


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The Cultural and Creative Industries

Justin O'Connor

The concept is not object but territory. It does not have an Object but a territory. For that very reason it has a past form, a present form and, perhaps, a form to come. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 101)

Introduction

Approaches to the cultural and/or creative industries tend to take two forms. One identifies a set of institutions and practices (a 'sector' or an 'industry') that demands our attention in some way, often against a background of their previously marginal position. A second takes a more 'constructivist' perspective, highlighting an active process whereby an object is created or assembled by or through policy discourse(s).

Looking back over 40 years of policy and academic (and indeed 'activist') writing on this topic it seems clear that these two approaches are not mutually exclusive; they represent different narratives or rhetorical tropes that have been used (often by the same person) in different situations. The former positions the creative and/or cultural industries as harbingers or catalysts for something new, 'out there', demanding recognition, investigation, promotion; they point to the real, the urgent, the exciting. The latter does not decry the activities to which the concept points (a position taken by cultural conservatives, by a certain kind of Marxism or by mainstream economic sceptics) but the ways in which these have been shaped, co-opted, maybe high-jacked, by different policy agendas. It is then tempting to range these approaches across a scale. At one end we can see purely empiricist attempts to define and statistically map the sector, the more to pin it down and establish its 'value'. At the other the term becomes an 'empty signifier', a stake in the game between competing interests who wish to provide the content that most suits their objectives. As such one can be a 'disinterested' agnostic about the term, or see it as a mere symptom (or mask) of a deeper tendency (such as 'dumbing down', or 'globalization', or 'neo-liberalism' or 'precarity').

However, this would be to position those evoking a catalytic emergent sector as naïve realists and the constructivists as reflexive and critical. There is inevitably something of this involved, in a move from immediate presence to some complex, perhaps contradictory, mediated reality. But rather than a simple passage from 'dupe' to 'worldly-wise', or the unmasking of error or illusion, we could follow Jameson (in the different context of 'realism/modernism') and see the move as a kind of dialectical thickening, or putting the first 'realist' concept 'under erasure', somehow co-present with the 'constructivist' (Jameson 2002). Or, following Latour (2004), we might say our task is less the iconoclastic undermining of immediate 'matters of fact' (exposure of illusory naturalness, revelation of deeper 'invisible' causality) and more the attempt to deepen our understanding of 'matters of concern'. For example, it is glaringly obvious in the constant terminological stumble of 'cultural and/or creative' that our concern here involves something more than simply a new sector 'out there', to be 'nailed down' by yet another definitive definition. Yet that something new *has* demanded our attention – has become a matter of concern – in this last 40 years is unavoidable – the 'digital revolution' providing the most recent such wake-up call (if we still needed it).

In this chapter I want to trace the complex and contested narratives around the 'cultural and/or creative industries', to try to establish if not what they are 'in themselves', then at least why they are a policy stake worth the struggle. That is, how they became 'matters of concern' and what kind of new concern they might now be.

The Cultural Industries

Forty years ago puts us in the early 1970s, when 'the cultural industries' began to emerge as an object of academic and policy concern. (See also Miller, Chapter 3, this volume.) Given the subsequent academic focus on frictions between culture and economics we need to emphasize that, at this time, it was the issue of culture and politics that was primary. Or rather, economics was registered mostly in terms of the social inequality which gave differential access to the media – a problem for liberal pluralist theories and for social democratic notions of the 'public sphere' (Habermas' (1989) influential work on this was published in 1962). This connection between culture and politics was to become ever closer as the notion of 'ideology' began to move beyond its crude reductionist use in the political battles of the Cold War years, acquiring a more complex set of 'cultural' meanings to account for the continued existence of 'capitalism', the 'status quo', the 'establishment' and so on. It was the political consequences of 'the culture industry' that had been most prominent since its inception in a post-war USA by Adorno and Horkheimer (1979). For them the term represented the final subsumption of culture to the logic of monopoly capitalism. No longer just dominated at work the worker was programmed during the leisure hours by 'conditioned response' entertainment that relaxed them in order to get them back on the assembly line in the morning. This thesis was wrongly, though inevitably, lumped in with 'mass society' theory and conservative anti-democratic cultural criticism that by the 1970s had become a well-worn academic and policy trope.

