1.3 Globalization, connectivities and networks

An archaeological perspective

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Introduction: ‘-izations’

‘Globalization’, ironically, need not be worldwide. At least, this is a necessary convenience in its current definition, as it would be hard to establish definitively if and when every corner of the globe is connected. And this being the case, ‘global’ becomes a little less important in globalization’s definition than does the idea of ‘complex connectivity’ (Jennings 2011: 2, citing Tomlinson 1999: 2). With complex connectivity, interactions have to be intense, forming dense networks – and they have to be between different regions and have the capacity to trigger social change if they are to be reckoned as globalization (Jennings 2011: 2). Given this set of features, one can see how archaeologists and historians have found it justifiable to take the idea of globalization back into the past, as there are many scenarios that fit the bill, as long as the ‘global’ aspect does not have to be taken too literally (e.g. Morris 2005; LaBianca and Scham 2006; Hodos 2010 and this volume). So we can now read of ancient globalizations from Rome (Versluys 2014) to the Andes (Jennings 2011 and this volume), and this move certainly has a lot of promise for strengthening cross-cultural approaches, and breaking down ‘the great wall’ between ancient and modern civilizations (Jennings 2011: 3).

What then is the advantage of calling a process of complex connectivity ‘globalization’ if it doesn’t really have to be fully global? It is a move that says not everything has to be connected, but everything could be. And if everything under the sun is up for grabs, then there is no a priori starting point – no assumed ‘core’ from which one then traces zones of influence and hence peripheries. This is very liberating for cultural analysis, because it allows a move away from civilizational histories that emphasise boundaries and boundedness, no doubt under the influence of our modern nation-states (Flood 2009: 2). With the focus instead on the cultural entanglements created by constant mobility and connectivity, we create much more dynamic and emergent histories. This flattening effect in globalization thinking is basically achieved by putting all ‘cultures’ for analysis in ‘one single cultural container’ (Versluys 2014: 12). So for the Roman world, for example, which is Versluys’ focus, one does not start at Rome as the core and work out – one treats the entire world touched by Rome as a zone of intra-cultural, rather than inter-cultural, connectivity. The ‘globe’ is not the scale of this container, but perhaps Eurasia is – and so a centralizing term like Romanization is quite inaccurate in fact, and is currently resisted by
many Roman specialists. Still, a more decentring term like ‘Eurasian-africanization’ is unlikely to catch on. So perhaps Romanization 2.0, as Versluys calls it, simply has to recognize itself as a decentred phenomenon – just as we should not get too hung up on the global in globalization, likewise for the Roman in Romanization.

And one reason why Romanization continues to have some efficacy as a term is that it conveys very well the notion that the social changes effected by this dense, widespread connectivity unfold over time. So globalization thinking is highly useful in both spatial and temporal dimensions. Processes of ‘-ization’ develop over space and through time. The way in which globalization thus combines space and time, geography and history, is particularly powerful, although arguably this power has not been harnessed sufficiently. It seems that these two dimensions are more typically separated in scholarship – along the lines of the roots/routes dichotomy, in fact (Clifford 1997; Friedman 2002; Flood 2009). Let me try to explain how this happens, and why it is ultimately unnecessary, if entirely understandable.

