


This article was downloaded by: 10.3.97.143

On: 04 Jun 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



The Routledge Handbook of Housing Policy and Planning

Katrin B. Anacker, Mai Thi Nguyen, David P. Varady

Prediction Is Difficult

Publication details

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315642338-30>

Alan Mallach

Published online on: 12 Jul 2019

How to cite :- Alan Mallach. 12 Jul 2019, *Prediction Is Difficult from: The Routledge Handbook of Housing Policy and Planning* Routledge

Accessed on: 04 Jun 2023

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315642338-30>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

29

PREDICTION IS DIFFICULT

The Future of Housing Policy and Housing Studies

Alan Mallach

Introduction

As Niels Bohr, or perhaps Yogi Berra, famously said, making predictions is difficult, particularly about the future. Since no one can know the future, predictive writing generally relies on extrapolation from present trends; where it does not, it is often better characterized as science fiction. A glance at the past few decades, however, makes clear how unreliable extrapolation is as a guide to the future; extrapolation would have enabled few to predict the fall of the Soviet empire, the Great Recession, and the banking crisis that continues to unsettle the European economy, the resurgence of populism and the politics of fear in the United States, or the wave of refugees that has shaken the European political scene. Thus, any predictive project needs to be pursued with humility, recognizing that even the near future, as with the past, is likely to be rife with unexpected shifts and reversals.

Bearing that in mind, in this chapter I will attempt to predict trends over the next ten or so years at three distinct levels. First, to discuss the underlying trends likely to drive future housing policy in developed nations such as the United States, Germany, or Japan, such as population decline, immigration, or economic growth; second, to explore the potential policy responses to those trends; and finally, to speculate on how the field of housing studies is likely to change in response to changes in both housing conditions and policies. Inevitably, my predictions are far more grounded in extrapolation from present trends, rather than speculation about what cannot possibly be known.

Trends Driving Future Housing Policy

The transformation of housing conditions for the great majority of the population of the world's developed nations is one of the great success stories of the twentieth century. During the course of the century, particularly during the decades immediately following World War II, millions of people who in previous decades would have lived in overcrowded, physically inadequate housing came to live in housing meeting modern standards of health and safety. Physical inadequacies, such as the lack of a private bathroom or adequate light and air, as well as severe overcrowding have been dramatically reduced. Despite this manifest achievement, developed nations continue to face growing housing policy challenges, some of long standing, and some only beginning to emerge.

While substandard and overcrowded housing conditions have been sharply reduced, they are no longer the norm; today, instead, they disproportionately affect populations that are to varying degrees marginalized—immigrants, the very poor, and minority communities that continue to be

subject to *de facto* discrimination, such as African Americans in the United States or the Roma in Eastern Europe. As Europe's vast stock of social housing built from the 1950s through the 1970s ages, however, problems of housing quality, and the need to rehabilitate or replace this stock, are likely to increase. Moreover, as housing conditions have improved, housing affordability has often declined. More than one of four private market tenants in the European Union (EU) spends 40 percent or more of their disposable income on housing (Eurostat 2015), while nearly half of all tenants in the United States spend 30 percent or more of their gross income on housing (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2015). While homelessness is notoriously difficult to measure, it is a major challenge in both the United States and Europe; point-in-time surveys found that 578,000 people were homeless in the United States on a single night in January 2014 (National Alliance to End Homelessness 2015), while the Canadian Homelessness Research Network estimated that 30,000 Canadians are homeless on a single night (Gaetz et al. 2013).

Wide variations exist, moreover, among those countries generally considered developed nations. While the "severe housing deprivation rate"¹ in the EU as a whole is under 5 percent, it is much higher in the former Socialist countries, particularly Romania, where it is over 20 percent. EU countries, as well as developed nations elsewhere, show extreme variation on many other measures, including cost burden, the homeownership rate, the size of the social housing stock, or the share of young adults living with their parents, which ranges from barely 16 percent in Denmark to over 70 percent in Slovakia (Pittini et al. 2015). The point is that it is often inappropriate to generalize about housing trends across the entire developed world: What may be a crisis in one country may be a matter of little significance in another (see also the chapter authored by W. Dennis Keating).

