19

MIND THE GAP

The Effects of Intra- and Inter-Party Competition on Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies

Reuven Y. Hazan and Reut Itzkovitch-Malka

General elections and candidate selection methods are two of the most central institutions in any democratic regime. Their centrality is, first and foremost, due to the fact that these institutions determine the distribution of political power and the identity of political elites. The literature clearly postulates that the choice of an electoral system will have consequences for, among other factors, voting and legislative behavior (see, for example: Carey and Shugart 1995; Katz 1997; Rae 1967; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Candidate selection methods, which have only recently received growing scholarly attention, also have ramifications for legislative behavior and party unity (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Hazan and Rahat 2010; Narud, Pedersen and Valen 2002; Ranney 1981; Schattschneider 1942).

Almost any prospective or incumbent politician in any country must pass two barriers, not one, in order to become a legislative representative – they must first be chosen by a party selectorate and only subsequently elected by the voters. Each of these two barriers can vary in relevance, and also in nature – each can be either more personal or more under party control – but both are present, both have consequences, and both must be taken into account if we want to understand legislative behavior. Yet, when it comes to legislative behavior the vast majority of the ongoing research continues to focus on the electoral system and its effects. In other words, most scholars attribute legislative behavior to the way legislators are elected by the general public, and not to the way they are selected by their parties.

We seek to address both barriers in a more comprehensive way, and present a better explanation of legislative behavior. However, we face some difficulty in our attempt to examine the influence of these two independent variables on our dependent variable – party unity. Legislators’ voting behavior is heavily constrained in parliamentary systems where we see very little variance in party unity (Carey 2009; Depauw and Martin 2009; Heidar 2006; Sieberer 2006) – but their attitudes and norms of behavior regarding party unity are far less constrained and present much more variance. In order to overcome the no-variance problem we are faced with, we can investigate party unity, both as it is perceived by the legislators and how it exhibits itself in the legislature, by conceptualizing it as a sequential decision-making process. To gain insight into the intra-party dynamics surrounding party unity we use attitudinal data, as this is the best way to understand the different stages legislators undergo when deciding how to behave. Hence, while this research does not address legislators’ actual voting behavior, it provides an understanding of the inner processes legislators and parties undergo before a legislator’s vote is cast in the plenum.
This chapter analyzes the effects of candidate selection methods, electoral systems and the interplay between them on party unity. Our main argument is that one must take into account the effects of both intra-party (candidate selection) and inter-party (electoral systems) competition, and the interaction between them, in order to better explain legislators’ attitudes and behavior. When it comes to party competition, the literature on the determinants of legislative behavior remains largely unidimensional, focusing only on electoral systems. We suggest that by expanding this focus to include the candidate selection dimension we can improve our understanding of how our elected representatives behave. Using attitudinal data from the PARTIREP project combined with data collected on candidate selection methods in 34 European parties in 10 countries (for a full list of the countries and parties included in this research see the Appendix), we are able to show that the candidate selection method – the first of two barriers legislators must pass in order to be reelected – conditions the influence of the electoral system on legislative behavior. That is, the interaction between the intra- and the inter-party dimensions offers a better interpretation than the traditional unidimensional explanation for party unity.

### Intra- and Inter-Party Competition

Candidate selection methods are defined as “the predominantly extralegal process by which a political party decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective public office will be designated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate or list of candidates” (Ranney 1981, 75, emphasis in original). Such methods can be classified according to several criteria, but the central criterion is the inclusiveness of the selectorate – who may take part in selecting the party candidates. At the inclusive pole are parties that allow all voters to select the party candidates with hardly any restrictions – similar to primaries in the United States. At the exclusive pole are parties that allow a party leader to single-handedly select the party candidates. In-between are parties that allow the party elite or party delegates to select the party candidates (Hazan and Rahat 2010).

