Though musicians spend years trying to find their musical voices, and an audience often emotionally responds to what it hears as their inner revelations, the notion of jazz as a form of self-expression is not exactly a thriving one in the literature. Scholars tend to see the idea as at best a kind of passé Romantic individualism and at worst a dangerous form of mystification that diverts us from seeing the way jazz performances are the products of larger social forces like race, class, and gender. Thus David Ake (2010, 18) criticizes “musical anthropomorphizing,” whereby listeners mistakenly see performances as direct reflections of the musician’s inner life and personality. Similarly, Robert Walser (1997) has criticized understandings of jazz performances as expressions of an individual subjectivity “detached from social experiences” (272); Walser praises alternative understandings, which he associates with black musicians, of the music as “a shared public discourse” and “the fulfillment of tradition” (276).

Ake and Walser are right to criticize Romantic notions of jazz performances as pure manifestations of individual subjectivity and to call our attention to the way larger musical and extra-musical discourses shape the jazz musician’s expressions. However, such discursive analysis creates the danger of losing the notion of jazz as self-expression altogether, subsuming the individual to larger social forces.

In this chapter, I use Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogic theories to rescue the notion of jazz improvisation as self-expression from its individualistic versions. Although a number of jazz studies scholars have referenced Bakhtin in passing, few have considered the implications of his work for jazz in an extended manner. For Bakhtin, because the self is rooted in language it is inevitably intertwined with the social world. But it is not socially determined, for we have the potential for what he calls “unfinalizability”—the ability to shape ourselves. Bakhtin shows us both that jazz improvisation is a struggle to differentiate one’s own voice from others’ and that one can only find one’s own voice in relation to others through a variety of kinds of dialog. I argue that jazz, as a dialogic art form Bakhtin calls (referring to novels, but using a musical metaphor) “polyphonic,” is particularly suited to the expression of the unfinalizable self, which requires a supportive group of equals.
Finding One’s Voice in the Vocabulary of the Other

For Bakhtin, the self is largely constructed linguistically, since we think in words. Yet a primary fact of human social life is that the words by which we construct our selves are not our own. As Bakhtin puts it, “I live in a world of others’ words” (1986, 145). A speaker “receives the word from another’s voice and filled with another’s voice, . . . permeated with the interpretations of others” (Bakhtin 1984, 202). Thus in our thoughts and utterances the past is constantly speaking through us, for every word “tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life” (Bakhtin 1981, 293). Utterances are never simply self-expression because they are always (in Bakhtin’s words) “overpopulated,” saturated with the voices of previous speakers (294).

Yet, at the same time individuals are shaped by the discourse of others, they are never completely defined by them, because we all have the capacity for what he calls “unfinalizability,” the ability to (within limits) shape and express ourselves. In the midst of others’ words, Dostoevsky’s Underground Man

knows that he has the final word, and he seeks at whatever cost to retain for himself this final word about himself, the word of his self-consciousness, in order to become that which he is not. His consciousness of self lives by its unfinalizability, by its unclosedness and indeterminacy.

(Bakhtin 1984, 53)

The concept of unfinalizability suggests that although one can achieve moments of self-definition—one can avoid being completely defined by social discourse—such a self is never static, but constantly evolving.

Individuals pursue unfinalizability by engaging in three kinds of dialog with the words of others. The first is a kind of interior dialog where we respond to the internalized utterances of others. This kind of creative engagement helps us shape our unfinalizable selves. Second, we respond to the words of others by recontextualization. For Bakhtin, words literally mean nothing without a context, and a new context changes their meaning. Using someone else’s word in a new context changes the word and creates “internally dialogic relationships” between the original word and the word in the new context (Bakhtin 1984, 200–201). The word of another can be further dialogized when we “assimilate, rework, and re-accentuate” (or “reaccent”) others’ phrases by, for example, stating them in ways that have personal resonances, like undermining their meaning through a sarcastic delivery (Bakhtin 1986, 89; see Bakhtin 1981, 293). Not all individuals fully pursue their potential for unfinalizability, of course; many are content to be passively defined by the words of others, but for Bakhtin this represents a renunciation of our capacity for freedom.

