INTRODUCTION

Peace journalism is a child of its time, a reaction to fractured politics and a growing disenchantment with journalistic norms that fan conflict, inadvertently or otherwise. Peace journalism was first proposed in the 1970s by Norwegian peace studies founder Johan Galtung, who envisioned it as a self-conscious, working concept for journalists covering war and conflict (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2006). Galtung (1998a), who made a strong case for rerouting journalism to a “high road” for peace, was critical of the “low road” taken by news media in chasing wars and the elites who run them, fixating on a win-lose outcome, and simplifying the parties to two combatants slugging it out in a sports arena. War reporting is also influenced by a military command perspective: news is about who advances, who capitulates, while losses are recorded in terms of tangible human casualties and material damage. Galtung urged journalists to take the “high road” of peace journalism that focused on conflict transformation:

As people, groups, countries and groups of countries seem to stand in each other's way (that is what conflict is about) there is a clear danger of violence. But in conflict there is also a clear opportunity for human progress, using the conflict to find new ways, transforming the conflict creatively so that the opportunities take the upper hand—without violence.

By taking an advocacy, interpretative approach, the peace journalist concentrates on stories that highlight peace initiatives; tone down ethnic and religious differences; prevent further conflict; focus on the structure of society; and promote conflict resolution, reconstruction, and reconciliation. Galtung (1998b, 2000, 2002) observed that traditional war journalism is modeled after sports journalism, with a focus on winning in a zero-sum game. Similarly, the reporting of peace negotiations is modeled after court journalism. Participants are portrayed as verbal pugilists: what is newsworthy is about who outsmarts the other, and who maintains his original position. In Galtung’s vision, peace journalism is modeled after health journalism. A good health reporter describes a patient’s battle against cancer and yet informs readers about the disease’s causes as well as the full range of cures and preventive measures. According to Lynch and McGoldrick’s (2006) definition, “[p]eace journalism
is when editors and reporters make choices—of what stories to report and about how to report them—that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict” (p. 5).

**TWO NEWS VALUES: OBJECTIVITY AND CONFLICT**

War reporting is a journalistic litmus test because journalists have to navigate an ethical minefield filled with critical questions about the accuracy and fairness of their coverage, the consequences of reportage, and personal safety. War reporting is shaped by two major journalistic values: objectivity and conflict. At first glance, peace journalism runs counter to the time-honored journalistic value of objectivity that sees the journalist as a detached and unbiased mirror of reality. As a neutral bystander, the journalist strives for detachment from internal biases and external influences while striking a midpoint between competing viewpoints through eyewitness accounts of events, and corroboration of facts with multiple sources to achieve balance. According to Iggers (1998): “Although few journalists still defend objectivity, it remains one of the greatest obstacles to their playing a more responsible and constructive role in public life” (p. 91). If this is true, responsible journalism should be about intervention, as argued by McGoldrick and Lynch (2000): “The choice is about the ethics of that intervention—therefore the question becomes ‘what can I do with my intervention to enhance the prospects for peace?’”

Many advocates of peace journalism thus view the approach as a moral imperative, especially in a world wracked with pessimism about the role of reason in solving conflict. As a goal-oriented strategy, peace journalism is premised upon journalists’ conscious, active, and formal engagement of specific working principles to promote peace. Two misconceptions about peace journalism must be dispelled. Peace journalism does not rely on actions that are unconscious, informal, or aimed only at avoiding harm; for example, steering clear of inflammatory reporting that may provoke violence. The principle of “doing no harm” rests upon a lower moral foundation when compared to the principle of “doing good” that peace journalism aspires to do. Galtung (1968) distinguishes between “negative peace” and “positive peace”; the former refers to the absence of organized violence between nations or religious, racial, ethnic groups, while the latter is defined as patterns of cooperation and integration. In Galtung’s reckoning, the latter supersedes the former—thus opening up a role for peace journalism.

In war reporting, objectivity is used to justify journalists’ disinterested moral autonomy from being swayed by the parties involved in a conflict. However, journalistic objectivity may cause more harm than good. As noted by Hackett (1989), “Objective journalism’s respect for the prevailing social standards of decency and good taste likely mutes reportage of the brutality of war, and the suffering of victims, helping to turn war into a watchable spectacle rather than an insufferable obscenity” (pp. 10–11). Objective reporting’s focus on facts and overt events, “de-values ideas and fragments experience, thus making complex social phenomena more difficult to understand” (Iggers, 1998, pp. 106–107). Hackett’s and Igger’s arguments make a moral case for advocacy journalism—the non-objective, self-conscious intervention by journalists premised in public journalism, development journalism, and peace journalism.

Factual reporting of war is a chimera; the ingredients of war—patriotism, national interest, anger, censorship, and propaganda—conspire to prevent objective and truthful accounts of a conflict (see Carruthers, 2000; Dardis, 2006; Devere, 2017; Iggers, 1998; Knightley, 1975, 2004; Lukacovic, 2016; Michael, 2006; Van Ginneken, 1998). Pedelty (1995) showed how institutional influences shaped the reporting of the civil war in El Salvador in the 1980s by comparing
two reports about the shooting down of a U.S. military helicopter. Written by the same correspondent, one report was for an American paper, and the other for a European paper. The former validated the anger of U.S. officials to legitimate the release of aid to fight the rebels, but the latter sympathized with the rebels. Similar findings, which abound in the literature of war reporting, are consistent with Knightley’s (1975) observation, in paraphrasing U.S. Senator Hiram Johnson’s famous remark in 1917 that in war truth is the first casualty. Galtung (1998b), however, argued that truth is only the second victim in war; the first is peace. Truth telling, even when it is achievable, is not enough because “[t]ruth journalism alone is not peace journalism.” War reporting requires some degree of separation from the military but embedded or similar programs in which journalists travel and report alongside military units—embraced warmly by war reporters desperate to gain access to battlefields—further compromise objectivity (see Devere, 2017; Haig et al., 2006; Paul & Kim, 2004; Pfau et al., 2004; Rosenblum, 1979). “A reporter who travels with one army, sharing C-ration peanut butter and watching friends fall dead, finds it hard to separate himself from the men around him” (Rosenblum, 1979, p. 173).

