Dilma Rousseff’s election in 2010 as Brazil’s first female president represented something of a paradox. Even as the nation elected a woman to its most important position, the presence of women in all other elected positions remained strikingly low (see Table 3.1). With just 10 percent women in the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil is near the bottom (153 of 193) of the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s “Women in Parliament” rankings (IPU 2018). Moreover, six years after Dilma’s initial election, Brazil had roughly the same proportion of female state legislators, federal deputies, and senators as it did when she took office.

This chapter explores the relationship between historical legacies, political institutions, and the representation of women in formal politics in Brazil. We first provide a brief overview of women’s political roles, starting with the fight for women’s suffrage and the election of the nation’s first female politicians. We then discuss the presence of women in politics from the Vargas era until the early 1980s. This is followed by an examination of the contemporary (post-'Diretas Já’) political system in which we offer a more detailed investigation of the entrance of women into formal politics. Emphasizing the dynamic between women’s movements and political parties, we present a descriptive analysis of the evolution of female candidates and

Table 3.1 Women in Power in the Presidencies of Dilma Rousseff: Elected Officials in 2010 and 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Women Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governors</td>
<td>3 (11.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senators</td>
<td>8 (14.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Deputies</td>
<td>45 (8.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Deputies</td>
<td>138 (13.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayors</td>
<td>504 (9.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Councilors</td>
<td>6,508 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * The percentages of mayors and municipal councilors reflect their numbers in 2010 and 2014. Actual municipal elections were held in 2008 and 2012.

Sources: TSE (2016) and IPU (2018).
women elected to legislative positions since the early 1980s. The chapter then discusses the 1995 gender quota law, the 2009 reform of the law, and the consequences of both for the representation of women in legislative politics. Moving to executive politics, we provide an overview of Dilma Rousseff’s election, the role gender played in her election, and the consequences of her election and impeachment for women’s representation in the executive. Our conclusion highlights some enduring challenges for women in Brazilian politics and presents opportunities for future research.

The gender and politics literature emphasizes three aspects of representation: descriptive, symbolic, and substantive. Descriptive representation focuses on the numerical presence of women in the political system. Symbolic representation addresses the ways in which the presence of women shapes the beliefs and attitudes of citizens and elites. Substantive representation centers on women-related policy making and the dynamics surrounding the legislation and implementation of such policies (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson 2014; Pitkin 1967). Since the emergence in the 1990s of legislated gender quotas in parliaments throughout the world, research on women in politics has produced a broad literature dealing with descriptive representation, that is, the inclusion of women in legislative bodies. The literature has evolved to produce works encompassing all three dimensions of representation, focusing especially on the relationship between them (see, for example, Beckwith 2007; Celis & Childs 2008; Franceschet, Krook, & Piscopo 2012; Schwindt-Bayer 2010). The rise in the number of female presidents and prime ministers in the late 1990s and the new millennium also led to the development of scholarship on the impact of women executives and on women’s representation (Bauer & Tremblay 2011; Jalalzai 2004, 2010, 2015; Jalalzai & Krook 2010; Tripp 2008). As more women become chief executives, particularly in Latin America, scholars must delve deeper into the relationship between descriptive representation (especially the election of women to executive posts) and symbolic and substantive representation throughout government. The election of Dilma Rousseff and her subsequent impeachment process provide for an important case study on women’s representation and executive politics.

This chapter focuses mainly on the descriptive representation of women in Brazilian legislatures, paying special attention to party dynamics and the gender quota law—a clear attempt to increase women’s descriptive representation in specific legislative bodies. As we elaborate on Dilma Rousseff’s tumultuous presidency, we provide a brief discussion of descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation under her administration. The conclusion articulates a future research agenda on the representation of women in Brazil.

Suffrage: Female Voters and Female Politicians

The Brazilian political system has always been male-dominated. Although this is true of most countries, analysis of the development of political institutions in each country yields crucial insights on the role of gender in the political process. As Acker (1992, p. 568) notes, “the construction of images, symbols, and ideologies that justify, explain, and give legitimacy to institutions” is a gendered process. Although political institutions are often seen as gender-neutral, in reality those institutions were created, recreated, and reinforced mostly by men, with women having to negotiate their presence in them (Acker 1990). Brazil’s current political institutions are a consequence of a legacy of social and political dynamics dating back to the Empire, dynamics that emphasize the primacy of men in politics. The fight for women’s suffrage takes place within that context.

