INTRODUCTION

Feminism and feminist ethics address how people can live together in healthy, productive, mutually satisfying ways and can alter social or political obstacles to healthy, productive mutually satisfying lives. Feminism has been largely appreciated for foregrounding women’s interests; feminist ethics was analogously long understood to correct male-centered ethical methodologies and theories that marginalize and under-value women’s moral thinking, deauthorize women as moral agents, or exclude women’s experiences as a source of moral reflection. Norlock’s (2019) review article centers feminist ethics around gender, even as she acknowledges that feminist ethicists hope to correct binary views of gender, which oppress those who do not conform to the gender binary and other harmful gender conceptions. Norlock emphasizes the importance to feminist ethicists of criticizing the privilege available to men but denied women. Both feminists and feminist ethicists, however, are interested in larger interventions that undo oppression of all kinds, including, but not only, inequity on the basis of race, class, sexuality, and (dis)ability, all of which intersect in crucial ways.

Because media are integral to contemporary culture and are primary markers of status and legitimacy, feminism’s commitment to transformative thinking and acting explains its concerns with media practices and content. That said, feminist theorizing may seem a vague resource for helping to resolve ethical dilemmas in media and communication. In part this is because feminists insist on contextualization. Most feminists reject claims that ethical codes can be deduced from a set of timeless hierarchically-arranged rights; they resist abstract disembodied, dislocated conceptions and usually regard universalizing efforts as masking a masculine or male agenda. Furthermore, multiple approaches to feminist ethics have emerged, in part given differing accounts of whether women and men engage in ethical reasoning the same way. “Feminist ethics comprises a complex and theoretically disunified body of work” (Calhoun, 2004, p. 8).

Feminist philosophers rarely focus explicit attention on media or cite media scholarship. Perhaps the low status within philosophy’s pecking order of feminist theory, normative ethics, and moral psychology (Meyers, 2005) discourages a turn to professional ethics. Nonetheless, a feminist approach to professional ethics may be derived from four strands of work. First, and discussed below in the greatest detail, are some key concepts in feminist ethics, including the ethic
of care, which, while it is contested, applies to a range of journalism issues. Second, feminist epistemology applies not only to media and journalism research but also to ethical dilemmas in professional practice. Embedded in feminist theories of ethical knowledge-seeking are highly relevant critiques of researcher-subject relationships and of objectivity. Third, feminism’s normative concerns with issues of verbal and visual representation and language per se highlight ethical dimensions of news and entertainment. Fourth, activists’ complaints about various forms of workplace discrimination challenge media institutions to design workplaces that enable and encourage ethical sensitivity. Feminist ethics can help analyze and resolve problems that emerge in media research, news and entertainment content, and media workplaces.

Below I first briefly outline three major efforts in the 1980s and 1990s to generate moral theories that take women seriously as moral agents: the ethic of care, lesbian ethics, and black womanism. I then assess attempts to modify, extend, or challenge caring, because articulating a practicable, productive ethic of care for journalism requires at a minimum extending the world of moral responsibility beyond the family and even beyond friendship relationships. Feminist ethics must be able to evaluate care, and criticize harmful, excessive, and other forms of unethical caring. Moreover, an ethical schema cannot work only for women or women’s interests. All major problems and ethical dilemmas have impact for both women and men, although the consequences may be different and unequal. The theorizing section of the chapter ends with a discussion of feminist standpoint epistemology, particularly its critique of objectivity, given its significance for media research and journalism practice.

Having sketched out these theories, I point out their potential applications to questions of media research, journalism practice, news and entertainment content, and media workplaces. Feminist theorizing emphasizes context but also the specific connection of the personal and political, so feminist ethics must serve media professionals inside and outside their work sites. Caring must be politicized and reconstructed to include caring for (some) strangers and distant communities if it is to be useful, for example, to journalists—who are in relationships not only with colleagues and known and “seen” sources and subjects, but also unseen and unknown audiences (Steiner & Okrusch, 2006). I treat “feminist ethics” as acknowledging women’s historical experiences but understanding—and wanting to correct—the problems “engendered” by a host of power inequities.

THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEMINIST ETHICS

Although second-wave feminists regarded and practiced feminism as explicitly normative, feminist ethics emerged as a distinct scholarly endeavor with Carol Gilligan’s 1982 In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, a ground-breaking book about women’s ways of analyzing and resolving moral dilemmas. According to Gilligan, who was trained as a developmental psychologist, Kohlberg’s then classic categorization of moral development failed to consider women’s distinctive ways of thinking, because he derived his notions of rights, rules, and justice from interviews with men. No wonder, therefore, that women apparently rarely attained the highest stage of moral development. Gilligan’s interviews with women (albeit all of them white, middle-class North Americans) showed their moral development beginning selfishly and then maturing through a conventional stage based in a network of relationships and sense of responsibility to maintain those relations; a final post-conventional stage was grounded in universal care.

For the next two decades, feminists debated the differences between an ethic of responsibility and care, associated with women’s ethical decision-making, and an ethic of rights and justice.
associated with men. Taking human interaction and dyadic caring relationships as ontologically fundamental, Noddings’ (1984) model for ethical decision-making, for example, privileged intimate, non-judgmental maternal caring. Noddings claimed that genuine caring—directed at people in definite relationships—involves thoroughly attending to the cared-for, while ignoring one’s own concerns and setting aside one’s goals. Meanwhile, in adopting the goals of the cared-for, care-givers are transformed. Emphasizing that all humans depend on non-reciprocal caring by others, first as infants and children, and likely later as well, Kittay (1999) likewise saw this relationship of dependency as paradigmatic. Others celebrated feminine traits and virtues that are popularly associated with women. In offering maternal nurturing as a model, Ruddick (1989) and Manning (1992) emphasized mothers’ efforts to socialize children and cultivate their virtues; sometimes mothers even encourage children to eschew values and traits that might seem valuable for social success, but that they deem unethical.

These scholars largely eschewed biological explanations. They often conceded that men, too, should care. Mothering is a learned way of thinking, so if men spent as much time attending to children as women do, presumably men would also think maternally. Nonetheless, this body of work was appropriately criticized for essentializing sex/gender and conflating female/feminine/feminist. Gilligan (1982) ignored the impact of a history of sex stereotyping and subordination; she falsely universalized women, ignoring differences in experiences interstructured with race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, as well as historical, geographic, and material circumstances (Steiner, 1989).