War reporting is grounded in the notion of conflict as a significant news value. The drama of discord inherent in antagonistic and opposing actions, fueled by a related news value—violence, appeals to journalists and their audiences alike. As a result, war reporting is often sensational and a mere device to boost circulations and ratings (Allen & Seaton, 1999; Hachten, 1999; Toffler & Toffler, 1994) although Galtung himself was skeptical of the claim that violence sells; he viewed it as an excuse panned out by incompetent journalists: “To say that violence is the only thing that sells is to insult humanity” (Galtung, 2000, p. 163). Journalistic preoccupation with conflict drives war journalism to be characterized by an identification with one or the home side of the war; military triumphalist language; an action orientation; and a superficial narrative with little context, background, or historical perspective. The news value of conflict further renders consensus-building efforts non-newsworthy. Journalists often ignore peace negotiations unless the proceedings are accompanied by violent or verbally explosive sideshows. Peace journalism subscribes to universal protonorms of nonviolence and respect for human dignity, which many journalists have cast aside in their pursuit of what they consider to be far worthier goals—professional values of objectivity and newsworthiness. In a sense, the peace journalist has grappled with and succeeded in answering the fundamental question: Am I a human being first or a journalist first?

Like public journalism and development journalism, peace journalism is grounded in communitarian philosophy—namely the commitment to the idea of civic participation, the understanding of social justice as a moral imperative, and the view that the value and sacredness of the individual are realized only in and through communities. Christians, Ferré, and Fackler (1993) urged journalists to abandon libertarianism in favor of communitarianism by adopting a new journalistic standard that gives priority to civic transformation. The idea that journalists have an active and conscious role in promoting peace is controversial nonetheless. The term “peace journalism” invokes strong reactions, many of them unfavorable. Unfortunately, peace is an overused, nebulous, and often misunderstood word; its inherent idealism does not seem to fit in with the mood of pessimism governing these trying times. The term “peace journalism” was coined by Galtung more than three decades ago, but as a practice, it has not gained wide acceptance among journalists nor attracted adequate attention from researchers.

In August 1993, Galtung founded TRANSCEND (www.transcend.org), a non-profit organization, to advance his ideas of peace, including peace journalism. In the late 1990s, his ideas were picked up by U.K.-based Conflict and Peace Forums (CPF) that refined his model through a series of dialogues with journalists. The CPF published four booklets: The Peace Journalism Option (Lynch, 1998), What Are Journalists For? (Lynch, 1999), Using Conflict Analysis in Reporting (Lynch, 2000), and Reporting the World (2002)—that are mainly how-to manuals based on anecdotes. Just as journalists are more interested in covering war than peace, much
has been written and studied about the role of the media in war, but little about their role in peace. Although there exists an excellent body of literature and research on war journalism (e.g., Abubakar, 2019; Allan & Zelizer, 2004; Carruthers, 2000; Dardis, 2006; Dimitrova, 2006; Hallin, 1986, 1987; Hallin & Gitlin, 1994; Iyengar & Simon, 1994; Knightley, 1975, 2004; Lang & Lang, 1994; Seib, 2004; Zhang, 2015), most of the work on peace journalism is philosophical or normative, outlining its benefits and detailing how it can be implemented (e.g., Galtung, 1986, 1998b, 2002; Horvitt, Cortés-Martinez & Kelling, 2018; Lukacovic, 2016; Lynch, 1998, 2003a, 2003b; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2006; McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000; Youngblood, 2016). There is little research on peace journalism, which is all the more relevant today in a world wracked with strife and conflict. Few studies have operationalized peace journalism.

The subsequent sections of this chapter will review four studies about the framing of war and conflict which are based on Galtung’s framework of peace/war journalism, and discuss the implications of the findings as well as directions for future research.

**OPERATIONALIZING GALTUNG’S IDEAS**

I was introduced to peace journalism by Filipino media scholar Maslog C. Crispin, who has developed and taught modules in peace journalism as part of his courses in international/intercultural communication in Asia, Norway, and the United States. Maslog is also author of *A Manual on Peace Reporting in Mindanao* (1990). Our collaboration resulted in several publications; the first was Lee and Maslog (2005). The *Journal of Communication* study is the first to offer a quantitative contribution to a topic that has received mostly normative and anecdotal discussion. By operationalizing Galtung’s classification of war/peace journalism, the study focused on four Asian conflicts: the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan; the Tamil Tiger uprising in Sri Lanka; the Aceh and Maluku civil wars in Indonesia; and the Mindanao separatist movement in the Philippines.

The study shows that news coverage of these conflicts is dominated by a war journalism frame. The Indian and Pakistani coverage of the Kashmir issue reveals the strongest war journalism framing while the coverage of the Tamil Tiger movement and the Mindanao conflict by the Sri Lankan and the Philippine newspapers suggests a more promising peace journalism framing. The three most salient indicators of peace journalism are the avoidance of demonizing language, a non-partisan approach, and a multi-party orientation. The war journalism frame is supported by a focus on the here and now, an elite orientation, and a dichotomy of good and bad. Based on a similar peace journalism research framework, my co-researchers and I published two other studies in 2006 that expanded our scope of study to the 2003 War in Iraq. An *Asian Journal of Communication* article examined how five Asian countries framed the war in Iraq (Maslog, Lee, & Kim, 2006) while an *International Communication Gazette* article compared the framing of Asian conflicts with that of the war in Iraq (Lee, Maslog, & Kim, 2006). A forthcoming work (Kim, Lee, & Maslog, 2009) focuses on the framing of Asian conflicts by vernacular newspapers. These four studies will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter.

