DISENGAGEMENT AND PREVENTING/COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

An analysis of contemporary approaches and discussion of the role disengagement can play in preventing/countering violent extremism

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The Horn of Africa (predominantly Mogadishu and South Central Somalia) has suffered from a series of brutal attacks since the establishment of Al-Shabaab in 2006. The Al-Qaeda-aligned group view having a regional aspect to their fight as a necessary part of their strategy (Maruf & Joseph, 2018). This was seen most recently by the 2019 attack on the Dusit Hotel in Nairobi. The regional nature of their violence is used by them to legitimise their claim to be an “international” terrorist organisation and helps attract financing and new recruits. Consequently, over the past years, the wider region and in particular Somalia and Kenya have been subjected to numerous initiatives to prevent violent extremism as well as to disengage fighters who have been members of Al-Shabaab.

Looking at primary, secondary and tertiary prevention the chapter shall describe and discuss the initiatives currently focusing on preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) and disengagement. It shall become apparent that there is a lack of understanding of the multifaceted processes of both joining and leaving violent extremist organisations and that there is a lack of cross-programme integration and knowledge sharing between disengagement and P/CVE work. It will be argued that a more integrated knowledge-sharing approach could be of significant benefit to the greater field of terrorism prevention. P/CVE is understood to be an emerging field of practice that includes a range of non-coercive and preventative measures (Khalil & Zeuthen, 2016). Formal disengagement from a terrorist or violent organisation can be seen to form part of P/CVE but due to its focus on individuals who were previously directly or indirectly involved in the production of violence, for the
purpose of this analysis it is considered as a distinct area of intervention. Programmatic terminology such as initiatives, interventions and programmes shall be used interchangeably when describing P/CVE and disengagement. Furthermore, there is also a lack of conceptual clarity regarding the differences between disengagement and deradicalisation. This chapter uses the term disengagement deliberately as it is measurable and has an emphasis on behaviour rather than belief. To explain the difference between disengagement and deradicalisation Horgan (2008) stated that:

While “deradicalization” has become the latest buzzword in counterterrorism, it is critical that we distinguish it from disengagement and stress that not only are they different, but that just because one leaves terrorism behind, it rarely implies (or event necessitates) that one becomes “deradicalized”.

Horgan has extensively studied how, when and why people leave terrorist organisations. He describes how it is a process and how it can be individual or collective, that there is both a psychological and a physical dimension to it and finally that it can be both voluntary and involuntary. Highlighting that this is not a simple straightforward process, he explains that of course the disengaged terrorist may not necessarily be repentant or “deradicalized” at all. Often there can be physical disengagement from terrorist activity, but no concomitant change or reduction in ideological support or indeed, the social and psychological control that the particular ideology exerts on the individual.

(Horgan, 2008, p. 5)

Horgan goes on to explain in his research that deradicalisation is understood as: “a softening of views, an acceptance that the individual’s pursuit of his objectives using terrorism were illegitimate, immoral and justifiable” (Horgan, 2008). When practitioners and policy makers describe programmes in the region, references are often arbitrarily made to deradicalisation and/or disengagement without clearly clarifying what is meant specifically. When this lack of clarity is transferred to programming it causes a lack of clarity of the objective and intended impact of a programme, namely if the focus is on change of behaviour, change of beliefs or both. Leaving the academic discussions behind and looking at the programmes focusing on former fighters in the region, it is evident that there is often an element of both disengagement and deradicalisation approaches built into the programmes. Most programmes have gone through limited evaluation and assessment, therefore the specific analysis of what the programmes are actually achieving as opposed to what they are seeking to achieve are mostly not available.

Methodology and limitations
The chapter focuses on Kenya and Somalia as they face the greatest threats and have advanced the furthest in their response. The analysis of P/CVE and disengagement also draws on publicly available information, policy documents, regional academic literature, reports and information shared during regional terrorism prevention conferences. The few studies referenced in this chapter of direct interviews with disengaged or former fighters mostly focus on the background of the individuals, their journey into the groups, their experiences while being in the groups, the process of leaving the group as well as their route to re-integration. Some studies include interviews with families and some with a control group for comparison. It is important to note some possible concerns around the
quality of the data; however, filling gaps in knowledge, these studies have contributed and will significantly contribute to bringing the thinking forward regarding the understanding of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa.

