The internationalization of executive education

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The emergence of the modern global economy gives rise to questions such as who has managed the firms during this process and how these managers have been prepared for their jobs. Most of the historical literature on the relationship between education and management positions and performance has focused on the role of formal degree programs, such as the MBA degree and engineering degrees, and on their different impact in different contexts (e.g., Locke 1989, 1984; Engwall et al. 2016). These comparative studies have highlighted the international aspects of business education. National systems of business education have received ideas from abroad and changed and, after World War II, especially the international impact of ideas and concepts from the United States had a strong impact globally. However, the studies also show that national variations are still strong despite international exchange of ideas on how to educate future managers.

This chapter narrows down the question of how to prepare for top executive positions to one type of education that aims to train them directly: non-degree executive education. Executive education as we have known it in recent decades is a typical post-World War II phenomenon, although the concept of executive education was not used before the 1960s (Amdam 2016). In the US, and in some other countries, selected business schools offered courses before World War II that predated the first executive programs. In the US, Harvard Business School offered a program called Special Sessions for Executives from 1928 and the course Business Executive Discussion Group from 1935, both approaching executives. However, both lasted for only a couple of years (Amdam 2016). In, for example, Paris, France, Centre de preparation aux affaires (CPA) was established in 1931 with the same purpose (Fridenson 2017). We date the birth of modern executive education to 1945, when Harvard Business School (HBS) began to offer a 13 week full-time on-campus non-degree program to men – and, from 1963, also to women – who were top management, or aspired to become top managers. At HBS, which was the first US business school to offer this kind of program, the program was called the Advanced Management Program (AMP). The idea was that the business schools should prepare people for top executive positions and improve top executives’ performance. These programs represented an attempt to strengthen the involvement of business schools in the development of professional executives, and to do so more directly than the MBA programs (which attracted young people who might be top executives one day in the future). In the context of the history of higher education, executive education represented a powerful new logic that was different from the
general academic trend in the business school programs after World War II. For the executive programs, recruitment was not based on previous grades, degrees or entry exams but on a person’s hierarchical position within a corporation. The participants were often chosen by enterprises and not selected by universities, and no grades or degrees were awarded after graduation (Amdam 2016).

Executive education, defined as short full-time on-campus non-degree programs for top executives or potential top executives, was a major innovation within the field of executive development. From the 1950s to the early twenty-first century, this concept spread globally in a remarkably standardized form, which makes it a good example of a real global product. The executive education programs could have different names, such as the Management Development Program or the Executive Development Program. As early as 1968, there were around 50 programs of a similar format to the HBS’s AMP at different US universities (West 1970). The aim of many of the programs was to train top executives for international assignments in a period when US corporations were internationalizing rapidly. Globally, there were similar programs modeled on those of US business schools – or organized by US business schools – in countries such as Japan, the Philippines, India, Morocco, South Africa, Switzerland, France, Italy, Costa Rica, and Chile. All of them had the purpose of training people who were in – or were about to be in – top executive positions.

The 1950s and 1960s were a formative period for executive education across the world. Among the top ten executive programs in the Financial Times’ 2017 ranking of open executive programs, seven, including HBS’s program of 1945, were created in this period. Six of the ten were run by European business schools. Faculty members from HBS were actively involved in establishing three of these in the 1950s: Institut européen d’administration des affaires (INSEAD), Instituto de Estudios Superiores de la Empresa (IESE) in Spain, and l’Institut pour l’étude des méthodes de direction de l’entreprise (IMEDE), later the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) in Switzerland. The Ford Foundation was actively involved in establishing the fourth of them, the London Business School, in 1965.1

The chapter argues that, globally, executive education is a relatively standardized US-influenced concept that has been neglected in the research literature on the development of business education. Based on this, it outlines some main patterns of development in the formative period 1945–1970 by defining the spread of the executive education “product” as an international process influenced by strong institutional factors. In the last part of the chapter these arguments are illustrated by exploring some prestigious business schools in Europe and India, based on secondary literature as well archival studies of the Harvard Business School and Ford Foundation archives.

