Yet there is no use pretending that all we know about time and space, or rather history and geography, is more than anything else imaginative. (Said 1978: 55)

Is there an archaeology of the soul? Of course the question is preposterous and most archaeologists would dismiss it as irrelevant: how can the immortal and immaterial be studied by a discipline wedded so strongly to the corporeal and material? And yet archaeologists outlay considerable effort on understanding the workings of other concepts that are also hidden and internal and that work in mysterious ways; for example, socio-economic systems, cultures, and, at another scale, individual identity comprising personhood and the self. These concepts are hidden because they are inferred from material remains, rather than directly observed, and they are internal because such understanding would not exist without our knowledge of life as layers of experience contained in memories and objects (Knappett 2006).

In this chapter I concentrate on the hidden landscape of human identity rather than the more familiar landscapes of organizational systems and cultural behavior. I am not interested in souls but instead in the rhetorical devices that infuse material with bodily experience thereby giving legs to the immanent in the form of metaphors. As Martin Hollis (1985: 227) put it from a philosopher’s perspective, we need metaphors to express what goes on inside us in order to analyze the hidden, inner sense that makes the whole system of human relations run. What Hollis identified was an imaginary geography located inside the body, which I explore here as a suite of hidden landscapes, or, more accurately, scapes. My task as an archaeologist interested in such inner landscapes is to recognize their metaphorical basis in the form of ancient material culture.

The essence of metaphor lies in understanding one thing in terms of another. Metaphors, moreover, are experiential (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Investigating these inner landscapes does not therefore depend upon language or the cognitive capacity for rational, discursive thought. Rather, they depend upon the metaphorical relationship that exists between material culture and the experience of the body (Gamble 2004, 2007). Consequently, I argue for a relational perspective on these infusions of bodily experience with material metaphors. I will show that the value for archaeologists lies in the exploration of almost three million years of changing human identity, through inner states of self and personhood.
Landscape, Scapes, and Material Culture

Landscape is a contested, imaginative space, defined by Daniels and Cosgrove (1988: 1) as “a cultural image, a pictorial way of representing or symbolizing surroundings.” However, Ingold (2000: 191) disagrees, rejecting their division between inner and outer worlds implicit in the notion of representation. Instead, landscape is “the familiar domain of our dwelling, it is with us, not against us, but it is no less real for that. And through living in it, the landscape becomes a part of us, just as we are a part of it.”

These contrasted views of inner and outer landscape are played out in many disciplines and in more extreme forms. Central to the distinction is the difference between rational and relational approaches to knowledge. These polar views are common in archaeology with the former still commanding majority support in many periods and especially when the economy is considered. For example, from a rational perspective, human adaptation is often presented as an attritional “game against the environment” (Jochim 1976) and where the economic analogy of the corner-store (Earle 1980) sets the tone of the enquiry for such encounters with landscape. An alternative, relational view sees landscape as an aspect of habitus, what Bourdieu regarded as a “feel for the game” (Gosden 1999: 125–26). An example of this perspective is provided by Bird-David’s (1999) study of contemporary hunters and gatherers via the primary metaphor (Gudeman 1986; Ortner 1973) of the giving environment.

For the archaeologist, landscapes begin and end with material culture. The affect and testimony of the people who dwelt in those landscapes are unavailable in familiar ethnographic form. But although the rhetorical nuances of language may be missing, we should not be hoodwinked by the apparent silence of the actors to the metaphorically deafening volume of material remains. As Tilley (1999) and others (Gamble 2007; Jones 2002; Parker-Pearson and Ramilisonina 1998) have shown, a productive approach to such landscapes is to view their material culture as solid metaphors. The ancient objects, monuments, villages, and fields that inhabit the landscapes archaeologists investigate are therefore as potent for a relational perspective as they are for a rational.

