


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Case Study Window – Discourse, Doctrine and Habitus: Redevelopment Contestation on Sydney’s Harbour-Edge

Glen Searle

Planning can be seen as an essentially political activity that involves contestation of outcomes. At its simplest, this involves a contest between property rights and the public interest, but at a more complex and nuanced level it incorporates competition between different planning discourses and different motives underlying support for each discourse. This chapter argues that an understanding of these motives, in the form of the doctrines and habitus of protagonists, can provide deeper insights into the basic forces shaping planning conflicts.

The chapter uses a hierarchical framework to consider the various influences of planning discourse, doctrine and habitus in conflicted planning situations. Support for particular discourses is viewed as being frequently driven by certain doctrinal beliefs and, more deeply, by the specific work habitus of many protagonists. This framework is argued in the next section. It is then applied to two case studies involving the redevelopment of old port areas alongside Sydney Harbour: inner west Pyrmont-Ultimo and the Darling Harbour precinct of Barangaroo.

Theoretical Framework

The framework employed here of different levels of influences on planning outcomes is not new. Allmendinger notes several applications of this approach to understanding public policy change (Giddens 1984, Healey 2007, 2004, Schön and Rein 1994; see Allmendinger 2011: 46). This chapter uses a hierarchy of influences that is similar to, but conceived independently of, that of Schmidt (2008). Her conceptualization uses three levels of influences. At the first level, policy solutions are generated by policy-

makers. Paradigms comprise the second level, encompassing the principles and assumptions underlying policy. The third level concerns public philosophies, denoting the values and principles of knowledge and society behind policies and paradigms. In this chapter, the first level consists of discourses used to argue the specific nature of redevelopment in harbourside Sydney. The second level comprises prevailing doctrines of the key protagonists that guide the underlying nature of development that is acceptable to them. Finally, the different habitus or ways in which planners, developers and bureaucrats work and think, forms a third level that is imbued distinctively within the practices of each group. (See also Greed, Chapter 5, this volume.) The habitus of each is formed and reinforced by the ongoing practices, rules and philosophies used in daily working life, and sets the basic approach that each group brings to achieving its development aspirations. The role of actor power in shaping development outcomes operates through these various lenses, which I discuss further below.

The most immediate set of influences shaping the emergence of types of urban development is that relating to the *discourses* used to justify the nature of the development. Here I apply the notion of discourse to debates and arguments that are played out within the professional and institutional contexts that pre-exist the development proposal in question. This contrasts with Schmidt's (2008) approach in which professional codes, planning doctrines, and local cultures and preferences embody 'background' discourses that influence planning policies and paradigms (Allmendinger 2011: 47). I argue that the doctrines and habitus of protagonists that incorporate such background discourses need to be considered separately from 'foreground' discourses because they underpin the way in which the latter are interpreted and used to achieve desired development outcomes.

The role of *doctrines*, the second level of influences used here, has come to be recognized within planning as setting particular spatial arrangements that keep on being applied. The notion of planning doctrine has been most fully developed by Faludi as describing embedded modes of thought within planning (Faludi 1997, Faludi and van der Valk 1994). In particular, planning doctrine refers to a body of thought about a planning policy area that involves consensus and shared coordination between professionals and planning-minded administrators and politicians (Faludi 1997: 83). The use of doctrine by planners to support certain spatial forms and developments, as well as the underlying legitimacy of planning, has been noted by Allmendinger (2011: 43). The on-going preservation and reinforcement of the Green Heart of the Netherlands, for example, has been argued by Faludi and van der Valk (1994) to be a long term planning doctrine. The inverse of the Green Heart, the green belt, is seen by Allmendinger (2011: 46) as akin to a paradigm in Schmidt's schema. It could as easily be conceived as a planning doctrine, which perhaps better conveys the fixedness and widespread acceptance of that planning concept, rather than the strict 'example or pattern' meaning of paradigm.