Larger systemic issues, however, continue to plague developed countries, which are likely to become more severe in coming years. While housing quality as such may be largely adequate, issues of neighborhood condition and the integration of minority and immigrant communities have been a continuing and growing problem. Racial segregation, while slightly declining (Frey 2015), continues to be a major problem in the United States, exacerbated by growing economic segregation, particularly in older urban areas, but increasingly in the suburbs. The problems of integrating the French *banlieues*, despite repeated governmental policy interventions, appear to be as intractable as ever (Cortéséro 2012; Stébé 1999).

As refugees and immigrants continue to press against Europe's borders, pressures that are more likely to increase than decline in coming years, issues of spatial as well as social integration are likely to continue and become more pronounced, to the point of potentially undermining the social fabric of some European communities.² This issue cuts in two ways; at the same time as the problems of distressed neighborhoods and communities may be getting worse, gentrification of historically affordable sections of strong market cities like Berlin, Paris, and San Francisco is also on the rise, reflecting the extent to which economic polarization is becoming an endemic condition of many urban areas in the developed world. Gale divides cities into three tiers in terms of the incidence of gentrification, appropriately distinguishing cities like Philadelphia or St. Louis, which "while experiencing significant levels of gentrification, mostly in their cores, still have substantial areas of disinvestment in areas of low market demand," from cities like Detroit or Flint, where isolated, modest signs of gentrification in a few areas are far outweighed by continuing decline of once-vital middle-income and working-class neighborhoods (see the chapter authored by Dennis Gale).

While some nations will be dealing with immigrant integration, others will be grappling with the problem of population decline, which is likely to lead to increasingly difficult challenges of excess housing supply and housing vacancy. Many developed nations are likely to lose population over the coming decades; the hardest hit are likely to be in Eastern Europe, where Bulgaria and Latvia are projected to lose over 40 percent of their peak population by 2050, but they include other countries elsewhere in Europe as well as Japan (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015).³

In many of these nations, population loss is taking place simultaneously with growing concentration of the remaining population in major centers, so that secondary cities and regions are experiencing disproportionate population losses, while growing centers are struggling to meet housing demand and manage growth. In Bulgaria, “depopulation [has] pushed 172 towns to the verge of extinction, and completely erased 24 from Bulgaria’s map” in 2012 alone (Crowder 2014). Sofia has continued to grow, however, and its share of the nation’s population has risen from 12 percent to 17 percent since the 1980s. In Latvia, although the Riga region is more stable than much of the rest of the country, a recent article noted that “a few minutes by tram outside the old town, which is showered with public money, a different reality emerges. Areas such as the Moscow District are crammed with crumbling tenements and empty wooden houses; it could be the set for a ghost town in a low-budget western. The dereliction is leavened only by alcohol and second-hand clothes shops” (Pyzik 2013, n.p.).

Population loss in the United States or the United Kingdom is also a significant issue, but is seen as a regional more than a national problem, affecting both countries’ historic industrial regions as well as, in the United States, many rural areas; the German perspective is similar, where despite evidence of shrinkage in some western areas, the issue is still widely seen as one facing the states of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), rather than a national issue. These changes, and the pressure they generate for greater public investment, however, are taking place at a time when economic growth in most of the developed world is likely to be modest, imposing significant constraints on the availability of resources to address them.

The Course of Future Housing Policy

Housing policy in the developed world is a complicated tangle of laws, policies, and programs, including those designed to promote well-functioning markets, such as mortgage guarantees and secondary markets, supply-side programs to provide social and affordable housing,⁴ demand-side programs such as housing allowances, fair housing and anti-discrimination programs, and a variety of programs targeted at particular housing needs, such as those of the homeless population. Within each of these categories, not only do programs and laws vary widely from nation to nation, but what are considered to be appropriate populations to benefit from public investment also varies widely. While the great majority of Austrians, for example, are potentially eligible for that country’s social housing and about 80 percent of Singaporean households live in social housing (Kwak 2015), most social housing programs in the United States are limited to families in the lowest 25 percent of the national income distribution. In 2012, 85 percent of all residents in federally subsidized housing in the United States had incomes under \$20,000 (Hollar 2014).

