The man is playing with his heart right here. He’s not readin’ notes off a piece of paper, he’s writtin’ it—as he plays with a feel. In the moment! Now that’s jazz. That’s improvisation. That’s genius. And we invented that—New Orleans. Right here.¹

In these lines from an episode of David Simon’s *Treme*, trombonist Antoine Baptiste (played by Wendell Pierce), is explaining to the school band he is coaching why they are not ready to play at Mardi Gras. He puts a CD into a player, and out comes the famous opening trumpet cadenza of Louis Armstrong’s “West End Blues” (1928). Antoine then uses Armstrong to demonstrate his point, via the words above, a point that conflates the creation of jazz with place and a very particular expressive aesthetic, all against the backdrop of post-Katrina New Orleans where *Treme* is set. While this is a statement about jazz that rehearses familiar tropes, it is worth considering the importance improvisation comes to play in rhetorical terms. Consider for a moment a convoluted transposition of the above statement. What if Antoine was trying to describe a piece of classical music? Would he exclaim, “that’s composition”? Perhaps that is a simplistic point to make, but it prompts the question: how many other forms of music have come to be so defined by a mode of creation as jazz? And to Antoine it is not just that this music is improvised, but that it sounds the way it does because it is improvised. I suggest that this intertwining of jazz with improvisation ought to give pause for thought and might prompt a critical account of just what effect this conflation of the two things has had within jazz scholarship.

Almost all accounts of jazz make light of the concept of improvisation. Jazz has often been defined through the presence of improvisation. But this relationship also works the other way; improvisation has come to be defined by jazz. In this chapter, I want to pursue the idea of improvisation as a concept that has emerged from jazz discourse, being shaped by conceptions about music and culture. Seen this way, improvisation is an idea about music making that emerges from specific contexts and discourses, rather than being some kind of absolute that exists outside of place or time. And in this chapter, I discuss some key changes of direction in this discourse that have framed the study of improvisation in a new way. To begin, I want to start by problematizing the actual term itself.

Because improvisation was largely regarded as a curiosity within the Western art music tradition for a long time, it tended to be identified in musics from outside the Western world. The result is that most studies of improvisation emphasize plurality, confronting the reader with the sheer
range of contexts in which it is practiced. Partly because the idea of improvisation originated in a discourse dominated by the Western art music tradition, it was framed against the normative idea of composition. Laudan Nooshin has demonstrated how discourse on improvisation constructs it as composition’s “other” (Nooshin 2003). Because composition functions as the norm within this discourse, improvisation has been described entirely in terms of composition, specifically how it differs from the act of composition. Nooshin explains how, when Western scholars encountered Iranian music, they began describing parts of its musiqi-e assil tradition as improvised, regardless of the fact that Iranian musicians had no corresponding term. This discourse did cultural work by imposing distinctions between composition and improvisation onto a tradition that had no such distinction. A westernized view of musical creativity was imposed on a non-Western music, and practices of music making were labeled as improvised and thus othered. This is a critical insight, because it reveals that to use the term improvisation is to accept a certain view of musical creativity, premised on an opposition between composition and improvisation.

In this light, the conflation of jazz with improvisation can be read in broad historical terms as prompted by the kind of binary that Nooshin describes. Discourses on Western art music were, in the first part of the twentieth century, very much bound up with the work concept, and the werktrue ideal that Lydia Goehr identifies (Goehr 2007). The idea that a composer left a definitive version of their intentions expressed through the medium of the notated score led to a discourse that was centered very much on composition rather than performance—performance being merely the execution of the composer’s wishes. The fact that extemporization had been a crucial part of earlier traditions was an inconvenient truth that was subservient to a broader narrative about white male European composers and the works they produced. The way that notation employed by contemporary composers of the time tended toward an exactitude and prescription of a kind that was quite new almost legislated against any real form of creative agency on the part of the performer. Even when the experimental tradition began to introduce notions of indeterminacy and chance, as most famously in the work of John Cage, there was, George Lewis argues, a move to actively deny the influence of jazz as a model, thereby invoking a hierarchy that elevated serious art music above the supposedly populist leanings of jazz (Lewis 2004b).