The debate shifted, however, once Gilligan (1987) explicitly denied that caring about and for people and following abstract principles of justice are opposites, much less that one mode is superior to the other. Care and justice are not be easily integrated, she conceded; practically speaking, only one can be deployed at a single moment. Yet, one may be aware of both. More to the point, all relationships, public and private, can be characterized both in terms of equality and attachment. Both inequality and detachment are grounds for moral concern. Everyone is vulnerable both to oppression and abandonment. Noddings (2002) acknowledged, “Even theories, like children, can grow up and move into the public world” (p. 2). While the home is where people learn how to care, direct personal “caring-for” (or being cared-for) teaches “caring-about.” So, instead of rejecting rights-based approaches, Noddings came to see justice ethics as extensions of caring: “justice itself is dependent on caring-about, and caring-about is in turn dependent on caring-for” (p. 6).

This brief overview of the early development of the feminist ethic of care, then, exposes a degree of terminological ambiguity. By 1995 Gilligan distinguished between a “feminine” ethic of care, emphasizing special obligations and interpersonal relationships, and a “feminist” ethic of care, emphasizing connections that, she noted, expose the disconnections in feminine selflessness and self-sacrifice premised on a faulty, patriarchal opposition between relationships and autonomy. Koehn (1998) labeled her own approach “female ethics” as a way to avoid ethical traditions dominated by men. Notably, while conceding that one could conceptualize the ethics of care without attaching an adjective, Sevenhuijsen (1998) refers to the “feminist ethics of care” to show how care and ethics are interwoven with gender in ways requiring feminist interpretation.

Certainly, feminist ethicists rarely ignore care altogether. Some ethicists remain highly sympathetic, commending the ethic of care for highlighting, if not mitigating, important defects in justice theory, including its impersonality and potential for arbitrariness. Caring is understood as including “everything we do directly to help others to meet their basic needs, develop or sustain their basic capabilities, and alleviate or avoid pain or suffering, in an attentive, responsive and respectful manner” (Engster, 2005, p. 55, italics in the original). Moreover, instead of deriving our duty to care from others’ dependency on us, Engster grounds the obligation to care for others on
our (common) dependency on others. Because we demand care from others for the reproduction of society, we should care for others in need. Drawing on Augustine and Emmanuel Levinas, and also sacredness, for her claim that caring is basic to flourishing as a human being, Grouenhout (2004) asserts that humans naturally tend to offer care, to accept care, and to be caring.

Some ethicists refuse to privilege care. Caring, or excessive caring, not only can hurt women (they can be exploited, for example) but also maims their capacity for moral autonomy and thus moral action (as when they protect people who are exploitive). Maternal care may be extreme, oppressive, or at least distorted. For Bartky (1990), doing the family’s emotional work and bolstering men’s egos disempowers women, even if they demur on this point or are paid to care. Koehn (1998) suggests that maternal care approaches are politically naïve, over-privilege the earth mother, and too easily dismiss autonomy. The ethics of care is “insufficiently suspicious of the classically feminine moral failing of self-sacrifice” and open to invidious partiality (Jaggar, 2000, p. 456). Of course, regardless of how care works as an ideal, it does not necessarily describe actual behavior or relationships.

LESBIAN ETHICS

In proposing lesbian ethics, Hoagland (1988) saw heterosexual femininity as offering an ethics of dependence and self-sacrifice that essentially accepts a masculine model of the feminine; manipulation becomes the primary mode of female agency. Hoagland grounded lesbian ethics, as a creative ethics of resistance, in lesbians’ experience of oppression, thereby opening up transformative conceptual possibilities. She drew on Monique Wittig’s assertion that the material basis of the man/woman distinction itself renders women as dominated by and “under” men. Hoagland likewise commended Audre Lorde’s proposal, in the name of pluralism, to embrace difference. Lorde argued that the Other is created by ignoring difference, such as when white women “white out” women of color and their distinct forms of resistance. Hoagland suggested that individual moral integrity and agency—her foundational values—will result from a new method of “attending.” Ultimately her goal was a lesbian community. Hoagland (1988) called for moral revolution and repudiated moral reform as merely greater adherence to existing Western values and ethical norms, for example, notions of consensus and self-sacrifice; these were imperialist ideas that sustained an ethics of control and power. Notably, some scholars suggested that Hoagland’s ideals might work for lesbians and “wimmin,” albeit not everyone. Some worried about the implications of a separatist lesbian communal ethics for black women of color (since it demands pulling away from black culture). Others seemed skeptical of the entire idea of lesbian ethics.

BLACK WOMANIST ETHICS

With even greater impact and ongoing resonance, African-American scholars draw especially from Christian theology, but also black history and feminist theory to develop a “womanist” ethics that, among other features, exposes and corrects the racism that has historically marked, or rather, marred, feminist thinking. Increasing attention has been paid in recent years to how white women abolitionists and suffragists wished to extend the privileges that white and middle-class women enjoyed in the domestic and private sphere; this maintained the social order (Norlock, 2019) and ignored, marginalized or even excluded most black women suffragists. Alice Walker’s conceptualization of “womanist” as involving tradition, community, self, and critiques of white
feminist thinking have often been deployed in womanist and black liberationist ethics. Religious studies scholars who initially articulated womanist ethics include Cannon, whose *Black Womanist Ethics* (1988) featured Zora Neale Hurston, and Townes (1993), who drew on activist/journalist Ida B. Wells-Barnett to develop a Christian social ethics. In the second generation of Christian womanism, Floyd-Thomas (2006) explicitly uses Walker’s definition as the basis of four tenets of womanist ethics: radical subjectivity, traditional communalism, redemptive self-love, and critical engagement.

Townes (2011) emphasizes particularity:

> All discourse is rooted in the social location of those who speak (or are silent or silenced) [so] such discourse is particular and ultimately biased … An ethic of justice must be based on the community from which it emerges, for it can degenerate into flaccid ideology if it does not espouse a future vision that calls the community beyond itself into a wider and more inclusive circle. (pp. 37–38)

Townes says that prescriptively, womanist ethics requires both the pastoral and the prophetic voice as “complementary forces that coalesce into a day-by-day ethic” (p. 42). For her, the womanist ethic is unapologetically confrontive; a prophetic voice must be, among other things, an agent of admonition.

