The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice

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INTRODUCTION TO
THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE

Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr.

Since the first three chapters of the volume (authored by Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., Jeremy Wanderer, and José Medina) survey the varieties of epistemic injustice (especially in their testimonial and hermeneutical variants, although not exclusively), we will devote this introduction to elucidating the significance of epistemic injustice issues and clarifying the structure of the volume and its contents.

In the era of information and communication, issues of misinformation and miscommunication are more pressing than ever. Who has voice and who doesn’t? Are voices interacting with equal agency and power? In whose terms are they communicating? Who is being understood and who isn’t (and at what cost)? Who is being believed? And who is even being acknowledged and engaged with? Epistemic injustice refers to those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowledge, understanding, and participation in communicative practices. These issues include a wide range of topics concerning wrongful treatment and unjust structures in meaning-making and knowledge producing practices, such as the following: exclusion and silencing; invisibility and inaudibility (or distorted presence or representation); having one’s meanings or contributions systematically distorted, misheard, or misrepresented; having diminished status or standing in communicative practices; unfair differentials in authority and/or epistemic agency; being unfairly distrusted; receiving no or minimal uptake; being coopted or instrumentalized; being marginalized as a result of dysfunctional dynamics; etc.

The topic of epistemic injustice is a very rich one, in at least three ways. The first is that it brings together, often in innovative ways, many topics, debates, and traditions in philosophy. These include issues concerning authority, credibility, justice, power, trust, and testimony as explored within areas like ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, and philosophy of language (and sometimes within related areas such as philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and aesthetics). The distinctively ethico-epistemic and socio-epistemic framing of those issues as provided by epistemic injustice resonates, in turn, with many deep themes that run through major philosophical traditions, such as pragmatism, phenomenology, and critical theory. The second is that epistemic injustice, as both a phenomenon and a topic of study, obviously connects to and interpenetrates with major social and intellectual movements, such as feminism, hermeneutics, critical race theory, disability studies, and decolonialising, queer, and trans epistemologies. The third source of richness for epistemic injustice lies in the fact of its status as a pervasive feature of our social and professional lives – where issues of authority, credibility, and testimony take on
distinctive forms. Much of the emerging interest in epistemic injustice comes from theoreticians and practitioners in different professional fields, areas of study, and areas of social interaction where problems of epistemic injustice take distinctive shapes.

Here is a quick overview of the five sections in which the volume is divided, followed by a fuller description of each section. In Part I: Core concepts, the volume begins with essays that lay out and clarify the central concepts used in the growing field of epistemic injustice. In Part II: Liberatory epistemologies and axes of oppression, authors explore the rich traditions and bodies of literature that have discussed epistemic injustices and offered critical tools to resist them. These are liberatory epistemological frameworks that were developed to denounce and resist the epistemic side of oppression even before the contemporary vocabulary of epistemic injustice was available. Part III: Schools of thought and subfields within epistemology elucidates the conceptual resources available in some schools of thought and identifies the critical tools available in some subfields of epistemology that can prove particularly fruitful for discussions of epistemic injustice. Part IV: Socio-political, ethical, and psychological dimensions of knowing uses concepts from psychology, social philosophy, ethics, and political philosophy to elucidate the nature and various dimensions of epistemic injustice. Part V: Case studies of epistemic injustice examines particular domains, identifying distinct sorts of epistemic injustices that arise within them.

Part I: Core concepts offers tools to navigate the rich and broad debates on issues of epistemic injustice that have taken place in various fields – in epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy, but also in related fields in philosophy and outside philosophy. The first three chapters look retrospectively at the different ways in which issues of epistemic injustice have been debated in recent years after the publication of Miranda Fricker’s 2007 book, but also prior to that in the long-held discussions of the epistemic aspects of oppression and marginalization in feminist, critical race, and decolonial philosophies (more on this in Part II: Liberatory epistemologies and axes of oppression). Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. offers four different lenses for examining the varieties of epistemic injustice and relations among epistemic injustices. Because our knowledge practices, including those that map concepts, orient epistemic attention simultaneously toward some and away from other aspects of the world, she cautions against using only one lens (or even one set of lenses) for thinking about epistemic injustices.