The appearance of the 'cultural industries' as a more positive policy concern at the end of the 1970s was not some 'recognition' of the economic importance of commercial

culture. Rather it was an opening up of a new kind of 'cultural political' space within what had previously been viewed by many in the policy establishment as degraded Americanized kitsch. This new cultural political space can be seen clearly in Augustin Girard's influential 1980 paper for UNESCO, written as head of research at the French Ministry of Culture (Girard 1982). Girard points to the huge commercial cultural sector and as a matter of urgency calls on the cultural policy establishment to take note. It was the same call as that made within the Greater London Council's (GLC) new left-wing Labour leadership, elected in May 1981 (Bianchini 1987, Garnham 1990, see also Bianchini, Chapter 22, this volume), and by Mitterrand's new Minister for Culture Jack Lange in the same year (Ahearne 2010, Looseley 1995). That is, that the vast majority of cultural consumption now took place outside the subsidized sector; that the consumption of commercial culture was growing at extraordinary rates across all social levels; that traditional, subsidized 'live' cultural forms were (following Baumol and Bowen 1966) economically incapable of satisfying this demand; and therefore a refusal to engage with this commercial sector was elitist and irresponsible. A cultural policy must engage with this sector to be democratic; it needs to engage with it in order to challenge some of the more 'negative tendencies' within it. As a consequence Girard called for more research into the dimensions and dynamics of the sector; but three themes already stood out clearly.

First, a positive charge was now attached to the notion of 'industry' as a collective project; individual artistic practice had to be set within a wide range of professional, managerial and commercial services. Media and communications academics in Europe and North America had already established this within the mass media. In the United States the 'production of culture' school had begun to investigate how both 'popular' and 'high culture' was produced within complex socio-economic 'art worlds' in which the 'artist' was a constructed and contingent position (Hesmondhalgh 2007). Bourdieu's work on cultural production and consumption had begun to open up similar ground in France. In the UK Raymond Williams (1981) had also become interested in the material 'industrial' conditions of cultural production and their historical trajectories. Indeed, a new kind of art history rejected the transcendental notion of the artists and placed the individual genius squarely back within her or his social and historical context (O'Connor 2011). This recognition of the collective social basis of cultural production thus gave a strong democratic valency to the notion of 'industry'.

But, second, this industry was also about markets and profits, which raised difficult issues for cultural policy makers. These issues were outlined clearly in the mid-1980s by Bernard Miede (1989, 1987, 1979) and Nicholas Garnham (1990), both academics who had been close to the policy worlds of Jack Lange and the GLC (see Bianchini 1987). Taking direct issue with Adorno and Horkheimer's account they wanted to give a much more specific account of the cultural industries, not so much as capitalist *ideology* but as capitalist *industries* engaged in the production of cultural commodities at a profit. In contrast to the monolithic 'culture industry' and echoing similar findings by the 'production of culture' school, they identified a much more fragmented and disparate group of cultural *industries*. Their products could cut across the explicit political ideologies of the state in their search for markets; their need to make a profit demanded some degree of innovation not just formulaic repetition; and their very success in reaping profit from the exchange value of cultural commodities related, in part at least, to the ability of such commodities to provide 'use value' to their consumers. This opened up a

more contradictory cultural space and it also introduced those 'negative tendencies' of which Girard spoke. These latter included concentration, monopoly, cross-ownership, vertical integration, ever increasing levels of capitalization and so on. Girard had also pointed to 'imbalances' at the international level, anticipating later accounts of globalization. Finally, there was the position of the artists. Artists (or creative workers/professionals as they were being called) had not been absorbed into some Taylorist culture factory, as Adorno had predicted, but remained a largely freelance workforce. For Mieke and Garnham the continued independence of the artist was not a hangover from their bohemian past (as Girard suggested) but essential for the profitability of the cultural industries – including free R and D, a 'reserve army of unemployed', flexible staffing and so on.