The concept of planning doctrine has, as Allmendinger (2011: 55) notes, become a mainstay in planning studies (Alexander and Faludi 1996, Murdoch and Abram 2002, Needham 1996). In this chapter I extend the application of the concept of doctrine to other key actors in a particular development. Thus understanding of the relevant implicit doctrine(s) of the state, a central player in the two case studies, is used to illuminate the predisposition of the state to its preferred outcomes. Allmendinger (2011: 55) observes that planning doctrine has recently been relabelled 'planning culture', with attempts to

embed planning doctrines within overarching local and national cultures (Sanyal 2005). In this, planning culture incorporates attitudes, beliefs and values, cognitive frames, and rules and norms, *inter alia* (Allmendinger 2011: 55). This chapter sees such general and embedded influences as better analysed separately as part of habitus, representing a more foundational explanatory level than doctrine, here used to convey acceptance of particular types of planning and development outcomes.

The concept of *habitus* was developed by Bourdieu to understand how the lived world of groups with shared expectations and experiences (such as planners) shapes their experiences, interests, capacities and actions (Hillier 2002: 13). Thus habitus is ‘... a system of schemes of perception and appreciation of practices, cognitive and evaluative structures which are acquired through the lasting experience of a social position’ (Bourdieu 1989: 19). Hence ‘habitus predispose agents to act in particular ways without reducing them to cultural dopes or inhibiting their strategic capacities’ (Crossley 2001: 84). Or as Painter (2000: 242) puts it, habitus ‘refers to the embodiment in individual actors of systems of social norms, understandings and patterns of behaviour, which, while not wholly determining action ... do ensure that individuals are more disposed to act in some ways than others’. Painter (1997: 138) has suggested the habitus of different groups centrally involved in the case studies in this chapter. Public sector professionals such as urban planners have a habitus grounded in procedures influenced by norms generated through professional training, and in common sense based on detachment, objectivity and public service. The habitus of local politicians is grounded, *inter alia*, on ‘common sense based on ... grassroots support and legitimacy’ (Painter 1997: 138).

The understandings and patterns of behaviour embodied within habitus will produce outcomes/practices within a particular field such as planning or property development through interaction with different kinds of capital (Huxley 2002, see also Dovey, Chapter 15, this volume). Four types of capital are identified by Bourdieu (1977: 177–83): economic (money, property and so on), social (acquaintances and social networks), cultural (cultural property, including education) and symbolic. The last incorporates the notion of legitimation, the ability to have certain dominant conceptions accepted as appropriate (Swartz 1997: 74). Such conceptions in turn relate closely to the idea of doctrine; thus practice within a particular field is produced by the way that an underlying habitus interacts with particular doctrines. In a particular development context, the specific detail of practice will in turn be shaped by the discourses relating to that development.

Nevertheless the limitations on the possibility of new practices that are imposed by the concept of habitus, and indeed by concepts of prevailing discourse and doctrine, should be recognized. Here the distinction of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) between striated space, where spatial practices are stabilized, and smooth space, where spatial practices show instability and have the possibility of new directions, is potentially useful. Smooth space lets rhizomes – underground migrating forms of life (Dovey 2008: 23) – emerge unpredictably, though they may in turn lead to new, locally stable systems (Bateson 1972). This conceptualization allows new, unchoreographed events beyond the discourse-doctrine-habitus hierarchy to come forth. It is particularly appropriate as a means of understanding the evolution of urban design in the Barangaroo case study analysed here.

The Redevelopment of Pyrmont-Ultimo

The Sydney suburb of Pyrmont is situated on an elevated harbourside peninsula immediately west of Sydney's central business district CBD, separated from it by Darling Harbour. Its neighbouring suburb of Ultimo lies adjacent to the south. Darling Harbour was Sydney's main seaport precinct until the late 1970s, when most of its port functions were shifted to new docks at Port Botany to the south. The former port role had generated a range of long-standing industrial developments in Pyrmont and Ultimo, including sugar refining, wool storage and electricity generation, creating an ageing industrial fabric that extended into the old rail lines, wharves, roads and sheds of the port itself. The loss of shipping activity meant that the New South Wales state government owned a substantial area of waterfront land near the CBD that could now be used for other purposes. This provided the main incentive for the intensive redevelopment of the peninsula under state auspices over the next two decades.