Theoretically, peace journalism is supported by framing theory. There is no one standard definition of framing (Entman, 1993; McCombs, Lopez-Escobar, & Llamas, 2000; Scheufele, 1999) but broadly, news framing refers to the process of organizing a news story, thematically, stylistically, and factually, to convey a specific story line. According to Entman (1993),

to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.

(p. 52)
Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, Bliss, and Ghanem (1991) described a media frame as “the central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” (p. 3). Frames package key ideas, stock phrases, and stereotypical images to bolster a particular interpretation. Through repetition, placement, and reinforcement, the texts and images provide a dominant interpretation more readily perceivable, acceptable, and memorable than other interpretations (Entman, 1991).

McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver (1997) argued that the concepts of agenda-setting and framing represent a convergence, in that framing is an extension of agenda-setting. In fact, the concept of framing has been explicated as second-level agenda setting (Jasperson, Shah, Watts, Faber, & Fan, 1998; McCombs, 1994; McCombs & Bell, 1996; McCombs & Evatt, 1995; McCombs et al., 1997). Object salience is transmitted in the first level of the agenda setting process. In the second level, framing, or indicator salience, illustrates how the media tell us how to think about something—a reprise of Bernard Cohen’s famous statement that the media tell us what to think about. Framing is found to activate specific thoughts and ideas for news audiences, as seen in the vast body of framing effects research (e.g., Iyengar, 1991; McLeod & Detenber, 1999; Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Sotirovic, 2000; Thorson, 2006; Willnat et al., 2006).

A number of studies have focused on the framing of war reporting. Gamson (1992) identified four frames used in the framing of the Arab-Israeli conflict: strategic interests, feuding neighbors, Arab intransigence, and Israeli expansionism. Wolfsfeld (1997) found that the media’s pursuit of “drama” frames in the Middle East conflict accorded the extremists from both sides more than their due share of air time, while drowning voices calling for peace. Carruthers (2000) suggested that the media, subjected to state and military censorship, employed the same values and priorities in reporting conflict as in covering other events. As a result, media become willing accomplices in wartime propaganda, and may help instigate conflict. Pfau et al. (2004) found that the embedded journalist coverage of the 2003 war in Iraq was framed more favorably toward the U.S. military than non-embedded reporting. Lawrence (2006), who studied the coverage of the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal in American newspapers, found a framing homogeneity that can be explained by institutionalist theory.

WAR AND PEACE: TWO COMPETING FRAMES

Galtung viewed peace journalism and war journalism as two competing frames. His classification of war journalism and peace journalism is based on four broad practice and linguistic orientations: peace/conflict, truth, people, and solutions. In contrast, war journalism is oriented in war/violence, propaganda, elites, and victory. Galtung’s labeling of peace journalism as both peace- and conflict-oriented may appear paradoxical but in reality, peace-oriented journalists must first accept that a conflict exists, and explore conflict formations by identifying the parties, goals, and issues involved. The journalist understands the conflict’s historical and cultural roots, and by giving voice to all parties (not only two opposing sides), creates empathy and understanding without resorting to emotionally-charged devices. Through careful, consistent, and conscientious application of peace journalism practices, the peace journalist hopes to create a setting in which the causes of and possible solutions to the conflict become transparent. Other peace journalism approaches include taking a preventive advocacy stance—for example, editorials and columns urging reconciliation and focusing on common ground rather than on vengeance, retaliation, and differences—and emphasizing the invisible effects of violence (e.g., emotional trauma, and damage to the social structure). In contrast, war journalism plays up conflict as an arena where participants are grouped starkly into two opposing sides (“them vs. us”) in a zero-sum game, and focuses on the visible effects of war (casualties and damage to property).
Galtung’s classification of war/peace journalism was expanded by McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) and Lynch and McGoldrick (2006) into 17 good practices in covering war. Advice to journalists included focusing on solutions, reporting on long-term and invisible effects, orientating the news on ordinary people, reporting about all sides, and using precise language. Maslog (1990) offered a similar peace journalism manual based on the Mindanao conflict that clarifies differences between Muslims and Christians and, more importantly, their common ground. Advice included avoiding mention of culturally offensive issues such as pork consumption and polygamous practices. Another important principle is linguistic accuracy. “Rebels” should be identified as dissidents of a particular political group, and not simply as “Muslim rebels.”

**PEACE JOURNALISM IN COVERAGE OF ASIAN CONFLICTS**

(LEE & MASLOG, 2005)

In our research, a news frame is defined as an interpretive structure that sets specific events within a comprehensive context. Based on Galtung’s classification of war/peace journalism, our first study posed two research questions: (1) Does the news coverage of the four Asian conflicts reflect war journalism and war journalism frames, and are there differences in framing with different conflicts? (2) What are the salient indicators of war/peace journalism manifest in the news coverage of these conflicts?

The 1,338 stories were harvested from the 10 English-language newspapers from five Asian countries—India: *Times of India* (122 stories); *Hindustan Times* (137); *Statesman* (91); Pakistan: *Dawn* (131); *Pakistan News Service* (261); The Philippines: *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (122); *Philippine Star* (61); Indonesia: *Jakarta Post* (189); and Sri Lanka: *Daily News & Sunday Observer* (145); *Daily Mirror* (79). The unit of analysis was the individual story, a definition that included “hard” news, features, opinion pieces, and letters to the editor.¹

The coding categories involved 13 indicators of war journalism and 13 indicators of peace journalism (see Appendix 24.1). These indicators, used to elicit from the body text of each story which frame—war or peace journalism—dominated the narrative, comprised two themes: approach and language. The approach-based criteria included: (1) reactivity, (2) visibility of effects of war, (3) elite orientation, (4) differences, (5) focus on here and now, (6) good and bad dichotomy, (7) party involvement, (8) partisanship, (9) winning orientation, and (10) continuity of reports. The language-based criteria focused on language that was (1) demonizing, (2) victimizing, and (3) emotive.