Terrorism-related research, disengagement and P/CVE programmes only share information to a very limited extent, partly for security concerns and partly to protect organisational interests in a highly competitive and possibly saturated field. Therefore, it is possible that other initiatives exist that only those involved in are aware of and are therefore not reviewed here. In some parts of the chapter specific names of programmes or details have been deliberately omitted out of consideration for the sensitivity of this work for implementers and managers in particular.

One major challenge of a review of this kind is the limited articulation of the logic of the programmes and therefore their focus. For example, in Kenya a number of traditional developments, humanitarian and peacebuilding actors have started doing work under the P/CVE banner. However, the objectives of such programmes are only tangentially relevant to certain aspects of terrorism prevention; for example, reducing unemployment for youth, inter-faith dialogue between youth of different faiths or female empowerment projects. All are designed on the assumption that the respective area of work will contribute to enhancing resilience to violent extremism or preventing recruitment, where resilience is often not clearly defined. Many programmes describe that they work with “vulnerable” youth without specifying the nature of the vulnerability. On this particular debate Corner, Bouhana and Gill (2018) discuss the concern over the lack of clarity of the terms:

Prevent guidance not only mentions vulnerability in terms of people who are “vulnerable” due to personal and/or social circumstances but also a “vulnerability to radicalisation”. This distinction is important. “People vulnerable to radicalisation” may include “vulnerable people”, but it remains to be demonstrated that “vulnerable people” are of necessity “vulnerable to radicalisation”.

If the programme is not specific on being focused on individuals “vulnerable to radicalisation” or “vulnerable to recruitment” it remains uncertain how the intervention is intended to prevent or counter violent extremism specifically. Only by looking at a programme in detail is it clear whether it is a programme that: (1) seeks to contribute to terrorism prevention by addressing structural motivators tangentially linked to violent extremism; (2) has a specific P/CVE focus on reducing recruitment and sympathy for violence before individuals engage in violence; or (3) seeks to directly disengage individuals already actively involved with the organisation. Moreover, programmes differ in their approaches in terms of their intention to address violent behaviours separately from attitudes that legitimise and support the use of violence (Khalil, 2014).

P/CVE initiatives in the region are generally designed based on the following identified key factors: (1) how the risk is defined (in particular if the initiative is close to the front line or further afield); (2) what the objective is; and (3) who is the implementing actor. However, one key factor which is often overlooked in P/CVE discussions is the motivations and drivers for an individual to join a violent extremist organisation and in particular the role of proximity to armed conflict in recruitment. While motivations and drivers to join violent extremist groups are complex and diverse, it should be noted that there are a higher number of recruits in areas of close proximity to the front lines of Al-Shabaab territory. Al-Shabaab is utilising clan conflicts and clan grievances in their recruitment approach in close proximity.
to their territories. Proximity to conflict can also increase the likelihood of forced recruitment. As such the proximity of the specific effort to the ongoing armed conflict is an additional crucial factor to consider when designing prevention as well as disengagement initiatives.

Adapting P/CVE policies and approaches

Individuals actively engaged in violent extremist organisations have taken and continue to take many lives across East Africa and cause significant human, economic, political and infrastructural harm in the region. The focus of this chapter is predominantly on Al-Shabaab, although affiliated groups and other violent extremist organisations continue to evolve as well as their recruitment strategies, financing needs, weapon and fighter-based needs and the communities’ response to violent extremist organisations. The response offered by governments and organisations therefore must continue to adapt to the changing approaches and strategies in order to ensure continued effectiveness. As an example, the increased involuntary recruitment from parts of Kenya as well as a larger focus of recruitment of women is such a change in approach that has been observed in recent years, which implementing actors and governments must adapt to with high flexibility (Badurdeen, 2018; Zeuthen & Sahgal, 2018). Implementing organisations may not have information in real time as government actors do and therefore, to ensure interventions being as effective as possible it is important that governments share information that will help enhance the effectiveness of the interventions.

There are different P/CVE and disengagement approaches in Kenya and Somalia. In Kenya there are many terrorism prevention efforts done at the community level, with the government as well as disengagement work done in prisons and with former fighters. In South Central Somalia the focus is primarily on disengagement alongside an emerging field of terrorism prevention which is inextricably linked to broader stabilisation efforts. In that sense the labelling of interventions as P/CVE efforts becomes significantly more challenging the closer they are to the armed conflict, as most development efforts in one sense or the other in South Central Somalia are seeking to have a positive impact in relation to the ongoing conflict being youth employment, gender empowerment, political dialogue and so on. That said, if the aim is not articulated specifically in relation to P/CVE, such as prevention of recruitment or support to communities receiving returning fighters, they cannot be defined as P/CVE programmes. Thereby, there are a range of ongoing activities within “stabilisation” which may also be playing a critical role in P/CVE but which are not incorporated into the broader P/CVE context and therefore are not readily available to learn from and analyse.

