This is a chapter outlining *Huaxiaism*, a new way of looking at the world developed by some leading scholars in China, particularly Ye Zicheng, a professor of political science at Peking University who is one of the authors. Zhu Xiaolue, Professor Ye’s coauthor, has also contributed some of the ideas in this chapter.

Today, there is still considerable disagreement regarding how to assess Chinese traditional political thought. In step with the process of modernization, Chinese politics have undergone constant change. From the New Culture Movement in 1915 to the period of the Great Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), traditional political thought and feudal monarchy have been regarded as corrupt and as ideological obstacles to China’s revival, even though some of these ideas constituted the core of political culture and influenced China’s political strategy. Specifically, the New Culture Movement and the Great Cultural Revolution critically assessed traditional political thought, viewing “tradition” as a synonym for “backwardness and decadence.” During the first two decades of the 20th century, Chen Duxiu, Lu Xun and others pursuing the spirit of national modernity rejected traditional thought (Davies 2013). Both the Republic of China, which overthrew the rule of the Qing dynasty, and the People’s Republic of China that followed were rooted in the spirit of a modern political order. This deepened doubts regarding traditional Chinese political thought, which had not played a role in the building of modern China. Was there, then, any particular need to study traditional political thought that had played no role in the process of modernizing the state? However, in the 1990s, reconsideration of the Great Cultural Revolution stimulated scholars on the mainland to reassess traditional Chinese culture, including traditional political thought. In this new era, a number of mainland scholars, including Chen Ming, Zhang Xianglong, Jiang Qing and Peng Yongjie, resolved to study and propagate political Confucianism (Dong 2011, 135–141). In short, these phenomena and impressions indicated people’s interest in the ideals of traditional political thought. There was a gradual shift from the previous negative attitude to one of respect and understanding. The various disputes involving differing assessments of traditional political thought reflect the contradictory state of mind of Chinese political identity in this century (Peng 2011).
phrase “contemporary China” possesses a dual character, embracing both modernity and tradition. The current state structure of China, with its form of government and core socialist values, originates from the West (namely Marxism). But if one goes a little deeper into the politics, to the concept of “government for the people,” one will discover that the concept of “benevolent government” and the concept of “the people’s welfare” permeate traditional political thought. In conjunction with the rise in China’s national status and self-confidence, blind faith in individualism gradually receded and became locked in a struggle with traditional political thought.

So, what does this mean? It means that Chinese traditional political thought is not a “theory of historical stagnation”; it is not merely a backward, immature autocratic system, as scholars have viewed it. It is a type of political tradition like that of the West or the Chinese phrase “并驾齐驱,” which means advancing at equal pace in evaluation. The view prevailing among mainland scholars of three great models (neorealism, neoliberalism and constructionism) must be supplemented and corrected. Viewed from the standpoint of methodology, there is an urgent need to bring to bear additional means of studying the issues. On the foundation of structural analysis, one must study the history of thought and employ documentary analysis. This suggests a return to one’s native linguistic territory (for Western researchers, it is “crossing the language boundary”), a sine qua non for explaining China’s historical political ecology. At the same time, this method really helps to explain the background of the contemporary Chinese policy of the “collective unconsciousness.” It is in this connection that Professor Ye of the School of International Studies at Peking University has made his contribution. By drawing upon the essence of traditional political thought, he has constructed a new political model and linked it to his system of Huaxiaism.

Professor Ye’s interest in traditional political thought is a natural extension of his concern for contemporary Chinese political problems. First, China’s foreign policy reflects the very strong influence of domestic factors; in other words, to a very great extent, decisions taken in the realm of foreign affairs serve the needs of domestic politics. Whether it is a strong expression of nationalism or one of mutual benefit and mutual interest, they both demonstrate the dominance of domestic politics in foreign relations. At the same time, patriotism, nationalism, mutual hostility and ideology significantly limit rational interstate contacts. These kinds of “passion” can also negatively affect domestic public opinion and mold foreign policy. Therefore, policymakers must pay great attention to popular opinion. And this type of foreign policy milieu, akin to a “people-centered” approach emphasizing a nationalist standpoint, indicates the kinship between contemporary China and ancient China’s political traditions. Second, ancient China had a long-standing foreign policy tradition. Professor Ye points out that China’s foreign policy may be traced back to the Eastern Zhou period (770–256 BCE). Mature kingdoms came into being; during the Spring–Autumn (721–476 BCE) and Warring States periods (475–221 BCE), all the dukes and princes manifested unique political characteristics. In terms of organization, the dukedoms and principalities all enjoyed comparative independence, mutually recognized political status, comprehensive foreign policy apparatuses and independent militaries (Moody 2011, 15–30). Although kinship ties were the main principle regulating lawful succession to power, in actual practice, this was trumped by the objective political situation. Nevertheless, all of these states, dukedoms and principalities achieved a common sense of political identity and perceived themselves as members of Tianxia (天下), recognizing the legitimacy of the Zhou king and his cultural appeal (Roetz 2009, 359–375). Their identification with the order of Tianxia distinguished them from those isolated feudal kingdoms perpetually engaged in fighting, such as during the Three Kingdoms Period. Those feudal states sought to obtain the highest power in the
empire and annex territory via warfare, quite unlike the states during the Spring–Autumn era (721–476 BCE) that strived for an ideal order. Looking further into the development of the political order during the Spring–Autumn era up to the Warring States era, the seven most powerful states strived to obtain control of the empire by annexing territory through warfare. They maintained a certain balance of power through competition. They had reformed their economic and political systems, and gradually strengthened their state power. But it was unlike the “rational order” of the Spring–Autumn era. The term “rational” signifies that in this period, the international order had not yet become one in which resorting to violence was the norm; the dukedoms and principalities could obtain support by practicing humane government and maintaining alliances. The states that practiced the “kingly way” (wang dao 王道) still occupied the leading position in public opinion. Wars frequently occurred, but a rational international order still functioned. This should be distinguished both from the quest for “unification” of monarchical politics and the emphasis on “organic unity” of the Tianxia pattern. It is worth mentioning that this situation was historically unprecedented: “Menghui the political phenomenon signifies in Chuntisu Era. Regarding due frequency, species, coverage as well as impacts, it is historically unique in China” (Mo 1996). In a certain sense, the modus operandi of the alliance system during the Spring–Autumn era (721–476 BCE) approximates that of the Westphalian system of a later period. However, its spirit of unification differed from the loose organization of the Holy Roman Empire. Professor Ye’s reflections on the diplomatic experience of the Spring–Autumn era undoubtedly heralded the concept of Huaxiaism.