Jeremy Wanderer’s and José Medina’s chapters critically review different conceptions of two of the most prominent kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Wanderer examines different kinds of testimonial injustices (“transactional” and “structural”), and he distinguishes them from a different kind of normative failure in testimonial dynamics in “thick” relations, what he terms “testimonial betrayal”. Medina critically reviews the different ways of thinking and categorizing varieties of hermeneutical injustice, offering an argument for having a pluralistic approach to this concept (which calls for an open-ended list of possible classifications rather than a closed and definitive list). He also calls attention to an extreme form of hermeneutical injustice, which he terms “hermeneutical death”. In her essay in this section, Miranda Fricker discusses evolving notions of epistemic injustice, looking not only retrospectively at her own work and the debates it has sparked, but also prospectively to future work ahead. Drawing a contrast with cases of conscious manipulation and deliberate distortion or silencing, Fricker offers an argument for restricting the notion of (what she is now labelling) “discriminatory epistemic injustice” to unfair treatments in epistemic practices that are produced un-intentionally although not always non-culpably. She calls attention to issues of powerlessness that are involved in discriminatory epistemic injustice, and she emphasizes that these issues demand that our philosophical analyses of epistemic practices become more socially alive and engaged. In this respect, she calls particular attention to the pressing research needed on discriminatory
epistemic injustice in “new terrains of social experience”, such as in the domain of physical and mental health care in which the paradigm of discriminatory epistemic injustice can shed light on the epistemic dysfunctions that arise in doctor-patient communicative interactions (more on this in Section V: Case studies of epistemic injustice). As Fricker acknowledges in her essay, her notion of “discriminatory epistemic injustice” leaves plenty of conceptual space for other notions of epistemic injustice, such as that of “distributive epistemic injustice” coined by David Coady. Coady’s chapter – “Epistemic injustice as distributive injustice” – challenges Fricker’s distinction between discriminatory and distributive epistemic injustice, arguing that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustices can be conceived as forms of distributive injustice and that, by treating them as such, considerable insight can be gained into the nature of these injustices and into their interrelations.

Going beyond the specific varieties and dimensions of the wide array of phenomena that can be described as epistemic injustices, the next four chapters in Part I elucidate fundamental concepts that appear in the diagnoses and analyses of and in the work of resistance against epistemic injustices: trust and distrust, kinds of knowledge and epistemic resources, epistemic responsibility, and ideology.

Katherine Hawley analyzes the roles played in epistemic injustices by the notions of trust and distrust (by contrast to the notion of reliance) and by the related notions of trustworthiness and untrustworthiness. According to Hawley’s analysis, different ways of trusting and distrusting are different ways of exercising social (or socio-epistemic) power, and she clarifies how those exercises can lead to epistemic injustices in testimony and in action. In “Forms of Knowing and Epistemic Resources”, Alexis Shotwell elucidates the importance of the distinctions between knowing-that and knowing-how, and between propositional and non-propositional knowledge, to settle disputes about knowledge and understanding. She argues that privileging one kind of knowledge as the only form of knowing worth considering is itself a form of epistemic injustice, for it leads to the marginalization and neglect of epistemic resources that can help oppressed subjects craft more just worlds. More specifically, Shotwell argues that the work of redressing epistemic injustice can benefit from attention to the epistemic resources involved in implicit understanding and knowing. In the next chapter, “Epistemic responsibility”, Lorraine Code takes a retrospective look at the genesis and evolution of the notion of epistemic responsible agency in her own pioneering work and in the debates around this notion in the last three decades. Code critically examines the philosophical obstacles posed to the formulation, development, and uptake of this notion by certain philosophical assumptions and views (in particular, individualism). Code argues for situating discussions of epistemic responsibility within particular epistemic imaginaries, drawing inspiration from Michèle Le Dœuff and Cornelius Castoriadis, and basing her argument on the claim that “there is no intellectual activity that is not grounded in an imaginary”. Finally, Part I concludes with Charles W. Mills’ examination of the concept of ideology and the key role it can play in the diagnosis, analysis, and treatment of epistemic injustices. Mills first identifies the ways in which recent discussions of epistemic injustices in feminist epistemology and standpoint theory are indebted to the concept of ideology in Marxist and Post-Marxist theories and their claims about distorted perspectives on social reality. In the second place, Mills analyzes racism as a form of ideology. Following Tommie Shelby in expanding the scope of “ideology” to include “forms of consciousness” (and not just formalized intellectual systems), he calls attention to how anti-black racist ideology works in different ways through moral legitimation, social reification, and metaphysical mystification. Mills underscores the implications of these ideological mechanisms for epistemic injustices in testimonial dynamics and in the hermeneutical resources available to and circulating across different racialized publics.
Part II: Liberatory epistemologies and axes of oppression contains chapters that investigate how discussions of epistemic injustices emerge from and can be further enriched by major social and intellectual movements of liberation, such as feminism, critical philosophy of race, indigenous and decolonial movements and theories, disability studies, and queer and trans epistemologies.