First, let us think about the spatial connectivity component of globalization – which is typically grasped through the idea of the ‘network’. This is often used as a metaphor rather than as a specific model or means for analysis. It is very compatible with globalization thinking, because it allows that ‘flattening out’ mentioned above, and is sufficiently flexible to let us imagine many different kinds of entity connected up in lots of different ways, be it socially, economically or technologically. Scholars of the ancient world keen on globalization thinking have also recently argued that what studies of ancient globalization need are networks (Jennings this volume; Hodos 2014), though as yet there has been little explicit uptake of network analysis. Some scholars using globalization to think with have gone quite deeply into network thinking, without utilizing network modeling or analysis (e.g. Malkin 2011). Others have done a great deal to study interactions and connectivities inter-regionally and over the long term without finding any particular need to speak of globalization (Broodbank 2013). But I would argue that a number of archaeologists are already quite a way along the path towards this merging of globalization and network concerns, even if not yet expressed like this. Barbara Mills and colleagues (2013), Søren Sindbæk (2013), Anna Collar (2013), Fiona Coward (2013) and Shawn Graham (2014), among others (see contributions in Knappett 2013, 2014a), have been studying inter-regional interaction using network analysis to achieve many of the same effects as those desired by those advocating globalization ideas. Arguably, network analysis does everything that globalization thinking does. But globalization is inherently macro-scale, and so is more specific than ‘network’, which can apply to a range of scales, from neural networks to entire ecosystems.

Another sense that ‘globalization’ conveys inherently that ‘network’ does not is emergence. So this takes us to our second point: the emergent quality of globalization; how it unfolds over time. ‘Networkization’ might do the job, but nobody uses this of course – and so to many observers ‘network’ seems quite static, especially if they are imagining railway networks, or the network visualizations that are so commonplace. Thus, network methods are commonly conceived as too static for getting to grips with change, and so scholars have sought other registers that they believe capture change more aptly. One of these is ‘meshwork’, proposed by Tim Ingold in direct challenge to network, and specifically for its capacity to convey movement, flow, and emergence (Ingold 2007, 2012). We also have ‘entanglement’, which came to prominence in part through globalization debates, especially following Thomas (1991), and then in archaeology (e.g. Dieter 1998, 2010; Silliman 2005; Martindale 2009). However, it is in the hands of Ian Hodder (2012) that the idea of entanglement has come to show its worth in explaining temporal emergence over the long term. Hodder, too, shows a reluctance towards networks, though somewhat more ambivalently than Ingold, for what he calls their inability to convey the ‘stickiness’ of thing–thing relations.
Network tools

Actually, these are misconceptions, because networks are invariably dynamic and emergent, even if these properties are not transparent in the term itself. While I find entanglement and network perspectives quite compatible, and one need not have to choose one over the other, we should perhaps guard against the division of temporal and spatial dimensions of globalization, to the point where they end up with different approaches or methodologies. I argue here that networks can provide what globalization theory needs – providing the tools for analysing not only connectivities across space, but also their emergent properties through time. While globalization applied to ancient societies does the important heuristic work of encouraging us to think about mobility and connectivity, networks take us a step further, allowing us to both model and analyse data (Östborn and Gerding 2014). The single ‘container’ idea of globalization (Versluys 2014) is easily managed with networks, flattening out the hierarchical assumptions left over from core–periphery thinking. Network analysis can be multi-scalar, and so work across levels from local to global, another key facet of globalization thinking. Contrary to some common criticisms (e.g. Walsh 2014), networks can certainly capture emergence and change (e.g. Padgett and Powell 2012). More specifically, a series of network properties can be modelled and measured, such as centrality, tie strength and clique formation. These have been the focus of a great deal of research, in both social network analysis (SNA), and complexity science (e.g. Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000; Newman et al. 2006). What the formal study of such properties allows is a richer cross-cultural analysis – a move that has been slow in coming in globalization debates – which would then mean we could actually start comparing different ancient globalizations, such as Romanization and Mediterraneanization, rather than just stating that they are all the result of complex connectivity and dense networks.

If we can start using some network measures to assess some of the details of ancient mobilities and connectivities, then we can move away from a position where the latter are little more than ciphers enabling the assertion of globalization as a spatio-temporal process. But what network measures would be most appropriate for studying ancient globalizations? If our first reaction (as archaeologists) is to think of the long-distance, inter-regional nature of globalized connectivities, then we may all too easily view ancient ‘-izations’ as spatial phenomena – maps of the Roman empire, for example, coming to mind. We should try to resist such knee-jerk cartographic thinking – even though much archaeological evidence is material and spatial rather than directly social (see Knappett 2014b), we should still try to remember that ancient networks were fundamentally social, economic, political or religious too. So when we consider these inter-regional mobilities, we really need to have the social nature of the connections very much in mind too. And what are long-distance social connections typically like? What should we expect of inter-regional connectivities in the past? Well, there are a few different ways we might think about them – and we can break them down into frequency, strength, content and directionality.