Third, alongside these negative tendencies we can see in this cultural industries moment a more positive appropriation of new technologies of production, reproduction and distribution. There was a strong sense of seizing hold of a democratic modernity – breaking with Heideggerian anti-technological 'culture critique' as well as the formalist aesthetics of post-war modernist orthodoxy. The 1980s saw a rediscovery of the thematics of inter-war left modernism, which had embraced the future promise held out by the forms and technologies of American and home-grown mass culture. This was a re-appropriation clearly made possible by the energies released by new forms of popular culture that had burgeoned since the 1960s. The embrace of industry and technology was necessarily accompanied by a revalorization of the market. It was clearly not just 'collective' production and technological reproduction/distribution that counted here but its organization outside state subsidy and control, that is, in the market.

Thus the early 1980s saw left-leaning cultural policy makers embrace markets and technology, both of which had previously seemed to mark the boundary between art and commercial culture. Can we see this as a first repudiation of that 'elitist' opposition of arts/industry or culture/capitalism that many such as Hartley (2005) claim for the 'creative industries'? To some extent this is so. The idea of a transcendental art(ist) untainted by commerce and aloof from the world of machines had been systematically undermined. Equally, social democratic politics were now much more open to the idea of markets and much more wary of the state. Garnham (1990), for example, was explicit in his claim that the market was crucial to a modern democratic cultural policy; how else could the production of, and demand for, culture be regulated? After all, how did one embrace commercial culture without somehow embracing the commerce involved?

But there were some key elements that mark it as very different from the 'creative industries' moment of the late 1990s. First, though the economic elements were to be embraced as a crucial dimension of cultural policy, the overall intention was their contribution to a more democratic culture rather than to 'the economy' per se. Girard's call for more economic research was in order to guide intervention. The introduction of economic concepts such as the 'value chain', as well as the serious investigation of employment statistics and industry trends in this period, were to be used primarily to secure cultural ends. Second, these economic concepts and tools were there to correct 'negative tendencies' – issues of monopoly, exploitation, international domination and so on. They were there to protect against market failure – not the failure to achieve market success, as it became, but the failures intrinsic to the market mechanism per se. Third, though markets were embraced they were markets redefined – not the abstract

neo-classical rational choice market but embedded socio-cultural practices. They were part of a mixed economy, not so much the Keynesian 'commanding heights' model of the 1950s but one that had emerged from a decade of grassroots democracy and urban social movements, from the rapid decline of the political prestige of the state and the incipient energies of post-Fordism. As we shall see, such an approach worked much better at local level, which is where some of the main strands of cultural industries policy-making developed.

From Arts to Cultural Policy

We also need to situate these developments within the shift, from the 1970s onwards, from 'arts policy' to 'cultural policy'. This is usually presented as a move from a narrow to a broad conception of culture. In the Anglophone tradition Williams' famous statement that 'culture is ordinary' (1958) is invoked here, and of course the shift owes a great deal to the rise of cultural studies since the late 1950s. In France it relates more to Henri Lefebvre's late 1950s work on 'everyday life', and crucially extended by Bourdieu and de Certeau (Ahearne 2010). In general the policy shift is associated with a deepening of democracy – from the post-war social democratic concern to open up 'access to the arts' to more a participatory and interactive 'cultural democracy'. There is no denying the strong democratic content of such a shift but it is useful here to examine a core theme of this narrative, that which links the 'elitism' of art to its separation from 'life'. (See also, Young, Chapter 23, this volume.)