But these are not simple landscapes and a road map, or rather mapscape (Figure 24.1) is needed to organize such complex imaginary geographies. Many scapes exist as a result of the relationship of the body to material culture (Hamilakis, Pluciennik, and Tarlow, 2002; Thomas 1996); among them bodyscapes, sensescapes and taskscapes (Ingold 1993), as well as the broader terms of landscapes of habit and social landscapes (Gamble 1999) and the environment of development, or childscape (Gamble 2007). The intersection of some of these

Figure 24.1 An imaginary geography, or mapscape, of several hidden landscapes that are accessible to archaeologists through the use of material metaphors. In this mapscape, they form layers that are sampled at locales and places.
is indicated diagrammatically in Figure 24.1. The important point is not the list or the scales of such scapes but rather their layered character, because this sedimentation qualifies them as hidden. I shall return to the childscape later since it is this, the most hidden of all the scapes, that is important for understanding a fundamental change such as the transition to agriculture.

**Missing Persons and the “Darkness of the Body”**

An apt analogy to the archaeologist’s pursuit of the hidden is provided by one of Andrew Wyeth’s much reproduced paintings, *Sea Boots* (www.museumsyndicate.com/item.php?item=15796). The body of the boots’ owner, Walter Anderson, is hidden and yet very strongly presented in this realistic, strutting image. The boots clearly have a history. They are biographical objects at ease in their familiar landscape. A person extends from those battered boots and by juxtaposing shoreline with roofline, settles into a landscape of habit as into an old shoe (Adams 2006).

Wyeth dwells on the mundane—boots, beach and roof—and composes them into a common artistic trope, the still life. In doing so, he tugs the missing person into the picture. We want to see their flesh and blood owner to confirm the image we have of his identity from his boots inhabiting their landscape. That might be the rational desire when confronted by such a realistic image. However, the boots also embody a relational perspective. They are not simply a proxy for the absent person but possess their own agency through the structure of material relationships (Gell 1998: 123). They are one layer of identity as thin as the paint on the canvass or the skin on the body.

The sculptor Antony Gormley (2004: 134) has made a similar point but in solid material form when he talks of “the darkness of the body” being revealed through “the other side of appearances:” “I am very aware as I speak to you now that where I am is behind my face; my face and my body in some way belong more to you than they do to me, and vice versa” (Gormley 2004: 134). These appearances consist of layers. They continue the journey into the dark, hidden landscapes of the body. A journey that began metaphorically by taking off a pair of old boots.

**Layerings**

My point here is that our understanding of these based on self and personhood, depends on material metaphors such as a pair of sea boots. Of course, we talk about how we feel inside and so construct elaborate geographies of our inner workings. These can then be shared in word and print. But these identities and their interior location are not dependent on language alone. Material metaphors such as Wyeth’s boots or Van Gogh’s chair (www.nationalgallery.org.uk/cgi-bin/WebObjects.dll/CollectionPublisher.woa/wa/work?workNumber=NG3862) are referenced to bodily experience, as are the more familiar linguistic forms. And as with their linguistic counterparts, material metaphors experience one thing in terms of another. Moreover, as Chapman (2000; Tilley 1999) has shown, material metaphors can be just as sophisticated in terms of the targets they reach through analogy, metonymy, and synecdoche.

If this is the case, then the way to understand material culture is not to search for semiotics and meaning but rather to see how material metaphors are referenced by the body. Elsewhere (Gamble 2005, 2006) argues, these networks are layerings for the routine actions of the body. Hence in Wyeth’s picture, the boots and the house are containers. They change the shape of the body when worn and they condition the structure of action when inhabited. When wearing the boots and sitting inside the house the individual concerned is layered, his agency structured and informed by landscapes that are assimilated by dwelling in them (Ingold 2000). The bodily experience associated with living in boots and houses becomes a material metaphor of those inner states enacted in everyday routines.

But let me be clear on one point. Those sea boots are not akin to the “wrong trousers” of Wallace and Gromit fame that control the actions of their unfortunate wearer. With material culture, the agency of the one (a pair of sea boots) depends on the agency of the other (the missing person). This is because such objects stand in networks of relationships to the landscape of the beach and the house as much as they stand in relation to the boots and the missing body. As Carl Knappett (2005, 2006) argues, these networks are layerings that entangle us with objects and them with us.