For this reason, it is not surprising that one of the most familiar tropes in early jazz discourse is how jazz is different from the Western art music tradition. This difference is, of course, usually framed in terms of improvisation. The distinction might often be framed like this: classical musicians play from a score, and jazz musicians play “from nothing.” Onto this dichotomy were also mapped a series of other binaries: art/popular, mind/body, and so on. This represents what I will call a figuring of improvisation; not a definition of the concept, but the invocation of a whole series of ideas about the practice that serve to locate it in relation to discourses about musical practices and cultures. This figuring of improvisation is dependent on the idea of composition, as that which provides improvisation with its identity through difference. To figure improvisation is to enact a set of beliefs about what it represents, and how it can (or cannot) be located as a musical practice. Seeing improvisation this way is to acknowledge that it is not an absolute, but rather a frequently romanticized idea about music making that had its origins in a particular cultural situation. And thus, in doing this, we acknowledge the contingency of the whole idea. Just as early jazz musicians would have had little or no use for the term, so its ubiquity within contemporary jazz pedagogy marks the fact that we think and talk about it as something universally understood.

Paul Steinbeck has already suggested a similar way of thinking in his article “Improvisational Fictions” (Steinbeck 2013). He suggests, following Marian Guck’s idea of “Analytical Fictions,” that as music is participatory, writings on music contain traces of interactions with music and reveal the beliefs and values of those doing the writing. Steinbeck suggests that three of the common fictions are these: improvisation is like composition, improvisation is primarily a social practice, and improvisation is about critique and opposition. To that I might add what I have just
suggested: improvisation is different from composition. There is also a kind of meta-fiction here, to alter Steinbeck’s terminology. All these fictions are themselves dependent on the very idea of improvisation as a practice that can be located and discussed. And because improvisation itself might be described as a fiction, the very invocation of the concept is often as significant as how it is discussed. Where I differ from Steinbeck is terminology, because I am wary of the implication of the term fiction as untruth or fantasy. To talk about the figuring of improvisation is to acknowledge that as it is placed in different contexts so it acquires meaning, and that in turn that meaning has broader consequences.

That is why we must interrogate how, in the wholesale integration of the idea of improvisation into jazz studies, the idea of improvisation becomes itself part and parcel of the discourse. Rather than being a fixed entity, it is something that is emergent from the telling of jazz history and wider narratives about jazz, instead of acting as the frame on which we construct those narratives. Improvisation is figured through discourses on jazz, rather than emerging directly from jazz itself. And the way that improvisation has become a central theme on jazz studies marks out certain frames through which jazz has been viewed. In what follows, I present what is no more than a sketch of some views of improvisation as it has been figured in discourse. I am particularly concerned with the implications these figurings have for the direction jazz studies has taken, and for our view of jazz history.

Jazz as Improvisation

I suggested above that the difference of improvisation from composition marked a key starting point for jazz discourse. One of the more specific manifestations of this approach comes from a figuring of the relationship between the two, as I have already suggested. That is, while improvisation is a defining feature of jazz, it is also premised on the idea of composition, and thus the two function in a particular hierarchical relationship. If the real and authentic quality of jazz is spontaneity, which can only emerge in a context where improvisation is present, then the act of composing only serves as a means to an end—to create the conditions under which musicians can improvise and create jazz. A particularly salient example of this tendency emerges in Jerry Coker’s 1978 book *Listening to Jazz*. While this text might not be considered particularly well-known, I use it here merely as an exemplar of an idea that is much more wide-ranging. Coker’s text is a kind of listener’s guide to jazz, designed to lead the beginner through an understanding of the functioning of the music and the contributions of some of its greatest exponents. He frames improvisation as the core of jazz. Jazz is, he suggests, “the only music founded on the expressive craft of improvisation” (Coker 1978, 44). For Coker, because this is the case, the real history of the music is found in the solos of the great improvisers. Improvisation is identified here as an act of the individual musician, invoking the “great man” trope of historiography. Coker sees compositions as providing vehicles for improvisation, thus placing the two in a relationship in which one serves the other. Composition is no more than the means by which improvisation can be allowed to take place. The compositions jazz musicians play are no more than canvases on which the real stuff of jazz improvisation happens.

Other manifestations of this idea occur in texts oriented toward similar audiences. For example, in John Postgate’s *A Plain Man’s Guide to Jazz* from 1973 we find this:

Jazz is at heart an improvised music. The tune or theme, so important in most orthodox music, is relatively unimportant in jazz. Its function is to set a mood for the jazz musicians’ improvisations and (usually) to supply their harmonic foundation. It is what a jazz musician makes of a tune that is important.