Governments in the region – led by Somalia and Kenya, as well as some local counties in Kenya – have developed publicly available national and county-based strategies. Through consultations with multiple government and non-government actors they have defined the strategic focus of efforts of P/CVE. The Kenyan National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) is based on pillars outlining the key areas of focus in terrorism prevention work, such as media, education, religious narratives and so on, involving a diverse set of actors and emphasising that terrorism prevention can only be done by involving multiple actors such as media houses, journalists, teachers, religious leaders, civil society leaders, political leaders and government officials in a coordinated effort. Based on the experiences of rolling out the strategy over the past years, the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) is currently undertaking a review of the strategy which is leading to an updated version due to be published during 2019.
At county level, several counties have followed up and developed county level strategies with collaboration between local government structures, security officials representing the County Commissioner, representatives from the national government as well as non-state actors from civil society. The county action plans are based on analysis of the specific context in the county and the plans reflect the national framework for specific efforts in that particular county. The strategy for Somalia was developed earlier and must be seen as part of an overall strategic framework where the National Rehabilitation Programme Strategy is an equally important document in their approach to prevent terrorism and disengage former fighters (a list of publicly available plans can be found in the reference list).

**Categorising prevention approaches**

To better understand P/CVE and disengagement programmes this chapter builds on a framework presented in a study by a group of researchers from Georgetown University Centre for Security Studies by the National Security Critical Issues Task Force in 2016. The framework suggests categorising prevention according to primary, secondary and tertiary approaches (Chalgren et al., 2016, p. 2). According to this study primary prevention is a broad approach directed towards society as a whole. Activities include education, health, social and cultural programmes. Secondary prevention focuses on individuals and groups identified as “at risk” for violent extremism. Activities include group-based interventions and counter-messaging. Finally, tertiary prevention is for radicalised individuals and groups who are actively planning attacks or recruiting for a violent extremist cause. Activities here include disengagement, deradicalisation, isolation and re-direction (Chalgren et al., 2016).

**Primary prevention approaches**

Primary prevention approaches focus on addressing drivers described as “structural motivators” (Khalil & Zeuthen, 2016) and comprise the majority of interventions in East Africa in terms of volume and financial support from donors. These are programmes focusing on the general population, such as job creation, vocational training, youth empowerment, education, governance and so on. They are large in monetary terms compared to smaller bespoke P/CVE and disengagement projects with budgets often in the region of 3–10 million Euro. They commonly have a large reach in terms of beneficiaries and are typically implemented by traditional development actors, national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations. They primarily focus on violent extremism before violence happens and mostly work at the community level through civil society organisations.

The beneficiaries of such programmes are identified based on a geographical analysis of marginalised areas, assuming a causal link between perceived (or real) marginalisation and susceptibility of recruitment to Al-Shabaab. These programmes do not clearly state what their specific objectives are in relation to violent extremism as it is assumed providing opportunities for youth in so-called marginalised areas will reduce the appeal of recruitment, assuming violent extremist groups offer an alternative to the marginalisation in terms of job opportunities and financial compensation. The lack of specific clarity is often intentional because the subject is generally viewed as highly sensitive or carrying too high a risk of stigmatising the communities they work in (Khalil & Zeuthen, 2014).
In Somalia, operational considerations around access and where it is physically possible to work are also typically key criteria considered in the selection of the communities. Similar considerations around access and safety are made in the North-East, the North Coast (Lamu and Tana River) as well as other harder-to-access areas in Kenya. It is important to note that these considerations are rarely made explicit in programme documents or external articulation of the programmes. As such considerations of operational security will weigh in above assessments of strategic concerns around areas of specific vulnerability to recruitment and radicalisation. Members of targeted and so-called marginalised communities are often included in the design of programmatic intervention, based on the assumption that they have useful insights into how to tackle the challenges their communities face and that they understand the problem. For example, studies of violent extremism often become studies of local communities’ perceptions of violent extremism, which of course is valid to understand perceptions but there is no guarantee that a community member has specific knowledge of violent extremism, just because he or she comes from a community where there have been cases of recruitment (Young et al., BRICS 2018). As such, this community consultation method is borrowing lessons from community-driven development and community-led peacebuilding (Bennett & D’Onofrio, 2015; Holmer, 2013), but is not always explicit about the limitations and problems of such approaches. Communities are not interest-free and individuals active in their community seeking to improve their conditions will have a position, based on their political views and interests. This must be taken into account when basing assessments and analysis uncritically on community perspectives to inform programmes.