The redevelopment of Pyrmont-Ultimo got under way in 1988 when a Central Sydney Strategy, produced by the state government and Sydney City Council, identified the peninsula's development potential. The drive for (re)development was impelled by several related discourses. The first argued the need to support Sydney's role as Australia's main centre of finance and corporate control, and its role as a major Asia Pacific financial centre, a discourse supported by the state government (Department of Environment and Planning 1988: 60) and the property industry. While the latter dimension grew in strength during the 1990s (Searle 1996), Sydney's global role had already emerged following the deregulation of Australia's financial sector after 1983 and by the late 1980s had started to generate pressure on CBD office space. Pyrmont-Ultimo was seen as providing potential for further expansion of central Sydney office activities. This discourse was supported by a variant that derived from the then-prevailing discourse supporting high technology development. This variant envisaged 'an advanced technology-based community with world class telecommunications infrastructure' for living and working (Travis Partners 1991: 4).

A related discourse supporting redevelopment was that of the need for urban intensification in areas such as Pyrmont-Ultimo with good access to jobs and services. Redevelopment plans for the suburbs proposed mixed commercial-high density residential development that would provide developer flexibility and contribute to government intensification goals for Sydney. This intensification discourse had been increasingly pushed by the state government after 1980 in order to save on state infrastructure costs and meet the needs of smaller households (Searle 2007). Again, this discourse had been supported by major apartment developers, who were able to garner sizeable profits from rezoning of old industrial sites and from a local planning culture of discretionary decision-making that favoured developers (Punter 2005).

The state government drew on these discourses to produce a regional plan for Pyrmont-Ultimo to increase the population from 2,800 in 1986 to an initial target of 16,500, and to increase employment from 14,000 to 54,000 (Department of Planning 1991, 1990). To fast track new development, the regional plan had several key elements (Searle and Byrne 2002: 13–14). It rezoned Pyrmont-Ultimo and set out development principles for the proposed new development, bypassing normal local council powers to do this under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act. The regional plan also provided for an Urban Development Plan containing detailed controls over development

that would also normally be prepared by Sydney City Council. In addition, the regional plan provided for master plans on key sites, principally the harbourside sugar refinery area and the large holdings of the state port authority. On master plan sites, landowners or lessees could prepare plans providing details of proposed development, which only needed the consent of the Minister for Planning. This gave owners/developers a high level of control over their development. To facilitate development, the state government also set up the City West Development Corporation to administer government-owned sites, provide major infrastructure and implement the redevelopment plans.

A variant on the pro-development discourse was added by Greenpeace Australia (Bell 1993). In 1991, it won a national design ideas competition for its car-free redevelopment design of Pyrmont. Car parks were to be confined to the perimeter, and a light rail line would link Pyrmont to the city. Most new residential buildings would be a maximum of four storeys high, while existing industrial buildings would be reused to the maximum extent possible.