*(Postgate 1973, 24–25)*
In *The Power of Black Music*, Samuel A. Floyd, Jr. talks of tunes and arrangements as “only materials on which a good performance can be built” (Floyd 1995, 228). And we can also see how jazz pedagogy is built on much the same idea. The huge market for play along books and recordings has established the idea that what one practices is improvising, and it is the composition that facilitates that. In fact, in this approach composition is often relegated to the role of helping to create the backing track, which cycles round endlessly.

In this figuring of improvisation, composition becomes subservient to it as an old hierarchical relationship is reversed. This figuring assumes that improvisation and composition are different kinds of creative acts, not merely in terms of temporality, but aesthetically and in what they produce. This view of jazz as a music made primarily by musicians, not composers, is a familiar one. But when it is applied with a historical brush it has interesting, albeit predictable consequences. Consider, for example, that the list of major figures in jazz Coker provides does not include Duke Ellington, nor any other musician who worked in a comparable field. This approach sidelines a whole range of musical activities or forms of musicking that do not fit the iconic image of jazz. Consider, for instance, just how little is said about the skill involved in arranging for the swing bands of the 1930s, how much attention is instead given to the name soloists in the prominent bands featured in much of the literature. This figuring of improvisation serves to bring out the importance of the individual, to contribute to the kind of “great man” history of jazz that has been so roundly critiqued. 3

Improvisation not only is an individual expression but also brings the personalities of its players to the forefront. This effect of unmediated immediacy has been key to jazz, and one arguably rooted in the blues aesthetic, as articulated via the idea of jazz as a folk tradition, thus unencumbered by the neutralizing effect of transmission in the form of being inscribed as notation. This idea of the “voice” of musicians manifesting through the sound they make when playing is enormously important. It gives rise to perhaps the most pervasive metaphor in the discourse, that of improvisation as storytelling. This is to invoke not only ideas of folk traditions and oral transmission but also some of what George Lewis describes as “Afrological” approaches to improvisation. For Lewis, the broad ideas of “Eurological” and “Afrological” approaches are “historically emergent rather than ethnically essential” (Lewis 2004b, 153). Part of Lewis’s exposition of the Afrological includes a notion of improvisation as related to sound and identity, as I alluded to earlier, and is worth quoting here:

> Part of telling your own story is developing your own “sound.” An Afrological notion of an improviser’s sound may be seen as analogous to the Eurological concept of composition “style,” especially in a musically semiotic sense. Moreover, for an improviser working in Afrological forms, “sound,” sensibility, personality, and intelligence cannot be separated from an improviser’s phenomenal (as distinct from formal) definition of music. (156)

This idea of an improviser’s sound as something personal and individual but at the same time rooted in tradition and context is absolutely central in Lewis’s Afrological aesthetic. It is indeed something that can be traced right back through a whole range of discourse, from LeRoi Jones to Albert Murray. It can be described as part of the “blues idiom expression” Walton Muyumba identifies as emerging from this discourse, an expression steeped in individual experience but also formed as public expression (Muyumba 2009, 15). Improvisation comes to be significant here because of its power to embed the idea of personal voice, individuality, and agency. It cannot be understood as mere text, laid bare through the artifacts that it leaves behind.

The storytelling metaphor hardly needs explaining. It is manifest in so many different famous sayings on jazz, discussed by so many writers. Ingrid Monson’s now-classic book *Saying Something*...
is perhaps one of the most apt works to be mentioned here in its direct use of the metaphor as a central theme (Monson 1996). The storytelling metaphor has important implications for figuring improvisation. But these are also confusing in that they point in two seemingly different directions. Or put differently, these directions draw on two different facets of language that are intimately connected but give rise to very different, almost diametrically opposed critical viewpoints: voice and syntax.