**A DOMINANT WAR JOURNALISM FRAMING**

Of the 1,338 stories, 749 stories (56%) were framed as war journalism, compared to 478 stories (35.7%) framed as peace journalism, and 111 neutral stories (8.3%). Overall in the sample, the war journalism frame was more dominant than peace journalism or neutral frames, \( \chi^2_2 \), \( N = 1,338 \) = 459.771, \( p < .0001 \). Country-wise, there was a significant difference in war/peace/neutral framing of stories, \( \chi^2_4 \), \( N = 1,338 \) = 150.834, \( p < .001 \); Cramer’s \( V = .237 \), \( p < .001 \). The strongest war journalism framing was found in the Kashmir coverage by Pakistani and Indian newspapers, followed by Indonesian, Philippines, and Sri Lankan papers’ coverage of their respective conflicts. Conversely, the strongest peace journalism framing was from Sri Lanka, followed by the Philippines, Indonesia, India, and Pakistan. The following section discusses the patterns of framing for each country’s newspapers.
India-Pakistan (Kashmir). There was a significantly higher proportion of war journalism frames observed in Pakistani papers (74.2%) than for Indian papers (63.7%). \(\chi^2 (2, N = 742) = 10.886, p < .005\); Cramer’s \(V = .121, p < .005\). The distribution of war/peace/neutral stories also differed among the five newspapers, \(\chi^2 (8, N = 742) = 23.104, p < .005\); Cramer’s \(V = .125, p < .005\). The strongest war journalism framing is seen in the Pakistan News Service; nearly 80% of its stories were framed as war journalism, followed by the Statesmen (67%), Hindustan Times (66.4%), Pakistan Dawn (65.6%), and Times of India (59%). The Pakistan News Service, a national news agency, has the highest number of war journalism frames among the 10 news outlets examined in the content analysis.

Indonesia. There was a significant difference in the distribution of war/peace/neutral frames in the Jakarta Post; 48% of its stories were framed as war journalism, compared to 41.8% framed as peace journalism, and 10.1% neutral stories, \(\chi^2 (2, N = 189) = 47.238, p < .001\). The Jakarta Post published 110 articles on the Free Aceh movement, and 79 on the Maluku conflict. Comparing the Aceh and Maluku conflicts, however, 37.31% of articles about Aceh were framed as war journalism compared to 54.5% peace journalism, and 8.2% neutral. In contrast, the Maluku stories showed a more salient war journalism frame—63.3% compared to 24.1% peace journalism, and 12.7% neutral. Clearly, the Jakarta Post’s coverage of the two conflicts did not share the same framing pattern, \(\chi^2 (2, N = 189) = 17.610, p < .001\); Cramer’s \(V = .305, p < .001\).

Sri Lanka. The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) coverage by Sri Lankan papers showed the strongest peace journalism framing. Of the 224 stories, more peace journalism stories were observed—58.0% compared to 30.8% war journalism stories, and 11.2% neutral stories, \(\chi^2 (2, N = 224) = 74.473, p < .001\). There was a significant difference between the two papers, \(\chi^2 (2, N = 224) = 7.080, p < .05\); Cramer’s \(V = .178, p < .05\), with more peace journalism frames in the Daily Mirror than in the Daily News & Sunday Observer. There was also a significant difference before and after the December 2001 ceasefire between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. \(\chi^2 (2, N = 224) = 30.199, p < .001\); Cramer’s \(V = .367, p < .001\). Prior to the ceasefire, the two papers demonstrated a significant framing difference, \(\chi^2 (2, N=224)=14.377, p < .001\); Cramer’s \(V=.199, p < .05\). Before the ceasefire, the Daily News & Sunday Observer produced 51.5% of war journalism stories, compared to 38.4% of peace journalism stories, and 10.1% neutral stories. After the ceasefire, its war journalism stories dropped to 4.3% while peace journalism stories increased to 89.1%. Before the ceasefire, the Daily Mirror published 20.4% war journalism stories, 59.3% peace journalism stories, and 20.4% neutral stories. After the ceasefire, its war journalism stories remained at 20.0% while peace journalism stories increased to 76.0%. As a result of an increase in peace journalism stories, there was no significant difference in the post-ceasefire distribution of war/peace journalism stories between the two papers, \(\chi^2 (2, N = 224) = 4.538, p < .103\). With the ceasefire, there was a change from war journalism to peace journalism framing in the Daily News & Sunday Observer but the change was less obvious in the Daily Mirror because it had a strong peace journalism framing prior to the ceasefire.

The Philippines

The framing of war/peace journalism stories was less clear. Although the newspapers produced more peace journalism stories compared to war journalism stories, statistical significance was absent, \(\chi^2 (1, N = 171) = 2.579, p < .108\). There was a significant difference in the distribution of war/peace/neutral frames between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star, \(\chi^2 (2, N=183)=6.840, p < .05\); Cramer’s \(V=.193, p < .05\), with more peace journalism stories in the Daily Inquirer compared to the Star.
INDICATORS OF WAR JOURNALISM AND PEACE JOURNALISM

Based on a frequency of 5,220, the three most salient indicators of war journalism were: a focus on the here and now (17.6%), an elite orientation (15.4%), and a dichotomy of the good and the bad (10.3%). Through a here-and-now perspective, the war journalism stories confined a conflict to a closed space and time, with little exploration of the causes and long-term effects of the conflict. Reporting only on the here and now is a common journalistic practice, focusing only on what is happening in the battlefield, the military clashes and the casualties, with very little background. Stories tended to focus on elites—political leaders and military officials—as actors and sources while ignoring the foot soldiers who fight the wars and the civilians who suffer the consequences of wars. Dichotomizing between the bad guys and the good guys involves casting simplistic moral judgments about the parties involved, and assigning blame to the party who started conflict. For example, the Pakistan News Service reported: “The Indian government’s fake elections held in the valley will not deter them. Despite giving them the right to self-determination, the Indian government had stepped up its brutal activities against innocent people in occupied Kashmir” (“Indian election drama not alternative to Kashmir cause,” April 5, 2002).