Ten years later, Professor Ye published his book Huaxiaism. In it, he further advanced his studies. He extracted the essence of Confucianism, Daoism and Fa Jia (Legalism), mixed them in a crucible, and refined them into a new model. While pondering the essence of traditional political thought, he concluded that three important social elements could impede China’s rejuvenation:

1. Lack of core values and of social solidarity
2. Vulgar money worship and abnormal worship of political power
3. Degeneration of public ethics and morality.

From a practical standpoint, institutional degeneration may be more harmful than the absence of social morality. However, Ye believes that a vulgar understanding of Niccolò Machiavelli led later generations to sever the connection between political institutions and political morality. However, Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan and neorealism obviously undervalued the importance of morality in politics. Professor Ye adopted Professor Samuel Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations, which argued that in the near future, the clash of civilizations would trump the conflict of ideologies and rise to become the main characteristic of international relations (Ye 2013). Consequently, cultural conflict and differences in moral principles would form the main contradiction in opposition to Western Christian civilization.

Professor Ye suggested that in comparison with other world civilizations, the unique characteristic of Chinese civilization was its consistency of thought. This consistency of thought was manifest not only in the integration of religious thought and ethical values but also in the integration of philosophy and political values. Examples are the imperial examination system, the Confucian concept of outstanding students serving as officials and the political theory of resigning from an evil court to conserve the gentleman’s conscience. Due to the influence of Confucianism, China emphasized “benevolence” in the education and training of the gentleman (junzi) [君子]. Daoism provided a philosophical, theoretical
foundation for the system of traditional political thought. As for the Legalists who had long criticized the Confucians, in reality, Legalism was the actual spring from which the model of ancient China’s legal system flowed. Notwithstanding the different concrete definitions supplied by the various schools of thought, “good governance” was the common objective of traditional Chinese political thought. Confucianism considered good governance to comprise a sage ruler; a benevolent government; the state of Qi that governs and pacifies Tianxia, respecting the rites; and other important elements. Daoism considered the sage ruler as the core of governance. Abjuring extremes, abjuring luxury and seeking peace are the requirements of good governance, and “stopping warfare,” “reducing taxes,” etc. are the concrete policies to achieve it. From a Daoist perspective on government, a state with sufficient food, domestic self-sufficiency and an absence of warfare was the hallmark of good governance. Legalism emphasized “law” as the core institutional element of government. Impartiality, transparency and decisiveness guaranteed the efficiency of political administration. Even the ruler could not disobey the authority of the law. In the Legalist definition, good government meant using the law to govern the state. By synthesizing the best elements of all three schools of thought, Professor Ye developed the system of political thought called “Huaxiaism.”

Professor Ye first emphasized the dominant position of the Yi Jing (Book of Changes). The thinking and form of logic of the Yi Jing are unlike anything else. From a comparative perspective, the law of contradictions is the foundation of logic. The core characteristic of a concept is that either it is or it is not a particular something. This sort of either-or concept is closely connected to zero-sum game theory. In the process of formulating a policy, a country is either an ally or it is an enemy; there is no in-between. After making this point, Professor Ye shifted his focus to the field of philosophy. The object of the social sciences is more concrete; it is also more “grounded.” In this process, utilitarianism cannot fully satisfy the demands of political science. The three main Western theoretical models are limited to the fundamental premise of the “law of contradiction.” This focus on the “scramble for supremacy” does not accord with the intentions of “good governance” (Husik 1906, 215–222).