The course of postwar housing policy in much of the developed world is generally seen as one of two principal phases: a period from the 1950s through the 1970s characterized by the dominant role of state actors and by large-volume construction of social housing, generally under public sector ownership, and a subsequent period of retrenchment, widely seen as reflecting the rise of a neo-liberal agenda, in housing policy as in many other arenas of economic activity. This is, of course, a great oversimplification, as many authors have recognized (Doherty 2004; Dodson 2006). Although neoliberalism has played an important role in framing today’s housing policies, as in the sell-off of public housing to tenants in countries like Israel and the United Kingdom, it is typically part of a policy framework that is far from the stereotype of a simplistic reliance on the market as the solution to housing needs. On the contrary, many housing policies that have emerged in recent decades represent thoughtful efforts to balance market and social considerations in light of some of the problems created by the statist policies of the earlier period, including the mix of market construction and social ownership in France (Mallach 2010), as well as inclusionary strategies such as Section 106 agreements in the UK (Monk 2010), and Ireland’s Part V (Calavita and Mallach 2010a, 2010b).

Some developed nations, such as the U.S., have expanded demand-side assistance in the form of housing allowances, while in some countries with historically large state housing sectors, such as France and the UK, the creation of social housing continues, but at a more modest rate and largely under the auspices of non-governmental entities (NGOs) rather than public bodies (see also the chapter authored by Rachel Bratt).

In contrast to countries like France and the UK with their highly developed social housing systems, many other countries, particularly many of the former Socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe, have dramatically reduced their social housing stock from their Socialist days and tend to have uneven, leaky social safety nets, particularly with respect to housing. In recent years, many of these formerly Socialist states including Croatia, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic have adopted new housing programs and policies, but they tend to be small in scale and limited in their impact; that appears to reflect not only these countries' severe fiscal constraints, but also their uncertainty or ambivalence about how best to address the intricacies of the housing sector, not to mention the complex political and social issues involved.

In general, the prognosis for housing policy in most developed nations in the coming decade is not positive. Over the coming decade or more the global environment seems unlikely to offer either the political stability or sustained economic growth on which strong policy development is likely to depend. The reasons for this situation are complex and multi-faceted, but many recent economic, demographic, and migration trends all point to sustained economic and political instability in much of the developed world, as well as most developing nations (Friedman 2016). Within that setting, the magnitude, complexity, and highly contested nature of the emerging housing policy challenges make it even less likely that many nations will be able to respond to them, whether for economic, political, cultural, or other reasons. These circumstances are in sharp contrast to the "*trente années glorieuses*" (30 glorious years) from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, when not only were housing policy challenges, although daunting, more straightforward and more matters of consensus, but the political and economic climate was more supportive of ambitious public goals and policies. In retrospect, however, much of the product of those years, particularly with respect to massive modernist housing estates and the often destructive so-called "renewal" of urban centers and neighborhoods, was far from glorious in its effects.

As suggested in the discussion of the factors driving housing trends, developed nations are likely to see at least seven distinct housing policy challenges over the coming decade or more, listed without any attempt to suggest relative importance:

- Improving housing quality and better integrating minority populations
- Upgrading deteriorating older housing stock, particularly social housing built in the 1970s or earlier
- Stabilizing older urban and suburban neighborhoods in the face of growing economic and demographic challenges
- Reducing the growing cost burden for lower-income households
- Encouraging revitalization of distressed low-income communities, while simultaneously expanding housing opportunities for minorities and lower-income people throughout regions
- Addressing the consequences of shrinking populations, including increased housing vacancies and reduced ability to finance public services
- Accommodating and integrating growing immigrant populations

The last challenge is something of a "wild card," since—in contrast to the first six, where the magnitude of the challenge can be at least approximated—the number of immigrants who will be seeking and gaining entry to the developed world, and Europe in particular, over the next decade is impossible to predict (see also the chapter authored by Alfons Fermin and Frank Wassenberg). Ironically, at

least in theory, in the long run large-scale immigration could help ameliorate some other problems, particularly the housing vacancies associated with shrinking urban populations (Coburn 2016). In the short term, however, immigration has become and will continue to be a further destabilizing factor (Traub 2016).