Charges against art's social irresponsibility, elitism, solipsistic individualism, unconcern for the real world and so on are of long standing across the political spectrum, and these had been exacerbated by the formalist tendencies within modernism. The powerful attacks of the community arts movement – and urban new social movements of which they were part (Bianchini and Parkinson 1993, Castells 1983, Mayer 2006) – on the 'arts establishment' revived themes of an older left modernism, but they also coincided with a philosophical and sociological challenge more fundamental than the long familiar critique of 'art for art's sake'. This challenge suggested that the originating claim of Western 'aesthetic' art since the eighteenth century, to a transcendental access to a certain 'truth' was deeply ideological (see O'Connor 2011 for longer discussion). This ideological function was systematically analysed by Bourdieu's 1974 *La distinction*, a work which more than any other subsequent 'debunking' fixed the equation of art and elitism (Bourdieu 1986). He suggested that the 'disinterest' which Kant saw as the defining characteristic of aesthetic reception, and which via Schiller was to become the basis for the 'autonomy' of art, was an expression of an emerging bourgeois 'habitus' (Bourdieu 1986). That is, it grounded the 'correct' ability to appreciate art in the 'higher' faculties which were freed from direct need or desire. The working class were thus excluded by their subjection to the lower passions and their need to labour. Art's claims to autonomy, and the faculties required to appreciate the 'free play' at its heart, were thus implicated in practices of social distinction and domination.

There are some huge problems with this account which we cannot address here; what is important is how this was used within cultural policy. To a left-leaning cultural politics it suggested that the self-contained, separate 'autonomous' work of art needed

now to take its place in a wider social context, in 'everyday life'. At the same time, it needed to recognize its material conditions of production, its relationship to 'economy'. In so doing its Apollonian 'disinterest' would give way to the Dionysian embrace of the 'lower' desires and interests, the business of political demands, the messiness of the market, and the unruliness of contemporary popular culture. Much of cultural studies comes from this. However, I would suggest that it is possible to see the autonomy of art not as secured at the expense of 'life', of the 'fallen' world, but against *culture* – a culture it sees as merely conventional, outworn, reified, debased. Rancière (2009) has persuasively argued that the characterization of 'aesthetic art' as separate from life is incorrect – that to the contrary it shows a constant dissolution of the boundaries between art and life established by pre-modern artistic practices. Jameson (2002) also points to the constant, systematic, often agonistic exchanges between 'art' and 'life' in the modern era. The autonomy claimed by art has a disruptive, transgressive force used not against 'life' but against the fixed, conventional forms of culture that mediate it. In this sense it is art, not 'culture', which asserts the radical heterogeneity of its domain of activity from the conceptual and administrative languages of economics, politics, the law and so on.

This can be clearly seen in two crucial areas of the post-war cultural policy settlement. On the one hand we have an art which had become a privileged representation and exemplification of national cultural identity. On the other we have an 'autonomous art' whose relationship towards such a national identity (or at least the conventional cultural expressions of such) was frequently ambivalent if not antagonistic. These two elements were highly disjointed, as the inter-war years showed, with 'autonomous art' (equated more or less with modernism) suppressed by totalitarian and right-wing authoritarian regimes. Cultural policy after the Second World War was an attempted social-democratization of this national cultural heritage. The decision to subsidize the arts was not (only) to take art out of the grubbiness of the market (although, of course, if you were already in the market then you disqualified yourself from being taken out) but to prevent art becoming the exclusive domain of the wealthy. Hence the crucial links to the expansion of education, public museums, libraries and so on. At the same time the promotion of a new canon of modern art (increasingly internationalized in the context of the Cold War and the Marshall Plan) involved a set of values much more ambivalent than the conventional humanism of a 'common artistic heritage' evoked by writers and policy makers such as Andre Malraux (see his 1951 *Voices of Silence*). These values included a radical, anarchic experimentation; a concern with the formal demands of the artistic medium; an avoidance of 'uplifting' humanistic content (and indeed content *per se*); a rejection of social and ethical conventions; and a refusal to position their work in relation to explicit political and economic rationales.