Debates have emerged within black womanism. Some see womanist ethics as a form of feminist ethics. Perhaps a greater number refer to womanist and feminist ethics, which simultaneously links and distinguishes them, suggesting that womanists and feminists understand and critique domination and subordination differently, albeit with equal passion. Relatedly, some womanists (analogous to black scholars more generally) argue that black women should not cite white sources. Sanders (1989) asserted that to appropriate white sources—to employ oppressors’ evaluative criteria—manifests racial self-hatred. Explicitly refuting Sanders, Cannon (1993) rejected the presumption of an absolute incompatibility between womanist critical scholarship and white feminist liberationist sources, predicting such a suspicion would result in time-consuming busy work and reinvention of the proverbial wheel. Cannon noted that her own womanist voice was shaped by personal experiences of many forms of oppression, including elitist class oppression within the African American community.

Nineteenth-century black women activists such as Ida B. Wells-Barnett, Sojourner Truth, and Anna Julia Cooper as well as more moderate members of black women’s clubs did not call themselves womanist. Nevertheless, they did fruitfully embody a nascent womanist social analysis. Thus, their non-universalizing, interstructured epistemology prefigures womanists’ insistence on justice as involving truth-telling, reality-testing, and radical challenge (Townes, 2011). Suggesting, too, a sense of the link between standpoint and moral analysis, Cooper, who was born into slavery in 1858, but earned a PhD in history from the Sorbonne in 1924, insisted in her 1892 book *A Voice From the South* that understanding of U.S. history required appropriate inclusion of Black American voices, especially the “open-eyed but hitherto voiceless Black Woman of America” (quoted in Norlock, 2019). These women and others grounded their work for women’s rights and arguments for women’s moral and socio-political equality not in domestic virtues but in equal legal protection, economic liberation, political representation, and the right to bear arms in order to provide for the liberation of Black Americans. Cooper believed that virtues and truth had masculine and feminine sides. Therefore, children should learn both masculine reason and feminine sympathy “in order that our boys may supplement their virility by tenderness and sensibility, and our girls may round out their gentleness by strength and self-reliance” (Cooper, 1892, quoted in Norlock, 2019).
REVISIONS OF THE ETHICS OF CARE

Care ethics remains alive, albeit highly contested, with different people in a variety of intellectual and professional domains offering different ways to revise and revitalize the concept. In introducing a special issue of the *International Journal of Care and Caring* on care ethics, Hamington (2018) defined care ethics as a relational approach to morality that values context, emotion and experience; considers people’s needs, and circumstances and constraints, including as they are constrained by relationships; and treats care thinking/theorizing and care work as interrelated. As Barnes, Brannelly, Ward and Ward (2015, p. 243) say:

The power of the ethics of care lies in its capacity to move between the messy everyday realities of care giving and receiving, and the political processes through which policy is made, while applying a coherent philosophical and psychological understanding of interdependence as fundamental to the human condition.

One issue turns on the political dimension of care. Held (2006) sees care as both practice (in terms of caring relations) and value, but not as a virtue. Others propose a virtue ethic featuring both justice and care, usually with care put first or as one among several prominent feminist virtues. Justice and care, as values, invoke different moral considerations; but as practices, caring may also need values such as justice. Held defends the ethic of care as a distinct normative theory that emphasizes respecting and meeting the needs of people we take responsibility for. She calls for developing frameworks of caring about and for one another at both community and global levels. “Socializing care has the potential of infusing care values into political decisions and accepted ideas that underlie social values” (Hamington and Miller, 2006, p. xiv). A social ethic of care simultaneously embraces human particularity and honors “the obligation to uphold that particularity in a social context of rights and fairness” (p. xv).

It is not that everyone and all issues must be treated equally. As Bell (2005) notes, ethical intersubjectivity cannot alone answer the question: “How far—across how much space and time, encompassing how many people—should I care?” (p. 502). Sevenhuijsen (1998) and Sander-Staudt (2006) note the risks in marrying care and justice. Sander-Staudt prefers a freestanding feminist care ethic, albeit working collaboratively with virtue ethics; at best, an open marriage between care and virtue ethics would require a prenuptial agreement and marital therapy. Worried that a hasty marriage will exclude politics, Sevenhuijsen (1998) sees care broadly, as a source of moral and political judgment, and thus treats care as a form of practice and human agency, and ethics as a political virtue. Mendus (2000) even argues that “domestic virtues are deformed when they are translated to a public world” (p. 114); political problems are characteristically large-scale and do not emerge at the level of individual relationships.

Koehn (1998) proposed dialogic female ethics, on the grounds that if an ethics of care or empathy provides no incentive to self-reflection, caregivers may indulge in self-righteous anger, manipulation, or even violence. While care is intrinsically good, it cannot provide for the complete good; indeed, each of us is prone to error. Her solution is to structure opportunities for receivers of care to contest caregivers’ expectations. Such a space requires principles (not rules), she says. Her dialogic female ethics thus incorporates the principles of male ethics into the consultative ethos of female ethics. It stresses human interdependence; requires empathy for the vulnerable; treats the domestic realm as having public significance; respects difference and individuality; emphasizes imaginative discourse and listening; and is transformative. But the “critical conversations” Koehn describes as crucial correctives are literal and interpersonal, without apparent application to professionals.
Many feminist theorists refuse to separate the personal from the political, unwilling to regard
justice as appropriate only to the public/political sphere while reserving care for the domains
of family and charitable organizations. Care is relevant to the political domain, although it is needed
most clearly in family and friendship contexts (Held, 2006). Care alone cannot handle all issues
of justice and rights, but may be a broad framework for individual rights; it points to ways for
radical restructuring of social, economic, and political policies.

Commending the ethics of care for moral and political judgments, Tronto (1995) distinguished
four phrases of care, each of which has a concomitant value: caring about, attentiveness; taking
care of, responsibility; care giving, competence; and care receiving, responsiveness. Although
many criticize her version of care as overly broad (for a review, see Sander-Staudt, 2006), Tronto
insists: “[C]are is not solely private or parochial; it can concern institutions, societies, even global
levels of thinking” (p. 145). She concedes that material imbalances in the amount of care that
people receive, when integrated with justice, raise political questions: Determining who needs or
deserves which kinds of care requires knowledge and thus public deliberation. Robinson (2011)
rethinks global and human security issues through what she calls “critical feminist care ethics.”
This enables her to critique how women from income-poor states migrate to affluent countries to
undertake work usually associated with the traditional roles of wives—child care (and for the sick
and elderly, homemaking, and sex—and as sex workers; environmental issues, global health (in)
security. She sees care ethics as relevant to global security governance, humanitarian intervention,
and peacekeeping and peacebuilding, including the specific moral and political responsibilities
that follow from recognizing how violent conflict leaves some people hurt and vulnerable.