With continuing uncertainty about the European economy, the weakening of the EU, the threat of terrorism, and the rise of xenophobic regimes in countries like Poland and Hungary along with increasing support for similar movements elsewhere, housing policies are likely to suffer. Policies to improve the condition of the Roma minorities in Eastern Europe, however inadequate, have been in no small part a product of both pressure and financial support from the EU (Ram 2003). With both likely to diminish in the future, such policies are likely to suffer. Immigrant integration may not be a major issue in some developed countries, again particularly those of Eastern Europe, because, as has already begun to happen, these nations may bar all but a small number of immigrants from entry.

Again, this is not true for all developed nations. Germany accepted about a million immigrants in 2015 alone; that number is likely to grow over the coming decade, and it is likely that Germany will adapt housing policies and allocate public resources to immigrant integration over the next decade. That notwithstanding, immigrant integration has already been shown to be difficult, and the issues associated with both the speed and scale of the latest immigrant wave are likely to be a destabilizing force in German society for many years.

With adoption of the *Nouveau Programme National de Renouvellement Urbain* in 2014 and a commitment of €5 billion in public funds added to the €17.5 billion previously appropriated to the *Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine* (ANRU) in 2003 (*Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine* 2015), France appears likely, barring a significant shift in political direction, to continue the large-scale investment in urban regeneration and socioeconomic integration initiated in 2003 with the creation of ANRU. Despite this substantial level of expenditure, most of the investment was directed toward the *banlieues*, although the larger social and political issues involved make the outcomes of these efforts still uncertain. Similarly, New Zealand, relatively less affected by global turmoil, adopted a comprehensive strategy for Maori housing improvement in 2014, which is likely to continue over the decade, although the level of public financial involvement is modest, especially if compared to that of France (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 2014). These are likely to be exceptions; overall the trend is likely to be that of retrenchment or, at best, stabilization of effort, although the recently elected Trudeau administration in Canada has also proposed a significant increase in social housing spending in its 2016 budget (McMahon 2016).

The issue of cost burden is another area where significant new policies appear unlikely, and the problem is likely to become greater rather than being ameliorated over the coming years. A recent report from the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) found that “European citizens [...] spend more and more on housing, with a disproportionate burden for the people at risk of poverty, while given fiscal consolidation, governments generally are struggling to support the affordable housing sector despite a growing demand. The impact [...] seems to be greater now than in previous years, since the crisis and austerity measures taken have a strong time-lag effect” (Athenosy and Revenco 2015, 22). Between 2008 and 2013, the percentage of lower-income households with cost overburden increased in 23 out of 28 EU nations (Fondation Abbé Pierre 2015, 19).

Cost burden is on the rise in the United States as well, where the percentage of renter households spending 30 percent or more of gross income for shelter increased from 37 percent to 48 percent between 2000 and 2013. Housing costs have risen faster than incomes in most developed nations from 2000 to the present. While there are housing allowances in most developed nations, they vary widely on the basis of eligibility and level of benefit; they are more extensive and in some cases provided as a right to income-eligible households in the wealthier countries of Northwestern Europe, less so in the former Socialist countries in the EU, or in the United States and Canada. As a general rule, however, public support for cost burdened families has not risen in proportion to the increase in

housing cost burden over the past decade. Even in the countries with the strongest social safety nets, “while the living conditions of their poor households are still preferable to that of other countries, housing inequality in these countries is increasing more rapidly than elsewhere and the holes in the safety net are getting bigger” (Fondation Abbé Pierre 2015, 13). Waiting lists for social housing, and in the United States for housing vouchers as well, are growing far faster than the social housing stock throughout the developed world (Pittini 2012, 8).