First, with what frequency were connectivities maintained across distance? We might imagine connections over long distances to have been typically infrequent, at least relative to the contemporary world. Although we should be wary of simplistic assumptions about levels of mobility in the past, there were nonetheless certain infrastructural limitations at different times. So, in the Mediterranean, travel across maritime space would presumably have been relatively restricted before the invention of the sail. Second, we should consider the strength of connectivity too – which is different to frequency. A strong tie may be infrequent, and vice versa. We might typically expect strong ties to be local ones, and weak ones to be over distance. This is not to say, however, that such weak ties are unimportant – indeed, for certain purposes they may be very powerful, as argued by Granovetter (1973) in a classic paper on the ‘strength of weak ties’ in facilitating network navigability. This idea has also been connected with the
notion of ‘small world’ networks (Watts and Strogatz 1998), whereby only a few random connections are needed to create global network navigability across an otherwise clustered set of local connections. If we then think of globalized entities as ‘small worlds’ (Malkin 2011; see also Tartaron 2013), then we should probably expect the long-distance links to be weak. But in certain cases, ancient globalizations seem to generate quite strong inter-regional connectivities (e.g. Collar 2013). And there are some network studies suggesting that the ties holding global networks together need not be weak (see White and Houseman 2003). Moreover, we should take ourselves back to Jennings’ comments concerning the definition of globalization: intense interactions forming dense networks (Jennings 2011: 2).

This question over the relative strength of long-distance ties brings up a third important area, which is the content of ties. As long ago as 1973, Granovetter warned against an excessive focus on tie strength at the expense of tie content. That is to say, we should ask what was actually moving or circulating through these ties – what kinds of matter, energy or information? Asking about tie content raises the issue of what motivates social mobility and connectivity in the first place. It is very easy in network analysis to take a particular network structure for granted, and then analyse the functions that take place on that network. But network structure evolves for some purpose, probably but not necessarily correlated with its current functionality, and so we need to pay attention to what an ancient network, or ancient globalization, is for. In other words, why connect across distances? It seems like an obvious consideration, but it is curiously easy to overlook. It is important to ask because network connections are not without cost – and so we must assess what the benefit would be in establishing and maintain a link. If we do observe many long-distance links of some strength in a given network, then we must ask what purpose they serve for whichever protagonists were investing in them. One means for assessing tie content, in archaeological contexts at least, could be to focus less on artefactual proxies, and more on the actual practices or praxeologies that appear to be shared through inter-regional connections (see contributions in Kiriatzi and Knappett 2016).

The fourth feature of network connectivities to consider here is directionality. Does a given node have links both coming in and going out? Are the flows of matter, energy and information unidirectional or multidirectional? This relates to the content and purpose of connections of course, and it may be that the directionality in a network could reveal aspects of its function. Do all nodes in a network have an equal interest in and contribution to the network function as a whole? Or are some nodes conspicuously more involved than others?