The chapter offers two contributions to the existing literature. First, it shows that the development and functions of executive education should be studied as a unique phenomenon, but also as a phenomenon related to business education in general. According to HBS’s Professor Kenneth R. Andrews, the new wave of executive programs was “an educational experiment unique in the history of education” (Andrews 1959: 593). Second, this chapter claims that, more so than for business education in general, the internationalization of “the American model” was a success in the way that it spread and developed in a surprisingly standardized form. This does not mean that there were no conflicts. Existing research on the international history of business education has highlighted the resistance in many countries to adopting American educational formats such as the MBA degree. This chapter also highlights the tension between competing US models for educating executives.
Literature and perspectives

Within the historical literature on business education, the non-degree top-executive activity of the business schools has, with a few exceptions, been neglected. It has been mentioned in short paragraphs or sub-chapters in some scholarly written anniversaries of business schools, and Matthias Kipping is one of a few who has addressed this sector as a separate research field (Cruikshank 1987; Epstein 2016; Kipping 1998; Sedlak and Williamson 1983; Wilson 1992). The question of the different logics of the degree and non-degree executive sectors of business schools has only recently been addressed. While the first sector recruits young students on the basis of their degrees, grades and/or enrolment tests, and awards grades, the second recruits on the basis of a position in a corporate hierarchy, has no exams, and awards no grades. Graduates of the first sector are young people who might end up in top executive positions after ten or 20 years; graduates of the second are people who are already in – or are close to – top executive positions (Amdam 2016).

Since Robert R. Locke’s (1989, 1984) seminal books comparing the development of US, German, French, and British management education, there have been several comparative studies of the development of modern business education (e.g., Amdam 1996, 2008; Amdam et al. 2003; Engwall and Zamagni 1998; Gourvish and Tiratsoo 1998; Kipping et al. 2009). The recent study by Lars Engwall et al. (2016) explores the development of business education (and media and the consulting industry) from the perspective of organizational fields, where an organizational field is defined as “a set of interdependent populations of organizations participating in the same cultural and social sub-system” (Scott 2008: 434). Historically, business education as a field has developed within different national contexts. By drawing on DiMaggio and Powell (1983), the argument is that the actors within a field tend to become more similar or isomorphic with one another because of mimic, normative, and coercive processes. According to Engwall et al. (2016), business schools have in general become more similar and closer to a US-dominated global model. Another expression of the institutionalization process is that they have developed from surviving to gaining legitimacy and authority. The role of executive education in this perspective is, however, not researched.

Changes within organizational fields may be the result of endogenous processes of interaction between actors or of exogenous shocks such as Americanization. Americanization is here defined as a political–economic–cultural institution that reflected an attempt to diffuse American ideas on how to organize modern societies and economies, especially in the period from 1945 to 1973 when the US’s international position was very strong (Berghahn 2010). The term was frequently used in business history studies around the millennium turn, and expressed a cultural turn in business and economic history (e.g., Berghahn 2010; Kipping and Bjarnar 1998; Djelic 1998; Zeitlin and Herrigel 2000).

This chapter will draw upon the organizational field perspective. However, it argues that we can talk about a specific field of top executive development that is related to – but is not identical with – the field of business education. Within this field of top executive development, business corporations and associations, in addition to business schools, other course providers, and institutions such as the Ford Foundation, played an active role. Further, I perceive the international diffusion of the AMP executive education model as a process of internationalization, and we draw upon the Uppsala model of international business (IB) to explore it. According to the Uppsala approach, organizations internationalize gradually in two ways: first, by moving from simple exporting to engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) by establishing subsidiaries, and, second, by investing initially in countries that are close in terms of psychic distance and then expanding geographically after having accumulated international experiential knowledge.
In their revised model, however, Johanson and Vahlne (2009) suggest that networks may replace psychic distance, so that firms’ patterns of FDI may be a result of networks that existed prior to their investments. In other words, being in networks that reduce the distance to foreign markets has a strong shaping effect on firms’ behavior regarding internationalization. However, Forsgren (2016) has questioned this shaping effect, and argues that more research is needed to understand the relationship between the characteristics of these networks and firms’ foreign investment behavior as it relates to pace, direction, and level of commitment.