Secondary prevention approaches

Secondary prevention approaches have the individual in focus and seek to address primarily individual incentives going beyond individual financial incentives and other structural drivers. That said, most programmes within secondary prevention will need to take structural motivators into account, as they are dominant in many of the communities in Kenya and Somalia where recruitment and radicalisation are taking place. Also, the enabling factors and enhancing resilience against the appeal of enablers and recruiters is important in secondary prevention initiatives focusing on reducing the risk of recruitment and radicalisation. Only a few examples can be found in Kenya that attempt to address the ideological and individual incentives a person may face and then, subsequently, try to debunk these narratives. Such interventions require deep, technical knowledge and are labor-intensive to implement, which could possibly be said for all of the most effective measures to curb violent activity. Moreover, these types of secondary prevention initiatives are more vulnerable to risks such as stigmatisation of the person who seeks to debunk the narrative (often being religious leaders), risk of being perceived as pro-government campaigns and when effective a potential negative response by the violent extremist groups. The best examples of secondary prevention are strategic communication initiatives as well as mentorship programmes such as STRIVE II, which focus on individual support and advice. Both Kenya and Somalia have seen various counter-narrative campaigns in recent years which sought to counter the extremist narrative through communication (Avis, 2016; Media Council of Kenya, 2014; Menkhaus, 2014; Williams, 2018).

Mentorship programmes often seek to provide guidance to young people identified through carefully considered risk analysis of who may be at risk of recruitment or radicalisation. Such programmes include, to a varying extent, approaches to establish alternative peer
networks for at-risk individuals, as well as softer skills in trying to challenge violent extremist narratives that include intolerance that legitimises violence towards people considered to be of different or of a “wrong” faith. Understanding the legitimisation of violence within some interpretations of Salafi Jihadism is an important aspect of such campaigns (Maher, 2016). While this type of programme can face finding the “needle in a haystack” problem, they do seek to individually identify and closely work with those who may be at risk of recruitment, achieving a narrower but deeper intervention. Secondary prevention interventions are tailored to individuals at risk of recruitment and radicalisation and, as such, criteria for vulnerability measures must be developed. This has led to significant debates in the literature recently and interventions seeking to identify who is at risk of radicalisation and recruitment must carefully consider and seek to mitigate the risk associated with “at-risk” categorisation (Corner, Bouhana & Gill, 2018; Khalil & Zeuthen, 2016; Sarma, 2017).

**Tertiary prevention approaches**

Tertiary prevention approaches, of key interest in this chapter, are those that take place through formal disengagement programmes and in prisons after an individual has been directly involved with violent extremist organisations and has left or wishes to leave. Recent studies of disengagement in Somalia point out that the disengagement process can take many forms and individuals who are seeking to disengage can follow different routes. One is disengagement back into communities without a formal process. This process often takes place in areas where there is limited access and knowledge of available disengagement opportunities and also for individuals who perceive limited risk associated with informal re-integration into the communities. This informal disengagement does not directly involve any organised intervention or external deradicalisation or rehabilitation efforts but is likely to be the highest proportion in terms of numbers of defectors. While the studies have a very small sample of women, this informal route appeared to be the most common for female defectors.

Other defectors follow the formal process of disengaging by going through government officials and following a screening asserting the level of risk the individual poses. Individuals who are found to pose a high risk will not be found suitable for rehabilitation and will be incarcerated. There are a number of disengagement centres run by the Federal Government of Somalia in close collaboration with different international actors. The overall process is managed according to the National Rehabilitation Programme as the official governing framework. The process post-screening going to a disengagement centre is, according to the established policy, voluntary and individuals can choose the specific centre which suits them best. According to recent studies, considerations around clan, socio-economic opportunities and risk are a part of the decision-making process when former fighters choose a centre. The activities in the centres vary but common to all of them is that they focus on rehabilitation activities including livelihoods skills, educational opportunities and physical wellbeing. There is a varying degree of attention paid to the ideological aspects or “deradicalisation”. Re-integration to the community is also of primary concern in most centres, though they have different approaches to this process (Felbab-Brown, 2018; Khalil & Zeuthen, 2016).