Wyeth’s painting suggests a further avenue for exploration. Containers form biographical traps, described by Hoskins (1998: 5) as memory boxes, not only of the mundane, such as fishing and keeping the feet dry, but also of the relationships between varied materials that a concept of landscape brings into relation. In this respect, the
that Lévi-Strauss (1966) championed as the distinction between the bricoleur and the engineer. The latter works by design, solving problems such as how to keep dry by rational means, projecting thoughts formed in an inner landscape onto an external world. By contrast, the bricoleur is more concerned with constructing meaning by bringing things together, most importantly for Lévi-Strauss in the form of myths. The distinction is between rational and relational attitudes to material culture, and, while never mutually exclusive, these have changed in the course of human evolution.

2.5 Million Years of Identity

An analysis of hominin technology, from the earliest stone tools to the appearance of writing in the Near East, reveals a slow gradient of change (Figure 24.2). During this time, innovations in technology changed the balance among material proxies of the body from instruments to containers (Fagan 2004; Gamble 2007; Troeng 1993). But this was not a question of replacement of one proxy by the other. Containers always existed, but for long periods of time they were rare. They can be found in the technologies of the great apes, such as sleeping pallets and leaf sponges (McGrew 1992). However, instruments dominate primate technologies and now include observations of New World monkeys (de Amoura and Lee 2004), indicating a truly deep evolutionary ancestry for hominin/hominoid relationships with material culture.

Two further observations need to be added to this overview of hominin involvement with technology. First, instruments and containers existed long before language. Exactly when words were first uttered is still contested, but an exponential rise in the size of hominin neocortex 500,000 years ago can be parsimoniously explained by the social brain hypothesis (Dunbar 2003) that links selection for new forms of communication to the demands of integrating individuals into larger group sizes. At this time, language offered advantages to increasingly busy hominins as they went about their social lives. But this early appearance of language did not equate with the origins of imaginary geographies constructed by metaphor. Hominins had been using such concepts for at least two million years previously, as shown by the archaeology of instruments and containers. Objects preceded words, and for a long time instruments dominated as proxies for the body.

In an interesting rerun of ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny (Gould 1977), child psychologists (Bloom 2004; Hespos and Spelke 2004) Prelanguage children learn to think by experiencing the material world. They come to recognize concepts through the shapes, textures, and fit of objects rather than first learning them through language and only later transferring this knowledge to the material world. Our first appreciation of metaphor, understanding one thing in terms of another, is material.

The second observation concerns the invisibility of children in the standard histories of technology (Fagan 2004). Indeed, children are a hidden category in most archaeologists’ descriptions of the past (Sofaer Deverenski 2000). They can be identified from their tiny footprints and to a limited extent through the study of apprenticeship (Pigeot 1987). They occur as burials, but here the tendency is to regard them solely as biological rather than cultural categories. Those landscapes of infancy and childhood will not, however, be revealed by correctly identifying toys or even a children’s technology such as cradle or sling. The situation is comparable to engendering the past by trying to find more objects that can be directly associated with women instead of considering how identities of self and personhood are constructed out of local conditions (Spector 1993).

The Childscape

The history of technology therefore needs to consider what is currently hidden. To this end, the mapscape (Figure 24.1) recognizes an imaginary geography, a space where these hidden layers can be revealed through their metaphorical associations. One solution is to consider a childscape intersecting with the adult spaces of the taskscape and the landscape of habit. The childscape is the environment of growth. It is a particular landscape of experience that is important in the construction of identity, the material associations of self and personhood. The childscape acts as any other archaeological landscape in that, as discussed above, it begins and ends with material culture. It therefore follows that the material arrays within the childscape, those instruments and containers acting as material proxies for the body, will have significance in structuring our metaphorical understanding. The difference between a childscape dominated by instruments to one where containers are the commonest artifact proxy (Figure 24.2) now assumes significance for the construction of those hidden landscapes of the body. Other technologies, such as language and literacy, have shaped our understanding of these inner landscapes. But in both cases, they were preceded by material metaphors and, in
Part IV: Living Landscapes: The Body and the Experience of Place

20–6Kyr B.P.

