What is epistemic injustice, and what might we learn from the phenomenological tradition about how to analyze, critique, and transform the harm done to someone in their capacity as a knower?

Miranda Fricker identifies two kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, which harms someone as a “giver of knowledge” (Fricker 2007: 7), for example by silencing them or discrediting their words in advance on the basis of their social identity, and hermeneutical injustice, which harms someone as a “subject of social understanding” (7) by depriving them of the necessary concepts and contexts for making sense of their own experience and becoming intelligible to others. Fricker’s work builds on decades of analysis by Women of Color feminists, critical race theorists, and critical disability scholars, and it skirts along the edges of work by continental philosophers such as Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, but there has been little, if any, engagement between the emerging field of epistemic injustice and the phenomenological tradition. 1

In what follows, I will explore some possibilities for engaging phenomenologically with issues of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. While these issues do not exhaust the field of epistemic injustice, they offer a productive starting-point for further conversation.

The phenomenological method

Fricker uses the word “phenomenology” to refer to the feeling of “what it is like” to experience something, rather than to the phenomenological method developed by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and others. As a method, phenomenology begins with first person experience, but it does not end there; rather, the aim of the phenomenological method is to identify the fundamental structures of experience and significance presupposed by perception, thought, and language. Put another way, it discloses the conditions for the possibility of testimonial and hermeneutical activity at its most foundational level. In reducing phenomenology to subjective feeling, Fricker excludes the resources of a method that begins with a reflection on the lived experience of first person consciousness, but also extends beyond subjective feeling to trace the intersubjective constitution of a sense of the objective world.

The phenomenological method was developed by Husserl as a way of navigating between the radically subjectivist and objectivist epistemologies of psychology and naturalism. The basic orientation of phenomenology is “Back to the things themselves!” (Husserl 2008: 168). This does not signal a return to pre-Kantian epistemology, but rather a critical rejoinder to Kant’s
opposition of phenomena to noumena and a reclamation of the phenomenal world as the primary site of meaning. Against theories of perception that posit an immaterial mind, a material world, and a set of representations and/or inferences to mediate between them, phenomenology begins with a thick description of how things actually appear to consciousness in lived experience, bracketing the ready-made theories and assumptions with which we typically explain our experience in what Husserl calls the “natural attitude” (Husserl 1991: 37). The natural attitude is a naïve, unreflective relation to the world as if it existed separately from the consciousness to which it appears. The task of phenomenology is to bracket or suspend the natural attitude through what Husserl calls the epoché in order to reflect on the transcendental structures through which the sense of the world is constituted in and by consciousness. This transcendental shift does not signal a retreat from the world or an abstraction from everyday lived experience, but rather a more critical, reflective relation to both.

A key insight of phenomenology is that consciousness is relational. By reflecting on our lived experience through the epoché, we discover an essential correlation between our intentional acts, or noesis (the act of thinking, perceiving, imagining, remembering) and the intentional objects or noemata towards which these acts are oriented and whose meaning they constitute (the thought, the perceived, the imagined, the remembered...).2 The process of following the traces of the given world back to the intentional acts in which they are given is called the phenomenological reduction. This process is elaborated through further reflection on the transcendental structures of givenness (the transcendental reduction) and through an imaginative variation of one’s own singular experience to discover the invariant essence or eidos of intentional objects (the eidetic reduction).

For Husserl, the essence of consciousness is transcendental subjectivity: a temporal flow of noetic-noematic correlations unfolding in the first person singular. A key question for phenomenology, then, is solipsism and the possibility of empathy: how does one consciousness experience another, not simply as an intentional object but as another consciousness who experiences itself in the first person, and for whom I too exist as another subject in a common world? Furthermore, how does a shared sense of the world emerge if each consciousness constitutes meaning independently through its own singular, unsharable intentional acts?