The metaphor of storytelling immediately invokes the idea of improvisation as language, a language in which there are identifiable and repeated components that might be said to carry meanings or implications. One of the earliest manifestations of this approach was in the way a number of scholars, but most famously Thomas Owens in a dissertation on Charlie Parker, dissected the elements of an improviser’s vocabulary (Owens 1974). From Owens’s work came the idea of what was sometimes called formulaic improvisation, identified as such in Barry Kernfeld’s article “Improvisation” for the *New Grove Dictionary of Jazz* (Kernfeld 1994). This approach has strong precedents in the study of literature and particularly work on epic oral poetry, such as Albert Lord’s 1960 book *The Singer of Tales* (Lord 2000). Gregory Smith’s 1983 dissertation on Bill Evans made this link explicit, while taking a similar kind of approach to Owens (Smith 1983). In these kinds of approaches, improvisation is figured as a language that is specific to an individual while also being part of a larger tradition. The operation of this language serves to characterize the voice of that individual, while some musicians served as exemplars because of the extraordinary facility they had in manipulating this language (Charlie Parker is the prime example).

Other approaches take the language metaphor in a more structuralist direction. Developing on analytical methodologies that aimed to explore the relationship between different elements in a musical discourse, a range of writers applied techniques like Schenkerian analysis and pitch-class set theory to jazz improvisation. Consider briefly two examples here, which demonstrate, in their own way, how improvisation figures in this discourse. Gary Potter’s article “Analyzing Improvised Jazz” from 1992 serves as a useful review of a range of different approaches. Midway through the article he pauses to consider an important issue:

> Any music analyst needs to ask two questions: Why analyze this music? And for whom is my analysis intended? My answers to these questions determine the direction of the rest of this article. Why analyze jazz? Jazz deserves to be studied because, at its best, it is glorious music, worthy of appreciation on all levels including the intellectual. For whom is my analysis intended? Any fairly well-trained listener-reader, whether jazz lover or not, particularly the musician who may have little exposure to jazz and who can be guided to greater understanding and, therefore, greater appreciation.

*(Potter 1992, 17)*

Appreciating music through intellectual understanding is a classical Western aesthetic, familiar from accounts of canonic art music and a discourse of appreciation. But what it also implied here is a classic Cartesian duality of mind/body. Left unsaid is the implication that jazz has generally been understood as raw unmediated physical sensation, via an old-fashioned kind of primitivism. The invocation of the idea of the intellectual is not just to do with the traditional discourse of appreciation, but as a counter to this physicality. Another scholar who championed the use of analytical techniques for jazz, Steve Larson, regularly invoked the comparison of improvisation with composition. In his article on Schenkerian analysis, for instance, he emphasizes the commonalities between composed and improvised music, and ends with a statement about exceptionality and (implicitly) genius (Larson 1998, 241). This ties in to one of Steinbeck’s fictions: improvisation is like composition. In both these cases, improvisation functions as the thing that elevates jazz, allowing it to demonstrate similar structural characteristics to the tradition of composition that
these kinds of analytical methods had usually addressed. While both writers have in mind to argue for the significance of jazz, the aesthetic grounds on which they do so only reinforce the terms of a hierarchy that is problematic.

The kind of approach Potter and Larson take is representative of a body of literature that now seems to occupy only a very marginal place within the jazz studies oeuvre. That is because of the way both musicology and jazz studies have moved forward, taking quite different paths that have tended to sideline analytical inquiry. More importantly, the reason such kinds of approaches have not been more widely adopted is because they represent a way of thinking about improvisation. That is, improvisation can be understood via the products it creates, musical texts that can be subjected to analytical inquiry that reveals the structural relationships at work. This way of thinking is one that came under wide scrutiny within musicology during the 1980s and 1990s, via a series of now-famous critiques that suggested that analytical inquiry was having the effect of treating the musical text as autonomous, free of any cultural or social context, pure music that could be understood and analyzed as such. Put simply, is it possible to analyze jazz simply through notes, without for instance understanding the context in which it was made, what those notes might come to signify, and so on? This approach figures improvisation as a process that can be understood in terms of the music it produces, via analytical models that quantify the relationships between those notes and consider ideas such as structures and relationships. One of the most specific attacks on this kind of approach is Bruce Johnson's essay in the *Cambridge Companion to Jazz* (Johnson 2002).

Johnson sees jazz as a music that had too often been marginalized because of the way that it challenged a whole series of assumptions usually made about music that was the subject of musicological inquiry. For Johnson, jazz was better considered in relation not to non-improvised musics (in other words, composed musics, acting here as a shorthand for the Western art music tradition), but to other non-musical traditions.