Can one expect any significant policy movement toward addressing cost burden over the coming decade? Barring a dramatic increase in economic growth in the developed world, which appears unlikely in the near future, it is hard to imagine that redistributionist national policies will emerge or expand to the extent that would be needed to address an issue that disproportionately affects poor or near-poor households, and moreover, are both highly expensive and—assuming house prices continue to rise faster than incomes—include substantial cost multipliers over time. At best, one can expect a variety of modest enactments to address narrowly targeted populations with clearly defined needs, such as homeless families, elderly households, or people with disabilities. This is true in the United States as well as in Europe. While the conditions of the majority of poor renters in the United States who do not have access to housing vouchers are dire in the extreme (Desmond 2012, 2016), and while the United States certainly has the economic resources to meet their needs, the political climate, particularly since the 2016 presidential election, makes any significant new policy developments in this area or any meaningful steps toward reducing the growing levels of income inequality highly unlikely.

The final areas are those where housing policy overlaps with urban policy writ large, and leads to many difficult challenges. These include not only maintaining the aging urban housing stock, but preserving the vitality of central or inner cities faced simultaneously with destabilization of historically sound neighborhoods and social conflicts exacerbated by gentrification, as well as addressing the consequences of urban shrinkage.

Here, too, for the most part future housing policy will reflect the continuation of policies of recent years. Germany appears committed to a strong urban policy, shown by the cumulative national, state, and local government commitment of over €5 billion to the urban regeneration or reconfiguration programs falling under the *Stadtumbau* (city rebuilding) rubric. It is likely that urban policy will continue to be a priority in Germany and many other Northern European countries over the coming decade, and at least possible, in light of the urgent challenge of immigrant integration, that increasing efforts will be made to link urban regeneration and integration policies.

By contrast, urban policy is less of a priority in most other developed nations. Most post-Socialist countries have pursued few systematic efforts to foster urban vitality beyond the revitalization of downtown areas; not surprisingly, the pace of suburbanization around major Eastern European cities has been rapid, although it has slowed since the onset of the fiscal crisis as well as from the effects of population decline. Moreover, up to now, issues of urban shrinkage—as distinct from general concerns about the population loss associated with migration and demographic trends—have not been consistently addressed as a matter of public policy in these countries (Strykiewicz 2013), although they have been a matter of concern at the EU level, which has invested large sums in the revitalization of shrinking cities in post-Socialist countries (Strykiewicz et al. 2012).

The same is largely true in Japan, but may be shifting. Although the discussion of low fertility rates, aging, and the depopulation of isolated outlying regions has taken place since the 1970s, it is only in the past few years that attention has begun to be given to the reality of widespread shrinkage as a national problem, particularly with respect to the rapidly growing number of vacant or abandoned houses in secondary cities and postwar suburbs. It is possible, as conditions worsen over the next decade or so, that Japan may embark on policies analogous to the German *Stadtumbau* programs designed to address the particular challenges of shrinking cities, but in light of its continued fiscal constraints, public investment at more than a modest scale appears unlikely.

In sum, I consider the prospects poor for significant policy departures or significant new public investment to address growing housing and neighborhood problems in most developed nations. The likely outcome over the coming decade will be a gradual aggravation of housing problems in many if not most developed nations, including increased housing cost burdens for lower-income households, deterioration of older housing estates, growing social, spatial, and economic disparities within each society, continued and potentially exacerbated isolation of immigration populations, and finally, in some countries, increasing problems associated with shrinking urban populations, housing vacancy, and deterioration of public services.

The Course of Future Housing Studies

Assessing the future of housing studies is, if anything, even more difficult than predicting the future of housing policy, since it is at least easier to identify the central issues around which housing policy will or will not coalesce. The field of housing studies is a large and diverse one, reflected not only in the diversity of multiple journals devoted to housing (such as *Housing Studies*, *Housing Policy Debate*, the *Journal of Housing Economics*, and others), but also in much of what appears in related fields such as urban studies, city planning, sociology, urban economics, and geography. The range of topics covered in a single major journal is vast; recent issues of *Housing Studies* have included contributions on economic studies of prices, studies of population migrations, neighborhood crime, urban regeneration, housing vouchers, post-disaster reconstruction, social housing policy, gentrification, and far more. Recent special issues have addressed the politics of housing, social mix, rental housing, and the future of public housing. Predicting the future behavior of the thousands of scholars from many disciplines and national backgrounds who are engaged in housing studies is akin to predicting the behavior of a particle subject to Brownian motion. Thus, in this section I will discuss those directions that I would like to see the field of housing studies take, as much as those that I expect it will take in the future.