The move from 'art' to 'culture' might thus be seen as a widening of an elitist, autonomous art to embrace the messy, grounded realities of 'ordinary culture'; but it should be clear that this widening was also a migration. It involved the introduction of the themes of 'autonomous art' – what Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) called the 'artistic critique of capitalism' – into 'new left' politics, resulting in new kinds of cultural demands and aspirations. We can see a transfer of many of the themes of modernism away from 'high art' and into 'culture'. In the radical community arts movements retrieving left modernism; in the urban social movements setting up new kinds of spaces and organizations; in the artistic avant-gardes operating on the fringe

of popular culture (and vice versa); in the transformation and expansion of higher education and the growth of radical cultural theory within it – in all these we can see not just the culturization of art but also the ‘aestheticization’ of culture. The rise of cultural industries was not then a repudiation of autonomous art by ‘entertainment’ or ‘popular culture’ but the extension of many of its values into their heart.

Here is the source of that urgency about a new ‘out there’, a rapid and volatile transformation of the practices of art and ‘everyday’ culture. Something is happening and we don’t know what it is. The signifier ‘cultural industries’ was a way for policy makers to come to terms with this unknown ‘out there’.

This can be seen in those community arts and urban social movements which formed a ‘new left’ opposition to traditional arts policy, resulting in new kinds of cultural policy-making in mainland Europe (Bianchini and Parkinson 1993), in the new GLC and in radical cultural policy coalitions in North America, Australia and elsewhere. Demands around ‘collective consumption’ were extended to cultural provision, as well as for more grass-roots control over resources. Such expanded culture became ‘aesthetic’ – more autonomous, opaque, refractive, abrasive with regards to ‘mainstream’ culture. This was not simply a replication of the forms of ‘difficult’ modern art but was part of that transformative promise of the ‘artistic critique of capitalism’. That is, critique which stressed not social injustice (though it did not deny this) but the inability of capitalism to satisfy those human demands for a meaningful life that were promised or embodied in the autonomous work of art. Rimbaud’s call to *changer la vie* could be seen in Joseph Beuys as well as in the cultural currents of Punk and Post-Punk. Further, this ‘artistic critique’ was no longer restricted to artists; though subsequently reduced to ‘bohemian lifestyle’ it initially brought new demands on work, new attitudes to careers, to social conventions, to the life-course and so on (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). Urban centres especially underwent a sea change, as demands for a more ‘meaningful life’ produced new cultures of consumption and production. We can see a new *habitus* emerging; new urban cultural milieus in which new cultural aspirations were learned, as were ways of inhabiting these aspirations and of turning these into some kind of income (Raban 1974, Zukin 1982). It was these aspirations to a meaningful, democratic culture in common, coupled with the possibilities of gainful and meaningful work that gave the cultural industries signifier a utopian charge amongst activists, academics and policy-makers as it entered into a very different political era (O’Connor and Wynne 1996).

The Creative Industries

From where then did the creative industries agenda come?

Though the cultural industries was associated with left-leaning governments this has not been the case with the creative industries. The UK’s ‘New Labour’ government coined the term in 1998 (DCMS), borrowing heavily from the forward vision of the Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating’s 1994 *Creative Nation* (Oakley 2013). But in Australia, for example, the creative industries agenda has been associated with the neo-liberal Howard government (Turner 2011). Despite suspicions regarding its opposition party provenance it has nevertheless been adopted by the Conservatives in the UK and the Labor party in Australia. Across Europe it has been picked up by a range of political

parties; and its rapid adoption across the very different contexts of China and East Asia, South East Asia, parts of Latin America and Africa (Kong et al. 2006, see also, Sasaki, Chapter 12, this volume) suggests the 'empty signifier' again. What does it signify?

