In her brilliant *Epistemic Injustice* (2007), Miranda Fricker argues that gender and racial prejudices can distort our perceptions of who is credible and who is not. Fricker contends that gender prejudice prevents Herbert Greenleaf (*The Talented Mr. Ripley*) from seeing Marge Sherwood as a source of knowledge about his son’s disappearance (2007: 86–88). Likewise, racial prejudice prevents the jurors in Tom Robinson’s trial (*To Kill a Mockingbird*) from seeing Robinson as a source of knowledge about events at the Ewell’s home (2007: 23–29). Fricker argues that these are paradigmatic cases of testimonial injustice, in which identity prejudice causes hearers to assign a deflated level of credibility to speakers. Accordingly, when our own gender and racial prejudices cause us to downgrade a speaker’s credibility, we too are testimonially unjust. Though it is possible for a hearer to inflict a single instance of testimonial injustice on a speaker as a ‘one-off’, I will focus on testimonial injustice as a disposition of hearers. Testimonial injustice is a disposition to fail to see speakers as credible when they are credible, due to the hearer’s identity prejudice.

Is the disposition of testimonial injustice an epistemic vice? If so, why? What makes it an epistemic vice? These questions fall under the purview of vice epistemology, which is an offshoot of virtue epistemology. Having made its debut in the 1980’s (Sosa 1980), virtue epistemology is now a well-established field. It has sought to answer three sets of questions:

*(VirtueE1)* What is an epistemic virtue? Which dispositions are epistemic virtues and why? Is there more than one kind of epistemic virtue? Can we give analyses of individual epistemic virtues (e.g., open-mindedness)?

*(VirtueE2)* How are epistemic virtues connected to knowledge? Is possessing epistemic virtues necessary for having knowledge? Is it sufficient? Are there weaker connections?

*(VirtueE3)* How can we acquire epistemic virtues? What is the role of the individual, the environment, and education in the development of epistemic virtues?

Unsurprisingly, virtue epistemologists have disagreed about the answers to these questions. But what unites the field, and distinguishes it from belief-based epistemology, is its focus on the cognitive dispositions of agents, especially their good cognitive dispositions — their epistemic virtues. In virtue epistemology, *agents* are the primary objects of epistemic evaluation, and epistemic virtues, which are evaluations of agents, are the fundamental building-blocks (Battaly 2008).1 Whereas, in belief-based epistemology, *beliefs* are the primary objects of epistemic evaluation, and
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justification and knowledge, which are evaluations of beliefs, are taken to be fundamental. Like virtue epistemology, the nascent field of vice epistemology also focuses on the cognitive dispositions of agents, though it targets their bad cognitive dispositions – their epistemic vices (Cassam 2016). Analogously, it seeks to answer:

(ViceE1) What is an epistemic vice? Which dispositions are epistemic vices and why? Is there more than one kind of epistemic vice? Can we give analyses of individual epistemic vices (e.g., closed-mindedness)?

(ViceE2) How are epistemic vices connected to knowledge? Do epistemic vices always impede knowledge? Are there weaker connections?

(ViceE3) How can we correct, rehabilitate, or eliminate epistemic vices? What is the role of the individual, the environment, and education in curbing epistemic vices?

Here, I pursue ViceE1. I argue that testimonial injustice is an epistemic vice. First and foremost, it is an epistemic vice because it consistently produces bad epistemic effects – e.g., it impedes the transmission of knowledge. It does this whether or not it is integrated with the agent’s values and motives. When it is integrated with the agent’s values and motives, testimonial injustice is epistemically vicious in a second way. It is epistemically vicious insofar as it expresses those bad epistemic values and motives – e.g., it expresses the racist values and motives of Tom Robinson’s jurors. Below, I ground this analysis in a distinction between three concepts of epistemic vice. I argue that testimonial injustice can take the form of an effects-vice or a personalist-vice, even if it sometimes – perhaps often – falls short of a responsibilist-vice. Here, the key issue is lack of control over our possession of testimonial injustice. I conclude by suggesting that we can be blameworthy for possessing testimonial injustice despite this lack of control.