When the focus of a discipline changes, it is likely to do so for one of two reasons. New models or ideas change disciplinary paradigms from within, as when Kahneman and Tversky (1979; Kahneman 2003) brought behavioral economics into the mainstream of economic research or when changing external conditions led researchers to change their focus, as witnessed in the spate of studies on mortgage foreclosure that have appeared since 2007 in the wake of the mortgage crisis in the United States (Frame 2010). Since housing studies is not a single discipline, strictly speaking, but a multidisciplinary field focusing on a cluster of related social, economic, and political issues falling under the housing rubric, change in the field is far more likely to be driven by changes in external conditions. These can be either changes in objective conditions, such as the wave of foreclosures, or policy changes, such as the increased public policy focus on mixed-income housing that emerged in the 1990s in a number of developed nations, which has arguably spawned an entire sub-discipline of scholarly books and articles. Finally, scholars are neither immune to ideological pressures nor to the human tendency to pay particular attention to whatever issues are receiving media attention at any given moment.

In the absence of a significant, visible paradigm shift, however, either in the discipline or in the external conditions that form its subject, disciplines change only gradually and incrementally. Such gradual, incremental change, rather than any dramatic shift in focus, is likely to be true of the housing studies field over the coming decade. Interdisciplinary work integrating spatial, social, and economic perspectives is likely to increase, furthered, perhaps, by the increasing availability of large-scale administrative datasets, including data in such areas as crime incidence, taxation, real estate transactions, and public health, offering new research opportunities. While such datasets have been mined for a number of years by researchers in Sweden and the Netherlands (Musterd and Andersson 2005, among others), they are only beginning to be available in the United States. One also hopes to see more research that links housing and neighborhood issues, including research that looks at

neighborhood change in a more integrated fashion than has often been the case, and more creative uses of new data sources to better understand the complex dynamics of neighborhood change.

The field's focus on the housing issues of disadvantaged and marginalized populations, and the relationship between housing issues and social isolation or integration, already strong, may grow. In light of the scale of the refugee crisis that emerged in 2015 and its multiple implications for housing and urban policy, we may see more research on the housing and neighborhood effects of immigration, particularly in Germany, where they are likely to be most pronounced.

More policy-oriented research may emerge, particularly focusing on the challenges of resource allocation under economic constraints in the context of the increasing severity of the challenges represented by growing cost burdens and the aging of the social housing stock. More policy research that looks at critical sub-state actors, particularly state/regional or local governments, would be welcome, in that much current European and Japanese policy research tends to focus on national policy with little sensitivity to significant regional and local variations in how that policy affects actions and behavior, even in societies with highly centralized governmental systems such as Japan.

As populations continue to decline throughout much of the developed world, including its cities, the urban and housing policy issues flowing from shrinkage, including market failure and excess housing supply, are likely to draw increasing attention. In light of the long-term downward population trajectories of many countries, including Japan and many Eastern European countries, the question of whether—and if so, how—cities can thrive while shrinking is likely to be an increasingly important area of investigation. Given the range of issues associated with shrinkage (Dewar and Thomas 2013; Weaver et al. 2016), and the number of different national settings where it will be an issue in coming years, this area may come to be seen as a distinct sub-field within housing studies.