By highlighting frequency, strength, content and directionality as features of network connections, we give ourselves some scope to assess and compare ancient globalizations. Of course, comparison is quite possible without formal network measures, as Jennings has shown, helped by Sklair’s identification of eight ‘trends’ in globalizations (Sklair 2006). Jennings also very helpfully highlights in this volume that not all instances in the past of long-distance connectivity quite qualify as globalization, as he argues is the case for the Hopewell interaction sphere. A further advantage of using these variables to assess networks is that none of them restricts us to searching for ancient globalizations at a particular scale. Bevan (2011) in his review of Jennings’ book quite justifiably raises the matter, noting that Jennings’ case studies tend to span about 1,000 km. Is there a typical ancient scale for globalization? Or can we use this same umbrella term to compare phenomena at scales ranging from the Roman empire to Cahokia, for instance? How does it help to call both of these ‘globalizations’? Well, scale is not the main concern – as long as the distances are in some sense ‘inter-regional’ (and this must also be relative, based on technologies, and difficulty of travel), then we can still compare them in terms of the frequency, strength, content and directionality of their ties and anticipate finding quite some variability in their scale, duration and purpose.
Globalization, connectivities and networks

Minoanization as globalization?

What I would like to do at this point is take an example from the ancient Mediterranean that, as far as I know, has yet to be seriously considered as an ancient globalization. It concerns the phenomenon often referred to as ‘Minoanization’, artfully defined by Broodbank (2004: 46) as:

>a modern term of sometimes deceptive convenience for a heterogeneous range of ancient material culture traits and practices that indicate the adoption in places beyond Crete, through whatever means, of ways of doing things that originated directly or indirectly within that island.

I say ‘artfully’, because with the term ‘through whatever means’ he delicately sidesteps the polarized debate between those who believe in a Minoan colonization of the Aegean, and those who favour a more bottom-up process of acculturation. Regardless of these different views, what one can say is that most specialists do look at this phenomenon in terms both of inter-cultural interactions – because the Minoan, Cycladic, Helladic and Anatolian cultures do look quite different, and have deep, distinct ‘civilizational histories’ – and with a definite sense of a directionality emanating from Crete, even if its exact character is debated. The term itself makes these assumptions hard to avoid. We could try to abandon using ‘Minoanization’ altogether, though I feel this would run into the same problems as trying to abandon ‘Romanization’ (see Versluys 2014). Another option would be to change the terminology so it would better reflect the total container within which interactions were occurring – and so perhaps ‘Aegeanization’ would be more apt (though this does overlook interactions with Egypt, for example). This is perhaps as likely to catch on as ‘Eurasianification’ is as a replacement for Romanization. A third option would be simply to retain the term Minoanization while remaining vigilant as to the assumptions it brings with it.

More important than the term we use is what we do in terms of analysis – and so what we should try here is to make the entire Aegean ‘the container’ for analysis, in order not to take Crete as our starting point or ‘core’. So we should simply take the Greek mainland, the Cyclades, the Dodecanes, coastal Asia Minor, the northeast Aegean and Crete, and see what kinds of connections we can detect between these different places, in terms of their frequency, strength, content and directionality. Moreover, we mentioned above that networks can quite readily incorporate the temporal dimension too, and fortunately so can the evidence from this region – we can, for example compare the before, during, and after of Minoanization, to see how this candidate for ancient globalization emerged and developed.

Phase 1: Middle Bronze Age, c.1950–1750 BCE (MM I–II)

This is essentially a phase of contact between all of the regions mentioned above, though seemingly at quite low levels (Figure 1.3.1). The evidence for the first use of the sail in this area is really only iconographic, but what we do have points to a date around 2000 BCE (Tartaron 2013: 53) – which means that this innovation could have been in part responsible for this phase of contact.

Cretan pottery is found at various sites in the Aegean, such as on the Cycladic islands of Kea (Abell 2014), Melos (Hood 2007) and Thera (Nikolakopoulou forthcoming), on Aegina in the Saronic Gulf (Gauss and Smetana 2007), at mainland Greek sites like Lerna (Zerner 1993), in the east Aegean on the Dodecanesian island of Rhodes (Marketou 2009), on the Anatolian coast at Miletus (Niemeier 2005), and even up into the northeast Aegean on the island of Samothrace.
Globalization, connectivities and networks