Upon receiving a defector, the centre staff seek to assess the individual in terms of socio-economic background, clan and prior perception of the government. This is done through entry interviews, which also include capturing data on their physical journey to the centre as well as their experiences prior to arriving at the centre. This provides an indication of their intention and interests in being at the centre, which will inform how the individual is
likely to perform, what level and type of support are required and how risk needs to be managed. Finally, the screening interview also supports the development of plans for when the defector has completed the programme at the centre.

Discussions around very high-level defectors such as Robow who surrendered to the Somali National Army in 2017 have been a subject of significant debate and controversy. When senior commanders are accepted back into society and political life with no punishment, it has been accused of sending a message of impunity (Felbab-Brown, 2018). A year after his surrender, Robow announced his candidature for presidency in Somalia’s South West State. The Federal Government was against his candidature and subsequently during the campaign he was arrested. The management of the process has been discussed by analysts as a factor that could potentially discourage others from defecting. Evidently the management of such high-level defectors is highly political and a clear policy is required to enable clear, transparent political action and to send a consistent message to other potential high-level defectors.

In Kenya disengagement is also a key priority for managing risk regarding citizens returning from having fought with Al-Shabaab. The Kenyan disengagement programme was rolled out after the government initiated an amnesty in 2015, which included a process of accepting returning fighters who voluntarily came forward. The government has announced that a formal policy and framework are under development and will be shared in the near future. The end goal of disengagement is a risk mitigation process leading to re-insertion and rehabilitation back into the communities, therefore information to the communities about the risk associated with re-integration of these individuals is crucial. The UN researcher Felbab-Brown who recently did a study on re-integration in Somalia outlines that:

Perceptions towards individuals associated with Al-Shabaab vary enormously, ranging from acceptance to extreme ostracization. Views are often based on whether a community, clan or family’s experience with Al-Shabaab has predominantly been marked by brutality or the delivery of justice and protection services ... Many local communities indicate they are afraid of ex-Al-Shabaab members returning to their areas.

(Felbab-Brown, 2018, p. 8)

In Kenya the front line is further away and families will rarely, except for in the north of Lamu and parts of Mandera, Wajir and Garissa, have been directly affected by the presence of Al-Shabaab but perceptions and fear associated with the group as well as the government’s response cannot be neglected. Further clarity around amnesty rules and processes will contribute to communities feeling safer in supporting rehabilitation and re-integration of returning fighters who have completed disengagement programmes.

Just as with disengagement centres in Somalia, running programmes for returnees in Kenya requires strong collaboration and trust between government agencies and implementing actors such as NGOs, religious groups and other community-based service providers like social workers. Implementing actors have a role to play that most likely could not be undertaken by the government. Likewise, non-state implementing actors need support from the government in order to undertake screening of participants when designing their interventions, as well as general support in handling individuals who are not suitable for re-integration. As such, working together within an agreed framework is essential to maximise the possibility of success.
This process is iterative and both security actors and community-based actors must continue to share information should initial assessments prove to have been wrong or indeed if an individual changes as a part of the process and the risk level changes.

Rehabilitation of offenders of terrorism in prisons is another key aspect of disengagement undertaken in the region. Working with individuals in this way is a unique opportunity but also poses a unique challenge as they may wish to further radicalise and recruit other inmates.

This brings a focus to the physical arrangements in the prison, something which has been documented as a challenge in other recruitment cases globally (Jones, 2014; Silke & Veldhuis, 2017). Purposeful isolation of such offenders is one option but there may be others which work to prevent further prison-based radicalisation (Jones & Morales, 2012). In Somalia, as with the rest of the world, some of the lessons learned appear to be centred on defining a rehabilitation programme that suits the individual’s needs, as well as increasing attempts to reduce the risk of negatively influencing others while in prison. Similar initiatives are ongoing in the region, and in Kenya in particular, the prison service in collaboration with the NCTC are continuing to improve the provision of opportunities for offenders such as better visiting conditions, better education options, religious guidance and recreational activities, as well as continuing to do research and study what works (Sahgal & Zeuthen, 2019).