The section opens with a chapter on intersectionality by Patricia Hill Collins, where the author elucidates the contours of intersectionality as the project of connecting resistant knowledges and using these connections, both in theory and in praxis, to navigate, survive, and subvert heterogeneous social contexts of multiple oppressions. Focusing on Black feminism, Hill Collins emphasizes that intersectional analyses and proposals cross political, social, and epistemological borders, and that this border-crossing is multi-directional and not reducible to a one-way traffic, either from social movements into the academy or vice versa. Offering an analysis of “epistemic violence within intersectionality”, Hill Collins issues some critical warnings for the future of the paradigm of intersectionality and echoes academics and activists who have recently expressed reservations about the ways in which intersectionality has become misrecognized, rigidified, impoverished, and misappropriated within the academy, resulting in the deterioration or neutralization of its emancipatory possibilities.

In the next chapter, Nancy Tuana brings to the fore the emancipatory possibilities within feminist epistemologies and the critical tools and resources that these epistemologies have to offer for discussions of epistemic injustice. Tuana analyzes how feminist epistemologists have called into question “the subject of knowledge” in a variety of fields and topics (from philosophy, science, and technology to popular culture, from the domain of domesticity to that of public life and policy-making, from the study of sexuality to the study of climate change or the global economy, etc.). As Tuana emphasizes, feminist critical questioning of “the subject of knowledge” accomplishes two things simultaneously: first, it calls critical attention to how dominant interests and values set the epistemic agendas and heavily influence what (and in what way) something counts as a proper “subject” of discussion and investigation, and secondly, it calls critical attention to what kind of subject one must be in order to be (seen as) a knowing subject. In her analysis Tuana underscores the emancipatory potential of feminist (and other liberatory) epistemological approaches that are informed by multifaceted ways of critically questioning “the subject of knowledge” along multiple axes of oppression, paying attention to the interactions among gender, sexuality, ability/disability, race, ethnicity, class, nationality, religion, etc.

Focusing on the epistemic side of racial oppression and the fight against it, in the next chapter of Part II, Luvell Anderson puts to use the critical and analytic tools that we find in the fields of philosophy of race, speech act theory, and the literature on epistemic injustice to shed light on contemporary discussions around post-racial ideals. Anderson argues that the pursuit of post-racial ideals (in their assimilationist, eliminativist, or colorblind varieties) produces hermeneutical injustices by “illocutionarily flipping” or by silencing the utterances of members of marginalized racial groups and he illustrates his argument brilliantly by analyzing the ways in which the slogan “Black Lives Matter” is neutralized and disarmed by post-racial sensibilities. In “Decolonial praxis and epistemic injustice”, Andrea J. Pitts examines how (what Walter Mignolo refers to as) the global geopolitics of knowledge produces, hides, and protects epistemic injustices from resistant knowledge practices. As Pitts’ analysis underscores, decolonial thought and praxis critically unveil the production and dissemination of knowledge (implicating universities, academic presses, research institutes, and a wide range of networks and agencies involved in “intellectual production”) within the material context of colonialism, imperialism, and capitalism. Acknowledging different threads of decolonial thought and praxis, Pitts’ chapter focuses on discussions among Latin American, U.S. Latina, and Caribbean decolonial theorists, linking these critical
discourses with the growing body of literature on epistemic injustice to address the following problem: “how to produce disciplinary discourses from Anglophone North American academic institutions on the topic of a decolonial geopolitics of knowledge without perpetuating an Occidentalism and ‘othering’ of communities whose existences require a perpetual struggle against neoliberal economic expansion and epistemic hegemony”.