The dependence of subjectivity on the discourse of others as well as the ability to maximize unfinalizability through internal dialog, recontextualization, and reaccenting can be seen in the expressions of jazz musicians as well. Like Dostoevsky’s Underground Man, the jazz soloist struggles with the discourse of others, but in this case a musical one. Every jazz great has begun by imitating others, as is apparent through recordings of a young Charlie Parker playing Lester Young solos (Parker 1991). Players learn David Baker licks, memorize Charlie Parker’s solos from the Omnibook, and play the changes from The Real Book. The jazz musician cannot escape the tradition, for if what he or she plays sounds like jazz, it reproduces the past through the familiar harmonic, rhythmic, and melodic devices that make it “jazz” in the first place. Since no jazz player can improvise original lines all the time, “jazz” phrases carry meaning left over from previous musicians who have used them. Musicians are also confined by the requirements of genre so that someone playing “bebop” or “swing” is bound by certain rules that define the genre; even “free jazz” has its own rules.

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Finding one’s voice in jazz seems an almost impossible task, given this need to assimilate the vocabulary. Musicians tell themselves that imitation is a process of absorbing the tradition and developing their own voice. But what if the player never reaches his or her own voice? Lick-playing jazz soloists, in Bakhtin’s eyes, negate their own freedom by letting themselves be defined by others.

One approach would be to prioritize one’s own voice by shunning predetermined “licks.” Thus saxophonist Lee Konitz strives to avoid playing preplanned ideas:

As soon as I hear myself playing a familiar melody I take the mouthpiece out of my mouth. I let some measures go by. Improvising means coming in with a completely clean slate from the first note. . . . The most important thing is to get away from fixed functions. (Hamilton 2007, 103)

But such originality can never be fully achieved because jazz is a language, and a completely idiosyncratic vocabulary would not be heard as jazz. Konitz in fact draws on the melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic conventions of jazz, despite his quest for originality. Further, as a practical matter no improviser can invent constantly, and Konitz like any other player has a reservoir of phrases from which to draw.

But Konitz does pursue unfinalizability through musical self-dialog, a kind of interior conversation whereby the soloist listens and responds to his or her own ideas, themselves drawn from the jazz vocabulary. Many musicians describe a solo as a conversation with oneself. On a polyrhythmic or polyphonic instrument like drums or piano, one melody or rhythm might be pitted against another, as when the interaction between figures on the bass drum, snare, high-hat, and ride cymbal or a pianist’s two hands creates a dialog.

But a succession of single melodies or rhythms can also create dialog. For Max Roach, each phrase he plays answers his previous one, so that “when I play, it’s like having a conversation with myself” (Berliner 1994, 192). Konitz also sees every note he plays as a response in real time to previous ones, creating what he calls “note-to-note” playing (Hamilton 2007, 71, 106). Though not creating themselves anew with each solo, dialogic improvisers like Konitz are constantly in dialog with their past, as their improvisational choices position them in relation to what they have played before. They are also in dialog with the jazz tradition itself. Musicians playing a standard like “Body and Soul” are also aware of, and can hear in their head, previous canonical versions (by Hawkins, Coltrane, and so on), and their improvisations place them in relationship to the past, whether they imitate, draw on, or reject those previous versions.

Musicians also use recontextualization and “reaccentuation” to avoid being defined by the tradition and its discourse. Just as Dostoevsky “often divined how a given idea would develop and function under certain changed conditions, what unexpected directions it would take in its further development and transformation,” and in doing so “placed the idea on the borderline of dialogically intersecting consciousnesses” (Bakhtin 1984, 91), a musician might bring a bebop line into a new harmonic context and change it. Thus, playing a standard in a new way, or using a phrase by Clifford Brown in a new context, allows improvisers to explore the relationship between the present and the past, contemporary and older consciousnesses. When Charlie Parker quoted Louis Armstrong’s cadenza from “West End Blues” in the context of a bebop solo, he brought new resonances to it, showing Armstrong’s modernity at a time when many saw him as old-fashioned or perhaps poking fun at the elder (Parker and the Stars of Modern Jazz 1989).