“Good governance” must first respond to the reality of the “clash of civilizations.” In the Middle East, the application of the Westphalian system encountered major difficulties and led to the dividing up of the people of this region. The Great Powers – the United States and the Soviet Union – altered the original regional structure, but the attempt to construct a democratic order, rooted in modernization theory, did not achieve its anticipated results. Under the direct influence of zero-sum game theory, tribal conflicts escalated into violent wars. Therefore, Professor Ye emphasized a mode of thinking that differs greatly from formal logic, namely that of the Yi Jing. This form of thought has a certain similarity to dialectics. But from a structural perspective, Socratic dialectics was deficient in its awareness of sequential, logical development. The concept of “deduction” differed from that of “development” in relation to political matters. The importance of “variables” trumped that of “constants.” The Yi Jing emphasizes the concept of “variables”; in political affairs, these are more important than constants. According to a certain special premise, in forecasting the direction of how things divide (in the Yi Jing, this is the sixth stage), one must simultaneously combine the actual situation and the fundamental character of that which is dividing in order to determine the outcome. Utilizing this premise, political divisions possess greater practicality and predictability. Comparing this with the law of contradictions, we may discover that the relations among the principal aspects of Yi Jing thought are not fixed. They depend upon constantly changing concrete relations, including those between “the enemy and us,” “symbiosis” and other forms. There is absolutely no doubt that the mode of thought embodied in the Yi Jing is not a matter of simple logic; rather, it is based upon inductions
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from political experience. Most of the sixty-four hexagrams and the major political events of the Three Dynasties – Xia, Shang and Zhou – may be explained in relation to the models presented in “The Beginning,” “The Four Stages” and “The Ending” sections of the Yi Jing. At the same time, each stage leads to the internal and external “variables.” Although the determinative relations among the variables are simple, the overall model of thought derived from this method is elegant. Professor Ye views this as a corrective to the contemporary decision-making model.14

The Confucian model

In addition, Huaxiaism comprises three main components. First is the Confucian model. There is no need to expatiate upon the place of Confucian thought in ancient China. Confucius’s place among the ancestral master sages is unshakeable. He was not only the first to teach commoners but also defined basic terms, such as “benevolence” and other concepts. The core of “benevolence” is “loving people,” and in governance, it is put into practice by the gentleman (junzi). In Confucianism, “good governance” derives from the rule of “sages” and the core of “loyalty and forbearance” or the core of the “four points.” The importance of the (Di 帝) declined.15 Permeating this was a new understanding of what constituted model politics: “human-centered” (Fung 1947).16 The (Di 帝) and the Three Dynasties were worshiped as constituting a continuous line of succession: The belief of the Xia and Zhou dynasties in the Di and in their ancestor was the origin of the legitimacy of the “Son of Heaven.” The Son of Heaven, relying upon kinship relationships, monopolized all power. They were said to be the descendants of Di. With respect to those who questioned the Son of Heaven, they were considered together with those who found flaws in religion and were subject to the most hideous tortures. This was an important result of combining politics and religion (Sellmann 2006, 49–64).17

Governance during the Three Dynasties was intimately connected with ancestor worship. Subsequently, government power changed and encountered difficulties. To provide a rationale for the legitimacy of dynastic succession, the Zhou dynasty introduced virtue (de) [德] as the variable in the succession to power. No longer was succession a matter of the king alone. The “people’s will” became the object of “virtue” and the content of “Heaven’s will” in place of the commands of Di and ancestral blood lineage, and constituted the condition for legitimate succession. There can be no doubt that this elevation of the “people’s will” was grounded in the Confucian theory of “human-centered” and “benevolent government.” Confucius promoted the value of “human beings,” and, at the same time, he revered the Zhou rites. The Confucian notion of the “people’s will” became an important element in “good governance.” The principle underlying the formulation of policy should be to “readily follow good advice,” making popular remonstration and the people’s will the foundation of good governance. This truly appeals to the gentleman (junzi) to undertake the burden of governing. The thought of Confucius is not only suffused with the spirit of “taking man as the measure of good governance” but also leads to the administrative model of government by the people. In concrete terms, it embodies the spirit of humanism, humanitarianism and meritocracy.