Brazil’s first imperial constitution (1824) had no mention of women’s exclusion from the right to vote. Such exclusion was implied by the “common sense” of the time, as women were
considered subordinates of their fathers or husbands (Dias & Sampaio 2011, p. 61). Female subordination in Brazil was not unique for the period, but it was noteworthy nevertheless, as described by European travelers at the time (Rachum 1977, p. 118). The late 19th century and early 20th century saw changes in women’s place in society. By the 1880s, more women were being formally educated (in women-only *seminários*), and the development of new technologies led to an increase in female workers in urban areas, changing the social dynamic in some regions of Brazil (Dias & Sampaio 2011; Rachum 1977). It was under those circumstances that Brazilian women obtained suffrage.

Women’s suffrage was a consequence of well-organized mobilization of middle-class urban women, in a movement led by Bertha Lutz (Dias & Sampaio 2011; Hahner 1982; Rachum 1977). The suffrage movement benefited greatly from the rise to power of Getúlio Vargas in 1930 and the initial liberal posture the regime held toward women (Rachum 1977). In 1932, Brazil became one of the first countries in the Americas to enfranchise women, behind only the United States, Canada, and Ecuador (Hahner 1982). A decree from the Vargas government finally made explicit that women had the right to vote under the same conditions as men. The addition of language speaking specifically to the right of women to vote took away the ambiguity present in the constitution of 1891 (Dias & Sampaio 2011).

With the extension of women’s suffrage came the right to seek office, and a minimal number of women began to contest and win elections. In Rio Grande do Norte, the governor extended voting rights to women in 1927, five years prior to national suffrage. The following year, some women won election to municipal councils, and Alzira Soriano became the first woman mayor elected in Latin America (Dias & Sampaio 2011; Juste 2010). In 1933, the first national election after women’s suffrage was established throughout Brazil, just one woman won election to the constituent assembly (Rachum 1977, p. 126). Those very modest gains happened within a system that historically had been an exclusively male environment, and they occurred amid the rising individual political dominance of Getúlio Vargas.

**From Vargas to Diretas Já: Women in the Political Process**

Women’s suffrage in 1932 represented a monumental shift in the voting base, but its effect on the presence of women in political office was minimal. Vargas granted women the right to vote, sought to promote labor policies that protected female workers, nominated women to work in his administration, and established ties with reformers seeking democratic institutions (Wolfe 2010). However, this early liberal posture would soon change into an authoritarian and populist approach, one that co-opted most organized interest groups, including women’s groups, and included a traditionalist view of gender that treated women as subordinates in need of protection (Hahner 1990; Wolfe 2010). With the establishment of the *Estado Novo* in 1937, any advances women experienced in society and in politics were severely curtailed. After 1937, for example, the Vargas regime removed women from all Brazilian consular services abroad (something Vargas had promoted in the early years of his government) and closed the doors to women in various government departments, reversing much of the progress of the early 1930s (Rachum 1977). Vargas’ co-optation of the women’s movement and the labor movement (which included female workers’ groups) undermined the development of women in positions of leadership. His policies reinforced traditionalist views of gender, including the role of women in the workforce, motherhood, and women’s place in the family structure (Hahner 1980, 1990; Wolfe 2010).

With the end of the Estado Novo regime in 1945, women gained some space in the newly established democracy. Nevertheless, women continued to be marginalized in the political
landscape. Political parties kept women in sex-segregated sectors of the bureaucracy, reproducing and reinforcing traditional gender roles and excluding women from positions of leadership (Hahner 1980, 1990). Although some women ran for office during that period, few were elected, as evidenced by the minimal presence of women in the Chamber of Deputies (see Table 3.2). Women did enjoy some successes, albeit limited, at the local level. Still, the majority of women who were successful in politics during the 1945–1964 democratic regime were members of well-established political families or the wives (and widows) of established politicians (Pinheiro 2007).