Denzin (1997) and Christians (2002, 2003) propose “feminist communitarian ethics” as a
means of facilitating civic transformation and promoting universal solidarity. Their point, fol-
lowing Benhabib, is that communitarianism, as a political philosophy, takes as fundamental the
social nature of the self, the connection of personal dignity and communal well-being, and the
importance of care, justice, and interpersonal respect. This version of feminist communitarian-
ism emphasizes that the community is ontologically and morally prior to persons; values, moral
commitments and existential meanings are negotiated dialogically.

Communitarian movement sociologists such as Amitai Etzioni do not necessarily ally them-
 selves with feminist aims. Some of them ignore the effects of patriarchy and sex discrimination,
as well as race, sexuality, and class, thus leaving in place a family in which sexual difference is
deepl y entrenched. With their more formal and even universalized notion of community, these
communitarians ignore feminists’ concerns both with the profound impact of social context and
the potential repression of specific communities. Communitarians worry about the loss of com-
munity boundaries, whereas feminists worry about the costs of traditional boundaries (p. 167).
As a result, feminists and communitarians of this type “have not been, are not, and perhaps
cannot or should not be more consistent allies” (Weiss, 1995, p. 161). Friedman (1993), for exam-
ple, warns against such communitarians’ over-warm invocation of the norms and traditions of
families, neighborhoods, and nations. That said, feminists might yet develop a distinctive version
of communitarian ethic that usefully and significantly extends caring. Christians (2004) proposes
feminist communitarianism as an intermediary step to dialogic communitarianism, which is the
most mature embodiment of both communitarian political philosophy and feminist social ethics.

Finally, Fraser (1986) helpfully indicates how dominant groups (by gender, class, race) control
the means of interpretation and communication; among other ways, they manage to control
the official vocabularies, rhetorical devices, idioms for communicating one’s needs, and the par-
adigms of argumentation accepted as authoritative in adjudicating conflicting claims. Rejecting
“universalist-formal” ethics, she advocates a dialogical ethic that enables the critique “of inter-
pretations of needs, of definitions of situations and of the social conditions of dialogue, instead of
establishing a privileged model of moral deliberation which effectively shields such matters from scrutiny” (p. 426). But instead of endorsing Gilligan’s relational-interactive model of identity, Fraser emphasizes a contextual, collective dimension in order to advocate the standpoint of the collective concrete other, a perspective focusing on that intermediate zone of group identity. The space between unique individuality and universal humanity leads Fraser to an ethic of solidarity governed by “norms of collective solidarities as expressed in shared but non-universal social practices” (p. 428).

Thus, to suggest caring as appropriate for journalists, who otherwise are committed (if merely as a strategic short-cut) to a formalist, rights-based and proceduralist insistence on neutrality, distance, and objectivity, requires first a politicized care that potentially embraces needy strangers and deserving communities. Importantly for media work, this notion of care requires thought, evaluation, deliberation, and informed debate. Moreover, even this radicalized notion of care cannot alone undergird an entire moral theory. Not all intimate caring relationships and contexts are moral; not all political “causes” are inherently moral and progressive.

THE RELEVANCE OF FEMINIST STANDPOINT THEORY

Given its attention to how all knowledge is socially situated and its challenge to the ideological practices of androcentric science, feminist standpoint theory is extraordinarily useful to the development of a robust feminist ethics for a variety of knowledge projects across scholarly, pedagogic, and professional domains. Feminist standpoint epistemology (FSE) insists that the historical and cultural contexts of knowledge are important and meaningful. It refutes “normal” scientists’ claim that they can perform “the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere” (Hawkey, 1991, p. 189), which conceals, rather than reveals, the working of power. Standpoint feminists rely on critical evaluation to determine which social locations tend to promote better knowledge claims, including the locations of those conducting the research. Moreover, communities are the primary makers of meaning. Communities, not individuals, generate, maintain, and hold bodies of knowledge. Reconceptualizing knowers as “individuals-in-communities” avoids atomism (Grasswick, 2004). Moral dialogue among a community of interlocutors will correct biases that individuals cannot detect in themselves (Friedman, 1993).

A key insight for FSE is that subordinated people must understand those who dominate them. In contrast, dominant groups do not need to understand those they subordinate and hence do not. So, FSE is wise about the uneven distribution and operation of power. It understands that all methods, including those claiming to be apolitical, are political. Beginning (but not necessarily ending) with the standpoint of women as a subordinated class, then, and grounding research in the perspectives of those who are the most marginalized will generate less partial, less distorted accounts. This affirmatively embraces particularity, in contrast to empiricists’ universalizing accounts, grounded in the illusion of a universal subject. FSE exploits the distinctive resources of differently situated groups for more critical, reflexive knowledge projects (Steiner, 2018). That said, in the same way that the enforced maternal giving may be distorting, so may the experience of subordination and oppression. FSE does not claim that women per se share a privileged vantage point, although this point has been greatly misunderstood (e.g. Hekman, 1997). Of course, not all women ethicists are feminist. Some men are. Nonetheless, FSE suggests, people’s perspectives and ways of knowing, and therefore their moral development and ethical standpoints reflect their experiences, which are (at least so far in history) themselves impacted by gender, race/ethnicity, class, (dis)ability and sexuality.
Philosopher Sandra Harding’s version of FSE offers a particularly useful critique of scientific objectivity. Harding acknowledges that the neutrality ideal can resolve internal differences within a scientific community. Objectivity can identify the social values and interests that differ among researchers—the context of justification. Remaining invisible, however, is the context of discovery, the implicit social assumptions shared by a community, including racist, homophobic, or misogynist biases. Harding’s point is that the scientific method, which is implemented or activated only at the stage of research design, comes into play too late in the process to identify the broad historical interests and values that shape the agendas and therefore the contents of inquiry. Objectivists do not ask whose questions are counted as worth pursuing, or how these questions are conceptualized and researched. This distorts the results to varying but obscured degrees.