Focusing on sexual and gender oppression, the next two chapters by Kim Q. Hall and Rachel McKinnon connect queer and trans epistemology with discussions of epistemic injustice. Exploring queer theory’s influential claim that “sexuality delineates an epistemic rather than a primarily erotic space in western contexts”, Hall’s chapter elucidates the ways in which queer epistemology explains the production of testimonial and hermeneutical injustices in the domain of sexuality. Hall underscores that queer epistemology identifies different forms of sexual testimonial and hermeneutical injustices, which include the sexual silencing of those deemed deviant, but also the epistemic violence of compulsory testimony about one’s sexuality and gender – i.e. being forced to “come out” and to speak in a particular way about one’s gender and sexuality. Using the critical tools of queer epistemology, Hall analyzes “a fraught epistemic terrain in which the epistemic authority of sexually minoritized people is contested”, and she elucidates the testimonial and hermeneutical mistreatments that result from being forced to understand oneself as a certain kind of person because of one’s desires, embodiment, and actions. Hall’s chapter discusses the meaning and significance of queer epistemology for issues of epistemic injustice in connection with four themes: (1) sexuality as a problem for truth, (2) queer epistemology and self-knowledge, (3) queer epistemologies and standpoint, and (4) queer and crip epistemologies. Next, in “Allies behaving badly”, Rachel McKinnon analyzes the phenomenon of gaslighting – that is, the phenomenon of systematically discounting another’s experiences or concerns as having a basis in reality – as a form of testimonial injustice. More specifically, McKinnon considers cases of well-meaning cisgender subjects who, while acting as an “ally” to a trans* subject, may nonetheless minimize the experiences and concerns of the trans* subject as having little or no significance or as meaning something quite different from what the trans* subject claims. McKinnon identifies problems with “ally culture” and how, far from helping mitigate epistemic injustices, an “ally culture” can contribute to their perpetuation. She argues that, instead of working on becoming “a good ally”, we should focus our efforts on becoming “active bystanders”.

Finally, in ‘Knowing disability, differently’, Shelley Tremain concludes Part II with a discussion of the failure of feminist epistemologists and theorists of epistemic injustice to incorporate a critical understanding of “the apparatus of disability” into their philosophical analyses. This failure, Tremain argues, constitutes an epistemic injustice that, among other things, seriously distorts our understanding of such concepts as identity, oppression, privilege, and even epistemic injustice itself. To make her argument, Tremain examines gaps and oversights in discussions of hermeneutical and testimonial injustice such as those contained in Fricker’s notion of “epistemic bad luck” and in the absolute failure to reflect upon disability in one of the cases that has received much discussion in the literature, that of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird. Analyzing this case with attention to the apparatus of disability in conjunction with those of race, gender, and sexuality, Tremain demonstrates the critical importance of robustly intersectional approaches to epistemic injustice.