The most conservative variant of the redevelopment discourse was that of the surviving local community. Its vision was one of constraining development so that the existing close-knit sense of community and its physical associations could be preserved (King and Cadavini 1994). The community expressed its alarm at the prospect of development bringing hordes of ‘yuppies’ into the area (O’Brien 1992), after the government’s social impact assessment stated that new residents would ‘predominantly be drawn from high and middle income groups’ (Brian Elton and Associates 1991: 43–4). Residents also expressed fears about the impact of tall buildings on the area’s character and the associated loss of views, overshadowing and loss of privacy (Brian Elton and Associates 1991: 38). The proposals for a number of high buildings in the draft regional plan were seen by a leading community member as ‘vandalism’ and an ‘absolute denial of Pyrmont’s uniqueness’ (King and Cadavini 1994). For the community, keeping the character of Pyrmont meant existing housing should be preserved and the heritage character of the area maintained (Brian Elton and Associates 1991: 35). This community discourse was successful in saving some key nineteenth-century cottages from demolition, but not others (Searle and Byrne 2002: 17–18) (see Figure 8.1). The main concentration of existing housing was in the central part of Pyrmont peninsula, which was slated for redevelopment with high-rise buildings in early planning. A heritage architect and community activist developed an alternative plan in which tall ‘monumental’ buildings would be built along the harbour front instead of scaling down from the centre to the harbour, thus preserving the main group of old houses (King and Cadavini 1994). The activist claimed his knowledge of government decision-making enabled him to get his proposal incorporated into the final regional plan (Hillier and Searle 1995). Nevertheless, this merely changed the location of new development under the plan, and left its total scale unchanged. But the strongest element of community discourse related to the construction of Sydney’s first casino on the eastern side of the peninsula, following state government authorization in 1993. Residents feared it would block views and bring even more high-density development (King and Cavadini 1994). Their stand was supported by the City Council, which reported that the casino’s size would detrimentally affect the peninsula’s residential amenity, contrary to the objectives of the regional plan (Searle and Bounds 1999). To avoid a legal challenge to its development approval, the government promulgated a state planning policy that allowed inconsistency with the regional plan and enabled the casino to be built.



Figure 8.1 Traditional housing preserved after community protest, Pymont

Source: Glen Searle.

While the community's anti-development discourse was founded on a desire to retain as much of the existing environment as possible, the discourses of the main agents sponsoring development – state government bureaucrats and planners, and developers – had deeper doctrinal roots. Government planners saw the redevelopment of the peninsula as the best opportunity in Sydney for significant urban consolidation (urban densification) (New South Wales Government 1995), with its target population of 15,000. The government's urban consolidation policy had originally been premised on infrastructure costs savings through reduced urban expansion on greenfield sites, and these savings had been confirmed in a commissioned consultant study in 1990 (Searle 2007). The trend to smaller household sizes was a second compelling rationale for the policy. The advantages of urban consolidation in encouraging public transport and lessening motor vehicle travel were also used to justify the policy in the 1980s (Department of Environment and Planning 1988), a relationship that was confirmed in Newman and Kenworthy's (1989) influential *Cities and Automobile Dependence*. This relationship then buttressed the perceived role of urban consolidation in addressing the emerging global problem of greenhouse gas emissions. The planning case for urban consolidation thus seemed ironclad, and by the mid-1980s it had the status of a planning doctrine for government planners and politicians, with both main political parties supporting it.

Nevertheless the urban consolidation doctrine on the scale applied in Pymont was challenged by non-government professionals, notably by city council planners and by architects. The City Council commissioned a report from an urban designer on

development outcomes to 1996, which said that the density, bulk, concentration and proximity of new residential development was ‘producing an undesirable urban form inconsistent with the objectives of high quality design in the ... regional ... plan’ with none of the desirable qualities of relaxation, calm, interaction, stimulation, pleasure and delight (Hogarth 1996). Architecture professor Winston Barnett had earlier predicted that a built form would emerge that was ‘totally unlike [Pymont’s] historic form and more akin to high-density development in other parts of Asia’ (O’Brien 1993: 5A). The Royal Australian Institute of Architects considered that the master plan for Pymont Point would generate residential development that ‘has the character of resort accommodation and does not retain the principles and therefore the memories and traditions of the built character remaining in the Ultimo-Pymont area’ (Maher 1993) (see Figures 8.2 and 8.3).



Figure 8.2 High-rise apartment development, Pymont

Source: Glen Searle.