The Confucian model of “humanism” is universally acknowledged. However, apart from the premise underlying this familiar maxim, the thought of Confucius also possesses additional important attributes. First is the emphasis on values. Although the founding rulers of the Xia and Shang dynasties were renowned for their kindheartedness, their successors did not always attend to the people’s well-being because legitimate political power derived from the commands of the Di, not from the people’s will. The humanism of Confucius thus
had a concrete referent: Protect the people. Because the people were always in an inferior position within the political structure, they required protection. Moreover, with regard to political affairs, Confucius laid partial emphasis upon the virtuous conduct of gentlemen (junzi). From his commitment to cherishing the people, he went a step further by opposing unjust wars waged by the states. What he especially despised were political intrigues intended to satisfy selfish desires. With respect to economics, he opposed corvée labor, financial exploitation and the Legalists’ campaigns to reclaim wasteland. He sought a proper balance between state and people with regard to trust, grain consumption and the military. In economics, he stressed agriculture, the management and control of the grain market, and the importance of subsidies to farmers. One may say that “humanism” is the fundamental principle of Confucian thought. The concept of “men of talent” in the “Confucian model” is also worthy of attention. During the Spring-Autumn period, the primary mode of succession was to the wife’s eldest son, thereby respecting the principle of kinship relations. Although Confucius did not completely oppose this principle, he later supplemented it with the theory of “esteeming the worthy.” Worthy persons could be promoted and should be relied upon to carry out virtuous rule, and one should not rely entirely on class status or bloodlines. At the same time, the importance of meritocracy ought not take second place to blood relations. We can say that Confucius’s concept of “worthy men” is also a link in his theory of “good governance.” Of course, the spirit of the Golden Mean was the guiding principle of the “worthy man.”

Confucian thought was one of the major components of Chinese culture. The Confucian model was a fundamental constituent of Chinese political culture and was embodied in the concept of “good governance,” which suffused traditional political thought. The guiding concept of “men of talent” in “esteeming the worthy” is even more of a structural guarantee imbedded in Confucian thought. From the Han dynasty on, following the establishment of the “Imperial College” and other institutions, and the introduction of official titles, such as court academician (bo shi), Confucian thought collectively valorized the literati-official stratum. At the same time, Confucian scholars preserved the habit of remonstrating against state power, and created an atmosphere at court and among the public in which they could provide oversight of state power. But most important was the integration of Confucian thought with the examination system, which facilitated the fusion of cultural education and political education. This was this historical achievement of applying the Confucian model.

The Shang Yang model

But unlike the religio-sacral attitude of the Confucians of that era, in constructing his theory, Professor Ye objectively expounds and analyzes negative aspects of the Confucians’ monolithic theory. To supplement Confucian thinking, Professor Ye introduced concepts from the “Shang Yang model.” Viewed from the perspective of political history, we see that Shang Yang provided definitions of other core concepts in politics. For example, it was from Lord Shang that the concept of “country” [guo 国] obtained the meaning of “state” [guojia 国家], which differed from the earlier notion of “family country” [jiaguo 家国]. Prior to the Qin dynasty, the enfeoffment system of the Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasties was akin to loose confederal relations. Consanguineal ties and family relations were the foundation for maintaining relations among all the dukedoms and principalities, the “Zhou rites” bound them together and culture provided a common identity (Ryckmans 1997, 498; Sanft 2014, 174–191). But all the states gradually developed their own separate currency systems, language systems, weights and measures, and standards for roads and communications. These
all contributed to the independence of the dukedoms and principalities in the system of “all-under-Heaven” (Tianxia). At the same time, all the dukedoms and principalities were seized with the desire to become the hegemon. In this political situation, Shang Yang made the state [Guojia] the basic unit of all-under-Heaven [Tianxia], and emphasized the importance of power. In order to increase state power, he proposed a policy of expanding agriculture by eliminating footpaths between fields, opening wastelands and rewarding bountiful harvests. He even pursued a policy of prevailing agriculture over commerce to ensure its paramount position in the economy and in the state. At the same time, military achievements were the primary criterion for bestowing awards on the feudal nobility. Shang Yang eliminated the criterion of family relations and transformed the “family state” (家国) based on blood ties into the state (国家). In order to ensure the smooth implementation of these reforms, Shang Yang instituted a series of reforms in the state of Qin based upon law (法).

At least two dimensions were involved. First was the fundamental idea of rule by law; second were concrete measures of reform. In terms of government structure, Shang Yang implemented a fundamental reform by instituting a system of prefectures and counties, completely replacing the traditional government system of “family” (家) (feudal fiefs) and “states” (国) [dukedoms and principalities] that had resulted in an increasingly divided political structure. He replaced them with administrative divisions of prefectures and counties. The basic level of the prefectures and counties were units of five and ten families organized into administrative units. This organization eliminated the intimate connections among natural families. The new nobility chosen from among those who had been rewarded for cultivating wastelands assumed leadership of the prefectures and counties, and succession by blood relations was eliminated. On behalf of Qin, Shang Yang achieved a thorough reform both of the political order and administrative structure. Starting as a secondary unit of population in the feudal order, “guo” (国) became a pillar of the law-based system, that is, it became a political unit with an independent government and its own authority in the realm of foreign affairs. In this respect, Shang Yang went well beyond the Confucians in emphasizing the concept of “interest” (利), including “national interest” (国家利益), and “power” (力), including “national power” (国家实力). Power and interest should be the foundation of state-building, and the state (国家) replaced the people (人) as the heart of the political system. In essence, this was the spirit of classical realism. Shang Yang also laid particular stress on a notion that is very close to the idea of “utility.” (1) The law restricted “illegal conspiracies” rather than “unjust schemes.” (2) Administrative disorder and chaos rather than injustice were what caused the collapse of states. (3) Law could restrain the excessive desires of human nature and channel them into becoming the pillars of authority and motive power of the state. These ideas, along with other profound influences he had on politics, were Shang Yang’s main contributions to traditional political development.