Standard conceptions of epistemic virtue and vice

Is testimonial injustice an epistemic vice? If so, why? What is an epistemic vice? Epistemic vices are bad cognitive dispositions – they make us bad thinkers. But, there is more than one way for cognitive dispositions to make us bad thinkers. For starters, they might produce bad epistemic effects – e.g., they might produce false beliefs, or impede knowledge. Or, they might involve bad epistemic motives for which we are blameworthy – e.g., they might involve motives to believe whatever is easiest, or whatever preserves the status quo, or whatever makes one feel good, instead of motives for truth, knowledge, and understanding.

These two nascent conceptions of epistemic vice correspond to the two conceptions of epistemic virtue that have dominated virtue epistemology: virtue-reliabilism and virtue-responsibilism. Virtue-reliabilism contends that epistemic virtues are reliable dispositions – they produce more true beliefs than false ones. It counts any reliable disposition as an epistemic virtue, be it a hard-wired faculty (e.g., 20/30 vision), a cognitive skill, or a cognitive character trait. It argues that dispositions are epistemic virtues because they consistently produce good epistemic effects; here, true beliefs. Virtue-responsibilism conceives of epistemic virtues as structurally analogous to Aristotelian moral virtues. Accordingly, it restricts epistemic virtues to acquired cognitive character traits – e.g., open-mindedness and epistemic humility – for which the agent is (at least partly) responsible. It argues that epistemic virtues require dispositions of epistemic motivation and epistemic action, for which the agent is praiseworthy. Roughly, it construes open-mindedness as a disposition of motivation (to care about truth and care about considering alternative ideas) and a disposition of action (to consider alternative ideas) that lies in a mean between the vices of closed-mindedness and naïveté.
Let's develop our two budding conceptions of epistemic vice by exploring the key features of virtue-reliabilism and virtue-responsibilism. Epistemic virtues are cognitive dispositions that make us good thinkers. But, there is more than one way they can make us good thinkers. Virtue-reliabilists argue that epistemic virtues make us good thinkers by producing good epistemic effects — true beliefs. There are five key features of virtue-reliabilism. First, the epistemic virtues are instrumentally valuable. Their value comes from the value of the things they produce: they are valuable because they consistently produce true beliefs. For reliabilists, dispositions that don't consistently produce true beliefs aren't epistemic virtues. This means that, second, epistemic virtues are reliable. They need not be perfect, but they must produce a preponderance of true beliefs. Moreover, any stable disposition that produces a preponderance of true beliefs will be an epistemic virtue. In other words, the reliability of a disposition is both necessary and sufficient for its being an epistemic virtue. Accordingly, third, epistemic virtues need not be acquired dispositions, they can be hard-wired faculties like 20/30 vision. Thus, Ernest Sosa argues that some of our epistemic virtues are natural, while others are derived: “some . . . come courtesy of Mother Nature and her evolutionary ways, but many others must be learned” (2007: 85). Fourth, reliabilists think that we need not be responsible for our epistemic virtues. After all, we have no control over which hard-wired faculties we end up possessing and thus aren't praiseworthy for ending up with reliable faculties. Nor can we control the operation of hard-wired faculties — they operate involuntarily and automatically — and so we aren't praiseworthy for this either. Fifth, reliabilists think that epistemic virtues need not be personal dispositions; they can be sub-personal. Roughly, personal epistemic dispositions express one's character — what one values and cares about. Accordingly, personal epistemic dispositions express one’s epistemic character — one’s epistemic motives and values. HarThey tell us whether one's values and cares about truth and understanding, or about (e.g.) getting good grades, or looking smart, or believing whatever is easiest. But, hard-wired epistemic virtues, like 20/30 vision, are sub-personal. They don’t express the epistemic characters of the individuals who possess them. Case in point: a person who values and loves truth, and a person who cares solely about protecting his own world-view, can both have the virtue of 20/30 vision (as can non-human animals).