For state government bureaucrats and politicians, a doctrine of neo-liberalism had taken root from the late 1980s. This favoured reductions in government spending and of controls that limited investor freedom, and the promotion of increased opportunities for investment. Neo-liberalism had emerged as a hegemonic ideology within the Australian federal government bureaucracy during the 1980s (Pusey 1991) and supported a major redirection of economic policy by the Australian Government after 1983, following the examples of Reagan in the United States and Thatcher in the UK. A neo-liberalist policy bent emerged within New South Wales with the election of a Liberal-National



Figure 8.3 High-rise apartment development, Pymont

Source: Glen Searle.

state government in 1988 (Laffin and Painter 1995). The redevelopment of Pymont-Ultimo embodied the doctrine of the new government by reducing the government's onerous capital liabilities and outgoings through sales of surplus state properties, and by accommodating new dwellings at lower state infrastructure costs than in greenfield locations.

In turn, support by the various redevelopment protagonists for particular discourses and doctrines can be argued as having roots in the respective habitus. For urban designers and in large part for local planners and architects, the habitus is grounded in an understanding of an appropriate composition and texture of the local

public realm and an appropriate relationship between building form and scale and the scale of the street. The precise content of this understanding might be contested and be split among the precepts of different schools, such as those of contextualism *qua* Sitte and rationalism *qua* Wagner (Cuthbert 2006: 179–86). Even so, most urban designers and architects could be argued to have shared enough common *habitus* elements to respond in similar (negative) fashion to development on the scale of that in Pymont and Ultimo, as indicated by the previous quotations from individual professionals. For a City Council that in the 1990s was controlled by community-based councillors headed by a strong Lord Mayor rather than by those representing major political parties, it was this locally-scaled *habitus* centring on the design amenity of new development that drove its opposition to the scheme. In this, the concordance of the councillors' support base, which came mainly from Pymont-Ultimo, with the ideals of the urban design professionals was a contributing factor.

Conversely, the *habitus* of state planners supporting intensive redevelopment of Pymont-Ultimo was derived from an instrumental rationality that prioritized metropolitan strategic objectives. The 1988 metropolitan strategy targeted a 50 per cent increase in multi-unit dwelling construction in the existing urban area based on concomitant state infrastructure savings (Department of Environment and Planning 1988), and this was significantly increased again by planners for the 1995 strategy (New South Wales Government 1995). The importance of supporting the development of central Sydney's emerging global city functions was also becoming apparent. The large harbourside area of obsolete port and industrial land in Pymont provided a major opportunity to implement these strategic goals. The state planners had little concern for design issues associated with strategy implementation. It was not until the end of the decade that the government turned its attention to measures to improve higher density residential design quality as the legitimacy of the urban consolidation programme became threatened by widespread community protests.

Across the government as a whole, a bureaucratic *habitus* had evolved from the late 1970s that incorporated a corporatist form of management managerial approach typical of large private companies (Considine and Painter 1997). Within the New South Wales government, a Ministerial Advisory Unit staffed by economists was set up in 1976 as the main source of advice to the new Labor Premier, focusing on departmental financial accountability (Hill 2006). The new *habitus* deified government efficiency and the fiscal bottom line. The Liberal-National state government of 1988–95 strengthened this *modus operandi* with full-blown neoliberal governance incorporating privatization, deficit reduction and the sale of redundant public assets. The redevelopment of Pymont-Ultimo using revenue from the sale of surplus government land and the fast-tracking of private investment that would save state greenfield infrastructure costs was very much in accord with the emergent corporatist-neoliberal mode of bureaucratic thinking and doing.

The alignment of state planner and state bureaucrat doctrines and *habitus* with conditions favouring private developer profit-making meant that a strong set of factors was in place for redevelopment. With actual and potential conflicts between the wider range of discourses, doctrines and *habitus* in play, however, the issue becomes one of understanding why particular examples prevailed to generate the redevelopment that actually happened. One way of approaching this is to view such projects in terms of their part in meeting society's expectations about what the prevailing socio-economic