100–21Kyr B.P.

2.7Myr–101Kyr B.P.

Figure 24.2 Changing material proxies during hominin evolution. Key: I = instrument, C = container and I/C hybrid proxies. (after Gamble 2007: fig. 7.1). The temporal divisions were chosen to illustrate the slow gradient in such changes to the understanding of hidden landscapes through material metaphors. Some examples of containers and instruments are shown. (engraved Blombos ochre container, courtesy C. Henshilwood; Boxgrove handaxe instrument, courtesy G. Marshall).

gradient that saw a change in the dominant material proxy for the body. Such changes were based on a different metaphorical understanding of our interior states stated not in words but in the relationship of things to the experiences of the body. As a result, the world of hominins became increasingly layered and elaborated through accumulation and enchainment (Chapman 2000).

But such a general trend should not obscure the immense local variation that occurred. Archaeologists in supporting economic adaptations (for example, hunter, fisher, herder and farmer) but because of the knowledge that comes from inhabiting a world of objects that resisted some interpretations and encouraged others (Parker-Pearson and Ramilisonina 1998: 310). An economic change as fundamental as that between hunting and farming therefore required a restructuring of that knowledge. This change was largely hidden because it occurred in the childscape (Figure 24.1). It is in this layer of the mapscape that
and structured by root metaphors (Ortner 1973), and so open to all sorts of interpretation. For example, Ingold (2000: 86) has commented that “growing plants and raising animals are not so different, in principle, from bringing up children.” The move to containers (Figure 24.2) identifies the local shift from one root metaphor, the giving environment to a new one, growing the body. These root metaphors provide the metaphorical associations for that layer of identity I call the childscape. The seeds of agriculture were first established in this environment of development, the childscape. And that identity changed the material world in ways that are now all too familiar to us. A process as fundamentally transforming as agriculture therefore derives from the layerings in the mapscape (Figure 24.1), of which the childscape is the most hidden but of great importance.

But who made these changes to the array of objects in the childscape? Not the child, an external change in temperature, or the return of deciduous forests to formerly glaciated lands. Instead, this is where the bricoleur rather than the engineer plays an evolutionary role. Materials were brought together in locally constructed patterns of meaning. Long before there were containers in the form of houses there were houselike constructions where bones, stones, earth, and bodies were placed, in association, by bricoleurs. This may explain why the evidence for architecture before the Neolithic is scant and problematic (Kolen 1999; Verpoorte 2001), because we approach it as engineers looking in the acts of accumulation for a rational purpose. When we come looking for relationships made from accumulation and enchainment, we find a different picture altogether and within such relationships there is space for the hidden landscape of the child.

Conclusions

The craft of the archaeologist has provided many disciplines with a metaphor for discovery, and none more so than psychology where digging into the unconscious is an exercise in peeling back the layers of accumulated experience. When the hidden landscapes of the body are considered on an evolutionary timescale, then it is these disciplines that, in turn, provide archaeologists with useful rhetorical devices. Sedimentation, layering, accumulation, and the deposition of memories are all dependent on notions of landscape. From personal experience, our earliest childhoods remain hidden. For us, they are an imaginary geography that depends on what others tell us or by leafing through the family album long after the events through our developing skills of forming concepts based on the experience of our bodies as they grew and inhabited the material world. These hidden landscapes of memory and inspiration were not static during human evolution. They varied from place to place as indicated by the proxies (Figure 24.2). Although we have always entertained the bricoleur and the engineer in our identities, we are having to rediscover more of the former in order to understand those changing landscapes in the past. Through the material metaphors they contain, we have always engaged with a coherent world and made it ours.

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