We can use these features to flesh out our first conception of epistemic vice: effects-vice. Accordingly, epistemic vices will be cognitive dispositions that produce bad epistemic effects — including (but not limited to) false beliefs. There are five points to note about effects-vice. First, they are instrumentally dis-valuable. They get their negative value from the bad epistemic effects they produce. Consequently, a disposition won’t count as an effects-vice unless it consistently produces bad epistemic effects. A student who cares solely about getting good grades, but who has the good luck of being in classes in which this motive consistently produces true beliefs (due to teacher-ingenuity), does not have an effects-vice. Moreover, second, any cognitive disposition that consistently produces bad epistemic effects will count as an effects-vice. A student who values and loves truth, but who nevertheless consistently produces false beliefs — he just can't figure things out no matter how hard he tries — has an effects-vice (Battaly 2014). He has an effects-vice because he ends up with a preponderance of false beliefs (despite his impeccable motives). Third, it follows that effects-vice can, but need not, be acquired dispositions, they can be hard-wired faculties like 20/200 vision. If all cognitive dispositions that consistently produce bad epistemic effects are effects-vice, then (uncorrected) 20/200 vision will be an effects-vice. Relatedly, fourth, we need not be blameworthy for our effects-vice, since their possession and operation may be beyond our control. Finally, effects-vice need not be personal. They can be sub-personal faculties that reveal nothing about our epistemic values or motives (Battaly 2016).

Let's explore virtue-responsibilism. One might contend that producing good epistemic effects isn't what makes us good thinkers, or isn't the only thing that does. It also matters why one
produces, or tries to produce, good epistemic effects. In this vein, Virtue-Responsibilists argue that epistemic virtues make us good thinkers because they require good epistemic motives.

There are five key features of virtue-responsibilism. First, the value of the epistemic virtues is at least partly intrinsic. Epistemic virtues are partly composed of epistemic motives – e.g., caring about truth, knowledge, or understanding – which are themselves intrinsically valuable. Consequently, dispositions whose value is purely instrumental won’t be epistemic virtues. Second, responsibilists agree that reliability is insufficient for epistemic virtue but disagree about whether reliability is necessary for epistemic virtue. Linda Zagzebski (1996: 99–100) argues that reliability is necessary; James Montmarquet (1993: 20) and Jason Baehr (2011: 123–126) argue that it is not. (They all think epistemic virtues like open-mindedness are reliable in the actual world.) Third, responsibilists restrict epistemic virtues to acquired dispositions, ruling out hard-wired faculties. They think epistemic virtues must be praiseworthy, and that we aren’t praiseworthy for native faculties since they aren’t subject to our control (Baehr 2011: 27). Thus, fourth, they think epistemic virtues must be dispositions for which the agent is (partly) responsible. Though they interpret this requirement differently – Zagzebski and Baehr require responsibility for virtue-possession; Montmarquet requires responsibility for virtue-operation (1993: 34) – they all emphasize control. For Zagzebski: “virtues are qualities that deserve praise for their presence, and blame for their absence” (1996: 104). They are dispositions that one must work (perform voluntary actions) to acquire: “it is part of the nature of a virtue in the standard case that it be an entrenched quality that is the result of moral work on the part of the human agent . . .” (Zagzebski 1996: 125). Crucially, the agent has some control over whether she acquires virtue, and the kind of praiseworthiness that attaches to virtue is said to reflect this control. Agents are praiseworthy for possessing virtues insofar as they are praiseworthy for putting in the requisite work (repeated voluntary actions) to acquire them. Dispositions whose possession doesn’t allow for such control are not praiseworthy in this way and thus won’t be epistemic virtues. Finally, epistemic virtues are personal. They express the epistemic characters – the epistemic values and motives – of the individuals who possess them. Responsibilists build these values and motives into the epistemic virtues themselves. They argue that dispositions to act appropriately are insufficient for virtue.

One could consistently do what an open-minded person would do – consider alternatives – but lack the virtue of open-mindedness; suppose one considers alternatives solely because one values and cares about good grades or looking smart. They argue that the virtue of open-mindedness requires belief and motivational components: one must care about truth and believes truth is important.