The three most salient indicators of peace journalism, based on a frequency of 9,104, were avoidance of demonizing language (15.9%), non-partisanship (13.8%), and multi-party orientation (12.8%). In avoiding demonizing language, the journalists provided precise titles or descriptions to players. By being non-partisan, stories were not biased for one side or another. In pursuing a multi-party orientation, stories gave a voice to the many parties involved, treating them with dignity. For example, the Sri Lankan Daily Mirror covered the work of a peace group: “The Peace Support Group in a statement signed by prominent activists (names) said it was abundantly clear that the electorate had endorsed a re-vitalization of the peace process and dialogue with the LTTE” (“A mandate for peace, grab it”; December 12, 2001).

The Kashmir coverage, which showed the most salient war journalism framing, was dependent on the following indicators (based on a frequency of 3,558): a focus on the here and now (15.4%), the use of elites as actors and sources (14.1%), a partisan approach (11.0%), and emphasis on differences (9.7%). The Sri Lankan newspapers’ coverage of the Tamil Tigers, which exhibited the strongest peace journalism framing, was supported by the following indicators (based on a frequency of 1,148): an avoidance of good-bad label (13.5%), a non-partisan focus (12.9%), a multi-party orientation (10.4%), and a win-win approach (10.1%).

OTHER FINDINGS OF INTEREST

There was no relationship between story type (news, feature, or opinion) and distribution of war journalism and peace journalism stories, \( \chi^2(6, N = 1,338) = 8.612, p < .197 \). Of the 1,338 stories, 76.1% were “hard” news stories, 10.0% were features, 9.0% were opinion pieces including editorials, and 4.9% were “others” that included letters to the editor and speech transcripts. Whether a story was written as hard news, a feature, or an opinion piece had no bearing on the framing of the story. However, there was a positive correlation between story length (in paragraphs) and peace journalism (\( r = .156, p < .001 \)). The longer the story, the more likely it was framed as peace journalism. Conversely, there was a negative relationship between story length and war journalism (\( r = -.186, p < .001 \)). Conceivably, longer stories allow journalists time and effort to investigate an issue or event more fully and thoughtfully, and to go beyond reporting of facts into providing analysis.
Foreign wire stories contain more war journalism frames and fewer peace journalism frames than stories produced by local sources including the papers’ own correspondents, $\chi^2(2, N = 1,338) = 7.964$, p<.05. About 10% of stories were produced by foreign wire services such as AP, CNN, BBC, Reuters, and AFP. That the majority—89.8%—were produced by local sources was unsurprising given the conflicts’ local nature. Of the stories produced locally, 96.2% were written by the newspapers’ own reporters, compared to 1.3% sourced from national news agencies, and 2.4% contributed by freelancers, academics, and the public. One explanation is that reporting by foreign wire services is less involved and more detached (as seen in the shorter stories; stories produced by local sources are significantly longer than stories produced by foreign wire services, t(1,336) = 6.133, p<.0005. The mean length of a locally sourced story is 12.98 paragraphs compared to 8.77 for a foreign wire story. Another explanation is that Western foreign news agencies tend to report violence and conflict more saliently than any other news from developing countries (e.g., Hachten, 1999; Hachten & Scotton, 2006; Hess, 1996; Riffe, Aust, Jones, Shoemaker, & Sundar, 1994; Rosenblum, 1979). The actions of foreign governments, when connected to violence and conflict, are more likely to be reported by U.S. media than other types of news. Not surprisingly, war journalism framing prevailed more in foreign wire copy than in local copy.

Following the study on Asian newspaper coverage of regional conflicts, we expanded our research to the coverage of the Iraq War and vernacular newspapers. The next section summarizes the findings of the three follow-up studies.

THE IRAQ WAR

Maslog et al. (2006) examined how the coverage of the war in Iraq by news organizations from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines was framed according to Galtung’s principles of peace and war journalism. The findings, based on a content analysis of 442 stories from eight newspapers, suggest a slight peace journalism framing. Religion and sourcing are two significant factors shaping the framing of the conflict, and support for the war and for its protagonists (Americans/British vs. Iraqis). Newspapers from the non-Muslim countries, except the Philippines, have a stronger war journalism framing, and are more supportive of the war and of the Americans/British than the newspapers from the Muslim countries, which are more supportive of the Iraqis. Stories from foreign wire services have a stronger war journalism framing—consistent with earlier findings—and show more support for the war and for the Americans/British than stories written by the papers’ own correspondents.