For Husserl, embodiment plays a key role in the experience of another consciousness. As an embodied subject, I perceive the world from a certain perspective: a “here” in relation to which everything else appears as “there.” This sense of “here” is mobile; I carry it with me as the “zero point” of orientation for consciousness, the “field of localization” for sensory experience, and the seat of the “I can” (Husserl 2002: 166, 156, 159). When I encounter another body who moves and orients itself towards objects in a way that is structurally similar to my own, I spontaneously experience this body as another “here”: an embodied consciousness with their own perspective on the world, to whom I appear conversely as “there.” For Husserl, this is not an inferential process but rather a structural pairing or “analogical transfer” of sense based on the apperception of another transcendental consciousness through the direct perception of their living, moving body (Husserl 1991: 108–20). This pairing of self and other forms the basis for my own experience of the world, and even of my own body, as objectively “there for others” and not just an intentional object for me. As such, the sense of objectivity is constituted intersubjectively through a triangulation of self, other, and world.

Feminist phenomenologists have critically engaged Husserl’s transcendental orientation, identifying a potential site of epistemic injustice in his assumption of an unmarked, pre-social transcendental I who is theoretically capable of discovering the truth of essences through introspective reflection in the first-person, and who spontaneously recognizes other embodied subjects as similar enough to itself to be perceived spontaneously as another ego.3 But feminists have also
Epistemic injustice and phenomenology

built on Husserl’s account of embodied consciousness and the intersubjective constitution of objectivity, along with the work of later phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty, to reorient and radicalize the basic methods and concepts of phenomenology towards the concrete social and material contexts within which the lived experience of consciousness unfolds. 4

How might a critical appropriation of phenomenological method contribute to current discussions of epistemic injustice? In the next section, I will sketch an overview of Fricker’s account of social perception in relation to testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, flagging the points at which I think a fruitful conversation with phenomenology could begin to unfold.

Testimonial injustice and the phenomenology of social perception

Fricker develops an account of social perception as part of her broader account of testimonial virtue. At stake here is the challenge of apprehending the testimony of others without unjustly granting or withholding trust on the basis of the speaker’s perceived social status; in order to become virtuous listeners, we need to understand the way social perception shapes our epistemic relation to others, and correct for unjust patterns of silencing or exclusion. Fricker contrasts inferentialist accounts of social perception, which are too clunky to account for its rapid, spontaneous, and unreflective character, with what she calls “phenomenological” claims, which account for the spontaneity of social perception at the expense of critical reflexivity. 5 The phenomenological view, which she attributes to Thomas Reid and Tyler Burge, is based on the assumption that people usually tell the truth, so we can and should grant a “default of credulity or acceptance of what others tell us” (Fricker 2007: 61–2). Here, as throughout Epistemic Injustice, Fricker equates phenomenology with “felt sense” rather than engaging with the phenomenological tradition and its methods. Fricker’s own account of social perception turns on the capacity of the hearer to shift back and forth between unreflective and reflective modes of engagement with the testimony of others. But as I will argue, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of perception both anticipates and enriches Fricker’s view, without falling into the uncritical stance that she associates with phenomenology as felt sense.

Fricker grants the non-inferentialist point that our default mode of engagement tends to be an unreflective, uncritical acceptance of what other people say. But she argues that this default mode is also regularly interrupted by “signs, prompts, or cues” that disrupt our unreflective trust and prompt a more reflective critical assessment of the speaker’s credibility (2007: 66). Perhaps the speaker avoids meeting my gaze, or some aspect of her testimony contradicts another aspect. I may be prompted to shift from an unreflective trust in her testimony to a more wary, critical, and reflective way of listening in which I seek further evidence of (un)trustworthiness, evaluate this evidence in my own mind, ask the speaker for clarification, and/or express my distrust openly.

Taking this description of the lived experience of conversation as a starting point, Fricker develops a hybrid view to which both inferentialist and non-inferentialist views contribute, but which neither can encompass on its own. 6 The theory turns on the cognitive capacity of the hearer to shift back and forth between unreflective and reflective modes, depending on the context of the conversation. This (re)situation of the philosophical argument from the level of ideal theory to the non-ideal “rough ground” of a discursive situation is crucial for Fricker’s argument, and it is a move that resonates with Merleau-Ponty’s own approach to the seemingly intractable conflict between rationalism and empiricism (2002: 60–74). In the end, Fricker characterizes moral-epistemic virtue as a “critical openness to the word of others” (2007: 66), which is both pre-reflectively trusting and pre-reflectively attentive to possible grounds for mistrust, and which is capable of shifting into reflective evaluation of the degree to which the speaker should be trusted. Fricker argues that such “credibility judgments” are not made on the basis
of a pre-existing theory or set of rules, but rather as an open-ended process of attuning oneself to the situation, adjusting one's comportment to new situations based on past experience, and developing a “sensitivity to patterns of moral salience” (2007: 74).