We can use these features to flesh out our second conception of epistemic vice: responsibilist-vice. Accordingly, epistemic vices will be cognitive character traits – e.g., closed-mindedness, intellectual arrogance – over which the agent has some control and for which she is blameworthy. These character traits will be partly composed of bad epistemic motives. There are five key features of responsibilist-vice. First, they are intrinsically dis-valuable. They get (at least some of) their negative value from intrinsically bad motives – e.g., caring about protecting one’s views, or about believing whatever will make one feel good, or fit in with one’s group. Second, producing bad epistemic effects will be insufficient for responsibilist-vice. This follows from each of their remaining features. Third, since such vices will be restricted to acquired dispositions, hard-wired faculties that produce bad epistemic effects (20/200 vision) will be excluded. Fourth, responsibilist-vice must be dispositions for which the agent is blameworthy, but an agent need not be blameworthy for producing bad epistemic effects. An agent can produce bad epistemic effects due to bad luck – to constitutive or environmental factors that are beyond her control. She might be hard-wired with a memory impairment or the victim of a Cartesian evil-demon. Crucially, responsibilist-vice require features over which the agent has some control, namely, her
bad epistemic motives and values. According to this conception of vice, the agent has considerably more control over the motives and values she comes to possess than she does over external effects. She is blameworthy for coming to possess bad motives and values because she is blameworthy for failing to perform the requisite voluntary actions to avoid them and/or blameworthy for performing the voluntary actions that eventually produce them. Crucially here, blameworthiness is keyed to control. Finally, fifth, responsibilist-vides must be personal — they must express the agent’s epistemic character. But, producing bad epistemic effects need not be an expression of the agent’s epistemic character — one can have impeccable motives and values but produce false beliefs due to an inhospitable (e.g., demon) environment. For this reason, too, bad epistemic motives and values will be required for responsibilist-vice.

**Testimonial injustice and standard conceptions of epistemic vice**

Arguably, both of the above conceptions of epistemic vice are legitimate — they simply highlight different ways in which we can be epistemically vicious (Battaly 2014: 65). One way to be epistemically vicious is to produce bad epistemic effects; another way is to have bad epistemic motives, for which one is blameworthy. Is the disposition of testimonial injustice an epistemic vice in either of these ways?

It is at least an effects-vice. Fricker rightly argues that whatever form testimonial injustice takes, it produces a ream of bad effects, both epistemic and moral. Epistemically, it prevents the hearer from getting knowledge from the speaker. It also degrades the speaker “in her capacity as a knower” and as a human, which can cause the speaker to lose confidence in her own beliefs and abilities, and even be prevented from acquiring epistemic virtues and knowledge (Fricker 2007: 44). Importantly, Fricker contends that testimonial injustice can take the form of a perceptual prejudice that operates below the level of belief and motive, and without the agent’s permission (2007: 39). This form of testimonial injustice can be “flatly inconsistent with the [agent’s] beliefs” (Fricker 2007: 36; see also Carel and Kidd 2014: 535). To illustrate, a card-carrying feminist at the level of belief and motive might still see men as more credible than women due to her prejudiced perception. Here, testimonial injustice gets its negative value from the bad effects it produces. Bad motives are not required — the card-carrying feminist’s motives are impeccable. Bad effects are — Fricker suggests that a person (like Huck Finn) with prejudiced motives and values, who nevertheless reliably perceives credibility and thus avoids producing the harms above, likewise avoids testimonial injustice (2007: 93–94). Note also that in the card-carrying feminist, testimonial injustice is sub-personal rather than personal. It does not reveal her motives and values; it operates contrary to them. But, it does reveal the prejudice that is prevalent in her society. On Fricker’s view, “human societies have prejudices in the air” that infect our perceptions of speaker-credibility, whether we want them to or not (2007: 96). The card-carrying feminist, along with the rest of us, unwittingly inherits prejudiced perception from her society. This means that we lack control over our initial possession of this form of testimonial injustice; we cannot prevent ourselves from absorbing it. Accordingly, we are not blameworthy for its initial possession. In short, when testimonial injustice takes the form of prejudiced perception, it meets the conditions of an effects-vice. It produces bad epistemic effects, even if it is neither personal nor under the agent’s control.