A jazz soloist can “reaccent” a line in a number of ways: a traditional phrase might be displaced rhythmically, put in a different meter, or articulated idiosyncratically (e.g., all staccato), notes might be left out or added, and so on. Parker’s quotation of “The Blue Danube Waltz” in a live
version of “Perdido” uses both recontextualization and reaccenting (Parker 1973). It is startling to hear the classical theme in the middle of a jazz solo, and it is made further idiosyncratic by playing the 3/4 melody in 4/4 time. One who would criticize the use of traditional licks or forms, in Bakhtin’s words, “ignores those changes that take place in a word during its passage from one concrete utterance to another, and while those utterances are in the process of orienting to one another” (Bakhtin 1984, 200). Engaging in dialog with tradition is a way of bridging the gap between the self and other as well as the past and future.

**Self-Expression Through Group Improvisation**

Inner dialog, recontextualization, and reaccenting musical lines help create a dialogic self and thus help musicians pursue their own unfinalizable voices. But these measures only go so far, because ultimately if the individual is to find his or her own voice it must be through dialog with another. Bakhtin shows us the restless, never-ending process of self-discovery and self-expression through engagement with the utterances of others, but he also shows us the way such self-exploration is intertwined with our real relationships with those individuals. Playing music, like speaking, is a communicative act, and one discovers one’s own voice only in conversation with others. “In dialog a person not only shows himself outwardly, but he becomes for the first time that which he is . . . not only for others but for himself as well. To be means to communicate dialogically” (Bakhtin 1984, 252).

Two scholars have meticulously explored the dialogic possibilities of the jazz group: Ingrid Monson and Paul Berliner. Monson’s *Saying Something* (1996) details the complex interactions among rhythm section players in jazz, illustrating the “collaborative and communicative quality of improvisation,” its creation of temporary or long-lasting communities “through the simultaneous interaction of musical sounds, people, and their musical and cultural histories” (2). Her focus is the way musicians actively listen and respond to one another with “cooperative choices” that create the kind of “groove” or “rhythmic flow” that is key to a successful jazz performance (27, 28). Monson describes such active listening in dialogical terms: “It is a type of listening much like that required of participants in a conversation, who have to pay attention to what is transpiring if they expect to say things that make sense to the other participants” (84). Similarly, Paul Berliner’s magisterial *Thinking in Jazz* (1994) plumbs the depths of jazz dialog for 882 pages, replete with first person accounts of the process of group improvisation and musical transcriptions that note all the instruments in a particular performance, like a fifteen-page score of Miles Davis’s “Blues by Five,” which details every note, chord, and drum hit by the performers with detailed commentary (732–757). These accounts and transcriptions shine an x-ray on the process of small group jazz interaction and reveal much about numerous levels of dialog within the jazz performance.

Perhaps the most obvious form of dialog within the jazz group is trading phrases—as when Dizzy Gillespie and Charlie Parker “trade fours.” But as Monson and Berliner show, in the ordinary course of a small group performance players in the band listen and respond to one another in myriad ways: the drummer matches the timbre of the instrument he or she is accompanying (Berliner 1994, 346), the bassist or drummer adjusts the beat placement (on top, behind, ahead) to other members of the band (351–352); musicians mirror each other’s rhythmic ideas (355); band members collectively work out the details of a tune’s harmony (substitutions, turnarounds, and so on) within the framework of the written chords (356); rhythm section players respond to and encourage the soloist, engaging in “imitative interplay” (358); and players alter a line’s dynamics or density in response to others (371). Such responsiveness requires a particular kind of listening that one musician called “dividing your senses,” listening to each member of the band simultaneously (362).

Jazz musicians in live performances are in dialog with the audience as well. Musicians adjust their style and repertory, even in mid-performance, to listeners. Thus one musician in his first set
played short, uninspired solos for a small, distracted audience, yet held forth with long, adventurous improvisations for a throng in the third, sounding like an entirely different player (Berliner 1994, 472–473). The musicians Berliner described discerned whether an audience was responsive or listless, sophisticated or simple, educated in jazz or not, and played accordingly. A good audience responds to creative, adventurous playing, spurring players to take risks and more fully be themselves, whereas unsophisticated audiences, even enthusiastic ones, provoke discouragement or lead to what bassist Chuck Israels calls “pandering” (465). Singer Carmen Lundy compares a jazz concert to a church service, where “everybody, not just the people in the choir, is part of the music,” through exhortations, swaying, and dancing (391, 469).