There also exists some evidence for Cycladic imports on Crete, in small quantities; and some links between the mainland and the Cyclades (Nikolakopoulou 2007), though nothing this early suggesting contact between the east Aegean and the Cyclades. In all cases the quantities are certainly modest, suggesting a low-level, infrequent mode of connectivity. Moreover, one would have to say that the connections are weak, as there is little to no sign of any effects on local traditions. The content of these exchanges seems to be largely economic, as we are dealing with storage amphorae and jars for the most part, though some indications from Aegina and Miletus could indicate closer ties. And in terms of directionality, the evidence suggests that Crete is more active in stimulating these connections. We have to guard against biases in the evidence, with Cretan pottery perhaps being more fully studied and more easily recognized; and we should not overlook the signs of other cross-cutting connections. Nonetheless, this is the period when the Cretan palaces of Knossos, Phaistos and Malia are in competition, and creating demand for bronze objects, with neither copper nor tin available on the island. So one might well imagine that metals are really a driver here, as in the east Mediterranean generally at this time (Broodbank 2013: 376).

Overall, the network ties in this phase are diffuse, and there is no sign of social changes occurring because of them. It is therefore difficult to argue that this phase is one of ‘globalization’. On the other hand, the weak ties holding together far-flung clusters of communities gives this the character of a ‘small world’ network – which would be resilient over the long term (Knappett et al. 2011).

Phase 2: Middle to Late Bronze Age, c.1750–1450 BCE (MM III–LM I)

Later in the Middle Bronze Age, equivalent to the Cretan phase Middle Minoan IIIA, or c.1750 BCE, something changes quite drastically in inter-regional connectivity. Lasting through the first phases of the Late Bronze Age, it corresponds to what I have elsewhere described as a shift from networks of exchange to networks of affiliation (Knappett and Nikolakopoulou 2005). We can now observe that network ties are having pronounced social effects. At the site of Akrotiri on the island of Thera, for example, various artefacts and practices better known from Minoan Crete find themselves adopted – from new kinds of architectural features and arrangements of space, to new weaving techniques, to new ways of making pottery on the wheel. Some of the uptake is quite faithful to Cretan prototypes, though there is also a lot of what some scholars might call ‘hybridization’, though this is a less effective term than others like ‘translation’. I use it here since Girella and Pavúk call this the ‘hybrid phase’ in the northeast Aegean too – where the previously very limited contact now seems much more thoroughgoing, at least at Samothrace, and to some extent also on the islands of Lemnos, Lesbos and Chios. Elsewhere we see much the same picture – on other Cycladic islands (Kea and Melos), in the Dodecanese (Rhodes and Kos) and in coastal Anatolia (e.g. Miletus and Iasos). Although the evidence for connectivity does tend to be largely dominated by Cretan imports, there are now also many more signs of cross-cutting connections, for example between the Cyclades and the east Aegean (with both Koan and Milesian imports on Thera: Knappett and Nikolakopoulou 2008; Knappett and Hilditch 2016). Material does also make its way to Crete from these areas, though largely confined to Knossos presently, where Cycladic and east Aegean imports (from Rhodes, Kos, and Miletus) have been identified (Knappett 2006).

So we can quite confidently say that in this phase the strength of ties is much greater than before, and so presumably was their frequency – with the depth of learning for some of the adopted technologies, like wall plaster, weaving, and the potter’s wheel, contacts were surely
more intense. As for directionality, there still seems to be a certain dominance of Cretan links, with the quest for metals as strong, if not stronger, than before, though the geopolitical situation on Crete had changed considerably, with Knossos now probably the single major palatial power. That said, there are certainly ample connections that are not Cretan, and although we tend not to imagine that the other areas of the Aegean had much impact on Minoan culture, there is the curious case of figurative wall paintings, which do not occur any earlier on Crete than they do in the Cyclades; and which given the rich pre-existing tradition in the Cyclades, could have originated there. We ought also to take into account the signs of mainland connectivity in LM IB: even when Crete is still supposedly dominant regionally, a number of sites seem to be receiving imports of Marine Style, a quintessential Cretan style, from the Greek mainland. So we should be careful about assuming too much directionality from Crete.