One clear referent is 'modernity' or 'the future'; but we might say these are empty signifiers in turn, and that these have been under political dispute since 'conservative' parties became neo-liberal modernisers. However, we can see in the polyvalency of the creative industries the emergence of a right-wing or at least neo-liberal claim to a cultural modernity traditionally associated with the left. We have noted how the creative industries are presented as a reduction of culture to the economy; this is an over simplification if we do not recognize that this is a new kind of culture and a new kind of economy. Claims for a new cultural economy were part of the cultural industries agenda in the 1980s and '90s; indeed, the 1998 launch of the new creative industries agenda in the UK by a minister with newly conferred cabinet status (and whose title included the word 'culture' for the first time, rather than 'arts' or 'heritage') suggested its political apotheosis. The sense of a new post-1960s cultural renewal along with the recognition of a new cultural economic sector bringing local and national benefits was palpable (DCMS 1998). This embrace of the new 'out there' against the older establishments of 'real industry/proper jobs' and publicly subsidized art elites gave this agenda a powerful charge of youthful, generational change. Taking a genealogical approach, however, we might see how elements of the cultural industries agenda were hollowed out and charged differently, or repositioned in a different signifying system changing their meaning.

The use of 'creativity' is a case in point. The change from 'cultural' to 'creative' has been widely discussed. For some it was a recognition of the centrality of culture, simply written under the sign of 'creativity'; the terminological change was pragmatic and not central to the real 'out there' which it designated. For others it was nonsensical: did it describe an input or an output; what was not creative; how was science, technology or business creativity different to that of 'culture'; was there a difference between creative and cultural industries – and art? I do not want to rehearse these here (see O'Connor 2011); I would suggest that 'creative' is quite clearly being used as pertaining to culture – but to an aestheticized culture exemplified by (a now 'democratized') art. Through the term creativity, the autonomy claimed by art against established culture – its challenge to conventions; its avoidance or deliberate flouting of rules; its concern to follow its own aesthetic logic, its specific non-logical methodologies – now becomes part of the symbolic meaning-making capacity of all individuals. 'Creativity' takes a specific kind of aesthetic, autonomous art and turns it into a universal human attribute – now no longer the exclusive property of the artist and one that can be made available for a wider social and economic development.

This can be set against the shift within 'information society' discourse from a concern with an abstract individual cultural capacity to 'process knowledge and manipulate symbols' (Castells 1989) acquired through formal education (and used as a standard measure of the quality of a local workforce) towards a more embedded notion of culture. This wider cultural capacity had complex historical roots which could not be (easily) replicated – and indeed, such 'tacit' or 'embedded' knowledge was part of their competitiveness and resilience *vis-à-vis* mobile global capital. As policy makers became more concerned with the demands of post-industrial innovation this cultural capacity – culture now in the sense of Williams' 'whole way of life' – was now

to be mobilized as a key economic resource or identified as dysfunctional drag. Either way what often became important was the capacity to re-invent and mobilize local 'structures of feeling', or to transcend the past, to slough off constrictive social and cultural traditions. In this way Saxenian's (1994) well-known comparative study of Boston and Silicon Valley was crucially instructive. The reason the former became the innovative powerhouse despite the latter's high levels of investment was that it escaped the traditional social, cultural and institutional structures that gave the East Coast city a comparative stiffness. Similarly Granovetter's 'The strength of weak ties' (1973) came to overturn the worries of people like Robert Putnam (2000) about social solidarity and suggested that the lack of strong social bonds allowed for great fluidity of interaction and exchange and thus economic innovation (Currid 2007, Florida 2002).

The cultural capacity for innovation thus went beyond the ability to routinely 'process knowledge and manipulate symbols' toward the ability to operate along the edges of established rules (Castells 1989). Management and business literature began to promote working 'outside the box', deliberately courting failure, chaos and disorder, using para-rational or intuitive knowledge, operating as a maverick and so on (Kelly 1998). These new values or ways of working explicitly drew on the unorthodox and unpredictable practices of artists and visionary scientists. In fact the newly emergent notion of 'creativity' within business language was parasitic on these exemplary figures. This was so not just in the realm of 'blue skies thinking' and the breaking of established paradigms and ways of doing – the new figure of the entrepreneur also picked up the cultural capital associated with the artist as social rebel.