COMPARING ASIAN CONFLICTS AND THE IRAQ WAR

Lee et al. (2006) examined the coverage of the War in Iraq and Asian conflicts by eight Asian newspapers to compare the framing of two different levels of conflicts—international and local. A content analysis of 1,558 stories from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Indonesia on the war in Iraq and their own local conflicts showed that the Asian press used a war journalism frame in covering local conflicts but deployed a peace journalism frame in covering the war in Iraq. Hard news was dominated by war journalism framing, while features and opinion pieces were shaped by peace journalism. Foreign-sourced stories from wire services contained more war journalism frames and fewer peace journalism frames than locally-produced stories written by the papers’ own correspondents, again supporting the findings of the previous two peace journalism studies.
THE VERNACULAR PRESS

The earlier studies discussed above focused on English-language Asian newspapers but the fourth study (Kim et al., 2009) concentrated on the vernacular press. In many Asian countries, the Western-language press has a long history harking back to Western colonial rule. Despite stiff competition from their vernacular counterparts, the English-language papers continue to be viewed as status symbols, with strong circulations and advertising revenues. Although the vernacular press is perceived as being less metropolitan and sophisticated, and is often marginalized from the mainstream media, it plays a significant role in shaping mass opinion because it includes the largest-circulation newspapers in the respective countries (Waslekar, 1995). It has been suggested that vernacular newspapers, unlike the national-level media in Asia (that most English-language newspapers belong to), are more likely to be swayed by communal feelings to the extent of inciting violence with irresponsible reporting (Chenoy, 2002; Khan, 2003; Press Council of India, 2003).

Kim et al. (2009) examined the peace/war journalism framing of three Asian conflicts—Kashmir, the Tamil Tiger movement, and the Aceh/Maluku civil wars—by eight vernacular newspapers from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. The findings from the content analysis of 864 stories support the results of the previous studies. First, the coverage of the conflicts was dominated by war journalism framing, the strongest of which is the case of Kashmir that generated the strongest war journalism framing among four regional conflicts analyzed in the study of 10 English-language Asian newspapers. Second, the most salient indicators of peace journalism included avoidance of emotive language, avoidance of demonizing language, people-orientation, and non-partisanship, while the most salient indicators of war journalism included focus on the here and now, dichotomy of the good and the bad, elite-orientation, and focus on differences. Third, there were significant relationships between war/peace journalism framing and story attributes. Stories that are longer and are written as features and opinion pieces instead of shorter or hard news were more likely to be framed as peace journalism.

IMPLICATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

As exploratory research, the four studies of Asian English-language and vernacular presses operationalized and measured the principles of peace journalism advanced by Johan Galtung—ideas that have garnered only normative and anecdotal discussion. It is hoped that the findings and subsequent work can help mass media training institutions to customize peace journalism programs, and build a case for offering such courses, as well as generate hypotheses for examining the framing effects of war/peace journalism on public opinion and policy-making.

Clearly, the coverage of the four Asian conflicts is dominated by war journalism. Pakistan and India, embroiled in a decades-old territorial battle over Kashmir, have demonstrated through their five newspapers that media adopt a knee-jerk, unreflecting kind of coverage of conflicts, with little consideration for long-term, peaceful solutions. The strong war journalism framing by Indian and Pakistani papers is not unexpected; the two countries have fought three wars, including two over the mostly Muslim region of Kashmir, which was divided between them after independence from Britain in 1947. Among the conflicts examined, Kashmir is the most acrimonious, involving not only the divisive factor of religion but also the minefield of national sovereignty, demonstrating that a country’s media are not likely to remain neutral in a conflict involving its government (see Bennett, 2003; Carruthers, 2000; Hiebert, 2003; Keeble, 1998; Knightley, 1975, 2004; Reese & Buckalew, 1994; Van Ginneken, 1998). In the study that compared the framing
of local and international, the Asian newspapers relied on war journalism framing to cover local conflicts, but used peace journalism framing to cover the Iraq War. Conceivably, the coverage of a local conflict reflected its government’s stand, be it in a war against another country or against rebels within the country’s borders. Conversely, the five Asian countries’ lack of direct involvement in the war in Iraq may have permitted their newspapers to adopt a more detached and conciliatory stance. The overall strong peace journalism framing could also be attributed to the widespread objection in the Asian countries to the U.S.-led military action in Iraq, and a desire among Asian governments to see a more peaceful resolution to the situation in Iraq. Despite assertions of objectivity among journalists, coverage of war is often shaped by national interest, which is perhaps the biggest obstacle to peace journalism.

The case of Sri Lanka may offer some encouragement to peace journalists. That a significant number of stories were framed as peace journalism may be surprising for a country that has faced two decades of violence. A possible explanation is the fact that the August 1, 2001 to February 28, 2002 period of analysis overlapped with government and LTTE efforts to negotiate for a peace treaty under international pressure, although violence persisted. Are peace journalism stories a simple reaction to developments in a conflict (i.e., ongoing negotiations) or genuine, self-conscious intervention by journalists to help promote peace? Journalists may find it difficult to escape the influence of context. The shift from war journalism framing to peace journalism by Sri Lankan papers after the December 2001 ceasefire agreement may reflect a conscious effort by journalists to promote peace through peace journalism. But it is also possible that the change of government and attendant changes in policy toward the LTTE could have motivated journalists’ peaceful disposition. Certainly, the measure of a true peace journalist lies in his work during a conflict, not after the conflict. There is an extensive body of literature documenting governmental influence on the work of journalists in conflicts (e.g., Bennett, 2003; Carruthers, 2000; Combs, 1993; Hiebert, 2003; Keeble, 1998; Lawrence, 2006; Lynch, 2003a, 2003b; Reese & Buckalew, 1994). One small dose of comfort does come from the Daily Mirror’s strong peace journalism framing prior to the ceasefire although the true picture for the Daily News & Sunday Observer’s strong war framing prior to the ceasefire is less clear.