The presence of women in formal politics remained limited throughout the authoritarian regime that emerged from the 1964 coup, dropping to levels last seen during Vargas’s Estado Novo. The military regime’s centralized power, led in its entirety by men, reinforced the hypermasculine character of Brazilian politics. Many positions, including governors and mayors of bigger cities (economically and politically important), were appointed rather than elected during the authoritarian era, with the majority of those positions going to men. In electoral politics, women gained some space in less important positions, particularly those stripped of influence by the centralization of the military regime. A few women won election to state legislatures, but their numbers represented less than 1 percent of all seats. Sixty women won mayoral elections in small towns between 1972 and 1976, mainly in the poorest, least industrialized, and least urbanized regions of the country (Blay & Soeiro 1979). At the national level, women practically disappeared (once again) from political office. With the exception of 1966, when some men were prohibited from running by the military regime, women were virtually excluded from the Chamber of Deputies (see Table 3.2).

As women lost space in formal politics, they began organizing for political change. The violent suppression of opposition movements during the military regime led women’s movements to organize as a voice not only on women’s issues but also in protest against the social injustices and political oppression of the time (Alvarez 1990). Some women aligned with the Catholic Church and organized within its structure. Most of the demands made by the newly established

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1796</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Representation of Women

women’s groups fell within the demands and goals established by the Church. This connection with the Church in the late 1960s and early 1970s allowed such women’s groups to flourish but limited the scope of their demands (Alvarez 1990; Baldez 2003). Other women aligned with feminist causes, including groups created by women returning from exile at the end of the dictatorship period (Hahn 1982). As discussed by Mitchell-Walthour in Chapter 4 of this volume, Afro-Brazilian women mobilized within both the Black movement and the women’s movement, but they found their voices and demands marginalized within each (Carneiro 1999; Caldwell 2007). In the mid and late 1970s, as the authoritarian grip loosened and the MDB (the only opposition party permitted during the dictatorship) started to win key local and state elections, the women’s movement began to see electoral politics as a way to address its policy interests (Alvarez 1990). Women who mobilized in the late 1960s and 1970s thus started to vie for a voice in the nascent political parties of the early 1980s.

The Return to Democracy

Before the opening of the political system in the early 1980s, the two officially sanctioned political parties of the military regime had not considered women for important elected positions. It was not until the contemporary multiparty system started to take shape in 1982 that more women ran for elected office. At the national level, an unprecedented 42 women ran for seats in the Chamber of Deputies, but only 8 (1.6 percent of the available seats) were elected (Pinheiro 2007). A few of the new parties embraced female candidates and included female leaders in their campaign and policy discussions. Both the Worker’s Party (PT) and PMDB, for example, established women-specific institutions within their party structures, allowing political leaders to create a connection between women, women’s issues, and the party (dos Santos 2012).

Parties paid lip service to female-related issues, but women were still confronted by discrimination within the party structure, and female candidates had limited access to campaign resources. Most new parties reproduced aspects of gender inequality in their organizational structures and in their political platforms, reinforcing gendered power imbalances (Alvarez 1990). Women entering the party structure were expected to make coffee, answer phones, and do other tasks that reinforced the idea that women serve while men lead (dos Santos 2012). In other words, the new political system maintained the gendered political roles that had been part of the Brazilian political system throughout the 20th century.

By the mid-1980s, women started to fight for more space inside political parties and seek greater presence in formal politics. In 1986, 26 women won election to the Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber (along with the Senate) served as the constituent assembly writing the 1988 Brazilian Constitution. This increase in women’s presence benefitted from two developments. The first was the slow but steady strengthening of female leaders from the women’s groups of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the second was the push by new and traditional political families in Brazil to elect more women. Pinheiro (2007) notes that 38.5 percent of the women elected in 1986 came from families with well-established political capital.2 Gradually, women began to enter formal politics, but the gendered, male-dominated character of political parties posed serious limitations for women without the political capital required to thrive in the entrepreneurial electoral arena. (See Chapter 9 in this volume for a more detailed discussion of the dynamics of electoral candidacies.) After the sharp increase in women elected to the national legislature in 1986, only a few more women were elected in the next two election cycles, in 1990 and 1994 (see Table 3.3). That stagnation in women’s presence in Brazil’s new democratic system provoked discussions of a gender quota law.
The Gender Quota Law and Its Impact