FSE philosophers go to considerable pains, it must be added, to repudiate relativism and to consider methods by which knowledge projects can become less false. To say that knowledge is provisional and situated is not to give up on standards or rigor, or to say that knowledge simply comes from and stays with the individual. Crasnow’s (2008) solution is to combine FSE with feminist empiricism (referring to empirical adequacy and other epistemic virtues) and what she calls model-based objectivity. That is, models—as tools that mediate between theory and pragmatic reality—have explanatory value by focussing on the features that we believe are salient to particular, local goals, even if they do not always work for all problems and for all time. Crasnow also proposes “bootstrapping”: we apply our standards to judge whether theories are good; then, when something does not work, we revise both the belief as well as the standards by which we judge. In this way, methodology evolves.

For journalism, this suggests that the embodied experiences of journalists and their subjects, including as these are raced, sexed/gendered, and classed, are potential resources. Besides transparency, accountability, comprehensiveness, consistency, and other regulative research ideals, FSE also demands systematic, critical examination of knowledge-seekers’ beliefs. Journalists would need to acknowledge how, as journalists, they are not exempt from these dynamics. Media professionals—like other people—would state their positions openly and offer mutual critiques, not as a matter of competition, but for transparency and to correct the overall value of their work. Standpoint epistemology requires journalists “to rethink themselves and their craft from the position of marginalized Others, thus uncovering unconscious ethnocentric, sexist, racist, and heterosexist biases that distort news production” (Durham, 1998, p. 132). Becoming engaged in the consequences of stories for the disenfranchised would “subvert from within the hegemonies in current news practice” (p. 135). Arguably, standpoint theory not only requires news accounts that include the powerless as sources, but also that women are hired for their distinctive standpoints.

APPLYING FEMINIST ETHICS TO RESEARCH

Some feminist scholars argue that feminism requires no specific methodology, much less a set of methods. Jaggar (2000) optimistically says that “feminism’s views about the processes, methods, and conclusions of good moral thinking are sufficiently varied, contested, and negotiable that each can provide a useful check on others” (p. 465). Yet, feminist theories of researchers’ ethical obligations to subjects, to social science, and to society have multiple implications for journalism/media research in both academic and applied or professional contexts. Despite their disagreements, Western feminist ethicists worry about contingent inequalities and advocate multidisciplinary approaches to understanding human knowledge (Jaggar, 2000). That is, feminist moral philosophy does not appeal to reason alone, and distrusts exclusively rationalist
approaches. Naturalized epistemology must “operate within a circle of what its practitioners take to be their best methods and conclusions” (Jaggar, 2000, p. 456).

As both a way of knowing and a moral perspective, the ethics of care requires researchers to be highly self-reflective and self-conscious about their ethical and scientific responsibilities. Feminist research takes seriously choice of topic: important problems, with potential for having a transformative impact, that help publics assess policies and provide good (valid, practical) reasons for acting (Koehn, 1998). Ethical researchers make research accessible to communities who need it; they share it with subjects themselves, not merely at the end but as the research proceeds. They avoid objectifying people. Agents of knowledge are not fundamentally different from objects of knowledge; both are socially located in space and time (Harding, 1993). Researchers humbly acknowledge their positioning and partiality, value diversity and pluralism, and do not claim to have all or “the” knowledge about others.

Gunzenhauser (2006) analogously posits a relational ethic that depends on caring researchers, with contact requiring subjectivity; the researcher and the researched both contribute knowledge to the relation. Brannelly (2018), who based her so-called “ethics of care research manifesto” on data about mental health problems, connects care ethics with “co-production” methodology and its commitment to attentiveness and group solidarity. Caring research, with its concerns for interdependencies and relationships, will expose marginalization and enact larger political and social efforts for change, so Brannelly calls for participatory research that values long-term involvement with communities and respects communities’ needs and wishes.

Rouse (2004) specifically denies that feminist science is an epistemological analogue to an ethics of care. Nevertheless, he contrasts feminist scientists’ “caring” attitude to androcentric aspirations to detachment. Feminist reconstructions of objectivity are, he says, attempts to hold knowers accountable for what they do (and for the effects of what they do) and to determine to whom and to what they need to be held accountable. These attempts take place with the recognition that inquiry and representation are inevitably partial and based in a particular perspective. Feminist researchers are therefore concerned with who gets to speak, who is heard as authoritative and how knowledge claims become authoritative, whose concerns or potential responses must be considered when constructing knowledge accounts, who has access to the material and social resources needed for research, and how the resulting authorization of knowers/knowledge changes people’s lives (Rouse, 2004).

Feminist moral epistemology thus offers a prescription for ethical research, including about media. Such ethics guide choice of topic, for example, including genres such as soap operas and romance novels, otherwise discredited by being associated with women and women’s pleasure. Lotz (2000) suggests “studying up” audiences (e.g., industry executives and media policy makers) and introspective “native study,” in contrast to the colonizing anthropologist who gazes down upon exotic Others. Feminist epistemology also urges qualitative methods, despite the enormous investment of energy, emotion, time, and labor this requires. When media scholars undertake ethnography, feminist principles again advise reflexivity, exposing power relations between researcher and participants, sharing conclusions or initial drafts with research participants, and attending to their feedback.

For Denzin (1997), a feminist communitarian ethic requires collaborative, reciprocal, friendly, trusting relations with ethnographic subjects, in part by giving them a voice in research design. It rejects positivism’s ethical principles (anonymity and justice) and norms (validity and random selection). Instead, this ethic is grounded in community, so that research serves the community, reflects a community’s multiple voices, and enables participants to act to transform their social world. Christians (2002) observes that feminist communitarians assume humans can “articulate situated moral rules that are grounded in local community and group understanding”
(p. 169); their research will therefore represent multiple voices, enhance moral discernment, and promote transformation. Applied to online communication, for example, researchers must understand that members of newsgroups need to consent to research and accept the researcher’s identity and purpose; respect each participant and encourage the mission of the group; let participants have a say in the research questions, and use the research to benefit the group (Hall, Frederick, and Johns, 2004).

Feminists suggest various ways to acknowledge how “particular social relations and their power dynamics have shaped the form and content of knowledge production” (Grasswick, 2004, p. 88). Fine, Weis, Weesen, and Wong (2003) remind researchers to ask themselves, among other questions: “Have I connected the ‘voices’ and ‘stories’ of individuals back to the set of historic, structural, and economic relations in which they are situated;” “Have I described the mundane” (rather than surfing through transcripts to find what is exotic or sensational); “Have I considered how these data could be used for progressive, conservative, repressive social politics;” and “Where have I backed into the passive voice and decoupled my responsibility for my interpretations.”