Such audience “comments,” verbal or otherwise, then cause the musicians to change the way they play, creating what Berliner calls a “communication loop” (Berliner 1994, 459). Musicians describe putting forth a musical “suggestion,” seeing how the audience responds, and if the response is positive (“Yeah! I hear you!”), the musician develops it further, further exciting the crowd. As trombonist Curtis Fuller put it,

I’ll put something else out there in my solo, and I flirt with it to feel them out to see what the response would be. . . . When I get the audience around that, they won’t let me off the stage.

In Berliner’s words, “audience members enter into and broaden the base of the conversation, responding to the musical statements of band members as if they were literally speaking with them” (468).

Supporting Bakhtin’s analysis, it is only through such musical dialog that the individual voice fully emerges. Individual musicians do not fully know who they are, or become who they are, outside of their interactions with others. Pianist Kenny Barron has talked about how he alters his style and in a sense becomes a different musician with different drummers (Berliner 1994, 364). This mutability of the musical self leads musicians to play things in the context of a group that they have never played before and are as surprised as anyone to hear them emanating from their instrument. According to one,

by talking to people up on stage through your music, you can start working on stuff you’ve never heard and never done. . . . I’d find that there are these things coming out of myself, which I didn’t even know were there, I’d never heard them, I didn’t know where they came from. . . . But playing with others triggers it.

(Berliner 1994, 816)

The same is true of playing before different audiences.

Like Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel, the best jazz performances present a conversation between voices, each of which becomes most fully themselves through dialog. Thus the Bakhtinian soloist pursues self-expression, yet he or she can only do so in dialog with him- or herself and others. From this perspective, jazz improvisers are simultaneously themselves, what is not (yet) themselves, and other people.

Jazz Improvisation and an Ethic of Responsiveness

Bakhtin’s conception of dialog is descriptive, emphasizing the way all utterances arise from and only have meaning in relation to those of others. However, there is also a prescriptive element that sees the polyphonic artwork as a model for community, one characterized by an ethic of mutuality.
and responsiveness that allows for the fullest development of the individual. For Bakhtin, “there is nothing more terrible than a lack of response” (1986, 127), and a person who is not acknowledged by others becomes a “voiceless thing” (161). The best jazz performances enact a world where individuals recognize and respond to each other, allowing them to emerge in the fullness of their unfinalizability.

Such an ethic of responsiveness and group interaction is illustrated by the improvising philosophy of Lee Konitz. When asked what he is thinking about when improvising, Konitz says,

Just trying to . . . be interested in what’s going on around me. . . . I want to hear the other players as clearly as possible. . . . If I hear what they’re doing, I never run out of things to play, because they’ll always feed me something.

(Hamilton 2007, 108)

He has described the pleasures of dialogic improvisation in great detail:

Now, I start to play . . . and, one-by-one, they join me . . . such a nice feeling to hear another sympathetic voice—nothing can compare to this process for me. . . . So, I hear the bass notes, then the piano plays a chord, and I say—in some part of me—“Wow, what was that?” Not enough time to really put a label on it, so I do the best I can to match that sound. Then the drums enter—great to hear! So now I am listening to myself in relation to three other sounds. “What’s the pianist doing now? Interesting, but what can I do to correspond to that nice progression.”

(125)

This description shows the existence of both internal and external dialog, each reinforcing the other. He is “listening to [himself]” but also “in relation to” the other musicians. His method also resists the finalization of himself and others, for in the moment, there is not time to “put a label” to what he hears—either his own notes or those of the other musicians—for that would finalize him and them as well as the music itself, and the dialog would be at an end.

The musicians who have played with Konitz have attested to the joy of being listened and responded to. According to Rufus Reid, “As a bass player you’re not relegated to the ‘basement’ with him. We get our materials from one another, and that’s what real jazz is” (Hamilton 2007, 115). The responsive band member then inspires Konitz in return:

There’s nothing more inspiring to me than to hear someone react to something I just did, and to tell me that he’s interested. Maybe he doesn’t love it, but he’s interested. I will respond immediately. Whatever I had in mind, I will go in that direction immediately, because he’s talking to me.