In the run-up to the 1995 Beijing Conference for Women, PT deputies Marta Suplicy and Paulo Bernardo proposed that a 30 percent gender quota be applied to candidate lists in proportional elections (Suplicy 1996). Gender quotas had jump-started women’s entrance into leadership positions in the PT’s internal party structures and its affiliated union, the Unified Workers’ Central (CUT), and they had been effectively implemented for legislative elections in neighboring Argentina (Marx, Borner, & Camionotti 2007; Suplicy 1996). Although recent discourse surrounding gender and racial quotas in Brazil has included vociferous opposition to positive discrimination measures (Johnson & Heringer 2015), at the time the gender quota proposal was remarkably uncontroversial, passing with little fanfare (Araújo 1999). A reduced quota target (20 percent) was first applied to the 1996 municipal elections, with parties required to reserve (but not fill) at least 20 percent of their candidate slots for candidates of “each sex” (9.100/1995). In 1997, the quota target returned to the initially proposed 30 percent, with the 1998 elections for state and federal deputy held to a transitional target of 25 percent (9.504/1997).

Still, the impact of the quota—applicable since 1998 to federal and state deputy elections and since 1996 to municipal councilor elections—has been limited (see Table 3.3), with only incremental progress in women’s representation since its implementation. In the Chamber of Deputies, theoretically Brazil’s representative legislative chamber, men still outnumber women 9 to 1. With just 10 percent of federal deputies female, the country’s international ranking is a lowly 153rd of 193 countries (IPU 2018). Furthermore, although the majority of Brazilians now identify as pardo/a (brown) or preto/a (black; IBGE 2015; Telles 2006), just 20 percent of Brazil’s federal deputies (10 of 51 female deputies and 93 of 462 male deputies) are Afro-descendant.

Table 3.3 Women’s Presence in Politics (1986–2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Elections</th>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>Senator</th>
<th>Federal Deputy</th>
<th>State Deputy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Candidates</td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>Candidates</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Elections</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Municipal Councilor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Candidates</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values reflect the percentage of women among candidates and elected.
Reforms to the gender quota law approved in 2009 (12.034/2009) entailed a modification in its language, with the 30 percent target now applicable to actual candidates rather than slots allowed. Given the generous candidacy allotment under Brazil’s electoral law—parties and coalitions are allowed candidacies equivalent to 150 percent of available seats in proportional elections (9.504/1997, 13.165/2015)—parties rarely complete their candidate lists, with the reserved slots for women typically going unfilled. As suggested by Table 3.3, enforcement of the reformed quota target did not begin in earnest until 2012.

Explaining Women’s Descriptive Representation

In spite of gender quotas, women’s representation in electoral office remains marginal, with a few prestigious exceptions. The persistent marginalization of women in formal politics stands in contrast to the country’s vibrant and effective women’s movements, girls’ and women’s educational attainment (superior to that of boys and men), and women’s growing participation in the formal workforce, all factors cross-nationally associated with enhanced female participation in electoral politics (Kenworthy & Malami 1999; Tripp & Kang 2008). Moreover, public opinion data suggest that the electorate favors increasing women’s political participation, with 74 percent of Brazilians agreeing that “true democracy exists only with the presence of more women in spaces of power and decision making,” and eight in ten agreeing that laws should change to guarantee gender parity in legislatures (IBOPE 2013).

Traditional gender norms persist, however, and women—especially poor and nonwhite women—remain disproportionately responsible for the bulk of unremunerated household labor. The “second shift” (Hochschild & Machung 1989) thus constitutes a formidable barrier to women’s political participation, with Brazilian women on average spending 26.6 hours each week on unpaid domestic responsibilities (IPEA 2012). The vast majority of women simply do not have time to devote to party activism and electoral office, which would entail a “triple shift” (Wylie 2012, 2018). Women also confront gender and racial wage disparities that impose further constraints on their time and resources. On average, white women and Afro-descendant women earn just 69.1 and 39.5 percent of what white men earn (IPEA 2014). And, in Brazil’s candidate-centered, personalist electoral system, financial resources are a critical predictor of electoral success.