Similarly, hooks (1989) asserts: “When we write about the experiences of a group to which we do not belong, we should think about the ethics of our actions, considering whether or not our work will be used to reinforce and perpetuate domination” (p. 43). Worried that the over-valuation of scholarship by whites about blacks maintains racism, hooks suggests that whites, including white feminists, overestimate their insights into other people, a fear that presumably also applies to media work. These scholars understand such questions have no single right or fixed answer. Unlike conventional ethics, which bars journalists from considering the implications or potential consequences of stories, feminist ethics urges us to ask these questions about our scholarly and journalism work.

**FEMINIST ETHICS FOR JOURNALISTS**

Journalism scholars have heard feminists’ critique of objectivity. To take one of many such examples, Pedelty (1995) describes the professional obsession with objectivity:

> Journalists turn fact into fetish. They believe facts speak for themselves; that facts are found, not created, and that they are communicable without placement in ordered and ‘valued’ systems of meanings. Discovered and verified, facts magically transform the correspondents’ prose into objective text.

(p. 171)

Journalists’ resistance to “caring” proposals perhaps reflects not only their sense that caring does not describe their work but also that it cannot, given their ongoing struggle to retain objectivity as a time-saving, status-preserving strategic routine, a ritual adopted to avoid criticism and threats of libel (Tuchman, 1972). More cynically, one might suspect that journalists and other media professionals prefer ethical rules that short-circuit external criticism by automatically forbidding risky and time-consuming processes of considering context and particularity. Associations of caring with feminism would not appear to help much.

Martin Bell, former BBC war correspondent, has ventured a “journalism of attachment”—“a journalism that cares as well as knows; that is aware of its responsibilities; that will not stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong” (Bell, 1998, p. 19). Bell says that journalists have a “moral obligation” to distinguish between good and evil in conflict zones, rather than
merely serve as “transmission vehicles” for governmental and military sources, producing what he calls “bystanders’ journalism.” Bell has met with outrage by war correspondents, who ignore the long history of women and men war correspondents as moral witnesses, for example, by Martha Gellhorn during the Spanish Civil War or more recently, Marie Colvin, who died while reporting on Syria. Vehemently denying all challenges to the notion of strict objectivity, journalists have condemned Bell’s intervention as dangerous and a menace to good journalism (see, e.g., Hume, 1997).

Nonetheless, Bell’s proposal is not totally dead. von Oppen (2009) reconceptualizes the journalism of attachment. She criticizes Bell’s call for war reporters to serve as moral witnesses for overlooking reporters’ responsibility as secondary witness to post-Cold War conflicts. Bell reduces war reporting to a moral problem, she says, by introducing the terms “good” and “evil.” This depoliticizes conflict, enabling western bystanders able to absolve themselves of all responsibility for the origins or representation of an “alien war.” Yet, von Oppen offers the German reporter Marina Achenbach’s reporting from Bosnia as demonstrating how journalists can be reflexive in their writing, recognizing their own “implicatedness” without abandoning attempts to represent the conflict accurately. According to von Oppen, Achenbach’s work transcended the binary of western European moral witness vs Balkan killer and successfully forced readers to reflect on their own role in the Bosnian conflict.

McLaughlin (2016) also avoids the moral panic regarding the journalism of attachment. Correctly, McLaughlin notes that both women and men war correspondents have tried to report on war’s human costs. Still, he notes the rise of women war correspondents and their “less gun-ho, more human-oriented sensibility” (p. 48) as one possible explanation for the emergence of the journalism of attachment. McLaughlin also cites BBC reporter Mark Urban, who attributes moralistic emotional reporting not to the feminization of news values but to the contemporary culture’s concern with victimhood. McLaughlin quotes Bell himself complaining that he was misunderstood—that he believes both that “facts are sacred” and that journalists have a moral responsibility, given the impact of their reporting.

In any case, feminism tolerates, and even urges, criticism and evaluation. A “caring” epistemology or “attached” attitude does not require reporters to believe all subjects equally, much less to give them equal power in gathering or interpreting news. It neither condones a casualness about accuracy nor encourages abandoning what thorough reporters believe to be facts. Rather, it requires reporters to be self-reflexive and to bracket their assumptions about sources, to hear sources out in their particularity. It requires reporters to acknowledge their privilege and not to deceive subjects. Above all, it requires them, as FSE suggests, to be modest about their claims, difficult as this is for reporters, whose professional culture typically eschews humility. “Fidelity to what inquiry can actually achieve can be a reasonable standard here. Thus, we can aim for the provisionally least false of all and only the hypotheses already tested” (Harding, 2006, p. 144).

Principles of extended or politicized caring and the ethics at the heart of feminist epistemology, then, can be embedded in journalism practice. Journalists so inspired will report on important problems, with potential for having a transformative impact; and will want to make their work accessible to the disenfranchised. Christians (2003) notes that communal obligation provides a richer ethics for research than does the thin, truncated, extrinsic code of contractualism. Others have also shown journalists are ethically constrained by proceduralism, resulting in an irony: journalists assert power inappropriately at the individual level but surrender moral authority institutionally (Bowers, Meyers, and Babbili, 2004). Properly linking research and practice, Denzin (1997) calls on ethnographers to function as public journalists producing a “communitarian journalism that treats communication and newsmaking as value-laden activities and as forms of social narrative rooted in the community” (p. 157).
At a minimum, caring journalists, no less than philosophers and educational psychologists, will listen attentively. The voices of some news sources who speak in the vocabulary of care and connection may be silenced or marginalized by journalists’ assumptions about rule-based logic. Just as important, caring journalists would avoid the sexism and sex stereotypes that otherwise lead to hearing only women’s caring voices but remaining deaf to men speaking in this idiom. In some cases, allowing caring voices to emerge requires listening more closely. In other cases, it requires asking new questions, additional questions. Christians (2002) urges journalism “toward critique, multivocal representation of the marginalized, and social transformation” (p. 170). This may suggest altogether new formats, such as citizen journalism, which is directly consistent with communitarian ethics. Both begin with concern for how citizens are engaged in local communities; both address the problems of individualism.