In a certain sense, Shang Yang’s reforms were revolutionary. In the state of Lu, Confucius served in the office of sikou (司寇), but his view regarding litigation was: “I could adjudicate lawsuits as well as anyone. But I would prefer to make lawsuits unnecessary.” In the Confucian model and Confucian thought, a society governed by litigation was inferior to one perfected by good government and practicing the rites. Mencius and later generations of Confucian scholars inherited this attitude of preferring governance via the rites. Similarly, Confucius was strongly opposed to formalizing the law. Statutory law weakened the rule of man and made it impossible for the gentleman (君子) to adjudicate political disputes according to the specific circumstances of each case. Moreover, Confucius believed that this would give pettifogging litigators an opportunity to make trouble. But this kind of do-as-you-like rule of man can also entrain political chaos. Shang Yang believed that government without
the security of law was undependable. In politics, every person has his or her individual sense of what benefits them. When government is based on the premise that human nature is good, it depends upon the gentleman’s subjectivity whereas law guarantees objective adjudication and avoids the pitfall of subjective assumptions, hatching of schemes and ingrained political prejudice. Only by treating everyone equally without discrimination, maintaining discipline and observing the law can the foundation for “good governance” be created. It may be said that Shang Yang’s political blueprint emphasized the construction of a man-made structure rather than the rule of man. His “ideal state” was a unified, powerful and united ancient state.

Professor Ye strongly emphasized Shang Yang’s theoretical contribution and opposed those who defamed him. For a long time, the Confucians looked upon the Legalists as accomplices to despots. However, Professor Ye clarified the contributions of the Legalists to institution building, to thinking about the rule of law, and other matters – contributions that transcended their own historical era. Impartiality, equality and publicly proclaimed sociopolitical ideals were not creations of the Confucians but were Shang Yang’s contributions. From a historical perspective, the Legalists modified the idea of “man as the measure,” which lay at the center of the Confucian model. The Legalist order and laws respecting high-ranking persons were responses to the contingent difficulties that afflicted societies governed by the rule of men rather than the rule of law. Even with the loss of a good gentleman (君子), for example, due to his passing or moral degeneration, society could still be effectively governed. Precisely because of the state’s universal objective standards and adherence to such standards in governance, whether the gentleman was alive or dead was not a crucial matter for the well-being of the state. Under the rule of law and other aspects, efficiency and objectivity were twin hallmarks of Shang Yang’s state. These were important conditions in the struggle for hegemony. In this connection, Professor Ye points out that Han Fei’s thought is actually a departure from as well as a blow against Shang Yang. The political system Han Fei proposed, which combined law, tactics and power, damaged the impartiality and equality of the law while simultaneously greatly augmenting the authority of the ruler. And in its tactical application, it inflicted additional harm to “good governance.” The quintessence of Legalist thought is rooted in the premise of a “legal system.” Han Fei transformed the “legal system” into one of “rule by law.” This was a distortion of the Legalist system.

Indeed, ancient politics had not entirely dispensed with cheating and trickery; in written records, “politics” was often conflated with “plots” as if behind-the-scenes manipulation and the struggle for power and profit were the essence of politics. Royal families manipulated the political situation, resorted to betrayal and frequently engaged in diplomatic double-dealing. Han Fei brought all these political tricks together and made them an important element of Legalist thought, because monarchical power was the only way to maintain the stability of the state. In this connection, we can see that political “stability” had a different meaning – the interest of the state and of the monarchy coincided. But Professor Ye pointed out that this was mistaken. The impartiality of the law rejected both plotting and the rule of man. With regard to the latter, the law of the state of Qin during the era of Shang Yang guaranteed openness and impartiality even with respect to Shang Yang himself. Everyone was bound by the law. Legal provisions even regulated the proper time for planting and other obligations of individual farmers. Obviously, it was meant to supplement and correct the idea of “rule by man.” With respect to politics, eventually the concepts of “rule of man” and “rule of law” achieved equilibrium.

Although pursuing the goal of a compassionate administration was uppermost, criminal law was also emphasized. (In ancient times, the law was basically criminal law.)
was a constructive rather than an inappropriate equilibrium. Their logical confluence not only satisfied the demands of practical politics but was also anchored in the foundation of metaphysics.

The Laozi model

In addition to the two schools of thought discussed earlier, Professor Ye also pays attention to a third school that profoundly influenced ancient Chinese politics: Daoist thought or what might be called the “Laozi model.” Many of the sayings in the “Laozi model” are relevant to contemporary political forces. For example, “sustainable development,” the “idea of liberty,” the concept of “equality” and so forth. As the most abstract theoretical construct in the pre-Qin period, Daoist political thought rested on a philosophical foundation. The ultimate quest of Daoism was to achieve the “Dao” (道), which differed from the personified spirit of “Di” (帝). Dao was an abstract thing-in-itself; it was the basis of all manner of existing things. “Good government” was not something that a personified spirit bestowed upon mankind; rather, it was a state of being attained by cleaving to its inherent character. This made “good government” possess sufficient uniqueness and an abstract foundation.