In the 1980s the Schumpeterian entrepreneur made a comeback against the Fordist 'organization man' of the 1950s and '60s. It was part of a re-vamped neo-liberal attack on state corporatism in favour of the small business enterprise. The New Right positioned both itself and the entrepreneur as outsiders and rebels. Entrepreneurs worked at the edges of the system, pushed its boundaries, explored new territories, confronting ossified ways of thinking and doing. Schumpeter's 'creative destruction' therefore had clear links with the dominant account of cultural modernism: its iconoclastic, shock-of-the-new obsession with innovation (Anderson 1984). During the 1980s entrepreneurs and artists often occupied the same place in new management literature – as society's outriders, productive rebels who might glimpse the outline of the future. In these ways – mobilizing a local cultural capacity, using aesthetic art as exemplar for innovation, and transforming the bohemian counter-cultural producer into creative entrepreneur – art and culture, no longer recalcitrant to economic development, become 'resource' (Yudice 2003).

The consequences of these kinds of shifts can be seen in the extensive debates around cultural work (see Oakley 2009). The promise of meaningful, autonomous cultural work has frequently resulted in (self-)exploitation; 'creativity' has been a way of shifting job market responsibility from governments to individuals; the creation of a culture in common easily becomes narcissistic self-promotion and the instrumental exploitation of social networks. I won't add to these extensive critiques here. What is crucial is that urgent 'out there' which the creative industries discourse could mobilize. What transformed the artist-creative from exemplary role-model (avant-garde artistic practice as a model for innovative and entrepreneurial thinking in business) to real economic resource was the growth of the 'cultural economy' itself. Not just the expansion of cultural commodity markets per se – music, television, radio, publishing, film, visual

arts, fashion, computer games and so on – but the increased cultural or symbolic content of functional goods and services. Product and interior design, ‘experience value’ in services, ‘attention value’ in marketing and public relations, cultural tourism, the growing role of web 2.0 based social networking within all of these – they were all part of that ‘culturalization of the economy’ which Scott Lash and John Urry had announced in 1994. (See also, Young, Chapter 23, this volume.) Therefore, though ‘creativity’ in general is deemed a core social value, because cultural or symbolic inputs were now a major source of value right across the economy then the particular skills, mind-sets and working practices of those operating in this risky, volatile and maverick cultural/creative industries sector would be at a premium.

It might be noted in passing that these kinds of transformations cannot simply be reduced to ‘neo-liberalism’. There is a polyvalency around these themes which makes them unstable. For the neo-liberal agenda is not simply the prevalence of the ‘free-market’; such an agenda marks the cultural policy struggles under the Reagan and Thatcher era – of de-regulation, cuts in subsidy and the insistence on economic justifications for art. The price of everything and the value of nothing and so on. Neo-liberalism was introduced by conservatives – who saw the 1960s counter-culture as antithetical to their project. This culture was ‘anti-business’ of course, but it also promoted social and cultural values which were detrimental to the traditional symbols of nationhood under which these early neo-liberal reforms were conducted. Hence the ‘culture-wars’ and the increasingly ‘conservative’ image of these inveterate modernizers. It was Clinton and Blair who saw the political availability of ‘60s counterculture to present a forward-looking agenda in which many of the themes of neo-liberalism could be extended through and within the realm of ‘aesthetized’ culture.

The new cultural economy involved new kinds and scales of commodification. But this was not the reduction of cultural ‘use value’ to the universal equivalence of exchange. This new economy was built on recognition of cultural use value and the skills and processes necessary to organize this. Hence the catalytic role with respect to the wider economy – generally demanding more ‘experience’, ‘attention’ and other service-industry qualities – claimed for the creative industries (Cunningham 2004, 2002, Miller, Chapter 3, this volume). The cultural use value is now linked to exchange value by extremely rapid, multiple and sophisticated circuits. Indeed, the integration of web 2.0 technologies into this process over the last decade has radically destabilized any remaining direct ownership of use value by the creative worker. Co-creation involved not just the direct input of consumers into the creative process; the very act of consumption and the technological ability of machines and organizations to track and analyse such consumption allows the generation of new value. The cultural product now gains an almost Adorno-esque objective existence apart from its creator; but it is its very distinctiveness, its evasion of equivalence and disruption of established rules which is the source of its economic value (Lash and Lury 2007).