Fricker draws on Aristotle's account of moral perception to develop a non-inferentialist account of “testimonial sensibility” (2007: 71). But she could have just as well drawn on the phenomenological tradition for such an account, while enriching the historical dimensions of moral-epistemic perception that she finds lacking in Aristotle (82). Potential resources for this account include Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological engagement with the figure/ground structure in Gestalt theory (2002: 3–74); his analysis of the complex interplay between spatial, temporal, social, historical, and affective senses of the “background” or field that both shapes the meaning of lived experience and also emerges through the sedimentation of embodied practices and habits of individual and collective Being-in-the-world (77–347); his account of embodiment as the primary site of meaning-making, both through the interplay of pre-reflective and reflective modes of comportment or behavior, and also through the expressive power of gestures and speech (112–70, 202–32); his patient description of the social and historical dimensions of embodied perception (348–425); and his account of the “chiasm” or inter-connected feedback loops between self and other, perceiver and perceived, vision and touch (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 130–55).

All this and more could be brought into conversation with Fricker's account of social perception, and both the discourse of epistemic injustice and the phenomenological tradition would be mutually enriched. In the next section, I will pick up on a few of these possibilities and elaborate them at greater length.

“Settling the mind” through the body

In giving an account of the harm incurred to those who are systematically and unjustly perceived as less credible, Fricker draws on Bernard Williams' account (2002: 192f) of the role that other people play in the process of “steadying the mind,” or creating a stable basis for one's own knowledge of the world. Williams argues that the main process through which the mind steadies itself is “trustful conversation with others” (Fricker 2007: 52). A question posed to me by another calls me into critical reflection on my perception of the world, challenging me to distinguish between my subjective experience and the objective reality of the world. The other's response, in turn, helps me to clarify how much of my subjective experience is corroborated by the experience of others.

This account of steadying the mind resonates with Husserl's phenomenological analysis of the way a sense of objectivity is constituted through the convergence of multiple perspectives in a shared world (1989: 60–95):

In every case the exhibition of any apprehended Objectivity whatsoever requires a relation to the apprehension of a multiplicity of subjects sharing a mutual understanding. . . Nature is an intersubjective reality and a reality not just for me and my companions at the moment but for us and for everyone who can come to have dealings with us and can come to a mutual understanding with us about things and about other people.

(Husserl 1989: 86, 91; 1999: 89–151)

It also resonates with Merleau-Ponty's more historicist and socially-contextual account of the intersubjective constitution of the sense of the world and of cultural objects (2002: 348–425). What is absent from Williams' and Fricker's accounts, however, is the role that the body plays in this co-constitution of meaning. This point is crucial, both for our understanding of social
epistemology and for our account of epistemic injustice, given the degree to which the social identities of race, gender, ability, class, and sexuality are perceived in and through the body and its expressive gestures. The phenomenological tradition offers multiple sources for reflecting on the embodied dimensions of social cognition; I will engage with one such account to highlight the possibilities for further development.

In *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty develops an account of the phenomenal body as the primary site and medium of one’s lived experience as consciousness and one’s meaningful comportment as Being-in-the-world. The relation between body and world is reciprocal: “my body is a movement towards the world, and the world my body’s point of support” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 408). For Merleau-Ponty,

> Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of “I think that” but of “I can”... In the action of the hand which is raised towards an object is contained a reference to the object, not as an object represented, but as that highly specific thing towards which we project ourselves, near which we are, in anticipation, and which we haunt. Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through the intermediary of the body. A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it into its “world”, and to move one’s body is to aim at things through it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call, which is made upon it independently of any representation. (2002: 159–61)

Perception is neither the reaction to an objective stimulus nor the classical phenomenological constitution of an object; it is, rather, “our inherence in things” (408), a way of relating to the world to which we belong and upon which we also have a perspective, in a relation of transcendence within immanence. As an embodied Being-in-the-world, I encounter the bodies of others not just as static objects but as “manifestations of behavior” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 411), just as I too manifest behavior that remains open to interpretation by others. In this context, “behavior” refers to patterned activity and interactivity, embodied and embedded within and responding to a surrounding world or environment. It is not the stimulus-response of an input-output mechanism, but rather the meaningful comportment of a living, self-organizing being, a being who is born to an other and who continues to grow and learn throughout its life.