(127)

The comment, “maybe he doesn’t love it,” implies that Konitz is looking not for pure affirmation or adulation but the kind of pushback one gets from a friend in a good conversation that then inspires one to develop one’s own thoughts and feelings more fully. This point is illustrated in his complaint that pianist Brad Mehldau was too quick to respond to him in an imitative way: “He was telling me that he was listening to me, and whether he agreed with it or not, he played with me. But it wasn’t an expansion of it” and did not “challenge” him enough (Hamilton 2007, 226). He seeks in a fellow musician what Bakhtin called “an active (not a duplicating) understanding, a willingness to listen” (1984, 299).
Konitz’s responsiveness to those around him leaves him vulnerable, because if they are not similarly responsive, his own improvisations will be weak. As pianist Alan Broadbent, who has played with Konitz, put it, “Lee is completely dependent on who he’s playing with, which is the way it’s supposed to be” (Hamilton 2007, 71). “Dependent” has negative connotations, yet Broadbent’s comment that dependence is “the way it’s supposed to be” conjures up an image of healthy interdependence, where self and other are made stronger by the connection and are not entirely separable. When a musician responds to a musical idea of another, he or she takes that idea and makes it his or her own, perhaps incorporating it into his or her vocabulary. To the extent that one’s musical ideas constitute one’s musical self, a kind of dialogic interpenetration of selves then occurs, for what Konitz calls “expanding” an idea suggested by another musician creates what Bakhtin calls “double voiced discourse.” Such “double voiced discourse” requires actively evaluating and responding to the speech of others rather than simply reproducing it or “merging” our voice with it (Bakhtin 1984, 195). Thus Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment, though his “inner speech” is “inundated . . . with these words of others,” reaccents them, “entering into a passionate polemic with them. Consequently his inner speech is constructed like a succession of living and impassioned replies to all the words of others he has heard” (238).

Such a responsive conversation differs both from merging and from an unresponsive musical conversation, where (in Wynton Marsalis’s words) people are “thinking about what they are going to tell you next, instead of listening to what you’re saying” (Berliner 1994, 401). The conversational model envisages a constant negotiation between individual will and the collective, in a “give and take.” Berliner (1994) describes a situation where “group members alternate between asserting their own interpretations of time and adjusting them to those of other players” (352). The best acts of improvisation allow tremendous individual expression and group solidarity, each coming more fully into focus at different times.\(^5\)

Of course, group jazz performances are not always conversational. Some soloists might prefer not to be “fed ideas” or be directly responded to by the rhythm section in many situations, and in any case some kinds of jazz (for example, big bands) inherently have less musical dialog (Givan 2016). Some leaders are overly directive, and there are always conflicts. Players might not listen, instead relying on their own or others’ prefabricated licks (Berliner 1994, 400); the rhythm section might keep repeating a soloist’s idea when he or she wanted to move on (403); a pianist might harp on a substitute chord that interferes with the harmony being developed by the soloist (404); or a rhythm section player might put forward intrusive comping figures, or be overly busy so as to interfere with the soloist’s development of ideas (404). But the Bakhtinian musical conversation, the dialog out of which the personal voice most fully emerges, is something to strive for, as the fulfillment of unfinalizability.

Bakhtin also shows us the difficulty of real self-expression in jazz. Unfinalizability by its very nature precludes standing still, and from a Bakhtinian perspective, even developing and repeating one’s own licks finalizes and confines the individual, not allowing him or her to “become that which he is not.” As Bakhtin says,

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\text{a man never coincides with himself. . . . In Dostoevsky’s artistic thinking, the genuine life of the personality takes place at the point of non-coincidence between a man and himself . . . [and] is made available only through a dialogic penetration of that personality. (Bakhtin 1984, 59)}
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Such a “dialogic approach to one’s own self” results in “destroying that naïve wholeness of one’s notions about the self that lies at the heart of the lyric, epic, and tragic image of man” (120). Yet the alternative to the self of Romantic individualism is not just the socially determined self but
rather a dialogically evolving one. The quest for selfhood is ongoing, for “when dialog ends, everything ends” (252). Soloists in pursuit of unfinalizability must never be content to fall into routinized improvisation, for they only become what they are by becoming what they are not. And yet this new self is only a temporary resting place to be negated again in the pursuit of further self-definition.