The internationalization process perspective is relevant for several reasons. First, in this period, we can perceive the AMP as a product that was exported to foreign units, such as management development centers or business schools, where programs were organized and taught by or in close cooperation with US business schools, especially HBS. The AMP was copied or adjusted according to the local context, but the basic idea of a limited number of weeks of extensive management development training, focused on general management and aimed at preparing participants for top management positions, remained. Most of these new units later developed into full degree-awarding business schools, but organizing such short executive programs was a key objective during their first years. Second, the relationships between the US business schools and the foreign units were similar to the relationships we find within other international organizations. The various relationships between the US business school partner and the foreign unit can be understood by using concepts from IB and by defining the unit as a licensing partner, an export agent, a strategic ally, or even a greenfield subsidiary. Third, among US business schools there was an awakening understanding of this process as something that was partly aimed at supporting the creation and development of US multinational enterprises (MNEs).

The network perspective is strongly highlighted in the literature that studies the role of the Ford Foundation in the Americanization process in the 1950s and 1960s. The Ford Foundation financed many of the projects that contributed to the export of US executive programs, such as the establishment of the London Business School, INSEAD in Fontainebleau, France, Instituto Postuniversitario di Organizzazione Aziendale (IPSOA) in Turin, Italy, and the Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad (IIMA). According to Gemelli (1998), who has studied the Ford Foundation and the growth of European business education in general (not just executive education), transatlantic political and intellectual networks were very important for the development of business education, especially in Italy and France. Parmar (2012), who has studied the global impact of the three largest US foundations, has approached the topic from a perspective inspired by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and has shown how transatlantic elite networks emerged around the Ford Foundation’s international operations.

**Executive education and Americanization**

In a broader sense, the internationalization of executive education was part of the Americanization process, which was aimed at transforming global capitalism and business practices on the basis of American models (Kipping and Bjarnar 1998; Djelic 1998). Seen from the US, this process was driven by a symbiosis of different forces, among which the most important were the foreign policy of the US state, expressed in the Marshall Plan and later the European Productivity Agency (EPA), the Ford Foundation, American enterprises that internationalized, and educational institutions (David and Schaufelbuehl 2015). All three of the US Technical and Productivity Program (USTAP) (McGlade 1998), the EPA (Boel 1998), and the Ford Foundation (Gemelli 1998) highlighted management education in a broader sense as a key element in what was later called Americanization.
From an internationalization process perspective, the Americanization process was an institutional framework, which, according to North (1990), represents both constraints and possibilities. The institutional possibilities that supported the internationalization of executive education were, most of all, financial grants. For example, the USTAP and the EPA financed visits from several hundred professors and potential professors from foreign business schools and training centers who stayed at HBS, MIT, and other US business schools in order to learn how to teach business in their home countries (McGlade 1998; Boel 1998). The Ford Foundation funded several projects, including those at US business schools (among which HBS was the largest recipient) and with foreign partners, in order to initiate new business education programs abroad. It also contributed to the establishment of some educational institutions that developed into prestigious business schools, such as INSEAD in France (Barsoux 2000), the London Business School (Barnes 1989), and the IIMA (Hill et al. 1973).

Among these actors, strong personal networks emerged through meetings, project cooperation, and mobility. For example, Paul G. Hoffman came from a position as director of the Economic Cooperation Administration, managing the Marshall aid program, to a position as president of the Ford Foundation (from 1950 to 1953). Among the Ford Foundation’s most active trustees was Donald D. David, HBS’s dean. Such networks illustrate the informal aspects of the institutional context. Seen from the perspective of the main exporter of executive education, HBS, the networks gave it access to information and a wider international reputation. As HBS’s dean said in 1954, after a trip to Europe during which he had noticed that HBS was well known, “I think they give us too much credit. … Since America has skills and the Harvard Business School teaches it, HBS must be mainly responsible. Naturally this is an overstatement – pleasing but embarrassing.”