Merleau-Ponty describes the structure of an encounter with the behavior of another in terms that recall the core insight that Fricker gleans from Bernard Williams:

> No sooner has my gaze fallen upon a living body in process of acting than the objects surrounding it immediately take on a fresh layer of significance: they are no longer simply what I myself could make of them, they are what this other pattern of behavior is about to make of them. Round about the perceived body a vortex forms, towards which my world is drawn and, so to speak, sucked in: to this extent, it is no longer merely mine, and no longer merely present, it is present to x, to that other manifestation of behavior which begins to take shape in it. Already the other body has ceased to be a mere fragment of the world, and become the theatre of a certain process of elaboration, and, as it were, a certain “view” of the world. (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 412)

For Merleau-Ponty, linguistic meaning presupposes this more basic power to apprehend and make sense of the world through sensory-motor feedback loops between my body and the bodies of others:
Between my consciousness and my body as I experience it, between this phenomenal body of mine and that of another as I see it from the outside, there exists an internal relation which causes the other to appear as the completion of the system. The other can be evident to me because I am not transparent for myself, and because my subjectivity draws its body in its wake.

(Merleau-Ponty 2002: 410)

These circuits of mutual understanding have existential-ontological implications. I discover in the other:

a miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar way of dealing with the world. Henceforth, as the parts of my body together comprise a system, so my body and the other’s are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously.

(Merleau-Ponty 2002: 412)

Language establishes a “common ground” between self and other, “a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator,” a “dual being” where myself and the other emerge as “collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 413). This does not mean that, as collaborators, we always agree about the meaning of the world, nor that every subject is granted equal power in the “consummate reciprocity” that Merleau-Ponty identifies as the shape of successful communication. Rather, it suggests that the co-constitution of meaning is an intersubjective or intercorporeal practice that must create the common ground upon which it relies for its knowledge claims. To exclude certain perspectives from this collaborative practice is not only to diminish one’s access to truth about the world, but also to harm oneself and others as intercorporeal knowers and perceivers.8

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of language and behavior helps to articulate the basic structures and (inter)corporeal practices of what Fricker calls “hermeneutical sensibility,” in a way that calls for more detailed exploration. For Merleau-Ponty, all perception involves a social dimension; we do not merely perceive others in the world, we perceive according to others, slipping in and out of their embodied perspectives in the process of making sense of our own. This intercorporeal dimension of perception (and of existence) also shapes our perception of inanimate objects:

[The spontaneous acts through which man has patterned his life are] deposited, like some sediment, outside himself and lead an anonymous existence as things. . . In the cultural object, I feel the close presence of others beneath a veil of anonymity. Someone uses the pipe for smoking, the spoon for eating, the bell for summoning, and it is through the perception of a human act and another person that the perception of a cultural world could be verified . . . The very first of all cultural objects, and the one by which all the rest exist, is the body of the other person as the vehicle of a form of behavior.

(Merleau-Ponty 2002: 405–6)

Through an engagement with these and other analyses in the phenomenological tradition, discourses of epistemic injustice could find fruitful ground for both the corroboration of its core insights and the critical elaboration of these insights beyond their current scope.
The existential harm of hermeneutical injustice

Fricker suggests that epistemic injustice may have ontological or existential implications. If it is “an essential attribute of personhood to be able to participate in the spread of knowledge and to enjoy the respect enshrined in the proper relations of trust that are its prerequisite” (Fricker 2007: 58), then to be harmed as a knower is to be harmed in one’s essential personhood. Following Bernard Williams, Fricker claims that the “process by which the mind is steadied . . . is also the process by which we may become who we deeply, perhaps essentially, are” (2007: 53). This implies an intertwining of epistemic capacities with identity: you are what you know, how you know it, and how others respond to your expression of knowledge. But it is not clear how the epistemic and ontological levels are related, beyond the claim that persons are essentially knowers. Existential phenomenology, in particular the work of social phenomenologists such as Fanon and Beauvoir, can help to clarify this relationship and to sketch an outline of existential and political resistance to epistemic injustice.