Along similar lines, one hopes to see more cross-national research, which is already being conducted, including the volume on inclusionary housing by Calavita and Mallach (2010a) mentioned earlier, important work by Galster on social mix in housing (Galster 2007), and important work by Varady and his colleagues on public housing restructuring (Kleinhans and Varady 2011; Dekker and Varady 2011). It is, nonetheless, still modest in scope compared to the great volume of studies that deal with a single national context. Given the extent, however, to which developed nations share similar issues, but think about them and address them in very different ways, cross-national research offers valuable opportunities to illuminate salient factors in national policies as well as to make critical distinctions between what dynamics are specific to an issue compared to those that are driven by distinct national political, cultural, and social contexts. In that light, the current international research is seriously imbalanced, with extensive research being published from the United States, United Kingdom, and a few other Northern European countries, and less coming from Eastern and Southern Europe, Russia, and East Asia. While some of this imbalance may have to do with the greater number of scholars pursuing housing studies in the former countries, it also reflects the painful reality that international research in English privileges Anglophone scholars and fails to reflect the scope of national discourses conducted in other languages.

Notes

- 1 The severe housing deprivation rate is defined as the percentage of the population living in a dwelling that is considered as overcrowded, while also exhibiting at least one of the housing deprivation measures. Housing deprivation is a measure of poor amenities and is calculated by referring to those households with a leaking roof, no bath/shower, and no indoor toilet, or a dwelling considered too dark.
- 2 Notwithstanding the political furor over immigration and refugee accommodation in the United States, the magnitude of the challenge, relative to the existing population base, is substantially less than in many parts of Europe. For a vivid and distressing picture of the effect of unprecedented migration on Sweden, see Traub (2016).

- 3 These are the United Nations' medium variant projections and appear to be conservative. The official Japanese population projections, which anticipate a national population of roughly 97 million by 2050, suggest a rate of decline roughly 50 percent greater than that projected by the United Nations.
- 4 Depending on the circumstances and setting, the terms "social" and "affordable" housing may be treated as generic descriptors, or as in the case of Ireland, terms used to describe two distinct types of housing product.

References

- Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine. 2015. *Nouveau Programme National de Renouvellement Urban*. Paris: Agence National pour la Rénovation Urbaine.
- Athenosy, Lucia, and Viorica Revenco. 2015. *Financial Social and Affordable Housing in Europe: The CEB's Approach*. Paris: Council of Europe Development Bank.
- Calavita, Nico, and Alan Mallach, eds. 2010a. *Inclusionary Housing in International Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
- Calavita, Nico, and Alan Mallach. 2010b. "Crisis and Response in Ireland: The Sudden Emergence of Inclusionary Housing." In *Inclusionary Housing in International Perspective*, edited by Nico Calavita and Alan Mallach, 169–202. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
- Coburn, Jesse. 2016. "Germany is Housing Refugees in Communist Ghost Towns." *Foreign Policy*, January 6.
- Cortéséro, Régis, ed. 2012. *La Banlieue Change: Inégalités, Justice Sociale et Action Publique dans les Quartiers Populaires*. Lormont: Editions Le Bord de l'Eau.
- Crowder, Nicole. 2014. "The Steep Decline of Bulgaria's Population in its Post-Soviet Era." *The Washington Post*, November 10.
- Dekker, Karien, and David P. Varady. 2011. "A Comparison of Dutch and US Public Housing Regeneration Planning: The Similarity Grows?" *Urban Research and Practice*, 4: 123–152.
- Desmond, Matthew. 2012. "Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty." *American Journal of Sociology*, 118: 88–133.
- Desmond, Matthew. 2016. *Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City*. New York: Crown Publishers.
- Dewar, Margaret, and June Manning Thomas, eds. 2013. *The City after Abandonment*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Dodson, Jago. 2006. "The 'Roll' of the State: Government, Neoliberalism and Housing Assistance in Four Advanced Economies." *Housing, Theory and Society*, 23: 224–243.
- Doherty, Joe. 2004. "European Housing Policies: Bringing the State Back In?" *International Journal of Housing Policy*, 44: 253–260.
- Eurostat. 2015. *Housing Statistics*. Brussels: Eurostat.
- Fondation Abbé Pierre. 2015. *An Overview of Housing Exclusion in Europe 2015*. Paris: Fondation Abbé Pierre.
- Frame, W. Scott. 2010. "Estimating the Effect of Mortgage Foreclosures on Nearby Property Values: A Critical Review of the Literature." *Economic Review: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta*, 95: 1–9.
- Frey, William. H. 2015. "Census Shows Modest Declines in Black-White Segregation." *The Avenue*, December 8.
- Friedman, Thomas L. 2016. "What If." *New York Times*, January 20.
- Gaetz, Stephen, Jesse Donaldson, Tim Richter, and Tanya Gulliver-Garcia. 2013. *The State of Homelessness in Canada 2013*. Toronto, ON: Canadian Homelessness Research Network Press.
- Galster, George. 2007. "Should Policy Makers Strive for Neighborhood Social Mix? An Analysis of the Western European Evidence Base." *Housing Studies*, 22: 523–545.
- Hollar, Michael K. 2014. *Understanding Whom the Low Income Tax Credit Program Serves*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
- Kahneman, Daniel. 2003. "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics." *American Economic Review*, 93: 1449–1475.
- Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." *Econometrica*, 47: 263–291.
- Kleinhans, Reinout, and David P. Varady. 2011. "Moving Out and Going Down? A Review of Recent Evidence on Negative Spillover Effects of Housing Restructuring Programmes in the United States and the Netherlands." *International Journal of Housing Policy*, 11: 155–174.
- Kwak, Nancy H. 2015. "Myth #8: Public Housing is Only for Poor People." In *Public Housing Myths: Perception, Reality, and Social Policy*, edited by Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Fritz Umbach, and Lawrence J. Vale, 175–188. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Mallach, Alan. 2010. "France: Social Inclusion, Fair Share Goals and Inclusionary Housing." In *Inclusionary Housing in International Perspective*, edited by Nico Calavita and Alan Mallach, 203–238. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