The institutions also acted as constraints to internationalization, since the actors had different motives and roles within the bigger picture of Americanization. HBS and the Ford Foundation often cooperated in exporting executive education, but sometimes their interests clashed. HBS’s model of short intensive executive programs was driven by a strong belief in training professional top executives to complete the managerial revolution (Amdam 2016). The Ford Foundation was in no way against this corporate transformation, but it had other concerns as well. One of these was the geopolitical perspective, since it was an institutional actor, albeit a soft one, in the Cold War. This motive explains its strong support for management education in Turkey in the 1950s and India in the 1960s (Parmar 2012).

Another of the Ford Foundation’s concerns arose because it initiated a huge project to turn American business schools into academic institutions. This New Look, as the project has been named, was based on an analysis that US business education was too practical and too remote from the academic standards of the universities. As was demonstrated in the Pierson report of 1959 on US business education (Pierson 1959) and in several grants to leading American business schools, among which the Carnegie Mellon School of Administration was a role model, the Ford Foundation played a major role in this transformation (Augier and March 2011). The idea was that business education should be more scientific, which, in particular, meant a stronger focus on mathematics, statistics, organizational behavior, and, to some extent, economics. Interestingly enough, this process did not include executive education but related primarily to the degree logic of the business schools (Andrews 1959). Consequently, the Ford Foundation did not intervene in the internationalization process in the content of executive education. However, as we will see from some archival examples, in some cases the Ford Foundation introduced constraints by offering or supporting alternatives, and especially degree alternatives, to the HBS model of executive education.

The Ford Foundation’s efforts were formed in the geopolitical context of the Cold War and were combined with a strong belief in science. The HBS model was, to a larger degree, formed.
The internationalization process of the AMP

The internationalization of executive education, which here is defined as short non-degree on-campus programs for top executives or potential top executives, developed largely according to the Uppsala model, but there were some important modifications. The original model holds that internationalization tends to happen in countries that are close in terms of psychic distance (having similar culture, language, and institutions), and the internationalization of AMP to Canada and Hawaii illustrates this (see Table 8.1). In both Canada and Hawaii, HBS professors, such as Ralph H. Hower and Kenneth Andrews, offered an AMP that was a shorter copy of the HBS AMP, and they did this on an individual basis with the informal approval of HBS.4

Table 8.1 Some examples of executive education programs that had various degrees of involvement from US business schools and/or the Ford Foundation, 1949–1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of first entry</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Institution/place</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Huron College London, Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>IPSOA, Turin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>University of Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>AMP in the Far East, Baguio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>JEFT/ICARE, Valparaiso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Kawanda, Keio University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>INSEAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>IMEDE, Lausanne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Nigeria Institute of Management and Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>IMAN, Mexico City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Management Development Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>West Pakistan Institute of Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>INCAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>British Institute of Management (HBS alumni organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>CAMSED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>IESA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>IDEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Singapore Institute of Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Compiled from various documents in Harvard Business School Archives and the Ford Foundation Archives.
Some of the new programs were also the results of personal networks. One type of network was the MBA alumni networks. From 1955 to 1959, HBS received requests for cooperation from 76 countries. Most of these were through visitors to Cambridge, MA, and many of them were MBA alumni who asked for cooperation in establishing an AMP in their home country; Mexico is an example here. In 1954, a group of Mexican alumni from the HBS MBA program contacted the HBS faculty, who agreed to teach for some years, and in 1958 the Ford Foundation awarded the Mexican institution a grant to write Mexican cases under the instruction of the HBS professors.