Sharing of experiences and lessons is vital for a continued improvement of longer-term disengagement and re-integration processes for the benefit of regional stability as a whole. While contexts differ, authorities and actors involved in rehabilitation can learn from each other’s experience and inspire ideas for innovative solutions feasible in the given context. Learning from each other across the region would significantly benefit all actors – security, political as well as community-based actors – engaging on this topic. The steadily growing body of research and evidence on these topics and initiatives is essential to enhancing learning around how to do screening, how to design interventions, how to manage risk, how to engage with religious actors and so on, which will help to contribute to programmatic improvements.

By establishing a framework for P/CVE, noting the importance of understanding drivers for individuals to join violent extremist groups, critical insight from disengagement activities would similarly serve to enhance the development of P/CVE activities. This has been seen recently in the information garnered from recent rare accounts of current disengagement programmes. These publications are highly commendable, allowing for implementers and governments to draw lessons from other initiatives when designing new initiatives or adjusting existing efforts.

One essential aspect of the conversation around disengagement is the role of ideology and defining the relationship between deradicalisation and disengagement approaches. For interventions in the region these terms remain widely interpreted in the different interventions and suffer from unclear articulation of the approaches regarding ideology specifically. In particular, disengagement efforts would benefit from clearly articulated and measurable indicators highlighting the different areas that the disengagement process is intending to have an impact on for the individual as well as when the risks are considered to have reduced to an extent that would justify re-integration into the community. Some of the lessons evolving from Somalia-based disengagement centres are focusing on why people enlisted in Al-Shabaab, why and how they disengage and also how they experience re-integration post-exit from the centres (Khalil et al., 2019; Taarnby, 2018) could potentially be relevant for interventions in Kenya, and potentially Tanzania, and vice versa.
Conclusion

When seeking to provide an overview of P/CVE and disengagement programmes addressing violent extremism, both before violence occurs as well as after, this chapter highlighted some of the limitations and concerns regarding lack of conceptual clarity in many interventions. The chapter has argued that there is a need for greater collaboration and utilisation of state and non-state actors’ different skills and approaches in order to have a holistic and integrated approach. It is evident that religious leaders, civil society and social workers can play unique roles that security actors cannot and vice versa. There is a need when fighting and preventing terrorism in the Horn of Africa for all expertise to come together and acknowledge each other’s role in addressing this complex phenomenon.

The chapter has highlighted some specific recommendations and suggestions in relation to each type of approach (primary, secondary and tertiary). At a broader level, the main recommendation from this chapter is the need for further integration of three levels of prevention including disengagement approaches within a comprehensive integrated framework. Primary, secondary and tertiary prevention need more robust evaluations and assessments to better understand the intended impact versus the actual outcome. For disengagement programmes specifically this will further clarify when and if “deradicalisation” happens and if it is a feasible objective of disengagement initiatives. A lot can be learned from the past years of work on terrorism prevention and disengagement in Kenya and Somalia at the community level, in disengagement centres as well as in prisons, but very limited information is publicly available or otherwise shared. More importantly, a lack of evidence sharing reduces the opportunities to share experiences and learnings between programmes and initiatives in order for them to become more effective in defining and achieving core objectives in the prevention of violent extremism.

The analysis of disengagement programmes in the region showed that a disengagement process is unique to each individual and highly multifaceted, which highlights the need for very specific programmatic approaches and clear articulation of the objectives. This could also highlight the need for a higher degree of interventions tailored specifically to the individual involved to enhance effectiveness. Finally, re-integration after risks have been reduced through disengagement programmes requires clear communication and assurances to gain support from families and the wider community.

Notes

1 Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) II is implemented by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) funded by the EU and the author of this paper is working as the team leader.


References


J. Khalil (2014). “Radical Beliefs and Violent Actions Are Not Synonymous: How to Place the Key Disjunction between Attitudes and Behaviors at the Heart of Our Research into Political Violence”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37(2), pp. 198–211.

**Policy documents**


Draft and final County Action Plans:

- Isiolo County Action Plan, Isiolo Peace Link & Isiolo County Government, 2018
- Kilifi County Action Plan, H. Shauri & Kilifi County Government, 2017

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• Kwale Action Plan, Huria & Kwale County Government, 2017
• Lamu County Action Plan, H. Shauri & Lamu County Government, 2017
• Mandera County Action Plan (draft), Mandera County Government & Mandera County Commissioners Office
• Mombasa County Action Plan, Haki Africa, Mombasa County Government & Mombasa County Commissioners Office, 2017
• Tana River County Action Plan (draft), KEKOSCE & Tana River County