Fricker refers in passing to Fanon’s concept of “psychic alienation” (via Sandra Bartky) as “the estrangement of separating off a person from some of the essential attributes of personhood” (quoted in Fricker 2007: 58). Let’s elaborate this concept in relation to a key passage from Fanon’s *Black Skin, White Masks*, in the chapter entitled, “L’expérience vécue du Noir,” or “The Lived Experience of the Black”:

I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my spirit filled with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I found that I was an object in the midst of other objects.

Sealed into that crushing objecthood, I turned beseechingly to others. Their attention was a liberation, running over my body suddenly abraded into nonbeing, endowing me once more with an agility that I had thought lost, and by taking me out of the world, restoring me to it. But just as I reached the other side, I stumbled, and the movements, the attitudes, the glances of the other fixed me there, in the sense in which a chemical solution is fixed by a dye. I was indignant; I demanded an explanation. Nothing happened. I burst apart. Now the fragments have been put together again by another self.

*(Fanon 1967: 109)*

This passage could be read as a precise phenomenological description of the lived experience of hermeneutical injustice, which disrupts one’s self-understanding and one’s sense of being or personhood. The speaker comes into the world as an active, creative epistemic subject, seeking to make sense of the world (“to find a meaning in things”) as intentional consciousness (“the source of [the meaning of] the world”). But given his social identity, and the way that privileged others respond prejudicially to this social identity, the speaker finds himself stripped of epistemic agency and reduced to an object. Importantly, the speaker is not just reduced to an object of knowledge for others, he is reduced to the ontological status of an object, as a thing rather than a consciousness who gives meaning to the world, and so introduces a dimension of nonbeing (or possibility, indeterminacy, and virtuality) into that world.

Other subjects have the capacity to restore the speaker to epistemic agency and ontological subjectivity with their attention, which liberates the speaker from objecthood by engaging with him as another subject. But just as this engagement begins, it “fixes” the speaker – not just with words, but with movements, attitudes, and glances – in a position that leaves the objectified subject nowhere to be. The speaker re-asserts his epistemic agency by demanding an explanation, but his question meets with no response; an instance of testimonial injustice compounds
and intensifies the hermeneutical injustice that already structures the entire (non)encounter. In
response, the speaker bursts apart; not only is he unable to “settle his mind,” but his existence as
a speaking, knowing subject is radically fragmented, and “another self” emerges to document,
analyze, and testify to the process. Who is this other self? Following Lewis Gordon’s distinction
between Fanon as “the voice of the text (the black) and the voice about the text (the theorist and
guide)” (Gordon 2015: 25), I suggest that this other self is the resistant remnant of an epistemic
survivor, who is altered but not destroyed by epistemic injustice, and whose testimony holds the
key to epistemic virtue for both survivors and perpetrators of epistemic harm, albeit in different
ways. For the survivor, testimony about the epistemic injustice s/he has experienced is a prac-
tice of resistance that performatively contests the patterns of silencing and discrediting that it
describes and analyzes, and for the perpetrator, such testimonies are precisely what s/he needs to
hear and understand in order to address the harm of past injustice, to develop a critical awareness
of present, ongoing injustice, and to develop more just practices for the future.

Fanon’s text offers a vivid example of what Fricker calls hermeneutical injustice, which not
only blocks the capacity of certain subjects to make sense of themselves and the world, but also
“undermin[es] them in their very humanity” (Fricker 2007: 44). As Fricker acknowledges:

When you find yourself in a situation in which you seem to be the only one to feel the
dissonance between received understanding and your own intimated sense of a given
experience, it tends to knock your faith in your own ability to make sense of the world,
or at least the relevant region of the world.

(163)

[H]ermeneutical injustice can mean that someone is socially constituted as, and perhaps
even caused to be, something that they are not, and which it is against their interests to
be seen to be.