Conventional wisdom holds that electoral rules constitute a central explanatory factor for representation. Indeed, Brazil’s electoral rules for municipal, state, and federal deputy elections—open-list proportional representation (OLPR) with large districts—privilege candidates with political and/or financial capital, as candidates must spend to differentiate themselves from a mass of candidates in both inter- and intra-party competition. Studies of Chamber of Deputies elections offer empirical evidence for the salience of campaign spending for electoral success and document significant gender discrepancies in campaign finance (Lemos, Marcelino, & Pederiva 2010; Sacchet & Speck 2012; Samuels 2001; Speck & Mancuso 2014; dos Santos 2012; Wylie 2012, 2018; Wylie, Marcelino, & dos Santos 2015). In the 2014 elections, nearly 6,000 candidates contested the 513 Chamber of Deputies seats; the average in campaign contributions for male candidates (R$308,868) was more than 3.5 times greater than the average for female candidates (R$87,711). And the average for white male candidates (R$396,177) was more than 10 times greater than the average for Afro-descendant women candidates (R$37,836; TSE 2016; Wylie 2018; Wylie et al. 2015).

OLPR rules generally encourage candidate-centered rather than party-centered elections. As a result, campaigns tend to emphasize relationships personalized by clientelism, pork, and/or “identifier characteristics” rather than party reputation and platforms (Ames 2001; Carey & Shugart 1995; Thames & Williams 2010; Valdini 2013). Such a system disadvantages most
female contenders, who confront the resource inequities and legacy of male political dominance discussed above. In addition, the OLPR rules provide a poor fit for the gender quota. As seats are allocated to candidates based on their order in a post-election list determined by their individual votes (rather than pre-election by party leaders, as in the case of closed-list PR), a party could fulfill the quota by advancing a ticket that is 30 percent female and still elect no women.

Brazil’s electoral rules also have important implications for its party system, with many gendered effects detrimental to women’s representation. The OLPR electoral context discourages strong parties, instead producing weakly institutionalized parties that often serve as electoral vehicles rather than robust organizations with consistent electoral presence and party platforms. The party system is extremely fragmented. The 2014 elections saw federal deputies from 28 parties with an effective number of parties of 13.22, exceeding nearly all values recorded cross-nationally (Gallagher 2015). As argued by Wylie (2012, 2018), weakly institutionalized parties are ill-equipped to recruit, support, and elect women. They tend not to be rule-bound, and they are thus less likely to comply with the gender quota or have clearly defined rules of the game for ascension within the party. They also rely on self-nomination, leaving intact a socialized gender gap in formal political ambition. Furthermore, inchoate parties have weak organizations with few opportunities for critical capacity building, and they suffer from a deficit of programmatic politics, privileging instead those with personal political capital.

Moreover, despite broad participation by women in Brazil and elsewhere in social movements, women have long been excluded from decision-making influence in party politics. As chronicled above, women’s participation in most parties was historically confined to powerless female sections. Leftist parties and leadership structures have typically been more inclusive than non-left parties, but they are not exempt from the general trend of male dominance. As of 2014, the mean proportion of women on the national executive committees (NECs) of Brazil’s 28 parties with seats in the Chamber of Deputies was just 17.7 percent. That average conceals significant variation across parties: several include no women in their national leadership structures. In addition, there is variation among leftist parties, with the PT having twice the level of female members on its NEC (39 percent) as the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB). Research by Godinho (1998), Kittilson (2006), Wylie (2012, 2018), and Wylie and dos Santos (2016) explains the salience of women in party leadership. When women have a real voice within party decision-making structures, they are able to “let the ladder down” to other women and can convince male leaders of the electoral value of promoting women’s participation. Although women acting on behalf of women is not guaranteed, at a minimum the inclusion of women in party leadership structures helps them to “stop functioning exclusively as masculine clubs” (Godinho 1996, p. 155). Parties that incorporate women in their state leadership structures are significantly more likely to comply with the gender quota and to nominate and elect women in elections to state legislative assemblies and the Chamber of Deputies (Wylie 2012, 2018; Wylie & dos Santos 2016).