Another type of personal network was the network of an individual’s faculty or previous faculty. In the case of INSEAD, George Frederic Doriot, who had been professor at HBS before World War II, was very active in the process that led to the creation of INSEAD in France in 1957. As early as 1930, he, together with a small group of French entrepreneurs, had created CPA in Paris to offer programs for top managers. In the 1950s, he worked with the business community, and especially Olivier Giscard d’Estaing (later member of the French parliament 1968–1973), Roger Godino (later advisor to the Premier Minister 1988–1991), and Claude Janssen (a French businessman in international banking), who were all HBS alumni, to establish INSEAD (Barsoux 2000; Gemelli 1998).

Networks of the third type were political networks such as that of George Cabot Lodge. Prior to being appointed as a lecturer at HBS in 1962, Lodge had worked as Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs, having been appointed by President John F. Kennedy. He used his political networks to get HBS actively involved in offering an AMP in the new Latin American Business School, INCAE, in 1964.

This internationalization pattern resulting from distance and networks was modified by two factors: geopolitical concerns, and alternative educational models that represented the New Look alternative in business education. First, concerning the geopolitical concerns, the Americanization movement with all its features has to be regarded in the light of the Cold War. The efforts of the Marshall aid administration, the EPA, and the Ford Foundation to include top management training and development as core initiatives in programs to strengthen the geopolitical position of the US contributed to a greater international demand for programs such as the AMP as well as the pattern of geographical localization of these programs during their internationalization. HBS categorized their international partners into three groups. First, there were partners with whom HBS had made formal cooperation agreements lasting between five and ten years; second, there were informal partners; and third, there were foreign business schools and management development centers where HBS professors taught AMPs on an individual basis.

In the first group, there were only three formal academic partners: the University of Istanbul, Turkey, IIMA in India, and INCAE in Central America. The formal agreements were the result of geopolitical initiatives. In the case of Turkey and India, the initiatives came from the Ford Foundation. In India, some regional management training centers were set up in the early 1950s; one of these was the Administrative Staff College, which was modeled on the Administrative Staff College in Henley in the UK and was set up in 1957. In the geopolitical post-war landscape in the 1950s, India was, due to her growing interests in the Soviet Union in the 1950s, given the Ford Foundation’s highest priority among countries outside the US (Sackley 2012). In 1955, Dr. Douglas Ensminger, the head of the Ford Foundation’s office in India, met with the Indian Minister of Science and Research. They agreed that the regional focus of the management training centers, and the middle-management focus of the Administrative Staff College, did not meet the requirements for training top executives in a post-colonial context. As a result, Ensminger organized a study tour to the US to allow representatives from the government and the business elite to meet US business schools that offered programs for top managers (Hill et al. 1973).
This process exemplifies how the US offered alternative models for executive programs even in the early phases of the New Look. In the US, the Indian group met four business schools with quite different focuses on training top executives: (1) HBS “stressed the training of practitioners, especially in general management”; (2) the Carnegie-Mellon School of Administration “defined its primary purpose as extensions of the frontier of knowledge, especially in the quantitative area”; (3) MIT “based its programs on a strong foundation of knowledge of quantitative methods and the behavioral sciences”; and (4) the University of Chicago “rests heavily on Chicago’s strength in the social sciences, especially in economics” (Hill et al. 1973: 37). In the case of the Indian developments, the Ford Foundation pushed for a consortium of MIT and UCLA, representing a quantitative approach, to provide an MBA program instead of a short executive program. However, as a result of strong and long-term pressure from the business community in Ahmedabad, which included several local HBS alumni, IIMA chose “the Harvard doctrine.” In 1963/1964 it offered its first program, an AMP, for 120 participants, and it later became a full business school with degree programs. At the same time as IIMA was established in 1961, the India Institute of Management Calcutta (IMMC) as established in Calcutta with MIT as its main American partner. IIMA was formally recognized by HBS as an institutional partner, and, until 1969 when the agreement ended, HBS sent seven faculty members to Ahmedabad every year to teach. For five years IIMA sent eight faculty members to HBS to be trained in case method teaching for executives (Hill et al. 1973; Anubhai 2011).