The opposition of cultural use value to exchange value no longer works as it did. In the creative industries creators don’t fully create and rejecting exchange value can only be elitist; or to claim the role of the ‘expert’ which amounts to the same thing (Hartley 2005). In the notion – developed from Hartley’s work – of ‘social network markets’ there is no source of meaning other than that instantaneously manifested in particular conjunction of personal preferences creating ‘value’ (O’Connor 2009, Potts et al. 2008). Its combination

of methodological individualism and the reduction of cultural value to exchange value represent the arrival of neo-liberal thought at the very heart of cultural theory.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to approach the cultural and creative industries policy not from the perspective of an economic sector to which various technical support policies can be applied. Rather I have tried to outline the ways in which they have emerged as 'matters of concern' for cultural policy. The creative industries 'moment' which began in 1997 combined many different and contradictory cultural agendas around an urgent call to recognize a new 'out there' – one that represented the future, change, renewal. Though often received with some cynicism in the UK around its explicit party political elements (see Harris 2003) it contained an energizing imperative. I have frequently witnessed, in Russia, in East Asia and elsewhere, assemblies of the most econometric policy-makers, calculating the value-added of culture, alongside young, energetic 'creatives' kicking against ignorant and corrupt politicians, global corporations and smug arts establishments which they see as standing in their way – of making a living and making a new culture in common. These moments are not to be denied their power; just as the earlier moments of the cultural industries coalition cannot be dismissed because their value was recouped by property developers and city marketing departments.

In developed countries at least the 'artistic critique of capitalism' has now become domesticated, a resource for economists, developers and high-minded idealists alike. The ability of the established corporate structures of the cultural industries to absorb the new social media and digital challenges, and the rapidity with which the new players became integrated; the association of creative work with new forms of exploitation; the absorption of the creative industries agenda into property development and the paucity of the intellectual and financial resources city governments (with some exceptions) put into their development – all these have very much undermined the transformative energies with which the creative industries agenda was first welcomed.

The ubiquity of cultural commodities and the easy access to the technologies of production and distribution is now taken for granted. Globalization is no longer the sole province of the de-regulators and off-shore outsourcing but also belongs to the post-national 'multitude' which – rather than being assembled *right now* under the banner of McDonalds or Benetton (Hartley 1999) – demands work to give it form (Hardt and Negri 2005). New kinds of cultural practice across the globe, concerned to create new spaces of possibilities and collaboration, can be seen as part of work to invent new kinds of social collectivities. They suggest a movement beyond autonomous aesthetic culture to a recognition of the social and ethical bonds within which this culture is produced. That is building cultural connections in a context – after neo-liberalism – in which 'traditional' (including Fordist industrial) cultures have been strip-mined and de-stabilized; in which 'conventional culture' now includes the urge to self-expression, creativity and innovation (often at the expense of any other consideration). This is clearly what is now at stake with the debates about self-control (Brooks 2011), 'bigger-than-self' thinking, and even 'big society', to put together a social order rocked by

four decades of economic modernization. As opposed to a conservative re-assertion of traditional values – deeply compromised by its neo-liberal turn – we might see the issue as creating a society of ‘weak ties’ conceived not as fragmented individualism but as an open, democratic social bond.

We can see this in the ‘ethical turn’ in design, where its association with the ‘aesthetic’ allure of the commodity is giving way to its application to social structures and processes (O’Connor 2012). So too is the general shift across what was once called the creative industries towards sustainability – not just to ‘green’ production but to local markets and livelihoods and to the cultures which intersect with these. In these processes older artistic values – of craft, time, patience, the determination by the object rather than self-expression, ethical-aesthetic communities – emerge (Gibson 2011). No longer just in North America, Europe and Australia but globally, the social and ethical dimensions of culture have been asserted against the purely economic, and the uncoupling of cultural workers from the agenda of the creative industries has gone on apace, if unevenly. This is the big ‘out there’ that should be a matter of concern. So far we don’t have a signifier for it.

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