In sum, although women have made substantial societal gains, and although public opinion is ostensibly favorable to women in politics, traditional gender norms persist. Gendered expectations for the role of women interact with incentives produced by Brazil’s electoral and party system to generate a web of gendered institutions producing and sustaining male political dominance.

Dilma Rousseff: Female Representation in the National Executive

The 2010 election of Dilma Rousseff came as no surprise in the context of party and electoral politics in Brazil. Selected by Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva as the presidential candidate for the PT after his tenure as president, Dilma enjoyed the support of a popular outgoing president
and a well-structured electoral campaign (dos Santos & Jalalzai 2014). Nevertheless, the election of the first female president in the history of Brazil was momentous. Even more remarkable was the fact that during the first-round elections, in October 2010, more than two-thirds of Brazilians voted for a female candidate, as Dilma received 46.9 percent and the Green Party’s (PV) candidate (Marina Silva) received 19.3 percent of the valid votes. This pattern was repeated in 2014’s first-round elections, when Dilma and Marina Silva, then with the PSB, received 41.6 percent and 21.3 percent, respectively, of the valid votes (TSE 2016). The country’s willingness to vote for two women for its most powerful position stands in sharp contrast to Brazil’s low level of female representation in all levels of government.

As Dilma’s election is recent, the literature focusing on the implications for women’s representation is limited. Most work dealing with Dilma focuses on her presidential campaign and the media treatment of that campaign. Some scholars argue that Dilma’s campaign focused on gender by adopting the nickname “Mother of Brazil” and using connections to motherhood throughout the campaign (Amaral 2011; Bertazzo 2012; Pires 2011; dos Santos & Jalalzai 2014). Other research has focused on the media’s portrayal of Dilma and the gendered dynamics that emerged from the campaign (Dota 2012; Fernandes 2013; Saisi 2014; da Silva 2011).

Dilma’s election to a historically strong executive position and the political crisis that soon engulfed the country provide for an interesting starting point to address how a female president can influence descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation. As we saw above, women’s descriptive representation in Brazil’s state and national legislatures saw only minimal progress over the course of Dilma’s tenure as president. Dilma’s effect on women’s descriptive representation in the national executive, however, was immediate and noteworthy, especially considering the politics of assigning ministers in Brazil. The president appointed nine women in 2011 to serve as ministers in her first cabinet. That number approximated the ten women Lula appointed throughout his eight years in office, and it was more than all women appointed by the previous four presidents combined (Jalalzai & dos Santos 2015). During most of her first presidential term, Dilma seemed to make a concerted effort to maintain a minimum of 15 percent women appointed to ministries. Rhetorically, Dilma sought to maintain the importance of women-related policies by naming this new consolidated institution the Ministry of Women, Racial Equality, and Human Rights (MINIRDH). The president even corrected reporters and ministry workers to emphasize that women came first, saying that “women will understand why I am insisting on this order” (Castro 2015). The absorption in early 2016 of the Secretary for Women’s Affairs (SPM) and the Secretary for the Promotion of Racial Equality (SEPPIR)—institutions created and promoted by Lula—into the Ministry of Human Rights signaled that the budget crisis would affect women’s descriptive and substantive representation in Brasília.

As the 2015–2016 crisis persisted, the president continued to provide women with space in ministries. The cabinet just prior to Dilma’s May 12, 2016 removal from office contained six women, or 22 percent of the available positions. The president’s gender-conscious cabinet formation was especially remarkable when compared with interim president Michel Temer’s first cabinet (following Dilma’s removal). Temer’s cabinet was comprised exclusively of white men (Portal Brasil 2016), the first time in 37 years that not a single woman was nominated to a ministry (Arbex & Bilenky 2016). With debates around gender and race figuring prominently in the media following the May 12 announcement, and pressures to replace ministers under investigation for corruption scandals, Michel Temer soon changed course and nominated two women to hold cabinet positions.