From this perspective, one can see why a Bakhtinian soloist like Konitz admires Heraclitus’s saying that “everything flows. . . . When I step into the river neither I nor the river are the same” (Hamilton 2007, 114). Dialogically engaging with “All the Things You Are” countless times, Konitz says, “I still have the feeling that I’m playing the first set of variations that I ever played on it” (199), for with each attempt he shapes himself anew. There is no definitive version of “All the Things” by Konitz or anyone else, for (Bakhtin) “as long as a person is alive he lives by the fact that he is not yet finalized, that he has not yet uttered his ultimate word” (1984, 59).

Notes

1. The author wishes to thank Brian Weiner and Daniel Melnick for their helpful suggestions in the writing of this chapter.

2. Ake (2010, 18) does allow that “parallels sometimes exist between the style of a musical performance and the biographical circumstances, attitude, or personality of the artist who created the performance,” but says it is “just as likely” that qualities attributed to the artist by listeners are projections. (Ake hedges his bets a bit by denying he is not “dismissing this sort of transference as mere fantasy,” though that seems close to what he is doing.)

3. There have been brief discussions of Bakhtin in the jazz literature but few extended treatments. Ingrid Monson (1996) refers to Bakhtin a handful of times, mostly utilizing the idea of “heteroglossia” from “Discourse in the Novel.” David Ake (2010) uses Bakhtin’s concept of the “carnivalesque” from Rabelais and His World. Charles Hiroshi Garrett (2012) also discusses the carnivalesque in relation to jazz humor. Tony Whyton (2010, 2013) considers Bakhtin in relation to questions of tradition and canonicity. Gabriel Solis (2007) refers to Bakhtin in his discussion of musical influences in relation to Monk. David Borgo (2004) and Peter Hollerbach (2004) also discuss musicians’ use of musical influences in the development of their personal voice in relation to Bakhtin. The fullest consideration of Bakhtin and jazz, particularly regarding “unfinalizability,” is Panagiotis A. Kanellopoulos (2011), though Kanellopoulos’s approach differs from mine in that it focuses mostly on the early Bakhtin writings “Toward a Philosophy of the Act” and “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity.” None of these authors uses Bakhtin’s Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, which I find his most useful text for thinking about jazz. I also use Bakhtin in Hersch (2007, 2017). Borgo, Hollerbach, and Monson discuss Bakhtin in conjunction with “signifying” (as theorized in Gates [1998]). Gates (1998) discusses Bakhtin’s concept of “double voiced discourse” in relation to signifying (50–1, 110–13, and 131). The relationship between Bakhtin’s dialogism and “signifying” goes beyond the scope of this essay, but I will say that while signifying is a process of revision of a text akin to parody (“repetition with a signal difference”) as a way to alter a dominant culture, Bakhtin’s dialogism has more emphasis on a back and forth or interactive process between individuals that to my mind makes it particularly appropriate to illuminating jazz improvisation. Other uses of signifying to understand jazz include Gary Tomlinson (1992), Robert Walser (1995) and Hersch (2007). Finally, no discussion of dialog in jazz would be complete without mention of Christopher Small (1987). Though he mentions neither Bakhtin nor signifying, Small’s Music of the Common Tongue insightfully focuses on many of the same questions; central is his assertion that “in all musical performances, as situations in which human beings encounter one another and try to create meaning from those encounters, it is the relationships that are established between the participants which constitute the most important element of that meaning” (62). Uses of Bakhtin to think about popular music include David Brackett (2000), George Lipsitz (1990), and Richard Middleton (2000), while Kevin Korsyn (1999) incorporates his work in a consideration of classical music. For a brief discussion of jazz and Bakhtin’s notion of polyphony in relation to John Edgar Wideman and other African American writers, see Tracie Church Guzzo (2011, 21–23). Guzzo cites other sources connecting Bakhtin with African American writing at 253n33.

4. According to Bakhtin, genres limit what we can comprehensibly say, for “even in the most free, unconstrained conversation, we cast our speech in definite generic forms,” ones with varying degrees of flexibility (Bakhtin
Genres (greetings, farewells, business conversations, etc.) structure our speech as much as grammatical rules do, and we unconsciously perceive the given genre once someone starts speaking, and this perception allows us to predict the length, tone, and structure of the utterance (79).

5. See Hersch (1998, 106–126) for a discussion of the free jazz of the 1960s in light of the dynamics between individual and group raised here.

References


Charles Hersch


**Discography**