(168)

Fanon’s phenomenological account of (what Fricker calls) hermeneutical injustice makes it clear
that the predicament of knowing and being known by others cannot be separated from existential
or ontological questions of Being-for-itself (or consciousness) and Being-for-Others (or social
existence), even if there is also a conceptual difference between knowing and being, or between
epistemology and ontology.

From epistemic virtue to social justice

For Fricker, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice call for the active cultivation of epistemic
habits and practices that correct for prejudice by neutralizing its impact on one’s perception and
judgment, and by “compensating upwards to reach the degree of credibility that would have
been given were it not for the prejudice” (Fricker 2007: 91). She suggests that “plain personal
familiarity” (96) can help to break down prejudice through habitual exposure to others with
different social identities, and that the reflective correction of one’s epistemic prejudices, when
practiced regularly, can lead to more virtuous spontaneous habits of moral-epistemic perception
as a kind of “second nature,” or what Merleau-Ponty might call the “habit body.” In the end,
Fricker acknowledges that individual virtue is insufficient to address the harm of epistemic
injustice; collective political action is also necessary to address the problem of structural epistemic
injustice. But, for Fricker, collective action of this sort goes beyond the scope of ethics and of
philosophy (174).
This is the point where a critical approach to phenomenology could expand the discourse of epistemic injustice beyond the call for individual correction or accommodation. I understand critical phenomenology as a practice of both reflecting on the structures of meaningful experience and also transforming those structures through collective action in order to make different experiences possible and intelligible. Critical phenomenology is a practice of liberation, not only from the natural attitude but also from the naturalized and normalized forms of oppression that shape our social, epistemic, and existential worlds. As Fanon writes in his critique of the racist, colonial natural attitude: “We shall see that another solution is possible. It implies a restructuring of the world” (1967: 82). Fanon’s commitment to the possibility of collective thought and action in resistance to colonial domination moves phenomenology from critical reflection to transformative praxis, and his work offers continuing inspiration for the struggle against epistemic injustice in all its forms. For more contemporary examples of critical phenomenology, see the work of Sara Ahmed, Lewis Gordon, Gayle Salamon, George Yancy, Iris Marion Young, and others.

Related chapters: 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 20

Notes
1 An important aspect of epistemic injustice that remains under-theorized in Fricker’s work is the role of willful and/or unconscious ignorance on the part of the privileged in producing and perpetuating a situation in which they are both epistemically advantaged (or over-invested with credibility) and also epistemically deficient (in the sense of refusing to understand and confront the conditions of their own privilege). Charles Mills, Kristie Dotson, W.E.B. Du Bois, Mariana Ortega, Jose Medina, Frantz Fanon, and others have developed nuanced accounts of the dynamics of privileged ignorance.

2 For a more detailed discussion of intentionality, see Ratcliffe (2016).

3 See, for example, Al-Saji (2010), Carel (2016), Heinämaa (2003), and Oksala (2006).


5 Fricker uses the term “phenomenological” in a non-technical sense, referring to views that focus on qualia or experiences as felt, and not to the phenomenological method I have described above.

6 This construction of a “middle path” between two mutually-opposed and incomplete views resonates with Husserl’s middle path between psychologism and naturalism, and with Merleau-Ponty’s middle path between rationalism and empiricism.

7 Later, Fricker writes: “If the adjustment [to a new, more critically-reflexive way of perceiving someone’s testimony] is direct, [for example, when a stereotype is disrupted and a re-evaluation of the speaker is provoked,] then she [the hearer] will undergo a kind of gestalt switch in how she perceives” that type of person (2007: 84). If the adjustment is indirect, then she will go through a process of “active critical reflection” and “some sort of corrective policy” (84). A fruitful discussion between phenomenology, Gestalt theory, and Fricker’s own account of epistemic injustice could emerge from these passages.

8 For a more detailed discussion of intercorporeality, which refers to the constitutive intertwining of embodied subjects, see Diprose (2002), Guenther (2013), and Merleau-Ponty (1968).

9 See, however, Fricker (2013), for an account of the relation between epistemic justice and political freedom, and the importance of contesting domination.

References