**Part III: Schools of thought and subfields within epistemology** examine particular philosophical approaches that are resourceful for thinking about epistemic injustice. The chapters by Amy Allen, Lisa Guenther, and Shannon Sullivan demonstrate the ways in which specific figures and schools of thought greatly enhance our understanding of epistemic injustice. In the opening chapter to this section, Amy Allen argues that Foucault’s work is indispensable for analyzing reason’s entanglements with power. Specifically, she identifies three areas of Foucault’s
work that complicate and enrich our understanding of epistemic injustices: his theorization of
distinct forms of power (constitutive and agential), his analysis of power/knowledge or the polit-
ical economies of truth, and his genealogical method as resistance to regimes of truth through
counter-memory. Given the degree to which Foucault examined and offered ways of resisting
reason’s entanglements in power, Allen notes that it is surprising that his work is not used more
often within current discussions of epistemic injustice. In the second chapter to this section, Lisa
Guenther contrasts Fricker’s colloquial use of “phenomenological” as a description of first per-
son experience to the phenomenological method first developed by Edmund Husserl and later
advanced by such figures as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Frantz Fanon. Guenther argues that
there are gaps in the literature on epistemic injustice that can be filled through the use of specific
insights from the phenomenological tradition and contemporary critical phenomenologists, for
example through phenomenology’s attention to consciousness as relational, its rich account of
the embodied dimensions of social cognition, and (particularly within the critical form Guenther
adopts) its emphasis on not only reflecting upon the structures of experience but also collec-
tively transforming them. Drawing on the pragmatist tradition, and the work of John Dewey
in particular, Shannon Sullivan considers what a transactional epistemology would bring to con-
versations about epistemic injustice. By transactional she means an epistemology that recognizes
knowing as an “activity undertaken by a bodily organism-in-the-world who helps shape what
is known”. Utilizing such an approach, she argues, greatly enhances our understanding of the
harm of epistemic injustice.

The chapters by Sanford Goldberg and Heather Battaly situate the notion of epistemic injus-
tice and the concerns it raises within particular subfields of epistemology, demonstrating how
these subfields are enhanced through discussions of epistemic injustice and identifying features of
these subfields that are helpful for thinking about epistemic injustice. Sanford Goldberg considers
epistemic injustice in light of social epistemology, understood as “the systematic investigation
into the epistemic significance of other minds”. Such an epistemology, he notes, will consider not
only various forms of epistemic dependence, but also the norms that underwrite our epistemic
expectations of others and the epistemic assessments implied when beliefs are socially acquired.
Within this framework, Goldberg identifies three ways in which social epistemic practices can
function illegitimately, leading to epistemic injustice: through unjust exclusions from epistemic
practices, when a practice itself contains a normative expectation that treats people unfairly, and
when a practice is structured or directed in such a way that treats people unfairly. Examining the
subfield of virtue epistemology and the growing subfield of vice-epistemology, Heather Battaly
distinguishes among three ways in which epistemic vice can be understood as a bad cognitive
disposition: (1) as a disposition that results in bad epistemic effects (effects-vice), (2) as a bad
cognitive character trait for which an epistemic agent is responsible (responsibilist-vice), and
(3) as a bad cognitive character trait that is not necessarily under the epistemic agent’s control
(personalist-vice). She argues that testimonial injustice can take the form of either an effects-vice
or a personalist-vice, even when it falls short of responsibilist-vice.

Part IV: Socio-political, ethical, and psychological dimensions of knowing contains
chapters that analyze epistemic injustice through a variety of perspectives that focus on differ-
ent dimensions of knowing. The first two chapters examine what might be considered non-
epistemic concepts in relation to epistemic injustice. In the first chapter, Jennifer Saul analyzes
the psychological concepts of implicit bias and stereotype threat, which at first glance might
appear simply to be instances of epistemic injustice. However, Saul argues that there are impor-
tant distinctions to be recognized between these concepts and the concept of epistemic injustice.
Her chapter outlines the convergences and divergences between implicit bias and stereotype
threat on the one hand and testimonial and hermeneutical injustice on the other hand. Matthew
Congdon utilizes the tools of normative ethics and critical theory to address the question: what is wrong with epistemic injustice? While noting ways in which consequentialist, Kantian, and virtue approaches certainly enrich our understanding of the wrong of epistemic injustice, ultimately Congdon argues that we ought to understand this wrong utilizing Hegelian recognition theory of the sort found in the work of Axel Honneth. Taking this approach in the latter part of his chapter, Congdon develops the notions of epistemic love, epistemic respect, and epistemic esteem as well as epistemic neglect, epistemic disrespect, and epistemic disesteem.