One of our four criteria that we have not yet discussed for this phase is tie content. I would argue that we are no longer just seeing economic exchange, but something more textured. We see pronounced mobility of many different kinds of artefacts and techniques, and some look as if they must be tied up with ritual. Miletus especially has a sanctuary area with pronounced Minoan influence, with altar platforms, plaster offering tables, and rhyta (Niemeier 2005; Raymond et al. 2016). The Xeste 3 frescoes at Akrotiri show what must surely be a ritual scene arranged around a lustral basin, a typically Minoan architectural feature with probable cult functions (Doumas 1992). We might also bring up the clear Minoan content in the riches of the Shaft Graves at Mycenae (Dickinson 1984). Indeed Joseph Maran has recently commented on the ‘wide array of Minoan religious paraphernalia’ in the Shaft Graves, and a ‘turn towards elements of Minoan religion at the very beginning of the Mycenaean period’ (Maran 2011: 289). Could it be that the Minoanization of this phase is in large part a religious phenomenon? That is not to say it was not also economic – as Kowalzig argues for the Mediterranean in the later, Archaic period, religion and maritime economic activity were tightly entangled (Kowalzig in prep). Religion would be one binding force that could stimulate multiple communities across a network to make the necessary investments in inter-regional ties to keep them strong. This then makes for intense interactions forming a dense network – or, in other words, the minimum definition of globalization. Minoanization may not span a particularly wide area, mostly confined to the Aegean, but its characteristics in this phase have all the hallmarks of globalization. If we were to explore further, using Sklair’s (2006) eight trends, then we would find that many of these also seem to apply quite well – such as standardization and unevenness, for example.

Phase 3: Late Bronze Age, c.1450–1200 BCE (LM II–III)

If we take the orthodox position that Minoanization spreads out from a Minoan core, then we have to imagine that Minoanization comes to a very abrupt end with the wave of destructions on Crete in LM IB that bring Minoan civilization to an end. However, the continuity of connectivity across the Aegean suggests that the network was not as centred on Crete as is often believed. We have already mentioned the imports of Marine Style from the Greek mainland occurring earlier, in the LM IB phase. Now we see the Greek mainland, from LM II onwards, really just picking up the same networks. Indeed, archaeologists working at Miletus have recently argued that this first Mycenaeanizing phase (Miletus V, LH IIIA) has much in common with the preceding Minoanizing phase (Raymond et al. 2016). It is not until the second Mycenaeanizing phase (Miletus VI, LH IIIB) that the situation changes radically, with much greater evidence for pervasive mainland influence. Indeed, the excavator of Bronze Age Miletus, Wolf-Dietrich Niemeier, believes that it signifies an actual presence of Mycenaean mainlanders, not least because of the Mycenaean burial customs (Niemeier 2005: 16). Mountjoy
Globalization, connectivities and networks

(1998), however, sees acculturation rather than immigration, though both authors agree that this ‘Lower Interface’ area sees a great deal more evidence for Mycenaeanization than do areas of coastal Anatolia further north, the so-called ‘Upper Interface’ (see also Girella and Pavuk 2016). Returning south, Rhodes and Kos also see a lot of Mycenaean influence, with many Mycenaean-style chamber tombs on Rhodes (Niemeyer 2005: 14), and all of the main features of Mycenaean identity present on Kos, with significant evidence for Mycenaean cultic objects and funerary rites (Vitale 2016). In the Cyclades, too, we see major changes in the material culture, with Minoan connections replaced largely by mainland Mycenaean ones. The east and west shrines at Phylakopi on Melos have clear connections with the Argolid, and Earle has used this and other evidence to suggest that cult practices were integral to Mycenaeanization in the Cyclades, much as they were with Minoanization too (Earle 2016).