Media audiences can “care at a distance,” as has been seen, to some extent, in news, especially when accompanied by strong visual images, about global issues—from (im)migration to wars and weather-related disasters. Silk’s (1998) distinction between benevolence (caring about others) and beneficence (caring for others) echoes Noddings’s distinction between caring about and caring for. Silk’s point is that media content can inspire responsive actions in distant contexts (third party beneficence); acting at a distance to produce mass media information that inspires self-help support groups is itself a form of beneficence. He concludes that the quasi-interaction facilitated by print and broadcast news content may relieve suffering and reduce people’s sense of isolation, without the embarrassment of face-to-face interaction. But usually evidence of caring is contestable. What may be intended as a caring performance can turn out to be patronizing or worse. Some raise the specter of compassion fatigue: “The more suffering that people see on their TV screens, the less concerned they feel. Current events demobilize them; images kill the feeling of obligation within them” (quoted in Tester, 2001, p. 5). Thus, journalists are ethically obligated not only to be sensitive to the voice of care, but also to evaluate and help readers evaluate claims to caring and suffering and to evaluate policies and proposals to ameliorate suffering (including problems in the structures and processes of care-giving). This politicized version of care calls on media to privilege the problems, stories, and counter-stories of marginalized or subordinated peoples and others who deserve care and compassion. It also suggests the value of a non-gendered vocabulary (which, after all, is increasingly accessible).

REPRESENTATION AS AN ETHICAL ISSUE

Ida Wells-Barnett’s famously heroic investigative journalism on lynching included men and boys but also murdered girls and women. She exposed the false narratives typically offered to justify lynching. That is, some of the relationships between white women and Black men were consensual while Black women and girls were raped by their slave owners. This challenged the “racial-sexual apologies for lynching to trample the twin myths of white (female) sexual purity and black (male) sexual savagery” (James, 1997, p. 80). The problem of racist narratives continues. “As both a people and as genders, African-American women and men have been stereotyped, categorized, scrutinized, and dichotomized into a people straining against the bonds of double-consciousness and triple-consciousness” (Townes, 2011, p. 38). Indeed, Crenshaw’s (1991) now canonical work on intersectionality was grounded in analyses of how news stories about domestic violence failed to understand black women’s particular circumstances in facing racism and sexism. Nor were black women’s experiences well represented within the discourses of either feminism or antiracism.
Feminist scholars and activists following in Wells-Barnett’s tradition have taken as a central issue the news and entertainment content that traffics in commodification and objectification, or that distorts women and women’s agency. No wonder that Betty Friedan, in her pioneering *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), devoted a chapter to power of advertising, popular culture, and especially women’s magazines in convincing women who were dissatisfied with their feminine roles to seek solace in even more femininity. This set the stage for subsequent critiques of images as a major factor in the oppression of women and for activism that transforms representations of women.

Intersectionality remains critical to feminist ethics including with respect to media coverage of both various non-hegemonic groups facing multiple and intersecting forms of exclusion, such as sexual minorities, and of topics such as reproductive rights and beauty norms. Durham (2018), for example, points out the ethical implications of two opposing positions on media representations of women’s sexuality. Feminist critics complain that these reassert patriarchal power over women, potentially causing depression, body shame, eating disorders. Repudiating that assessment as largely moral panic that ultimately reinforces conservative political agendas, postfeminists often celebrate these as expressing female sexual agency and power, connoting strength, independence. Durham highlights how an intersectional perspective considers not only sexism, racism, classism, homophobia, but also differences by culture, society, economics, temporality. So, middle class teenagers may see pole dancing as pleasurably transgressive and empowering. Poor teenagers may be traumatized by seeing pole dancing, which, for them, may represent coerced sex work.

Much of the second wave feminist attention was provoked by exaggerated fears that sexist content, especially pornography, had “real” effects on people’s actions, attitudes, and short- and even long-term potential. More recent analyses focus on symbolic implications. Nussbaum (2000), the rare philosopher to address media issues, treats pornography as a tool of objectification: it involves instrumentality, denial of autonomy, inertness, fungibility, violability, ownership, and denial of subjectivity. A prominent conceptualization is that representation signifies social existence, while “absence means symbolic annihilation” (Gerbner and Gross, 1976, p. 182). Tuchman (1978) drew attention to how media images symbolically annihilate women by excluding, trivializing, or demonizing them. It is in this context that feminists advocate—and literally produce—distinctive representations in mainstream commercial and alternative media, both news and entertainment, by including employing gender-neutral language. This logic also makes the issue of who can represent whom, an important ethical matter. Fraser (1986) calls for groups to achieve

>a degree of collective control over the means of interpretation and communication sufficient to enable one to participate on a par with members of other groups in moral and political deliberation; that is, to speak and be heard, to tell one’s own life-story, to press one’s claims and point of view in one’s own voice.

(p. 428)

These efforts imply normative standards for evaluating how people, relations, power, and behaviors are represented in journalism, advertising, music lyrics and music videos, whether online, in print, or on television, cable, and film. To trivialize women candidates for political office or demonize sexual/gender minorities is uncaring and unfair. To sexually exploit, objectify, and trivialize a group—simply by virtue of group identification—violates feminist ethics. Fairness is not a matter of equality, even equality between men and women. Magazines that sell subscriptions and products by making men deeply unhappy with their bodies does not solve the
problem of magazine content and advertising depicting an impossible “ideal” woman. Music videos that subvert the typical pattern by objectifying men are likewise unethical. Sports news that sexualizes the bodies of African-American men, to take one more prominent and not accidental example, is likewise problematic. The point here is that—in contradistinction to second wave thinking in both feminism and ethics—no measurable ill effects on behavior need to be alleged, much less proven, for distorted representations to be regarded as unethical. To be clear, however, government censorship or similar legal action is not the solution. Generally, ethical dilemmas should be addressed through analysis and debate that promote sensitivity and awareness.

**FEMINIST ETHICS AND THE WORKPLACE**

Feminist critiques of a distorting polarity between the public arena as the legitimate and valued site of work (and men) and a private arena devalued by its association with emotion, domestic, and reproductive processes (and women) can be applied to media organizations. Feminists propose alternative forms of workplace organization: horizontal rather than hierarchical, flexible and rotating rather than bureaucratic and rigid, granting agency and humanity to employees rather than objectifying or subordinating them, and blurring conventional boundaries between the personal and political. For example, as a matter of feminist principle, many second and third wave feminist newspapers, cable collectives, and other kinds of media organizations—internationally, both offline and virtually—are committed to experimenting with collaborative structures and rotating leadership (or no leadership at all) as well as family-friendly and collectivist policies.