What is clear is that media outlets within the same cultural and political context do not frame the same event the same way. Another example of context-shaped coverage is the Jakarta Post’s dissimilar framing of the Maluku and Aceh conflicts. At the time of the study, the Indonesian government and the GAM (Free Aceh Movement) were on their way to the negotiating table. The Swiss-based Henry Dunant Centre brokered a peace deal between the two parties on December 9, 2002, a major breakthrough in 26 years of hostilities. Hence, a stronger peace journalism framing was evident in the coverage of Aceh. In the case of Maluku, the conflict was still raging, hence the stronger war journalism framing. Similarly the higher number of peace journalism stories in the Asian newspapers’ coverage of the Iraq War was encouraging but peace journalism is a self-conscious concept. The peace journalism framing of the Iraq War may be more reflective of caution in reporting a controversial military engagement initiated by a superpower in a distant land than genuine desire to promote peace and seek solutions. More research is needed, especially at the levels of news gate keeping.

Although there are promising signs in the use of peace journalism frames in Sri Lanka and the Philippines, and in the Asian newspapers’ coverage of the Iraq War, a closer examination of the patterns of war journalism and peace journalism indicators reveals that peace journalism framing is still highly dependent on criteria of a less interventionist nature, for example, an avoidance of good-bad labels, a non-partisan approach, a multi-party orientation, and an avoidance of demonizing language. These four indicators, although important in the overall scheme of peace journalism laid out by Galtung, are mere extensions of the objectivity credo: reporting the facts as they are. Galtung (1998b) believed that truth telling as a guiding journalistic principle in war reporting is simply inadequate: “[T]ruth journalism alone is not peace journalism.” These
indicators do not truly exemplify a strong contributory, pro-active role by journalists to seek and offer creative solutions and to pave a way for peace and conflict resolution. For example, journalists often simplify storytelling by allowing only a set of villains and a set of victims. The inclusion of a multi-party orientation is a significant step forward in the peace journalism calculus but it does not take the story significantly beyond reporting the facts or telling the truth.

Journalists’ dependence on peace journalism practices that are less interventionist in nature can be explained by the dominance of the libertarian notion of the public sphere as a value-free area where individuals freely exploit a wealth of disparate information based on their own personal interpretations and needs. In such a public sphere, the values and identities of individuals, including that of journalists and their work, are obscured by professional aspirations to facilitate purely utilitarian relationships based on satisfying individual/professional goals without adequate consideration for universal protonorms such as nonviolence and respect for human dignity. Unlike the libertarian tradition, the communitarian ethic openly accepts the peace journalist as an interventionist—insofar as that intervention allows the inclusion of a journalist’s values and participation in a community’s dialogue, consensus building, civic transformation, and a commitment to social justice. In the controversy over peace journalism one sees the clash between two different levels of values—universal and professional, that is best captured by the fundamental question: Am I a human being first or a journalist first? In principle, peace journalism is closer to Carol Gilligan’s ethics of care than the more established ethics of justice. In seeking conflict resolution, peace journalism avoids dichotomizing between the victims and the villains, and emphasizing the differences between them. Instead it prefers to focus on their common ground and sustainable relationships; most customary practices of settling disputes (assigning blame, vilifying the wrongdoer, and righting wrongs with punitive actions) are merely short-term solutions that do not lead to genuine reconciliation and lasting peace.

In the four studies, the pattern of salient indicators supporting the peace journalism frame consistently falls short of Galtung’s characterization of peace journalism as an advocacy and interpretive approach oriented in peace-conflict, people, truth, and solution. While there is some demonstration of the journalists’ deeper understanding of the conflict by mapping it out as consisting of many parties, there is little in terms of a solution-seeking approach, and more disappointingly, not many peace journalism stories are supported by a people-orientation. With little focus on ordinary people and treating them with dignity, and without finding out what whether their position as stated by the elites are reflective of the true feelings on the ground, there is little that journalists can do to empower the ordinary people. The work of journalists follows predictable rituals, and reliance on elites and on official sources that they perceive to be authoritative, credible, knowledgeable, and powerful, is one of them. In a meta-analysis, Gouse, Valentin-Llopis, Perry, and Nyamwange (2018) found that peace journalism studies most often assessed media by using the war/peace indicator of elite-oriented versus people-oriented. This is an encouraging trend, but the fact remains that peace journalism cannot be understood based on one indicator alone. In our studies, the peace journalism frame also did not receive adequate support in terms of journalists focusing on a conflict’s causes and consequences. Without this understanding, solutions—and social justice—are hard to come by.

The relationships between peace journalism and story attributes such as sourcing, length, and type of story need further investigation. Why does the war journalism frame prevailed more in foreign wire services copy than in locally produced copy? The finding of significant differences in war/peace journalism frames between the locally-produced stories and foreign wire stories is supported by the literature (e.g., Hachten, 1999; Hess, 1996; Riffe, Aust, Jone, Shoemaker, & Sundar, 1994; Rosenblum, 1979). Foreign wire copy or the stories originating from Western news agencies tend to emphasize war/conflict/violence. Foreign news is preoccupied with conflict and violence in which developing nations are described as the scenes of disasters or violence.
One could argue that published foreign wire stories may reflect to some extent a newspaper’s framing of the War in Iraq as some gate keeping is involved in selecting which foreign wire stories are published and which are not. In general, however, foreign wire copy, according to newsroom routines, are used to describe and convey daily situation updates of the war, and do not undergo much editing. The positive relationships between hard news and war journalism framing, and between features/opinions and peace journalism framing suggest that the inverted pyramid style of writing and an overemphasis on objectivity and traditional news values such as conflict and violence, other than national interest, may be major obstacles to peace journalism.

If peace journalism were to succeed, journalists must first reassess their notions of hard news, objectivity and traditional news values. The relationship between story length and war/peace journalism framing suggests that with longer stories, journalists have more opportunities to investigate an issue or event more fully and thoughtfully. Longer stories allow journalists to move beyond reporting of facts into analysis and interpretation, and exploration of the causes and alternatives (as supported by the significant relationships between features/opinion pieces and peace journalism framing). However, newshole allotment to war reporting is a complex affair, subject to not only editorial judgment but also economic considerations, given a shrinking newshole and a shift of focus to entertainment and celebrity news. In the case of the American media, Sept 11 marked a turning point: the shrinking newshole for foreign news became a story of the past as the terrorist threat from abroad and U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq renewed interest in foreign news and increased foreign news coverage. But in reality, these stories continued to rely on traditional news values—conflict and American interest—and are little more than American news with a foreign dateline as aptly described by Larson (1984).