system should deliver. In this, the state's role is to participate in a way that provides legitimation for its existence (Habermas 1976). A crisis of capital accumulation in the West in the 1970s challenged the prevailing social democratic mode of government and its legitimacy, and generated a turn to neo-liberalism (Harvey 2005). By the late 1980s this had taken root in the New South Wales state. It was played out in strengthened urban consolidation policies (Searle 2007) and the sale of state assets that were encapsulated by Pymont-Ultimo's redevelopment under a public-private partnership. While the instrumental rationality of the state planners in metropolitan planning was essentially a modernist approach from earlier in the century that had by the 1990s induced a reaction against it in Europe as the role of government was questioned (Allmendinger 2009: 78), it remained influential in Australia because of a unique level of state influence over urban development (Searle and Bunker 2010). This state control meant that the City Council would be stopped by state legal powers from setting the development agenda in Pymont-Ultimo if that could conflict with the government's own agenda. The pre-existing local community lacked the numbers and resources for its discourse to threaten the government's legitimacy, unlike proposed redevelopment of old industrial areas in nearby gentrified Balmain several years later (Searle 2005). Finally, the role of Australia's largest developer, Lend Lease, in ratcheting up the scale of building on the old sugar refinery site beyond the regional plan's original controls was a significant factor in shaping redevelopment outcomes. This up-scaling was accepted by the government as it enabled redevelopment targets to be more quickly met, but it was merely the latest example of developer windfalls from Sydney's discretionary planning system (Punter 2005).

The Redevelopment of Barangaroo, Darling Harbour

The Barangaroo project involves the redevelopment of the last shipping wharf and associated state dockside land in Darling Harbour, totalling 22 hectares, on the western side of Sydney's CBD. As in Pymont-Ultimo, value capture of redeveloped state land would be used to fund necessary infrastructure and a large harbourside park. This followed years of slow growth and stagnating construction in Sydney following the 2000 Olympics. The project was endorsed by the state government as offering a major stimulus to construction in the short term and boosting longer term economic development by 'secur[ing] Sydney's role as a global financial services hub in the Asia Pacific region' (Barangaroo Delivery Authority 2010a).

An international design competition for the site, with the state setting target office space levels and a requirement for half the site to be public parkland ('Headland Park'), was held in 2005. A consortium led by a local firm won the competition. A concept plan based on the winning entry was approved by the state government in early 2007, using new Part 3A powers under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act that allowed the minister to approve major projects instead of the local council. The government rezoned the land in late 2007. The maximum approved floor space was 388,000 square metres. Lend Lease was awarded development rights and a 99-year lease, in return for providing waterfront plaza infrastructure and funding development of Headland Park, building a pedestrian tunnel from the nearest rail station, and

relocating the passenger cruise terminal, at a total cost of \$521m (Barangaroo Delivery Authority 2010b).

At this point contestation over the concept plan began, leading to significant alterations. The master plan was revised to increase the maximum floor space to 508,000 square metres. The Pymont developer ploy of negotiating floor space increases after initial approval was played out again, a process that was rampant across Sydney: 'By a process of attrition, community endorsed Development Control Plans or Master Plans are amended again and again until developers get the building heights they want' (Moore 2002). Soon after, the design excellence review panel, led by former Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating, revised the concept plan, drawing on the scheme of the design competition runner-up led by Lord Richard Rogers. The new plan 'reinstated' the Headland Park and Northern Cove elements into a more 'natural' physical form in which the shoreline and profile would closely resemble the landscape as it existed in 1836. While this was traded off by increased maximum heights for the office towers, still more development was required at the southern end to offset Lend Lease's costs of reproducing a more natural foreshore, now totalling \$150m (Lenaghan 2010). In 2010 Lend Lease applied to increase floor space by a further 60,000 square metres and to increase the height of the towers to a maximum of 209 metres, creating and valorizing better corporate views across the harbour. Much of the extra floor space would be located in a new high-rise hotel to be built on a new pier. After intense opposition from community groups (Friends of Barangaroo, Barangaroo Action Group and Australians for Sustainable Development), the government approved a modified application that reduced the commercial towers from four to three (but kept total floor space the same), reduced the hotel height to a still significant 170 metres, and reduced the pier length to 85 metres. In response, in early 2011 almost 60 architects and planners produced an alternative plan that reinstated the straight edge of the existing wharf, kept the international cruise ship terminal, eliminated the hotel and its pier, aligned roads with the city grid and instituted stepped towers (Munro 2011). After a community petition against the government's revised plan with 11,000 signatories was presented to parliament, the new Liberal-National state government (elected in March 2011) appointed an independent review panel. The panel's report broadly supported the revised plan though it criticized the bulk of the three office towers. The government rejected the recommendation to redesign the towers, but bowed to community and professional opposition and deleted the proposed pier with its high-rise hotel.