Feminist media organizations cannot claim that women are more ethical in actual practice. The constraints and barriers to fairness are organizations and structural; and ideas about ethics are enforced by university training, workplace socialization, and professional organizations. Moreover, feminist ways of working and organizing do not consistently succeed in merging personal and emotional dimensions with rational, political, and professional dimensions. *Ms.*, the magazine that tried to bring feminism to the mainstream, wanted to be egalitarian and collective. Efforts to include everyone in decision-making resulted, however, in an unclear chaotic chain of command and a “tyranny of structurelessness” (Farrell, 1998). Arguably there is a trade-off between efficient production of content and experimentation with egalitarian organization; while some feminist collectives privilege participation in feminist-inspired processes, others care more about efficiently disseminating feminist information. Indeed, feminism’s openness to struggle, to contradiction (or at least to provisional, experimental, emergent processes), and to aspirational ethics explains failures to achieve ethical purity. The explicitly institutionalized principles of ethical communication at one feminist organization, for example, caused considerable tension: in the name of empowerment and “bounded emotionality” members were required to express themselves authentically to the group, disclose emotions and feelings, and expose conflict (Ashcraft, 2000).

Media organizations did not invent untenable double standards and double binds for women (i.e., requiring women to adopt behaviors and styles associated with men, yet condemning them when they do so; mandating that women do women’s work and act, even dress, like women, but then condemning them for doing so). Nor is sexual harassment unique to media workplaces. Still, feminist media ethics requires active efforts to ameliorate, if not end, sexism, sexual violence, and sexual harassment. This includes understanding victims’ reluctance to report it, by empathetically hearing out the stories of people who have experienced harassment, creating internal and external structures that address problems, and refusing to tolerate or overlook sexual predators in the workplace.
THE FUTURE OF FEMINIST ETHICS IN MEDIA

Feminist ethics, as multidimensional and messy as it is, involves prescribing morally justifiable ways to challenge unfair subordination and promote justice. Inverting male values and privileging women’s interests cannot suffice for feminist ethics. Fully feminist ethics are distinctively political, concerned with the working of power and committed to the elimination of oppression in all its manifestations.

The evidence that women journalists “do” ethics differently than men is mixed, at best and not dispositive. According to data collected more than 20 years ago, platform (print, broadcast, etc.) and professional training, as well as socio-economic background and political values predicted journalists’ values and approaches to ethical decision-making far better than did gender (Weaver, 1997). This is even more likely now. Many women journalists adamantly deny that they report “like” or “as” women, although women may cover different topics, even covering them slightly differently—for example, more about women’s problems, more women sources, more human context. Certainly, the moral epistemology of media professionals deserves study, through careful analyses of the political, economic, and cultural conditions and contexts that allow for compassion or constrain ethical practices, regardless of gender.

Feminist theorizing is increasingly sensitive to the importance of recognizing how systems of oppression construct identities in complex hierarchies of power and privilege (Carrastathis, 2014, p. 304). The same is true of feminist ethics. Moradi and Grzanka (2017) call for more nuanced, richer “responsible stewardship” of intersectionality, whether intersectionality is a field of study, an analytic strategy or disposition, or critical praxis for social justice and for transforming structures and systems of power, privilege, and oppression. Feminist ethics, including one useful for media, does not rely on gender and/or sex differences for two reasons. Gender itself is a social construct, albeit a powerful one, that is increasingly understood as not a binary. Second, gender oppression is always woven with domination by sexual orientation, class, race, ethnicity, and religion. Feminism’s embrace of intersectionality has successfully challenged universalizing ethical theory, with its attendant universal–abstract and disembodied–ethical subject (Bell, 2005). So, feminism as a way of studying and thinking about social and political relationships offers ethical and epistemological principles that correct misogynist biases without forever reifying women’s experience, much less the experiences of white privileged women.

Bell hooks (1989) notably suggests an “ethics from the margins.” Likewise hoping to avoid unhelpful sameness–difference debates, although from a different perspective, Baehr (2004) calls for feminist politics not based on gender, “or at least one that makes extremely minimal ontological claims about gender” (p. 414). Perhaps the reluctance to study feminist ethics reflects a tendency within feminism to associate “morality” with repressive moralizing. Eschewing the term “ethics,” Walker (1998) proposes an “expressive-collaborative” model of morality. For Walker, negotiation of moral knowledge involves “socially situated and socially sustained practices of responsibility” (p. 201), modified during reflection and interaction; what matters is not theory, but how we actually live and judge.

A deeply intersectional and multiculturalist feminism may yet construct a non-sexist theory that respects difference and particularity of all sorts. Its ethics can incorporate values (such as community) and responsibilities (such as caring) that historically are associated with women, without assuming that all women around the globe are permanently, much less equally, subordinated and pressed into patriarchal domestic, reproductive, and sexual arrangements. We can tilt toward care of those who need it most, globally, rather than those we love or give birth to.
Indeed, a context-sensitive notion of gender is consistent with feminism and feminist ethics, even as these incorporate into community, connection, and compassion, at local and distant levels—or wherever these are most required.

Moreover, media content, production, and consumption are implicated; news and entertainment are integral to modeling how processes of feminist ethics operate in daily life. The development and incorporation of feminist ethics, among other “channels,” requires deploying these understandings in both the content and the structure of media organizations. Compared to some of the thinner, more conventional rule-based approaches to journalism ethics, this emerging feminist ethics can provide a richer account of the importance of media in symbolizing and celebrating structures of human life and thus a more coherent basis for ethical media practices.

NOTES

1. Family relationships are more equal and reciprocal than mother-child relationships (Friedman, 1993).
2. Sevenhuijsen (1998) reconceptualizes care in political terms but defends the articulation of the mother-child bond as an ideal type and model of reasoning; that is, it’s not as about actual mothers and children. Ultimately, she regards the “motherly metaphor” as relying too heavily on a mythical and inadequate image of “woman.”
3. For discussion of standpoint theory, see Harding (1993), and especially essays in Harding (2004), as well as Collins (1990), and Hartsock (1983).
4. But the editor of the special issue in which Crasnow’s article appears argues against feminist standpoint theory, calling it a discredited idea that diverts attention away from women scientists’ educational and career needs (Pinnick, 2008).
5. This is not a judgment about which sexual behaviors are (im)moral; feminist ethics favors frank discussion of sex and sexuality, not burying it.
6. Carastathi’s point is that intersectionality as a concept is vague and overused.
7. Conversely, the templates for utilitarian, contract, neo-Kantian or rights-based theories represent morality as a “compact, propositionally codifiable, impersonally action-guiding code within an agent, or as a compact set of law-like propositions” (Walker, 1998, p. 7).

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