If one of the reasons that the kind of analytical models we find operating in Pressing (Pressing 1987), Larson, and others have been relatively little used, it is perhaps because they imply a view of improvisation as product rather than process. They see language in terms of the utterances it creates, rather than the dynamic processes involved in conversation. But it is in thinking about and figuring improvisation more as process that leads to what has been a range of much more significant and influential approaches to the subject. As Vijay Iyer puts it, thinking about improvisation as process implies “a collective activity that harmonizes individuals rather than a telegraphic model of communication as mere transmission of literal, verbal meanings” (Iyer 2004, 394). As we will see, this view of improvisation as language leads in a very different direction.

This figuring of improvisation as a form of storytelling that is personal but also communal and social finds its most salient explication in two books, namely Ingrid Monson’s *Saying Something* and Paul Berliner’s *Thinking in Jazz*. (Monson 1996; Berliner 1996) Taken together, both volumes on their publication in the 1990s represented a highly significant shift in thinking on improvisation. Both approach improvisation not in terms of the musical text but as an activity that is profoundly social. And both write about improvisation from the point of view of ethnography, as a living tradition that can be experienced and understood from within. Monson’s explanation of her title is worth quoting here:

> Since saying something—or “sayin’ something,” as it’s usually pronounced—requires soloists who can play, accompanists who can respond, and audiences who can hear within the context of the richly textured aural legacy of jazz and African American music, this verbal aesthetic image underscores the collaborative and communicative quality of improvisation. (Monson 1996, 1–2)
Improvisation is placed here at the moment of performance, and in terms of the effect it has, namely creating a sense of community through the way it encourages responses and draws in participants. Monson’s formulation of this set of relationships also echoed what Christopher Small would, in his 1998 book, call musicking—music not as a thing but as an act involving both musicians and audiences (Small 1998). Both Monson and Berliner’s work serves to document the complexities of learning to improvise and how players form themselves in relation to a tradition, aware both of the of ideas cultivating an individual voice while also articulating a respect for and understanding of that tradition. Both writers cover a whole range of musical practices: soloing, comping, time playing, and so on. For Berliner in particular, improvisatory music making is the heart of jazz practice. But what that means is a broad concept no longer beholden to any narrow definition of spontaneous invention. Berliner charts, for example, the ways musicians interact with tunes, learn ideas from each other and from records, pick up parts of a tradition, and become aware of the normative limits of what was and was not idiomatically appropriate and accepted, all as part of this broad tradition of improvisation. Similarly, what emerges most strongly from Monson’s work is the idea of improvisatory practice as something that happens within an ensemble, no longer merely the province of the individual musician playing solos but something much broader. But Berliner sometimes displays, Scott DeVeaux suggests, an “indifference to the complications of historical context” (DeVeaux 1998, 395). And that is to say that the particular framing of musical practice he presents is specific to a certain group of musicians located in a particular time, place, and stylistic idiom. It is, for instance, the fact that this account has little to say about the practices of musicians who play more avant-garde kinds of jazz, or for that matter much more traditional styles, or in big bands where reading from notation becomes particularly important. Improvisation is figured as a practice that takes place in small groups, and largely in a style that we might characterize as post-bop. This suggests, then, that what this point represents in jazz studies is not just a different view of improvisation, but a new kind of figuring of improvisation as a broad category of music making that incorporates a whole range of ideas and approaches and certainly no longer holds to the fairly strict ideals of spontaneous invention.

If the work of Monson and Berliner represents part of a move away from a focus on the musical text, toward a broader theorization of improvisation as a practice that is social and cultural as well as musical, some recent moves in jazz studies and beyond have extended that critical trajectory further. The establishment of the journal *Critical Studies in Improvisation* in 2004 marked the bringing together of work started at symposia held at the Guelph Jazz Festival in Canada. While the journal does not focus on jazz specifically, many of the musics discussed are closely connected with jazz, hardly surprisingly. It is worth here quoting the journal’s aims, as stated in its first issue:

> Broadly considered, improvisation, we contend, offers a salient point of entry for theorizing a broad range of pressing issues of cultural concern: power and resistance, the politics of identity formation, intercultural collaboration, intellectual property rights, social mobility, institutional constraints, multiculturalism, alternative pedagogies, community development, human rights, hope, and new networks of social interaction.