Another example of a business school for which HBS and the Ford Foundation presented conflicting models, and for which HBS’s model was chosen, was IMEDE, which was established in 1957 by the multinational company Nestlé in Lausanne, Switzerland. In 1990 IMEDE merged with Centre d’Etudes Industrielles (CEI) in Geneva to become IMD (David and Schaufelbuehl 2015). When planning IMEDE, two top managers from Nestlé contacted HBS for cooperation. They looked to HBS to gain legitimacy, and HBS responded by taking an active part in shaping and managing IMEDE, which started as a management training center offering executive programs. According to the Boston Sunday Herald newspaper, IMEDE was “the first attempt to blend American teaching with the business practice and production methods of Europe and other parts of the world.” Seven HBS professors went to the new school to teach on the basis of HBS case methods. Within this cooperative framework, HBS convinced the Nestlé directors to change the focus of IMEDE from an internal corporate focus to one that approached the European market for top managers. They even established a “Boston Committee” in 1957, with three of the HBS professors who taught at IMEDE acting on an advisory committee for IMEDE’s management. The committee was frequently contacted regarding strategic questions on how to develop IMEDE.

The first program at IMEDE was a non-degree executive program, but it lasted for eight months rather than the 13 weeks offered at HBS. This reflected the fact that IMEDE was an independent institution that, from the beginning, focused on executives from a lower level of the corporate hierarchies than the HBS AMP. The length of the course was also affected by the fact that IMEDE had a strong international profile and primarily attracted European participants from outside Switzerland who needed time to adjust to a multicultural setting.

From the first year of cooperation, HBS made several efforts to push IMEDE toward the shorter AMP model. After an initiative from the “Boston Committee,” the creation of a short AMP was on the IMEDE board’s agenda in 1964. The HBS faculty at IMEDE met resistance from two parties. The first of these contained the majority of the small number of permanent IMEDE faculty. Not all of the permanent faculty were enthusiastic about the case methods, and especially the AMP, which, they argued, was too short to go into any depth. There was also a question of who within IMEDE should make the decision or, as IMEDE’s director Chaffee E. Hall, Jr. wrote,
Should this be a function of the Faculty, or should an Advanced management programme be planned by the Advisory Committee at Harvard in the same way that the original IMEDE programme was planned? And what role do the Trustees play?\textsuperscript{14}

HBS also met resistance from the Ford Foundation, which promoted a change from the eight-month program toward a degree program in cooperation with the University of Lausanne. The Ford Foundation was concerned that IMEDE was too dependent on HBS and its case tradition, and at the beginning of the 1960s this led to negative responses from the Ford Foundation when IMEDE applied for funding (David and Schaufelbuehl 2015: 92). When, later in the 1960s, the IMEDE faculty began to articulate its lack of enthusiasm for the short AMP concept and argued in favor of a longer program and more research, representatives from the Ford Foundation had several meetings with the faculty and management at IMEDE. They were told that, in the US, the Ford Foundation did not support MBA or short management development programs, but preferred research-based activities, such as PhD programs.\textsuperscript{15} They were also encouraged to develop the relationship with the University of Lausanne and to prepare for the introduction of a degree program.\textsuperscript{16}

As a result of its strong position at IMEDE, and because of a demand from business for shorter programs, HBS managed to continue its campaign for shorter executive programs. HBS regarded the length of the program as an important success factor if a program should be able to attract real top executives. In 1966, a new four-week AMP was offered, nine years before the MBA degree was formalized in 1975. CEI, which was established in 1946 by Alcan and cooperated closely with HBS in the 1950s, also started with a longer non-degree residential program of 11 months and moved toward shorter programs by offering an AMP in 1963. The MBA came in 1979. At INSEAD in France, the first program, from 1957 onwards, was a ten-month program. The first AMP was offered in 1966. The MBA degree, however, was introduced as late as 1969 (David and Schaufelbuehl 2015; Barsoux 2000). All these highly ranked European business schools, including IESE in Barcelona,\textsuperscript{17} started as business schools offering what today we call executive programs, and strengthened their profiles by introducing AMP before later expanding to offer degree-awarding programs.