The more inclusive the selectorate, the less control the party has over the process of candidate selection and, as a result, over the behavior of the candidates selected. The inclusiveness of the selectorate thus affects legislative behavior in several ways. First, more inclusive selectorates may infringe on the party’s ability to create a united list, due to the fact that the party leadership has less control over the selection process. As a result, the homogeneity of preferences among legislators who belong to parties that use inclusive selectorates is lower than that among legislators who belong to parties that select their candidates by more exclusive methods. Second, inclusive selectorates create a double source of legitimacy for legislators, party and non-party, since legislators are exposed to various pressures which “could be both quite different from, and even contradictory to, that of the party program, and the candidates will have to be responsive to them” (Atmor, Hazan, and Rahat 2011, 25). This may result in lower levels of party unity.

Electoral systems are composed of three main dimensions: district magnitude, electoral formula and ballot structure (Blais 1988; Farrell 2011; Rae 1967; Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Each of these dimensions has an effect on legislative behavior. District magnitude affects the foci of representation, shifting from personal representation in single-member districts (SMD) to party-focused representation in multi-member ones (Bowler, Farrell and Pettitt 2005; Lancaster 1986; Mitchell 2000; Shugart 2001). This distinction is also relevant for the second dimension of electoral systems, the electoral formula, since there is a strong correlation between the two – multi-member districts are predominant in proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, while SMDs are predominant in majority/plurality electoral
systems. The third dimension of the electoral system is the ballot structure, defined as the way in which voters are allowed to express their preference(s) among candidates (Katz 1986; Katz and Bardi 1980). The more open the ballot, the more the electoral system cultivates personal representation and individual accountability, as legislators are not solely dependent on their party for reelection (Carey and Shugart 1995). More open ballots, it is claimed, can damage party unity.3

The dimensions of an electoral system can be combined differently to produce a candidate-based electoral system or a party-based one. For example, a plurality/majority SMD electoral system will produce more candidate-based incentives at the expense of party/collective accountability – such as in the U.S. – since greater individual accountability and constituency responsiveness will result in lower levels of party unity (Bowler and Farrell 1993; Stratman and Baur 2002). A PR multi-member district electoral system will do the opposite – such as in the Netherlands – since it is built on responsible parties and collective accountability, which produce higher levels of party unity (Carey 2009; Strom 1990). This differentiation is based on the extent to which politicians are rewarded for their personal reputation in the elections. In candidate-based electoral systems politicians will cultivate a personal vote by maintaining a close connection with their voters, especially through constituency work, at the expense of party unity (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; Carey 2007, 2009; Carey and Shugart 1995). In party-focused electoral systems the personal incentives are largely absent, legislators are not individually elected, and as a result they must curry favor with the party leadership who can exercise more control over their behavior.

**Hypotheses and Method**

This chapter examines three hypotheses concerning the effect of candidate selection methods and electoral systems, and the interaction between them, on legislative behavior. The first two hypotheses address either the candidate selection method or the electoral system separately, while the third assesses their joint effect.

**H1:** Candidate selection methods have an effect on legislative behavior, whereas the effect of electoral systems on legislative behavior is marginal.

**H2:** Electoral systems have an effect on legislative behavior, whereas the effect of candidate selection methods on legislative behavior is marginal.

**H3:** Both the candidate selection method and the electoral system have a dependent effect on legislative behavior.

The first hypothesis is counter-intuitive because one expects that legislators will be first and foremost responsive to their wide electorate, not to their relatively small party selectorate. The second hypothesis presents the “conventional wisdom” in the academic literature that focuses on the electoral system as the most important explanation of legislative behavior. The third hypothesis posits that the influence of either the candidate selection method or the electoral system on legislative behavior depends on the nature of the relationship between the electoral system and the candidate selection method. That is, the effect of one depends on the type, or kind, of the other.

Our basic argument is that it is the electoral system that is dependent on the candidate selection method. We first base our argument on the fact that selection mechanisms precede electoral ones: before a candidate can run in a general election, s/he has to survive the selection stage. This enables the candidate selection method to set the ground rules and to shape the arena in which legislators operate. We posit that the electoral system will not have the ability to
completely counter the general context set by the candidate selection method, but it certainly
has the ability to make significant changes both within, and to, the given framework.

More specifically, we claim that the effect of the electoral system on party unity differs, given
different types of candidate selection methods, measured according to their level of inclusiveness.
The more inclusive the candidate selection method is, such as U.S.-style primaries, the
smaller the effect of the electoral system on party unity. The largest effect of the electoral system
on party unity is thus expected when the candidate selection method is the most exclusive.