Political excesses were rooted in the ruler’s desire for luxury. Confucians hoped to make progress on the basis of humanism; they sought a foundation for this in human nature, for example, the four principles Mencius advocated of benevolence, justice, knowledge of virtue and reverence of the rites. But Daoism did not make its argument for “good government” from the perspective of human nature. People are not born to do good, because even born from the Dao, though they follow their nature and do not seek to attain the Dao externally, still they may be driven by desires that cause them to slight nature.21 The Dao of Heaven and the Dao of man are two different models for human society and politics. In this connection, Daoism puts forward the sage who controls his desires as a model of “good government” following the Dao of Heaven in place of the Confucians’ quest, which ends in the Dao of man.

In Daoist thought, politics is a manifestation of the Dao. Since everything emanates from the Dao, the object of politics and politics itself must respect and follow the principles of the Dao. What are the principles of the Dao? “Laozi” provided the ruler “Methods of Governance.” The principle of the Dao is the self-cultivation of those in power. From an administrative perspective, the ruler must rid himself of excessive desires. He should govern appropriately with a light touch. He should not make striving for victory, fame or goodness the primary means of ruling All-under-Heaven but should implement wuwei (无为). Later generations interpreted this concept in various ways. The mainstream was to interpret wuwei as “let things take their own course.” Professor Ye expressed doubt about this interpretation. The basic meaning of “wuwei” should be the opposite of “you wei” (有为). If the ruler has an excessive desire for material goods, craves greatness and success or other overabundance, then he will inevitably seek to satisfy his desires through political means. In pursuit of better government, or while engaging in wars of annexation, he increases taxes and corvée labor; but if the ruler is not driven by excessive desires and instinctively respects the Dao, and makes self-cultivation in pursuit of the Dao the starting point of his governance, then he will start with the intention to develop society, beginning on a small scale, then expanding his efforts, and culminating in great achievements. This is “wuwei” (无为). We can see that “wuwei” is rooted in the universality of “Dao” inasmuch as “Dao” is immanent in everything. Thus, from an individual perspective, simple desires rather than renouncing all desires will enable one to return naturally to “Dao” itself. This notion that “the ruler minimizes his desires and simplifies his governance of the people” is obviously different from the notion of
“going with the flow.” “Wuwei” provides both a general outline and concrete measures for political action; it is not a prescription for a laissez-faire attitude of letting things happen on their own without interference (Bai 2009, 481–502). In the “Laozi model,” government is not only one of the ways in which human society organizes itself; it is also a way in which “Dao” manifests itself. This provides a philosophical foundation for “good governance” in the “Laozi model.” At the same time, the issue of dominance and subordination, the relationship between royal power and the legal system is resolved on an abstract foundation by respecting natural law. This kind of internal logic applied by the Legalists constituted the foundation of the Legalists’ abstract theory. The understanding of politics in other modes of thought during the Spring-Autumn and Warring States periods was concrete; with the exception of Laozi, no one else developed politics to such an abstract level. Confucian thought and the Confucian model brought together the concepts of “the public will” and “man as the measure,” and emphasized political objectives and values. This was certainly an outstanding contribution, but it overemphasized the subjective element (民本), thereby impairing objectivity and impartiality. The striving in Confucian thought to promote “Great Unity” (大同) and “Moderate Prosperity” (小康) engendered even more disputes. The Legalists stressed power; the “Shang Yang model” avoided talking about “the kingly way” (王道) and “the Godly way” (帝道) and only discussed how to augment state power from the perspective of the “way of the hegemon” (霸道). It has this point in common with contemporary realism. But only the “Laozi model” upheld the abstract notion of political unity. Government was not an unnatural form of organization imposed upon people but a form of organization that accorded with human nature. Judged from this perspective, all government systems that were divorced from human nature were bad systems. And “good governance” (善政) must be combined with wuwei (无为) and the spirit of Dao.

Conclusion

Summing up, Huaxiaism helps bring together the three aforementioned models. Moreover, it deduces a set of immanent political and diplomatic theories from traditional political thought. At the same time, Huaxiaism possesses considerable practical value as a guide. For example, the current diplomatic concept of “soft power” is distilled from the diplomatic thought of the “Laozi model.” From a structural perspective, the foundation of Huaxiaism is abstract: “Good governance” (善政), the ideal of Chinese politics, should have the systemic characteristics of security and stability. In such a system, morality and law should coexist, and the object of government policy should be man (人). However, in the process of governing, “legislation” (立法), “the administration of justice” (司法) and “administration” (行政) should be strictly distinguished, and men (人) should not be exalted above respect for the law. “Impartiality” (公正) and “justice” (正义) rather than “benevolent government” (仁政) should be that hallmark of governance. Therefore, the state (国家) is still the unit of national government (国家政治). Huaxiaism succeeds in distinguishing between “humanism” (人文主义) and other types of political culture. It also parts company with technocracy, elitism and other political thought that overemphasizes efficiency. The modernization of contemporary societies has encountered its share of difficulties, and these difficulties derive from structural weaknesses as well as from ethical deficiencies. Huaxiaism is a comprehensive concept designed to solve numerous problems. In sum, among the many extant systems of thought, Professor Ye has strived to establish a set of political concepts that possess internal consistency and avoid extremes. Huaxiaism provides a very good model toward this end.
Notes