Whereas women’s descriptive representation is relatively easy to measure, symbolic and substantive representation are more complicated. Initial work on Dilma’s symbolic representation attempted to address the impact of her election and presidency on three distinct groups: the
general public, women in the country, and elite women. Dos Santos and Jalalzai (2015) find that the general public experienced slight but significant changes in attitudes toward women during Dilma’s first term as president. The authors also observe that Dilma’s request to be called Presidenta instead of Presidente shows intent to create a symbolic identity to affect women as a group in the country. Finally, the authors see a strengthening of the role model effect on political elites, especially women involved in left-leaning parties in national politics (dos Santos & Jalalzai 2015).

Any initial assessment of Dilma’s impact on Brazilian politics in general, and women’s representation more specifically, must now address the political crisis and impeachment process finalized on August 31, 2016. Moreover, in the case of symbolic representation, the term itself must be better conceptualized. As the literature on female representation in the executive continues to evolve, more discussion on what a female president means to the citizenry as a whole, and specifically to female citizens and elites, should include a clear analysis of the impact of the president’s impeachment on attitudinal views about Dilma specifically and about women in politics more generally.

The political crisis also provides challenges and opportunities for the study of substantive representation. Looking at Dilma’s first term, Jalalzai and dos Santos (2015) argue that Dilma’s impact on women-related policies was complex and relied heavily on policies established by Lula. Dilma’s expansion of Bolsa Família and changes in the ownership laws for Minha Casa Minha Vida houses (awarding the house to women in cases of divorce) showed how Dilma was willing to play on symbolic views of womanhood to expand class-based policies. However, her inaction on controversial issues such as abortion and her failure to expand health care to pregnant women (through the highly controversial Rede Cegonha) showed the limitations to a female president’s influence on women-related policy making.

As a consequence of Dilma’s impeachment, we expect women-related policy making (substantive representation) will be negatively affected. The elimination of MMIRDH under Temer’s interim government through its disintegration and subsequent absorption into the Ministry of Justice and Citizenship provides an indication that the interim government does not see women-specific policy making as an immediate priority. The political crisis, budget crunch, and ideological shifts within the government yield a ripe environment in which to study their implications for specific policies and policy areas related to gender and racial equity and representation.

**Conclusion and Prospects for Research**

Women remain severely underrepresented in Brazil’s formal political structures. The historical male dominance of Brazil’s most important political institutions has constructed and sustained a system that is seldom welcoming to female political aspirants. Although the return to democracy in the 1980s opened some doors that had long been shut to women, those opportunities were limited and embedded in a male-dominated system. The establishment of a quota law in 1995 (and reforms to that law in 2009) did little to increase the representation of women in legislative positions. Electoral institutions such as gender quotas are not created tabula rasa; rather, they are embedded in the existing electoral rules and party system and inherently constrained by the interests of the actors who designed and approved the reform (Gatto 2016). In the case of female representation in Brazil, evolving societal preferences and legal expectations have proven insufficient to induce substantial change in the opportunities afforded to women within the country’s personalist, male-dominant formal political realm. The election of a woman to Brazil’s top executive post led to optimism among some proponents of women’s representation, but the
budget crisis and the August 2016 impeachment resulted in a period of uncertainty regarding many aspects of the political environment, including women’s representation.

This chapter provided a brief history of women’s descriptive representation (presence) in Brazil’s elected positions. As scholars move forward in explaining women’s underrepresentation, more emphasis should be placed on subnational politics, thus leveraging the significant variation within Brazil to evaluate the persistent challenges to female inclusion. The limitations of formal institutional fixes to women’s underrepresentation, illustrated by the shortcomings of the gender quota, illuminate the salience of informal institutions and their interactions with formal institutions for understanding politics and power. It is also imperative to explore the effect of women’s limited descriptive representation on the substantive representation of women in the country. Future research looking at specific types of female-related legislation and policy should take into consideration the fact that so few women are part of the political elite, while also assessing the impact those few women have on such policy proposals. Increasing numbers of female politicians will facilitate that agenda, which has long been stunted by the problem of a limited n. Moreover, Dilma’s presidency and impeachment proceedings open up a fertile research agenda for the near future, when scholars can assess both the impact of her presidency on different aspects of women’s representation and the effect of gender on the impeachment process and the collective memory of Dilma’s administration and ousting. Finally, future research must work to disaggregate the concept of “women,” acknowledging salient distinctions of class, race, sexuality, and beyond. Studies of women’s underrepresentation that do not address such distinctions implicitly render invisible the double marginalization faced by many women. A better understanding of the causes and consequences of the underrepresentation of marginalized groups is essential for illuminating challenges to the consolidation of Brazilian democracy.