Improvisation figures in this kind of discourse in quite a different way from the contexts I have presented up to now. While the authors are clear that the subject of the journal is improvisational music, music is less the object of this discourse and more the thing that enables a much broader critical debate to take place. This can be seen in how, in their 2015 book *The Fierce Urgency of Now*, Fischlin, Heble, and Lipsitz, two of whom act as editors of *Critical Studies in Improvisation*, talk about their subject this way:

> Improvisation . . . can be defined in a number of ways; as a form of asymmetrical engagement between the individual and the community; as a metonymy for the ways larger
cultural forms take shape; as a critique of discourses that do not allow for the kinds of anarchic exploration of sonic vocabularies and registers to be found in improvisation at its freest and as a test of the limits of free speech and free thought, and how that freedom both challenges and establishes a framework for the encounter between the so called individual and the social framework in which she operates. At its most reduced, and knowing how dangerous it is to make these sorts of definitive affirmations, improvisation is a site of encounter.

(Fischlin, Heble, and Lipsitz 2015, 61, emphasis my own)

This marks not a decisive critical turn but part of a broad refiguring of improvisation, away from a musical process that results in a text that can be analyzed, toward something where the object of the discourse is less the music itself and more the way it articulates values, ideas, identities, relationships, and so on. In the move away from analytical inquiry that had the effect of instating autonomy to the text, the general consensus came to be that music was a product of the socio-cultural condition in which it was created and as such had to be understood in relation to that context in terms of how it enacted relationships of power. Here it is the act of improvising that not only reflects a set of circumstances and conditions but also participates in challenging existing frameworks and establishing new conventions.

This move is also, in many respects, about challenging the claim that music has laid to the term improvisation. George Lewis remarks that “music is already in a leading, perhaps over-determining position within improvisation studies” (Lewis 2013), suggesting that the general assumption that improvisation refers to music making might lead to a kind of decoupling of the two. Indeed, as co-editor of The Oxford Handbook of Critical Improvisation Studies, Lewis has, arguably, put that edict into practice (Lewis and Piekut 2016). While the book is listed within the music section of the publisher’s catalog, it includes contributions that consider the role of improvisation within yoga, poetry, dance, comedy, and management, to name but a few. Its very remit suggests the possibility of an improvisation study that is genuinely interdisciplinary and fosters a dialog about the nature of improvisation in a vast range of different contexts.

But to conclude, I want to return to Fischlin, Heble, and Lipsitz’s (2015) The Fierce Urgency of Now. Even in a text that is passionate about its subject and celebratory of the power of improvisation, there is a certain figuring of improvisation that again needs to be drawn out. That is that, in celebrating improvisation’s power, especially in contexts where it functions as a device for communities that are disenfranchised, what is being discussed are certain musical forms, most particularly those where improvisation serves as part of a musical discourse that seeks to extend the vocabulary of the normative. Improvisation comes to be aligned with a certain kind of musical language. But that musical language is culturally and historically specific, and as much as this approach is inclusionary, it excludes certain styles and forms. Consider again how little this work says about the practice of improvisation in contexts like swing band music and how its emphasis particularly on forms of music that might either broadly be termed free improvisation or free music can exclude a whole range of jazz.

My point here is a broad one, and it is not to challenge the insights that these new debates have produced but instead to point to the way in which discourse is always formed out of certain culturally inherited suppositions. The manner in which the idea of improvisation as representing this site of encounter has emerged has tended to mean that certain kinds of idioms serve this discourse much better than others. The figuring of improvisation and its changing conception has always resulted in views of jazz that emphasize certain aspects over others, perhaps art over popular, progressive over conservative, or performance over composition and arranging. Thus, the history of jazz is also a history of changing ideas about improvisation. The other side of that coin is that as our understanding of improvisation has changed, so has our view of jazz history; the two exist in a symbiotic relationship. But by paying attention to the nature of this relationship and the way in
Figuring Improvisation

which improvisation is being figured, we can come to see the significance of those words I quoted at the outset, to understand how it is that improvisation can carry so much weight as a statement of cultural and musical identity.

Notes
2. See for instance Solis and Nettl (2009), Bruno Nettl had, years earlier, proposed that all musics could be placed somewhere on a continuum between improvisation and composition (Nettl 1974). A similar argument is advanced by Carol S. Gould and Kenneth Keaton (Gould and Keaton 2000).
3. See also Whyton (2010, 16–17).

References