ‘Churches as political communities’; Wald, ‘Political cohesion in churches’.
21 Rosenblum, ‘Religious parties’.
23 Wilcox, Radical Dreams.
24 Byrnes, ‘Party leadership’; Harmel and Robertson, ‘Formation and success’.
25 Norris, Radical Right.
26 Rozell and Wilcox, Second Coming.
27 Duverger, Political Parties.
28 Budge et al., Mapping Policy Preferences.
29 Vassallo and Wilcox, ‘Parties as carriers’.
30 Chhibber, ‘State policy, rent seeking’.
31 Chhibber, ‘Who voted for the BJP?’
34 Bruce, Politics and Religion.
35 Jenkins, ‘Muslim democrats’; Kalyvas, ‘Commitment problems’.
36 Byrnes, ‘The challenge of pluralism’.
37 Layman, The Great Divide; Wilcox and Robinson, ‘Prayers, parties, and preachers’.
38 Ozzano and Cavatorta, Religiously Oriented Parties.
39 Ozzano, ‘The many faces’.
40 Bolce and DeMaio, ‘Secularists, anti-fundamentalists’.
41 Rydgren, ‘Explaining the emergence’.
42 Lipset and Rokkan, Party Systems.
43 Dalton, ‘Political cleavages’; Dogan ‘Erosion of class voting’; Kotler-Berkowitz ‘Religion and voting behaviour’; Norris, Electoral Engineering.
44 Lijphart, ‘Patterns of democracy’.
46 Chhibber, ‘Who voted for the BJP?’
48 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State; Gill, Rendering Unto Caesar.
49 Sahu, ‘Religion and politics in India’; Toyoda and Tanaka, ‘Religion and politics in Japan’.
51 Warner, Confessions of an Interest Group.
52 Kalyvas, ‘Commitment problems’.
54 Wilcox and Robinson, ‘Prayers, parties, and preachers’.
57 Tamadonfar, ‘Islamism in contemporary Arab politics’.
58 Wilcox and Larson, Onward Christian Soldiers?
59 Ozzano, ‘The many faces’.
61 Kalyvas, ‘Commitment problems’.
65 Hanley, ‘The European People’s Party’.
66 Warner, Confessions of an Interest Group.
68 Gerard and Van Hecke, ‘European Christian Democracy’.
69 Rydgren, ‘Explaining the emergence’.
70 Nexon, ‘Religion, European identity’.
71 Himes, ‘Vatican II’.
72 Petrocik, ‘Reformulating the party coalitions’.
73 Cox, Jones and Navarro-Rivera, ‘I know’.
74 Eck, A New Religious America.
75 Larson, Madland and Wilcox, ‘Religious lobbying in Virginia’.
76 Warren, Dry Bones Rattling.
77 Verba, Schlozman and Brady, Voice and Equality.
78 Mitchell, ‘Religion is not a preference’.
79 Wilcox, ‘Radical dreams and political realities’.
80 Berry and Wilcox, The Interest Group Society.
81 Leege, et al., The Politics of Cultural Differences; Wilcox and Robinson, Onward Christian Soldiers.
82 Brown, Trumping Religion; Hertzke, Representing God in Washington; Larson, Madland and Wilcox, ‘Religious lobbying in Virginia’.
83 Harris, Something Within.
84 Wilcox, ‘Radical dreams’.
85 Petrocik, ‘Reformulating the party coalitions’.
86 Silk and Green, ‘The GOP’s religion problem’.
87 Wald and Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics.
88 Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear.
89 Abootalebi, ‘Islam, Islamists, and democracy’.
90 Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link.
91 Gellner, ‘Civil society in historical context’.
94 Schwedler, ‘A paradox of democracy?’
95 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market.
96 Salamé, Democracy Without Democrats?
97 Nasr, ‘The rise of Muslim democracy’.
98 Ibid., 26.
99 Barsalou, ‘Islamists at the ballot box’.
100 Ibid., 1.
101 Berman, ‘Taming extremist parties’.
102 Ibid.; Clark, ‘The conditions Of Islamist moderation’.
103 Berman, ‘Taming extremist parties’.
104 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood.
105 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation.
106 Hamid, Temptations of Power; Cavatora and Merone, ‘Moderation through exclusion?’
107 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, 192.
108 Longley, ‘The high water mark’.
109 Ibid.
110 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, 215.
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112 Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*.

113 Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*.

114 Deeb, ‘Hizballah: A primer’.

115 Harb and Leenders, ‘Know thy enemy’.


117 Deeb, ‘Hizballah: A primer’, 4

118 Shaery, ‘Iran, the Vatican of Shi’ism?’

119 Kalyvas, ‘Commitment problems’.

120 Mantilla, ‘Democratization and the secularization’.

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