Can testimonial injustice also be a responsibilist-vice? Fricker argues that testimonial injustice can take a second form, in which prejudiced perceptions are integrated with prejudiced beliefs and motives (Fricker 2007: 36). To illustrate, Tom Robinson’s jurors fail to see Robinson as credible and do so because of their prejudiced beliefs (e.g., that he and all blacks are inferior) and racial hatred (they are not motivated by the evidence, which exonerates Robinson). They are racists...
at every level. When testimonial injustice takes this form, it is personal – it expresses the agent’s prejudiced values and motives. The bad epistemic motives it requires also make it intrinsically bad (its bad effects continue to make it instrumentally bad). Thus far, this form of testimonial injustice meets the conditions for responsibilist-vice. But, does it meet the control and blameworthiness condition? Recall that the responsibilist-vice we are focusing on require the agent to have a considerable degree of control over their possession. This is where matters get tricky. Arguably, agents typically lack control over whether they initially come to possess prejudiced beliefs and motives. It is no surprise that children ‘raised’ by the Hitler Jugend (or the Taliban or ISIS) acquire prejudiced beliefs and motives involuntarily, as a product of their environment (Adams 1985). Fricker seems to think this is the norm: it is standard for agents to first acquire prejudiced beliefs and motives by passively and unwittingly inheriting them from their societies (2007: 82, 95). In short, agents who acquire this robust form of testimonial injustice don’t typically control their initial possession of it and thus aren’t blameworthy for that initial possession. Even so, don’t they gain control over its possession as mature adults? This, too, is tricky. After all, (1) some of them are in insular societies – they are not afforded the opportunity to know better. Thus, Fricker argues that although Robinson’s jurors were in a position to know better (2007: 89–90; see also Pohlhaus, Jr. 2012: 729–731), Greenleaf was not – he had the “epistemic bad luck” of landing in an historical context in which the requisite gender concepts were unavailable (2007: 103). Moreover, (2) their initial possession of this robust form of testimonial injustice impedes their ability to change direction. José Medina argues that Robinson’s jurors are “meta-insensitive” – they are insensitive to the fact that Robinson is a source of knowledge and insensitive to the fact that they have this limitation (2013: 76). Their prejudiced beliefs and motives prevent them from even recognizing that they have a problem! Relatedly, George Sher contends, “by the time a miscreant-in-training has . . . achieved a degree of maturity, the expectation that he will display the insight, flexibility, and persistence . . . needed to arrest or reverse his incipient corruption may well be unreasonable” (2006: 55). In sum, when testimonial injustice takes this robust form, it sometimes – arguably often – falls short of a responsibilist-vice. It runs afoul of the control and blameworthiness condition with respect to its initial possession. It also frequently runs afoul of this condition in mature adults. Presumably, it is sometimes a responsibilist-vice – some agents satisfy the control and blameworthiness condition. But, this happens less frequently than we might think.

Testimonial injustice and an alternative conception of epistemic vice

Notice that when testimonial injustice is robust, it succeeds in expressing the agent’s epistemic character, even when it fails to meet the control and blameworthiness condition on responsibilist-vice. This puts us in a position to argue for a third conception of epistemic vice: personalist-vice (Battaly 2016; Battaly and Slote 2015). This conception is a via media between effects-vice and responsibilist-vice. Like responsibilist-vice, it requires epistemic vices to be personal traits of character – to express the epistemic values and motives of the agent. And, like effects-vice, it rejects control and blameworthiness as a necessary condition: a disposition can count as a personalist-vice even if the agent lacks control over, and is not blameworthy (accountable) for, its possession. This means that the robust form of testimonial injustice in Robinson’s jurors will be a personalist-vice, whether or not its possession is under their control.

There are two advantages to recognizing this robust form of testimonial injustice as a personalist-vice. First, bad epistemic effects aren’t the only thing that make this form of testimonial injustice bad. It is also intrinsically bad, due to its bad epistemic motives and values. Robinson’s jurors are not motivated by the evidence; they are motivated by racial hatred and by their beliefs in accordance with the status quo, which deems all blacks incompetent. These epistemic
motives and values would be bad even if they didn’t produce bad effects. As Robert Adams puts the point, “it matters . . . what we are for and what we are against, even if we do not have the power to do much for or against it, and even if it was not by trying that we came to be for or against it” (1985: 12). Recognizing this robust form of testimonial injustice as a personalist vice allows us to capture its intrinsic dis-value.

Second, personalism allows us to hedge our bets, in case we lack control over our possession of this form of testimonial injustice and over our possession of epistemic character traits more generally. As suggested above, we may have less control over our possession of bad motives and values than Responsibilists think. This is the view of non-voluntarists like Sher, who argues that “we rarely exercise effective control over the development of our traits” (2006: 12). Sher contends that exercising such control would require knowingly performing actions that contribute to the development of our traits. But, he thinks that even as adults, we aren’t usually in a position to know whether an action would make a contribution to our development or what sort of contribution it would make. In his words, the connections between actions and traits are often “transparent only in retrospect” (2009: 38). Of course, responsibilists and other Aristotelians (Jacobs 2001) disagree. In short: at best, the jury is still out on whether we usually control the possession of our epistemic character traits; at worst, control has been a red herring. Recognizing this form of testimonial injustice as a personalist-vice allows us to circumvent this debate over control. Whether we have control or not, personalism allows us to count this form of testimonial injustice as a character vice.