When the party uses an exclusive selectorate to select its candidates – be that the party leader
or a small party caucus – it can select candidates whose ideological preferences are as close as
possible to the party’s agenda and as a result ensure high levels of party unity. Additionally, since
the party controls the most important resource for legislators – their ability to be reselected, and
as a result reelected – an exclusive candidate selection method provides clear, party-centered
incentives to legislators. Legislators know that if they wish to be reselected by their party they
must behave as party team players, demonstrating high levels of party unity.

However, legislators do not only need to be reselected by their party, they also need to be
reelected by the voters on Election Day. This is where the electoral system comes into play,
affecting the incentives offered to legislators and, as a result, their attitudes and norms of behavior.
The electoral system can either reinforce the incentives the candidate selection method offers legislators, or it can contradict them.

When an exclusive party-based selectorate is coupled with a PR party-based electoral system,
the two reinforce each other, resulting in high levels of party unity. Unsurprisingly, legislators
who are both selected and elected under party-based rules are expected to frequently share the
ideological preferences of their party and to demonstrate substantial loyalty towards it. However,
when the party-based incentives of an exclusive candidate selection method are coupled with
personally focused incentives of an SMD electoral system, legislators are faced with conflicting
incentives, pulling in opposite directions. Introducing a candidate-based electoral system to an
exclusive selectorate may thus decrease the level of shared preferences the legislator shares with
his/her party, as well as create competing principals to whom the legislator must be accountable.
Both consequences reduce party unity.

On the contrary, when the party uses inclusive selectorates such as primaries, the nature of
the electoral system matters much less. Once a party democratizes its candidate selection method,
making it more inclusive, it loses much of its control over the process. Inclusive selectorates offer
legislators personally focused incentives and limit, to some extent, the ability of the party to control
the identity of the candidates selected. As a result, we claim that once the selectorate becomes
inclusive the dynamics of either a reinforcing incentives scenario – when an inclusive selectorate
is coupled with an SMD electoral system – or a conflicting incentives scenario – when such a
selectorate is coupled with a PR electoral system, becomes largely irrelevant. Given the fact that
the dynamics of democratizing candidate selection are so influential (and destructive) to party
unity, we argue that the electoral system would not have much of a say on these issues, if any.

In order to test the three hypotheses we used two key variables, one for the candidate selection
method and one for the electoral system. We chose to focus on the main characteristic of the
candidate selection method that the recent literature points to as the most relevant factor when
examining legislative behavior – the inclusiveness of the selectorate (Best and Cotta 2000; Hazan
and Rahat 2010; Norris et al. 1990). The inclusiveness of the selectorate is a scale variable
borrowed from Hazan and Rahat’s (2010) 24-point index. Of the three main characteristics of the
electoral system – electoral formula, district magnitude and ballot structure – we chose to focus on
the electoral formula as the defining variable of the electoral system (Duverger 1954; Rae 1967;
Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005). We dichotomized the electoral formula into a dummy variable:
plurality/majority systems and PR systems. This allows us to distinguish between a candidate-centered SMD electoral system associated with a constituency-based focus of representation and a party-centered PR electoral system associated with a more generalist party-based focus and to test their effect on party unity.

As mentioned above, we expect inclusive selectorates to create an incentive for legislators to demonstrate a more personalized type of representation. The result might be devastating for party unity, since collective representation is, to a great extent, damaged (Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999; Cross 2008; Katz and Cross 2013). More exclusive selectorates will place the focus on the party, at the expense of personal representation, resulting in increased levels of party unity (Cross 2008; Katz and Cross 2013). As for the electoral system, we expect plurality SMD electoral systems to create an incentive for legislators to engage in constituency service, or pork-barrel politics, and to demonstrate individual accountability to their voters (Carey 2007, 2009). On the other hand, legislators in PR multi-member district electoral systems have an incentive to demonstrate party-focused representation and behave as loyal team players, rather than to engage in active constituency service (Bowler and Farrell 1993; Stratman and Baur 2002).