**Conclusion**

Globally, modern executive education is a viable and profitable division, particularly in the most prestigious business schools, and it is presented in formats of different length and content. Within this great variety of programs and courses, the short non-degree AMP model has achieved a position as the preferred format for executive education. This format emerged at HBS as a contribution to the completion of the managerial revolution by preparing the new group of professional top executives who were detached from the knowledge and norms of the owners. In some countries, there were national initiatives prior to this process, and in some countries the process has been stronger than in others. The model spread globally, partly through the mechanisms of closeness and networks that are prescribed in internationalization process theories, but it was also modified by the institutional context of Americanization, with the Ford Foundation as a key actor. The emergence of a new non-degree logic directed toward managers in top or close to top positions, with the AMP as the core, was anchored in a strong demand from business for short intensive programs. In many countries, the Ford Foundation tried to push the process in a more academic direction into the degree format. However, this aim was of secondary order and subordinated to the general aim of developing business education. Therefore, the foundation was basically a supporter, and if possible, a modifier to the process where the US
business schools were the providers of a new concept for executive education and local actors key partners to implement executive education in a new context.

Research on the development of executive education does not only contribute to our knowledge about the formation of top executives in a period of globalization. Since most of the non-American business schools that began to offer this program in the period 1945–1970 started with executive programs and then began to develop MBA, PhD and other degree programs, the emergence of this sector also leads to a more nuanced perception of the general development of business schools. First, by including the development of executive education within the business school we modify the impression of radical changes toward a rigorous academic logic linked to the New Look movement that attempted at making the schools more scientific and more detached from business practice. Second, this study shows that US concepts, such as executive education, had a strong impact when institutional constraints, such as national regulations, were of less importance than in the degree-part of business education.

This story is about the globalization of the business of executive education. It is basically the narrative of the internationalization of a concept for how to develop top executives. Although not explicitly discussed here, it also relates to the internationalization of students since some went abroad to attend such programs. The story also includes the question of education and training as tools to develop skills that are required for the creation and development of MNEs, which came in focus from the late 1960s. The impact these programs had on the development of MNEs has not yet been addressed as a question for historical studies.

Another topic for further studies is the role of local actors and institutions in adjusting the general idea of executive education to the local context. This chapter argues that the influence from the US was strong in this field, and that national institutions were different compared to the educational system in general since executive education did not challenge national degree-specific institutions. This does not mean that national institutions and actors were not important. Indeed, they were of great relevance and their influence should be explored further in future studies. A third interesting and so far underexplored research field is the content of these programs. Since they were short and intense in time, and emphasized on-campus location where participants lived together and worked in groups, we can hypothesize that the main aim of the programs was to socialize the participants into the world of executives and establish social networks. If so, this has potential implications for the future development of executive education. While business schools today are concerned with how to meet the new digitalized world by introducing new technology into the programs, the key to the future of top executive education could depend more on their ability to develop the social dimensions that require on-site activities.

Acknowledgement

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Notes

Internationalization of executive education


9 Request for Grant Action, 30 October 1964; Grant file 62-520; FA732D, reel 1921, Ford Foundation Record, Rockefeller Archive Center (hereafter FFR).


12 E.g., Clark E. Meyer (Director), Comments of the director on the Smith–Christensen report, June 17, 1959, box 74, folder “IMEDE, Memos, reports 1958–1959,” HBS/Andrews.

13 Chaffee E. Hall, Jr. Director IMEDE to Prof. Robert N. Anthony, 6 October 1964, box 8, folder “IMEDE, Advanced Management Program, Summer 1966,” HBS Archives, George Albert Smith’s paper.

14 Ibid.


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Internationalization of executive education