The third and fourth chapters in Part IV take up the relationship between a political concept and its epistemic counterpart. Lorenzo C. Simpson utilizes a hermeneutical approach to consider the complexities of agency, drawing a distinction between first-order agency, or the ability to implement action, and second-order agency, or the ability to identify and access the conditions that facilitate first order agency. This distinction disaggregates the volitional and epistemic dimensions of agency, which, Simpson argues, helps us to understand and identify particular sorts of epistemic injustice. Simpson’s analysis further reveals that in order to understand and address certain forms of political injustice, we must engage a hermeneutical investigation under a constraint he calls “narrative representability” such that we ask “how do things appear from the first person perspective from which these choices were made?” Susan E. Babbitt uses Cuban political philosophy and history to investigate the nature of and relationship between epistemic and political freedom. In particular, she notes that understanding the nature of ideas is critical for political freedom; that epistemic freedom is constituted socially, materially, and through action; that as such epistemic freedom requires more than reason; and that consequently epistemic freedom is undermined when epistemic injustice is named and analyzed without transforming the conditions that explain it. Babbitt’s analysis suggests that epistemic injustices committed against other cultures and epistemic resources (such as Latin-American philosophy) obscure and impoverish the concept of “epistemic injustice” as understood and deployed in Western academic contexts.

In the final two chapters, Nancy Arden McHugh and Sally Haslanger examine the notions of epistemic community and epistemic objectivity respectively in conjunction with epistemic injustice. In her chapter, Nancy Arden McHugh analyzes debates concerning the locus of knowledge in either the individual epistemic agent or epistemic communities, arguing that attention to epistemological communities of resistance gives us a more robust understanding of epistemic injustice. She closes her chapter with an examination of one such community, a prison writing group with which she developed an epistemology of incarceration. In the final chapter to this section, Sally Haslanger examines the notion of epistemic objectivity and its relation to epistemic objectification, and oppression. Haslanger argues that certain models of objectivity support what she calls status quo reasoning, which both enables epistemic injustices and is an epistemic tool of oppression. Her analysis reveals three distinct forms of objectification that qualify as epistemic injustices: ideological, projective, and Kantian. Furthermore, Haslanger identifies a focus on individual as opposed to structural explanations and a bias toward stability as culprits that facilitate epistemically unjust forms of objectification, marginalization, and their use as epistemic tools of oppression through status quo reasoning.

Section V: Case studies of epistemic injustice explores forms of epistemic injustice that can emerge and manifest within specific professional, disciplinary, and social domains. The assumption is that epistemic concepts and practices take distinctive forms within such domains that complicate and variegate the forms of epistemic injustice that can occur within them.

Michael Sullivan explores the ways that epistemic injustice can occur within legal systems and practices, which, after all, ideally aim at truth as well as justice. Since testimony, credibility, and a capacity to make sense of other’s social experiences matters so much in legal cases, Sullivan identifies four ways to combat epistemic injustice in trials that invoke practical reform, diversification
of juries and judges, and greater collection and disclosure of evidence. Gloria Origgi and Serena Ciranna propose that the transformations of our epistemic lives by digital technologies can both exacerbate existing forms of epistemic injustice and also generate new and distinctive ones. Indeed, these new forms may be more centrally epistemic than others, since they pertain to our very epistemic capacities, by challenging guiding assumptions about confidence, credibility, and epistemic authority and agency.

Heidi Grasswick’s chapter examines epistemic injustice within the institutions and practices of one of our most powerful forms of knowledge production: science. Drawing on the history, sociology, and philosophy of science, Grasswick identifies two broad categories of epistemic injustice within this domain: participatory epistemic injustices, or those that systematically marginalize and unfairly exclude particular knowers from contributing to collective scientific pursuits, and epistemic trust injustices, or those that unjustly alienate particular groups of knowers from scientific institutions so that they cannot reasonably rely upon those institutions in the ways that others can. Ben Kotzee explores the many points of contact between epistemic injustice and educational institutions, practices, and ideals, including the ways that unfairness or bias can affect the credibility teachers assign to students qua developing epistemic agents, whose social experiences are selected for inclusion in curricula, and important political questions about policies promoting epistemic and social diversity in classrooms.