Notes

1 There are limited data on the election of female politicians to local and state legislatures during this time period. The literature, however, points to the fact that these elections were less important and less competitive than national elections. Moreover, at the local and state levels, political families exercised significant influence and often nominated their own members, including wives and daughters, increasing their reach at the local level and keeping politics in the family (Pinheiro 2007).

2 Although there are no data for the 1986 election, the literature suggests that the Brazilian political system benefits men and women with familial political capital. Miguel, Marques, and Machado (2015) show that in the 2002, 2006, and 2010 elections a considerable number of men and women elected to the Chamber of Deputies were from well-established political families. Familial capital in those three elections was present for 53.0 and 39.6 percent of women and men elected, respectively (Miguel et al. 2015, p. 734). Therefore, even without data on familial connections for men elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1986, it is safe to assume that a large portion of those men came from families with established political capital. Ames (2001) presents data showing that political families are stronger in the less developed parts of the country.

3 Analyses of public opinion data suggest the majority of Brazilians now support racial quotas for university admission (64 percent in 2013), with a vocal (largely white, upper-class) minority remaining strongly opposed (Mitchell-Walthour 2015). Many opponents of gender and racial quotas root their opposition to positive discrimination in the myth of meritocracy. Such a stance, however, presumes a level playing field, an assumption not supported by empirical evidence (Johnson & Heringer 2015).

4 The categories pardo/a and preto/a are often lumped together by bureaucrats and activists to constitute “Afro-descendant.” Yet, when the racial binary is imposed, levels of identification as Afro-Brazilian or “negro” decline (Loveman, Muniz, & Bailey 2012). Just four of the ten Afro-descendant female federal deputies consider themselves a part of the Black caucus.

5 From 1998 to 2014, parties and coalitions were allowed 150 percent and 200 percent, respectively, of available seats in state and federal deputy elections, with those in states with 20 or fewer Chamber of Deputies seats allotted 200 percent and 300 percent of available seats (9.504/1997). In 2015, the
candidacy allotment was slightly modified: currently, parties and coalitions alike are allowed candidacies equivalent to 150 percent of available seats. The additional allowance for state and federal deputy elections in smaller states has been restricted to states with 12 or fewer Chamber of Deputies seats, and it is 200 percent for both parties and coalitions (13.165/2015). The excess candidacy provision has been around in some form since at least 1965 (4.737/1965). For more information on the excess candidacy provision and how it interacts with the gender quota, see Wylie and dos Santos (2016).

For a more detailed discussion of Brazil’s electoral system, see Chapters 9 and 10 in this volume.

As a reviewer noted, campaign finance averages may be skewed by excessive contributions accumulated by congressional party leaders. We recalculated the trimmed mean in campaign finance for each demographic, excluding the candidates with the ten highest and lowest amounts, and found the gendered and raced inequities were actually heightened. The trimmed mean thus excludes two sources of skew—white male congressional party leaders and the few exceptions to the norm of starkly underfunded campaigns for female candidates, especially those of African descent. Male candidates raised on average R$293,153, nearly five times the average for women (R$60,268). White male candidates raised on average R$372,418, nearly 20 times the average for Afro-descendant women (R$19,908).

Calculated by the authors using data from party websites and the TSE (2016).

Brazil’s coalitional presidentialism (see Amorim Neto and Pereira & Bertholini in this volume; Figueiredo & Limongi 1998; Power 2010; Lopez 2015; Praça, Freitas, & Hoepers 2011) imposes limitations on presidents’ selections for cabinet posts. In the context of ideologically non-cohesive governing coalitions, cabinet appointments often hail from the coalition parties, making it harder for a president to appoint ministers based on specific characteristics such as gender.

References


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