- McMahon, Tamsin. 2016. "Budget Offers \$2.3-Billion Boost for Affordable-Housing Measures." *Toronto Globe & Mail*, March 22.
- Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. 2014. *Improving Housing for Māori and Their Whānau*. Wellington: Ministry of Businesses, Innovation and Employment.
- Monk, Sarah. 2010. "England: Affordable Housing through the Planning System: The Role of Section 106." In *Inclusionary Housing in International Perspective*, edited by Nico Calavita and Alan Mallach, 123–168. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
- Musterd, Sako, and Roger Andersson. 2005. "Housing Mix, Social Mix, and Social Opportunities." *Urban Affairs Review*, 40: 761–790.
- National Alliance to End Homelessness. 2015. *The State of Homelessness in the United States*. Washington, DC: National Alliance to End Homelessness.
- Pittini, Alice. 2012. *Housing Affordability in the EU: Current Situation and Recent Trends*. Brussels: CECODHAS European Social Housing Observatory.
- Pittini, Alice, Laurent Ghekière, Julien Dijol, and Igor Kiss. 2015. *The State of Housing in the EU 2015*. Brussels: Housing Europe.
- Pyzik, Agata. 2013. "In Latvia, Riga Is Becoming a Ghost Town." *New Statesman*, August 22.
- Ram, Melanie H. 2003. "Democratization through European Integration: The Case of Minority Rights in the Czech Republic and Romania." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 38: 28–56.
- Stébé, Jean-Marc. 1999. *La Crise des Banlieues*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Stryjakiewicz, Tadeusz. 2013. "The Process of Urban Shrinkage and its Consequences." *Romanian Journal of Regional Science*, 7: 29–40.
- Stryjakiewicz, Tadeusz, Przemysław Ciesiółka, and Emilia Jaroszevska. 2012. "Urban Shrinkage and the Post-Socialist Transformation: The Case of Poland." *Built Environment*, 38: 196–213.
- Traub, James. 2016. "The Death of the Most Generous Country on Earth." *Foreign Policy*, February 12.
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2015. *World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision*. New York: United Nations.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2015. *American Community Survey 2015*. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
- Weaver, Russell, Sharmishta Bagchi-Sen, Jason Knight, and Amy E. Frazier. 2016. *Shrinking Cities: Understanding Urban Decline in the United States*. New York: Routledge.