The principal discourse in this case was that of global city competition, with a sub-text of Sydney's need for stronger economic growth. The new state Treasurer claimed the project 'would enable us to realise our ambition of becoming a global financial centre' (Salusinszky 2011). The more immediate need for major development activity involving 9,000 jobs was the rationale for the new Premier to reject redesigning of the towers: '... we simply cannot afford to delay Barangaroo' (Moore 2011). This discourse was supported by the property and development industry, which saw the project as meeting almost half the underlying office demand in the CBD over the following decade, and providing the large floor plates now sought by large corporations (Hopkins 2010).

The discourse of the anti-development community groups focused on the excessive height and bulk of the project, the commercial arrangements with Lend Lease, and on the perceived threat to the character of Sydney Harbour from the hotel in particular. While one group mainly comprised disaffected local residents concerned with threats

to their amenity, another group had wider planning concerns. A City Councillor who helped set up the group said it was about 'a real caring for our harbour' (Tovey 2010). This strand of the discourse reflected the iconic status which the wider Sydney community had long attributed to the harbour. Its opposition to the project thus took on doctrinal overtones.

The global city discourse can also be viewed as having the status of a doctrine within the state government by the time redevelopment at Barangaroo began to be planned. McGuirk (2004) has argued that from the mid-1990s Sydney's governance was hegemonically organized and practised to produce a competitive global city. By 2005, the priority of securing Sydney's global role was very evident within the government, with the new metropolitan strategy claiming to be a 'broad framework to secure Sydney's place in the global economy' (New South Wales Government 2005: 6). The strategy showed the CBD and North Sydney as the site of 'Global Sydney', within which Barangaroo offered the greatest development opportunity. In turn, while Barangaroo's planning can be seen as aligned with an instrumental rationality prioritizing metropolitan strategic objectives such as global Sydney, this has accommodated the project rather than been its active product as at Pyrmont-Ultimo. This perhaps reflects a weakening of a technocratic paradigm/habitus within state planning (Madanipour 2010). Barangaroo is not mentioned in the 2005 metropolitan strategy, for example.

State neo-liberal doctrine also underpinned this project, as at Pyrmont. The government has proceeded with the project on the basis that it is 'cost-neutral'. This has required the scale of office development to be massive in order to offset the extensive infrastructure and site improvement costs. Again, as at Pyrmont-Ultimo, this reflects the contemporary bureaucratic habitus of state governance emphasizing a corporatist 'new public management' approach involving, *inter alia*, flexibility and entrepreneurialism that maximize private funding to meet government objectives (see Madanipour 2010: 361).