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2 There are two major deprecations onto China's traditional thoughts, including history, politics and philosophy. In the 1910s, numerous scholars who had received a Westernized education had been revolting against the trend of restoration of a monarchy. At that time, Yuan Shikai, the president of Republic of China, had schemed an accession to the throne. Various newspapers and certain celebrities had advocated Confucianism and a reverence for the monarchy. In contrast, democratic thinkers, such as Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Lu Xun, published their essays and other literary works in the magazine New Youth to confront Yuan Shikai's schemes. They chiefly criticized feudalism in China in favor of democracy and liberty. However, overwhelming political demands helped improve deprecation of traditional Chinese thought. In 1915, New Youth magazine was founded, and is regarded as the commencement of the democratic New Culture Movement in China. Then in 1966, the People's Republic of China had aroused another acute criticism of traditional Chinese thought. During that time, literature researchers would still be obedient to the demand of politics. With endeavors to set back political intrigues to seize the power, the Communist Party of China had made the decision of propagating the Great Cultural Revolution, which aimed to terminate traditional Chinese culture, which they considered "decayed," so as to serve the CPC's own political purpose. Confucianism, major Chinese schools of thought and other associated ideas were denounced, even with material inheritance damaged. Those movements had affected the evaluation of China's political tradition even today.

3 "As a leading advocate of Baihua, or vernacular, Lu Xun tried to set an example with his own writings, balancing a need to pursue his own style without bowing to more radical calls to eschew all aspects of the classical language." See Gloria Davies. 2013. Lu Xun's Revolution Writing in a Time of Violence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

4 Certain scholars attempted to restore Confucianism's superiority both religiously and politically, and managed to extend their theories to political and social lives. Although being divided into various schools, they have obtained similar political views of contemporary China. For instance, Chen Ming had preferred an organized religion, in contrast to orthodox philosophic Confucianism, Zhang Xianglong inclined to establish a Conservative Reserve to protect the Confucian lifestyles. Jiang Qing upheld the supremacy of religion in Confucianism, and regarded it as the ultimate form of ancient China's civilization. Peng Yongjie claimed the future of organic Confucianism instead of official mechanic Confucianism. See Dong Lingli. 2011. A Review of Reconstruction of Confucianism during the Past Decade: Theoretical Approach, Organizational Practice and Future Trend. Journal of Social Science 12: 135–141.


6 "The name of the era implies the Warring States were constantly at war with each other, and the era is sometimes adduced to show the cross-cultural universality of the principles of balance of power. The actuality was a little more confused. There developed during the time a rich and usually entertaining literature on diplomatic practice, subtle explorations of the logic of power and the remote consequences of particular actions, focusing on how to preserve the power you have and, where possible, expanding it." See Peter R. Moody. 2011. Han Fei in His Context: Legalism on the Eve of the Qin Conquest. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38: 15–30.

7 For example, there were power transferring between different families in one country, as the rulers of Qi (Tian's family substituted for Jiang's family) and Jin (three major ministers assumed power and divided this state into Zhao, Wei and Han). Blood ties were invalidated in those cases.

8 "Arguments to the effect that Chinese culture, inasmuch as it has been influenced by Confucianism, is traditionalistic sometimes have a linguistic dimension. Wolfgang Bauer, for one, has argued that in China any attempt for innovation has come to nothing because of the two basic powers, the family system and the structure of the language. The spell of timelessness due to the nonexistence of tempus markers inhibits the idea of a future distinct from the past. Chad Hansen, too, has based his thesis of Confucian hyper-traditionalism on a linguistic theory that has also been basically endorsed by Hall and Ames." See Heiner Roetz. 2009. Tradition, Universality, and the Time Paradigm of Zhou (周) Philosophy. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36: 359–375.

9 During the Warring States period, the Meng hui had lost its supremacy between states. Official conferences were held for particular political, marital or martial incidents. Meng hui were held at random. In more than two hundred years during the Warring States period, Meng hui concerning


10 The word Junzi can be interpreted in many ways, but none of them should appropriate the origin of Junzi. Regarding the current apprehension to the word “gentleman,” this English word should befit Junzi’s meaning. But Sapient vir translated by Angelo Zottoli in Cursus litteraturnae sinicæ: neo-missionariorum accommodatus (1879–1882) would be a better option, for Christian godfathers in the 18th century would have maintained closer contacts to China. Their innate preferences to ecclesiastical Latin words, with a certain spectacular liking to moral sense, would behave more accurate in interpreting the concept of the Junzi.