Several research papers have attempted to apply peace journalism to breaking news, but this category of news, characterized by their brevity and main function in the news business as information updates, may not be the best unit of analysis. The practice of peace journalism requires a significant amount of journalistic reflection and analysis—elements typically not found in breaking news. Future research should also consider television news, and attempt to apply Galtung’s framework to visual images of war. Many of the coding categories used for assessing narrative content were conceived by Galtung as a form of pre-publication criteria, suggesting that another potential locus of research lies in the newsgathering stage.

Many studies have conveyed the concept of framing as an unconscious act (shaped by journalistic routines, social norms and values, time pressures, organizational culture and constraints, etc.; see Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tuchman, 1978) but theoretically, framing studies have neglected to explore framing as a conscious act by journalists. As noted by Gamson (1989), the motives behind a journalist’s framing of the news can be unconscious, but may also involve intent. Scheufele (1999) rightly observed that this particular link between journalists’ individual-level variables and media frames “deserves more attention than it has received” (p.117). The concepts of reciprocity, intent and motive in news framing—with the attendant implications—warrant a closer examination, especially in the news coverage of war, where a potent cocktail—national interest, patriotism, religious differences, censorship, propaganda—can be found.

Framing effects research has found that news consumers respond to journalists’ framing of a socially important event rather than to the actual event itself. Peace journalism, as a conscious and deliberate act by journalists, can offer significant insights on a hitherto unexplored aspect of framing theory. Indeed, if framing can be a conscious act involving intent, journalists must then confront the issues of moral accountability, and can no longer seek refuge in the notion that how they cover the news is merely shaped by journalistic routines, social norms, and organizational cultures and constraints that are beyond their control. Tehranian (2002) suggests that the locus of media ethics be expanded from the individual journalist to institutions, nation-states and international communities in order to advance peace journalism. This is a laudable proposal indeed,
as more is needed institutionally, be it in the form of infrastructure or sanction, to support ethical journalistic work. But until journalists covering war and conflict are willing to acknowledge and overcome their internal biases and external influences, rethink their over-reliance on objectivity and detachment, and break free of the professional shackles that detract from universal proto-norms of nonviolence and respect for human dignity, peace journalism will always remain a child of its time, never to come of age.

**APPENDIX 24.1**

*Coding Categories*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>War journalism approach</th>
<th>Peace journalism approach</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Reactive (waits for war to break out, or about to break out, before reporting)</td>
<td>1. Proactive (anticipates, starts reporting long before war breaks out)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Reports mainly on visible effects of war (casualties, dead and wounded, damage to property)</td>
<td>2. Reports the invisible effects of war (emotional trauma, damage to society and culture)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Elite-oriented (focuses on leaders and elites as actors and sources of information)</td>
<td>3. People-oriented (focuses on common people as actors and sources of information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Focuses mainly on differences that led to the conflict</td>
<td>4. Reports the areas of agreement that might lead to a solution to the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Focuses mainly on the here and now</td>
<td>5. Reports causes and consequences of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Dichotomizes between the good guys and bad guys, the victims and villains</td>
<td>6. Avoids labeling of good guys and bad guys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Two-party orientation (one party wins, one party loses)</td>
<td>7. Multi-party orientation (gives voice to many parties involved in conflict)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Partisan (biased for one side in the conflict)</td>
<td>8. Non-partisan (neutral, not taking sides)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Zero-sum orientation (one goal: to win)</td>
<td>9. Win-win orientation (many goals and issues; solution-oriented)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Stops reporting with the peace treaty signing and ceasefire, and heads for another war elsewhere</td>
<td>10. Stays on and reports aftermath of war—the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and the implementation of peace treaty</td>
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*Language*

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<td>11. Uses victimizing language (e.g., destitute, devastated, defenseless, pathetic, tragic, demoralized) which only tells what had been done to people</td>
<td>11. Avoids victimizing language, reports what has been done and could be done by people, and how they are coping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Uses demonizing language (e.g., vicious, cruel, brutal, barbaric, inhuman, tyrant, savage, ruthless, terrorist, extremist, fanatic, fundamentalist)</td>
<td>12. Avoids demonizing language (and uses more neutral and precise descriptions, titles or names)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Uses emotive words (e.g., genocide, assassination, massacre, and systematic)</td>
<td>13. Objective and moderate (avoids emotive words, reserves the strongest language only for the gravest situation, and does not exaggerate)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE**

1. The stories, content analysed by six mass communication graduate students, were harvested from the most recent peak periods of the conflicts (some of which date back at least five decades) at the time of the study. When the number of peace journalism indicators exceeded the indicators for war journalism, the story was classified as peace journalism. When our journalism indicators exceeded peace journalism indicators, the story was classified as war journalism. Equal scores denoted neutral stories. The war journalism index ranged from 0 to 13, with a mean of 3.90 and a standard deviation of 2.60 (Cronbach’s
alpha = .72). The peace journalism index ranged from 0 to 13, with a mean of 2.98 and a standard deviation of 2.73 (Cronbach’s alpha = .78). Other variables studied include the story type (news, feature, or opinion), story length, and source (local, foreign/national news agencies, wire service). In terms of intercoder reliability, a coding of 100 stories produced Scott’s pi between .76 and .93, with only one indicator (continuity of reports) recording a value of below.

REFERENCES


24. PEACE JOURNALISM