The relation of epistemic injustice to medicine, healthcare, and illness is the theme of chapters 32 and 33. Havi Carel and Ian James Kidd argue that many ill persons are often vulnerable to epistemic injustices due to negative stereotyping and structural features of healthcare systems. An omnipresent feature of critical discourse about “modern medicine” are reports of feeling “silenced”, “ignored”, and “not listened to”, all of which are apt for analysis in terms of epistemic injustice and resonate with recent developments in the philosophy of healthcare and the phenomenology of illness. Continuing this theme, Anastasia Scrutton investigates epistemic injustices in the context of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, which can occur through both credibility-deflating stereotypes and the entrenched focus on medical perspectives on experiences of mental illness. Such injustices can be counteracted by recognition of the distinctive forms of epistemic privilege that a person with a mental illness might possess, and the ways this recognition can enhance clinical practice in more epistemically just ways.

Chapters 34 and 35 consider epistemic injustices in the context of morally, politically, and epistemically charged interactions between cultures. Rebecca Tsosie places the concept of epistemic injustice into the complex interplay of law and ethics in the context of anthropology as it pertains to the historic and ongoing harms suffered by Indigenous peoples. The legacies of colonialis and imperialist history continue to disadvantage those peoples in a variety of ways, many of which have overt epistemic aspects – for instance, by privileging the social and epistemic practices of academic and scientific disciplines whose conceptions of testimonial credibility and hermeneutical resources are often insensitive or hostile to the values, sensibilities, and interests of Indigenous peoples. Andreas Pantazatos focuses on epistemic injustices and cultural heritage. The tangible and intangible heritage of a culture – including objects, sites, biological remains, music, literature, and so on – are richly epistemic: testimonies from the past, perhaps from one’s ancestors, preserving and transmitting experiences, events, values, and “forms of life” and shared ways of making sense of them. But for these reasons, heritage is complexly contested by ethicists, scientists, cultural resource managers, museums and other institutions, political leaders, and aboriginal communities. Pantazatos identifies a specific form of participant perspective epistemic injustice, that occurs when the authoritative institutions constitutive of modern heritage management are charged with failing to select, preserve, interpret, present, transmit, or otherwise control (aspects of) cultural heritage in ways that fail to properly include the perspectives of those whose heritage
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it is. Pantazatos argues that this generates a complexly layered epistemic injustice – one affecting whole cultures, rather than individuals or groups.

Ian James Kidd describes a variety of ways that religious persons and traditions can be both perpetrators and victims of epistemic injustices, including in “generic” and religiously inflected forms. Religious communities and traditions can perpetrate epistemic injustices by depriving certain groups of credibility and hermeneutical authority, which is a latent theme within feminist, liberation, and queer theologies. But religious persons and groups can also be victims of epistemic injustices, if, as some critics argue, the prevailing sensibilities of late modern societies tend to deny credibility and intelligibility to religious testimonies and experiences. In the final chapter of the volume, Linda Martín Alcoff argues that modern European philosophies themselves emerged from, and continue to perpetuate, epistemic injustices against non-European societies. Those philosophies often evince a form of “Eurocentrism” that reflects a “transcendental delusion”, a conviction that thought is separable from its spatially and culturally specific sources, such that social and historical considerations can be safely neglected. Unfortunately, the socio-historical contexts of the European philosophical traditions, and the wider cultures in which they are embedded, were and are rife with epistemic injustices, many of which have affected philosophicalizing. Epistemic justice might therefore require not just closer engagement with philosophical traditions and ideas from the wider non-European worlds, but also a difficult form of self-critical reflexivity – a task informed by feminist, postcolonial, decolonial, and critical race theories that might offer not only pluralism and perspective, but also epistemic justice.