In order to account for the effects of candidate selection methods and electoral systems on legislative behavior, this chapter relies on the attitudinal data collected for the international PARTIREP project and integrates it with data on candidate selection methods which was gathered from various sources based on party regulations, expert surveys and published articles. The PARTIREP project involved a quantitative cross-national survey carried out among members of 15 national and 58 sub-national European parliaments plus Israel. For the purpose of this analysis only national parliaments were taken into account. Data collection took place between 2009 and 2011. Legislators were asked to participate in either a face-to-face interview, a print questionnaire or a web-based survey.

We analyze cases from 10 countries (out of the 15 included in the PARTIREP project) encompassing a total of 34 political parties. We chose these cases because these are the ones for which we have reliable data on their candidate selection methods. Cross-national data on candidate selection methods is very hard to achieve since it often requires familiarity with local politics and accessibility (Hazan and Rahat 2010). Therefore, this chapter makes use of available data from a variety of sources, including our own extensive data collection.

When analyzing the data we used pooled logistic regression models to assess the effect of the candidate selection method, the electoral system and the interaction between them on party unity. Our models include four control variables: party agreement, parliamentary seniority, government participation and gender. Those were included as they are often addressed in the literature as variables that may affect our dependent variable (see, for example, André and Depauw 2014; André, Gallagher and Sandri 2014; Van Vonno et al. 2014).

**Party Unity**

We conceptualize party unity as the result of legislators’ sequential decision-making processes. In the first stage of the process – party agreement – legislators consider whether or not they agree with their party’s position. If they agree, then the result is unity based on shared preferences. If, however, legislators do not agree with the position of their party, they then proceed to the second stage – party loyalty – where they decide whether or not to subscribe to the norm of party unity and vote according to the party line, despite their disagreement. If they disagree but are loyal, the result is unity based on shared norms.

When it comes to party unity, we are interested in the second stage because we feel that party agreement is quite different from party loyalty – focusing on the first will mask much of the
relevant dynamics within the party. Clearly the inner dynamics in a party where there is high party agreement are different than the dynamics in a party whose legislators lack party agreement but possess high levels of party loyalty.

We stop before a possible third stage in a legislator’s decision-making model. If legislators both disagree with their party and decide not to subscribe to the norm of party unity, a third stage of the process – party discipline – includes the possible use of disciplinary measures, negative sanctions and positive incentives, by the party leadership in order to achieve party unity. We do not include this phase because, once again, the dynamics of party unity based on shared preferences or norms are very different from the dynamics in a party whose legislators lack both and require discipline.

Our conception of party unity thus moves beyond party agreement to legislators’ internalized behavioral norms, that is, how legislators believe it is appropriate to behave once they find themselves in a conflict with their party. We believe this stage to be the most important because it evaluates party unity – the legislators’ voluntary subscription to the norm that they should not publicly deviate from their party line, even when they disagree with it.6

Findings

Table 19.1 shows two models – with and without an interaction term – for the effect of the candidate selection method and the electoral system on party unity. Model 1, which does not include an interaction term between our two explaining variables, shows that both the electoral system and the candidate selection method have an independent effect on party unity. In other words, the candidate selection method has an effect on party unity even when controlling for the electoral system, and vice versa. This brings us to reject hypotheses 1 and 2, according to which only one of the variables has an influence on party unity whereas the other has a marginal effect at best. Model 1 clearly shows that MPs elected by a candidate-centered electoral system are less likely to demonstrate party unity compared to MPs elected by a party-based electoral system (odds ratio of 0.47, \( p < 0.01 \)), and that MPs selected by more inclusive candidate selection methods – primaries being the most inclusive method – are also less likely to demonstrate party unity compared to MPs selected by exclusive methods (odds ratio of 0.9, \( p < 0.05 \)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Party Loyalty (Model 1)</th>
<th>Party Loyalty (Model 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Formula (SMD)</td>
<td>(-0.75^{***} (.19))</td>
<td>(-2.46^{**} (.71))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectorate Inclusiveness</td>
<td>(-0.05^{**} (.02))</td>
<td>(-0.10^{***} (.03))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Formula × Selectorate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusiveness</td>
<td>(0.14^{**} (.05))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Agreement</td>
<td>(-0.63^{***} (.18))</td>
<td>(-0.60^{***} (.18))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>(-0.01 (.01))</td>
<td>(-0.01 (.01))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Participation</td>
<td>(0.59^{***} (.18))</td>
<td>(0.43^{**} (.19))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>(0.02 (.21))</td>
<td>(0.03 (.21))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>(-341.26)</td>
<td>(-337.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R(^2)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Results are presented as log of odds, robust standard errors in parentheses. \(^* p < .1, ^{**} p < .05, ^{***} p < .01.\)
Model 2 adds an interaction term to the analysis and examines the contingent effect of the electoral system and the candidate selection method on party unity. The fact that the interaction term is statistically significant indicates that there is indeed a meaning to the interplay between the electoral system and the candidate selection method in their effects on party unity. However, since this is an interaction model we cannot interpret these coefficients at face value. Each one of the lower-order terms (the coefficients for the electoral formula and for the inclusiveness of the selectorate) only have a substantive meaning at a specific value of the other (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). Therefore, in order to effectively communicate this interaction we use a conditional marginal effect plot, which visualizes the marginal effect of the electoral system at different levels of the inclusiveness of the selectorate.