The architectural habitus underpinning the project was split into two basic camps. A minority philosophy was that the scheme needed to make an iconic 'statement', such as the red-tinted high-rise hotel jutting into the harbour proposed by the project's lead architect Richard Rogers. Prominent architectural critic Elizabeth Farrelly considered that the government's commitment to a given bulk (floor space) meant that it has relinquished 'all real control over design' (Farrelly 2011). For her, Barangaroo is thereby 'too boring' rather than too big, epitomized by the axing of the hotel-in-the-harbour. The majority philosophy was similar to that in Pyrmont-Ultimo, centring on scale and urban grain. A series of articles in the May/June 2010 issue of *Architecture Australia* set out the majority's concerns: lack of fine-grained urbanism exacerbated by having only one developer, lack of an inclusive public realm, the failure to extend the city grid, and restricted potential for spontaneity and change. The most telling critique of the revised plan has come from Sydney City Council. The two residential towers were seen as too tall and incompatible with the adjacent proposed innovation centre. The Council also considered the heights of the three major commercial towers should be adjusted to reduce excessive bulk and to provide height differentiation. Similarly, the building floor plates were considered too large above lower levels because of their bulk and negative visual impact. The proposed street widths were considered to be too narrow and lacking in 'refinement', while streets connecting with the city grid were not properly aligned with existing streets in the grid. The high-rise hotel proposed beyond

the existing shore line in Darling Harbour was seen as weakening the ‘distinctive western edge of the compact high-rise city’ (City of Sydney 2010). In a wider sense, the two architectural philosophies here represent the opposition of older rationalist/contextualist schools and newer, more post-modern stances.

A further frame is needed to complete the analysis of Barangaroo. The intervention of Keating to reinstate the early nineteenth-century foreshore is a powerful example of agency exerting an influence beyond prevailing discourses, doctrines and habitus. Though his was a political appointment, his intervention turned out to have a rhizomatic quality, a subterranean influence emerging unpredictably. Keating’s long-standing desire to return Sydney Harbour to a less urbanized state had emerged publicly over a decade earlier when he sought demolition of a historic finger wharf further east at Woolloomooloo.

The Barangaroo project, and the government’s exercise of its power to bring it about, can – like Pyrmont-Ultimo – also be seen as helping to meet the government’s need for legitimation. Towards the end of its rule (1995–2011), the state Labor government was experiencing a legitimation crisis (Habermas 1976) caused by widespread failures of state governance (Sartor 2011). Barangaroo thus can be argued to represent ‘a complex dialectic whereby overt expressions of power in space tend to be commensurate with the vulnerability of that power’ (Dovey 2008: 17, see also Dovey, Chapter 15, this volume). Discourses and doctrines of globalization, economic development and neoliberalism supported the way in which the project provided legitimation in the face of counter discourses and habitus.

Conclusion

Successive phases of state-led harbourside redevelopment in inner Sydney at Pyrmont and Barangaroo have involved similar competing discourses, doctrines and Bourdiean habitus at multiple scales, with similar outcomes in terms of excessiveness of scale and concomitant subordination of community and architect concerns. Yet the two cases also show how variations in the nature and strength of these analytical lenses can illuminate understanding of the specifics of each redevelopment. A state legitimation crisis had emerged by the time planning for Barangaroo had started, and the project was able to address this by recourse to globalization and economic development discourses in particular, underpinned by neoliberalist and new public management doctrines. Pyrmont-Ultimo redevelopment, by contrast, emerged primarily from a planning doctrine of urban consolidation, supported by a combination of instrumental rationality habitus and neoliberal doctrine. The Barangaroo project evolved in a more opportunistic fashion that can be understood by adding a Deleuzian-Guattarian rhizomatic perspective.

This chapter has attempted to show that a simple reading of contested planning outcomes in terms of the power of the state and major developers in determining prevailing discourses requires a deeper and less contextually-driven understanding of the underlying imperatives of doctrine and habitus. These elements have been conceptualized here as comprising successively embedded shapers of planning and development outcomes from specific development contexts to underlying modes of

thinking and practice. This perspective can allow a fuller understanding of the deeper roots of planning conflict and the possibilities of conflict resolution.

The basic elements of this framework – discourse, doctrine and habitus – and their hierarchical integration are less distinct in practice than in theory. Doctrines can emerge out of long-accepted discourses, and the distinction between doctrines and their application as habitus is not always apparent. And the role of habitus was less apparent in the Barangaroo case than in Pymont-Ultimo. Even so, each element has potentially distinctive insights to contribute to understanding planning contestation, as this chapter has postulated.

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