### Blameworthiness without control

But, doesn’t personalism let Robinson’s jurors off too easily? Doesn’t it commit us to claiming that they – along with Greenleaf and the Nazis – aren’t blameworthy for possessing testimonial injustice? To be sure, it commits us to claiming that they are not accountable for possessing it. But, non-voluntarists have argued that the notion of blameworthiness has “two faces”: (1) accountability, which requires control, and (2) attributability, which does not (Watson 2004). In short, Robinson’s jurors, Greenleaf, and the Nazis can be blameworthy in the attributability sense, even though they aren’t accountable.

What is attributability-blameworthiness? Unsurprisingly, this is hotly debated (Talbert 2016). Non-voluntarists agree that attributability-blameworthiness does not require control. Along these lines, Fricker has recently argued that we can be blameworthy for behavior and for “bad traits or motives” that are “beyond our ken and control” (2016: 41). But, non-voluntarists disagree about the positive constraints on attributability-blameworthiness. Gary Watson’s constraints are relatively strict. Watson endorses a ‘self-disclosure’ view, according to which an agent is only blameworthy for bad traits that express her ‘real self’ – the values and motives she has endorsed (Watson 2004: 270). Arguably, Sher’s constraints are less strict. He contends that an agent is blameworthy for bad traits that reflect badly on her, whether or not they express her ‘real self’ (2006: 57). In his words, she is blameworthy for bad traits that stem from “the innumerable desires, beliefs, attitudes, and dispositions, many of them unconscious, that together make [her] the individual [she] is” (2009: 20). Fricker’s constraints may be less strict still (2016: 42fn21). She argues that an agent is blameworthy for bad traits that have their source either in the agent’s epistemic character or epistemic system. As she puts the point, these traits need not be restricted to what is characteristic of the agent, much less to his ‘real self’ since “uncharacteristic acts and motives can still be ours in the relevant sense – features of our epistemic system” (2016: 41).

All three of these analyses allow us to count Robinson’s jurors, Greenleaf, and the Nazis as blameworthy for possessing testimonial injustice in the attributability sense. Indeed, where the
constraints are relatively permissive, there will be plenty of attributability-blame to go around. Permissive constraints allow agents to be blameworthy for possessing both explicit and implicit forms of testimonial injustice (and for possessing implicit biases more generally), whereas ‘real self’ views struggle on this score. But, one might wonder whether permissive analyses cast the net too widely, counting the agent as blameworthy for too many dispositions, thus (ironically) curtailing the role of epistemic bad luck. Their challenge will be distinguishing dispositions that have their source in the agent’s epistemic character or system from dispositions that “merely flow through” the agent but have their source in the environment. I close with three open questions:

1. Is the card-carrying feminist blameworthy for possessing testimonial injustice in the attributability sense?
2. Are an agent’s implicit cognitive dispositions part of her epistemic character (see Holroyd and Kelly 2016)?
3. Does personalism allow for epistemic vices that are implicit?

These warrant further exploration. For now, the key point is this. If the notion of attributability-blameworthiness is viable, then debates over control may be a distraction. We don’t need control for blameworthiness.

Related chapters: 2, 4, 6, 8, 22, 23, 26

Notes

1 Though virtue epistemology has largely focused on individual agents, recent work on collective agents and distributed agents has helped to expand its focus. On collective agents, see Fricker (2010); on distributed agents, see Battaly (forthcoming).
2 At the institutional level, testimonial injustice produces widespread, reverberating harms. As Anderson (2012) points out, it silences agents who are systematically denied fair access to education. In so doing, it prevents these agents from making a contribution to inquiry and thus further narrows the epistemic resources that are available to the community as a whole. Thanks to Ian James Kidd and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. for this point.
3 Holroyd (2012) also disagrees. She endorses an indirect control (tracing) account.
5 Saul (2017) discusses the relation of implicit biases and epistemic injustice.
6 I am grateful to Ian James Kidd and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. for comments on an earlier draft.

References

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