Figure 19.1 presents the conditional marginal effect of changing the electoral system from a PR system to SMD on the predicted change in the probability of party unity, given different levels of the inclusiveness of the candidate selection method. The figure shows that as the selectorate becomes more inclusive, the difference between PR and SMD electoral systems in their effect on party unity becomes smaller. As was expected, the largest difference found between the two electoral systems is when the selectorate is the most exclusive. That is, under exclusive selectorates electoral systems are most influential in their effect on party unity: the predicted difference in the probability of party unity between PR and SMD systems is about 0.6. As the selectorate becomes more inclusive, the difference between the two types of electoral systems shrinks – hence the ability of the electoral system to influence party unity becomes more limited. Once the selectorate reaches a score of 14 the results become statistically insignificant and therefore we cannot say much about the differences between electoral systems in selectorate scores of 15 and up. Still, we believe this is a strong finding, especially because the vast majority of parties
in our sample (75 percent of the cases), and in the population in general, receive a selectorate score of 0–14.

Figure 19.1 supports our third hypothesis and confirms it: the selectorate conditions the ability of the electoral system to affect party unity. In exclusive selectorates, the electoral system is able to influence party unity, with legislators elected by PR electoral systems demonstrating higher levels of party unity than those elected by SMD electoral systems. In inclusive selectorates, however, the ability of the electoral system to affect party unity is limited.

**Conclusion**

This research shows that when the party uses inclusive selectorates, such as primaries, then the nature of the electoral system hardly matters for party unity. Once a party democratizes its candidate selection method, making it more inclusive, it loses its control over the process. Inclusive selectorates offer legislators personally focused incentives and limit the ability of the party to control the identity of the candidates selected. It is true that here too we can portray a reinforcing incentives scenario, when an inclusive selectorate is coupled with an SMD electoral system. We can also portray a conflicting incentives scenario, when such a selectorate is coupled with a PR electoral system. We claim, however, that once the selectorate becomes inclusive these dynamics become largely irrelevant. In other words, an inclusive selectorate shapes party unity to such an extent that the electoral system cannot do much about it, whether it is a party-focused PR electoral system, or a personally based SMD one. Once legislators understand that they owe their reselection – which is a prerequisite for their reelection – to someone else other than the party and its leadership, there is no going back. That is, the dynamics of reinforcing and conflicting incentives given the nature of the candidate selection method and the electoral system are relevant, we claim, only for exclusive selectorates.

The interaction between the candidate selection method and the electoral system shows that the key to understanding internal party dynamics lies first and foremost in the nature of the candidate selection method. In other words, the identity of those who control the nomination process has a substantial influence on legislative attitudes and behavioral norms, not only directly, but also indirectly, by conditioning the ability of the electoral system to affect those attributes. The effect of the more inclusive candidate selection methods is thus greater than that of the electoral system; it overcomes and overrides that of the electoral system. In other words, inclusive candidate selection methods such as party primaries are more important in explaining legislative behavior than the electoral system.