Indeed, there is an argument to be made that Mycenaeanization has very similar network properties to Minoanization in these same areas of the Aegean where the latter was present – i.e. the Cyclades, the Dodecanese, and the ‘Lower Interface’ of coastal Anatolia. That is to say, possessing the same levels of tie strength and frequency, and similar content, according to the argument that religion was key to both. Of course, the directionality has changed, from Crete to the Greek mainland, but interestingly the network is robust to this change. But Mycenaeanization has another important feature that we have not yet addressed – its much wider reach. We have to now include parts of northern Greece (Kiriatzi and Andreou 2016); the eastern Mediterranean, notably Cyprus (van Wijngaarden 2002); as well as the central Mediterranean, especially southern Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia (Blake 2008). Mycenaean pottery is found both imported and locally imitated (depending on the period) in quite some quantities. However, we might suggest that these more far-flung connections are different to those we have described above: perhaps less frequent, less strong, with different directionalities (e.g. Crete more tied to the central Mediterranean than was the Argolid – see Kiriatzi and Andreou 2016), and probably different tie content too – arguably more economic than religious. In this respect, these wider network links are perhaps more like those of phase 1 for the Aegean, as described above.

What are we then to make of this ‘Mycenaeanization’ phase? Certainly, if we are to dub Minoanization an example of an early globalization, then Mycenaeanization, at least in the Aegean area, also qualifies. But should we also extend this to the wider east and central Mediterranean areas? Whereas in the Aegean I think one can certainly describe a dense network of intense interactions in this phase 3, it is debatable whether that description applies to the wider region. The wider space has more the character, arguably, of a ‘small world’, bound together by the strength of weak ties – and an economic rather than a religious phenomenon.

Conclusions

This brief look at the before, during and after of Minoanization, by comparing the frequency, strength, content and directionality of connectivities, shows both how useful globalization can be as an organizing principle, and how underdeveloped some of our thinking is about connectivities. Even just taking some parameters of networks is a useful start, without even venturing into more formal network analysis. One especially interesting question has surfaced through this exercise – what would motivate multiple communities to all invest in connections, thereby distributing the otherwise prohibitive costs of long-distance strong ties? With the material discussed here, it seems one of the most convincing answers is ‘religion’. Even though it is conceivable that in the case of Minoanization this religion is promoted from a centre (Knossos), its acceptance by other communities (if only in part) would suggest that it brought considerable benefit. Furthermore, we might note that if Minoan religion was polytheistic (see Gulizio and
Nakassis 2014), then it could have been adopted accretively rather than in an exclusionary fashion. If we think briefly about what happens later, it is only in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Bronze Age political systems that the entire Mediterranean basin becomes quite tightly connected for the first time, in a process of Mediterraneanization (Morris 2005). Broodbank (2013) has this happening as early as the tenth/ninth centuries, whereas Malkin pins it as an Archaic phenomenon. Either way, if we could assess it in terms of the parameters outlined above, we would get further towards interpreting it comparatively. This would be an interesting exercise, as Malkin calls it a ‘small world’, which by strict definitions should be composed of weak rather than strong ties over distance, whereas we have seen that a basic definition of globalization requires strong connections forming dense networks. Given the latter requirement, then it would indeed be interesting if it were religion that again helped to distribute the network cost of having long-distance strong ties, as inferred by Kowalzig for the Archaic period (Kowalzig in prep).

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for the invitation to speak in the Classics Department at UC Santa Barbara, where I had the opportunity to discuss some of these themes, receiving very useful feedback from Brice Erickson, Stuart Smith and John Lee. Justin Jennings, Tamar Hodos and Barbara Kowalzig very generously provided feedback on an earlier draft. Justin Leidwanger kindly provided the map for Figure 1.3.1, adapted by Cristina Ichim.

References


Globalization, connectivities and networks


Globalization, connectivities and networks