11 “Another change that affected the household structure was the institution of laws intended to change it and discourage the formation of extended-family groups. One part of these was penalizing families with multiple adult sons residing at home, which was condemned for harming the structure of society. Another was the slightly later prohibition of male relatives sleeping in the same room.” See Charles Sanft. 2014. Shang Yang Was a Cooperator: Applying Axelrod’s Analysis of Cooperation in Early China. Philosophy East and West 64: 174–191.

12 “To understand the nature of this truth it is necessary to define what is meant by ‘opposite attributes’. Examples are plentiful: white—not white; good—not good; true—not true; in general, A—not A.” Isaac Husik. 1906. Aristotle on the Law of Contradiction and the Basis of the Syllogism. Mind 15: 215–222.

13 “Hence the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West. This will require the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations. It will also require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilization, for the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others.” See Samuel P. Huntington. 1993. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72: 22–49.

14 We shall expound the actual meaning the Di (帝) here. Di have numerous meanings, one of them is the “ancient governor.” Huang Di (黄帝, not the word 皇帝) is the most illustrious Di in legend. But in the Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasties, Di (帝) chief denotes a sacred god. He is the ancestor of earthy governors of every dynasty, and turned to the ultimate god after his death. Inscriptions on bones or tortoise shells of the Shang dynasty chiefly referred to that Di (帝). We also accept that usage in this chapter.

15 “In addition, he was China’s first teacher. Hence, though historically speaking he was only a teacher, it is perhaps not unreasonable that in later ages he was regarded as the teacher.” See Fung Yulan. 1947. A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. New York: The Free Press.

16 “To injure, or to mutilate that body was considered a great disgrace not only to oneself, but also to one’s whole lineage. Tattooing, for example, could only work as a punishment on a filial ‘Chinese’ son who considered tattooing to be a disgrace. There are many references in ancient Chinese literature to the non-Chinese tribal peoples who tattooed their bodies—some of them still do. Because some of the tribes enjoyed tattoos, it follows that tattoos could not be used as an effective means of punishment for those people. Hence, tattooing as a punishment could not have originated with the tribes; rather the Chinese could use it as an effective punishment because it shamed the Chinese criminal, making him look like a tribal-barbarian because he acted like an uncivilized person by breaking the custom-law.” See James D. Sellmann. 2006. On the Origin of Shang and Zhou Law. Asian Philosophy 16: 49–64.

17 “I have always heard that what worries the head of a state or the chief of a clan is not poverty but inequality, not the lack of population, but the lack of peace. For if there is equality, there will be no poverty, and where there is peace, there is no lack of population; and then, having attracted them, make them enjoy your peace. But now, with you two as his ministers, your master is in capable of attracting people from far away, his land is racked with divisions and unrest, he cannot hold it together any longer—and yet he wants to wage war against one of his own provinces!” See Confucius. 1997. The Analects. Translated by Pierre Ryckmans. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
“Axelrod specifically notes that Hierarchy and organization are especially effective at concentrating the interactions between specific individuals. Structures like bureaucracy bring individuals into contact more often than they would otherwise. Setting up prefectures with dedicated administrators and appointing heads of the pentads were by definition hierarchical and bureaucratic arrangements. And although it does not number among the reforms I listed earlier, Shang Yang also suggested that the movement of the population be controlled, and Qin law in fact did this: both changing residence and personal travel required official approval. These restrictions lent relationships a durability they might otherwise have lacked and limited the potential for contact with new people, thus promoting cooperation.” See Charles Sanft. 2014. Shang Yang Was a Cooperator: Applying Axelrod’s Analysis of Cooperation in Early China. *Philosophy East and West* 64: 174–191.


“The Tao works to use the excess, and gives to that which is depleted. The way of people is to take from the depleted, and give to those who already have an excess.” Laotzu. 1997. *Tao Te Ching*. Translated by Gia-fu Feng. New York: Random House, Inc.

This “go-with-the-flow” attitude is likely to be found in the *Zhuangzi*, although the latter does not seem to have a universal principle of eternal return. But for *Laotzu*, although all movements, under the master principle of eternal return, are cyclic, there is nevertheless a preferred cycle. Within this cycle, human perversions (unnatural desires) are under control, and do not lead to cycles of violent rising and falling. There remain ups and downs in this cycle, but they are neither violent nor drastic. Human beings are born, mature, age, and die, but they are not killed in a conflict caused by greed. They work but only to get enough food to survive. In this preferred cycle, we are returned to our roots – the apparent stillness that actually consists of peaceful, smooth and slow cyclic movements. According to Liu, such a state was considered natural by Laotzu. I should add here that naturalness should be understood normatively. Descriptively, all things move in cycles, violent and smooth. But Laotzu has a moral preference for the smooth cycle, anointing it as natural (in a normative sense). See Bai Tongdong. 2009. How to Rule without Taking Unnatural Actions (*无为而治*): A Comparative Study of the Political Philosophy of the *Laozi*. *Philosophy East and West* 59: 481–502.


References


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