Our main argument in this chapter has been that one must take into account the effects of both intra-party and inter-party competition, and the interaction between them, in order to better explain legislators’ attitudes and norms of behavior. The literature has shown that electoral systems matter, and we posit that candidate selection methods do so, too. But what matters the most is the combination between them and the way they interact with one another. Our research moves us from the traditional unidimensional perspective to a two-dimensional intra- and inter-party approach, and it sheds light on an important explanatory variable that has only recently begun to receive scholarly attention. Legislative behavior is indeed difficult to explain, and even more difficult to predict, but we should not limit ourselves to partial, myopic arguments based on a single explanatory variable.
### Countries and Parties Included in the Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Electoral system</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Selectorate score</th>
<th>n (party)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>MR (Reform Movement)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CD&amp;V (Christian Democratic and Flemish)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Open VLD (Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PS (Socialist Party)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPA (Different Socialist Party)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VB (Flemish Interest)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Plurality/majority</td>
<td>UMP (Union for Popular Movement)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PS (Socialist Party)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union of Bavaria)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Die Linke (The Left)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>G (Green Party)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Union)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>PR (STV)</td>
<td>Fianna Fail</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fine Gael</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Likud</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kadima</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yisrael Beytenu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PvdA (Labour Party)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VVD (The People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>DNA (Labour party)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FRP (Progress Party)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Høyre (Conservative Party)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SV (Socialist Left Party)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>PP (People’s Party)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>Plurality/majority</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *To account for differences in the number of respondents across parties we use party weights in all analyses.

**Notes**

1 The PARTIREP project is a cross-national MP survey aimed at analyzing changing patterns of participation and representation in modern democracies. It includes data on elected representatives from: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See: http://www.partirep.eu.
It is important to note that the inclusiveness of the selectorate is not necessarily correlated with party size. That is, one cannot claim that large parties are the ones that tend to have more inclusive selection procedures and vice versa.

Despite the rich theory on the ballot structure and its effect on legislative behavior, our data shows little variation in legislative behavior according to the ballot structure. Moreover, in many instances the effect of the ballot structure on legislative behavior runs in the opposite direction than expected. However, the PARTIREP dataset does not include countries that use open ballots, such as Finland. As a result, we are left with relatively little variation on the ballot structure between countries, such as the variation between countries that have completely closed party lists (Spain, Israel) and countries that have flexible but rather closed party lists (Belgium, Norway). The limited range of ballot structures in our data might be one of the reasons for the aforementioned outcomes; as a result, we choose to focus on the electoral formula as the defining variable of the electoral system in our analysis.

The most comprehensive study of candidate selection methods (Hazan and Rahat 2010) elaborates four dimensions of analysis: candidacy; selectorate; decentralization; and voting/appointment. The existing literature does not show a correlation between most of these dimensions and the electoral system. For example: the selectorate might be more or less inclusive despite the fact that the general elections are based on universal suffrage. Similarly, the party might vote or nominate its candidates, while the general elections are held only on voting procedures. Candidacy might be slightly affected by the electoral system since if the election law places limitations on candidacy for public office (such as citizenship or age) then the party can only narrow its candidacy requirements even further, but not the other way around. The only dimension of candidate selection methods where we can see an effect of the electoral system on the candidate selection method is decentralization. That is, it is reasonable to assume that if the electoral system is based on districts, the party will prefer to choose its candidates on the district level as well. We therefore do not address the decentralization dimension of candidate selection in order to avoid problems of multicollinearity.

Defined as the extent to which co-partisans share similar policy preferences with one another when voting on legislation.

As previously mentioned, there is an intimate connection between party agreement and party unity. In other words, the view that dissent is a reasonable behavior is, at least partially, a function of whether the legislator happens to frequently disagree with the party position or not. Therefore, our analysis of party unity controls for party agreement in order to avoid omitted variable bias. This also allows us to assess whether the source of dissent intentions is the result of a selection effect (presented by party agreement) or the result of the incentives legislators face. Party agreement is added as a control variable to the three controls used in the model. The effect of party agreement on party unity does not diminish the effect of the incentives provided to legislators by both the electoral system and the candidate selection method for unified or disjointed behavior.

References


Mind the Gap


